

Sodobni vojaški izzivi

Contemporary Military Challenges


Znanstveno-strokovna publikacija Slovenske vojske

ISSN 2463-9575
September 2022 – 24/št. 3



REPUBLIKA SLOVENIJA
MINISTRSTVO ZA OBRAMBO
GENERALŠTAB SLOVENSKE VOJSKE

ER
R
G
A
M
Z
ER
R
C
A
C
Z



Sodobni vojaški izzivi

Contemporary Military Challenges

Znanstveno-strokovna publikacija Slovenske vojske

ISSN 2463-9575
UDK 355.5(479.4)(055)
September 2022 – 24/št. 3



REPUBLIKA SLOVENIJA
MINISTRSTVO ZA OBRAMBO
GENERALŠTAB SLOVENSKE VOJSKE

Izdajatelj Publisher	Generalštab Slovenske vojske General Staff of the Slovenian Armed Forces
Glavna urednica Editor in Chief	dr. Liliana Brožič
Uredniški odbor Editorial Board	dr. Andrej Anžič, Evropska pravna fakulteta, Nova Gorica dr. Gorazd Bajc, Narodna in študijska knjižnica, Trst dr. Anton Bebler, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Ljubljana višja vojaška uslužbenka XIV. razreda dr. Valerija Bernik (OF-4), Višja vojaška strokovna šola, Maribor višji vojaški uslužbenec XIV. razreda dr. Denis Čaleta (OF-5), Knjižnično-informacijski in založniški center, Ljubljana, Library, Information and Publishing Centre dr. Maja Garb, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Ljubljana dr. Bastian Giegerich, International institute for strategic studies, London dr. Irina Goldenberg, Military Personnel Research and Analysis, Canada dr. Olivera Injac, Univerzitet Donja Gorica, Podgorica polkovnik dr. Tomaž Kladnik (OF-5), Center vojaških šol, Maribor dr. Sergei Konoplyev, Harvard University, Cambridge dr. Igor Kotnik, Generalštab Slovenske vojske, Ljubljana dr. Julie T. Manta, US Army War College, Carlise dr. Thomas Mockaitis, DePaul University, Chicago dr. Klaus Olshausen (OF-8, ret.), Clausewitz-Gesellschaft e.V., Hamburg generalpodpolkovnik dr. Iztok Podbregar (OF-8), Fakulteta za organizacijske vede, Kranj dr. Zoltán Rajnai, Doctoral School on Safety and Security Sciences, Budapest dr. Tibor Szvircev Tresh, Militärakademie an der ETH, Zürich dr. Viljar Veebel, Baltic Defence College, Tartu dr. Thomas Young, Center for Civil-Military Relations, Monterey dr. Yahia H. Zoubir, Kedge Business School, Paris
Sekretarka Secretary	višja praporščakinja Nataša Cankar (OR-9)
Prevajanje Translation	Iris Žnidarič
Lektoriranje Proofreading	Justi Carey, Marjetka Brulec, Vesna Vrabič
Oblikovanje Design & Graphic	Skupina Opus Design
Tisk Print	Silveco, d.o.o.
ISSN	2232-2825 (tiskana različica/print version) 2463-9575 (spletna različica/online version)
Naklada Edition	300 izvodov/copies Izhaja štirikrat na leto/Four issues per year
Revija je dostopna na spletni strani Publication web page	https://dk.mors.si/sodobni-vojaski-izzivi https://dk.mors.si/sodobni-vojaski-izzivi
E-naslov urednice Managing Editor e-mail address	liliana.brozic@mors.si



Prispevki, objavljeni v Sodobnih vojaških izzivih, niso uradno stališče Slovenske vojske niti organov, iz katerih so avtorji prispevkov.

Publikacija je uvrščena v bibliografsko zbirko podatkov COBISS.SI, Crossref, Military and Government Collection EBSCO in Air University Library Index in Military Periodicals.

Articles, published in the Contemporary Military Challenges do not reflect the official viewpoint of the Slovenian Armed Forces nor the bodies in which the authors of articles are employed.

The publication is indexed in bibliography databases COBISS.SI, Crossref, Military and Government Collection EBSCO and Air University Library Index in Military Periodicals.

VARNOSTNE PERSPEKTIVE

»... EU in njene države članice morajo vlagati več v svojo varnost in obrambo, da bi postale močnejši politični in varnostni akter.«

Strateški kompas za varnost in obrambo – Za Evropsko unijo, ki varuje svoje državljane in državljanke, vrednote in interese ter prispeva k mednarodnemu miru in varnosti, 2022, str. 6.

SECURITY PERSPECTIVES

»... the EU and its Member States must invest more in their security and defence to be a stronger political and security actor.«

A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence - For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security, 2022, p 6.

VSEBINA

CONTENTS

Liliana Brožič	7 UVODNIK VARNOSTNE PERSPEKTIVE
Liliana Brožič	11 EDITORIAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVES
Tamas Somogyi, Rudolf Nagy	15 KIBERNETSKE GROŽNJE IN VARNOSTNI IZZIVI NA PODROČJU FINANC NA MADŽARSKEM CYBER THREATS AND SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE HUNGARIAN FINANCIAL SECTOR
Uroš Tovornik	31 GEOSTRATEŠKE PERSPEKTIVE SLOVENIJE V SPREMINJAJOČEM SE SVETU GEOSTRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES OF SLOVENIA IN A CHANGING WORLD
Olusola Kolawole Oluwagbire	51 OCENA VPLIVA ODNOSOV Z VELESILAMI NA NACIONALNO VARNOST: PRIMER NIGERIJE AN ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF RELATIONS WITH MAJOR POWERS ON NATIONAL SECURITY: NIGERIA IN PERSPECTIVE
Mariann Minkó-Miskovics, Csaba Szabó	69 PRIMERJAVA RAZLAG CIVILNE IN VOJAŠKE OPREME V EVROPSKI IN MADŽARSKI SODNI PRAKSI INTERPRETATION OF CIVILIAN VS. MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN EUROPEAN CASE LAW – EU AND HUNGARY

Jarosław Włodarczyk	83 PROBLEM LEKSIKALNIH VRZELI PRI POUČEVANJU VOJAŠKE ANGLEŠČINE THE PROBLEM OF LEXICAL GAPS IN TEACHING MILITARY ENGLISH
Klemen Kocjančič	101 RECENZIJ O POMENU VOJAŠKE GEOZNANOSTI
Klemen Kocjančič	107 REVIEW ON THE IMPORTANCE OF MILITARY GEOSCIENCE
	113 SLIKOVNO GRADIVO FIGURES
	117 AVTORJI AUTHORS
	124 NAVODILA ZA AVTORJE
	129 INSTRUCTIONS TO AUTHORS

UVODNIK

VARNOSTNE PERSPEKTIVE

Tako smo naslovlili tretjo številko v štiriindvajsetem letu izhajanja *Sodobnih vojaških izzivov*. Izhajali smo iz sprememb, ki so se dogajale v zadnjih nekaj letih. V mislih smo imeli povečane migracijske tokove v smeri Evropske unije, izkušnje iz obdobja epidemije covid-19, podnebne spremembe, ki nas presenečajo vsakič znova, čeprav se jih zavedamo in se jim poskušamo prilagoditi ter ustrezno odzivati nanje. Marca letos je nastal »Strateški kompas za varnost in obrambo – za Evropsko unijo, ki varuje svoje državljane in državljanke, vrednote in interese ter prispeva k mednarodnemu miru in varnosti«, konec junija pa novi Natov strateški koncept. Namen obeh je bil prevetriti, uskladiti in poenotiti pogled na trenutne varnostne izzive ter oblikovati nove varnostne perspektive.

V začetku leta nas je presenetil oborožen napad Ruske federacije na Ukrajino. Nekateri so ga napovedovali, drugi samo predvidevali. Številni so bili prepričani, da tak pojav v sodobni demokratični družbi sploh ni mogoč. Huntingtonova teorija o spopadu civilizacij, ki se je zdela v sodobni evropski družbi preživeta in že presežena, je znova postala aktualna. Realističen pogled na sodobne varnostne, družbene in politične razmere v svetu, predvsem pa kriza vrednot in posledično potreba po poenotenju sta spodbudila Evropsko unijo k ambiciji postati globalni varnostni akter v mednarodnem okolju. Vojna v Ukrajini sili Evropsko unijo k ukrepanju. Ta je pripravila sveženj ekonomskih ukrepov oziroma sankcij, s katerimi želi vplivati na Rusko federacijo v smislu izražanja svojega nestrinjanja glede njenih enostranskih potez. Kljub temu si države članice niso povsem enotne glede stališča, kako se spoprijeti s stanjem in se mu upreti. Brez enotnosti ter enotnih političnih stališč in ukrepov Evropska unija ne more postati globalni varnostni akter, kot si je to zastavila v strateškem kompasu. Pri tem je treba omeniti tudi njeno skupno varnostno in obrambno politiko, ki je predvsem politika, in dejstvo, da Evropska unija nima svojih vojaških zmogljivosti, ki bi jih upravljala. Vojaške zmogljivosti imajo države članice, ki za svojo obrambo namenajo različne zneske. V zadnji dekadi je večina držav članic svoje obrambne

izdatke zniževala, čeprav je bilo na Natovem vrhu v Walesu leta 2012 dogovorjeno, da bodo ti znašali dva odstotka BDP. Vse države članice Evropske unije niso tudi članice zaveznitva, vendar pa je med njimi enaindvajset takih, ki so članice obeh. Douglas Barrie je skupaj s sodelavci leta 2020 pripravil posebno poročilo na temo *European defence policy in an era of renewed great-power competition*, v katerem so ugotovili, da bi Evropska unija s svojimi državami članicami ob predpostavki, da bi res vse namenjale dva odstotka BDP za obrambo, potrebovala od deset do petnajst let, da bi lahko bila v varnostnem smislu s svojimi zmogljivostmi ustrezno pripravljena na morebitno agresijo države z vojaškimi zmogljivostmi, kot jih ima Ruska federacija danes. Ob vlaganjih na tem področju, kot so leta 2022, pa bi za to potrebovala dvajset let. Navedeno vodi v logičen sklep. Rusko federacijo je mogoče ustaviti pri njenih ozemeljskih in političnih ambicijah le na dva načina. Prvi in najustreznejši je političen, drugi vojaški. Ker Evropska unija v obrambnem in vojaškem smislu ne pomeni resnega nasprotnika tej veliki in vojaško močni državi, je edini način, da doseže svoj status globalnega varnostnega akterja, političen. Vojaški spopad v Ukrajini je velika preizkušnja tako za Unijo kot za zaveznitvo. Evropska unija ima zdaj priložnost, da preveri, kako močni in verodostojni so njeni ideali, vrednote in prepričanja. So njeni visoki predstavniki dovolj modri in inovativni, da poleg ekonomskih sankcij poiščejo še druge diplomatske poti, po katerih lahko dosežejo, kar so zapisali v strateškem kompasu, in sicer biti globalni akter?

Odgovor na to vprašanje bo prinesel čas. Do takrat bodo znanstveniki in drugi strokovnjaki proučevali različne vplive in pojave na področju varnosti. Nekateri med njimi jih bodo delili tudi z bralci Sodobnih vojaških izzivov.

V času ekonomskih sankcij, ki ji sprejema Evropska unija, se **Tamas Somogyi** in **Rudolf Nagy** osredotočata na zaščito kritične infrastrukture, katere pomembni del je tudi finančno področje. V prispevku *Kibernetske grožnje in varnostni izzivi na področju financ na Madžarskem* raziskujeta varnostna tveganja, s katerimi se spoprijema bančni sistem v njuni državi.

Prispevek *Geostrateške perspektive Slovenije v spreminjajočem se svetu* izhaja iz dveh geopolitičnih teorij avtorjev Mackinderja in Spykmana, ki sta v njih razvila svoje poglede na evropski prostor. **Uroš Tovornik** je raziskoval geostrateško lego Slovenije na temelju njunih teorij s poudarkom na njenih geopolitičnih značilnostih. Svoje ugotovitve je strnil v štiri mogoče scenarije, ki jih te determinirajo, iz njih pa tudi izhajajo mogoče geopolitične usmeritve v prihodnosti.

Kakšen je vpliv svetovnih velesil in kako se kaže na primeru posamezne države, je raziskoval **Olusola Kolawole Oluwagbire**. Afrika kot zelo velika celina je sestavljena iz številnih in raznolikih držav. Vpliv velesil je bil vedno zelo močan in sestavni del afriškega življenja ter varnosti njenih prebivalcev. Kakšen je ta v zadnjih letih in kako vpliva na varnost posamezne države, avtor predstavlja v prispevku *Ocena vpliva odnosov z velesilami na nacionalno varnost: primer Nigerije*.

Mariann Minkó-Miskovics in **Csaba Szabó** ugotavljata, da je na področju predpisovanja izdelkov za dvojno rabo, torej za civilne in obrambne namene, med evropsko in madžarsko zakonodajo nedoslednost. Še več. Prepričana sta, da neuskklajenost lahko pomeni varnostno tveganje. Kaj to pomeni v praksi, predstavljata v prispevku *Primerjava razlag civilne in vojaške opreme v evropski in madžarski sodni praksi*.

O pomenu pravilega razumevanja jezika med različnimi deležniki v mednarodnem vojaškem okolju piše **Jarosław Włodarczyk**. Njegova študija je osredotočena na poučevanje angleškega jezika med vojaškimi osebami na Poljskem in na tiste vrste besed, ki nimajo neposrednega prevoda v angleški jezik ali obratno v poljski jezik. Poseben izziv pri tem je, kako ustrezno razložiti in poučiti o tem vojaške osebe v izobraževalnem procesu. Svoje ugotovitve je strnil v prispevku *Problem leksikalnih vrzeli pri poučevanju vojaške angleščine*.

EDITORIAL

SECURITY PERSPECTIVES

This is the title of the third issue in the twenty-fourth volume of the Contemporary Military Challenges. We started from the changes that have taken place over the last few years. We have had in mind the increased migration flows towards the European Union, the experience of the Covid 19 epidemic, the climate change that surprises us time and time again, despite the fact that we are aware of it, and that we are trying to adapt and respond to it accordingly. In March this year, the »Strategic Compass for Security and Defence - For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security« was launched, and at the end of June, the new NATO Strategic Concept. Both with the aim of rethinking, aligning and unifying the way we look at existing security challenges and developing new security perspectives.

At the beginning of this year, we were taken by surprise by the Russian Federation's armed attack against Ukraine. Some had predicted it; others only foresaw it. Many were convinced, however, that such a phenomenon was not possible in a modern democratic society. Huntington's theory of a clash of civilisations, which seemed to have outlived its usefulness in modern European society, has become relevant again. A realistic view of the contemporary security, social and political situation in the world and, above all, the crisis of values and the consequent need for unification have encouraged the European Union to aspire to become a global security actor in the international environment. The war in Ukraine is forcing the European Union to act. It has prepared a package of economic measures or sanctions to influence the Russian Federation in terms of expressing its disapproval of its unilateral moves. However, the Member States are not entirely united on how to confront and counter the situation. Without unity, united political positions and united action, the European Union cannot become the global security actor that it has claimed to be in its strategic compass. In this context, it is also worth mentioning its Common

Security and Defence Policy, which is first and foremost a policy, and the fact that the European Union does not have its own military capabilities to manage. The Member States have military capabilities, and they spend varying amounts on their defence. Over the last decade, most Member States have been reducing their defence expenditure, despite the fact that it was agreed at the NATO summit in Wales in 2012 that it would amount up to 2% of GDP. Not all Member States of the European Union are members of the Alliance, but there are twenty-one of them that are members of both. Douglas Barrie and his colleagues produced a special report in 2020 on 'European defence policy in an era of renewed great-power competition', which concluded that, assuming that all Member States did indeed spend 2% of GDP on defence, the European Union and its Member States would need ten to fifteen years to be adequately prepared in terms of security capabilities for a possible aggression by a country with the military capabilities of the Russian Federation today. With investments in this area as they are in 2022, it would take twenty years. This leads to the logical conclusion. There are only two ways of stopping the Russian Federation in its territorial and, of course, political ambitions. The first and most appropriate is political, the second military. Since the European Union does not represent a serious opponent in defence and military terms to this large and militarily powerful country, the only way for it to achieve its status as a global security actor is politically. The military conflict in Ukraine is a major test for both the Union and the Alliance. The European Union now has the opportunity to test how strong and credible its ideals, values and beliefs are. Are its senior representatives wise and innovative enough to look beyond economic sanctions to other diplomatic avenues to achieve what they have written in their strategic compass – to be a global player?

Time will answer this question. Until then, however, scholars and other experts will be studying the various influences and phenomena in the security domain. Some of them will also share them with the readers of Contemporary Military Challenges.

In a time of economic sanctions imposed by the European Union, **Tamas Somogyi** and **Rudolf Nagy** focus on the protection of critical infrastructure, of which the financial sector is an important part. In their article *Cyber threats and security challenges in the Hungarian financial sector*, they explore the security risks facing the banking system in their country.

The paper *Geostrategic perspectives of Slovenia in a changing world* draws on two geopolitical theories by Mackinder and Spykman, who develop their views on the European space. **Uroš Tovornik** explored Slovenia's geostrategic position on the basis of their theories, focusing on its geopolitical characteristics. He summarised his findings into four possible scenarios, which are determined by these characteristics and from which possible future geopolitical orientations are derived.

Olusola Kolawole Oluwabire explored the influence of the world's major powers and how this is reflected in the case of each country. Africa, as a very large continent, is made up of many and diverse countries. The influence of the major powers has

always been very strong and integral to African life and the security of its people. In his article *An assessment of the impact of relations with major powers on national security: Nigeria in perspective*, the author presents how this has changed in recent years and how it affects the security of each country in.

Mariann Minkó-Miskovics and **Csaba Szabó** note that there is an inconsistency between European and Hungarian legislation in the field of dual-use regulation, i.e. for civil and defence purposes. Moreover, they are convinced that this inconsistency may pose a security risk. What this means in practice is presented in the article *Interpretation of civil vs. military equipment in European case law - EU and Hungary*.

Jaroslav Włodarczyk writes on the importance of a proper understanding of language between different stakeholders in the international military environment. His study focuses on the teaching of English among military personnel in Poland and on those types of words that do not have a direct translation from Polish into English or vice versa. A particular challenge here is how to adequately explain and teach this to military personnel in the educational process. He summarised his findings in his paper *The problem of lexical gaps in teaching military English*.

KIBERNETSKE GROŽNJE IN VARNOSTNI IZZIVI NA PODROČJU FINANC NA MADŽARSKEM

CYBER THREATS AND SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE HUNGARIAN FINANCIAL SECTOR

Povzetek V zadnjih letih je v bančništvu opaziti naraščanje števila kibernetških napadov, kar kaže na pomen informacijske varnosti na tem področju. Cilj te študije primera je bolje razumeti informacijsko varnost v okviru zaščite kritične infrastrukture skozi razpravo o izzivih in praksah finančnega področja na Madžarskem. Najprej so v članku opredeljene glavne storitve področja, nato so na podlagi podatkov iz ustrezne literature in poročil organov javne uprave opisane najnovejše kibernetške grožnje za posamezna področja. V zadnjem delu je predstavljen precej izčrpen pregled najpomembnejših točk informacijske varnosti in najboljših praks na podlagi predpisov, priporočil in standardov.

Ključne besede *Informacijska varnost, kibernetška grožnja, kibernetška varnost, kibernetška odpornost, finančno področje, banka, Madžarska.*

Abstract In recent years an increasing trend has been observed with regard to the number of cyber-attacks in the banking industry, which demonstrates the importance of information security in this sector. The goal of the present case study is to gain a better understanding of information security within critical infrastructure protection by discussing the challenges and practices of the Hungarian financial sector. First, the sector's essential services are identified. Then, the most current sector-specific cyber threats are described, based on data collected from the relevant literature and public authority reports. The final part presents a reasonably comprehensive overview of the key points of information security and best practices based on regulations, recommendations and standards.

Key words *Information security, cyber threat, cyber security, cyber resilience, financial sector, bank, Hungary.*

Introduction

The daily life of our civilization in this ever-changing world is being threatened more and more as new challenges arise. Besides the traditional security challenges (e.g. the possibility of a wide and devastating war), new challenges have emerged: natural hazards caused by environmental changes, running out of raw materials, the pandemic, to name just a few. Each of these global challenges threatens the infrastructure that serves our accustomed life. Beyond doubt, answering these challenges is crucial from our future's point of view. As politicians and respective experts have realized this, much effort has been made and still is being made in order to identify and protect all the assets needed for essential services.

Besides being a terrible cause of loss of life, the impact of a disruption in essential services or serious damage to the necessary infrastructure is unpredictable. These types of destructive event have diverse effects on the macroeconomy, negatively impacting economic sectors, and thus economic growth, as the findings of Panwar and Sen confirm (Panwar and Sen, 2019). The economic impact is immeasurable, although various disaster impact assessments have been introduced by economic theory (Galbusera and Giannopoulos, 2018). Beyond doubt, these negative economic impacts may provoke economic and social instability, which may cause political instability as well. With regard to the possible political effects of a disastrous event, the consequences of the 9/11 attacks can be mentioned: US homeland security was reorganized and a serious war started (Bullock, Haddow and Coppola, 2020a). Another generally accepted example of possible economic, social and political impacts is the coronavirus pandemic (Karabag, 2020).

To mitigate the severity of these impacts, effective disaster management and resilience is required. The importance of this can be underpinned by the example of the Italian earthquake which struck the Reggio Emilia and Bologna provinces in 2021. A well-coordinated civil protection system, a rapid reorganization of the territory, and strong social networks led to the shortest reconstruction period in Italian history, and to an economic restart despite the ongoing financial crisis (Ghini et al., 2021).

As new technologies emerge, governments, law enforcement bodies and disaster management bodies face new challenges. As Cavelti and Wenger (2019) have indicated, political and military actors are attempting to better understand the strategic utility of cyber operations and how to manage intelligence services. Li and Liu (2021) argue that cyberspace and related technologies are one of the most important sources of power. Bullock, Haddow and Coppola (2020b) showed the role of government in cyber security and critical infrastructure protection in the USA, along with the US governmental effort to secure cyberspace.

We live in an increasingly digitalized world; information and communication technology (ICT) has become an inevitable part of our lives, and during the coronavirus pandemic the remote usage of digital services has unexpectedly grown even more. This phenomenon can also be observed in the financial sector: both the

number of financial services offered online and the number of clients using online services are constantly increasing.

Similarly, cybercrime has increased in the past few years (Kerti and Záhonyi, 2020), especially during the coronavirus pandemic as reported by Europol (Europol, 2020). Complex cybercriminal networks operate across the world. Evidence appears to confirm that the use of the *dark web* (a hidden part of cyberspace that provides anonymity for members) is increasing, thus providing more opportunity for malicious activities in cyberspace (Besenyő and Gulyás, 2021). As cyberspace knows no border, nor do the criminals acting worldwide. Beke and Rajnai (2019) remind us that cyber threats have become a worldwide problem, as cyber-attacks can affect users from all over the world. Individuals, businesses, governments and critical infrastructures (CI) are all threatened by cybercrime (Pléta et al., 2020). This is confirmed by Interpol's comprehensive overview of cybercrime during the coronavirus pandemic, which demonstrates that in Europe:

- Widespread phishing campaigns to steal data (including sensitive data) have been registered;
- Official government websites have been cloned and malicious domains have been registered aiming to take advantage of the growing interest in information about Covid-19;
- Ransomware attacks have targeted critical infrastructure and healthcare institutions (Interpol, 2020).

After demonstrating how dangerous a cyber-attack can be, Prevezianou (2020) suggested the introduction of the term »cyber crisis«, and urged the academic world to research this new crisis concept. A study carried out by Koraus et al. (2017) revealed that the majority of people had already encountered cyber-attacks or banking fraud, as ways of shopping had been changed by the expansion of payment cards.

What is remarkable about this overview is that it stresses the fact that cybercrime is a real threat for everyone, especially nowadays, as the usage of online financial services is greater than ever. The impact of a successful cyber-attack against essential services is unpredictable (Tvaronavičienė et al., 2020), so there is an urgent need to better address information security in the financial sector. This case study seeks to describe the cyber threats and information security approaches of the Hungarian banking industry in a comprehensive way (including cyber security and cyber resilience), thus attempting to advance the knowledge of the law enforcement bodies and operators of essential services.

1 FINANCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Financial services not only play an essential role in the growth of the economy and well-being of people, but they are also vital for nation-states, as Nagy and Somogyi (2021) revealed. Financial institutions offer a wide array of services and products

to both individuals and large corporations. It is beyond dispute that any significant disruption to these services would have economic, social and political effects which could cross borders and impinge on other EU Member States as well. As Reznik et al. (2020) pointed out, the financial security of the state is fundamental, so significant attention must be paid to it at both the national and international levels.

As Ruvín et al. (2020) claimed, the role of the state in ensuring cyber security in the financial sector by the regulatory framework is fundamental, so national and international regulations concerning cyber threats and information security must be examined when addressing this issue.

In line with EU Council Directive 2008/114/EC, the financial sector in Hungary was identified as a sector providing essential services. Three parts of the financial sector were defined as critical infrastructure (CI) (Act CLXVI of 2012):

- Commerce, payment and clearing of monetary assets and liabilities;
- Security of banks and credit institutions;
- Cash management.

Critical infrastructure protection in the financial sector is regulated by Government Decree 330/2015. The National Bank of Hungary was nominated to take the role of supervisor and control coordinator of critical infrastructure protection in the financial sector. As supervisor, it may call the operator of essential services (OES) to fulfil the relevant requirements; call for the modification of the operational security plan (OSP); or impose a fine. The protection of the identified financial CI should be organized in accordance with the OSP. OESs must appoint a contact person, called a *security liaison officer*, as a single point of contact between the OES and the relevant authorities.

- In addition, emergency cases in the financial sector were defined by Government Decree 330/2015 as:
 - The disruption of a control system which has no alternatives within 30 minutes, or where the recovery of the OES must be supported;
 - The disruption of ICT or other facility necessary for the fundamental activities which has no alternatives within 1 hour, or where the recovery of the OES must be supported;
 - An outage more than one hour long, or a breach of the service level agreement of account management services, e-channel services and cash management;
 - An outage more than one day long, or a breach of the service level agreement of cash management;
 - Quarantine at the OES;
 - An outage of human resources causing a shutdown of CI.

Hence the National Bank of Hungary, as the sector-specific authority, recommends that business continuity plans be created and OES be prepared for the unavailability of the site of operation or of ICT infrastructure (National Bank of Hungary, 2020a).

Taking into consideration these regulations, together with the general expectations of the clients, it can be asserted that financial infrastructure as critical infrastructure must meet the highest recommendations of information security. Moreover, Besenyő and Fehér, in their study of 2020, argue that critical infrastructures become targets of terrorism, including cyber-attacks, so critical infrastructure protection, including information security, must be addressed appropriately.

2 CYBER THREATS IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR

Hydra, a recently identified malware, targeted those using the online banking services of the German Commerzbank. As the National Cyber Security Centre of Hungary described the case in its weekly newsletter, a fake homepage was used to share the camouflaged malware (National Cyber Security Centre, 2021). This case is not extraordinary. The European Central Bank (ECB), as a sector-specific supervisor in Europe, has observed¹ an increasing trend in the number of cyber incidents in the last few years. As the ECB pointed out: *»40% of the banks were the target of at least one successful cyberattack in 2019, a considerable increase from the 28% reported in 2018«* (European Central Bank, 2021, 5th paragraph).

The general picture emerging from the analysis of the cyber incidents is that the vast majority of cases involved malicious and criminal intent. Analysis of the reported cyber incidents in 2019 shows that phishing attacks against financial institutions or customers were the most frequent type of incident, followed by denial-of-service attacks (generally Distributed Denial of Service – DDoS – which involves a large number of raiders at the same time). The purpose of DDoS attacks is to cause an interruption to services by flooding the servers with mass requests. A variant of the DDoS attack has also been observed, where the perpetrators threatened financial institutions with a DDoS attack unless a ransom was paid (European Central Bank, 2021). DDoS attacks became the most frequent cyber incidents in 2020 (European Central Bank, 2020).

Naturally, other types of attacks also have to be taken into consideration, including the ‘man-in-the middle’ (criminals insert themselves between the customer and the bank to steal information or manipulate transactions), and the ‘zero-day exploit’ (criminals taking advantage of a vulnerability in a used software before the vendor is able to fix it) (BIS, 2021).

¹ *Significant cyber incidents are reported to the ECB through the cyber incident reporting framework as soon as they are detected, so trends can be identified and monitored by the supervisor.*

Besides the emergence of cyber risks, another trend can also be observed: reliance on outsourced ICT services is steadily growing. Today banks increasingly use third-party providers (e.g. cloud service providers and consultants) in order to provide more and a higher level of services. Cooperation between financial institutions and FinTech (financial technology) companies is gradually growing. Undoubtedly, providing better services and using new technologies is advantageous for both the financial institutions and their clients. However, the overall ICT risk has sharply increased:

- Third parties have discovered incidents roughly as often as banks (European Central Bank, 2020), meaning that these third-party providers are also facing cyber-attacks, just like financial institutions do;
- Supply chain risk (criminals attempting to insert malware into ICT systems by the access supply chain) must also be taken into consideration, as the consequence of this risk may be damage to the integrity of ICT services (National Counterintelligence and Security Centre, 2020).

A particular manifestation of the challenges to the banking system was observed in the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, during the course of which, guided by the intention to cause social disturbance to facilitate armed military operations, a coordinated hacker attack hit the Georgian banking system (Besenyő, 2008). Similarly, in their study Zachosova and Babina (2018) found that the financial sector of Ukraine has also faced non-traditional threats since the conflict in East Ukraine.

It is worth adding that these potential and already implemented attacks may have different purposes (fraud, espionage, activism/sabotage, cyber terrorism), and may use a variety of techniques (e.g. social engineering, intrusion attempts through the exploitation of vulnerabilities, deployment of malicious software).

Seeking to address the cyber threats of the financial sector, the European Banking Authority (EBA) has issued *Guidelines on ICT Risk Assessment under the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process* (European Banking Authority, 2017). In order to promote a common methodology for assessing ICT risks, the EBA Guidelines support the notion of grouping ICT cyber risks as:

- Cyber-attacks and other external ICT-based attacks (attacks through the internet or outside networks resulting in control being taken of internal ICT systems; execution of fraudulent transactions by hackers; attacks on communication connections and conversations);
- Inadequate internal ICT security (gaining unauthorized access to critical ICT systems; unauthorized manipulations; security threats due to a lack of security awareness; the unauthorized storage or transfer of confidential information);
- Inadequate physical ICT security (misuse or theft of ICT assets; deliberate or accidental damage to physical ICT assets; insufficient physical protection against natural disasters);

- Disruptive and destructive cyber-attacks (attacks which result in the overloading of communication and information systems and the network, preventing services from being accessed).

Taken altogether, the data and trends presented above provide evidence that cyber threats are an increasing challenge for the financial sector. In a digitalized world such as that we live in today, cyber incidents are inevitable. However, the financial sector, as critical infrastructure, must take action to mitigate the associated risks. This responsibility is considerable; in many cases, these cyber incidents received both local and national media coverage, potentially affecting the banks' reputation and eventually also trust in the national CI as a whole. Some incidents were even reported in the international press (European Central Bank, 2020), bringing an international focus to the issue.

After this description of the current cyber threats, it is necessary to examine the key points of the information security applied in the Hungarian financial sector.

3 INFORMATION SECURITY IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR

In addressing the issue of information security, Hungarian financial institutions follow the recommendations of the National Bank of Hungary. As a sector-specific authority, the National Bank summarizes the basis of ICT protection in its Recommendation No. 8/2020 (National Bank of Hungary, 2020a). Besides this recommendation, the best practices of the financial sector are based on relevant case studies, audit findings, the results of various types of test, and industry standards (e.g. the ISO/IEC 27000 series on information security questions; ISO/IEC 22237 on data centre facilities and infrastructures).

A comprehensive list of answers to information security challenges clearly consists of the following solutions in order to reduce the risk of a successful attack and be ready to respond at all times. It must be noted that a holistic approach is required in order to build up effective information security; cyber defence, cyber security and cyber resilience must be taken into consideration together.

3.1 Training and education

Callies and Baumgarten (2020, p 1154) highlighted the significance of the human element in security: *»Often, businesses and institutions are overly focused on technological security and software, but they neglect company culture, people, and processes. The human element, however, is still the weakest link when it comes to cybersecurity«*. This has been recognized by the legislators; provisions for regular mandatory security training in the financial sector have been included in Government Decree 42/2015. The National Bank of Hungary recommends that security training be held on an annual basis (National Bank of Hungary, 2019).

Phishing attacks, one of the most frequent types of cyber-attacks (as mentioned above), try to deceive people. Improving resistance to phishing attacks involves education; staff must be familiar with the importance of recognition and the fast escalation of a phishing attack. Although email-based phishing is currently the principally used deceptive attack, other types must also be mentioned. People working in the financial sector must also be prepared for *vishing* (voice phishing over the phone) and *smishing* (SMS phishing), and certain officers and managers must be well prepared for *spearphishing* (targeting specific people), *whaling* attacks (targeting senior managers or board members) and *honey traps* (attackers pretending a romantic interest).

