Page 61 - Cyber Terrorism and Extremism as Threat to Critical Infrastructure Protection

MARK GRZEGORZEWSKI: RUSSIAN CYBER OPERATIONS: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STATE AND CYBERCRIMINALS

typology and have a closer relationship with the state. It is to say that at this time the cyber-
criminals know that the state has no interest in prosecuting them as long as their activities
harm external enemies.

Moreover, by channelling Russian cybercriminals into acts outside the state and against Rus-
sian foes, the Russian state can employ the ultimate version of plausible deniability. This
benefit works both ways in that the cybercriminal, if caught, has no idea of any larger plan
by the state; if the cybercriminal were to be apprehended, he could not inform on the state
since he is not working for it. Rather, the cybercriminals are working towards their own self-
interest, which just happens to align with the state’s interest. Conversely, the state can claim
that it had no interaction with the cybercriminal and therefore the act was not committed on
behalf of the state.

In addition, by relying on the negative norm and not directly employing cyber actors, the
Russian state is granted flexibility, all the while keeping costs low. In fact, the techniques
and tools that a cybercriminal uses may not be all that different from the methods used by
the state. In such a case, using a cybercriminal may be just as good as using a Russian state
hacker, but at a fraction of the cost. This is due to the competitive market for cybercrime in
Russia, which keeps prices down. When compared to keeping a permanent government em-
ployee on the books, including the training and upkeep of their skillset, it is much cheaper to
allow cybercriminals to carry out their operations, especially if you do not have to pay them
to weaken your enemies.

Finally, in the West cybercrime is artificially separated from warfare, meaning Russian actions
never rise to the level of military operations against an adversary. Therefore, the Russian state
can continue to escalate its operations against the West without fear of military reprisal. Using
cybercriminals in this hybrid approach to warfare allows Russia to operate in the grey zone
between peace and war – all the while, over time, weakening the West.

6 Conclusion

This study’s theoretical argument, which extends Maurer’s (2018) theory of cyber mercenar-
ies, begins with the assumption that it is valuable for states, in this case Russia, to employ
cyberspace proxies on behalf of the state in order to retain plausible deniability. Operating
within Dark IR, Russia is able to conduct operations that are not typically addressed within the
international system, as this system is typically the domain of states. By implicitly employing
cybercriminals and creating a negative norm in which they can prosper, states cannot bring
formal charges against the Russian state nor claim that Russia’s actions rise to the level of war.

By adding a new typology to Maurer’s cyber mercenary thesis, scholars and practitioners
alike can re-frame what Russia is doing in the international system today. This re-framing
should cause states, in particular the West, to look into the shadows of where the Russian
state is not formally operating. This is the space where Russian cybercriminals are conduct-
ing operations retribution-free. By calling out this negative norm, the West can begin to re-
conceptualize the false distinction between crime and national security. The implications of
this re-framing should more broadly shape the proper way to address cyber criminals and the
states that do not stop them. Ultimately, it should cause states to stop operating by the old
rules of war and instead look to how states are supplanting conventional warfare with hybrid

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