Page 17 - Cyber Terrorism and Extremism as Threat to Critical Infrastructure Protection

DR. PAUL S. LIEBER: RE-ASSESSING ONLINE JIHADI EXTREMISM: REASONING FOR A MARKETING APPROACH
TO COUNTER-RADICALIZATION

religious pardon of terrorism act sins. This second grievance is perhaps most salient for those
who – on returning to Europe from warzones– now find themselves marginalized and in pris-
on environments.

Social network analysis – for all of its potential – does not directly consider grievances in
its structure equation modelling calculations about violent extremist networks1. Even when
grievance-associated themes and frames are linked to such assessments (via textual analysis),
they are only considered as a mathematical sorting of ideas and individuals based on their fre-
quency and likelihood of connection. Thus, while they are useful data points, there is no way
to validate such online patterns as representative of a violent extremist population (notably
offline) writ large. Even the best social network analysis data of jihadi extremists (captured
over longer periods of time and featuring abundant data points) is not fully predictive or even
indicative of offline interactions.

What contextual focus exists in the current battle against online jihadi violent extremism
lies in countering extremist narratives. This approach is derived from a presupposition that
grievances can be satiated or reframed by offering prosocial alternatives housed within a
competing message. Not only does this subscribe to long-dismissed mass communication
inoculation theory, that messages – upon receipt – are automatically infused and adopted
within a population’s core belief systems (McGuire, 1961), it also assumes a population keen
to consider duelling aspects of the said grievances from which to form ultimate, reasoned
opinions. Lastly, there remains limited attempts to synchronize counter-narrative efforts with
those on the ground, the latter essential reinforcement criteria in establishing the legitimacy
of all intervention activities (Reed, 2018).

4 Counter-Extremism Policy

Policy efforts to address European violent extremism suffer from similar maladies. Despite
an abundance of statutes clearly recognizing a global online extremist issue, most European
policies – unintentionally or otherwise – do not require joint solutions either within a country
or across the region (Hussain & Saltman, 2014).

Also – and in an effort to best address online violent extremism – an array of newer govern-
mental organizations emerged with seeming expertise in influence and cyber nuances. With
more manpower, however, comes an increased risk of both task redundancy and strategic
disconnect. Thus, there is a glaring need to formulate more inter-departmental coordination
mechanisms, and an incentive (and forcing function) for individuals to work together towards
common solutions. This mindset, however, needs to overcome a multitude of authority-based
roadblocks, as well as disclosure restrictions for when partner nations are factored in.

Jihadi extremist groups are well aware of these paradigms and shortcomings. Notably, coun-
ter-extremism efforts pre-suppose threats from larger scale, well-funded and globally con-
nected individuals. There exists a very real possibility that European violent extremists will
instead turn to low-cost, poorly planned, and terrorist acts below the planning threshold. This

1 Structure equation modelling is an advanced statistical technique where pathways of prediction are indicated
by numerical confidence. For social networks, it would be the confidence one has in a node (e.g. an individual
person) within a network to engage with another as part of the said network.

17