Kárász and Négyesi (2020) established a link between the security awareness of an operator of essential services and the engagement of the management; employee awareness is based on the awareness level of the management. Therefore, the more engagement by the top management in critical infrastructures, the higher level of information security awareness. In order to provide an experimental and practical learning opportunity through game play, Legárd (2021) outlined several gaming models for training, and drew up a plan for an information security awareness raising application.

It must be noted that, according to the aforementioned Government Decree 42/2015, training is mandatory for everyone involved in the operation or use of ICT systems in production. Moreover, in order to ensure the appropriate high level of knowledge of security experts in financial institutions, special training must be organized for those working in the field of cyber security. As a best practice, financial institutions require that certain staff members have a relevant certificate, or support the staff in acquiring a certificate. It is worth mentioning that sector specific training is provided in Hungary by the national association of the staff of financial institutions.

3.2 Simplifying the ICT landscape – segmenting the network

Financial institutions and Fintech companies are continually developing digital technologies and competing to roll out new services. However, increasing the attack surface has been identified as a cyber risk. Financial institutions must aim to reduce the possible entry points of unauthorized access into the ICT infrastructure.

Furthermore, the network must be segmented, and each segment must have only the minimum number of necessary gates. In the event of an unauthorized access to a certain network segment, all the other segments can be protected by cutting off the minimal access points between them.

In order to be effective, security must be built in to both the hardware and software levels. The *security by design* principle must be taken into consideration to have the right level of security from the very beginning, in order to treat the root cause and not the symptom. However, security decision-making is difficult for new system designs, since there is no past experience that can be taken into consideration. Meland et al.

described a threat likelihood estimation approach to support decision-making for new system designs (Meland et al., 2022).

Additionally, it must be noted that the increasing number of services provided by the financial sector necessarily involves the use of some cloud-based services. Besides the cloud-specific recommendations of the National Bank of Hungary (National Bank of Hungary, 2019), the sector-specific authority also recommends that the cloud service provider's controls for data protection and cyber security be supervised by the financial institution (National Bank of Hungary, 2020a).

3.3 Appropriate, tested procedures

Procedures must exist and be applied and continuously improved in order to prevent

- Unauthorized access to ICT systems;
- Unauthorized use of ICT infrastructure;
- Unauthorized manipulation of data or the system configuration;
- Unauthorized storage or transfer of confidential information.

A notable example of procedure with regard to authorized access to ICT systems is password management, which is an important part of information security. A study by Kadena (2019) administered a survey to university students enrolled in ICT studies to determine the habit of password selection. Kadena's findings provide convincing evidence that even ICT people tend to neglect the use of strong passwords. In financial institutions, password management must force the use of strong passwords. Regular password cracking exercises run by the security operators of the financial institution can ensure that weak passwords are not used in the organization.

Besides these procedures, financial institutions must also have thorough procedures for identifying risks and for taking the appropriate action in order to avoid having a risk without a proper countermeasure. Besides the aforementioned EBA Guidelines on ICT risk assessment (European Banking Authority, 2017), the international standard of ISO 31000 on risk management can also be used.

It must be mentioned that these procedures must be regularly audited and, if required, modified in accordance with the audit findings. Moreover, incidents, losses, changes in the industry standards, and the results of test exercises must all be analyzed and used as input for improving the procedures.

The National Bank of Hungary recommends that the aforementioned procedures exist and that staff are trained in them in a documented manner (National Bank of Hungary, 2020a). Undoubtedly, ICT and information security governance must include all the procedures, principles and standards concerned with setting the financial institution's objectives, strategies and risk management framework.

3.4 Tools of security, defence and resilience

Undoubtedly, state of the art technology must be applied in the field of information security. The most modern tools that have been installed in the financial institutions can be categorized as:

- *Endpoint protection* to detect and block suspicious activity at endpoints (e.g. antivirus and data leakage protection);
- *Endpoint detection and response* to monitor and detect suspicious activity at endpoints (e.g. virus scanning and labelling as part of the data leakage protection system);
- *An intrusion detection system* to monitor and detect suspicious activity in the network or in an ICT system (e.g. host intrusion detection system);
- *An intrusion prevention system* to respond to suspicious activity in the network or in an ICT system (e.g. firewalls);
- *A honeypot* as a decoy to attract cyber criminals who then spend time and effort on nothing really important while their activity is monitored and analyzed;
- *DDoS protection* to protect online services against disruptive and destructive cyber attacks;
- *An incident management system* to support the management tasks of a security incident;
- *A backup system* to store data in a safe way in order to be able to recover data if required.

These tools aim to support the high level of security, defence (by preventing the disruption or destruction of the services and by inhibiting cyber criminals from gaining control over the ICT systems), and resilience (by being able to respond to and recover from a cyber incident and resume business operations). Moreover, by using honeypots, information on the cyber criminals and their techniques can be gained to improve the level of security and the capability of a fast and successful recovery. A honeypot-based approach for intrusion detection/prevention systems has been proposed by Baykara and Das (2018), in order to analyze information in real time.

As described above, backup systems provide the ability to restore data, which is an important aspect of cyber resilience. It must be noted that special backup solutions are applied to data considered the most important, based on an appropriate assessment: *immutable backup solutions*. These data storage solutions refer to technology against malicious attacks aiming to destroy data by deletion, modification or encryption.

Confidential, sensitive and personal data are stored, processed and transferred in the financial sector, so communication channels must also be protected. Applying appropriate actions to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of data transferred through communication channels is expected by the National Bank of Hungary (2020a).

It is worth adding that an appropriate level of security solutions must also be applied in the case of home offices (National Bank of Hungary, 2020b). The importance of the issue of home offices has increased since the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic, so future studies will have to continue to explore the questions of *home offices* and *bring your own device* possibilities in the financial sector to deal with the risk of data leakage. The importance of this issue has been observed by Michelberger (2020), who suggested an appropriate security framework.

3.5 Partnership and information sharing

Undoubtedly, extensive partnership has already been established. Information sharing takes place within the national association of financial institutions, where the sector-specific authority is also represented. This body also serves as a link between the sector and the legislators.

Financial institutions cooperate with external auditors and companies from the field of security. The level of cyber security and cyber resilience can be increased through companies with broad international experience, for example, through the findings of independent auditors. Ethical hackers also may contribute to raising cyber security and cyber resilience to the highest levels. The *red team exercise* refers to a case where ethical hackers test the financial institution's defence by attacking the company. The time of the attack and the method is unknown to the security experts of the financial institution (who are referred to as the *blue team*). *Purple team exercises* refer to a case when internal (blue team) and external (red team) experts join together for a period of time to analyze part of the financial institution's security lines and solutions. These exercises are also an opportunity to try out and improve crisis and incident management.

It is important to note that sharing information about the big picture of information security is dangerous. It is therefore highly advisable to cooperate with various partners within this field, and to share information about and provide access for each partner only to different parts of the entire information security system. The same caution is suggested in the case of staff members; knowing the big picture is not necessary for them.

As already mentioned, all the Hungarian OESs appoint a security liaison officer to act as a single point of contact between the OES and the relevant disaster management bodies. Clear roles in government institutions and the financial sector members lay the ground for appropriate communication during preparation, test exercises, and in the event of a real security incident. Recognizing the importance of this role, the qualifications of the security liaison officer are specified by Act CLXVI of 2012.

3.6 Physical security

Few attempts have been made to explore the role of physical security within the field of information security. However, ICT systems undoubtedly represent a considerable

part of the financial institutions' assets, which must be protected, so physical security must also be addressed. Physical access to the ICT infrastructure creates a twofold risk: the first is the risk of the destruction or theft of the ICT infrastructure elements, and the second is the risk of attacks on communication connections and conversations, or the taking control of ICT systems.

These risks must also be taken into account to improve the level of information security. A high level of physical security has been recommended by the National Bank of Hungary (2020a). In addition to this recommendation, relevant parts of the standard ISO/IEC 22237 on data centre facilities, just like the standard of ISO/IEC 30104 on hardware security assurance, are also to be applied within the field of physical security.

Conclusion Technological innovation plays a crucial role in the financial sector from a strategic standpoint and as a source of competitive advantage. New digital services are continually being offered by financial institutions to an increasing number of customers. Nevertheless, cyber crime has also been increasing in the world, as pointed out by respective international law enforcement bodies and relevant studies. Taking into account the potential impact of a significant disruption to the essential services of the financial sector, there is no doubt that critical infrastructure protection and information security must be addressed appropriately.

To gain a better understanding of the security challenges, the current sector-specific cyber threats were explored. Analyzing the public reports of the relevant authorities, this study found that phishing and DoS are the most common cyber-attacks, while the risk of inadequate ICT and physical security and the supply chain risk must also be taken into consideration.

Seeking answers to these challenges, the key elements of information security were explored. Examining the best practices, regulations and standards, this study has identified the following key elements of information security applied in the financial sector in Hungary: training and education; a simple ICT landscape; appropriate procedures; state-of-the art tools arranged in a comprehensive and multi-layered way; suitable partnership between sector members; and physical security.

This study was undertaken to provide an overview of the cyber threats and best practice security solutions applied in the Hungarian financial sector in order to contribute to the development of information security within critical infrastructure protection.

Bibliography

1. Baykara, M., and Das, R., 2018. *A novel honeypot based security approach for real-time intrusion detection and prevention systems. Journal of Information Security and Applications. Vol 41, pp 103–116. 2018. ISSN 2214-2126.*
2. Beke, É., and Rajnai, Z., 2019. *Global and European cyber defence framework and recommendations. In: Rajnai Z. (Ed.) Kiberbiztonság/Cybersecurity. Biztonságtudományi Doktori Iskola, Budapest, pp 123–136. ISBN 978-963-449-185-9.*
3. Besenyő, J., 2008. *A new kind of war? Internet warfare in Georgia. Army Review, Vol 6, No 3, pp 61–63., 2008.*
4. Besenyő, J., and Fehér, A., 2020. *Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) as new soft targets: private security vs. common security. Journal of Security and Sustainability Issues. Vol 10, No 1., pp 5–18. 2020. ISSN 2029-7025.*
5. Besenyő, J., and Gulyas, A., 2021. *The effect of the dark web on security. Journal of Security and Sustainability Issues. 2021, Vol 11, pp 103–121. ISSN 2029-7025.*
6. *BIS bulletin No. 37., 2021. Covid-19 and the cyber risk in the financial sector. Bank for International Settlements Bulletin. 14 January, 2021. ISBN 978-92-9197-451-0, <https://www.bis.org/publ/bisbull37.pdf>, 24 Nov 2021.*
7. Bullock, J. A., Haddow, G. D., and Coppola, D. P., 2020a. *Chapter 1 – Homeland security: the concept, the organization. In: Introduction to Homeland Security, pp 1–34. 2020. ISBN 978-0-12-817137-0.*
8. Bullock, J. A., Haddow, G. D., and Coppola, D. P., 2020b. *Chapter 8 – Cyber security and critical infrastructure protection. In: Introduction to Homeland Security, pp 425–497. 2020. ISBN 978-0-12-817137-0.*
9. Calliess, C., and Baumgarten, A., 2020. *Cybersecurity in the EU – the Example of the Financial Sector: A Legal Perspective. German Law Journal, Vol 21, No 6, pp 1149–1179.*
10. Cavely, M. D., and Wenger, A., 2019. *Cyber security meets security politics: complex technology, fragmented politics and networked science. Contemporary Security Policy. Vol 41, No 1, pp 5–32. 2020. ISSN 1743-8764.*
11. *European Banking Authority, 2017. Guidelines on ICT Risk Assessment under the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP). 11 May 2017, <https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/default/documents/files/documents/10180/1841624/ef88884a-2f04-48a1-8208-3b8c85b2f69a/Final%20Guidelines%20on%20ICT%20Risk%20Assessment%20under%20SREP%20%28EBA-GL-2017-05%29.pdf?retry=1>, 24 Nov 2021.*
12. *European Central Bank, 2020. Guarding Against IT and Cyber Risk. 13 May 2020, https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/publications/newsletter/2020/html/ssm.nl200513_1.en.html, 24 Nov 2021.*
13. *European Central Bank, 2021. Supervision Newsletter, IT And Cyber Risk: A Constant Challenge. 18 August 2021, https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/publications/newsletter/2021/html/ssm.nl210818_3.en.html, 24 Nov 2021.*
14. *Europol, 2020. Covid-19 sparks upward trend in cybercrime. Press release 5 October 2020, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/covid-19-sparks-upward-trend-in-cybercrime>, 24 Nov 2021.*
15. Galbusera, L., and Giannopoulos, G., 2018. *On input-output economic models in disaster impact assessment. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction. Vol 30, pp 186–198. 2018. ISSN 2212-4209.*
16. Ghinoi, A., Righi, E., Lauriola, P., Giovanetti, E., and Soldati, M., 2021. *Disaster risk reduction and interdisciplinary education and training. Progress in Disaster Science. Vol 10. 2021. ISSN 2590-0617.*
17. *Interpol, 2020. Cybercrime: Covid-19 impact. August 2020, <https://www.interpol.int/content/download/15526/file/COVID-19%20Cybercrime%20Analysis%20Report-%20August%202020.pdf>, 24 Nov 2021.*

18. Kadena, E., 2019. Password selecting habits. In: Rajnai, Z. et al. *Kiberbiztonság - Cybersecurity 2. Biztonságtudományi Doktori Iskola. Budapest. 2019*, pp 161–175. ISBN 978-963-449-185-9.
19. Karabag, S. F., 2020. An unprecedented global crisis, the global, regional, national, political, economic and commercial impact of the coronavirus pandemic. *Journal of Applied Economics and Business Research*. Vol 10, No 1, pp 1–6. ISSN 1927-033X.
20. Kárász, B., and Négyesi, I., 2020. Information security responsibilities of critical (information) infrastructures in the aspect of human risk factors. *Hadtudományi Szemle*. Vol 13, No 3, pp 71–86. 2020. ISSN 2060-0437.
21. Kerti, A., and Záhonyi, L., 2020. A study of the history of information security – incidents, methods, standards and trends. *National Security Review*. Issue 2/2020, pp 176–189. ISSN 2063-2908.
22. Koras, A., et al., 2017. The safety risks related to bank cards and cyber attacks. *Journal of Security and Sustainability Issues*. Vol 6, No 4, pp 563–574. ISSN 2029-7025.
23. Legárd, I., 2021. A game for the future: possibility of developing information security awareness with the help of a gamified application. *Polgári szemle*. Vol 17, No 1-3, pp 358–373. 2021. ISSN 1786-6553.
24. Li, Y., and Liu, Q., 2021. A comprehensive review study of cyber-attacks and cyber security: emerging trends and recent developments. *Energy Reports*. Vol 7, pp 8176–8185. 2021. ISSN 2352-4847.
25. Meland, P. H. et al., 2022. Assessing cyber threats for storyless systems. *Journal of Information Security and Applications*. Issue 64, 2022. ISSN 2214-2126.
26. Michelberger, P., and Fehér-Polgár, P., 2020. BYOD security strategy (aspects of a managerial decision). *Journal of Security and Sustainability Issues*. Vol 9, No 4, pp 1135–1143. 2020. ISSN 2029-7025.
27. Nagy, R., and Somogyi, T., 2021. The financial infrastructure as a critical infrastructure and its specialities. *National Security Review*. Issue 2/2021, pp 213–223. ISSN 2063-2908.
28. National Bank of Hungary, 2019. Recommendation No 4/2019 (IV.1.), <https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/4-2019-felho.pdf>, 24 Nov 2021.
29. National Bank of Hungary, 2020a. Recommendation No 8/2020 (VI.22.), <https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/8-2020-informatikai-rendsz-vedelmerol.pdf>, 24 Nov 2021.
30. National Bank of Hungary, 2020b. Recommendation No 12/2020 (XI.6.), <https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/12-2020-tavmunka-ajanlas.pdf>, 24 Nov 2021.
31. National Counterintelligence and Security Centre, 2020. *Supply Chain Risk Management*. 25 September, 2020. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, <https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/supplychain/20200925-NCSC-Supply-Chain-Risk-Management-trifold.pdf>, 24 Nov 2021.
32. National Cyber Security Centre, 2021. *Weekly Newsletter*. 41/2021, https://nki.gov.hu/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Sajtoszemle_41.het_.pdf, 24 Nov 2021.
33. Panwar, V., and Sen, S., 2019. Economic impact of natural disasters: an empirical re-examination. *Margin: The Journal of Applied Economic Research*. Vol 13, No 1, pp 109–139. 2019. ISSN 0973-8029.
34. Plèta, T., Tvaronavičienė, M., Della Casa, S., and Agafonov, K. 2020. Cyber-attacks to critical energy infrastructure and management issues: overview of selected cases. *Insights into Regional Development*, 2(3), pp 703–715. [https://doi.org/10.9770/IRD.2020.2.3\(7\)](https://doi.org/10.9770/IRD.2020.2.3(7)).
35. Prevezianou, M. F., 2020. Beyond ones and zeros: conceptualizing cyber crises. *Risk, Hazards & Crisis In Public Policy*. Vol 12, No 1, pp 51–72. ISSN 1944-4079.
36. Reznik, O., et al., 2020. Financial security of the state. *Journal of Security and Sustainability Issues*. 2020. Vol 9, No 3, pp 843–852. ISSN 2029-7025.

37. Ruvín, O., et al., 2020. *Cybersecurity as an element of financial security in the conditions of globalization. Journal of Security and Sustainability Issues. Vol 10, No 1, pp 175–188. 2020. ISSN 2029-7025.*
38. Tierney, K., 2012. *Disaster governance: social, political and economic dimensions. Annual Review of Environment and Resources. Vol 37, pp 341–363. 2012. ISSN 1543-5938.*
39. Tvaronavičienė, M., Plėta, T., Della Casa, S., and Latvys, J. 2020. *Cyber security management of critical energy infrastructure in national cybersecurity strategies: cases of the USA, the UK, France, Estonia and Lithuania. Insights into Regional Development, 2(4), pp 802–813. [http://doi.org/10.9770/IRD.2020.2.4\(6\)](http://doi.org/10.9770/IRD.2020.2.4(6)).*
40. Zachosova, N., and Babina, N., 2018. *Identification of threats to financial institutions' economic security as an element of the state financial security regulation. Baltic Journal of Economic Studies. 2018. Vol 4, No 3, pp 80–87. ISSN 2256-0963.*

e-mail: somogyi.tamas@phd.uni-obuda.hu

e-mail: nagy.rudolf@uni-obuda.hu

GEOSTRATEŠKE PERSPEKTIVE SLOVENIJE V SPREMINJajoČEM SE SVETU

GEOSTRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES OF SLOVENIA IN A CHANGING WORLD

Povzetek Članek je namenjen opredelitvi geostrateških temeljev Slovenije ter z njimi povezane paradigme in perspektiv, s katerimi se lahko država v prihodnosti sreča. Posebna pozornost je namenjena identifikaciji geopolitičnega osrčja Slovenije in elementom, ki so z njim povezani, da bi prepoznali dejavnike, ki vplivajo na njen geostrateški položaj. Rdeča nit argumentacije temelji na geopolitičnih teorijah Mackinderja (Osrčje) in Spykmana (Obrobje). Da bi jo poudaril, se avtor sklicuje na organsko geopolitično teorijo Friedricha Ratzela, dela Saula Cohena, Rudolfa Kjelléna in Karla Haushoferja. Ob koncu članka so predstavljene geostrateške možnosti Slovenije v kontekstu nenehno spreminjajočega se sveta.

Ključne besede *Geopolitika, geostrategija, Slovenija, Jadran, osrčje, obrobje.*

Abstract The article focuses on Slovenia's geostrategic foundations, and defines its geostrategic paradigm and perspectives. It pays particular attention to identifying the country's geopolitical core and its underlining elements in order to discern the key influencing factors that could have an impact on its geostrategic position. The main argument is underpinned by using Mackinder's Heartland and Spykman's Rimland geopolitical theories. To reinforce it, the author also refers to Friedrich Ratzel's Organic geopolitical theory, and the work of Saul Cohen, Rudolf Kjellén and Karl Haushofer. The article concludes with possible geostrategic options for Slovenia in the context of an ever-changing world.

Key words *Geopolitics, Geostrategy, Slovenia, Adriatic, Heartland, Rimland.*

Introduction

In the third decade of the 21st century, Europe and the world found themselves in a considerably different geostrategic situation, unthinkable just a few years before, and especially at the end of the Cold War. The Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 seems to mark a turning point in Europe's contemporary history. It can be perceived in a much broader context than purely as an act of aggression against a sovereign state which undermines the basic principles of international law, enshrined in the UN Charter¹, and the Helsinki Final Act². Following Vladimir Putin's speeches³ on the eve of the invasion, tendencies to relativize the history and geopolitical events of the past 100 years, and in particular since 1991, became more apparent, and the upcoming geopolitical consequences more far-reaching.

Having one (or potentially two)⁴ of the great powers overtly challenging world order means that a major geostrategic shift has appeared, and a new strategic balance is in the making, as also acknowledged by Henry Kissinger⁵ and George Friedman⁶. To achieve such a new balance, the very fundamentals of Europe's peace are being put into question by undermining the territorial integrity and questioning the statehood tradition of certain countries. Putin's first February speech did exactly that, as the Russian President built up his argument beginning from the aftermath of the 1917 October revolution. He stated that *»Ukraine never had a tradition of genuine statehood«, and that »modern Ukraine was entirely created by Russia, more precisely, Bolshevik, communist Russia ... after the revolution of 1917 and Lenin and his associates did it in a very rude way towards Russia itself – by separating, tearing away from it part of its own historical territories«* (Putin's speech of 21 Feb 2022). He goes on to list other examples (e.g. territorial changes in Romania and the historical region of Bessarabia) and stresses that *»Stalin endowed Poland with part of the original German territories, and in 1954 Khrushchev for some reason took away Crimea from Russia and gave it to Ukraine«* (Putin's speech of 21 Feb 2022).

In Europe, this type of political discourse, especially from one of the great powers, has been unheard of since at least the Second World War. It could be especially worrisome for all those European countries which were not independent before 1991 and without a recognised statehood tradition before 1918. Alongside Ukraine

¹ Article 2, para 4 states that *»all UN Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations«* (UN Charter, 1945, p 3).

² *Territorial integrity of Member States is, among other things, one of the cornerstones of the Helsinki Final Act, based on which the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was established.*

³ *With the aim of justifying the invasion on Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin addressed the Russian public twice, on 21st February and on 23rd February 2022.*

⁴ *Russia and China*

⁵ *At the 2022 World Economic Forum in Davos, the former US Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, stated that »the Ukraine conflict has produced a rupture in the economic arrangements that have been made in the period before, so that the definition and operation of a global system will have to be reconsidered«* (Kissinger, interview, 23 May 2022).

⁶ *In his article of 3 May 2022, »The Beginning of a New Era«, George Friedman stated that systemic shifts occur cyclically, »roughly 30-40 years apart« and that »we are now in an era in which shifts occur«* (Friedman, 3 May 2022).

and some others⁷, Slovenia too falls into that category. To understand the strategic options that such countries have on a geopolitical chessboard it is therefore important first to try to understand the fundamentals of the contemporary geostrategic game, and second to understand individual countries specific geostrategic positions, the elements that form these positions (e.g. political, military, historical, economic, geographic, etc.), their features, and possible future developments. In this article, the author presents and analyzes each of these aspects by referring to several geopolitical theories (such as the Heartland theory of Mackinder, the Rimland theory of Spykman, the Organic theory of Ratzel, or the geopolitical thoughts of Kjellén and Haushofer). He also illustrates his arguments by using the book by Saul Cohen, *»Geopolitics, The Geography of International Relations«* especially with a view to determining Slovenia's *perspectives in the new geostrategic reality*⁸.

1 EUROPE'S GEOSTRATEGIC CONTEXT UP TO 2007: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

A century ago, the British geographer Halford Mackinder, in his book *»Democratic Ideals and Reality«*, stated that the one *»who rules East Europe commands the Heartland, who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island, who rules the World-Island commands the World«* (Mackinder, 1996, p 106). Later Nicholas Spykman in *»The Geography of the Peace«* claimed that *»the Rimland of the Eurasian land mass must be viewed as an intermediate region, situated as it is between the Heartland and the marginal seas«* and that the *»Rimland functions as a vast buffer zone of conflict between sea power and land power«* (Spykman, 1944, p 41)⁹. *»Who controls Rimland rules Eurasia, who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world«* (Spykman, 1944, pp 41, 43). Whereas Mackinder's work points to *»a struggle of Heartland-dominated land power against sea power, placing the Heartland-based land power in the better position«*, Spykman held that the *»Rimland was the key to world power, as the maritime-oriented Rimland was central to contact with the outside world«* (Kaplan, 2013, p 96).

These theories, and those related to the Eurasian landmass, laid the foundations of modern geopolitics and its strategic implications, and are graphically presented in Figures 1 and 2 (See p 114). Spykman's theory heavily influenced the US Cold War Containment strategy¹⁰ towards the Soviet Union, which, at that time, practically controlled the whole of Mackinder's Heartland. This strategy was implemented

⁷ Such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia, Latvia, Moldova, North Macedonia, and Slovakia.

⁸ Full names of the authors are: Halford Mackinder, Nicholas Spykman, Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolf Kjellén, Karl Haushofer, and Saul Bernard Cohen.

⁹ Furthermore, according to Cohen, there are *»two major geographical settings that provide arenas for the development of distinctive geopolitical structures, maritime and continental«* (Cohen, 2015, p 38).

¹⁰ The idea of containing the communist (Soviet) expansion by creating strategic alliances in geographic areas which correspond to what Spykman calls the *»Rimland«*. It was first voiced by US diplomat George F. Kennan in 1946 and 1947.

through the Truman doctrine¹¹ in 1947, which became the basis of American foreign policy throughout the Cold War. It contributed, in 1949, to the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and of various security agreements in East Asia, such as those with Japan and with South Korea¹². The Marshall plan (or the European Recovery Programme), initiated by the US after the Second World War, was a tool of the Containment strategy, and helped the economies of the Western European nations to recover by fostering economic cooperation. Even though the European Union itself does not stem from the Marshall Plan, the latter inspired the European integration process which began in 1951 with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community.

Since the Truman era, the Containment strategy has become a standard in US foreign and defence policy. It was advocated by two influential political advisors and strategic thinkers, Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzeziński¹³ even after the end of the Cold War and the dismantlement of the Soviet Union. The reason was the renewed interest of the US in Eastern Europe and Central Asia as a way to expand its influence from the Rimland to the very Heartland. Their arguments influenced the US Defence Planning Guidance of 1992, the so-called »Wolfowitz doctrine«. This document set the scene for post-Cold War US strategic thinking, where the main US political and military objective was to prevent the emergence of a rival superpower, and to be prepared to take unilateral actions (US Defence Planning Guidance, 1992, pp 2, 5). Key elements from this Strategic Guidance were taken over in the 2002 Bush Doctrine, which marked the first decade of the 21st century. It proclaimed a unilateral approach towards geopolitical issues, the enlargement of NATO to Eastern Europe, and the outreach of US strategic interests into the Caucasus and Central Asia (thus entering Mackinder's Heartland and fighting the War on Terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan, which corresponds to Spykman's Rimland).

At the beginning of the 21st century the world's geopolitical setting, according to Cohen, was composed of geostrategic realms¹⁴, geopolitical regions¹⁵, shatterbelts¹⁶ and national states with five orders of national power level (Cohen, 2015, pp 37, 48, 51). In this context, the first or the highest level consists of »major powers – the US, the EU, Japan, Russia and China. These all have global reach, serving as the cores of the three geostrategic realms« (Cohen, 2015, p 51), where the maritime realm, led

¹¹ Harry S. Truman was US President from 1945 to 1953. In his speech to the US Congress in March 1947, Truman announced US support to all nations that were threatened by the Soviet Union, with the aim of containing Soviet geopolitical expansion during the Cold War.

¹² After the 1950-53 Korean War.

¹³ Zbigniew Brzeziński, US diplomat and political scientist, touched upon this topic in his books »Diplomacy« and »The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives«.

¹⁴ 1 – Atlantic & Pacific maritime realm, 2 – Eurasian continental Russian heartland, 3 – Mixed maritime-continental East Asia.

¹⁵ Maritime-related regions are North America, South America, Maritime Europe & Maghreb, and the Asia-Pacific Rim; the other two realms encompass only one region each with the same name as the two realms.

¹⁶ Deeply fragmented regions of the Middle East and most of Africa, which are global destabilizers.

by the US and supported by the EU and Japan, dominated the other two¹⁷. In Cohen's system, a special status is granted to »gateway« states or regions, which »play a novel role in linking different parts of the world by facilitating the exchange of peoples, goods and ideas¹⁸« (Cohen, 2015, p 54). The value of gateway countries consists in their mitigation role which »helps to convert former barrier boundaries to borders of accommodation« (Cohen, 2015, p 55). In this context, according to Cohen »Estonia is beginning to serve such a role as a link along the geostrategic boundary between the European portion of the maritime realm and heartlandic Russia, and Slovenia plays such a role between Central and South-Eastern Europe« (Cohen, 2015, p 55).

2 A CHANGING WORLD (2007-2022): GEOSTRATEGY IN PRACTICE

US supremacy was unquestioned until 2007, when the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, in a speech in Munich, claimed that US supremacy in the world's strategic affairs had left Russia and others out. Putin went further to argue that »the unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in today's world«, that the »force's dominance inevitably encourages a number of countries to acquire weapons of mass destruction«, and that the world had »reached that decisive moment when we must seriously think about the architecture of global security« (Putin's Munich speech, 2007). Furthermore, Putin stated that Russia, as a successor to the Soviet Union, had complied with all agreements, be them nuclear or conventional, and in return »NATO has put its frontline forces on Russia's borders« (Putin's Munich speech, 2007). The same message was repeated in February 2022 when Putin recalled Russia's continued strategic uneasiness with »the expansion of the NATO bloc to the east, bringing its military infrastructure closer to Russian borders« (Putin's speech of 23 Feb 2022). Russia seems to perceive NATO (and EU) expansion towards its borders as a loss of its strategic depth, which lies, according to Friedman, as far as possible »west of the line from St. Petersburg to Rostov on Don« (Friedman, 2016, para 4), a loss to which Russia needs to react.

A change in Russia's behaviour on the world scene can therefore be traced back to 2007, but it was first visible in the following year, after the NATO Summit in Bucharest, when the war in Georgia broke out. As of that moment, events and moves on the strategic chessboard began to accelerate and fundamentally altered the world's geostrategic landscape. The declared unilateralism of the 1990s was gradually eroded by overt discussions about a transition into multilateralism on the one hand, and by remarks about China and Russia trying to impose a new world order on the other. The sequence of major events up to the beginning of the War in Ukraine in 2022, as the author sees them, are presented in Figure 3 (See p 115).

¹⁷ The second order consists of regional powers with the potential to extend their power to other regions. The third, fourth, and fifth orders consist of those states with a limited reach to parts of their regions only (based on Cohen, 2015, p 51).

¹⁸ Characteristics of gateway states, based on Cohen, are their strategic economic location or the adaptability of their inhabitants to economic opportunities.

Geostrategic shifts usually announce the transformation of old political and strategic paradigms. Modern history offers plenty of examples, such as the events after the fall of Napoleon, the 1856 Crimean War, the 1878 Berlin Congress, the two World Wars, and others. Most of them have changes of borders as a common denominator. Furthermore, the disappearance of various empires after the First World War (Habsburg, Ottoman and Russian Empires) and the birth (Poland, Yugoslavia, etc) or territorial expansions (Italy, Japan, Romania) of some countries, underpin the argument of Friedrich Ratzel¹⁹ and Rudolf Kjellén²⁰ about the Organic geopolitical theory. In the last strategic change, which occurred in the 1990s, Slovenia became independent for the first time, and thus a sovereign actor on the chessboard of the European Rimland. As we again face geostrategic turbulence with possible consequences to Europe's political geography, we will elaborate next on Slovenia's geostrategic context, its prospects, and its strategic »*marge de manoeuvre*«²¹.

3 SLOVENIA ON THE GEOSTRATEGIC MAP

In Slovene geopolitical and geostrategic thinking²², Slovenia is usually defined as a »*contact area*« which »*creates some difficulties in the allocation of Slovene territory to standardized categories*« (Bufon, 2003, p 125). Bufon sees it as a country »*on the edge*« or »*in the contact area of many geopolitical and interest spheres*« (Bufon, 2003, p 128), important for the »*control of the Balkans as a contact point between the USA on one side and Russia and Turkey on the other*« (Bufon, 2003, p 128). Similarly, Slovenia is placed, according to Črnčec (2010, p 41), »*in between*«, and is at the same time a »*Central European and Southern European country*«²³. From the standpoint of the »*military-geographic classification, there is no doubt that Slovenian space has always been an integral part of the Southern Theatre of War*« (Črnčec, 2010, p 42). Furlan defines Slovenia as »*a continental and maritime country*« and as »*a crossroads between the Central European, Southern European and Mediterranean geostrategic and geopolitical spaces*« (Furlan, 2020, p 208).

