DKMORS - Prodor v Posočju leta 1917 : zmaga konceptov, moralne in bojne moči

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Naslov	Prodor v Posočju leta 1917 : zmaga konceptov, moralne in bojne moči
Avtorji:	Torkar, Blaž (Avtor) Kuhar, Miha (Avtor) Bizjak, Matjaž (Avtor dodatnega besedila)	Jezik:	Slovenski jezik	Vrsta gradiva:	Znanstveno delo	Tipologija:	2.01 - Znanstvena monografija	Organizacija:	MORS - Publikacije MORS	Ključne besede:	prva svetovna vojna, vojna taktika, soška fronta, vojne operacije	UDK:	94(497.473)"1917"(0.034.2)	COBISS_ID:	296298752	Statistika:	7344 ogledov; 970 prenosov	Področja:	Gradivo ni uvrščeno v področja.
Datoteke:	Torkar_Kuhar_Prodor_v_Posocju_2018.pdf (2,49 MB)
Opis:	Monografija poskuša prikazati vojaški pomen 12. soške ofenzive, ki je bila kompleksna in zahtevna vojaška operacija tako z vidika načrtovanja in organizacije kot tudi načina izvedbe. Začetna poglavja opisujejo vojaško analizo geografskega prostora Zgornjega Posočja, poleg tega pa so analizirane vojaške in politične razmere v Evropi leta 1917. Natančno so opisane priprave na 12. soško ofenzivo, sestava in premik enot 14. armade na soško bojevališče, stanje v italijanski 2. armadi, vojskovalna moč nemške vojske, nemški stil vodenja in poveljevanja t. i. auftragstaktik, gorsko bojevanje ter razvoj taktike prodora. V knjigi so natančno opisane bojne aktivnosti vojskujočih se strani, še posebno v začetnih dneh bojev, ko je ofenziva potekala na slovenskih tleh. Natačno so tudi analizirani vzroki za nemško-avstro-ogrsko zmago in italijanski poraz, predstavljena pa so še nova spoznanja o vlogi Erwina Rommla in nekaterih drugih nemških častnikov v 12. soški ofenzivi. Monografija tudi problematizira o nekaterih ustvarjenih mitih o velikem nemškem vojskovodju in nazadnje poudari, zakaj je 12. soška ofenziva tako pomembna za razvoj vojaške stroke. V tej ofenzivi je prišlo do spopada dveh različnih konceptov, dveh doktrinarnih pristopov, dveh različnih kultur poveljevanja ter vodenja enot in seveda tudi doktrin ofenzivnega in defenzivnega delovanja. Izstopala sta dva pomembna stebra, ki sta odločilno prispevala k zmagi 14. armade. Prvi je že dobro znan nemški koncept poveljevanja in vodenja auftragstaktik, ki ga današnje vojaške doktrine obravnavajo kot poveljevanje s poslanstvom oziroma namero, drugi pa predstavlja še precej neznano področje, ki ga poimenujemo »miselni manever«. To je sicer izraz, ki ga takrat niso poznali, vendar lahko ocenimo, da je bil način razmišljanja poveljnikov na vseh ravneh zelo blizu temu konceptu, ki ga danes sodobne vojske uvajajo v svoje vojaške doktrine. 12. soška ofenziva je danes opredeljena kot manevrsko vojskovanje. Pri tem se je uporabljala taktika jurišnih skupin, ki se je razvila v taktiko prodora oziroma taktiko infiltracije. »Čudež pri Kobaridu« je torej šolski primer združenega bojevanja rodov pehote in artilerije, ki ima presenetljivo podobne ali enake elemente sodobnega vojskovanja pehote.
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Metapodatki

