Page 15 - Cyber Terrorism and Extremism as Threat to Critical Infrastructure Protection

1 Re-assessing Online Jihadi Extremism:

Reasoning for a Marketing Approach to

Counter-Radicalization

Paul S. Lieber

1 Introduction

The recognition that the lifeblood of European jihadi violent extremism resides in online do-
mains is anything but a new concept. For over a decade, Al-Qaeda and subsequently ISIS have
displayed a seemingly omnipresent global reach, one empowered through social media based
tools (Lieber & Reiley, 2019). These tools remain incredibly adept at the recruitment and
sustainment of devotees, and are also quick and clever at dancing around attempts to reduce
both access to and effectiveness of extremist communication.

While the physical structures and geographic footholds of jihadi extremist groups have con-
siderably diminished, this has not been mirrored online (Brzuszkiewicz 2017). The likelihood
of extremist splinter cells fomenting, the re-emergence of terrorist groups as new entities, and/
or the emergence of a new threat organization entirely all remain real problems for European
nations. Moreover, the influx of returning foreign fighters and/or advocates from warzones
only compounds this potential. Disgruntled, potentially excommunicated, and with unstable
support systems, these oftentimes military-capable individuals are simply waiting for a call to
action to re-engage, but now on their home soil against a ‘far enemy’ (Brzuszkiewicz, 2018).
Brzuszkiewicz posited that the current ISIS strategy is now a deliberately homegrown effort:
“ISIS propaganda has gradually evolved towards more insistent exhortations for its support-
ers to stay where they are and fight the kuffār (infidels) where it hurts the most – that is, in
their own countries.” Due to close border proximity, this creates a realistic threat potential
spanning the entire European continent.

Greater threat awareness has led to increased pressure on European nations from their con-
stituents to respond to jihadi online extremist group communication (Meleagrou-Hitchens,
2017). Still, there remains miniscule evidence of the effectiveness of counter-messaging
within Europe, if at all (McCants, 2015). Compounding this problem is that even when gains
are made, it is near-impossible to tether success to a particular action or intervention (Briggs

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