In the geopolitical context of Mackinder and Spykman, Slovenia's position falls outside the Heartland but within the Inner or Marginal Crescent. In Spykman's words, it forms part of the western, European part of the Rimland, being in between the Heartland and the marginal seas, that is, the Adriatic. As the Rimland functions overall as »*a vast buffer zone of conflict between sea power and land power*«

¹⁹ Friedrich Ratzel was one of the founders of German geopolitics and a father of the »Organic theory«, in which he compared political entities (e.g. states) with a living organism, claiming that in order to survive both are searching for nourishment, firstly in terms of food, and secondly (independent states) in the form of territorial expansion.

²⁰ Rudolf Kjellén was a Swedish political scientist and geographer who first coined the term »geopolitics« in 1899. His work was influenced by Friedrich Ratzel.

²¹ In English: room for manoeuvre, flexibility, limitations to doing something, options.

²² The first known paper on Slovene geopolitics was the 1926 article »Geopolitičen oris Jugoslavije« by Silvo Kranjec.

²³ Based on this fact, Slovenes could be identified as »Central European Southerners« (Črnčec, 2010, p 41).

(Spykman, 1941, p 41), the same could be said about the territory of Slovenia and of the territories where Slovenes have traditionally dwelt since their settlement in the 6th century. To the West it has traditionally touched the Roman (maritime) world or Italy, and to the East the Ugro-Finnic (continental) world, or Hungary. At the same time, this territory has served the Germanic (continental) world (which is by tradition land-oriented) as an access to the seas to the south (the Mediterranean/Adriatic). Throughout modern history, the Maritime powers (France, the United Kingdom, and the USA) have made efforts to cut off the Germanic world from access to this sea. In this context, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SHS), which was established in 1918²⁴, served as a barrier to German access to the Adriatic and at the same time as a guarantor²⁵ against the reconstitution of the Habsburg Monarchy.

After the Second World War, due to its geostrategic position, socialist Yugoslavia (and in this context Slovenia as one of its constitutional federal units) served as a buffer zone between the two geopolitical blocks, the Western (capitalist) Maritime-oriented one, located in Spykman's Rimland, and the Eastern (communist), land-oriented one covering all of Mackinder's Heartland. As Yugoslavia covered the eastern part of the Adriatic it was, based on Mackinder's adapted Heartland boundary²⁶, an extremity of the European part of the Rimland bordering the Heartland (Cohen, 2015, p 22).

The breakup of the Soviet Union (and also Yugoslavia) could be seen as a victory of capitalism over communism, but also of the Maritime powers over one Land power²⁷, which was by then practically controlling the whole Heartland and an important part of the Rimland²⁸. This geostrategic shift facilitated the re-emergence of other traditional powers, such as Germany and Turkey in Europe, and China and Japan in the Asia-Pacific region. At that time (the beginning of the 1990s) it seemed that the geopolitical theories of Mackinder and Spykman had been overcome. At the same time, in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, including Yugoslavia, other geopolitical theories re-emerged, notably the Organic theory of Ratzel²⁹ and Kjellén. With the opening of the strategic vacuum, the Organic theory re-appeared first in strategic borderland areas: the Balkans and the Caucasus. The wars in former Yugoslavia and Nagorno-Karabakh were to some extent a mixture of the legacy of post-WWI events and the related unsettled territorial conflicts, and of the renewed impact of the re-emergence of powers such as Germany in the Balkans and Turkey (and Iran) in the Caucasus.

²⁴ *From 1929 the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.*

²⁵ *Together with the Kingdom of Romania and Czechoslovakia.*

²⁶ *In 1943 Mackinder moved the boundary of the Heartland west, thus in principle setting the border with the European part of the Rimland along ideological borders, where Yugoslavia was outside, while its eastern neighbours, Romania and Bulgaria, formed part of the Heartland (based on Cohen, 2015, p 21).*

²⁷ *The Soviet Union.*

²⁸ *Eastern Europe and, to some extent, China.*

²⁹ *Political concepts that include territorial expansions, such as Greater Serbia, Greater Croatia and/or Greater Albania.*

After nearly a decade, this vacuum was filled by international organizations such as NATO and the European Union, which, within two decades, practically integrated most of the European part of the Rimland and thus, at least temporarily, froze the impact of the Organic theory. In this context Cohen sees maritime Europe together with Maghreb as a separate geopolitical region, »*Maritime Europe*« (Cohen, 2015, pp 44-45). By entering the Euro-Atlantic organizations in 2004, the newly independent countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including Slovenia, seemed to overcome their traditional status as a strategic buffer zone. But the events that followed proved this assumption to be short-lived or just too optimistic.

3.1 Geostrategic focal point

In global geostrategic thinking, the importance of the Slovene-inhabited territories has been usually linked to the »*Adriatic question*« and in particular the »*Trieste question*«. This north Adriatic town has continually drawn the attention of great powers, as possessing it and controlling its port held considerable strategic value. Geographically, Trieste is the most northern access point of Central Europe to the Mediterranean, and traditionally was controlled by German-speaking countries³⁰. It represented the (only) direct German access to the warm seas. The traditional German school of geopolitics, embodied by Haushofer and his followers, places it in the »*German cultural space*« (Grafenauer, 1994, pp 30, 31). When able to possess Trieste, German-ruled countries basically cut Europe along the north-south line (from the North Sea to the Adriatic), thus placing Western Europe in the situation of having no direct territorial links with Eastern Europe. In this context, Germany and the Habsburg Empire were in an advantageous position to directly influence the European part of Rimland and control the gates towards the Heartland. However, as Trieste was ethnically surrounded by Slovenes, the access to it, be it from German or Italian-speaking lands, would have always crossed Slovenes' territory and thus had a significant geostrategic impact on this nation.

During the 1919 Versailles peace conference, one of the ideas to overcome the so-called »*Adriatic question*« and the related dispute over Trieste and its hinterland between the Kingdom of Italy and other Great Powers was to establish an independent (buffer) country which would stretch from the Adriatic to the river Drava. On the eve of the Second World War, Slovene national leader Anton Korošec allegedly recalled the so-called »*English plan*« for Slovenia, originally drafted at the end of the First World War by Toynbee³¹, who proposed to the UK Foreign office the creation of »*an independent country in the vicinity of Trieste*« (Godeša, 2019, p 339) in order to mitigate the Italian (French and UK) strategic concerns over German access to the north Adriatic. While thinking about solving the issue of Trieste, Toynbee, who

³⁰ Trieste began to evolve as the most important (open) port of the Habsburg Empire in 1719, which means that it provided strategic access to the southern seas to the German world for 200 years, until 1918 when it came under Italian possession.

³¹ An independent Slovene state was proposed, for the first time, by British historian Arnold Joseph Toynbee in his work »*Nationality and the War*«, published in 1915.

was respected not only in the UK but also in the US, stated that the »*Slovene unit should become neither part of Italy nor of new Germany*«. It should »*become either part of a new Yugoslav state or an independent political entity, under European protectorate*« (Lipušček, 2011, p 64).

After the Second World War, Yugoslavia was not granted the port of Trieste, mainly to prevent the Soviet Union (a land power controlling the Heartland) to access, through its political influence over Yugoslavia, one of the key strategic ports of the Rimland's marginal seas, which would open the gates to the plains of river Po and thus to the whole of northern Italy. Instead, a kind of a buffer protectorate was established, called the »*Free Territory of Trieste*«³². Seven years later, due to the geostrategic shift³³, part of the southern half of that territory came under the jurisdiction of Slovenia (itself part of Yugoslavia), which completely changed the geostrategic dimension of Slovenia, providing it with access to the sea through the town of Koper.

The situation after Slovenia's independence proved once more the importance of Trieste and its surroundings on the geostrategic stability of Slovenia. Italy's support for Slovenia's accession to the EU³⁴ and NATO in the mid-1990s was manifested only after the two countries came to an agreement over the property-related issues emanating from the period of the Free Territory of Trieste (FTT). Thus, an agreement was concluded in the context of the Slovenia Association Agreement, with the EU granting a privileged right to acquire properties to those citizens who left the part of the FTT integrated into Yugoslavia after 1954. It was of vital geopolitical importance for strengthening the stability and prosperity of the young state. Recently reported plans to transform Trieste into one of the main European entry ports of the Chinese-sponsored »*Road and Belt Initiative*« prove yet again its strategic importance.

3.2 National heartland

The father of geopolitics, Rudolf Kjellén, saw the state as »*an independent object of study with its own dynamic and logic, power and will, an organic unity of land and people, an organism with body and soul, a personality on the international stage*« (Tunander, 2001, p 453). Kjellén explained his perspective by »*using further metaphors from poetry and prose: like man, the state may lose a limb without perishing, but there are others, without which the state could not survive*« (Tunander, 2001, p 453). Taking Kjellén's definition further and paraphrasing Mackinder, such an area could be called a »*national heartland*«, or the »*historic or nuclear core*« by Cohen (Cohen, 2015, p 39). A national heartland is usually linked to a territory or places (historical, mythological, and/or religious) in which the state or the statehood

³² *The Free Territory of Trieste was an independent territory under the responsibility of the UN. For a period of seven years, it acted as a free city state. Italian and Slovene were both official languages and thus those nations acted as constitutional nations of that state. It was divided between Italy and Yugoslavia in 1954.*

³³ *From 1948 Yugoslavia distanced itself from the Soviet bloc which enabled better relations with the West.*

³⁴ *Slovenia and Italy, with the support of the EU Spanish Presidency, signed the so-called »Spanish compromise« in 1996, translated into Annex XIII of the 1999 EU-Slovenia Association Agreement (OJ L 51/67-68 of 26.2.1999).*

idea originated. It serves as a reference point or a nucleus for state legitimacy and tradition. Even nations with little or no statehood tradition try to find such a reference point.

In 1918, the Slovenes emerged in (modern) history as one of the three constitutional nations within the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes³⁵, and thus placed their name on the world map for the first time (Hassid, 2021, p 28). Before that date the statehood tradition effectively did not exist. There were only two historical reference points which contributed to the development of a statehood idea, which Hassid calls »*the myths*« (Hassid, 2021, pp 56-60). The first was the early (proto)Slovene medieval principality of Carantania (7th-9th centuries) located in today's Austrian Carinthia, and the second was the Principality of Celje (15th century)³⁶. The other (proto)Slovene medieval principality of Carniola (8th-9th century), located south of Carantania, was little known and therefore did not figure as a reference. But historically, it was in fact Carniola which, due to its central geographical position among other Slovene-inhabited lands and its ethnic Slovene character, provided the territorial nucleus for the future unification of the Slovene-inhabited lands of the Holy Roman and later the Habsburg Empire. It seems that the death of the Carantanian statehood idea (or myth) in 1918-20³⁷ made space for a new tradition, with its (geo)political epicentre in the territory of Carniola (Kranjska). The movement was obviously evolutionary, beginning back in the 16th century with the first book written in Slovene, which slowly sparked the awareness of the ethnic specificities of a nation living between the Adriatic and the eastern Alps. Furthermore, many key political and intellectual elites who contributed to the process of national unification³⁸ came from Celje and its surroundings. Moreover, the area played an essential part in the defence of Maribor and Slovene Styria, and in the military intervention in Carinthia during the crucial months from November 1918 till June 1919.

That said, one could geographically identify the Slovene national heartland as being formed of Ljubljana, Upper Carniola (Gorenjska), Lower Carniola (Dolenjska) without Kočevje/Gottschee³⁹ and Bela Krajina⁴⁰, the traditional Inner Carniola

³⁵ *The State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs was established on 29th of October 1918, but 33 days later, on 1st of December 1918, together with the Kingdom of Serbia, formed the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.*

³⁶ *The three golden stars from the coat of arms of the Dukes of Celje represented Slovenes in the coat of arms of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, later the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. As of 1991, these three golden stars form the coat of arms of Slovenia, thus forming a symbolic continuity of Slovene statehood tradition as of 1918.*

³⁷ *The contributions of the Slovenes in Carinthia in implementing the national unification in 1918-20 were modest. Furthermore, the majority of Slovenes voted against unification with the rest of the country in the Carinthian plebiscite on 10 October 1920.*

³⁸ *For example, the first bishop of Maribor, Anton Martin Slomšek; the leader of the Styrian National Council in 1918 in Maribor and the initiator of Ljubljana University, Karel Verstovšek; the northern border combatant Lt. Franjo Malgaj and his associates; and numerous key figures in organizing national anti-Nazi resistance in Maribor during the Second World War, such as Miloš Zidanšek.*

³⁹ *A German speaking 'island'.*

⁴⁰ *The traditional Uskoki region, geographically separated from the rest of Carniola by the chain of Gorjanci mountains.*

(Notranjska)⁴¹ region, and the territory of the traditional Celje region (Savinjska)⁴². This territory roughly corresponds to the basin of the rivers Sava and Savinja, and comprises various strategic mountain passes, such as the Ljubljana and Postojna Gates, the Rateče valley in the Julian Alps, the Ljubelj/Loibl Pass in the Karavanke Alps, and the pass over the Vitanje mountains, a natural barrier in an east-west direction between Maribor and Celje. To the south, the area is limited by the Kočevski Rog forest and the Gorjanci mountains, and is open towards the river Sava in the direction of Zagreb, Croatia.

Within this national heartland area, Ljubljana acts as a key central point. According to Cohen's classification, it is called a »*Capital or Political Centre*« (Cohen, 2015, p 39). But it would be impossible for it to exert such a role without other organic elements within the heartland. In this context, the author sees the control of the four surrounding towns as crucial for the functioning of the heartland and its capital. These are Postojna, Novo Mesto, Celje and Kranj. They form a square and the entrance to the Slovene heartland, and at the same time an ultimate fortress for the heartland's capital, Ljubljana. In this context it was not by chance that in the 1990s the Slovene Armed Forces held three military Headquarters at operation level in the three of the four towns: Postojna, Kranj and Celje (Šteh, Tovornik, 2013, p 20).

3.3 Key geostrategic points outside the national heartland

If the national heartland area is key for the survival of a state, other geographic areas can be essential for its strategic position, which makes a country relevant in the wider geostrategic context. In the case of Slovenia, three towns have such features. The first is Koper, which provides territorial access to the Adriatic Sea. Koper's hinterland represents a connecting area for Italy's access to Croatia and the other countries of the Balkans. The second is Maribor, which is at the crossroads of two strategic axes, the north-south one connecting Austria and Germany with Croatia/Serbia, the other countries of the Balkans and the Middle East⁴³, and the east-west one, providing Hungary and Ukraine with access to Italy/France and the shortest access to the sea⁴⁴ via the port of Koper. The third town is Nova Gorica, situated at the border with Italy and at the gates to the Friulian/river Po plains, which extend deep into the north of Italy. Nova Gorica is an entry point to the shortest route from Italy via Ljubljana towards Hungary, Eastern Europe and Central Asia. It is also the last Slovene urban outpost in the western part of the country. Together with the

⁴¹ The traditional inner Carniola region includes the towns of Idrija and Postojna and stretches to the strategic point of Senožeče, from where the terrain opens towards the Vipava valley and further into the plains of the river Po in Italy, towards the Karst and Trieste (Adriatic) and towards Ilirska Bistrica and the Kvarner/Quarnero Bay at the town of Rijeka/Fiume in the Adriatic.

⁴² Which corresponds to the current Celje statistical region.

⁴³ Pan-European corridor No 10.

⁴⁴ Pan-European corridor No 5.

national heartland, these three towns and their associated regions represent what Cohen calls »*the Ecumens*«⁴⁵ (Cohen, 2015, p 39).

All three towns have common geopolitical, economic, educational, and spiritual characteristics. From the geopolitical point of view, all have taken up the role of a replacement/substitute for the urban and economic centres lost after the First and Second World Wars. In this context, Maribor could be seen as a replacement for Klagenfurt/Celovec in Austrian Carinthia, Koper as a replacement for Trieste/Trst (in Italy), and Nova Gorica as a replacement for Gorizia/Gorica (in Italy). Educationally, all three towns are University centres⁴⁶ alongside the capital, Ljubljana. From a spiritual perspective, all three have traditionally had an ecclesiastical seat, a Bishop or even an Archbishop⁴⁷. Even though Nova Gorica has officially only a co-cathedral seat, it represents the Slovene Rimo catholic tradition of Gorizia/Gorica⁴⁸, which played a key role in preserving the Slovene national identity in the whole Littoral region in the times of the Habsburg Empire, as well as later on during Fascist Italy.

The latest Spatial Development Strategy of Slovenia (SDSS), agreed by the National Parliament in 2004, re-emphasises the strategic importance of these three towns by stressing that »*due to their size, population pressures, universal issues and/or anticipated development, special attention shall be devoted to the harmonized development of wider urban areas of the centres of national significance, particularly Ljubljana, Maribor, Koper, Celje and Nova Gorica*« (SDSS, 2004, p 25). In the draft Spatial Development Strategy (SPRS) 2050, Maribor and Koper are recognized as first category towns, whereas Nova Gorica falls into the second category (SPRS, 2020, p 34). Nevertheless, the document acknowledges its importance as cross-border urban agglomeration with Italy's Gorizia (SPRS, 2020, p 16). That said, Maribor, Koper and Nova Gorica are seen as three strategic bastions which open the doors towards the country's heartland.

3.4 Geostrategic surroundings – neighbouring countries

Slovenia is bordered by Austria to the north, Italy to the west, Hungary to the north-east, Croatia to the east and south, and the Adriatic Sea to the south-west. All are members of the EU, and three of them are members of NATO.

Austria is a landlocked, continental-oriented country located in the centre of Europe, covering the territory between Germany to the north-west and Italy and the Balkans

⁴⁵ *Areas of greatest density of population and economic activity which are, usually, the state's most important political area (based on Cohen, 2015, p 39).*

⁴⁶ *In addition to the university, Maribor also hosts the Military School.*

⁴⁷ *Since 2006, Maribor has been an Archdiocese and thus a seat of an Archbishop. Gorizia/Gorica is an Archdiocese, which territory, in Habsburg times, covered, among others, the diocese of Ljubljana and the diocese of Trieste-Koper.*

⁴⁸ *The first ever two Archbishops in the history of the Slovene nation and the Slovene Catholic Church were the Archbishops of Gorica/Gorizia, Jakob Missia (1897-1902), and Frančišek Borgia Sedej (1906-1931). Jakob Missia was made a cardinal in 1899, the first Slovene ever to be given that rank.*

to the south and south-east. Its strategic focus is on Central Europe, northern Italy and the Balkans, in particular those areas controlled by the Habsburg Empire before 1919. Its main geostrategic partner in Europe seems to be Germany. Its border with Slovenia is defined in the 1919 Treaty of Saint Germain and the 1955 Austrian State Treaty. For Austria, according to Jančar, its *»strategic importance is quite high as it comes third, after Germany and Italy«* (Jančar, 1996, p 95). He adds that *»geopolitically, Slovenia covers the territory which represents the shortest distance for most of Austrian territory to the Mediterranean«*, likewise for its geographical position with regard to transport in the direction of the Balkans and the Levant. *»When strategically heading towards the South, it is difficult for Austria to avoid Slovenia«* (Jančar, 1996, p 95). Cohen sees Austria, together with Slovenia, as a gateway country (Cohen, 2015, p 57). Historically, the territories of South Austria⁴⁹ and Slovenia used to form *»Inner Austria«* which, together with the Duchy of Austria, represented the *»nucleus around which the Habsburg Empire was built«* (Lipušček, 2003, p 141)⁵⁰. The loss of Slovene-inhabited territories in Carinthia after the First World War, and the memory of Nazi occupation in Slovenia during the Second World War, have hampered closer strategic cooperation between the two countries.

Italy is a predominantly maritime-oriented country, strategically focused on the Mediterranean region and the Alpine borderlands. Its most important geostrategic partner in Europe seems to be France (Maselli, interview, 5 May 2021). The Italian-Slovene border was defined in the 1920 Treaty of Rapallo⁵¹, the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, the 1954 London Memorandum and the 1975 Treaty of Osimo. Italy's eastern border was at the core of both Italian and Slovene geostrategic aspirations for much of the 20th century, and a cause of geostrategic traumas that still partly resonate on both sides of the frontier. The common strategic denominator for both was control over Trieste. Cataruzza (2017, p 290) states that the *»question of the Italian eastern frontier which ended in 1954 played a crucial role in the history of the Italian nation. It remained for about fifty years one of the great themes capable of triggering national mobilization«*. With the Treaty of Osimo, which officially closed the chapter of Italy's eastern border, and Italian recognition of Slovenia as a successor state to the Yugoslav treaties after 1991, gives hope that the Risorgimento⁵² is finally over. In this context, both countries can further develop their strategic ties, established in the mid-1990s⁵³, as Slovenia represents the gate to the Pannonian plains and beyond (Hungary Romania, Ukraine), as well as to the Balkan region.

⁴⁹ *The Duchies of Carinthia and Styria.*

⁵⁰ *It could be considered as a »historic or nuclear core« or a kind of »national heartland« of the Habsburg Empire.*

⁵¹ *The first few kilometres of the border, spanning from the Slovene/Austrian/Italian three border point at Mount Peč in the Karavanke Alps to a few hundred metres north of Kotova špica in the Julian Alps, remain the same as that defined in the Treaty of Rapallo in 1920.*

⁵² *A political movement for Italian unification initiated in the 19th century.*

⁵³ *Following the 1996 »Spanish compromise«, and Slovenia's Accession to the EU, Italy launched a »Trilateral Cooperation« with Slovenia and Hungary, thus trying to play a visible role in Central and Eastern Europe.*

Hungary is a landlocked, continental-oriented country with its strategic focus on Central Europe, and in particular the areas historically controlled by the Crown of Saint Stefan before 1919. Its border with Slovenia is defined in the 1920 Trianon Treaty. Historically, its main geostrategic partner in Europe was Germany/Austria, but currently its focus seems to be on the Višegrad⁵⁴ countries. Slovenia plays an important role as it is seen as a natural access to the Adriatic through the Port of Koper, not only for Hungary but also for the other Višegrad countries. Furthermore, it provides the shortest route for Hungary towards South-Western Europe (Italy/France/Spain).

Croatia is both a continental and a maritime-oriented country, and at present the continental dimension seems to be prevalent. Its strategic focus lies in Central Europe and the Western Balkans. Historically, it was closely related to Hungary. Its main geostrategic partner in Europe seems to be Germany/Austria. Slovenia is seen as a gateway towards Northern and Western Europe (Austria/Germany and Italy/France). While Cvrtić (2000, p 150) sees Croatia, similarly to Slovenia, as a »gateway to South-Eastern Europe«, Cohen places it in Central and Eastern Europe and in particular in the Western Balkans⁵⁵ (Cohen, 2015, p 59). There is an impression that Croatia attempts to compete with Slovenia in positioning itself as a key gateway to the Balkans, as well as a country providing access to the Adriatic through its north Adriatic ports. In this context, Croatia continually demonstrates a certain degree of strategic hostility in relation to Slovenia by trying to limit Slovenia's access to the open seas in the Adriatic⁵⁶. This position is difficult to explain as, historically, there have not been any hostilities or military conflicts between the two countries. Furthermore, both share similar interests as far as the Adriatic and the Balkan regions are concerned.

4 SLOVENIA'S GEOSTRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES

As of 24th February 2022, the world we are living in entered a stage of strategic transformation and is heading towards a new balance of powers. At this point in time, it is difficult to make an estimation as to how long the current conflict will last, what its magnitude will be in the event of further escalation, and what its geostrategic outcome will look like. There are nevertheless some indications: by questioning the territorial integrity or even the *raison d'être* of certain independent states, and by using history of over 100 years ago to justify modern geostrategic goals, Russia

⁵⁴ The Višegrad Group (or V4), established in 1991 in the Hungarian town of Višegrad, currently consists of four European Union Member States: Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary. The V4 is a political alliance within the EU with the aim of advancing military, economic and energy cooperation between these countries.

⁵⁵ Cohen sees Croatia in a potential confederation together with Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro and Kosovo.

⁵⁶ There have been two attempts, both initiated by Slovenia, to solve the open border issues with Croatia, in 2001 (Drnovšek-Račan Agreement) and in 2009 (the Arbitration Agreement). The first was notified by the Croatian Prime Minister but was not ratified in the Croatian Parliament. With regard to the second, the Arbitral Tribunal in the Hague delivered its Final Award in June 2017, determining the course of the maritime and land boundary between the two countries, but Croatia refuses its recognition and its implementation. After more than 30 years since the two countries became independent, the border question remains open.

is opening up »Pandora's box«, putting into question basic treaties underpinning modern international relations. Furthermore, it questions the overall peace in Europe.

The upcoming period should be therefore especially worrisome, in particular for small, new countries with little statehood tradition, such as Slovenia. Kjellén's Organic theory draws parallels between states and real life, saying that there is a permanent fight for survival, which is also valid between nations and states. After a fortunate period of peace and prosperity following the end of the Cold War, institutionally reflected in the enlargement of the European Union, it seems that we are now entering a new period where a »*fight for survival*« might again be on the agenda. Therefore, it is key for countries to know their geostrategic positions and define their long-term goals in order to be able to form meaningful alliances and face potential adversaries. By paraphrasing ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu, in order to survive (or win the battle) one needs to know oneself and one's opponents⁵⁷. And knowing oneself means knowing one's foundations.

Slovenia's geostrategic foundations have been presented throughout this article through the lens of the author, and various conclusions could be drawn. First, Slovenia is situated outside Mackinder's Heartland and forms part of the Western or European part of Spykman's Rimland, between the Heartland and the Adriatic. In its role of geostrategic boundary between Central and South-Eastern Europe, Cohen sees it as a gateway to this region.

This analysis suggests that its location next to the Adriatic is the key geostrategic factor which has been influencing not only the country's overall strategic setting but also its destiny. In this context, providing or denying access to the Adriatic forms the key paradigm in defining Slovenia's geostrategic position. It is particularly so as »*providing access to the Adriatic*« fits well with the approach of the traditional land-centred powers (such as Germany), while »*denying access to the Adriatic*« fits well with that of the traditional maritime-centred powers (such as Italy, France and the UK). Thus, geostrategically, Slovenia finds itself in a major dichotomy, struggling to position itself between the land⁵⁸ and the maritime⁵⁹ powers. Being able to maintain a geostrategic equilibrium depends, therefore, on a permanent search to balance these two dimensions. It also partially explains why Slovenia does not have a traditional, dedicated strategic partner in Europe⁶⁰. In concrete terms it means that Slovenia is at the junction of two geostrategic axes; the first being the maritime one, represented by Italy trying to push in the direction of Central and Eastern Europe through Slovenia and Hungary; and the second (the land one), trying to connect Germany (Austria) with Croatia and South-Eastern Europe/the Western Balkans with the Middle East.

⁵⁷ »If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.« (Sun Tzu, 2005, p 53)

⁵⁸ Germany, Austria, Hungary, Croatia, Bulgaria, Turkey.

⁵⁹ Italy, France, the UK, the Nordic countries, Benelux, Greece, Spain, Portugal. This group could include Romania, Poland, and potentially Serbia.

⁶⁰ Another reason might be the lack of a statehood tradition.

The underlying reasons for such a setting are also internal. The maritime/land dichotomy is enshrined in the very core of the national heartland. In the early Middle Ages, the March of Carniola was seen as an Eastern bulwark or the first line of defence against the invasion of Huns into the East Frankish Kingdom, as well as into Friuli (Churchill, 1915, p 41), and thus the Italian peninsula and the Mediterranean. On the other hand, the late Middle Ages Duchy of Celje had an active geopolitical role in shaping the Balkans, as well as the lands controlled by Hungary in Central Europe and beyond; therefore a very continental orientation. Both territories together form the national heartland, and thus carry the maritime/land dichotomy which is so typical for Slovenia. Geographically speaking, the boundary between the maritime and land-influenced orientation of Slovenia could be drawn along the river Sava, which also divides the national heartland in two. Furthermore, the capital, Ljubljana, lies on the river Sava, which makes it in fact a kind of epicentre of the core. In this geostrategic context, Slovenia represents a true transition territory, which confirms the characterizations by some Slovene authors as being »on the edge« (Bufon), »in between« (Črnčec), and at »a crossroads« (Furlan), and as a »gateway« by foreign authors (Cohen and Cvrtila).

All this said, understanding the foundations is key to assessing Slovenia's potential perspectives or its strategic »*marche de manoeuvre*«, especially in times of geostrategic shifts. Thus, there are four main options or possible strategic perspectives:

1. The first perspective is the current one, where Slovenia forms, together with neighbouring countries, one geostrategic bloc, the European Union. Cohen suggests in »*Maritime Europe & Maghreb*« that its strategic principles⁶¹ are based on the US Containment strategy, even though it contains a mix of classical maritime and land-centred powers and countries. It is strategically reflected in the Franco-German axis. Slovenia has formed part of this perspective since 2004.
2. The second is the »*maritime perspective*«, on account of its strategic alignment with the traditional maritime powers and other partners, such as the US. It is composed of two subdivisions: traditional »*maritime-oriented*« countries, and the »*maritime-aligned*« countries. The first subdivision includes the UK, France, the Netherlands, Greece, and (from the neighbouring countries) Italy. Slovenia or most of its territory was first aligned to this perspective during the Napoleon Illyrian provinces (1809-1813), in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1918-1945)⁶², and after independence, from 1996 to 2004, through its closer links to Italy during its association process into the Euro-Atlantic integrations⁶³. The second subdivision comprises Poland⁶⁴. From the neighbouring countries,

⁶¹ As is the case with NATO.

⁶² Later called the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, which officially existed till 1945.

⁶³ The formal framework was the Trilateral Co-operation (IT, SI, HU) and was in the second half of the 1990s one of the most important dimensions in Slovenia's foreign policy. It extended into military cooperation which still exists.

⁶⁴ And the other Višegrad countries: Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary.

this classification could partially include Hungary. Slovenia has tended to approach this dimension in the years 2020-22.

3. The third is the »*land perspective*« and suggests the country's alliance with the land powers. It is composed of two subdivisions: the »*European continental land perspective*« and the »*Eurasian land perspective*«. In the first category falls Germany and (from the neighbouring countries) Austria, Croatia and, up to a point, Hungary. Slovenia (or its territories) was part of this from the times of the Charlemagne at the end of 8th century⁶⁵ until 1918⁶⁶, and since its independence in 1991 until the Trilateral Cooperation Agreement in 1996. The second subdivision is composed of Russia and China, both being Eurasian land powers. Among the Balkan countries, Serbia belongs to the second subdivision. Slovenia (as a Yugoslav federal unit) was part of this from 1945 until the 1948 Informbiro⁶⁷.
4. Finally, the fourth perspective is the autonomous or independent one. It includes a combination of the above three perspectives, ad hoc or no alliances. This concept includes the non-aligned position of the Second Yugoslavia (and thus Slovenia), roughly from 1948 till 1991.

Conclusion This article paid special attention to the identification of Slovenia's geostrategic foundations while taking into account the global geopolitical context, in general, and that in Europe, in particular. In doing so, it analysed several determinant aspects, such as the national heartland with its focal point, but also the key outside areas. All of this defines the country's very distinctive geostrategic paradigm, and enables the identification of possible perspectives. However, it is not the intention of this article to advocate any of the presented perspectives, but to draw the attention to them all, as Slovenia may be confronted with different options when the new geostrategic constellation leads to a new balance of world powers. When that time comes, it will be crucial to assess and decide, based on historical experiences and analysis, and given the geostrategic setting, which of them guarantees the survival and prosperity of the Slovene state..

⁶⁵ Both the principalities of Carantania and Carniola came under Frankish rule, led by Charlemagne.

⁶⁶ With the exception of the period of the Illyrian provinces (1809-13).

⁶⁷ Informbiro is the short name for the »Communist Information Bureau«, initiated by Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, which aimed to reduce divergence between communist governments. In 1948, after the political split between Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito and Stalin, Yugoslavia was expelled from the Informbiro. Although presented by both sides as an ideological dispute, the conflict also had its roots in the geopolitical struggle in the Balkans.

