Page 114 - Cyber Terrorism and Extremism as Threat to Critical Infrastructure Protection

SECTION II: CYBER TERRORISM AND SECURITY IMPLICATION FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

the functioning of the system as a whole. It will serve to analyze the actions of different actors
and set-up mechanisms and processes.

The method of generalization will be used to observe specific countries of South-Eastern
Europe (Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Northern Macedonia and
Kosovo) through the prism of the Republic of Croatia, since the other countries mainly fol-
low the path and development of normative acts and operational activities (the issue of Euro-
Atlantic integration, peacekeeping missions, civil protection, critical infrastructure and so on)
modelled on the Republic of Croatia. The other countries of South-Eastern Europe will not be
considered in this study because of their extraordinary heterogeneity and significant diversity
from the specified countries.

With the deductive method, we will derive individual points of the view from the general
ones. If we determine the level of normative regulation and cooperation at the level of the EU,
we can draw an inevitable conclusion about the regulation and activities of the protection of
critical infrastructure at the level of the Republic of Croatia. The inductive method, however,
will lead us to general conclusions based on individual facts, which means that by analyzing
the capacity to protect critical infrastructure from terrorism in the Republic of Croatia, we will
come to an understanding of the coordination capacity at the level of the EU.

The method of analysis will be used to investigate individual parts in relation to the whole
through the breakdown of complex structures. With this method, we will analyze the entire
system of protection of critical infrastructure both at the EU and the Croatian level by analyz-
ing the subsystems, elements and measures of protection (holders of authority, participants
and operational forces, public policies, principles of functioning and activation within the
system, etc.).
We will use the synthesis method to explain specific settings by compiling simple pieces into
more complex ones. That is, we will explain the system of protection of critical infrastructure
from terrorism at the EU and Croatian levels by linking the processes of identification, speci-
fication and protection of critical infrastructure, the application of sectoral and cross-sectoral
benchmarks, the importance of establishing public-private partnerships, and data secrecy pro-
tection. Throughout our research based on system theory and the methods outlined above, we
will uphold a cross-cutting approach to combine and compare the results of the research and
ultimately to be able to provide recommendations based on the research.

Research set up in this way has some limitations. The first limitation is in the selected research
samples, the European Union and the Republic of Croatia as representative of both the EU and
of part of South-Eastern Europe; the analysis of these two entities will only lead to a partial pic-
ture of the subject area, since a more in-depth analysis would need to cover all the countries of
South-Eastern Europe, which is beyond the scope of research appropriate to one article.

The next limitation should also be explained in the light of the subtitle of this paper: Coor-
dination and Cooperation from Brussels to South-Eastern Europe and Back. The observed
countries are highly oriented towards Brussels in many ways, including the areas of interest
of this research. They aspire to join the European Union and the NATO Alliance (except for
Serbia, which is militarily neutral and does not intend to apply for full membership of NATO),
and see Brussels as a natural place for coordination and cooperation. Brussels does serve as a
point of coordination, but without a management function, which it is important to point out.

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