Page 16 - Cyber Terrorism and Extremism as Threat to Critical Infrastructure Protection

SECTION I: EXTREMISM, RADICALIZATION AND CYBER THREATS AS AN IMPORTANT
SECURITY FACTORS FOR COUNTERING TERRORISM PROCESSES

& Feve, 2013). Perhaps Melagrou-Hitchens (2017) put it best, in “proving that any specific
such measure directly contributed to someone not becoming a terrorist, which in other words
is attempting to prove a negative, is patently impossible.”

2 Extremist Social Networks

Corresponding to the strategic shift of the extremists, the majority of European counter-
extremism resources are now directed towards a better understanding of the online domain
(Melagrou-Hitchens, 2017). Social network analysis remains a preferred online assessment
tool, even more so when it has the necessary global focus. By assessing who speaks to whom
and how frequently, social network analyses can semi-independently identify leadership roles
within a Jihadist organization’s communication structure (Lieber & Lieber, 2017). Combined
with textual analysis (from social media sites) mapped to these same individuals, uncovered
patterns and trends can also comfortably label the resonance of particular ideas within a social
network. This is an integral part of identifying burgeoning threats and grievances, as tracking
individuals and ideas in tandem can better isolate and rank preferred geographic attack loca-
tions.

Moreover, a closer look at social network ideas can also elucidate how specific concepts
are framed around particular themes. This framing data becomes a helpful guide in gauging
public sentiment for/against established governance and/or alternative power structures (that
threat networks reside in). Mass media, in most instances, will follow suit, or vice-versa.
Mass communication theory refers to this phenomenon as second and third level agenda set-
ting theory. These theories reason that mass media determines which issues are most salient
(agenda setting theory), also how audiences should reason about such items (second level
agenda setting theory), and finally which issues should be linked together (third level agenda
setting theory) (McCombs et al., 2012).

3 Grievances

As grievances do not emerge in a vacuum, this is an especially salient point in understanding
the motivations for violent jihadi extremist groups within Europe. These groups form, sus-
tain, and grow on foundations of actual and perceived grievances. Their ability to recruit is
a product of: a) the seeming legitimacy of such grievances, and b) a willingness by others to
declare them as legitimate.

Brzuszkiewicz (2018) divided European extremist grievances into two categories. The first
she described as ‘a narrative of self-pity,’ of unfair injustices Muslims the world over face (in-
cluding in primarily Muslim countries). Savary and Dhar (2020) discovered that individuals
struggling with concepts of self are more likely to stay loyal to [even] a [destructive] premise,
especially concepts foundational to self- identity. Perhaps not surprisingly, these same indi-
viduals are also less likely to accept a new [and potentially helpful] premise that deviates from
their established self-identity.

The second extremist grievance category was one Brzuszkiewicz (2018) saw as a desire for
‘empowerment’ and ‘redemption’. Specifically – and for violent extremists – a longing for

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