Bibliography

1. Bufon, M., 2003. *The Geopolitical Location of Slovenia in the Perspective of European Integration Process*. Dela 19, 123–139, Ljubljana, 2003.
2. Cattaruzza, M., 2017. *Italy and its Eastern Border, 1866-2016*. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, New York, 2017.
3. *Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice*. San Francisco, 1945. <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter>, 25. 7. 2022.
4. Churchill, E. S., 1915. *The Barrier Boundary of the Mediterranean Basin and its Northern Breaches as Factors of History*. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Volume V, pp 27–59. Published online on 19 February 2009.
5. Cohen, S. B., 2015. *Geopolitics, The Geography of International Relations*, Rowman & Littlefield, Third Edition, Lanham, Maryland, 2015.
6. Cvrtila, V., 2000. Croatia – the »Gateway« to Southeast Europe. *Politička misao*, Vol. XXXVII, No. 5, pp 150–159, Zagreb, 2000.
7. Črnčec, D., 2010. Slovenia in the Geopolitical and Geostrategic Environment of the 21st Century. *Bilten Slovenske vojske* pp 29–66, Ljubljana, 2010.
8. *Europe Agreement, establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, acting within the framework of the European Union, of the one part, and the Republic of Slovenia, of the other part*. *Official Journal of the European Communities*. 26. 2.1999.
9. Friedman, G., 2016. 10 maps that explain Russia's strategy. *Business Insider*; <http://www.businessinsider.com/10-maps-that-explain-russias-strategy-2016-1/#russia-is-almost-landlocked-1>, 7. 5. 2017.
10. Friedman G., 2022. *The Beginning of a New Era*. *Geopolitical Futures*, 3rd of May 2022. <https://geopoliticalfutures.com/the-beginning-of-a-new-era/>, 22. 7. 2022.
11. Furlan, B., 2020. *Teorija in praksa strategije, Nacionalna (varnostna) strategija (Theory and Practice of Strategy, National (Security) Strategy)*. Ministrstvo za obrambo Republike Slovenije, Center vojaških šol, Ljubljana 2020.
12. Gabrič, A. (Ed.), and Godeša B., et al., 2019. *Slovenski prelom 1918 (The Slovene Revolution of 1918)*. Slovenska matica, Ljubljana 2019.
13. Grafenauer, B., 1994. *Oblikovanje severne slovenske narodnostne meje (The Evolution of the Slovene Northern Border)*. Zveza zgodovinskih društev Slovenije, Zbirka zgodovinskega časopisa – 10, Ljubljana, 1994.
14. Hassid, L., 2021 *Une géopolitique de la Slovénie (A Geopolitics of Slovenia)*. *La Route de la Soie – Éditions*, Paris, 2021.
15. Jančar, M., 1996. *Slovenska zunanjepolitična razpotja (Slovenia's Foreign Policy Crossroads)*. Društvo 2000, Ljubljana, 1996.
16. Kaplan, R. D., 2013. *The Revenge of Geography*. Random House Trade Paperbacks, New York, 2013.
17. Kissinger, H., 2022. *Kissinger: These are the main geopolitical challenges facing the world right now*. Interview by Schwab, K., *The World Economic Forum*, Davos, Switzerland, 23rd of May 2022. <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/05/kissinger-these-are-the-main-geopolitical-challenges-facing-the-world-right-now/>, 21. 7. 2022.
18. Kranjec, S., 1926. *Geopolitičen oris Jugoslavije (Geopolitical Outline of Yugoslavia)*. *Gospodarski vestnik* pp 8-16, Ljubljana, 1926.
19. Lipušček, U., 2003. *Ave Wilson: ZDA in prekranje Slovenije v Versaillesu 1919-1920 (Ave Wilson: US and the drawing of Slovene borders in Versailles 1919-1920)*. Založba Sophia, Ljubljana, 2003.
20. Mackinder, H. J., 1904. *The Geographical Pivot of History*. *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 23, No. 4, pp 421-431, *The Royal Geographical Society*, London, 2004.

21. Mackinder, H. J., 1942. *Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction*. National Defence University Press, Edition of the Classic Work on Geopolitics, Washington D.C., 1996.
22. Maselli, F., 2021. *Italy's Three Priorities: Economy, Demography and the Mediterranean*. Francesco Maselli, Italian geopolitics expert. Interview by M. G., Trieste News, Trieste, Italy, 5th of May 2021. <https://www.triesteallnews.it/2021/05/italys-three-priorities-economy-demography-and-the-mediterranean-francesco-maselli-italian-geopolitics-expert/>, 25. 6. 2022.
23. Rahten, A. (Ed.), Šumrada, J. (Ed.), Lipušček, U., et al., 2011. *Velikih pet in nastanek Kraljevine Srbov, Hrvatov in Slovencev / Les Cinq Grands et la création du Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes (The Big Five and the Creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes)*. Studia Diplomatica Slovenica, Ljubljana, 2011.
24. Putin, V., 2007. *Speech and the Following Discussion of Vladimir Putin at the Munich Security Conference on 10 February 2007*. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034>, 19. 5. 2017.
25. Putin, V., 2022. *Vladimir Putin's Televised Address on Ukraine on 21 February 2022*. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IfWntkm-Sxo>, 27. 2. 2022.
26. Putin, V., 2022. *Transcript: Vladimir Putin's Televised Address on Ukraine on 24th of February 2022*. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-02-24/full-transcript-vladimir-putin-s-televised-address-to-russia-on-ukraine-feb-24>, Bloomberg news, 27. 2. 2022.
27. *Spatial Development Strategy of Slovenia (SDSS)*. Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No 76/2004. Ministry of the Environment, Spatial Planning and Energy, Ljubljana, 2004.
28. Spykman, J. N., 1944. *The Geography of the Peace*. Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1944.
29. *Strategija prostorskega razvoja Slovenije (SPRS) 2050*. Javna razprava o osnutku SPRS 2050 (*Spatial Development Strategy of Slovenia 2050, Draft Document Public Debate*), 15. 1.–15. 3. 2020. Republika Slovenija, Ministrstvo za okolje in prostor, Ljubljana, 2020.
30. Šteh, J., and Tovornik U., 2013. *Slovenska vojaška identiteta od 1918 do današnjih dni (Slovene Military Identity from 1918 to the Present Day)*. Revija Obramba, letnik 45, pp 19-21, junij 2013.
31. Tovornik, U., 2017. *Geostrategic Shifts in Contemporary Europe*. Contemporary Military Challenges Publication, September 2017, 19/št. 3, pp 15–31, Ljubljana, 2017.
32. Tunander, O., 2001. *Swedish-German geopolitics for a new century*. Rudolf Kjellén's 'The State as a Living Organism'. *Review of International Studies*, 27, pp 451–463, 2001.
33. Tzu, S., 2005: *The Art of War*. Shambhala, Boston & London, 2005.
34. *US Defence Planning Guidance, April 1992*. US Department of Defence, 1992, Declassified in 2008.

e-mail: uros.tovornik@mors.si

OCENA VPLIVA ODNOSOV Z VELESILAMI NA NACIONALNO VARNOST: PRIMER NIGERIJE

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF RELATIONS WITH MAJOR POWERS ON NATIONAL SECURITY: NIGERIA IN PERSPECTIVE

Povzetek Za odnose med državami v okviru vestfalskega sistema je bil značilen boj za oblast ali pa vzajemne koristi na vseh področjih, vključno s politiko in vojsko. Zunanjepolitični cilji velesil naj bi navadno vplivali na nacionalno varnost drugih držav. Nigerija, država v Zahodni Afriki, je primer take države, na katere nacionalno varnost naj bi vplivali njeni odnosi z velesilami. V prispevku poskušamo oceniti stopnjo tovrstnega vpliva na nacionalno varnost Nigerije. Poudarjamo, da tak vpliv v resnici obstaja na področjih, kot so trgovinska bilanca, vojaški potencial, družbene vrednote in poseganje v regionalno prevlado Nigerije.

Ključne besede *Velesile, Nigerija, nacionalna varnost, odnosi, zunanja politika.*

Abstract Relations between states under the Westphalia system have been characterized either by power struggles or mutual benefits in all spheres, including politics and the military. It has been conjectured that the foreign policy objectives of major powers normally influence the national security of other states. Nigeria, a country in West Africa, is an example of such a state whose national security is believed to be influenced by its relations with the major powers. An assessment of the degree of such influence on Nigeria's national security is the focus of this contribution. We point out that there is indeed such influence in areas such as balance of trade, military capacity, societal values and interference with Nigeria's regional dominance.

Key words *Major powers, Nigeria, national security, relations, foreign policy.*

Introduction

Relations between states have evolved significantly since the introduction of the Westphalia state system in 1648. Throughout history, these relations have either been based on power struggles or mutual benefits, ranging from political to military spheres. Although the Peace Treaty of Westphalia serves as the basis for the modern state system, the evolution of territorial states to powerful political units was unfamiliar during the period of Westphalia (Fischer, 2012). Today, as in previous centuries, nations still compete among themselves for power, influence, and economic resources. However, the difference in the 21st century is that competition between nation-states is largely governed and dictated by technological prowess, and facilitated by globalization through Information and Communication Technology (ICT). Globalization has provided a platform for a strong, continuing process of integration of all the states around the globe. Consequently, evolving challenges such as terrorism, drugs and human trafficking, in addition to other organized crimes, have assumed a global dimension, causing a significant shift in the nature, dynamics and perception of national security. This has therefore resulted in a rethink of nations' foreign policies and their impact on national security.

It is pertinent to note that the imbalances of power between nations, as well as ambitions between and among states, are usually enshrined in their foreign policies (Kissinger, 1995). It is these imbalances and ambitions of state actors that make some states more prominent than others in the global arena. Some of these more prominent states are referred to as 'the major powers', particularly those that have been at the forefront of initiating strategic influence in ensuring peace and security in the international arena. Also, these major powers are those states that are influential on the international scene with regard to wealth, might and reach. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), namely the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), France, Russia and China, are therefore considered major world powers. These major powers have the capacity to affect the behaviour of and developments in less powerful states, such as most African states.

Africa remains an area of particular interest to the world, and indeed the major powers, for a variety of reasons. Its population of over one billion people attracts trade and commerce. Its natural resources further make the continent a battleground for resource competition among the superpowers. Despite foreign interest in Africa, the continent is faced with numerous internal challenges. While economic interests continue to be a pull factor, there are issues of the crisis of legitimacy of leadership, widespread corruption, and severe insecurity within the African geopolitical space (Democratization in Africa: African Views, African Voices, 1992). These crises have placed an enormous burden not just on the African Union (AU), but also on other regional organizations in Africa. These factors seem to be the reason why the influence of major powers can easily undermine African interests and national security. However, some nations, such as South Africa, Egypt, and Nigeria, appear to have assumed leadership positions in the continent, given the roles they play in their different sub-regional organizations, as well as in the AU. For instance, Nigeria played a leadership role through the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to

restore peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s (Musah, 2011). Nigeria also spearheaded the deployment of enormous diplomatic resources to settle disputes in Guinea-Bissau in 2012 and The Gambia in 2017. Nigeria contributed both financially and politically to ending the apartheid regime and in support of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa in the 1960s and 70s. It additionally played the lead role in the establishment of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in 2015 in the Lake Chad Basin region against the Boko Haram insurgency (Iroegbu, 2015).

Nigeria is a nation whose relations with the major powers can be traced back to its independence in October 1960. This relationship, over the years, has been central to Nigeria's foreign policy activities. The dominance of these countries on the global stage affects Nigeria and influences its national security to a large extent. Examples of such influences include support for the rebel Biafran Government (1967); suspension from and heavy sanctions by the Commonwealth, European Union and United Nations (1994); addition of Nigeria to the Terror Watch List (2010); and restriction on the sale of weapons to Nigeria (2014), among others. Thus, a painstaking look at the foreign policy of Nigeria, in line with the way it is influenced by world powers in relation to its national security, is not just necessary, but apt. To this end, this article examines the nexus between Nigeria's relations with the superpowers and the effects of this relationship on its national security. Therefore, a brief description of Nigeria's geopolitics is key to understanding the central issues of the study.

Nigeria is a country strategically located in Africa, precisely West Africa, along the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) (Metz, 1992). The country's landmass is 923,768 km², which makes it the 38th largest country in the world (World Factbook, 2022). Nigeria is bordered to the north by the Republic of Niger, to the south by the Atlantic Ocean, to the west by the Republic of Benin, and to the east by Chad and Cameroon. The country is a land of great contrast, both in terms of physical attributes and cultural configurations. Nigeria is Africa's largest democracy and one of the most densely populated countries in Africa, with a population of about 200 million (World Factbook, 2022). Nigeria possesses one of the largest militaries in Africa. The 2022 Global Firepower ranked Nigeria 35th of 142 countries considered worldwide. However, its defence spending is just about 0.76% of GDP, which is below the 2.2% global average. Nonetheless, according to the World Bank, Statista, BRIU of April 2022, Nigeria's military spending has increased from \$1.72 billion in 2016 to \$5.4 billion in 2022 (Babatunde-Lawal, 2022). The strength of Nigeria's military is 223,000, which is 0.4% of the total labour force of the country (World Bank Data, 2019). Additionally, Nigeria has large deposits of human and material resources and is considered Africa's biggest economy, and the seventh-largest exporter of crude oil in the world.

Unfortunately, like most developing nations, Nigeria has been grappling with a myriad of security challenges since 1960, when independence was gained from its British colonial masters; the latest being Boko Haram in the North-East and the Independent People of Biafra (IPOB) in the South-West. Also, farmers-herdsmen

clashes across the country and banditry are causes for concern. The country is also faced with widespread poverty and massive youth unemployment. The challenges have combined to place Nigeria in the global spotlight, and impacted negatively on its capacity to enhance national security. Notwithstanding these security challenges, Nigeria still tries to manage its issues and at the same time assert itself as a major actor on the African continent. The question that begs answers is whether its neighbouring countries, as well as the major powers, recognize Nigeria as a major actor on the African continent. While it is true that Nigeria has always sought recognition and respect from the major powers, it is uncertain if it has received due acknowledgement from them. Thus, this article seeks to bridge the gap between the perceived and the real relationship between Nigeria and the major powers, and how this affects the security architecture of Nigeria.

1 NIGERIA'S RELATIONS WITH MAJOR POWERS

Nigeria's relations with the major powers have been as varied as the major powers are diverse in their foreign policy objectives. These will be discussed under Nigeria-China relations, Nigeria-France relations, Nigeria-Russia-relations, Nigeria-UK relations and Nigeria-US relations.

1.1 Nigeria-China Relations

China's foreign policy model transcends individual states or regions; it emphasizes equal diplomatic relations with all important states globally. China is perceived by many developing countries as a friendly alternative for trade, financial aid, and military aid. In Africa, Nigeria is China's biggest market and the biggest Chinese investment destination (All Africa online newspaper, 2016). Nigeria-China diplomatic relations began in 1971; shortly afterwards, the Nigerian Civil War caused a strain between the two nations due to China's tacit support for Biafra, a move intended to upset the US, the UK and Russia. However, the Sani Abacha-led junta stigmatization by the West from 1993-1998 forced the regime to adopt a »Look East« foreign policy. This strengthened the seed of trust between the two countries.

Nigeria received some military support from China over the fight against militancy in the Delta region and the ongoing Islamic insurgency in the north-east. During the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan, China announced a new strategic relationship with Nigeria with shared benefits. Subsequently, the two countries signed some agreements/Memoranda of Understanding on bilateral trade, investment cooperation, economic cooperation, investment in the automobile industry, and the construction of industrial towns and agricultural towns (All Africa online newspaper, 2016). China's foreign policy towards Nigeria is therefore quite vibrant, as it cuts across trade, agriculture, transportation infrastructure, especially railway lines, investment and cultural exchanges. For instance, China committed USD 200 million to the development of the Free Trade Zone in Lagos, Nigeria (Mohammed, 2019).

In recent times, Nigeria-China relations have attracted debate on China's motives and Nigeria's benefits. There are those who consider China's inroads into Nigeria as being parasitic, while others think Nigeria stands to benefit by closing the infrastructural deficiency gap through such relations (Umejei, 2015). Notwithstanding the debate, China presents Nigeria with opportunities that do not necessarily impinge on its national security. China is committed to assisting Nigeria in both technical and security matters. It is willing to enhance cooperation in satellite technology. On the other hand, some of the security implications in dealing with China include outright flouting of Nigeria's laws such as the use of underage labour, noncompliance with environmental regulations, and the spread of sub-standard products, in addition to saddling the country with too much debt. Thus, Nigeria's relations with China can be generally described as »win-some, lose-some.«

1.2 Nigeria-France Relations

Nigeria's relations with France could be better understood from its relations with its Francophone neighbours. From independence in 1960 until the Civil War in 1967, Nigeria was keen to safeguard the Francophone influence in West Africa. The conflict with Ivory Coast over the recognition of Biafra was the beginning of a change in Nigeria's perception of the preservation of Francophone influence in the sub-region. Subsequently, this affected Nigeria's relations with France. In fact, in the literature, opinions abound that in the past France worked tirelessly towards the dismemberment of Nigeria. Therefore, it could be said that the immediate post-colonial relationship between Nigeria and France was a very difficult one. The primary explanation for the dissatisfied partnership between Nigeria and France is the competition for the control of the Francophone countries in West Africa. France has always remained determined to take control of the affairs of the West African Francophone countries and considers Nigeria as an apparent obstacle, largely because of Nigeria's Pan-Africanism policy. Consequently, France was always instrumental in ensuring that Nigeria was unable to assume its leadership roles in the West African continent.

The last three French presidents, however, have pursued a foreign policy that is based on economic interest rather than historical ties. The current administration in France reportedly wants to partner with Africa and not dominate it. Currently, France seems to be partnering with Nigeria, leading to a two-day state visit by President Macron in July 2018. He addressed a joint press conference with President Buhari and stated his commitment to helping the fight against Islamist militants (France Diplomacy, 2021). Politically, France-Nigeria diplomatic relations assumed a deeper dimension following the escalation of violence by the Islamic insurgency in the Lake Chad area. The catalyst was the 2014 kidnapping of more than 200 schoolgirls from Chibok, which generated international condemnation. France was moved to initiate an international summit held in Paris on 17 May 2014, where the Heads of State of Nigeria, Benin, Cameroon, Niger and Chad, and representatives of the US, the UK and the EU met to deliberate on the effective methods of winning the counterinsurgency war against Boko Haram. This Summit was followed by a

number of accords signed between France and Nigeria in areas such as security, trade and education, among others.

Generally, relations between Nigeria and France since the 1960s were difficult until about a decade ago, when they began to improve. This new relationship is hoped to be sustained if France desists from its tendency towards controlling its former colonies. Therefore, Nigeria's recent relations with France can be described as 'delicately symbiotic', especially based on the renewed commitment in the area of security.

1.3 Nigeria-Russia Relations

Diplomatic ties between Nigeria and Russia were officially established on 25 November 1960, less than two months after the former's independence. In 1961, the Soviet Union set up its Embassy at Lagos, and in 1962, Nigeria set up its Embassy in Moscow. The most landmark relations between Nigeria and Russia (then the Soviet Union) can be traced to the Nigerian civil war era. Faced with British and American refusal to meet Nigeria's need for bombers, General Gowon turned to Moscow for a supply of arms in early July 1967. Over the years, Nigeria-Russia Bilateral Relations (NRBR) engaged in positive development, culminating in the first major state visit of either of the two countries' leaders when President Olusegun Obasanjo visited Russia in 2001, and the President of Russia at the time, President Dmitri Medvedev, reciprocated with a trip to Nigeria in 2009.

Economic and trade relations between Russia and Nigeria can be traced through more than 50 years of active interaction. A Nigerian-Russian Chamber of Commerce, comprising over 160 companies, was established in 1998 to boost economic relations between the two countries. Prominent Russian companies doing business in Nigeria include Kamaz (trucks); Gazprom (gas production) and Megaviation (aircraft). Nigeria has been Russia's most significant trading partner in Africa, and the trade value rose from \$300 million in 2008 to nearly \$1.5 billion for Russia by 2010 (Agubamah, 2014). Diplomatically, Russia and Nigeria regularly assist each other in the multilateral sphere.

Russia and Nigeria's interests in the domain of security and defence converge in the sale of arms and peace support operations. Russia has consistently supported Nigeria in its fight against the Boko Haram insurgency through the sale of heavy arms and equipment, such as the Su-30 fighter aircraft as well as Mi-35 and Mi-17 helicopters with attendant training packages. There are other series of military-technical assistance and military cooperation, such as the training of AFN personnel in Russian institutions, among other things. Russia thus exhibits firm support for Nigeria in its counter terrorism and extremism efforts.

Overall, Russia's foreign policy initiatives are beginning to cast the country as a dependable partner to Nigeria, especially in the light of the sanctions and disappointments from the Western powers with regard to the supply of arms, until

recent times. Following its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Nigeria has been careful in its dealings with both countries. Thus, Nigeria considers Russia as a major ally, with huge potential for more mutually beneficial ties in future. Accordingly, Nigeria would do well to strengthen her relations with Russia.

1.4 Nigeria-United Kingdom Relations

The UK, like most major powers, accords certain parts of the world far greater priority than others, especially in terms of resource allocation (both human and financial), which affects their policy-making process. The UK's foreign policy towards Nigeria is focused on improving the bilateral strategic partnership between the two countries, with a view to seizing common opportunities and addressing mutual threats (GOV. UK, 2020).

With regard to defence and security cooperation, Nigeria's tie to the UK as a former colony has gone through many decades of close collaboration. The UK cooperates with Nigeria to combat elements of discontent, terrorism, and jihadist ideology, so as to preclude widespread extremism in the region. This also includes other threats such as human and drug trafficking, piracy, and cybercrimes, among others. The two countries have developed a comprehensive security accord covering a number of security deficits of yesteryear. August 2018 became a milestone in the security relations between Nigeria and the UK, because an agreement was made to respond to shared threats in terms of military hardware and software. In 2022, the first Nigeria-UK Security and Defence Partnership meeting between the strategic leaders in the sector was held.

Concerning trade, the UK has a robust relationship with Nigeria. The trade relationship was worth £4 billion in 2015, with an inherent capacity to grow. With regard to climate change, the UK has been readily on hand to provide assistance to Nigeria, and in May 2019 announced nearly £153 million in funding to rural farmers as aid to combating the effects of climate change on livelihoods in Nigeria, Ethiopia and the rest of the Sahel region (GOV.UK, 2020). The UK's current foreign policy focus towards Nigeria is on improving the bilateral strategic partnership between the two countries with a view to seizing common opportunities and addressing mutual threats. Nigeria remains a key and traditional partner of the UK in Africa in economic, social, cultural, educational, defence and security terms; nevertheless, there is still room for further deepening of the relations between the two nations.

1.5 Nigeria-United States Relations

US foreign policy operates through a network of alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), among others. In Africa, the US established diplomatic relations with Nigeria in 1960 after its independence from the UK. Since then, Nigeria-US relations, although they have had their moments of tension, have generally been 'warm, dynamic, respectful and cooperative' (Ukonga,

Private Communication, June 10, 2019). The present scope of engagement between the US and Nigeria revolves around key areas of mutual interest, such as security and counter-terrorism efforts, global health, and expanding energy access, as well as trade and investment. The last major visits between the leadership of the two nations was that of the US Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken, on 18 November 2021 to Abuja, while President Buhari was the first African leader to meet with President Trump in April 2018. Later, the omission of President Buhari from the first set of calls made to African leaders by President Biden after his inauguration did not go unnoticed (Ekott, 2021).

With regard to regional security, it is generally believed that the US supports Nigeria in its security and counter-terrorism (CT) efforts. However, the refusal to sell \$600 million worth of arms to Nigeria during the Barack Obama administration came as a big blow to Nigeria and a repetition of history (BBC News, 2017). It may be recalled that in 1967 the US refused to sell arms to Nigeria, which made the Gowon regime turn to Moscow (Laidi, 1990). The repetition of this action in 2014 on the grounds that Nigeria had not been respecting human rights demonstrates the US exercise of power and influence even when the vital interest of Nigeria was under threat. Even though the Trump administration reversed the decision by agreeing to the sale of about a dozen A-29 Super Tucano aircraft to Nigeria, this does not dispel the fact that self-assertive democratic values of the US remain a critical concern in Nigeria-US relations (BBC News, 2017). With reference to trade and investment, economic ties between the US and Nigeria are anchored on the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA); African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA); and the Bi-National Commission (BNC).

Overall, it may be observed that the core message of Nigeria-US relations has been that of dependency. Rodney once argued that dependent nations will always respond to the will of the developed nations (Giovanni, 2019). Often the US does not cajole Nigeria into any action using force; rather the US depends on its power and influence. This assertion would thus necessitate examining the influence of Nigeria's relations with the major powers on its national security.

2 THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

The influence of Nigeria's relations with the major powers on the country's national security has gone through several phases since its independence in 1960. As it were, Nigeria's diplomatic history vis-à-vis its national security may be divided into six distinct periods, namely:

- a) The Age of Innocence: The first period, 1960-1974
- b) The Era of Awakening: The second period, 1975-1984
- c) The Epoch of Realism: The third period, 1985-1992
- d) The Dark Age: The fourth period, 1993-1998
- e) The Renaissance: The fifth period, 1999-2010

f) The Reality Check Age: The sixth period, 2010-present (Asobie, 2010)

2.1 The Age of Innocence (1960-1974)

The regime of Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa as the first Prime Minister of Nigeria was the beginning of the Age of Innocence. Excerpts from his first address to the nation in his Independence Speech on October 1, 1960 revealed his vision for Nigeria. The perception of the international system was encapsulated in his 'Five Fundamental Principles of Nigeria's Foreign Policy'. These were:

- a) Acknowledgement of human equality and the advancement of the integrity, sovereignty and hence the independence of all countries;
- b) Non-interference with other nations' affairs;
- c) Non-alignment with any of the existing ideological and military blocs;
- d) Nigeria to be part of international organizations that are functionally relevant to its needs;
- e) Africa to be the focal point of Nigeria's foreign policy (Asobie, 2010).

These five principles have cut across the range of civilian and military regimes to date, making them perhaps the most enduring legacy of the late Prime Minister's vision. During this period, the foreign policy of Nigeria, particularly in Balewa's administration, has often been described as conservative and timid due to inexperience and a divided political terrain (Asobie, 2010). This era also witnessed the first military coup in the country, as well as a civil war from 1967-70. In the early stages of Gowon's administration in 1967, Nigeria's foreign policy thrust focused on obtaining support for the nation's civil war efforts. One of the major gains from the war was closer ties with Russia (then the Soviet Union), China and other Eastern European countries which came to Nigeria's rescue when Britain and some other countries in the West refused to sell heavy field artillery guns, bombs, and aircraft to the Federal side. This was the first sign of the influence of the major powers on the outcome of Nigeria's internal crises. It is necessary to observe that national security was not specifically highlighted in the fundamental principles enunciated for foreign policy guidance during Nigeria's 'Age of Innocence'.

2.2 The Era of Awakening (1975-1984)

The Era of Awakening was brought about by General Murtala Mohammed. This period witnessed the articulation and implementation of Nigeria's Afrocentric policy. General Murtala noted, in his address to the Organization of African Unity (OAU), now African Union (AU), in Addis Ababa, that there was a new direction for the continent in which Nigeria would play a leadership role. He spoke thus:

“Africa has come of age; it is no longer in the orbit of any continental power. It should no longer take orders from any country, however powerful. The fortunes of Africa are in our hands to make or mar...» (Ota & Ecoma, 2016)

The confidence he thus displayed could have played a role in his assassination. There is a theory about a scheme by the West to remove him because of his revolutionary position and firm belief in Africa. This is especially so since the West continued to control the destiny of Africa even after many years of independence (Ota & Ecoma, 2016). This brings to the fore the influence the major powers have on the African continent, so that they could even influence a change in government, as allegedly in the case of Murtala. Evidently General Murtala did not help the situation with his powerful confrontation with the US on the crisis in Angola between the National Union for the Liberation of Angola (UNITA) and the Peoples' Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in 1975. Nigeria gave support to the MPLA Government, while the US recognized and supported UNITA. This was critical in turning the tide against the US and other Western nations, as well as mobilizing international support for the MPLA.

The subsequent administration, that of General Olusegun Obasanjo (1975-1979), continued in the same vein after General Murtala's assassination. This era also witnessed the term of Nigeria's first executive president, Alhaji Usman Shehu Shagari in the Second Republic (1979-1983) and the Buhari/Idiagbon military regime (1983-1985). Foreign policy during the Shagari years was allegedly like the Balewa years, 'conservative, routine, cautious and sometimes, unpopular.' The foreign policy of the Buhari regime remained focused on Africa; however, the regime dealt decisively with border threats from Chad and Cameroon using firm military deployments. It is essential to highlight that foreign policy matters need to be tackled expediently as they affect national security negatively if treated otherwise.

2.3 The Epoch of Realism (1985-1992)

The Epoch of Realism best describes the period under General Ibrahim Babangida, popularly referred to as 'IBB'. He remains one of Nigeria's most charismatic leaders. He conceived foreign policy to be an »issue-based pursuit reflecting a package of objectives and goals tied to the nation's security and the well-being of Nigerians generally" (Global Security, 2020). He achieved this by having the best people on board and allowing them the necessary latitude to execute their plans to accomplish the said objectives. Thus, the many issues of foreign policy, for example, the Concert of Medium Powers initiative and the Technical Aid Corps (TAC) programme, became the foreign policy thrusts of Nigeria, which were generally accepted and had the input of many intellectuals the President had made part of his cabinet. These initiatives projected Nigeria and other like-minded nations who were pursuing neutralist foreign policy onto the global scene, while using the influence of soft diplomacy to engage some other nations (Aina, 2020).

It was also when General Babangida was the Chairman of ECOWAS (1986-88), that the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Citizens took effect. The formation of ECOMOG was one of the high points of the Babangida administration, and it was lauded as a pioneering and commendable foreign policy initiative. He also established relations with Israel, which had been broken over the Arab-Israeli crisis

since October 1973. However, despite the warm relationship that Nigeria enjoyed on the international scene, it was not difficult for the international community, especially the major powers, to isolate Nigeria after the cancellation of the Presidential election of June 12, 1993, which was declared arguably the most transparent and accountable election to have taken place in Nigeria (Global Security, 2020). This action led to mass protest and riots in Nigeria and uproar on the global scene, which later led to the handover of government to Ernest Shonekan as an interim administration. Accordingly, a country may not make much progress in its foreign affairs if it does not pay adequate attention to domestic affairs, particularly national security issues; national security issues impact significantly on foreign affairs, and vice-versa.

2.4 The Dark Age (1993-1998)

The Dark Age is used to describe the period under General Sani Abacha. The General took over in an ‘unnecessary’ coup d’état at a time when the world was progressively leaning in the direction of liberal democracy. This led to deep international resentment and opposition to Nigeria. The unwarranted execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa, an Ogoni activist, and eight others despite appeals from the comity of nations worsened the situation. This led to the cutting of diplomatic ties by countries such as Britain, the US, France, Germany, Canada and South Africa, among others.

In response, the Abacha-led administration fell back on Asia, in a Look East policy, and increasingly engaged in relations with countries like China and North Korea. This was seen in the initial award of a contract for the reconstruction of Nigerian railway lines to the Chinese Civil Engineering Construction Company (CCECC) in 1995 (Osondu-Oti & Ifedayo, 2016). The military and other security agencies also began to receive new equipment/weapons and training of their personnel in eastern nations such as North Korea, China and Russia, among others. It similarly introduced new dynamics into the security architecture of the country. For the military, it brought about the induction of new weapons, platforms and technology. This equally attracted less cooperation from traditional allies in terms of military assistance, training and sharing of intelligence, among other things, which led to military sanctions from the Western nations. Many Nigerian Armed Forces personnel on courses in many of the Western countries were arbitrarily withdrawn by the host authorities and forced to return to Nigeria.

Overall, the foreign policy shift during the Abacha years brought bitter resentment from overseas, as well as greater unease and disaffection at home (Folarin, 2017). The country came under severe economic, political, and military sanctions, influenced by the major powers. Nigeria was in this condition until the sudden death of General Abacha on 8 June 1998. What is evident from this period is that missteps in foreign policy have a marked tendency to lead to developments which can significantly impact national security.

2.5 The Renaissance (1999-2010)

A Renaissance or period of rebirth best describes the era of President Olusegun Obasanjo. In his inaugural address on 29 May 1999, the President said:

»We shall pursue a dynamic foreign policy to promote friendly relations with all nations, and will continue to play a constructive role in the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity and other international bodies. We shall continue to honour existing agreements between Nigeria and other countries. It is our resolve to restore Nigeria fully to her previous prestigious position in the community of nations.« (Folarin, 2017)

The foreign policy of Nigeria at this time was entrenched in democratic values, and the result was that it strengthened the institutions of the state, thereby leading to a culture of good governance. Again Nigeria maintained her previous stance in Africa, which was to uphold her Afro-centric interests and aspirations. The diplomacy of the Obasanjo era yielded some economic benefits. The bulk of the nation's foreign debts were cancelled or rescheduled. Additionally, Nigeria began to attract foreign investments, which invariably led to job creation and opened a window for social interactions in the international arena. President Obasanjo was succeeded by President Umaru Yar'Adua (2007-2009), who apparently inaugurated the idea of »Citizen Diplomacy« as the focus of the nation's foreign policy (Okuchukwu, 2015). This policy portrays the aspiration of the government to get ordinary citizens actively involved in diplomacy by acting as representatives of the state in other countries.

During this period, perhaps because of the renewed hope and optimism of the international community towards Nigeria, the country was able to secure considerable assistance in security. However, the security situation began to degenerate towards the end of President Obasanjo's second term and heading into the Yar'Adua era, not because of failings of foreign policy essentially, but because of certain dynamics in the domestic arena. There was also the belief in certain quarters, such as the view expressed by Lieutenant-General Victor Malu, the respectable Chief of Army Staff, that the President gave too much consideration to international cooperation, in defiance of national security. However, to an appreciable degree, foreign policy during the Renaissance period can be stated to have enhanced national security.

