Page 34 - Cyber Terrorism and Extremism as Threat to Critical Infrastructure Protection

SECTION I: EXTREMISM, RADICALIZATION AND CYBER THREATS AS AN IMPORTANT
SECURITY FACTORS FOR COUNTERING TERRORISM PROCESSES

The EU believes that it is vital that all information received is shared, not only with Europol, but
with every relevant authority figure in all the Member States. The EU has approved this type of
action with Article 47 in the aforementioned European Border Coast Guard (EBCG) regulation.
As they must be involved in European protection from terrorism, Europol has founded the Eu-
ropean Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC). The European Council has control over the Centre,
and its purpose is to become the main hub for the fight against terrorism. Apart from support in
investigations and aid if a terrorist attack does occur, the ECTC has access to Europol bases that
can be checked, if necessary, for the purpose of investigations. Exchange of information can
also occur through the information base of Europol, the Europol Information System (EIS), and
the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS), which is used so that states can
share information related to any event in any criminal activity, both on suspects and convicted
criminals; in other words, to any information that can keep the EU a safer place. This type of
information comes to Europol through the Member States, and is later published in the EIS.
Considering that this information is very confidential, the program SIENA (Secure Information
Exchange Network Application) is used so as not to compromise it in any way.

In discussing the exchange of information, FADO is also beneficial; the False and Authentic
Documents Online is a website managed by Geospatial Service Centre (GSC) which has in
its database more than 3000 examples of false identities, travel documents, visas, stamps and
so on. Another useful component of the EU’s anti-terrorist work is the Terrorism Finance
Tracking Program (TFTP), which helps Europol to detect the financing of terrorism. In 2015
the Council and the European Parliament adopted new rules to prevent money laundering and
terrorist financing, and in 2016 the European Commission released a proposal to amend those
rules to strengthen the fight against the financing of terrorism.

Finally, it does not matter that the EU offers some frameworks to deal with returning foreign
fighters; the Member States are still the ones who must take full responsibility and prosecute
or find successful ways to deal with foreign fighters.

Next, we will present some individual state approaches to the issue of returning foreign fighters.

3.1 Case Study: Germany

During the second half of the 20th century, Germany did not have a successful anti-terrorist
policy. Germany has very strict laws about privacy that reduce the possibilities for counter-
terrorism actions. One of these restrictions was the forbidden surveillance of public spaces
without a concrete court order. The situation began to change when, in the 1970s, “the main
German anti-terrorist laws were adopted. The main changes were in the area of arresting
suspects and improving the coordination activities of police forces in the fight against terror-
ism. In parallel with this was the establishment of centralized structures for co-ordination and
control in anti-terrorist security and police activities. A special anti-terrorist unit was formed
inside the Federal Criminal Police (BKA). The German BKA has primary jurisdiction on in-
ternal national security in the area of counter-terrorism activities. GSG9 was founded in 1972
as an elite anti-terrorist special unit” (Wilkinson, 2002, p 114). Since 1989 there has been a
law for the fight against terrorism called “Gesetz zur Bekampfung des Terrorismus”.

A stronger reaction by the German authorities began after the attack in 2001. At this time
being a part of a terrorist organization in Germany was criminalized; there was already a

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