

REŠEVANJE NEZAKONITIH MIGRACIJ V EVROPI

TACLING IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN EUROPE

Povzetek Nezakonite migracije pomenijo varnostno tveganje za Evropsko unijo, vendar se s tveganji zunaj Evrope ne moremo učinkovito spoprijeti brez vzpostavljanja zmogljivosti na mednarodni ravni, zato lahko to področje umestimo v okvir Skupne zunanje in varnostne politike. To stališče so potrdili tudi val nezakonitih priseljencev, ki je Evropo dosegel leta 2015, ter tveganja in posledice nepripravljenosti držav na ravni zagotavljanja nacionalne varnosti. V študiji predstavljamo tri glavne poti nezakonitih migracij, ki so prizadele Evropo. Predstavljeni so tudi države, ki so jih priseljenci prečkali, in ukrepi organov EU. V sklepu članka so predlagane morebitne rešitve za to stanje.

Ključne besede *Nezakonite migracije, varnostno tveganje, vzhodnosredozemska pot migracij, osrednjesredozemska pot migracij, zahodnosredozemska pot migracij.*

Abstract Irregular migration is a security risk for the EU. This risk from outside Europe cannot be dealt with effectively without capacity building at foreign interfaces, so it could be assessed as an area of the former CFSP. This position was supported by the influx of irregular migrants that reached Europe in 2015, and the risks and consequences of unpreparedness for national security. This study presents the three main routes for irregular migrants which affect Europe, the countries they pass through, and the actions of EU bodies. In addition to the discussion, later in the article potential solutions to the issue will be formulated.

Key words *Irregular migration, security risk, Eastern Mediterranean migration route, Central Mediterranean migration route, Western Mediterranean migration route.*

Introduction

The Global Trends 2019 Forced Displacement report of the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) – published the day before World Refugee Day – estimated the number of forcibly displaced individuals to have reached 79.5 million worldwide in 2019 (70.8 million in 2018). This was the most drastic increase in the history of the organization, with 45.7 million (41 million in 2018) of the 79.5 million migrants settling within their own country's borders, and 4.2 million (3.5 million in 2018) asylum seekers currently living globally (UNHCR Global Trends, 2018, 2019).

In 2015 an unprecedented influx of migrants hit Europe, with an arrival of 1,822,180 individuals. The EU Member States were completely unprepared for the huge number of migrants who were able to travel uncontrollably to the countries of their choice, mostly in the areas of Northern and Western Europe (Idemudia and Boehnke, 2020).

Given that a significant improvement in the long-standing political instability of the North African region is not foreseeable in the near future, Europe remains the most attractive destination for migrants. The political uncertainty of the region continues to have a negative impact on public security, including border control. In the long term this security risk will be a major burden for both the EU institutions and the Member States (Schapendonk, 2015). In this article, we would like to explain the problem in more detail by presenting the three main routes of irregular migration affecting Europe.

We have analyzed and compared articles on the EU, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and irregular migration, with an emphasis on the main migrant routes, and brought together different approaches, views, and findings on the issue to ascertain how the EU can deal with irregular migrants. The article's main goal is to provide insight into how the EU institutions and the Member States can effectively tackle this phenomenon.

1 EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN/WESTERN BALKANS MIGRATION ROUTE

In 2015, huge crowds travelled from one Member State to another on foot along motorways and by public transport, all without registration. Migrants committed a number of common crimes against the population, breaking into houses, sneaking into courtyards, and stealing clothing and food. However, a significant number of crimes remained latent, given that migrants' violations against each other were not well reported to the authorities. Hungary reacted quickly and realized that the only effective way to tackle this new social phenomenon was to create a technical barrier at the external Schengen borders. At the same time, it introduced¹ and amended legislation,² as a result of which the Armed Forces were also able to participate in guarding the border.

¹ E.g. Act CXL of 2015 on the Amendment of Certain Acts Relating to the Management of Mass Immigration law.

² E.g. the Constitution of Hungary.

Thanks to a legal institution commonly referred to as a “legal barrier”, people who entered illegally could be escorted back to the transit zones, initially to eight kilometres from the border, and then to the entire territory of Hungary. Although late in enacting this, Hungary was followed by several other Member States, adopting certain measures that led to the narrowing of the Western Balkans migration route. This also brought a significant change in terms of migratory pressures on Europe, with the number of migrants falling to 511,050 by 2016, 204,720 in 2017, and 150,100 in 2018. In 2019 and 2020 this pressure further decreased.

At the same time, and in spite of the measures introduced, criminal organizations emerged, whose main profile has become human trafficking (Besenyő, 2016). This activity has become much more rewarding, as they can serve a huge section of it, asking migrants for amounts between €1000-5000 per person per route. If the pass is not successful, they promise that they will retry at a later time. Those who run out of financial resources sell various activities, smuggle drugs or weapons, or become prostitutes, sometimes making one of their family members do so. In view of this, it can be said that irregular migration thus has a number of national security risks, which are a problem not at Member State level, but at the regional level (EU Commission, 2020).