2.6 The Reality Check Age (2010- Present Day)

The period from 2010 to date has served as a reality check for Nigeria with regard to how it handles its foreign relations. President Goodluck Jonathan (2009-2015) sustained the foreign policy of the late Yar'Adua, his predecessor. Several bilateral agreements were checked and re-negotiated, while new ones were brokered. Nigeria continued its partnership policy with the Asian nations, leading to the signing and activation of bilateral Joint Commissions with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and India (Kia, Nwigbo & Ojie, 2017). Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that the gross national insecurity during the administration significantly affected Nigeria's

relations with its neighbours. They perceived the country as not doing enough to counter the Boko Haram threat, and thus were hesitant in their relations with Nigeria.

The major foreign policy direction of President Muhammadu Buhari's administration (2015-date) is aimed at boosting the country's image globally and ensuring socio-economic stability. The essence is to lure Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into Nigeria and address the threats of insurgency in north-eastern Nigeria. Prior to the emergence of Muhammadu Buhari in 2015, Boko Haram insurgents had captured some Local Government Areas (LGAs) in Borno State. The Muhammadu Buhari administration therefore decided to make the fight against corruption, economic development and ensuring security the focus of its 'Change Agenda'. President Buhari was able to build and secure international awareness and collaboration, both in the world and in the region, against insurgencies. He championed the development of a Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) of about 8,700 troops from the Lake Chad Basin Commission member countries (Olowojolu, 2017). The government has additionally empowered diplomatic ties with the major powers, especially China, the US, France and Germany. The recovery of stolen funds, the ability to secure loans and the deepening trade deals are part of the friendly gestures extended to President Buhari (Olowojolu, 2017).

During the Reality Check Age, it had become clear that foreign policy is a vital mechanism for the promotion of national interest and in addition, national security. Also, little gain may be made if it is not used dispassionately or objectively; thus, the need to build institutions rather than individuals cannot be overemphasized. Similarly, it is important for Nigeria's foreign policy to be dynamic and assertive, because of the country's disposition and the peculiar national security challenges confronting it.

Overall, Nigeria has undergone different foreign policy directions from the Age of Innocence to the Reality Check Age. However, one thing that is obvious from the different eras is that Nigeria can no longer sustain the idea of 'Father Christmas' diplomacy or Afro-centrism at the expense of her national interest and citizens. Also, the influence of the major powers on Nigeria's national security needs to be factored into its foreign policy thrust. An assessment of the influence of these relations on Nigeria's national security will be discussed subsequently.

3 ASSESSMENT OF THE INFLUENCE OF RELATIONS WITH MAJOR POWERS ON NIGERIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY

This article has deduced that the major powers have exerted reasonable influence, although in varying degrees, on Nigeria's national security. They did this using their elements of power with a view to projecting their respective national interests and ultimately their foreign policies. The degrees of influence range from modest to insignificant. Nigeria is, however, not attached to any one of the major powers.

The major powers act independently with regard to Nigeria, and have clearly articulated the national interests which drive their relations with it. Their influence on the country's national security is nonetheless not contradictory, as they would benefit more from a safe and stable Nigeria. There is also a significant relationship between the interests of the major powers and their support of Nigeria's foreign policy objectives for enhanced national security. Pertinently, any time the nation's foreign policy objectives align with the interests of the foreign powers, they initiate activities that enhance Nigeria's security as generally witnessed from 1998 onwards, since the advent of the Fourth Republic (democracy) up to today. The assessment of the degree of influence is highlighted subsequently.

- a) The balance of trade is dispassionately tilted against Nigeria and in favour of the major powers, which suggests that Nigeria needs them more on issues of trade than they need Nigeria. The country is largely dependent on the major powers for the supply of military hardware, which inadvertently affects its military capacity. It is only recently that Nigeria is beginning to explore other sources, particularly some medium powers like Pakistan, Turkey, and Israel, for its military hardware. This greatly affected the security architecture in the north-east of the country, where the Nigerian Armed Forces was denied the necessary arms for fighting insurgency.
- b) The continued dependence by Nigeria on the major powers in the purchase of arms and ammunition, in addition to other military equipment, especially discourages efforts to improve the military-industrial complex in Nigeria. These nations can therefore hold the country to ransom at any point in time if Nigeria's foreign policy misaligns with their national interests. For example, US President Barack Obama threatened to cut off foreign aid to Nigeria if an anti-gay bill was passed by the National Assembly in 2011 (Nsehe, 2011). The anti-gay bill was later signed into law by President Jonathan in 2014, and President Obama denied Nigeria purchase of crucial arms in the face of massive insurgency in the north-east in 2015 (Onuah, 2014; Ofeibea, 2015). Consequently, the dependence of Nigeria on external sources for most of its defence requirements bears directly on the country's national security. It is an unhealthy trend that needs to be reversed. Furthermore, the major powers unduly interfere in the activities of Nigeria's neighbours in its 'strategic backyard', thereby undermining the country's dominance in the sub-region and making it vulnerable.
- c) Generally, the major powers want to benefit from an improved economy and trade with Nigeria, as well as to avoid threats posed to them by the scale of poverty in the nation and the resulting export of threats. Because of this, they tend to reverse their hard stand once in a while in favour of Nigeria. It is also observed that 'non-traditional power blocs' like China and Russia are now increasing the scope and depth of their activities in the country, thus stoking up increased competition from the other players. This also has implications for Nigeria's national security, as imported doctrines from different power blocs and

their perception of the country tend to negate security and relationship gains made in the past.

The relationship between the support by the major powers for Nigeria's foreign policy objectives towards improved national security, and their interests as world powers, is direct and robust. The major powers have a strong influence on global security issues, with a common desire for peace and security in Nigeria, the powerhouse of West Africa. They also desire a country whose citizens do not constitute a threat to their nations in form of illegal migration and the spread of terrorism, as well as human and drug trafficking, among other things. They equally look forward to a large market for their products and a country that will support their various agendas among the comity of nations.

Conclusion The global economic and political system is defined by relations between state actors competing for resources. States' unequal endowment in terms of material and human resources have placed some states above others, hence there are states referred to as major powers in the comity of nations. The major powers, also recognized as such by the UN, are the main actors in the international scene, and can influence activities within the global space. The influence of these major powers on Nigeria's national security is in varying degrees from modest to insignificant, especially since the advent of the Fourth Republic.

A critical review of foreign policy in Nigeria has shown that many issues must be resolved before Nigeria can optimize the advantages of a global partnership with the major powers. The impact of relations with the major powers on Nigeria's national security can at times be visible in how these countries advance their national interests regardless of how it affects Nigeria. Thus, it can be said that the relationship between the support by the major powers for Nigeria's foreign policy objectives towards improved national security, and their interests as world powers, is direct and robust. Nigeria does not have a choice but to succumb to their whims, because the country is dependent on foreign supplies of arms from the major powers, which influences its military power considerably and by extension, its national security. This article has observed that the major powers would continue to support Nigeria's foreign policy objectives towards improved national security in as much as it guarantees their own interests. Therefore, Nigeria needs to develop its economy as well as its military-industrial complex in order to have a voice globally and to tackle its security issues.

Nigeria could adopt a number of measures to help leverage the influence that flows from relations with the superpowers on its national security. A good take-off point to achieve this would be for the country to review its foreign relations. It needs to begin to engage with the major powers in a pragmatic way where it has something to offer, and where the interest of Nigerians is paramount. In this light also, the density of the influence of the major powers must be diluted with concrete relations with other emerging or medium powers of like interests. Secondly, the country must

develop economic capacity in order to free itself from the whims and caprices of the major powers. This can be done principally through diversifying the economy, investing in infrastructure, and making the investment climate more attractive, among other actions. Thirdly, to moderate the influence of the major powers on Nigeria's national security, the country needs to strengthen its institutions – military, political, social and so on – and ensure they develop capacity. Finally, Nigeria needs to take deliberate steps to develop its military-industrial complex, as this is one area where the influence of the major powers is most significant.

Overall, Nigeria's foreign policy has metamorphosed significantly from independence to current times. It is now most impacted by economic realities and national security challenges. Also, the effect of the country's relations with the major powers is quite significant, particularly in areas such as the economy, defence, politics, and culture, which provide the foundation on which security rests. Consequently, Nigeria's relations with the major powers influence its national security substantially, in varying and complex degrees.

Bibliography

1. Agubamah, E., 2014. *Bilateral Relations: Periscoping Nigeria and China Relations*. *European Scientific Journal*, Vol. 10, No. 14. pp 63–70. URL: <http://eujournal.org/index.php/esj/article/view/3392>, 30. 10. 2021.
2. Aina, D., 2020. *Technical Aid Corps: Nigeria's Soft Diplomacy Since 1987*. <https://guardian.ng/opinion/technical-aid-corps-nigerias-soft-diplomacy-since-1987/>.
3. *All Africa Online Newspaper*, 2016. *Nigeria: Overview of Buhari's Foreign Policies*, 27. 5. 2016. <https://allafrica.com/stories/201605270015.html>, 28. 5. 2020.
4. Babatunde-Lawal, A., 2022. *Increasing Nigeria's Defence Budget to Improve Security*. *Business Day*, May 20 2022. <https://businessday.ng>, 15. 7. 2022.
5. Asobie, H., 2014. *Nigeria's National Interest in a Globalising World: A Theoretical Perspective*. In: *Contemporary Challenges in Nigeria, Africa and the World: Reciprocity and Nigeria's African Policy: Beyond the Challenge of Incapacity*. Akinterinwa, B., (Ed.). Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. pp 275–314. <http://eprints.covenantuniversity.edu.ng/6781/1/State%20Failure%2C%20Terrorism....compressed.pdf>, 8. 11. 2021.
6. BBC News, 2017. *More than 40 killed in battle with Boko Haram in Nigeria*. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-40740323>, 31. 5. 2020.
7. BBC News, 2017. *Trump administration to sell Nigeria planes for Boko Haram fight*. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-39564855>, 4. 6. 2020.
8. *Democratization in Africa: African Views, African Voices*. 1992. Washington DC: The National Academies Press.
9. Ekott, I., 2021. *Nigeria Relations: Biden snubs Buhari in first calls to Africa* | Premium Times Nigeria (premiumtimesng.com).
10. Fischer, R., 2012. *The Peace of Westphalia and the World State: A Case for Casual Pluralism in International Relations*. Budapest: Central European University, Department of International Relations and European Studies.
11. Folarin, S., 2017. *Student Feature – Foreign Policy*. *E-International Relations*, 23. 12. 2017. <https://www.e-ir.info/2017/12/20/student-feature-foreign-policy/>, 31. 5. 2020.

12. France Diplomacy, 2021. Nigeria – Visit by Franck Riester (12-14 April 2021). <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/nigeria/news/article/nigeria-visit-by-franck-riester-12-to-14-apr-21>, 31. 5. 2021.
13. Giovanni, V., 2019. *The Persisting Relevance of Walter Rodney's »How Europe Underdeveloped Africa«*, April 18, 2019.
14. Global Security, 2020. *The Abortive Third Republic*. <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/nigeria/history-05.htm>, 21. 9. 2020.
15. GOV.UK, 2020. *Nigeria and the UK: Our Mission*. <https://www.gov.uk/world/nigeria/news>, 27. 10. 2021.
16. Iroegbu, S., 2015. 'Military General Appointed Commander of the MNJTF', *This Day* (Lagos), 3 June 2015.
17. Kia, B., Nwigbo, T., and Ojie, P., 2017. *Foreign Policy Strategy of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1960-2012: the Missing Link*. *Journal of International Relations, Media and Mass Communication Studies*, May 2017, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp 10–27.
18. Kissinger, H., 1995. *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks.
19. Laidi, Z., 1990. *The Superpowers and Africa: The Constraints of a Rivalry 1960–1990*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
20. Metz, H. C., 1992. *Nigeria: A Country Study*. Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. Washington, D.C: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.
21. Mohammed, A., 2019. *China-Nigeria relations: an Opportunity or Opportunism?* Tallinn University of Technology.
22. Musah, A., 2011. *ECOWAS and Regional Responses to Conflicts*. In: *ECOWAS and the Dynamics of Conflict and Peacebuilding*. Jaye, T., Garuba, D., Amadi, S. (Eds.). Dakar: Council for Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), pp 115–130. <https://codesria.org/IMG/pdf/9-5.pdf>, 10. 11. 2021.
23. Nsehe, M., 2011. *Obama Fights Nigerian Anti-Gay Bill, Threatens to Cut Off Aid*. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/mfonobongnsehe/2011/12/09/obama-fights-nigerian-anti-gay-bill-threatens-to-cut-off-aid/amp/>, 9. 12. 2011.
24. Ofeibe, Q., 2015. *Nigerian President: U.S. Refusal to Provide Weapons Aids Extremism*. <https://www.npr.org/2015/07/23/425654481/nigerian-president-u-s-refusal-to-provide-weapons-aides-extremism>.
25. Okuchukwu, C., 2015. *Nigerian Foreign Policy Relations (1999-2010): A Comparison of Obasanjo's (1999-2007) and Yar 'Adua's (2007-2010) Foreign Relations*. *National Journal of Advanced Research*, November; 2015, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp 38–54.
26. Olowojolu, O., 2017. *Mid-Term Report of President Muhammadu Buhari's Foreign Policy*. *Journal of Arts and Contemporary Society*, 26.03.2019, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp 1–12.
27. Onuah, F., 2014. *Nigerian President signs anti-gay bill into law*. <https://www.reuters.com/article/nigeria-gay-idUSL6N0KN2PP20140113>. 13. 1. 2014.
28. Osondu-Oti, A., and Ifedayo, T., 2016. *Nigeria's Foreign Policy: Structures and Decision-Making Processes*. *Academia*, 2016. https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/50331699/Paper-with-cover-page-v2.pdf?Expires=1636023638&Signature=YZmuaBi5F0f-mrZ-lH9hHVwf-m3OJfp5JaUM3mcUH3WnNEbiQ7GxMUF11ljiWsId79Gf1vzwZDyht6v9pXfKZz0UojEOaNizKmIglX1LQaI9ejhHXIiU6x02AbJAAH9zj2LnEGcawYH49hYO9Xc4ahwTNez29-vjQdbIngNaJY1soCIQWbkP3XAgNR0peNZ3-s4a8oEYT-K45H6sFVDmOilHwi~uLAnLuZnMokprMaa1GgzSb1L~AM4w7aeZ4cMzO10om9BQmeTH75soxpt83Oq0wSxQvLMAxeuU8UzjYJTDExhiz2BsCQkIl4RAAQ61Kwek8zst3NdHga7oXrVaw__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA, 4. 11. 2021.
29. Ota, E., and Ecoma, C., 2016. *Nigerian Foreign Policy and the Democratic Experiment: the Lessons of History and Options for the 21st Century*. *International Journal of Applied and Advanced Scientific Research*, 2016, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp 9–18.

30. *The World Bank Data: International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Military Balance, 2018. Armed Forces Personnel, Total – Nigeria.* <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.TOTL.P1?locations=NG>, 3. 6. 2021.
31. *The World Factbook, 2022. Explore All Countries – Nigeria.* <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/nigeria/>, 26. 7. 2022.
32. *Ukonga, A., 2019. Private Communication, 10 June, 2019.*
33. *Umejei, E., 2015. China's Engagement with Nigeria: Opportunity or Opportunist? University of the Witwatersrand Johannesburg, Gauteng, South Africa.*

e-mail: oluwagbire@yahoo.com

PRIMERJAVA RAZLAG CIVILNE IN VOJAŠKE OPREME V EVROPSKI IN MADŽARSKI SODNI PRAKSI

INTERPRETATION OF CIVILIAN VS. MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN EUROPEAN CASE LAW – EU AND HUNGARY

Povzetek Predpisovanje izdelkov, primernih za civilne in obrambne namene, se mogoče zdi obrobna tema, vendar vpliva tako na notranjo kot na zunanjo varnost. V članku predstavljamo poseben primer teh predpisov. Čeprav v Evropski uniji obstaja pravni okvir za uporabo v nacionalni zakonodaji, madžarski organi uporabljajo drugačno prakso, ki je pogosto v nasprotju z duhom veljavnih zakonov EU. Posledično sta izvoz in uvoz nekaterih izdelkov z dvojno rabo po madžarski zakonodaji bolj zapletena, kot je predvideno v zakonodaji EU, kar omejuje možnosti poslovanja podjetij na tem področju. Namen članka je predstaviti pravni okvir za temi predpisi in kakšne težave lahko povzroči udeležencem na trgu to, da jih pristojni nacionalni organi različno razlagajo.

Ključne besede *Oprema z dvojno rabo, EU, Madžarska, pravni okvir, zakonodaja v primerjavi s sodno prakso.*

Abstract The regulation of products suitable for both civilian and defence purposes may seem to be a marginal area; however, it affects both inner and outer safety. We present a peculiar case of this regulation: even though the EU legal framework exists for implementation in national laws, the Hungarian authorities follow a different practice, often conflicting with the spirit of the applicable EU laws. As a result, the export and import of specific dual-use products under Hungarian law is more complicated than that intended by EU law, which restricts the ability of companies in this area to conduct their business operations. The aim of the article is to present the legal framework behind the regulations, and to demonstrate the difficulties the inconsistent interpretation of these by the applicable national authorities can cause to market participants.

Key words *Dual-use equipment, EU, Hungary, legal framework, legislation vs case law.*

Introduction

Items that qualify as both civilian and defence products or equipment¹ are members of a generally unknown and not particularly widespread product group, but are also of particular importance to individual Member States and the European Union (EU), as the majority of them are defence-related, and, as a result, indirectly affect both national and common defence policies.

Considering the foregoing, it is rather surprising that these products or equipment are relatively underrepresented in legislation all around the world, and have a modest amount of relevant case law, especially compared to EU legislation and case law. However, the area is indisputably important, given that dual-use items and equipment, alongside defence policy, have a significant impact on the (military) development of nations and the EU as a whole, influence the budget, and play a key role in the field of judicial cooperation. This is further exacerbated by the fact that there has been absolutely no research carried out in this area, so there is no literature and no comparisons exist even at the EU level.

Furthermore, these products have gathered even more importance following the recent geopolitical incidents (e.g. the use of dual-use products during the invasion of Ukraine).

Dual-use items² specified in Annex 1 of the EU Common Military List – i.e. products and equipment covered by the ML1 (Military List)³ – are considered to be the most problematic. The products belonging to ML1 are mostly smooth-bore weapons with a smaller calibre or other arms and automatic weapons with a given calibre and their accessories. For some specific types of products and equipment under ML1 which will be discussed later, EU legislation constitutes a small set of provisions overlapping and contradicting not only each other in several aspects, but also some distinct national laws and a completely different set of case law.

The aim of this article is to present the challenges in the legal framework of the EU and Hungarian regulations for specific products and equipment belonging to ML1, and to show the difficulties an incompetent authority can cause to market participants. Furthermore, the article also aims to show the discrepancies between the EU and Hungarian legislation through a Hungarian example which is rather surprising, as no literature is available on solving any upcoming issues in this area.

¹ Note that the legislation dealing with this area uses both terms depending on the exact EU legislation, which will be detailed later in the present article.

² Note that the present article only deals with the comparison and overlap of civilian and defence products or equipment, so it does not cover general dual-use products or equipment.

³ The Military List is based on the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008, which defines the common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment, and which is updated annually pursuant to it. However, it was only in 2020 that the latest Military List – the COMMON MILITARY LIST OF THE EUROPEAN UNION adopted by the Council on 17 February 2020 (equipment covered by the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment) – was issued.

1 METHODS

Since the aim of the article is to present the legal regulations on ML1 and the collision of EU and Hungarian legislation, the most effective method was to collect the relevant laws, comparing them and drawing up similarities and discrepancies between them. It was also necessary to collect and review several judicial decisions on the effectiveness of the laws and to analyze the practice of the Hungarian authorities, in order to be able to present the collision of the practice with the effective regulations.

It was also important to collect data on the economic effect of ML1 products and equipment, as it shows the relevance of the topic under discussion.

The coverage of ML1 within EU law can be considered relatively narrow; there are only three parts of laws giving the regulatory framework: ‘Parliament and Council Directive 2009/43/EC’ (2009) on transfers of defence-related products within the EU; ‘Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009’ (2009) on the control of dual-use equipment; and ‘Council Directive 2021/555/EC’ (2021) on the acquisition and possession of weapons. The relevant law has been dealt with in a very small number of decisions by the EU judicature, as well as in national courts and authorities, but without addressing the most pressing issue: the deviating case law of national authorities with regard to the export of ML1 items.

2 RESULTS

2.1 Definition and content of the ML1 list: civilian versus defence-related products

ML1 is defined in the Annex to Directive 2009/43/EC, and – according to its title – covers the following items with a precise technical description: smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20 mm; other arms and automatic weapons with a calibre of 12.7 mm (calibre 0.50 inches) or less and accessories; and specially designed components therefor, such as rifles and combination guns, handguns, machine, sub-machine and volley guns.

The ML1 list also includes specific types of smooth-bore weapons (such as those specially designed for military use or of the fully automatic type), weapons using caseless ammunition, and accessories designed for these types of weapons. It should be emphasized, however, that the ML1 list does not address⁴ certain types, such as not fully automatic weapons, antique weapons, deactivated firearms and, most importantly, smooth-bore weapons used for hunting or sporting purposes which are

⁴ The term used here is particularly important when it comes to the different language versions, especially with regard to the Hungarian version. The term used in the Directive is »nem engedélyköteles« in Hungarian, »does not control« in English, »erfasst nicht« in German, »ne vie pas« in French and »ei asetete« in Finnish, suggesting that various lawyer-linguists from different nationalities interpret and translate certain terms in a different manner, and as a result, each national court may have a divergent interpretation of the same law. This results in the incoherent practice of the Hungarian authorities to be presented later in this article.

not specially designed for military use or of the fully automatic firing type (known as shotguns⁵) (Note 1 of Directive 2009/43/EC).

Directive 2021/555/EC specifies and, contrary to Directive 2009/43/EC, even classifies firearms and accessories (such as ammunition and projectiles) into four categories: where the purchase and possession of firearms and ammunition falling under Category A are prohibited (except where this is not contrary to public security or public order), Category B firearms and ammunition are subject to specific authorisation requirements⁶. Taking a closer look at the list of firearms and ammunition in each category⁷, one can conclude that there is a partial match with the items regulated under the ML1 list of Directive 2009/43/EC.

Directive 2009/43/EC set out a rather exact, exhaustive list in this respect. The problem, however, lies in the fact that some products or equipment on the ML1 list are considered essentially dual-use, given that such items qualify as equipment intended for both civilian and military use. This is illustrated by a (rather ambiguously worded) provision of Directive 2009/43/EC, which effectively states in the form of a »Note«⁸ that ML1 does not control smooth-bore weapons used for hunting or sporting purposes if not specially designed for military use or of the fully automatic firing type.

Accordingly, a specific group of smooth-bore weapons used for hunting or sporting purposes do not require – and as such, can be transferred within the EU without – any authorization⁹. The scope of the exceptions is reinforced by the non-binding¹⁰ preamble of Directive 2009/43/EC which is without prejudice to the application of Directive 2021/555/EC. Furthermore, it is set out in Article 2 of Directive 2021/555/EC that it does not apply to commercial transfers of weapons and ammunition of war.

⁵ *Firearms with smooth-bore barrels are, in practice, shotguns (Fábián 2015, p 17.).*

⁶ *Categories C and D are not included in the present article as the products and equipment they deal with cannot be regarded as dual-use products or equipment, and are therefore not connected to the subject of this article.*

⁷ *Category A covers the following products: explosive military missiles and launchers; automatic firearms; firearms disguised as other objects; ammunition with penetrating, explosive or incendiary projectiles, and the projectiles for such ammunition; and pistol and revolver ammunition with expanding projectiles and the projectiles for such ammunition, except in the case of weapons for hunting or for target shooting, for persons entitled to use them. Category B includes: semi-automatic or repeating short firearms; single-shot short firearms with centre-fire percussion; single-shot short firearms with rimfire percussion whose overall length is less than 28 cm; semi-automatic long firearms whose magazine and chamber can together hold more than three rounds; and semi-automatic long firearms whose magazine and chamber cannot together hold more than three rounds, where the loading device is removable or where it is not certain that the weapon cannot be converted, with ordinary tools, into a weapon whose magazine and chamber can together hold more than three rounds. Annex I, point II of Directive 2021/555/EC.*

⁸ *It is worth noting that in this case, the wording of the Directive is consistent in each language and there was no discrepancy in this aspect.*

⁹ *Authorization means a transfer licence in this case, governing the transfer of defence-related products within the EU, as stated in Article 1(1) and Article 3, Points 2, 5 and 6 of Directive 2009/43/EC.*

¹⁰ *The preamble to an EU act has no binding legal force, as established in the judgement Deutsches Milch-Kontor GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas, (2005) paragraph 32.*

Table 1:
Comparison of
the currently
effective EU
laws regulating
smooth-bore
weapons¹¹

Directive 2021/555/EC	Directive 2009/43/EC (ML1)
<p>Category A - Prohibited Firearms</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Explosive military missiles and launchers - Automatic firearms - Firearms disguised as other objects - Ammunition with penetrating, explosive or incendiary projectiles, and the projectiles for such ammunition - Pistol and revolver ammunition with expanding projectiles and the projectiles for such ammunition, except in the case of weapons for hunting or for target shooting, for persons entitled to use them - Automatic firearms which have been converted into semi-automatic firearms - Special centre-fire semi-automatic firearms - Semi-automatic long firearms, that is to say firearms that are originally intended to be fired from the shoulder, that can be reduced to a length of less than 60 cm without losing functionality by means of a folding or telescoping stock or by a stock that can be removed without using tools - Any firearm in this category that has been converted to firing blanks, irritants, other active substances or pyrotechnic rounds, or into a salute or acoustic weapon <p>Category B – Firearms Subject to Authorization</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Repeating short firearms - Single-shot short firearms with centre-fire percussion - Single-shot short firearms with rimfire percussion whose overall length is less than 28 cm - Semi-automatic long firearms whose magazine and chamber can together hold more than three rounds - Semi-automatic long firearms whose magazine and chamber cannot together hold more than three rounds, where the loading device is removable or where it is not certain that the weapon cannot be converted, with ordinary tools, into a weapon whose magazine and chamber can together hold more than three rounds - Repeating and semi-automatic long firearms with smooth-bore barrels not exceeding 60 cm in length - Semi-automatic firearms for civilian use which resemble weapons with automatic mechanisms - Any firearm in this category that has been converted to firing blanks, irritants, other active substances or pyrotechnic rounds, or into a salute or acoustic weapon. 	<p>Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20 mm, other arms and automatic weapons with a calibre of 12.7 mm (calibre 0.50 inches) or less and accessories, as follows, and specially designed components therefor: rifles, carbines, revolvers, pistols, machine pistols and machine guns</p> <p>Smooth-bore weapons:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Smooth-bore weapons specifically designed for military use; - Other smooth-bore weapons <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - of the fully automatic type; - of the semi-automatic or pump-action type; - Weapons using caseless ammunition; - Silencers, special gun-mountings, clips, weapons sights and flash suppressors for such arms

¹¹ These items are subject to authorization or prohibition based on the effective EU laws.

Table 1 demonstrates basic deviations with certain overlaps (emphasized in bold) in the material scope of the two Directives, which – especially the Notes of Directive 2009/43/EC – give rise to interpretation issues with regard to the equipment specified under ML1. Such issues are, however, mostly discernible through the case law.

2.2 ML1 and the relevant case law

The major difficulties of interpretation with regard to ML1 are discernible through case law, where national authorities have, in many cases, taken different approaches to it. National authorities often construe items listed in Note 1 Directive 2009/43/EC as defence-related products, and apply the provisions governing defence-related products accordingly.

Investigation of the available community case law shows that the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has addressed Directives 91/477/EEC (1991)¹² and 2009/43/EC and Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 in relatively few cases, and that the available court decisions do not deal with these issues, either¹³.

On the other hand, in the well-known case of *Zeman* (2014), of the available judgments passed in a preliminary ruling procedure, the CJEU specifically examined the conformity of hunting and sporting weapons legislation with Slovakian law. The CJEU established that one of the objectives of Directive 91/477/EEC was to prohibit the cross-border transfer of firearms (other than weapons for hunting or target shooting) within the EU, and that it carved out a simplified procedure for hunters and target shooters.

This stance of the CJEU was confirmed later, as it was declared in the *Czech Republic v Parliament and Council* (2019) that Directive 91/477/EEC contains rules intended to harmonize the Member States' administrative measures relating to the movement of firearms for civil use, and that the provisions of Directive 91/477/EEC govern firearms acquired and possessed by private persons, including the obligation to obtain authorization or to submit a declaration, and also with regard to prohibitions.

2.3 A problematic approach in national case law: Hungary versus the Member States

So far, this paper has discussed the reasons underlying the fact that ML1 may give rise to some controversies. It is also worth looking at national case law, which – through an examination of the superficial community law – will help to better understand the importance of the area at issue at both community and national level.

¹² Note that up to now (15 March 2022) no decision has been made or even any procedure started concerning Directive 2021/555/EC.

¹³ For example, the CJEU has not addressed Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 or Directive 2009/43/EU at all, which signals that the legal framework of dual-use items and defence-related products is actually not present in EU case law.

Of the national case laws of the 27 Member States, Hungarian case law deserves particular attention, given that, contrary to other national case laws, it uses a completely different approach to address the scope of ML1 products and the relevant authorization processes. Hungarian case law basically has two segments: judicial and administrative case law, which can be considered to be fundamentally contradictory and do not even fully comply with the legal provisions.

2.3.1 Judicial decisions

Judicial decisions mostly deal with ML1 in the area of dual-use items, taking into account – in almost all cases – the relevant expert opinions.

According to a decision by a lower Hungarian court, Case B.1059/2007.30 (2007) of the Csongrád County Court, also citing an expert opinion, many items that can now be used as children's toys are also considered military equipment under the laws; but the court is always bound by the legal provisions, regardless of whether the law in question is considered obsolete or not.

Another decision, Case B.255/2009.82 of the Metropolitan Court (2009), established that the classification of certain equipment in appropriate categories (i.e. military or non-military equipment) made the work of the experts and staff of the Special Service for National Security¹⁴ responsible for investigations more complicated.

Furthermore, in a different decision, Case Bhar.280/2018/6 of the Metropolitan Regional Court (2018), the court concluded that a military rifle charge may not be used for civilian purposes, and therefore did not qualify as ammunition for civilian firearms having a privileged status under the laws governing military equipment. The case involved the felony of abuse of firearms, given that the perpetrator retained a military rifle charge for sentimental reasons. The interpretation of the body applying the law – i.e. that the scope of small arms goes beyond firearms that can be acquired and possessed by a civilian with a licence, regardless of the fact that the concept of small arms has not been defined – is worth noting in this case.

Additionally, another decision, Case 4.Bf.15/2013.I of the Metropolitan Regional Court (2013) – also in the field of criminal law – which helps to interpret a similar case should also be mentioned. According to this decision, Hungarian law, contrary to EU legislation, does not specify technical parameters for clandestine intelligence-gathering equipment, but in the case of unsuitability, such items are not to be considered as instruments of abuse of military products. According to this decision, if an item is unsuitable for military use, it is not considered a military product or equipment, but rather a civilian item.

Examination of the decisions demonstrates that Hungarian case law always clearly follows the strictest interpretation of the letter of legal provisions, even in cases

¹⁴ In Hungarian: *Nemzetbiztonsági Szakszolgálat*.

where equipment cannot be unequivocally classified or its technical parameters cannot be established, and hence various exceptions listed may apply.

2.3.2 Administrative procedures

The case law of public authorities, on the other hand, is significantly more complex, as there is a greater overlap of material competence between the various authorities, and as such, it is not always clear which authority is acting in a given case and why.

The authorization of military equipment and responsibilities with regard to dual-use items are assigned to the Government Office of the Capital City of Budapest Department of Trade, Defence Industry, Export Control and Precious Metal Assay¹⁵ (BFKH) as of 1 January 2017¹⁶. The licensing of firearms is a police competence¹⁷; but it should be stressed that the police may grant different types of licences for firearms for specific purposes set out in an exhaustive list (i.e. self-defence, work, film production, target shooting, education, sport shooting, protection of people and property, hunting)¹⁸. Accordingly, there are two authorities with the material competence for authorization processes, which overlap in certain cases – including ML1 products, in particular firearms used for hunting and target shooting – where inadequately regulated distinctions are not reflected in the case law either.

In order to clarify the overlaps in material competences, the National Advocacy Association of Hungarian Firearms and Ammunition Traders¹⁹ (the Association)²⁰, a trade association of Hungarian firearms and ammunition traders in both Hungary and in the Member States of the European Union, as well as in other domestic and international relations, repeatedly requested the position of certain government Ministries and bodies between November 2018 and January 2020. These requests focused on three major issues: first, whether the trade of bullet weapons and ammunition that are not specifically for military use (i.e. for hunting or sporting purposes) requires a specific military licence, or whether a police licence is sufficient; second, how an undertaking with a military licence may trade firearms and ammunition imported as military equipment as products for hunting and sporting purposes, provided that such items are covered in the list of exceptions under ML1; and the third question was aimed at clarifying the extent to which case

¹⁵ In Hungarian: Budapest Főváros Kormányhivatalának Kereskedelmi, Haditechnikai, Exportellenőrzési és Nemesfémhitelesítési Főosztálya.

