Page 45 - Cyber Terrorism and Extremism as Threat to Critical Infrastructure Protection

DENIS ČALETA, SARA PERKOVIĆ: EXTREMISM AND RADICALIZATION IN THE EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT – SECURITY CHALLENGES
OF RETURN FOREIGN FIGHTERS

husbands are killed, widows are often forced to remarry. An estimated 140 Kosovar nationals,
or 45 percent, were still in the conflict theatre as of May 2016” (Shtuni, 2016, p 3).

The reasons why Kosovo has become a very desirable ground for the recruitment of foreign
fighters and for the expanding ideology of the Islamic State can be found not only in social
issues such as the previously mentioned poverty, high youth unemployment, and social isola-
tion, but also in not having a quality government, which is blamed by many for this situation.
The government was not ready, from either a secular or a religious point of view, to solve the
problems of a greater expansion of extreme ideology, especially in the rural parts of the coun-
try, where young people felt isolated and which were used by radical Imams who had been
imprisoned before for spreading extremism.

The Kosovo Centre for Security Studies (2017) states that three main reasons for the story of
Islamic State are:
• An externally-driven narrative that relies on an interpretation of Islam, the quotations from
the Koran and a basic “clash of civilizations” worldview to justify the call to join IS in a
bid to create the “caliphate” as an Islamic entity that would triumph over the secular state
and the Christian world;
• An internally driven, locally tailored narrative that pits IS Kosovo Albanian leaders against
the state and religious establishment in Kosovo in a bid to discredit them;
• An attempt to replace appeals to join IS from the pulpit by examples of direct action, often
simply by appearing in the war theatre, but also by engaging in brutality (Kraja, 2017, p 20).

Every fighter carries a specific risk, so the government has had to approach this challenge very
firmly. It seems that the government is very aware of the problem that they have with foreign
fighters, so they have publicly said that they are being very strict in order to have a strong
stand against terrorism, and that their main goal is to protect their citizens. As in many other
countries, the main role must be in the cooperation of institutions. In Kosovo, a large role is
played by the Kosovo police, who have not only arrested returnees, but also encouraged the
arrests of Imams who have been recruiters. “From 2013 to July 2016, the Kosovo police have
kept 292 individuals suspected of involvement in acts of terrorism or promoting religious ex-
tremism under surveillance. Criminal charges have been brought against 219, 119 have been
arrested, and indictments have been filed against 92” (Shtuni, 2016, p 11).

The Government of Kosovo has indicated that in order to find out why people left to join the
Islamic State, their intention will be to interview the people who are returning from the con-
flict. It will try to give better attention to prisons as potential places for the recruitment of new
terrorist fighters, and also pay attention to families of the fighters. “Dritan Demiraj, a former
Interior Minister of Albania and a graduate of the country’s Military Academy as an expert in
terrorism, said that the deradicalization of relatives of ISIS fighters remains a challenge for
the authorities. ‘The Albanian authorities should provide social assistance to their relatives,
particularly to their children. Such service centres have been established in various countries.
So it is made clear to them that they have no future with terrorism,’ Demiraj told BIRN” (Hax-
hiaj and Nabolli, 2018, p 8). It is the government’s intention for the public to know that the
“prevention of violent extremism and radicalism remains a priority and a constant challenge
for the institutions of Kosovo. The activities of law enforcement and security institutions have
been intensified, and the causes and favourable factors for the spread of Islamic extremism
and radicalism in Kosovo have also been identified” (Arifi, 2018, p 116).

45