Page 98 - Cyber Terrorism and Extremism as Threat to Critical Infrastructure Protection

SECTION II: CYBER TERRORISM AND SECURITY IMPLICATION FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

3 From Asymmetric, Cyber and Hybrid Threats to
Hyper Threats to South-Eastern European Countries’
CI and CII

The term “hyper threat” is not a new “buzz word” that has just recently begun to dominate
geo-strategic and security debates. During World War II the term combined many concurrent
theatres of war. Giving the technological development of that time it is understandable that
the revolution in military affairs that occurred prior to WWII led the idea of a “pan-war” to
influence the understanding of the term “hyper”.

Little has been written about hyper war and hyper threats. Most of the existing debates in the
modern context connect this term to a desire to explain threats that come from the intercon-
nectivity and interdependence of the modern way of living put in the context of AI systems.
The origin of the word, however, comes from the Greek term “hyper” meaning over or above.
Usually this term is used to express something that is beyond what is already known, defining
an abundance of something.

In the modern context, hyper threats in their essence have AI systems’ performance and ability
to collect, process, and disseminate data at a higher volume and a greater velocity. As General
John R. Allen asserted, “What makes this new form of warfare unique is the unparalleled speed
enabled by automating decision-making and the concurrency of action that will become possible
by leveraging artificial intelligence and machine cognition” (Allen & Hussain, July 10, 2017).

Similarly, Stuart Lauchlan argued that “hyper warfare is the idea that future war could take
place at such a high level of strategy, technology and destruction that its effects would be
worse than the Second World War between 1939 and 1945” (Lauchlan, 2019). Euhus believes
that hyper war requires more strategic comprehension than just the tactical effects of AI sys-
tems (Euhus, 2019).

The GLOBSEC NATO Adaptation Initiative analysis, on the other hand, concluded that “Ad-
vances underway in security and defence-related technologies that span the conflict spectrum
from Hybrid War at the lower end, to Hyper War at the future high end, will be rapid and dra-
matic. Hybrid War will continue to drive requirements for enhanced intelligence collection,
cyber-security, and critical infrastructure protection. Given the reliance of Alliance societies
on web-vulnerable infrastructures, the effects of a cyberattack could lead to significant if not
catastrophic physical damage” (GLOBSEC, 2018).

From all of the above, it seems that applying AI systems in the security context brings an abil-
ity that is beyond just the asymmetric cyber capacities or hybridity. The asymmetry of these
systems spans from their availability right up to the ethical, moral and legal boundaries of their
applications. AI systems are expanding very fast. Terrorist organizations have so far proved
creative and ready to employ whatever serves their cause (Heffelfinger, 2013). They would
not be hesitant to employ AI systems and applications to achieve their strategic ends. Hacking
these systems, overriding their algorithms and subordinating them to the terrorists’ goals is not
impossible. Terrorists or hackers working in these capacities could endanger existing SEE gov-
ernments’ AI systems or partner nations’ systems performing critical functions or missions. As
Tomáš Valášek of Carnegie Europe argued, “AI can be effectively deployed to undermine trust
among countries fighting on the same side by discrediting their intelligence (Valášek, 2017).

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