¹⁶ Prior to 1 January 2017, the relevant tasks were carried out by the Hungarian Trade Licensing Office (in Hungarian: Magyar Kereskedelmi Engedélyezési Hivatal; (MKEH)); however, with regard to the information available on their website, only the name of the authority was modified, without any substantial changes. (Section 2(2)(b) and Section 2(3) of Decree 365/2016 (XI. 29.) Korm. on assigning the Government Office of the Capital City of Budapest as the authority for specific industrial and commercial matters and the regional metrology and technical safety authorities).

¹⁷ Section 3(1) of Firearms and Ammunitions Act.

¹⁸ Section 2 point 43 of Firearms and Ammunitions Act.

¹⁹ Registration number: Cg.01-02-0011564; Registered office: H-1118 Budapest, Nagykőrösi út 24./ A.; Represented by: Ákos Szűcs.

²⁰ In Hungarian: Magyar Lőfegyver és Lőszerkereskedők Országos Érdekképviseleti Szövetsége

law is consistent with the relevant Hungarian and EU laws²¹. The reactions to these requests, however, have shown perfectly well that the Hungarian approach in this area is completely different from the case law of some EU Member States, given that the Ministry of the Interior²² referred the Association to the Ministry of Innovation and Technology (ITM).²³ Furthermore, in its response to the request, the ITM stated that it considers the provisions of Directive 2009/43/EC and the transposing Hungarian laws to apply to all ML1 products, without taking into account the provisions of other laws, including Directive 91/477/EEC²⁴. The Association also consulted the BFKH, and received a statement that all ML1 products under Directive 2009/43/EC are considered suitable for specific military, national security, law enforcement and policing purposes, regardless of the purpose of its actual end use. The BFKH also stated that the term ‘suitable’ was not an equivalent to being specifically designed for military, national security or other purposes, referring to both the functional and the technical approach²⁵, and it has not changed its position even after several comments and consultations²⁶.

Foreign case law was explored in the context of Hungary and Romania, where a Romanian company submitted a request for a position to the National Police Headquarters (ORFK)²⁷ to clarify the authorization obligation for dual-use items. In its position, the ORFK stated that if firearms and ammunition to be imported or exported for commercial purposes fall under ML1, their authorization is subject to the material and territorial competence of the BFKH. If such activity is solely related to equipment covered by Directive 91/477/EEC, its authorization falls under the material competence of the police²⁸.

It should be noted that the Romanian company in question submitted certificates²⁹ issued by several manufacturers established in EU Member States.

²¹ Each request was processed on the basis of the responses, using the file numbers set out in the request for identification purposes.

²² In Hungarian: *Belügyminisztérium*.

²³ In Hungarian: *Innovációs és Technológiai Minisztérium*.

²⁴ Letter of response to the request for a position on the interpretation of the laws governing the military activities of the Ministry of Innovation and Technology; Ref. IPFO/67659-1-2018/ITM.

²⁵ Position of the Government Office of the Capital City of Budapest in response to a request; Ref. BP/15-HTO-Á/671-2/2018.

²⁶ Position of the Government Office of the Capital City of Budapest in response to a request; Ref. BP/15-HTO-Á/671-6/2018.

²⁷ In Hungarian: *Országos Rendőr-főkapitányság*.

²⁸ Position No. 29000/30619-1/2018. *ált. of the National Police Headquarters*

²⁹ The manufacturer's certificates were issued by the following companies: *Ceska zborjovka a.s.* (Registered office: Svatopluka Cecha 1283, 688 01 Uhersky Brod, Czech Republic; Registration number: 46345965); *Sellier & Bellot a.s.* (Registered office: Lidicka 667, 258 01 Vlasim, Czech Republic; Registration number: 28982347); *Sako Limited* (Registered office: 11101 Riihimäki, Finland); *RUAG Ammotec GmbH* (currently *RUAG MRO Holding AG*; Registered office: Seetalstraße 175, 6032 Emmen, Switzerland); and *Meopta – optika s.r.o.* (Registered office: Kabelikova 1, 750 02 Prerov, Czech Republic; Registration number: 47677023); and such certificates were issued in a specific commercial case. A separate authorization was issued for the use of the manufacturer's certificates in this study.

The Association's requests for a position from the ITM were accompanied by these certificates, in which each manufacturer clearly declared that the firearms, ammunition and other equipment manufactured by them and sold to a Hungarian company were exclusively intended for civilian use. However, these certificates were completely ignored by the Hungarian authorities when formulating their position.

All this raises the need – with special emphasis on the case law³⁰ of the Court of Justice of the European Union – for the verbatim transposing of certain parts of Directive 2009/43/EC³¹. The necessity for such a review is substantiated by the statistics available on ML1, according to which ML1 items with a total value of EUR 2,429,150.00 were imported into Hungary in 2019³². These statistics are not suitable for determining those cases where the authorities handled these items, which were subject to defence-related product exception, as defence-related products³³.

2.3.3 Economic relevance

The importance of the presented issue may also be understood by reviewing the value of ML1 products and equipment within Hungary. The chart below summarizes the development of Hungarian export and import data for ML1 products from 2013 onwards³⁴, but it does not indicate whether the equipment mentioned in the Note 1 of Directive 2009/43/EC were included when calculating these values³⁵.

³⁰ *Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of the Netherlands (1990).*

³¹ *Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of the Netherlands (1990)*

³² Source: COARM public v2 (2021).

³³ *It should be noted that the Hungarian authorities do not submit adequate data to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), they provide relatively few data, which as a result, is unsuitable for analysis.*

³⁴ *SIPRI has been collecting these data since 2013 in respect of Hungary, and therefore, the processing of such data is also relevant from that date.*

³⁵ *It is noteworthy that the relevant data is collected, managed and processed by the BFKH; however, they do not disclose any adequate or meaningful data with reference to a law (i.e. Act XXIX of 2004 on the amendment and repeal of certain laws, as well as the establishment of certain regulations relating to Hungary's accession to the European Union). In its response to a request dated 17 February 2021, the BFKH only noted — without attaching any identification or case file number to the request — that no applications for the authorization of ML1 products or equipment had been refused, and that since 2005 a total of 1,136 applications for authorization had included ML1 products or equipment.*

The foregoing, however, raises an issue with respect to the transparency and traceability of the activities and operations of the BFKH — given that the purpose of the requested data and their use is solely scientific — if it is impossible to make data available even for scientific purposes, in a form that cannot be identified.

Chart 1:
Import to
Hungary and
Export from
Hungary
regarding
products on the
ML 1
(Source: EU
External Action,
licences. [ML1_Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20 mm, other arms and automatic weapons with a calibre of 12.7 mm \(calibre 0.50 inches\) or less and accessories, and specially designed components

Year	Import to Hungary \(€\)	Export from Hungary \(€\)
2013	~3,000,000	0
2014	~2,000,000	0
2015	~1,000,000	~1,000,000
2016	~3,000,000	0
2017	~2,000,000	0
2018	~3,000,000	~15,000,000
2019	~9,000,000	~29,000,000
</div>
<div data-bbox=)

Conclusion In summary, there are several overlaps in the context of Hungarian and EU laws with regard to ML1, which may require further consultation in order to be resolved.

On the one hand, such overlaps are reflected in the terms used, and on the other, they appear due to the lack of clarity as to the material competence of the authorities. The problems outlined above bring about a lack of uniformity in the case law with regard to the content of different laws. It is recommended that an appropriate application of the overlaps in the laws be standardized in such a manner that it is clear to each relevant authority which cases involve civilian use and which are of a military nature. Remedying most inconsistencies would ensure an effective application of the law, and it would resolve current anomalies and conflicts of laws by amending them accordingly, including, where appropriate, the relevant EU provisions.

A further solution to the contradictions outlined above is that the courts and the individual authorities – in particular the Government Office of the Capital City of Budapest Department of Trade, Defence Industry, Export Control and Precious Metal Assay – interpret individual laws in accordance with their preamble, i.e. the purpose of such laws, taking into account the relevant provisions of the Fundamental Law. This would enable them to classify weapons used for sporting and hunting

purposes as dual-use items in accordance with their intended purpose, and to establish appropriate procedures for such items.

Our proposal to address this is that the competent national government departments should issue an interpretation guide to EU and national law, clarifying the existing misunderstandings and providing an opportunity for the proper interpretation of the law and, through this, the development of satisfactory case law.

Bibliography

1. *Amendment of Certain Laws in the Areas of Industry and Trade Regulation and for the Purpose of Legal Harmonization Act LXXXIII of 2019.*
2. *Arms and Ammunitions Government Decree No. 253/2004 (VIII. 31).*
3. *Authorization of Foreign Trade of Dual-use Equipment Government Decree No. 13/2011 (II. 22).*
4. *Authorization of Manufacturing Military Equipment and of the Provision on Military Services Act CIX of 2005.*
5. *Authorization of the Export, Import, Transfer and Transit of Military Equipment and Services and on the Certification of Undertakings Government Decree No. 160/2011 (VIII. 18).*
6. *Case 4.Bf.15/2013.I (2013) of the Metropolitan Regional Court (in Hungarian: Fővárosi Ítéltábla).*
7. *Case B.1059/2007.30 (2007) of the Csongrád County Court (in Hungarian: Csongrád Megyei Bíróság).*
8. *Case B.255/2009.82 (2009) of the Metropolitan Court (in Hungarian: Fővárosi Bíróság)*
9. *Case Bhar.280/2018/6 (2018) of the Metropolitan Regional Court (in Hungarian: Fővárosi Ítéltábla).*
10. *Civil Code Act V of 2013.* https://njt.hu/translation/J2013T0005P_20210701_FIN.PDF
11. *COARM V2.* [80 | Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges](https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/easqap/sense/app/75fd8e6e-68ac-42dd-a078-f616633118bb/sheet/24ca368f-a36e-4cdb-94c6-00596b50c5ba/state/analysis>, 15 March 2022.
12. <i>Commerce Act CLXIV of 2005.</i>
13. <i>Commission v Kingdom of the Netherlands (1990) Case No. C-339/87. European Court Reports 1990 I-00851.</i>
14. <i>Consumer Protection Act CLV of 1997.</i>
15. <i>Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP on defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment. Official Journal L335, pp 99–103.</i>
16. <i>Council Directive 91/477/EEC of 18 June 1991 on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons. Official Journal L256, pp 51–58.</i>
17. <i>Council Regulation No. 428/2009 on setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items. Official Journal L134, pp 1–269.</i>
18. <i>Criminal Code Act C of 2012.</i>
19. <i>Czech Republic v Parliament and Council (2019) Case No. C-482/17. European Court Reports ECLI:EU:C:2019:1035.</i>

</div>
<div data-bbox=)

20. *Designation of the Government Office of the Capital City of Budapest as the Authority Acting in Certain Industrial and Commercial Matters as well as on the Territorial Metrological and Technical Safety Authorities Government Decree of 365/2016 (XI. 29).*
21. *Detailed Rules for the Authorization of Military Activities and of the Certification of Undertakings Government Decree 156/2017 (VI. 16).*
22. *Deutsches Milch-Kontor GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas (2005) Case No. C-136/04. European Court Reports 2005 I-10095.*
23. *Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community (2009). Official Journal L146, pp 1–36.*
24. *Fábián, L., 2015. Fegyverismereti vizsga – Felkészülési segédlet. Alpokalja Sportegyesület, Budapest*
25. *Firearms and Ammunitions Act XXIV of 2004.*
26. *Fundamental Law of Hungary 2011. https://njt.hu/translation/TheFundamentalLawofHungary_20201223_FINrev.pdf.*
27. *General Rules for Access to and Exercise of the Service Activity Act LXXVI of 2009. https://njt.hu/translation/J2012T0100P_20210708_FIN.pdf.*
28. *Legislation Act CXXX of 2020.*
29. *Market Surveillance of Products Act LXXXVIII of 2012.*
30. *Marking of Military Products and on the Registry of Military Products and Services Decree of the Ministry of Economics and Trade No. 32/2007 (III. 19).*
31. *Position of the Government Office of the Capital City of Budapest No. BP/15-HTO-Á/671-2/2018.*
32. *Position of the Ministry of Innovation and Technology No. IPFO/47377-2/2018/ITM.*
33. *Position of the Ministry of Innovation and Technology No. IPFO/67659-1-2018/ITM.*
34. *Position of the Ministry of the Interior No. BM/18631-6/2018.*
35. *Position of the National Police Headquarters No. 29000/29077-1/2018. ált.*
36. *Position of the National Police Headquarters No. 29000/30619-1/2018. ált.*
37. *Position of the Office of the Prosecutor General No. T.KvFE.2980/2018/1-I.*
38. *Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the evaluation of Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community, COM/2016/0760 final Tasks and Competences of the Members of the Government Government Decree No. 94/2018 (V. 22).*
39. *Zeman (2014) Case No. C543/12. European Court Reports ECLI:EU:C:2014:2143*

e-mail: dr.miskovics.mariann@gmail.com

e-mail: csaba.szabo3@bm.gov.hu

PROBLEM LEKSIKALNIH VRZELI PRI POUČEVANJU VOJAŠKE ANGLEŠČINE

THE PROBLEM OF LEXICAL GAPS IN TEACHING MILITARY ENGLISH

Povzetek Ker anizomorfizem oziroma odsotnost natančnega ujemanja besed v dveh različnih jezikih pogosto ovira proces učenja tujega jezika, morajo učitelji tujega jezika najti učinkovite metode za njegovo obvladovanje. S poskusom, v katerem je sodelovalo 109 slušateljev, smo preizkusili več metod poučevanja vojaških slovničnih posebnosti angleškega jezika, za katere ni neposrednih ustreznic v poljskem jeziku. Rezultati so pokazali, da je pri leksikalnih vrzelih prevajanje v materni jezik manj učinkovito od enojezičnih razlag, predstavitev terminov znotraj konteksta in ponazoritev njihovega pomena s primeri. Rezultati kažejo tudi, da slušateljem pri anizomorfizmu pomaga uporaba kontrastivne analize v maternem jeziku.

Ključne besede *Strokovna angleščina, vojaška terminologija, poučevanje besedišča, pomenska neprekrivnost, anizomorfizem.*

Abstract Since anisomorphism, the absence of an exact correspondence between words in two different languages, often impedes the process of second language (L2) acquisition, L2 teachers need to recognize effective methods for dealing with it. In an experiment involving a total of 109 students, we tested several methods of teaching English language military vocabulary particulars which lack direct Polish language equivalents. The results suggest that L1 translation is less effective in dealing with lexical gaps than monolingual explanations, presentation of the terminology in context, and illustrating its meaning with examples. However, the results also indicate that the use of L1 for contrastive analysis may help students cope with anisomorphism.

Key words *English for specific purposes, military terminology, vocabulary teaching, non-equivalence, anisomorphism.*

Introduction During the practice of institutional translation, officially published glossaries, dictionaries and document templates should give clear guidelines for dealing with problems arising from non-equivalence or partial equivalence between the vocabularies of different languages. However, there are few aids which address the same issues in less formalized environments. Since military second language (L2) classroom practice also aims to prepare students for the latter type of situations (translations of formal documents will often be provided by language professionals), military L2 students should be equipped with tools enabling them to deal with anisomorphism.

1 THE PROBLEM OF LEXICAL GAPS IN FOREIGN LANGUAGE TEACHING

Non-equivalence and partial equivalence between individual words in the first (L1) and second language lexicons hinder the process of L2 acquisition. According to Masrai and Milton, »learners tend to learn L2 words that have a direct translation equivalent in the learners' L1 rather than those with a non-direct translation equivalent« (2015, p 3). Analyzing the process of English vocabulary acquisition in Saudi students, the researchers measured the uptake of L2 vocabulary items which have a direct L1 equivalent against the uptake of those words which lack it, and concluded that »words with a non-direct translation equivalent are difficult to learn, even when they are more frequent than those with a direct translation equivalent (Ibid., p 6).« This relative importance of translation equivalence vis-à-vis frequency becomes even more significant given the fact that frequency not only facilitates learning a word, but also increases its usefulness in communication. As Nation has argued: »the high-frequency words make up a relatively small, very useful group of words that are important no matter what use is made of the language. Because each word in this group is frequent, [learners] will get a very good return on learning them« (in Augustyn, 2013, p 370).

Several reasons for this influence of anisomorphism on the L2 acquisition process can be identified. Translation of individual vocabulary items from and into the L1 is a very common way of explaining their meanings. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in the early stages of L2 acquisition pairing new words with their L1 equivalents is not only the most common, but also the most efficient way of both teaching new vocabulary and learning it. This view is supported by the results of an experiment conducted by Prince (1996, p 478), which as Boustani has put it »revealed the superiority of using translation in learning vocabulary in terms of quantity of words learned« (Boustani, 2019, p 4). Moreover, according to some scholars »learning a foreign language involves the occasional or systematic use of bilingual dictionaries at all levels of proficiency« (Augustyn, p 362), and even though some teachers may view the use of L1 to explain meanings of L2 vocabulary items with reluctance, »several studies confirm that what learners actually do inside and outside of the classroom definitely includes frequent use of translation« Augustyn, p 367).

The importance of correlation between L2 vocabulary items and their L1 equivalents is also emphasized by some psycholinguistic models of vocabulary storage. These models differ in their assessment of the role of the L1 equivalents, and usually indicate that this role will be influenced by several factors. Some researchers have suggested that words may be represented either in a single »store« common to both languages, or »in separate language-specific stores« depending on such factors as the type of word (e.g. abstract vs concrete) (Boustani, 2019, p 4). Both anecdotal evidence and research suggest that the role of a L1 equivalent in understanding the L2 vocabulary item differs in relation to the learner's fluency level. According to Navracsiacs: »As language proficiency increases the connection between the word and its meaning becomes more direct, relying less on a mediating connection through the L1 lexicon« (2016, p 2). However, even as learners' reliance on the L1 equivalents diminishes with their increased language competence, according to some scholars the meanings of L2 vocabulary items are still mediated by the meanings of the corresponding L1 words. In Jiang's view, while the link to the syntax of the L1 equivalent weakens with the learner's time of exposure to L2, the semantic link is retained:

With increased experience in L2 ... L2 words are no longer mapped to L1 translations but to L1 meaning directly. ... [Once] L1 semantic information has entered L2 lexical entries ... it is very hard for new meanings to get in. The semantic information that is copied from the L1 translation stays in the L2 lexical entry and continues to mediate L2 word use with the continued exposure to the L2. As a result, even highly proficient L2 users will use L2 words on the basis of the semantic specifications of their L1 translations. (Jiang, 2002, p 619).

Therefore, it seems that the issue of limited and non-existent equivalence between L2 and L1 words is an important factor to be considered in syllabus development and in the educators' choice of teaching methods.

2 AREAS OF ANISOMORPHISM BETWEEN POLISH AND ENGLISH MILITARY LEXICONS

During the process of teaching English to personnel of the Polish Armed Forces (with the aid of commercially published dictionaries and textbooks, and glossaries provided by military institutions, as well as teaching materials based on original military documents), we have identified four areas of limited equivalence or lack of equivalence between Polish (L1) and English (L2) military terminology. The most notable one is the absence of an equivalent in one of the languages. This can be further divided into two subcategories: the absence of the referent in one of the armed forces (such as a military rank which has no equivalent in the armed forces of the other nation), and the absence of the term in one of the lexicons (such as a technique of tactical movement which is not defined in the manuals of a nation's armed forces even though it is normally executed as part of a wider tactic). The next area comprises referents differently categorized in each of the languages or in each of the armed forces (e.g. different typologies of weapons and equipment or tactical

concepts, differences in organization). A less tangible but very common problem is the partial overlapping of semantic fields covered by seemingly corresponding pairs of L1 and L2 words. Inconsistencies or changes taking place in one of the languages (from the unsurprising differences between the US and UK dialects of English to rather unexpected irregularities within the terminology used by one of the services of a single nation) comprise the fourth category.

2.1 Absence of an equivalent in one of the languages

2.1.1 Absence of the referent in one of the armed forces

Many elements of organization, culture, and doctrine differing one nation's armed forces from those of its allies and its potential enemies are sufficiently important, noticeable, or conceptually simple to be represented in the nation's language. For example, the lack of Space Forces in the Polish military organization will not produce any lexical gap, as the terms »*Wojska Kosmiczne*« or »*Sily Kosmiczne*« can be easily produced in Polish. Similarly, vocabularies of languages used by land-locked nations which have no need to maintain their own navies will nonetheless include a word referring to this branch of armed forces.

In some cases, however, the absence of the referent in the armed forces communicating in either of the languages in a pair will be reflected by the lack of an equivalent word in its lexicon. From the military English teacher's perspective, the most noticeable area including such lexical gaps is the military hierarchy and especially, the vocabulary of military ranks. Equivalents of the Polish Armed Forces' commissioned ranks can be found in all the militaries of the NATO English-speaking countries, but the differences between non-commissioned rank structures appear even between the services of the US Armed Forces, not to mention the differences between the British Commonwealth and the United States militaries (Table 1). This problem is particularly important in a military English language classroom because students' military ranks and appointments constitute part of »personal information«, and as such are expected to be described at early stages of L2 learning when the translation of individual vocabulary items is heavily relied upon. While the translation of Polish military ranks issued by the Polish MOD (Table 2) may remedy this problem, it is worth noting that the translations include some items which are non-existent in the armed forces of NATO English-speaking countries (e.g. *Master Corporal* and *Senior Corporal*); both Polish and British Warrant Officer ranks do not correspond to the ranks bearing the same name in the US Armed Forces; and *kapral*, traditionally translated as *Corporal*, corresponds to the rank of Private or Private First Class in the UK and US militaries. Likewise, some appointments, such as *Battalion Adjutant* in the British Army, do not have direct equivalents in the armed forces of other nations. Similar lack of equivalents also appears in some other areas. For example, the word *Marines* is present in the Polish military lexicon when it refers to the entire branch of the armed forces or of the navy, even though this branch does not exist in the Polish Armed Forces (it must be noted, however, that the Polish equivalent *piechota morska* literally means »marine infantry,« which actually is only one of the sub-branches of

the US Marine Corps); however, Polish has no word for individual servicemen and women of this branch, who usually are referred to as *żołnierze piechoty morskiej* (literally »soldiers of the Marines«).

Table 1:
Comparison of
enlisted ranks in
the Polish, UK
and US Armies
and the USMC
Source: NATO
STANDARD
APersP-01
NATO CODES
FOR GRADES
OF MILITARY
PERSONNEL
Edition A,
Version 2
MARCH 2022.)

NATO code	Polish Army	British Army	US Army	US Marine Corps
OR-9	– Starszy Chorąży Sztabowy – Starszy Chorąży	Warrant Officer I (21)	– Sergeant Major of the Army – Command Sergeant Major – Sergeant Major – Master Gunnery Sergeant	– Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps – Command Sergeant Major – Sergeant Major – Master Gunnery Sergeant
OR-8	Chorąży	Warrant Officer II (22)	– First Sergeant – Master Sergeant (46)	– First Sergeant – Master Sergeant (46)
OR-7		Staff Sergeant (20) (23)	Sergeant First Class	Gunnery Sergeant (48)
OR-6	Młodszy Chorąży		Staff Sergeant	Staff Sergeant
OR-5	Starszy Sierżant		Sergeant	Sergeant
OR-4	Sierżant	Corporal (26)	– Corporal (47) – Specialist	Corporal (47)
OR-3	– Plutonowy – Starszy Kapral	Lance Corporal (27)	Private First Class	Lance Corporal (48)
OR-2	Kapral	Private (or equivalent) (Classes 1-3) (20) (28)	Private E-2	Private First Class (48)
OR-1	Starszy Szeregowy	Private (or equivalent) (Class 4) (20) (28)	Private E-1	Private
	Szeregowy			

Table 2:
Translations
of Polish Land
Forces enlisted
ranks issued by
the Polish MOD
(Source:
DECYZJA Nr
133/MON
MINISTRA
OBRONY
NARODOWEJ
z dnia 26
czerwca 2017
r. w sprawie
tłumaczenia na
język angielski
nazw stopni
wojskowych
żołnierzy Sił
Zbrojnych
Rzeczypospolitej
Polskiej,
używanego na
poliwęglanowych
kartach
tożsamości.)

NAZWA STOPNIA WOJSKOWEGO W JĘZYKU POLSKIM	TŁUMACZONA NA JĘZYK ANGIELSKI NAZWA STOPNIA WOJSKOWEGO
Starszy chorąży sztabowy	Senior Staff Warrant Officer
Starszy chorąży	Senior Warrant Officer
Chorąży	Warrant Officer
Młodszy chorąży	Junior Warrant Officer
Starszy sierżant	Senior Sergeant
Sierżant	Sergeant
Plutonowy	Master Corporal
Starszy kapral	Senior Corporal
Kapral	Corporal
Starszy szeregowy	Private 1st Class
Szeregowy	Private

2.1.2 Absence of the vocabulary item in one of the lexicons

Some referents of English language words which do exist in the reality of the Polish Armed Forces are nonetheless not denoted by any vocabulary item of the Polish military lexicon. One such term is *overwatch*: »a role in which troops or tanks observe and give covering fire if necessary« (Bowyer, 2004 p 172). The two following fragments of the Polish Land Forces' *Podręcznik walki* and the US Army *Training Curricular No. 3-21.8* depict riflemen's roles in clearing rooms:

... number one and two Soldier of the clearing team may move deeper into the room while *overwatched* by the other team members. (*TC 3-21.8*, p 3-64, my emphasis)

Pomieszczenia powinny oczyszczać zespoły w składzie minimum dwóch żołnierzy. jeden z żołnierzy prowadzi ogień ... a następnie zajmuje miejsce, z którego *może obserwować* całe pomieszczenie. ... Drugi żołnierz przed wejściem do środka krzyczy „WCHODZĘ«... [Eng: Rooms should be cleared by teams consisting of at least two soldiers... one of them ... provides fire ... and then takes position *enabling observation* of the entire

room.... The other soldier calls »COMING IN« before entering].
(Dakudowicz, *Podręcznik walki*, p 233, my emphasis)

Although the recommended tactics seem to be fairly similar (while one element is maneuvering, another element is ready to engage the enemy if necessary), the Polish quote uses a word which does not denote the readiness or ability to return fire (and as such might be misleading to a learner if provided as a Polish equivalent of the word *overwatch*). At least from the language teacher's perspective, the word *cover* (»support for another person or unit,« »to provide fire support for another person or unit,« »to be able to observe or shoot into a specific area« (Bowyer, p 60)) may be treated as synonymous with *overwatch* and *provide overwatch*. This word does have direct Polish equivalents, which is illustrated by the fragment on room-clearing drills which directly follows the one quoted above.

W podobny sposób żołnierz wychodzący z pomieszczenia, które *ubezpiecza* inny żołnierz, powinien krzyknąć »WYCHODZĘ«. [Similarly, the soldier leaving the room *covered* by another soldier should call »GOING OUT«].
(Dakudowicz, p 233, my emphasis).

However, even with this assumption in mind, the limited number of Polish equivalents at the teacher's and lexicographer's disposal may at best lead to the problem of partial semantic overlap (further discussed in 3.3. below). For example, the same verb, *ubezpieczać*, is used to describe one of the three subgroups an infantry platoon should be divided into for an attack on a building: »atakująca, wspierająca, ubezpieczająca (skrzydła i tyły).« (Dakudowicz, p 230, my emphasis). Now, the English instructions for the same type of operation call for dividing the platoon into »an assault element, a support element, and a security element« (Combat Leader's Field Guide: 12th Edition, p 159). *Assault* can be translated as *atakująca*, the Polish equivalent of *support* is *wspierająca*, but *ubezpieczająca (skrzydła i tyły)* is the group responsible for (rear and flank) *security*. Thus, the Polish noun *ubezpieczenie* and words related to it are also used in meanings which are not covered by the term *overwatch*.

Another lexical gap that can be included in this category is the lack of a term exclusively denoting *friendly* forces as opposed to *own* forces. The paragraph from a Polish Operation Order template describing friendly forces is entitled »*Wojiska Własne*« (*Poradnik dowódcy plutonu*, 2011 p 47). Yet, the basic English equivalent of *własny* is the adjective *own*, which (unsurprisingly to a native speaker of Polish) is confirmed by the relevant entry in the bilingual dictionary *Wielki słownik słownik polsko-angielski PWN Oxford* (2014, p 1239). Since the *friendly forces* section of an Operation Order »[lists] higher, adjacent, supporting, and reinforcing units who are participating in this operation...« (Edwards, 2000, p 114) the use of the Polish equivalent of this term may be misleading as to its real meaning.

2.2 Differently categorized referents

According to the military manual *Poradnik dowódcy plutonu*, a platoon's soldiers can be divided into training groups including »strzelcy karabinków, [and] celowniczo karabinów maszynowych« (p 80). While the obvious translation of the latter group is *machine gunners* (literally »machine-gun aimers«), translating the former as *riflemen* does not reflect the fact that bilingual Polish-English dictionaries usually put forward the word »carbine« as the equivalent of the word denoting their assigned weapon, »karabinek« (Grzebieniowski and Gałązka, 1996, p 565).¹ This diminutive form of *karabin* originally referred to short-barrelled rifles, but after the introduction of the intermediate cartridge it was adopted as the term for rifles using this type of ammunition, which are also standard personal weapons in most armies. Hence, the official website of the Polish Armed Forces uses the word *karabinek* to refer to standard Polish infantry weapons, the Beryl and the Grot rifles (*Karabinek szturmowy wz. 96 Beryl*). However, in English a carbine is a short rifle, which is illustrated by the Field Manual No. 3-22.9 on *Rifle Marksmanship M16-/M4-Series Weapons*, which refers to the M4 as a »carbine« while calling the M16A2/A3 a »rifle« (2008, pp 2-1, 2-2, 2-5). So, notwithstanding the contents of the Polish-English dictionary entries, *rifle* will normally be translated as *karabin* only in the case of weapons using a full-power cartridge or light fire-support weapons.

Another pair of equivalents suggested by dictionaries that must be approached with caution is *pododdział* and *sub-unit*. The Polish *Regulamin Działań Wojsk Lądowych* defines *pododdział* as »część oddziału lub związku taktycznego nie mająca zwykle samodzielności gospodarczej i administracyjnej« [a part of a unit or military grouping which usually is not administratively or financially independent] (2008, p 427). A sub-unit, on the other hand, is: »a grouping, which forms a part of a larger grouping« (Bowyer, *Dictionary of Military Terms*, p 229). The latter definition does not mention the administrative or financial status of a sub-unit. Additionally, a platoon may be seen as both a *sub-unit* of a company and as a *unit*, whereas the Polish term *oddział* is reserved for units included in tactical and operational formations or operating independently, such as brigades, regiments and separate battalions (»wchodzą w skład wyższych związków organizacyjnych (związków taktycznych, operacyjnych) lub występują samodzielnie; zalicza się do nich brygady, pułki i samodzielne bataliony«) (*Regulamin Działań Wojsk Lądowych*, p 423).

2.3 Partial semantic overlap

As »it is not frequent that the lexical meanings of the two lexical units are absolutely identical« (Xiaomei Yu, 2020, p 1), partial semantic overlaps are probably the most common type of lexical gap. Some gaps belonging to this category can easily be identified and as such are dealt with successfully by bilingual dictionaries and glossaries. For example, both military Polish equivalents of the word *support*,

¹ It must be noted, however, that some dictionaries provide the word *rifle* as the second choice of the English equivalent of *karabinek*, which is done e.g. by *Wielki słownik PWN-Oxford, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN S.A. i Oxford University Press 2004*.

wsparcie and *zabezpieczenie*, are listed in the relevant entry of *Słownik terminów wojskowych angielsko-polski polsko angielski* (2000, p 71), and the *AAP6PL (2017) NATO Glossary* translates the term *combat service support* as »*zabezpieczenie działań bojowych*,« while translating *combat support* as »*wsparcie bojowe*« (p 108).

However, colloquial uses of some military vocabulary particulars evade the attention of lexicographers and do not find their way into dictionaries. *Jednostka*, another Polish equivalent of *unit*, is normally used in spoken and informal Polish to denote the place where a unit is permanently stationed. Hence, military English students often fail to achieve the intended meaning, producing such utterances as »Soldiers who spend all their professional lives in their units have no combat experience« instead of »Soldiers who spend all their professional lives in their barracks have no combat experience.« Similarly, the word *company* will often be used to denote the place where this unit is billeted, which leads to the production of such phrases as »cleaning the company« instead of the intended »cleaning the company's barrack rooms«.

2.4 Inconsistencies within one language

Since English is recognized as the official language or one of the official languages of several NATO and EU Member States and numerous other nations, many of which use their own distinctive dialects and follow their own traditions, it is no surprise that a single referent may be denoted by more than one item of »English« military lexicon. Another source of inconsistencies within a language is the changing nature of the reality described by it. A language often reflects technological advances, doctrinal changes and political developments by expanding or modifying the meanings of the existing words rather than adding new items to its lexicon. For example, juxtaposing the words *rocket* and *missile* used to be a very efficient way of explaining their meanings to Polish students, who otherwise would be influenced by the L1 collocations such as *rakieta balistyczna* or *rakieta ziemia-powietrze* (literally *ballistic* »*rocket*« or *surface to air* »*rocket*«). However, the prevalence of electronic systems has led to the development of munitions being called »guided rockets«. Although military authorities categorize this type of ordnance under such labels as »fixed-wing Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II« (APKWS), the *Official Site of the US Air Force* has announced its introduction with the headline »A-10 fires its first laser-guided rocket« (King Jr., 2013).

