Page 70 - Cyber Terrorism and Extremism as Threat to Critical Infrastructure Protection

SECTION I: EXTREMISM, RADICALIZATION AND CYBER THREATS AS AN IMPORTANT
SECURITY FACTORS FOR COUNTERING TERRORISM PROCESSES

rorist radicalization, which differs from other forms of radicalization (including those with a
positive meaning).

Secondly, radicalization must be aimed at pursuing the goals of a terrorist organization, in-
cluding terrorist-related behaviours (recruitment for terrorism purposes, terrorist training, and
the like). Thus, the process of radicalization does not only refer to the adoption of views
and beliefs that justify violence, but also to a process which imposes and shapes such views
(Borum, 2012a, p 2). It is always an interactive process (even with the minimum degree of
interaction) between individual and external influences, including those inciting terrorism and
those seeking to recruit others for terrorism. The terms “self-directed” or “self-initiated” radi-
calization are often used when there is a minimal degree of interaction with people actively
seeking to radicalize them (OSCE, 2014, p 38). Vergani et al. point out the need to focus more
on the interaction between push, pull, and personal factors, both cognitive and behavioural
radicalization and specific conditions that develop the occurrence of different types of these
factors in certain contexts (Vergani, Iqbal, Ilbahar, & Barton, 2018).

Thirdly, in accordance with the multifactorial approach to explaining crime, including terror-
ism, other factors (external and internal) leading to behaviour referred to as terrorism should
be considered. To accept radicalization as the only cause of terrorism, which is sometimes
referred to as “mainstream” radicalization, is not only wrong, but also overstates the explan-
atory potential of this phenomenon while leaving other causes underemphasized (Schuur-
man and Taylor, 2018, p 13). Additionally, the process of radicalization itself is multi-fold;
it is triggered and sustained by more than one cause (Borum, 2012c, p 57). Radicalization
involves both internal and external factors, and the causes of radicalization can be equally
socio-economic, ideological, personal or psychological , as well as a number of other com-
16
ponents, including, for example, socialization with the group (Hendrickson, 2014, p 2). These
triggers are complex, multi-fold, interconnected, and closely linked to structural elements of
the environment, which may favour radicalization and eventual violent extremism (UNDP,
2016). Therefore, radicalization should be understood as a complex phenomenon including
individual, group, and societal level dynamics (Ozer, Bertelsen, 2018, p 654), depending on
the circumstances surrounding each individual case.

3 Radicalization in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Radicalization in BiH began in the early 1990s, with the outbreak of the 1992 conflict, and has
continued through at least three stages (see more: Šikman, 2018, p 121). The first was marked
by the arrival of foreign terrorist fighters from Afghanistan and other countries (Egypt, Syria,
Yemen, and so on) who, driven by the idea of global jihad, fought in the 1992-1995 war

in BiH while actively spreading the radical fundamentalist ideology known as the global
17
jihadist movement . These were the first instances of radicalization through this ideology in
18
16 According to Keiran Hardy (2018), the predominant causes of radicalization, though not pure types (e.g. overlap-
ping political and ideological causes) can be divided into ideological (e.g. demonizing enemies, promising heroic
merit), psychological (the lack of self-esteem or sense of identity), social (group dynamics), political, economic
and technological (spreading terrorist propaganda via the internet) (Hardy, 2018, p 82-90).
17 During 1992, they acted independently, and from mid-1993 as the squad “El Mujahid” as part of the 3rd Corps
of the BiH Army, headquartered in Zenica (cf. Lučić, 2001, p 127; Šikman, 2018, p 122).
18 This was done within training which also included the religious education of local people who joined them. Ad-
ditionally, as Edina Becirevic states, “the Salafi ideology that arrived in Bosnia during the war was more rigid
than the version that spread in Western European countries, and even more rigid than the version preached in
Saudi Arabia, the home of Salafism” (Bećirević, 2016, p 36 as cited in Šikman, 2018, p 123).
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