Sekundarni jezik
Jezik:	Angleški jezik	Opis:	This monograph aims to present the importance of the Twelfth Isonzo Offensive, which was a complex and challenging military operation from all the aspects of planning, organization, and implementation. The initial chapters offer a description of the military analysis of the Zgornje Posočje geographical region, and an analysis of the military and political situation in Europe in 1917. Later, the monograph provides a detailed description of the preparations for the Twelfth Isonzo Offensive, the structure and transfer of the 14th Army units to the Isonzo front, the situation in the 2nd Italian Army, the German Army’s combat power and its command and control methods, i.e. auftragstaktik, mountain warfare, and the development of the attack tactics. The book additionally includes detailed descriptions of the belligerent parties’ combat activities, focusing specifically on the first days of combat, which took place on Slovenian ground. It explains in detail the reasons for the German- Austrian-Hungarian victory and the Italian defeat, and presents new findings on the role of Erwin Rommel in the Twelfth Isonzo Offensive, as well as that of other German officers. Furthermore, the monograph highlights the issue of certain set myths, the great German commander-in-chief, and the importance of the Twelfth Isonzo Offensive for the development of the military profession. The offensive was a clash between two concepts, two doctrinal approaches, two different cultures of command and unit leadership, and between the offensive and defensive operation doctrines. Two important pillars contributed significantly to the victory of the 14th Army. The first stands for the already known German command and control concept, auftragstaktik, categorized by contemporary military doctrines as the mission- or intent-oriented command, while the second represents a relatively unknown field, called the “manoeuvrist approach”. This expression was not in use at the time; however, it can easily be assessed that the commanders’ way of thinking at all levels was indeed very close to this concept, which is now incorporated into the doctrines of contemporary armies. Nowadays, the Twelfth Isonzo Offensive, as a whole, is categorized as manoeuvre warfare, for it was during this offensive that the tactics of assault teams were used, which later developed into infiltration or attack tactics. “The Miracle of Caporetto (Kobarid)” is a textbook example of joined warfare of the infantry and artillery branches, which incorporated surprisingly similar or even exactly the same elements as contemporary infantry warfare.

Sekundarni jezik

Jezik:

Angleški jezik

Opis:

This monograph aims to present the importance of the Twelfth Isonzo Offensive, which was a complex and challenging military operation from all the aspects of planning, organization, and implementation. The initial chapters offer a description of the military analysis of the Zgornje Posočje geographical region, and an analysis of the military and political situation in Europe in 1917. Later, the monograph provides a detailed description of the preparations for the Twelfth Isonzo Offensive, the structure and transfer of the 14th Army units to the Isonzo front, the situation in the 2nd Italian Army, the German Army’s combat power and its command and control methods, i.e. auftragstaktik, mountain warfare, and the development of the attack tactics. The book additionally includes detailed descriptions of the belligerent parties’ combat activities, focusing specifically on the first days of combat, which took place on Slovenian ground. It explains in detail the reasons for the German- Austrian-Hungarian victory and the Italian defeat, and presents new findings on the role of Erwin Rommel in the Twelfth Isonzo Offensive, as well as that of other German officers. Furthermore, the monograph highlights the issue of certain set myths, the great German commander-in-chief, and the importance of the Twelfth Isonzo Offensive for the development of the military profession. The offensive was a clash between two concepts, two doctrinal approaches, two different cultures of command and unit leadership, and between the offensive and defensive operation doctrines. Two important pillars contributed significantly to the victory of the 14th Army. The first stands for the already known German command and control concept, auftragstaktik, categorized by contemporary military doctrines as the mission- or intent-oriented command, while the second represents a relatively unknown field, called the “manoeuvrist approach”. This expression was not in use at the time; however, it can easily be assessed that the commanders’ way of thinking at all levels was indeed very close to this concept, which is now incorporated into the doctrines of contemporary armies. Nowadays, the Twelfth Isonzo Offensive, as a whole, is categorized as manoeuvre warfare, for it was during this offensive that the tactics of assault teams were used, which later developed into infiltration or attack tactics. “The Miracle of Caporetto (Kobarid)” is a textbook example of joined warfare of the infantry and artillery branches, which incorporated surprisingly similar or even exactly the same elements as contemporary infantry warfare.