NATO terminology adopted by the former Warsaw Pact Member States which joined NATO after the fall of the Iron Curtain sometimes replaced already existing terms referring to the same concepts or items. The fading of some Warsaw-Pact era acronyms and terms into oblivion may not have even been noticed by contemporary military English students and teachers. What is more, their replacement by acronyms and abbreviations commonly used in the armed forces of NATO Member States, such as »FEBA, FLOT, FSCL« (*Planowanie działań na szczeblu taktycznym w Wojskach Lądowych*, p 56), may actually facilitate military vocabulary teaching and learning. However, there are vocabulary items which still have different meanings

according to different sources. For example, the word *kombatant* has entered the Polish terminology of the law of armed conflict as the equivalent of the English term *combatant*, which is illustrated by the following quote from *Poradnik dowódcy plutonu*: »Należy zawsze rozróżniać między: a) kombatantami a osobami cywilnymi« [literally: »a distinction must always be made between: a) combatants and civilians«] (p 97). Yet, the online dictionary of the Polish language, *Słownik Języka Polskiego PWN*, does not reflect this use of *kombatant*, describing it traditionally as »1) były żołnierz regularnych formacji wojskowych, oddziałów partyzanckich lub uczestnik ruchu oporu; 2) weteran« [literally: 1) a former soldier of regular military formations, partisan units or a member of the resistance; 2) veteran] (accessed May 15, 2022) and the *Wielki słownik polsko angielski PWN-Oxford* translates this word exclusively as *veteran* (2014, p 373).

3 METHODS FOR DEALING WITH LEXICAL GAPS IN TEACHING MILITARY ENGLISH

We have conducted a series of experiments aimed at testing the following methods of teaching English military vocabulary particulars which lack Polish equivalents or have only partial L1 equivalents to Polish students: (1) illustrating the meaning of a vocabulary item with examples; (2) illustrating the meaning with a translation; (3) introducing a term in the context of a standardized NATO document; (4) presenting monolingual definitions; (5) presenting comprehensive bilingual definitions; and (6) involving students in contrastive analysis in order to raise their awareness of the problem of anisomorphism.

The other existing methods, such as helping »students choose and use the right bilingual dictionaries,« (Boustani, p 19), were not tested.

3.1 Method

3.1.1 Participants

The 75 Military University of Land Forces (MULF) students participating in the main part of the study were divided into eight groups. In the experiment, students from each group were paired with students from a group with a similar level of language skills and military experience: two groups of professional soldiers with English language skills at the B1 level of the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR); two B1 groups of 3rd year cadets; two B2/C1 groups of 1st year cadets; and two C1 groups of 3rd year cadets. In order to further randomize the results, the tasks alternated in such a way that students relying on a translation or belonging to the control group in two of the tasks constituted the experimental group while doing the other tasks. Since some doubts could be raised as to the validity of the results used to describe the relative effectiveness of Method 1, another task for this method was conducted with a further 34 MULF students belonging to four 2nd year groups. The average level of English-language skills was different in each group, ranging from A2 to C1. For the experiment, each of

the groups was divided into two subgroups, so that each of the two methods of introducing vocabulary was tested by a separate subgroup.

3.1.2 Materials and Procedure

A test was designed comprising four separate sets of questions for measuring the effectiveness of individual methods. The relative effectiveness of *Illustrating the meaning of a word with examples* (Method 1) was measured against the effectiveness of *Illustrating the meaning with a translation* (Method 2). In the introductory task of this part, students testing the effectiveness of illustrating the meaning with a translation matched the words with their Polish equivalents, while students testing the effectiveness of providing examples matched the same set of generic terms with examples. In the main task of this part, both groups were instructed to fill in gaps in sentences, choosing a word from the previous task. Since the results of this experiment may be seen as inconclusive, another task was designed and run with another set of groups of students. Instead of the introductory task, each group was presented with a separate glossary, either explaining meanings of words by giving their L1 equivalents, or by providing examples of their referents. In the task below the glossary, the cadets were to fill in gaps in three sentences, using some of the words from the glossaries. For *Introducing a term in the context of a standardized NATO document* (Method 3), the control group and the experimental group saw the vocabulary item in the context of the same document (an operation order), but for the former group a simplistic translation of the item was added (the Polish term *wojska własne* was presented as the equivalent of the heading *friendly forces*). *Presenting monolingual definitions* (Method 4) was measured against *Presenting comprehensive bilingual definitions* (Method 5). Students in both groups were instructed to fill in the same missing words in identical sentences, but in one group the words to choose from were defined in L2, while in the other they were defined in L1. Both the English definitions and the Polish equivalents were extracted from dictionaries published or co-published by the Oxford University Press, albeit the English-Polish *Wielki Słownik Angielsko-Polski* was published in 2004 whereas the monolingual *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary* was accessed in 2021. An attempt was made to reproduce the experience of using an actual dictionary, so entries from both dictionaries also included information which was irrelevant in the context of the experimental task. For *Involving students in contrastive analysis* (Method 6), the control and experimental groups had to work out the meanings of the same vocabulary items. However, in the case of the experimental group this task was introduced by an activity in which they were supposed to come up with nonsensical literal translations of English phrases, while the control group was deprived of any introduction which could have reminded them of the risks involved in literal, word by word translation.

The students participated in the experiment in a normal class setting. With the exception of the task checking the relative effectiveness of Method 6, they were told not to use any dictionaries or other aids. The teachers conducting the experiment in their classes were told to allow sufficient time to do all the tasks.

3.2 Results and Discussion

During the initial analysis, *Illustrating the meaning with a translation* seemed to yield better results than *Illustrating the meaning of a word with examples* (Figure 1). Overall, 84% of the participants testing the former method chose the correct word, while only 68% of those who had the vocabulary explained by means of examples accomplished the same task successfully. However, during further analysis it was discovered that most of the mistakes in the latter group were caused by the participants' misinterpretation of the instructions. Since they had been given a list of weapon names, they wrongly believed that they were expected to use one of these to fill in the gap in the test sentence. When all such mistakes were eliminated, and only the substitution of the wrong common noun came into focus, the results actually reversed, suggesting that providing students with examples was a more effective method, as only one out of the total of five students who made this type of mistake had the vocabulary explained to them in this way (Figure 2). Nonetheless, since the percentage of the participants who made this type of mistake was very low, the effectiveness of the method was measured again in another experiment, conducted with a new group of participants. Again this time the results initially seemed to indicate *Illustrating the meaning with a translation* as a more effective method: 83% of the answers given by participants testing it were correct in contrast to 69% taught in the other way (Table 3). However, in case of the sentence checking the ability to use the pair *rifle/carbine* the results again pointed to the presentation of examples as the more effective method (with the score at 94%, as opposed to 83% in the group relying on translations (Table 4)). In trying to explain this discrepancy it was noticed that the examples for this pair were more likely to be familiar to students than the examples for the other two pairs (rocket-missile and IFV-APC). The examples of the two categories of firearms included Polish weapons (Beryl vs Mini-Beryl) and the widely known US weapons (M16 and M4), whereas the acronym *MLRS* is not commonly used in Polish to denote a free rocket system, and the BMP-1 IFV is locally known as the *BWP*.

Figure 1:
The results of the experiment measuring the effectiveness of illustrating the meaning with a translation against illustrating the meaning of a word with examples (correct answers shown as a percentage of the total)




Figure 2:
The actual numbers of key mistakes made by students who tested illustrating the meaning with a translation and those who tested illustrating the meaning of a word with examples.




Table 3:
The results of the second experiment comparing 'illustrating the meaning with a translation' to 'illustrating the meaning of a word with examples'

	Correct answers as % of the total	Correct answers as % of the total	Correct answers as % of the total	Correct answers as % of the total	Correct answers as % of the total
	A2	B1	B2	C1	Average
TRANSLATIONS	73	80	100	87	83
EXAMPLES	33	50	93	83	69

Table 3:
Correct answers (shown as the percentage of the total) in the case of the pair rifle/carbine in the second experiment comparing illustrating the meaning with a translation to illustrating the meaning of a word with examples

	Correct answers as % of the total	Correct answers as % of the total	Correct answers as % of the total	Correct answers as % of the total	Correct answers as % of the total
	A2	B1	B2	C1	Average
TRANSLATIONS	80	60	100	100	83
EXAMPLES	100	75	100	100	94


In the case of *Introducing a term in the context of a standardized NATO document*, the control group achieved much worse results (48.6%) than the experimental group (65.8% – Table 5), which is all the more significant given the fact that the Polish translation of the term *friendly forces* did not replace the operation order template, but in fact constituted *additional* information. The only subgroup apparently unhindered by this exposure to the Polish term bearing misleading connotations were the professional officers and NCOs (66% of those who saw the translated term accomplished the task successfully, as opposed to 33% of those who did not). This result is unsurprising in the light of the fact that, unlike cadets, members of this subgroup must have already been reading or writing real documents in this format in their professional lives, and had internalized the specialist, unintuitive meaning of the Polish term *wojska własne* in its context.

Table 5: Introducing a term in the context of a standardized NATO document. The percentage of the correct answers is shown for each group presented and not presented with the Polish translation of the term *friendly forces*

C1/ 1st year		B1/ 3rd year		C1/ 3rd year		B1/ professional		Average	
NO translation	Translation of friendly forces as <i>sily własne</i>	NO translation	Translation of friendly forces as <i>sily własne</i>	NO translation	Translation of friendly forces as <i>sily własne</i>	NO translation	Translation of friendly forces as <i>sily własne</i>	NO translation	Translation of friendly forces as <i>sily własne</i>
54.5	50	54.5	36	92	54	33	50	58.5	47.5


The group completing sentences with words explained by means of monolingual L2 definitions did better (70%) than the group relying on comprehensive entries in the English-Polish dictionary (60%) (Figure 3). This result was to be expected in some cases: *Wielki słownik...* puts forward the same word, *przyczólek*, to translate both *bridgehead* and *beachhead* (unlike the *AAP-6PL (2017)* which differentiates between *przyczólek lądowy* and *przyczólek morski*, pp 77, 86). On the other hand, as a comprehensive dictionary, *Wielki słownik...* provides sample collocations, including »civil aviation« – precisely the same phrase that was needed to complete one of the test sentences. It seems that what should be expected of a comprehensive dictionary entry is not only the amount of information contained in it, but also its organization, improving the accessibility of the information being sought.

Figure 3: The results of the experiment comparing the effectiveness of Presenting monolingual definitions (L2 Definitions) and Presenting comprehensive bilingual definitions (L1 equivalents) (correct answers shown as a percentage of the total)



Involving students in contrastive analysis prior to doing the vocabulary task seemed to slightly improve their results. On average, the correct answers constituted 48.2% of the total in the experimental group, as opposed to the average of 43.85% in the control group (Figure 4). It was noticed, however, that some answers in the experimental group seemed to be purposefully nonsensical, which suggests that their authors had misunderstood the instructions and continued employing the principles of the preparation phase (which was supposed to highlight the risks of literal translation), instead of trying to produce the best possible translation. Also, it is doubtful whether raising the general awareness of the limitations of literal translation is possible in a short-lived experimental setting, and it would be interesting to see the results achieved by a group involved in contrastive analysis for a longer period of classwork.

Figure 4: The results of the experiment evaluating the effectiveness of Involving students in contrastive analysis prior to doing the vocabulary task (correct answers shown as a percentage of the total)



Conclusion Several methods can be used by military English teachers to help their students deal with anisomorphism. The results of our experiment suggest that translation (including comprehensive definitions) is a less effective way of presenting partially equivalent and non-equivalent L2 terminology than monolingual explanations and presentation of the terminology in context (including the context of standard document formats). Illustrating meanings with examples is probably also a very effective method, but caution must be taken to provide examples which the students will be familiar with. However, the experiment also showed that the use of L1 for contrastive analysis may help students cope with lexical gaps. Thus, when discussing the effectiveness of L1 in vocabulary learning, its conscious and careful use is called for, rather than its elimination.

The data gathered also provided experimental evidence for the founding thesis of this study, the observation that limited lexical equivalence between the L1 and L2 poses a serious problem which must be addressed in language teaching, confirming conclusions drawn from our previous classroom experience and findings of the authors quoted in this paper. During the experiment, even the most advanced groups seldom achieved 100% accuracy, despite the fact that in the case of each tested method the participants were provided with aids designed to help them come up with the correct answer. Therefore, further research into this problem, and especially into methods for dealing with it, is recommended both to corroborate the results of this study, and to explore the areas which have not been covered by it. It must be noted that some existing methods of dealing with lexical gaps (e.g. advising students as to the choice of a good bilingual dictionary) were not tested in this experiment. Moreover, the effectiveness of the methods tested here may need to be further verified for pairs of languages other than Polish/English. (For example, it cannot be ruled out that the results of comparing the effectiveness of using monolingual and bilingual dictionaries were influenced by the organization of dictionary entries typical to English-Polish dictionaries, or by some other factors which do not appear universally in bilingual dictionaries). Finally, the value of contrastive analysis could be further confirmed by an experiment involving systematic classroom use of this method.

Bibliography

1. AAP-6, 2017. *Słownik terminów i definicji NATO, Zawierający wojskowe terminy i ich definicje stosowane w NATO, [AAP-6 (2017) NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, 2018, NATO Standardization Office (NSO).*
2. APersP-01, *NATO Codes for Grades of Military Personnel, Edition A, Version 2, MARCH 2022, NATO Standardization Office (NSO).*
3. Augustyn, P., 2013. *No Dictionaries in the Classroom: Translation Equivalents and Vocabulary Acquisition, International Journal of Lexicography, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp 362-385. doi:10.1093/ijl/ect017. <https://academic.oup.com/ijl/article/26/3/362/1018918>, 12 September 2021.*

4. Boustani, K., 2019. *The Correlation between Translation Equivalence, as a Vocabulary Learning Strategy, and Tunisian EFL Learners' Speaking Anxiety*, *Languages*, 4, 19; doi:10.3390/languages4010019. www.mdpi.com/journal/languages, 2 May 2022.
5. Bowyer, R., 2004. *Dictionary of Military Terms, Third Edition*. Oxford: MacMillan.
6. *Combat Leader's Field Guide, 12th Edition, 2000. Revised and updated by Stobeberger, B. A., Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books.*
7. Dakudowicz, T., et al., 2000. *Podręcznik Walki Pododdziałów Wojsk Zmechanizowanych (pluton, drużyna). [Mechanized Infantry Combat Manual for Small Units (Platoon, Squad)]*. Warszawa: Dowództwo Wojsk Lądowych, Wyższa Szkoła Oficerska im. Tadeusza Kościuszki.
8. Decyzja Nr 133/MON Ministra Obrony Narodowej z dnia 26 czerwca 2017 r. w sprawie tłumaczenia na język angielski nazw stopni wojskowych żołnierzy Sił Zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, używanego na poliwęglanowych kartach tożsamości (Decision No. 133/MON of the Minister of National Defence of 26 June 2017 on the translation into English of the names of military ranks of soldiers of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland, used on polycarbonate identity cards), *Dziennik Urzędowy Ministra Obrony Narodowej*, Warszawa, 27 June 2017, Item 139.
9. Edwards, J. E., 2000. *Combat Service Support Guide, 3rd Edition*. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books.
10. *Field Manual No. 3-22.9 Rifle Marksmanship M16-/M4-Series Weapons, 12 August 2008*. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army. www.us.army.mil, 20 April 2022.
11. Grzebieńowski, T., and Galęzka., A, 1996. *Military Dictionary English-Polish, Polish-English*. Warszawa: Harald G Dictionaries, Wydawnictwo Bellona.
12. Jiang, N., 2002. *Form–Meaning Mapping in Vocabulary Acquisition in a Second Language, Studies in Second Language Acquisition*, pp 617-37. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/231929217_Form-meaning_mapping_in_vocabulary_acquisition_in_a_second_language, 2 May 2022.
13. *Karabinek szturmowy wz. 96 BERYL (wz 96 Beryl Assault Rifle), Wojsko Polskie*. <https://www.wojsko-polskie.pl/beryl/>, 15 May 2022.
14. King, S., Jr, 2013. *A-10 fires its first laser-guided rocket, Official Site of the US Air Force*. <https://web.archive.org/web/20130714111421/http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123342831>, 15 May 2022.
15. *Kolejne 18 tysięcy karabinków MSBS GROT dla Wojska Polskiego [Another 18 Thousand MSBS Grot Rifles for the Polish Military]*, *Wojsko Polskie*. <https://www.wojsko-polskie.pl/articles/tym-zyjemy-v/2020-07-08v-kolejne-18-tysieczny-karabinkow-msbs-grot-dla-wojska-polskiego/>, 15 May 2022.
16. Masrai, A., and Milton, J., 2015. *An Investigation of the Relationship between L1 Lexical Translation Equivalence and L2 Vocabulary Acquisition, International Journal of English Linguistics; Vol. 5, No. 2; Canadian Center of Science and Education*. <https://www.researchgate.net/journal/International-Journal-of-English-Linguistics-1923-8703>, 25 October 2021.
17. Navracscics, J., 2016. *Word classes and the bilingual mental lexicon, ResearchGate*. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/298214210_Word_classes_and_the_bilingual_mental_lexicon/link/56e711b508ae438aab87f281/download, 2 May 2022.
18. *Planowanie działań na szczeblu taktycznym w Wojskach Lądowych (Planning for Tactical Level Land Forces Operations) DD/3.2.5, 2007*. Warszawa: Dowództwo Wojsk Lądowych, Zarząd Operacji Lądowych.
19. *Poradnik dowódcy plutonu (Platoon Leader's Field Guide), 2011*. Warszawa: Dowództwo Wojsk Lądowych.
20. *Regulamin Działania Wojsk Lądowych (Regulations for Land Forces Operations), 2008*. Warszawa: Dowództwo Wojsk Lądowych, Pion Szkolenia.

21. *Słownik Języka Polskiego PWN (Polish Language Dictionary)*. *kombatant - definicja, synonimy, przykłady użycia (pwn.pl)*, 20 May 2022.
22. *Słownik terminów wojskowych angielsko-polski polsko angielski (English-Polish and Polish-English Dictionary of Military Terms)*, 2000. Warszawa: Dom wydawniczy Bellona.
23. *Training Circular No. 3-21.8, Infantry Rifle and Mechanized Platoon Collective Task Publication*, 19 August 2013. Washington, D. C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army. <https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/index.html>, 14 May 2022.
24. *Wielki słownik polsko-angielski PWN Oxford (Polish-English Dictionary)*, 2014. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN S.A., Oxford University Press.
25. *Wielki słownik polsko-angielski, angielsko-polski PWN-Oxford (Polish-English and English-Polish Dictionary)*, 2004. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN S.A., Oxford University Press.
26. Xiaomei, Y. *Equivalence in Bilingual Dictionaries*, in *English Language Teaching*; Vol. 13, No. 12; 2020, p 1. <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ1279936.pdf>, 15 May 2022.

e-mail: jaroslaw.wlodarczyk@awl.edu.pl

RECENZIJA

O POMENU VOJAŠKE GEOZNANOSTI

Leta 2022 je švicarski del mednarodne založbe Springer izdal knjigo, in sicer zbornik del z naslovom **Military Geoscience: A Multifaceted Approach to the Study of Warfare**. Sestavljajo jo izbrani prispevki mednarodnih raziskovalcev s področja vojaške geoznanosti, predstavljeni na 13. mednarodni konferenci o vojaški geoznanosti, ki je potekala junija 2019 v Padovi.

Prvi prispevek je delo urednikov Aldina Bondesana in Judy Ehlen. V njem na kratko predstavita razumevanje pojma vojaške geoznanosti kot aplikacijo geologije in geografije na vojaškem področju ter zgodovinski razvoj te znanosti. Pri tem je treba poudariti tudi, da Mednarodno združenje za vojaške geoznanosti (ICMG), ki organizira to bienalno mednarodno konferenco, v zadnjih dveh desetletjih pokriva tudi druge vidike, na primer konfliktno arheologijo.

Publikacija je naprej razdeljena na tri dele. Prvi del obsega tri prispevke, ki predstavljajo vojaško geoznanost do 20. stoletja. Prvi prispevek, delo Chrisa Fuhrimana in Jasona Ridgewaya, prinaša spoznanje glede bitke pri Maratonu z vizualizacijo topografije. Geografska danost Maratonskega polja, doline med gorama Kotroni in Agrieliki, je namreč omogočila grškim branilcem, da so izničili prednost perzijske konjenice in lokostrelcev, ki niso mogli popolnoma razviti svojega potenciala.

Sledi prispevek Judy Ehlen, ki raziskuje geološko ozadje angleško-britanskega sistema obalnih fortifikacij vzdolž Rokavskega preliva, s poudarkom na območju Portsmoutha v Hampshiru. Avtorica tako poudari, da je sprememba artilerijske tehnologije in pomorske taktike med 16. in 19. stoletjem zahtevala spremembe v gradnji obalnih fortifikacij tako glede oblike fortifikacij in načina gradnje, vključno z izbiro osnovnega gradbenega materiala, kot tudi umestitve fortifikacij v prostor.

Naslednji prispevek je posvečen raziskavi trdnjave Monte Baldo v severovzhodni Italiji med Gardskim jezerom in reko Adižo. Francesco Premi v prispevku analizira prisotnost trdnjave na prehodnem prostoru med germanskim svetom in Sredozemljem ter pomen tega dela Italije (na skrajnem južnem delu predalpskega gorovja) v vojaški zgodovini, kar se kaže v večjem številu pomembnejših vojaških in vojnih ostalin ter spomenikov.

Drugi del knjige, ki je najobsežnejši, se osredotoča na obe svetovni vojni in ga sestavlja devet prispevkov. Prvi prispevek v tem delu analizira delovanje kampov za usposabljanje za bojevanje v jarkih na območju francoske regije Aube. Skupina avtorjev, Jérôme Brenot, Yves Desfossés, Robin Perarnau, Marc Lozano in Alain Devos, sprva ugotavlja, da do zdaj kampi za usposabljanje za statično vojskovanje niso bili deležni večje pozornosti. S pomočjo zračnega fotografiranja omenjene regije iz leta 1948 in ohranjenega slikovno-fotografskega gradiva iz svetovne vojne so tako identificirali približno 20 območjih, na katerih so se vojaki antantnih sil v jarkih usposabljali za frontno službo. Sledilo je tudi kombinirano arheološko-sociološko terensko delo, ki je potrdilo prisotnost teh kampov, tako prek ohranjenih ostalin kot tudi kolektivnega spomina.

Tudi drugi prispevek iz tega dela se nanaša na preučevanje strelskih jarkov, in sicer iz severne Italije na območju Tridentinske Benečije. Avtorji Luigi Magnini, Giulia Rovera, Armando De Guio in Giovanni Azzalin v prispevku s pomočjo digitalne klasifikacijske metode in arheologije ugotavljajo, kako so se italijanski in avstro-ogrski strelski jarki iz prve svetovne vojne ohranili, oziroma če so izginili, zakaj je do tega prišlo, tako z vidika naravnih danosti kot antropologije, z vidika obnovitve predvojnega stanja.

Naslednji prispevek, delo Paola Macinija in Paola Sammurija, analizira delovanje minerjev in pionirjev italijanskega korpusa inženircev med prvo svetovno vojno, še posebej glede inovativnih pristopov k minersko-podzemnemu vojskovanju. Na območju Dolomitov so italijanski inženirci z različnimi prisluškovalnimi napravami, vrtalno mehanizacijo in uporabo geofizikalnih metod razvili sistem vrtanja podzemnih minskih komor, s katerimi so nameravali in tudi uničili dele avstro-ogrskih položajev.

Prispevek Elene Dai Prà, Nicole Gabellieri in Mattea Boschiana Baila se nanaša na delovanje italijanske kopenske vojske med prvo svetovno vojno, in sicer glede uporabe taktičnih zemljevidov s poudarkom na tipološki klasifikaciji in uporabi simbolov ter digitalne analize kartografije. Avtorji so analizirali taktične zemljevide italijanske 3. armade, ki so bili nenehno posodabljeni z vrisovanjem sprememb položajev in taktičnih premikov obeh strani, pri čemer so raziskali spremembe tako z vidika uporabe novih simbolov kot tudi analize premikov.

Sledi prispevek z geografsko predstavitvijo delovanja italijanske kopenske vojske med prvo svetovno vojno. Avtorji Paolo Plini, Sabina Di Franco in Rosamaria

Salvatori so zbrali 21.856 toponimov z analizo dokumentov in zemljevidov. Lokacije so tudi geolocirali in tako prišli do pregleda krajev, v katerih je med prvo svetovno vojno delovala italijanska kopenska vojska. Analiza je sprva pokazala kompleksnost dogodkov na bojiščih, pa tudi, da so viri napačno ugotavljali kraje delovanja, saj je prišlo do napačne identifikacije toponimov, še posebej v primeru homonimov, in tako tudi do napačne identifikacije območja delovanja. Pri tem so izpostavili tudi primer Vipave, ki se lahko nanaša tako na reko kot na naselje.

Naslednji prispevek je prvo poglavje, ki se nanaša na obdobje druge svetovne vojne, in sicer delo H. A. P. Smita o italijanskih vojnih ujetnikih v Južni Afriki. Avtor predstavi okoliščine, v katerih so italijanski vojaki prispeli na jug afriške celine in tam živeli, ter tudi, kakšen prispevek so imeli na lokalno okolje in družbo ter ostaline njihove prisotnosti, ki so se ohranile do današnjih dni.

V prispevku avtorja William W. Doe III. in Michael R. Czaja analizirata zgodovino, geografijo in pomen kampa Hale v zvezni državi Kolorado. Pri tem se osredotočata na analizo vojaške organizacije in vpliva na lokalno skupnost. Kamp Hale je bila tako prva vojaška inštalacija ameriške kopenske vojske, namenjena testiranju in usposabljanju ameriških vojakov za gorsko in alpinsko bojevanje. Tu so izoblikovali ameriško 10. gorsko divizijo, ki je svojo vojno pot končala tudi na slovenskih tleh. Prisotnost divizije v tem nekdanjem kampu, ki je bil po vojni v vojaški uporabi vse do leta 1965, ter v okolici je še vedno vidna prek številnih spomenikov.

Sledi prispevek, delo Hermanna Häuslerja, ki se ukvarja s tematiko nemške vojaške geografije in geologije na vzhodni fronti druge svetovne vojne. Dobro leto pred nemškim napadom na Sovjetsko zvezo so nemški in avstrijski vojaški geologi začeli analizo topografije, prebivalstva in infrastrukture evropskega dela Sovjetske zveze, kar je privedlo do izdaje serije publikacij, vključno z zemljevidi, ki so prikazovali primernost terena za vojaške operacije. Med vojno so nato vojaško-geološke skupine sledile frontnim enotam in opravljale geotehniške naloge, kot so oskrba z vodo, gradnja fortifikacij, preskrba z gradbenim materialom za transportno infrastrukturo in analiza primernosti terena za vseterensko vožnjo za gosenična ter druga vozila.

Isti avtor je prispeval še naslednje poglavje, ki se tokrat osredotoča na delovanje nemških vojaških geologov na območju Jadrana. Podobno kot v prvem prispevku avtor predstavi delo vojaških geologov na območju severne Italije kot tudi severozahodne Slovenije. Pri tem se osredotoči tudi na gradnjo fortifikacijskih sistemov v severni Italiji in delovanje kraških lovcev v operacijski coni Jadransko primorje.

Tretji del opisuje 21. stoletje, in sicer s petimi različnimi prispevki (poglavji).

Prvi prispevek avtorja Alexandra K. Stewarta se nanaša na delovanje posebnih skupin ameriške kopenske vojske v Afganistanu. Te ekipe za razvoj agrarne industrije (*Agribusiness Development Team*) so izvajale specializirano obliko protigverilskega

bojevanja, ko so prek pomoči lokalnemu prebivalstvu na področju kmetijstva poskušali izboljšati pogoje za razvoj lokalnih skupnosti in tako hkrati izničiti podporo za talibane. Avtor ugotavlja, da je imel projekt v desetletju po začetku programa le 19-odstotno uspešnost, toda kljub temu poudari, da bi take oblike civilno-vojaškega sodelovanja morale biti prisotne tudi v prihodnjih operacijah.

Naslednje poglavje, delo Francisa A. Galgana, je namenjeno analizi delovanja sodobnih piratov prek vojaško-geografskih oziroma geoloških metod. Pirati, ki pomenijo veliko mednarodno varnostno grožnjo, so v štirih regijah sveta: v južni in jugovzhodni Aziji, vzhodni Afriki in Gvinejskem zalivu. Na podatkih o piratskih napadih med letoma 1997 in 2017 tako avtor pokaže časovne in prostorske vzorce delovanja piratov ter tudi, kako geografija obalnih območij vpliva na njihovo delovanje.

Sledi še eno poglavje s pomorsko vsebino. Mark Stephen Blaine obravnava geografijo teritorialnih sporov v Južnokitajskem morju. Prek predstavitve mednarodne zakonodaje, strateške pomembnosti morja (pomorske poti, naravni viri) in prekrivajočih se teritorialnih zahtev Kitajske, Tajvana, Malezije, Vietnama ter Indonezije avtor pokaže naraščajočo stopnjo konflikta na tem območju in poziva k čim večjemu prizadevanju za preprečitev izbruha sovražnosti oziroma vojne.

Prispevek M. H. Bulmerja se nanaša na analizo delovanja turških oboroženih sil v Siriji z vidika vojaške geologije. Tako se avtor osredotoča na obrambne projekte kurdskih sil, ki so se ukvarjale predvsem z gradnjo strelskih jarkov, opazovalnih stolpov oziroma točk, vkopanih tunelov in podzemnih objektov, ter tudi na delovanje turških oboroženih sil proti tej vojaški infrastrukturi. Pri tem je prišlo do spopadov tako v gorskem svetu kot v podzemlju. Medtem ko se je ta obrambna infrastruktura izkazala za uspešno v obdobju gverilskega bojevanja, pa so neposredni turški napadi na te objekte pokazali njihovo ranljivost.

Zadnje poglavje se nanaša na trenutne operativne potrebe in omejitve vojaških geoznanosti z vidika avstrijskih oboroženih sil. Friedrich Teichmann izpostavi, da globalni interes delovanja držav določa potrebo po točnih geopodatkih in geopodporo v primeru hitro razvijajočih se zahtev. Pri tem se mora geoznanost odzivati na nove oblike groženj, tako asimetričnih kot kibernetičnih, in to v času, ko so sredstva za geostoritve omejena, kar zahteva tudi večjo sinergijo in inovativen pristop k iskanju rešitev med več deležniki. K temu spada tudi večja digitalizacija, vključno z uporabo satelitske in druge vesoljske tehnologije.

Število poglavij v publikaciji nazorno prikazuje obsežnost in globino vojaške geoznanosti ter tudi pomen geoznanosti za pretekle, sedanje in prihodnje konflikte oziroma vojaške operacije in misije. Sedanje vojaške operacije v Ukrajini dokazujejo, da je treba upoštevati geografsko-geološke danosti okolja in da je teren še vedno eden odločilnih dejavnikov za uspeh na bojišču, ne glede na tehnološki razvoj vojaške

tehnike in tehnologije. To pa je lahko tudi spodbuda za slovenske raziskovalce in tudi za Slovensko vojsko za povečanje raziskovalne dejavnosti na področju vojaške geoznanosti, še posebej glede na bogato vojaško in vojno zgodovino na geografsko oziroma geološko raznolikem ozemlju Slovenije.

REVIEW

ON THE IMPORTANCE OF MILITARY GEOSCIENCE

In 2022, the Swiss branch of the international publishing house Springer published a book, a collection of papers entitled *Military Geoscience: A Multifaceted Approach to the Study of Warfare*. It consists of selected contributions by international researchers in the field of military geoscience, presented at the 13th International Conference on Military Geosciences, held in Padua in June 2019.

The first paper is by the editors, Aldin Bondesan and Judy Ehlen, and provides a brief overview of understanding the concept of military geoscience as an application of geology and geography to the military domain, and the historical development of the discipline. It should also be pointed out that the International Conferences on Military Geosciences (ICMG), which organises this biennial international conference, has over the past two decades also covered other aspects, such as conflict archaeology.

The publication is further divided into three parts. The first part comprises three contributions covering military geoscience up to the 20th century. The first paper, by Chris Fuhrman and Jason Ridgeway, provides an insights into the Battle of Marathon through topography visualisation. The geography of the Marathon field, the valley between Mt. Cotroni and Mt. Agrieliki, allowed the Greek defenders to nullify the advantage of the Persian cavalry and archers, who were unable to develop their full potential.

