Page 38 - Cyber Terrorism and Extremism as Threat to Critical Infrastructure Protection

SECTION I: EXTREMISM, RADICALIZATION AND CYBER THREATS AS AN IMPORTANT
SECURITY FACTORS FOR COUNTERING TERRORISM PROCESSES

returned FTFs who are put through a process of counselling and reintegration if needed. The
programme focuses on ideological and pragmatic elements (such as finding employment) as
well as addressing the reestablishment of family relations and potentially finding an alterna-
tive social network” (Heide and Geenen, 2017, p 10).

These initiatives are based on advanced methods and approaches, in order to work with those
close to radicalized people and stop the whole radicalization procedure, preventing radical-
ized Muslims from becoming foreign fighters in the first place. Al-Hayat seems very useful
even though not everyone is convinced that it will succeed. “Hence, while Hayat’s methods
were demonstrably successful in combating neo-Nazi violence, it is not clear that such pro-
grammes work quite as well when it comes to radical Islamism” (Esman, 2016, p 5).
nd
Germany, because of its role in the 2 World War, has the burden of everything it does being
examined in close detail. Germany understands that it is very important to use deradicaliza-
tion and reintegration programmes and to learn from the past, using good practice in rehabili-
tating young neo-Nazis.

3.2 Countries of the Western Balkans

The Western Balkan region has proved to be fertile ground for the Islamic State, which used
this area to successfully gather foreign fighters. “Overall, it is believed that from the end of
2012 until the end of 2017, some 1,000 individuals (men, women, children, and the elderly)
from the Western Balkans travelled to Syria and Iraq. Approximately 300 have returned, more
than 200 have been killed, and some 400 remain there. A number of individuals are also miss-
ing. And, following the collapse of the remaining ISIL/DAESH strongholds Mosul and Deir
ez-Zor, we can assume that the ranks of current Western Balkans foreign fighting contingents
have been further decimated...” (Azinović and Bećinović, 2017, p 7).

When talking about specific countries, “ICSR research indicates that volunteers from South-
Eastern Europe include, at the last count, some 90 foreign fighters from Albania, 330 from
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 150 from Kosovo, 12 from Macedonia, and 70 from Serbia”
(Azinović, and Jusić, 2016, p 18). Recruitment in this part of Europe was very strong up to
2017. Recruitment was carried out in many different ways, one of them being through social
media. The IS knew that this part of the world was important, so they even had media in local
languages: “Apart from al-Naba’, in 2017, IS officially endorsed propaganda outlets were the
A’maq News Agency, the al-Hayat Media Centre, the al-Furqan Media Production Company,
the al-Ajnad Media Production Company, the al Himma Library and al-Bayan Radio. Since
its creation in 2014, A’maq News had acted as an independent news outlet, pretending to be a
journalistic organ. By 2016 it had become one of the main tools for IS to claim attacks, includ-
ing lone actor attacks in western countries. IS officially endorsed A’maq News in July 2017.
The Nashir Agency is also suspected of belonging to the IS media apparatus, although it has
not been formally or publicly endorsed by the IS. By the end of 2017, IS’s main publication
remained the weekly Arabic newsletter al-Naba’ (“the news”). Starting in 2016 the organiza-
tion launched Rumiyah. In 2017, Rumiyah was published in Bosnian, English, French, Ger-
man, Indonesian, Kurdish, Pashto, Russian, Turkish, Urdu and Uyghur on a near monthly
basis” (Tesat, 2018, p 30).

The pace of departure of citizens from the region to Syria and Iraq slowed down in 2015 and
had almost completely stopped by mid-2016 (Azinović and Bećinović, 2017, p 7). There are
several reasons for this:

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