Our website uses cookies. For some of them we need your consent. Edit consent...

Zapri

MoD Library and Information System

Digitalna knjižnica

TitleThe return of deep battle : reforms and counter-reforms in the russian military
Osnovni podatki o gradivu
Authors:Tchantouridzé, Lasha (Author)Language:EnglishWork type:ArticleTipology:1.01 - Original Scientific ArticleOrganization:MORS - MORS publicationsKeywords:Russian military reforms, deep battleUDC:355.4(470:477)"2022/2023:355(470)article ISSN:2463-9575COBISS_ID:247099907Link is opened in a new windowStatistika: 638 ogledov; 3 prenosovCategories:Document is not linked to any category.
Files:.pdf RAZ_Tchantouridzé_Lasha_i2025.pdf (553,29 KB)
Abstract:This study explores the reasons behind the poor operational performance of the Russian armed forces during the initial phase of the Ukraine war (2022–2023). The key finding contends that the poor performance of the regular armed forces of Russia in the Ukraine war was due to the Russian military reforms of 2008–2020. These reforms dismantled the old Soviet models of combined and joint operations and, in its place, created a model of ground warfare entirely based on light and mobile infantry battalions. The reformed forces gained a major advantage in mobility and maneuverability, but once Ukraine's defenders neutralized that advantage, the Russian units turned out to be incapable of generating successful combined arms operations. The Russian high command did find a fix to the failed operational design, and by 2023, the Russian ground forces reverted to the old Soviet operational art
Citiranje gradiva
Secondary language
Language:SlovenianTitle:Vrnitev globoke bitkeAbstract:Članek raziskuje razloge za slabo operativno uspešnost ruskih oboroženih sil v začetni fazi vojne v Ukrajini (2022–2023). Pomembna ugotovitev je, da je bila slaba uspešnost rednih ruskih oboroženih sil v vojni v Ukrajini posledica ruskih vojaških reform v letih od 2008 do 2020. Te reforme so razgradile stare sovjetske modele kombiniranih in skupnih operacij in namesto njih ustvarile model kopenskega bojevanja, ki je temeljil na lahkih in mobilnih pehotnih bataljonih. Reformirane sile so pridobile veliko prednost v mobilnosti in manevrski sposobnosti, vendar ko so ukrajinski branilci to prednost nevtralizirali, se je izkazalo, da ruske enote niso sposobne izvajati uspešnih kombiniranih oboroženih operacij. Rusko vrhovno poveljstvo je našlo rešitev za neuspešni operativni načrt in do leta 2023 so se ruske kopenske sile vrnile k stari sovjetski operativni umetnosti.Keywords:ruske vojaške reforme, globoka bitka