This is followed by a paper by Judy Ehlen, who explores the geological background of the Anglo-British coastal fortification system along the English Channel, focusing on the Portsmouth area of Hampshire. The author thus points out that changes in artillery technology and naval tactics between the 16th and 19th centuries necessitated changes in the construction of coastal fortifications, both in terms of the form of the

fortifications and the method of construction, including the choice of basic building materials, as well as the siting of the fortifications in space.

The next article is then dedicated to the Monte Baldo Fortress in north-eastern Italy, between Lake Garda and the Adige River. In his article, Francesco Premi analyses the presence of the fortress in the transition area between the Germanic world and the Mediterranean, and the importance of this part of Italy (at the southernmost part of the pre-Alpine mountains) in military history, as reflected in the large number of important military and war relics and monuments.

The second part of the book, which is the most comprehensive, focuses on the two World Wars and consists of nine papers. The first paper in this part provides an analysis of the operation of trench warfare training camps in the Aube region of France. The group of authors, Jérôme Brenot, Yves Desfossés, Robin Perarnau, Marc Lozano and Alain Devos, initially note that static warfare training camps have not received much attention so far. Using aerial photography of the region dating from 1948 and surviving World War II photographic material, they identified some 20 sites where soldiers of the Entente forces were trained for front-line service in trenches. Combined archaeological and sociological fieldwork followed, confirming the presence of these camps, both through preserved remains and the collective memory.

The second paper in this volume also concerns the survey on trenches, located in northern Italy in the Venezia Tridentina Veneto area in northern Italy. The authors Luigi Magnini, Giulia Rovera, Armando De Guio and Giovanni Azzalin thus use digital classification methods and archaeology to determine how Italian and Austro-Hungarian First World War trenches have been preserved or, in case they have disappeared, why this was the case, both from the point of view of the natural features as well as from the anthropological point of view of the restoration of the pre-war settings.

The next paper, by Paolo Macini and Paolo Sammuri, analyses the activities of the miners and pioneers of the Italian Corps of Engineers during the First World War, in particular with regard to innovative approaches to underground mine warfare. In the Dolomites, the Italian engineers, using various listening devices, drilling machinery and geophysical methods, developed a system for drilling underground mine chambers, which they intended to use and actually used to destroy parts of Austro-Hungarian positions.

The paper by Elena Dai Prà, Nicola Gabellieri and Matteo Boschian Bailo concerns the Italian Army's operations during the First World War. It focuses on the use of tactical maps with emphasis on typological classification, the use of symbols, and digital cartography. The authors thus analysed the tactical maps of the Italian Third Army, which were being constantly updated by plotting the changes in positions and tactical movements of both sides. These changes were examined both in terms of the use of new symbols and the analysis of the movements.

This is followed by a geographical presentation of the Italian Army's activities during the First World War. The authors Paolo Plini, Sabina Di Franco and Rosamaria Salvatori have thus collected 21,856 toponyms by analysing documents and maps. The locations were also geolocated to give an overview of the places where the Italian Army operated during the First World War. The analysis initially revealed the complexity of the events on the battlefields, but also that the sources had misidentified the places of operation, as toponyms were misidentified, especially in the case of homonyms. Consequently, the area of operation was misidentified as well. In this respect, the case of Vipava was highlighted, which can refer to both a river and a settlement.

The following paper is the first on the Second World War. It is the article by H. A. P. Smith on Italian prisoners of war in South Africa. The author outlines the circumstances in which Italian soldiers arrived to and lived in the southern African continent, and the contribution they made to the local environment and the society, and the remnants of their presence preserved to the present day.

In their article, William W. Doe III and Michael R. Czaja analyse the history, geography and significance of Camp Hale in the state of Colorado. In doing so, they focus on the analysis of the military organization and its impact on the local community. Camp Hale was thus the first military installation of the U.S. Army, designated to test and train U.S. soldiers in mountain and alpine warfare. It was here that the U.S. 10th Mountain Division was formed, which concluded its war path on Slovenian soil. The Division's presence in this former camp, which was in military use also after the war until 1965, and in the surrounding area is still visible through numerous monuments.

This is followed by a paper by Hermann Häusler, who deals with German military geography and geology on the Eastern Front of the Second World War. A good year before the German attack on the Soviet Union, German and Austrian military geologists began an analysis of the topography, population and infrastructure of the European part of the Soviet Union, which led to a series of publications, including maps showing the suitability of the terrain for military operations. During the war, military geological teams then followed the frontline units and carried out geotechnical tasks such as water supply, construction of fortifications, supply of building materials for transport infrastructure, and analysis of the suitability of the terrain for all-terrain driving of tracked and other vehicles.

The same author also authored a paper in the next chapter, this time focusing on the activities of German military geologists in the Adriatic area. Similarly to his first contribution, the author presents the work of military geologists in northern Italy and north-western Slovenia. He also focuses on the construction of fortification systems in northern Italy and presents the work of karst hunters in the Operational Zone of the Adriatic Littoral.

Part 3 covers the 21st century with five different papers (chapters).

The first paper by Alexander K. Stewart deals with the operations of the U.S. Army specialised teams in Afghanistan. These Agribusiness Development Teams (ADTs) carried out a specialised form of counter-guerrilla warfare in which they sought to improve the conditions for the development of local communities through agricultural assistance to the local population. In this way, they were also counteracting support for the Taliban. The author notes that, in the decade after the programme's launch, the project had only a 19% success rate. However, he stresses that such forms of civil-military cooperation should be present in future operations.

The next chapter, by Francis A. Galgan, analyses the activities of modern pirates through military-geographical or geological methods. Pirates, who pose a major international security threat, are present in four regions of the world: South and South-East Asia, East Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. Building on the data on pirate attacks between 1997 and 2017, the author shows the temporal and spatial patterns of pirate activities, as well as the influence of the geography of coastal areas on their activities.

This is followed by another chapter with a maritime topic. Mark Stephen Blaine discusses the geography of territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Through a presentation of international law, the strategic importance of the sea (sea lanes, natural resources) and the overlapping territorial claims of China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Vietnam and Indonesia, the author shows the increasing level of conflict in the area and calls for the utmost efforts to be made to prevent the outbreak of hostilities or war.

M. H. Bulmer's paper analyses the Turkish Armed Forces' activities in Syria from the perspective of military geology. The author focuses on the Kurdish forces' defence projects, which mainly involved the construction of gun trenches, observation towers or points, tunnels and underground facilities, as well as on the Turkish armed forces' actions against this military infrastructure. This involved both mountain and underground warfare activities. While these defensive infrastructures proved to be successful during the guerrilla warfare period, direct Turkish attacks on these installations demonstrated their vulnerability.

The last chapter deals with the current operational needs and limitations of military geosciences from the perspective of the Austrian Armed Forces. Friedrich Teichmann points out that the global operational interest of states determines the need for accurate geo-data as well as geo-support in case of rapidly evolving requirements. In this context, geoscience must respond to new forms of threats, both asymmetric and cyber, at a time when resources for geospatial services are limited, which also requires greater synergy and an innovative approach to finding solutions among multiple stakeholders. This also includes increased digitisation, including the use of satellite and other space technologies.


The number of chapters in the publication illustrates the breadth and depth of military geoscience, as well as the relevance of geoscience to past, present and future conflicts or military operations and missions. The current military operations in Ukraine demonstrate the need to take into account the geo-geological realities of the environment and that terrain remains one of the decisive factors for success on the battlefield, irrespective of the technological developments in military engineering and technology. This can also be an incentive for Slovenian researchers and the Slovenian Armed Forces to increase research activities in the field of military geosciences, especially in view of the rich military and war history in the geographically and geologically diverse territory of Slovenia.

Slikovno gradivo

Figures


Slika 1
Osrednje
območje
ali Osrčje
(Mackinder,
1904, str. 435)

Figure 1:
Pivot area or
Heartland
(Mackinder,
1904, p. 435)




Slika 2
Obrobje in
območje
evrazijskega
konflikta
(Spykman,
1944, str. 52)

Figure 2:
Rimland and
Eurasian Conflict
Zones (Spykman,
1944, p. 52)



Slika 3
 Časovnica
 ključnih
 globalnih
 strateških
 dogodkov
 od leta 2007
 (Tovornik,
 2022)

Figure 3:
 Timeline of key
 global strategic
 events since
 2007 (Tovornik,
 2022)



Avtorji

Authors



Tamas Somogyi

Mag. Tamas Somogyi je magistriral iz informacijskega inženiringa in dodatno še iz pravnih študij. Ima več kot deset let izkušenj na področju informacijske tehnologije v bančništvu in je zaposlen v drugi največji banki na Madžarskem kot vodja operativnega tveganja, odgovoren za obnovitev po nesreči. Poleg tega je trenutno doktorski študent na doktorski šoli za varnostne vede na univerzi Óbuda.

Tamas Somogyi, MSc, holds a Master's degree in IT engineering and a complementary degree in Legal Studies. Having more than ten years of experience in the field of IT within the banking industry, he is working for the second largest bank in Hungary as an operational risk manager, being responsible for disaster recovery. Besides this, he is currently a PhD student at the Doctoral School on Safety and Security Sciences, Óbuda University.



Rudolf Nagy

Dr. Rudolf Nagy, polkovnik v pokoju, je trenutno docent na univerzi v Obudi. Bil je častnik za JRKB-obrambo in sodeloval pri nalogah zagotavljanja varstva pri delu. Izkušnje je pridobil kot operativni častnik v Natovi misiji Sforja. Pozneje je bil namestnik vodje oddelka za obvladovanje izrednih razmer pri madžarskem nacionalnem generalnem direktoratu za obvladovanje nesreč. Od leta 2015 poučuje predmete s področja varstvoslovja in je odgovoren za specializacijo iz protipožarnega inženiringa.

Dr Rudolf Nagy, ret. Col., is currently Assistant Professor at Óbuda University. He was a CBRN defence officer, and took part in industrial safety tasks. He gained experience as an operations officer in the NATO SFOR mission. After that he became Deputy Head of the Emergency Management Department of Hungarian National Directorate General for Disaster Management. He has been teaching subjects of safety and security sciences since 2015, and is responsible for the fire protection engineering specialization.



Uroš Tovornik

Mag. Uroš Tovornik je leta 2001 diplomiral, leta 2005 pa magistriral iz politologije, oboje na Univerzi v Ljubljani. Profesionalno pot je začel leta 2001. Od leta 2006 je uslužbenec Ministrstva za obrambo, v okviru katerega je služboval v domovini in tujini (Nato in EU). Je avtor oziroma soavtor nekaj strokovnih oziroma znanstvenih del s področja političnih ved, geopolitike, geostrategije in obrambe.

Uroš Tovornik, MSc, holds Bachelor (2001) and Master's (2005) degrees in Political Science from the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. His professional career began in 2001, and as of 2006 he has been working for the Ministry of Defence of Slovenia both at national and international levels (NATO and the EU). He authored and co-authored several professional and academic papers in the field of political science, geopolitics, geostrategy and defence.



Olusola Kolawole Oluwagbire

Kontraadmiral Olusola Kolawole Oluwagbire je doktoriral iz mednarodnih in diplomatskih študij na Novi univerzi v Sloveniji. V nigerijski mornarici se je zaposlil leta 1983. Je mornariški častnik s specializacijo iz komunikacij. Kot visoki mornariški častnik je deloval na krovu ladij nigerijske mornarice različnih razredov. Opravljal je različne štabne in inštruktorske dolžnosti na ravni enote, poveljstva ter mornariškega in obrambnega štaba. Trenutno je načelnik operative v poveljstvu mornarice, kjer skrbi za programiran in operativni nadzor flote nigerijske mornarice ter njene priprave na vojno.

Rear Admiral Olusola Kolawole Oluwagbire holds a Doctorate in International and Diplomatic Studies from the New University Slovenia. He was commissioned into the Nigerian Navy in 1993. He is an officer of the Seaman Branch, with specialization in communications, who has served on board various classes of ships. He has served in various staff and instructor roles at the unit, command, naval and defence headquarters levels. Rear Admiral Oluwagbire is the Director of Operations at the Naval Headquarters, where he is responsible for the programmed and operational control of the NN fleet, as well as its preparation for war.



Mariann
Minkó-Miskovics

Dr. Mariann Minkó-Miskovics je doktorirala in magistrirala na področju prava ter je neodvisna odvetnica, vpisana v imenik odvetnikov pri odvetniški zbornici v Budimpešti na Madžarskem, za področje varstva podatkov, prava gospodarskih družb in prava javnih naročil. Dr. Minkó-Miskovics je poleg odvetništva tudi samostojna raziskovalka na področju oboroženih kaznivih dejanj in kaznivih dejanj z uporabo orodja na Madžarskem, v Avstriji in Nemčiji ter obrambnih proizvodov na Madžarskem in v Evropski uniji.

Mariann Minkó-Miskovics, PhD, LL.M. is an independent attorney at law admitted to the Budapest Bar Association in Hungary with the working areas of data protection, corporate law, and public procurement law. Apart from acting as a lawyer, Dr Minkó-Miskovics is also an independent researcher whose research areas are armed crimes and crimes committed with tools in Hungary, Austria and Germany, and also defence-related products in Hungary and in the European Union.



Szabó Csaba

Izred. prof. dr. Szabó Csaba je višji svetnik, zaposlen kot svetovalec na madžarskem ministrstvu za notranje zadeve, in odgovorni urednik *Belügyi Szemle*, strokovne in znanstvene revije ministrstva za notranje zadeve. Predava na Fakulteti Deák Ferenc za pravne in politične znanosti na katedri za kriminologijo, Univerzi Széchenyi István v Győrju. Njegova raziskovalna področja vključujejo policijsko upravo, politike in upravljanje orožja na Madžarskem in v Evropski uniji. Dr. Szabó Csaba deluje tudi kot mentor pri doktoratih.

Assoc. Prof. Szabó Csaba, PhD, is a senior superintendent working as an adviser in the Ministry of the Interior of Hungary, and the responsible editor of the *Belügyi Szemle*, the professional and scientific periodical of the Ministry of the Interior; Associate Professor at Deák Ferenc Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, Department of Criminal Sciences, Széchenyi István University of Győr. His research areas are police administration, gun policies and administration in Hungary and in the European Union. Dr. Szabó Csaba also acts as a supervisor for doctorates.



Jarosław Włodarczyk

Mag. Jarosław Włodarczyk je višji predavatelj in vodja oddelka za angleški jezik na katedri za tuje jezike Vojaške univerze kopenskih sil Tadeusza Kościuszka v Wrocławu. Iz angleščine v poljščino je prevedel več kot trideset knjig, večinoma leposlovnih ali zgodovinskih del, in številna krajša dela. V zbirki *Explorations: A Journal of Language and Literature* (7, 2019) je objavil članek o prevodni pragmatičnosti pri prevajanju biografije Tigerja Woodsa avtorjev Jeffa Benedicta in Armena Keteyiana v poljščino.

Jarosław Włodarczyk, MA, is a senior lecturer and the head of the English Language Section of the Foreign Language Department at Tadeusz Kościuszko Military University of Land Forces in Wrocław. He has translated over thirty books, most of which are works of fiction or historical nonfiction, and numerous shorter works from English into Polish, and published the article: »The Pragmatic Economy of Translation: Rendering Technical Vocabulary in the Polish Translation of Tiger Woods' Biography by Jeff Benedict and Armen Keteyian« in *Explorations: A Journal of Language and Literature* (7, 2019).

Navodila za avtorje

Instructions to authors

NAVODILA ZA AVTORJE

Vsebinska navodila

Splošno **Sodobni vojaški izzivi** je interdisciplinarna znanstveno-strokovna publikacija, ki objavlja prispevke o aktualnih temah, raziskavah, znanstvenih in strokovnih razpravah, tehničnih ali družboslovnih analizah z varnostnega, obrambnega in vojaškega področja ter recenzije znanstvenih in strokovnih monografij (prikaz knjige).

Vsebina Objavljamo prispevke v slovenskem jeziku s povzetki, prevedenimi v angleški jezik, in po odločitvi uredniškega odbora prispevke v angleškem jeziku s povzetki, prevedenimi v slovenski jezik. Objavljamo prispevke, ki še niso bili objavljeni ali poslani v objavo drugi reviji. Pisec je odgovoren za vse morebitne kršitve avtorskih pravic. Če je bil prispevek že natisnjen drugje, poslan v objavo ali predstavljen na strokovni konferenci, naj to avtor sporoči uredniku in pridobi soglasje založnika (če je treba) ter navede razloge za ponovno objavo. Objava prispevka je brezplačna.

Tehnična navodila

Omejitve dolžine prispevkov Prispevki naj obsegajo 16 strani oziroma 30.000 znakov s presledki (avtorska pola), izjemoma najmanj 8 strani oziroma 15.000 znakov ali največ 24 strani oziroma 45.000 znakov. Recenzija znanstvene in strokovne monografije (prikaz knjige) naj obsega največ 3.000 znakov s presledki.

Recenzije Prispevki se recenzirajo. Recenzija je anonimna. Glede na oceno recenzentov uredniški odbor ali urednik prispevek sprejme, če je treba, zahteva popravke ali ga zavrne. Pripombe recenzentov avtor vnese v prispevek. Zaradi anonimnega recenzentskega postopka je treba prvo stran in vsebino oblikovati tako, da identiteta avtorja ni prepoznavna. Avtor ob naslovu prispevka napiše, v katero kategorijo po njegovem mnenju in glede na klasifikacijo v COBISS, spada njegov prispevek. Klasifikacija je dostopna na spletni strani revije in pri odgovornem uredniku. Končno klasifikacijo določi uredniški odbor.

Lektoriranje Lektoriranje besedil zagotavlja OE, pristojna za založniško dejavnost. Lektorirana besedila se avtorizirajo.

Navajanje avtorjev prispevka	Navajanje avtorjev je skrajno zgoraj, levo poravnano. <i>Primer:</i> Ime 1 Priimek 1, Ime 2 Priimek 2
Naslov prispevka	Navedbi avtorjev sledi naslov prispevka. Črke v naslovu so velike 16 pik, natisnjene krepko, besedilo naslova pa poravnano na sredini.
Povzetek	Prispevku mora biti dodan povzetek, ki obsega največ 800 znakov (10 vrstic). Povzetek naj na kratko opredeli temo prispevka, predvsem naj povzame rezultate in ugotovitve. Splošne ugotovitve in misli ne spadajo v povzetek, temveč v uvod.
Povzetek v angleščini	Avtorji morajo oddati tudi prevod povzetka v angleščino. Tudi za prevod povzetka velja omejitev do 800 znakov (10 vrstic).
Ključne besede	Ključne besede (3–5, tudi v angleškem jeziku) naj bodo natisnjene krepko in z obojestransko poravnavo besedila.
Besedilo	Avtorji naj oddajo svoje prispevke na papirju formata A4, s presledkom med vrsticami 1,5 in velikostjo črk 12 pik Arial. Na zgornjem in spodnjem robu naj bo do besedila približno 3 cm, levi rob naj bo širok 2 cm, desni pa 4 cm. Na vsaki strani je tako približno 30 vrstic s približno 62 znaki. Besedilo naj bo obojestransko poravnano, brez umikov na začetku odstavka.
Kratka predstavitev avtorjev	Avtorji morajo pripraviti kratko predstavitev svojega strokovnega oziroma znanstvenega dela. Predstavitev naj ne presega 600 znakov s presledki (10 vrstic, 80 besed). Avtorji naj besedilo umestijo na konec prispevka po navedeni literaturi.
Strukturiranje besedila	Posamezna poglavja v besedilu naj bodo ločena s samostojnimi podnaslovi in ustrezno oštevilčena (členitev največ na 4 ravni). <i>Primer:</i> 1 Uvod 2 Naslov poglavja (1. raven) 2.1 Podnaslov (2. raven) 2.1.1 Podnaslov (3. raven) 2.1.1.1 Podnaslov (4. raven)

Oblikovanje seznama literature

V seznamu literature je treba po abecednem redu navesti le avtorje, na katere se sklicujete v prispevku, celotna oznaka vira pa mora biti skladna s **harvardskim načinom navajanja**. Če je avtorjev več, navedemo vse, kot so navedeni na izvirnem delu.

Primeri:

a) knjiga:

Priimek, ime (začetnica imena), letnica. *Naslov dela*. Kraj: Založba.

Na primer: Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

b) zbornik:

Samson, C., 1970. Problems of information studies in history. S. Stone, ur. *Humanities information research*. Sheffield: CRUS, 1980, str. 44–68. Pri posameznih člankih v zbornikih na koncu posameznega vira navedemo strani, na katerih je članek, na primer:

c) članek v reviji

Kolega, N., 2006. Slovenian coast sea flood risk. *Acta geographica Slovenica*. 46-2, str. 143–167.

Navajanje virov z interneta

Vse reference se začinjajo enako kot pri natisnjenih virih, le da običajnemu delu sledi še podatek o tem, kje na internetu je bil dokument dobljen in kdaj. Podatek o tem, kdaj je bil dokument dobljen, je pomemben zaradi pogostega spreminjanja www okolja.

Primer:

Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, str. 45–100. <http://www.mors.si/index.php?id=213>, 17. 10. 2008. Pri navajanju zanimivih internetnih naslovov v besedilu (ne gre za navajanje posebnega dokumenta) zadošča navedba naslova (<http://www.vpvs.uni-lj.si>). Posebna referenca na koncu besedila v tem primeru ni potrebna.

Sklicevanje na vire

Pri sklicevanju na vire med besedilom navedite priimek avtorja, letnico izdaje in stran. *Primer:* ... (Smith, 1997, str. 12) ...

Če dobesedno navajate del besedila, ga ustrezno označite z narekovaji, v oklepaju pa poleg avtorja in letnice navedite stran besedila, iz katerega ste navajali.

Primer: ... (Smith, 1997, str. 15) ...

Pri povzemanju drugega avtorja napišemo besedilo brez narekovajev, v oklepaju pa napišemo, da gre za povzeto besedilo. *Primer:* (po Smith, 1997, str. 15). Če avtorja navajamo v besedilu, v oklepaju navedemo samo letnico izida in stran (1997, str. 15).


**Slike,
diagrami
in tabele**

Slike, diagrami in tabele v prispevku naj bodo v posebej pripravljenih datotekah, ki omogočajo lektorske popravke. V besedilu mora biti jasno označeno mesto, kamor je treba vnesti sliko. Skupna dolžina prispevka ne sme preseči dane omejitve.

Če avtor iz tehničnih razlogov grafičnih dodatkov ne more oddati v elektronski obliki, je izjemoma sprejemljivo, da slike priloži besedilu. Avtor mora v tem primeru na zadnjo stran slike napisati zaporedno številko in naslov, v besedilu pa pustiti dovolj prostora zanj. Prav tako mora biti besedilo opremljeno z naslovom in številčenjem slike. Diagrami se štejejo kot slike.

Vse slike in tabele se številčijo. Številčenje poteka enotno in ni povezano s številčenjem poglavij. Naslov slike je naveden pod sliko, naslov tabele pa nad tabelo. Navadno je v besedilu navedeno vsaj eno sklicevanje na sliko ali tabelo. Sklic na sliko ali tabelo je: ... (slika 5) ... (tabela 2) ...


Primer slike:



Slika 5: Naslov slike

Primer tabele:

Tabela 2: Naslov tabele

**Opombe
pod črto**

Številčenje opomb pod črto je neodvisno od strukture besedila in se v vsakem prispevku začne s številko 1. Posebej opozarjamo avtorje, da so opombe pod črto namenjene pojasnjevanju misli, zapisanih v besedilu, in ne navajanju literature.

Kratice

Kratice naj bodo dodane v oklepaju, ko se okrajšana beseda prvič uporabi, zato posebnih seznamov kratic ne dodajamo. Za kratico ali izraz v angleškem jeziku napišemo najprej slovensko ustreznico, v oklepaju pa angleški izvornik in morebitno angleško kratico.

**Format
zapisa
prispevka**

Uredniški odbor sprejema prispevke, napisane z urejevalnikom besedil MS Word, izjemoma tudi v besedilnem zapisu (text only).

**Naslov
avtorja**

Prispevkom naj bosta dodana avtorjeva naslov in internetni naslov ali telefonska številka, na katerih bo dosegljiv uredniškemu odboru.

**Kako poslati
prispevek**

Na naslov uredništva ali članov uredniškega odbora je treba poslati elektronsko različico prispevka.

**Potrjevanje
prejetja
prispevka**

Uredniški odbor avtorju pisno potrdi prejetje prispevka.

Korekture

Avtor opravi korekture svojega prispevka v treh dneh.

**Naslov
uredniškega
odbora**

Ministrstvo za obrambo
Generalštab Slovenske vojske
Sodobni vojaški izzivi
Uredniški odbor
Vojkova cesta 55
1000 Ljubljana
Slovenija

Elektronski naslov
Odgovorna urednica:
liliana.brozic@mors.si

Prispevkov, ki ne bodo urejeni skladno s tem navodilom, uredniški odbor ne bo sprejemal.

INSTRUCTIONS TO AUTHORS

Content-related guidelines

General **The Contemporary Military Challenges** is an interdisciplinary scientific expert magazine, which publishes papers on current topics, researches, scientific and expert discussions, technical or social sciences analysis from the security, defence and military field, as well as overviews of professional and science monographs (book review).

What do we publish? We publish papers in Slovene with abstracts translated into English and, based on the decision of the editorial board; we also publish papers in English with abstracts translated in Slovene.

We publish papers, which have not been previously published or sent to another magazine for publication. The author is held responsible for all eventual copyright violations. If the paper has already been printed elsewhere, sent for publication or presented at an expert conference, the author must notify the editor, obtain the publisher's consent (if necessary) and indicate the reasons for republishing. Publishing an article is free of charge.

Technical guidelines

Limitations regarding the length of the papers The papers should consist of 16 typewritten pages or 30,000 characters with spaces, at a minimum they should have 8 pages or 15,000 characters and at a maximum 24 pages or 45,000 characters.

Overviews of science or professional monograph (book presentation) should not have more than 3.000 characters with spaces..

Reviews The papers are reviewed. The review is anonymous. With regard to the reviewers assessment, the editorial board or the editor either accepts the paper, demands modifications if necessary or rejects it. After the reception of the reviewers' remarks the author inserts them into the paper.

Due to an anonymous review process the first page must be designed in the way that the author's identity cannot be recognized.

Next to the title the author indicated the category the paper belongs to according to him and according the classification in the COBISS . The classification is available on the magazine's internet page and at the responsible editor. The editorial board determines the final classification.

Proofreading The organizational unit responsible for publishing provides the proofreading of the papers. The proofread papers have to be approved.

Translating The translation of the papers or abstracts is provided by the organizational unit competent for translation or the School of Foreign Languages, DDETC.

Indicating the authors of the paper	The authors' name should be written in the upper left corner, aligned left. <i>Example:</i> Name 1 Surname 1, Name 2 Surname 2,
Title of the paper	The title of the paper is written below the listed authors. The letters in the address are bold with font size 16. The text of the address is centrally aligned.
Abstract	The paper should have an abstract of a maximum 800 characters with spaces (10 lines). The abstract should present the topic of the paper in short, particularly the results and the findings. General findings and reflections do not belong in the abstract, but rather in the introduction.
Abstract in English	The authors must also submit the translation of the abstract into English. The translation of the abstract is likewise limited to a maximum of 900 characters with spaces (12 lines).
Key words	Key words (3-5 also in the English language) should be bold with a justified text alignment.
Text	The authors should submit their papers on a A4 paper format, with a 1,5 line spacing written in Arial and with font size 12. At the upper and the bottom edge, there should be approx. 3 cm of space, the left margin should be 2 cm wide and the right margin 4 cm. Each page consists of approx. 30 lines with 62 characters. The text should have a justified alignment, without indents at the beginning of the paragraphs.
A brief presentation of the authors	The authors must prepare a brief presentation of their expert or scientific work. The presentation should not exceed 600 characters (10 lines, 80 words). These text should be placed at the end of the paper, after the cited literature.
Text structuring	Individual chapters should be separated with independent subtitles and adequately numbered <i>Example:</i> 1 Introduction 2 Title of the chapter (1 st level) 2.1 Subtitle (2 nd level) 2.1.1 Subtitle (3 rd level) 2.1.1.1 Subtitle (4 th level)

Referencing

In the bibliography only the authors of the references you refer to in the paper have to be listed alphabetically. The entire reference has to be in compliance with the **Harvard referencing style**.

Example:

Surname, name (can also be the initial of the name), year. *Title of the work*. Place. Publishing House.

Example A:

Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

At certain papers published in a collection of papers, at the end of each reference a page on which the paper can be found is indicated.

Example B:

Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. 45-100.

Referencing internet sources

All references start the same way as the references for the printed sources, only that the usual part is followed by the information about the internet page on which the document was found as well as the date on which it was found. The information on the time the document was taken off the internet is important because the WWW environment constantly changes.

Example C:

Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. p. 45-100. <http://www.mors.si/index.php?id=213>, 17 October 2008.

When referencing interesting WWW pages in the text (not citing an individual document) it is enough to state only the internet address (<http://www.vpvs.uni-lj.si>). A separate reference at the end of the text is therefore not necessary

More on the Harvard referencing style in the A Guide to the Harvard System of Referencing, 2007; <http://libweb.anglia.ac.uk/referencing/harvard.thm#1.3>, 16 May 2007.

Citing

When citing sources in the text, indicate only the surname of the author and the year of publication. *Example:* (Smith, 1997) ...

If you cite the text literary, that part should be adequately marked »text«...after which you state the exact page of the text in which the cited text is written.

Example: ... (Smith, 1997, p 15) ...

Figures, diagrams, tables

Figures, diagrams and tables in the paper should be prepared in separate files that allow proofreading corrections. The place in the text where the picture should be inserted must be clearly indicated. The total length of the paper must not surpass the given limitation.

If the author cannot submit the graphical supplements in the electronic form due to technical reasons, it is exceptionally acceptable to enclose the figures to the text. In this case the author must write a sequence number and a title on the back of each picture and leave enough space in the text for it. The text must likewise contain the title and the sequence number of the figure. Diagrams are considered figures.

All figures and tables are numbered. The numbering is not uniform and not linked with the numbering of the chapters. The title of the figure is listed beneath it and the title of the table is listed above it.

As a rule at least one reference to a figure or a table must be in the paper.

Reference to a figure or a table is: ... (figure 5) (table 2)

Example of a figure:




Figure 5: Title of the figure

Example of a table:

Table 2: Title of the table



Footnotes

Numbering footnotes is individual from the structure of the text and starts with the number 1 in each paper. We want to stress that the footnotes are intended for explaining thoughts written in the text and not for referencing literature.

Abbreviations

When used for the first time, the abbreviations in the text must be explained in parenthesis, for which reason non additional list of abbreviations is needed. If the abbreviations or terms are written in English we have to write the appropriate Slovenian term with the English original and possibly the English abbreviation in the parenthesis.

Format type of the paper

The editorial board accepts only the texts written with a MS Word text editor and only exceptionally texts in the text only format.

Title of the author

Each paper should include the author's address, e-mail or a telephone number, so the editorial board could reach him or her.

Sending the paper

An electronic version of the paper should be sent to the address of the editorial board or the members of the editorial board.


Confirmation of the reception of the paper The editorial board sends the author a written confirmation regarding the reception of the paper via e-mail.

Corrections The author makes corrections to the paper in three days.

Editorial Board address Ministrstvo za obrambo
Generalštab Slovenske vojske
Sodobni vojaški izzivi
Uredniški odbor
Vojkova cesta 55
1000 Ljubljana
Slovenia

Executive editor address:
liliana.brozic@mors.si

The editorial board will not accept papers, which will not be in compliance with the above instructions.



Vsebina

Liliana Brožič	UVODNIK VARNOSTNE PERSPEKTIVE
Liliana Brožič	EDITORIAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVES
Tamas Somogyi, Rudolf Nagy	KIBERNETSKE GROŽNJE IN VARNOSTNI IZZIVI NA PODROČJU FINANC NA MADŽARSKEM CYBER THREATS AND SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE HUNGARIAN FINANCIAL SECTOR
Uroš Tovornik	GEOSTRATEŠKE PERSPEKTIVE SLOVENIJE V SPREMINJajoČEM SE SVETU GEOSTRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES OF SLOVENIA IN A CHANGING WORLD
Olusola Kolawole Oluwagbire	OCENA VPLIVA ODNOSOV Z VELESILAMI NA NACIONALNO VARNOST: PRIMER NIGERIJE AN ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF RELATIONS WITH MAJOR POWERS ON NATIONAL SECURITY: NIGERIA IN PERSPECTIVE
Mariann Minkó-Miskovics, Csaba Szabó	PRIMERJAVA RAZLAG CIVILNE IN VOJAŠKE OPREME V EVROPSKI IN MADŽARSKI SODNI PRAKSI INTERPRETATION OF CIVILIAN VS. MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN EUROPEAN CASE LAW – EU AND HUNGARY
Jarosław Włodarczyk	PROBLEM LEKSIKALNIH VRZELI PRI POUČEVANJU VOJAŠKE ANGLEŠČINE THE PROBLEM OF LEXICAL GAPS IN TEACHING MILITARY ENGLISH
Klemen Kocjančič	RECENZIJA O POMENU VOJAŠKE GEOZNANOSTI
Klemen Kocjančič	REVIEW ON THE IMPORTANCE OF MILITARY GEOSCIENCE