Turkey's border protection activities and the asylum agreement of 18 March 2016, which allows the EU to return any migrants who have arrived illegally on a Greek island and not been granted refugee status to Turkey, have played an important role in reducing traffic on the route.³ Compensating for Turkish readmission, the EU agreed to take in one Syrian refugee who arrived legally in Turkey for each illegal migrant returned. As a result of the emergency situation between the EU Member States and Turkey, on 15 March 2017 the Turkish Foreign Minister announced that Ankara would partially suspend the asylum agreement. Under this measure, Turkey would not readmit asylum seekers who had arrived and stayed illegally in the EU. If the situation deteriorated further, the head of the Turkish Foreign Ministry envisaged a unilateral denunciation of the entire convention. Of the EU Member States, Austria reacted most drastically to the move, which would have halted subsidies to Ankara and the country's EU accession talks. The Austrian political leadership additionally stated that circumstances made it necessary to strengthen the protection of the EU's external borders, especially in the Western Balkans. In response to the situation on the Turkish side, the Turkish Minister for EU Affairs called on EU leaders to provide financial assistance and an EU visa waiver. Tensions have eased since then, but the Turkish threat will persist for a long time to come, with the number of migrants in the country estimated at 6.1 million, according to IOM.⁴

The complete denunciation of the convention by the Turks will probably not take place, as this would also mean that the country would have played its only trump

³ *By the end of July 2019 this had reached as low as 21,000 people.*

⁴ *Migration Data Portal.*

card against the EU, so that it would no longer be able to impose conditions in order to obtain any concessions.

In 2019 the European Commission called for urgent intervention by Cyprus, as the level of migration had increased dramatically in the country over the previous two years. Unfortunately, this did not bring a lasting solution, so Cyprus still has the highest number of asylum applications per capita in the European Union, which is why Cypriots would like to see the relocation of about 5,000 migrants. To make the process easier, Nicosia reduced the time taken for applications from 75 days to 30 days (Asylum Information Database, 2020); however, Cyprus has also started to build a fence to cope more effectively with irregular migration (In-cyprus, 2021).

Greece remains one of the most prominent conflict zones for migratory pressures on Europe. According to the UNHCR, in 2019 the number of migrants in the country was around 80,000, of which more than 70,000 were refugees on the islands.⁵ In 2021 the number of migrants reduced to around 19,000 due to the Covid-19 pandemic. In Greece, those entitled to benefits receive a subsidy of €90-550 per person or per family per month, resulting in an expenditure of around €7 million. The European Union's Internal Security Fund has provided €50 million in aid to Greece to set up a new recognition system to monitor those entering the Aegean region by sea 24 hours a day. It is planned to set up 35 monitoring and two mobile stations at Aegean military bases. The station will provide continuous and up-to-date information to Athens, Brussels and FRONTEX. With this development, further serious steps can be taken in the fight against irregular migration (Ekathimerini, 2019).

North Macedonia also began to install a technical border barrier in 2015, which it had to strengthen in 2016 as it was broken through by migrants in February that year. In 2019, the number of registered migrants was close to 8,000. The country's border protection is supported by more than 100 foreign⁶ police officers and border guards. In 2019, contrary to the global trend, the number of irregular migrants apprehended on the southern border of the country tripled compared to 2018. As a result of the pandemic, in 2020 the number of arrested irregular migrants on the southern border of the country decreased significantly. The country is facing domestic political difficulties in 2021, exacerbated by migration challenges (Spasov, 2016).

Albania is also affected by the Balkan migration route, but to a much lesser extent than North Macedonia. It was an important step in the life of the EU when, on 22 May 2019, FRONTEX launched its first non-EU mission in Albania, deploying 50 border guards, 16 vehicles and a moving thermal camera. The main task of the new mission has been identified as combating cross-border crime near the coast of Greece. The statement was issued just days before the EU parliamentary elections,

⁵ *Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Leros, Kos, and the islands without hotspots: Tilos, Rhodes, Agathonisi, Farmakonisi, Crete, Methoni.*

⁶ *Hungarian, Polish, Croatian, Austrian, Czech, Serbian, Slovenian and Slovak.*

leading to differing views and comments from political camps. However, Dimigris Avramopoulos, the Commissioner for Migration, described the new mission as a serious, historic step.

Bulgaria and Romania are less affected by the Balkan migration route, an important element of which is that, unlike the Serbian authorities, for example, the Bulgarian and Romanian authorities are cracking down on migrants and smugglers seeking to enter the country illegally. This strong, sometimes brutal, official attitude has proved effective, as evidenced by low headcount figures.

Most refugees continue to come to Serbia from North Macedonia, with no change in the routes through the country. In 2019 the number of migrants in Serbia was around 6,100, of which about 500 were without shelter,⁷ while the remainder were waiting in migrant camps for the opportunity to move on. In 2020 the number of migrants in the country dropped to around 2,000. The Serbian police still do not take action against refugees; they only intervene if they detect a crime. Illegal migration from Serbia to the EU via Croatia is partly controlled by Afghan migrants, and business conflicts between gangs have been settled by showdowns on several occasions (Délhír, 2019). The refugees are organized into small groups and then sent on in a coordinated way, mostly to the Bosnian border. In its statements, Belgrade proposes joint European action to tackle migration successfully, but in its actions, due to the idleness of the authorities, it shows the opposite, as it sees the country as a transit country for irregular migration, so no action is taken against human traffickers or migrants (Umek et al. 2019).

