Page 145 - Cyber Terrorism and Extremism as Threat to Critical Infrastructure Protection

ALEXANDRU GEORGESCU, ADRIAN VICTOR VEVERA, CARMEN ELENA CÎRNU: A CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
PERSPECTIVE ON COUNTER-TERRORISM IN SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

with the SEE region will become even more important, as it is no longer just about transfer-
ring CIP expertise, but of simultaneous growth in CIP capacity across the whole of Europe.

4.3 Other Cooperation

There are also other formulas for cooperation which may enhance capacity in CIP. Those coun-
tries with NATO cooperation (such as Member States Albania and North Macedonia) could
also develop CIP efforts within NATO’s emerging CIP policies (Caşın, 2018). The regional
politics do not allow for NATO to be an omnipresent actor in regional partnerships, but it may
have a useful role to play in mediating the transfer of experience and good practice in CIP, es-
pecially for cybersecurity (Kocabas, 2017). The NATO-EU cooperation also touches obliquely
on the CIP issues, especially through the common Declaration of 2016, which had 42 recom-
mendations in 7 areas, with 32 concrete actions. The priority areas included countering hybrid
threats, cyber defence and security, strengthening political cooperation and dialogue, common
exercises, and maritime cooperation, as well as increased defence capacity. The overlap with
CIP efforts is quite substantial, and the institutionalized cooperation between CERT-EU (the
EU Computer Emergency Response Team) and NCIRC (NATO Computer Incident Response
Capability) in the realm of cybersecurity is an important operational example.

We should also not neglect the role of bilateral and minilateral cooperation on CIP issues, es-
pecially when there are common interests at stake in the form of existing and impending inter-
dependencies. EPCIP is focused on infrastructures which are critical to two or more Member
States, but there is a role to be played in identifying and designating critical infrastructure af-
fecting an EU Member State and a Western Balkan or SEE non-EU state, requiring the attention
of both countries. This may involve cooperation between sectorial CERTs in the cyber realm,
between the coordinating authorities in CIP, between regulating authorities, and so on. A case in
point is the Iron Gates hydropower plant between Romania and Serbia. Another example is the
Belgrade-Budapest railway under construction by a Chinese company as part of the 17+1 coop-
eration between China and its Central and Eastern European partners. As mentioned earlier, the
perspective of Chinese investment in cross-border infrastructure in the CEE region, including
the SEE part, raises not only political issues, but also critical infrastructure protection issues, as
new interdependencies are fostered. The future pipelines crossing through the region, whichever
may be built, are another opportunity for cooperation between states and between the EU and
the non-EU states, in multiple possible formats, as well as an inducement to make available the
resources and assistance for resilient development and governance.

4.4 Institutional Construction

One of the more successful initiatives in a regional with fraught and challenging relationships
has been SELEC, which is geared specifically towards the South-Eastern Europe region, but
focuses on transborder organized crime of all types, a theme which is adjacent to the issue
of terrorism and even of Critical Infrastructure Protection. We contend that it would be both
possible and helpful to create a South-East European Critical Infrastructure Protection Centre
(SECIPC), possibly with EU backing or assistance from individual countries such as the US.
Given the sensitive nature of the work undertaken, it could be placed in Slovenia. This would
be another mechanism for technical assistance to generate and reform a CIP framework in the
individual countries, while allowing for case by case cooperation on transferring experience
and, very importantly, on the creation of links for consultation and early warning in the case

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