Kosovo continues to be less affected by migration, as it is neither economically attractive nor a member of the EU. Montenegro is already playing an increasingly important role in the Balkan route, but is also a transit country for migration (FRONTEX: Western Balkans, Quarterly, Q4, 2019).

Bosnia and Herzegovina is also heavily burdened by migration in the Balkans, which in 2020 numbered 11,300 migrants (in 2019 the number was 18,000). One of the main reasons for this is the lack of border control in most parts of the country bordering Serbia. The worst situation is in the canton of Una-San, where, due to the dramatically deteriorating security situation, emergency measures have been introduced to restrict the movement of migrants outside the reception centre. Most migrants are accommodated in Bihács and Velika Kladusa, and many have moved to Vucjak, close to the Croatian border. Given that the quality of services provided to migrants in this country is below average, and that the number of available places is also underestimated, the situation between different ethnic groups has become tense, which has already led to mass fights, e.g. at the Miral Reception Centre. At a meeting of the three-member Bosnian presidency on 11 June 2019, the involvement of the army in dealing with the migrant situation on the Serbian-Montenegrin border

⁷ For example, in the Savamala area of Belgrade, which is commonly called the “Afghan Park”.

was also raised, but the proposal was rejected by the Serbian member of the Bosnian presidency, Milorad Dodik. He also vetoed the possibility of FRONTEX members protecting the border section from Croatia in the future. At the same time, Dodik prevented the establishment of uniformly distributed reception centres for migrants across the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which would have helped the more vulnerable regions. He explained his decision by saying that areas mostly inhabited by Serbs should not be turned into a buffer zone. Despite the above, one way to relieve the burden of Bihács and Velika Kladusa was to transfer migrants staying in private houses and other accommodation to a temporary tent camp in Vucjak near the Croatian border (N1 Srbija, 2019).

In response to the actions taken by Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia has begun the construction of a three-metre-high spiked metal fence at the Maljevac border crossing in north-western Bosnia near Velika Kladusa. There are plans to install a technical border lock at two more border crossings in the Gejkovac and Pasin Potok areas. According to statements, this can optimize the use of police forces, since in the event of a violent border crossing attempt, the fence may already be a sufficient deterrent until reinforcements arrive (N1, 2019). It is also a problem in Croatia that with the start of the tourist season, more police officers must be deployed to protect the places visited by guests, which can lead to a shortage of people and congestion in the summer. The actions of the Croatian authorities against migrants are described by international organizations as excessive, sometimes violent. The country has also finally, in 2021, introduced austerity measures in order to promote its accession to the Schengen area (Lučka and Čekrlija, 2020).

In Slovenia, it is also seen as desirable to strengthen border protection by continuing to build panel fences where the terrain so requires. In addition, the government increased the number of border guards in both the police and the army (Garb, 2018), and procured surveillance drones for technical developments (STA, 2020). For further reinforcement of the Slovenian-Croatian border section, camera surveillance systems have been installed. The fight against human traffickers has been stepped up, with Ilirska Bistrica being one of the border towns most affected by migratory pressure. In 2019, 130 human traffickers were arrested, mostly foreign nationals. According to the Slovenian Ministry of the Interior, the number of registered border violations increased by 47.1% in 2019 compared to 2018, i.e. 5,345 cases. The effects of the Covid-19 pandemic reduced the number in 2020. Going further, the country also tightened border controls on its common border with Italy, introducing mixed Italian-Slovenian patrols as planned (Brožič, 2020).

2 CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN MIGRATION ROUTE

By the end of October 2020, 25,900 people had arrived illegally across the sea from Libya, Tunisia, and Algeria to Italy, a decrease from 2019. Most cross this section of the very dangerous route with the help of human traffickers – mainly Ukrainian and

Russian citizens – but a few hundred have reached the southern Italian coast directly, by their own methods. (Human Rights Watch, 2021, A).

Libya remains a major gathering point for migrants from Africa and other Arab countries to Europe. According to international organizations, the level of care provided to people in reception centres/internment camps operated by state bodies is far below average. In order to leave the inhumane conditions as soon as possible, migrants⁸ need the help of human traffickers to get to Europe. The route is extremely dangerous, not only because of the high rates of drowning, but also because the refugees are at risk of being trafficked in the North African region (Cusumano, Villa, 2019). The picture is further nuanced by the fact that the events of the civil war in Libya do not spare migrant camps; in July 2019 a bomb attack hit a centre in the suburbs of Tripoli, Tajura, killing 53 people and injuring 130 more. The recurrent conflict, which brought war conditions back with General Halifa Haftar's LNA (Libyan National Army) spring offensive, has already claimed the lives of 1,093 people, with nearly 6,000 wounded. The Prime Minister of the UN-backed Government of Libya's National Consensus is trying to take control of the situation, but will find it difficult to do so without international help.

Due to the above, the number of migrants arriving in Tunisia from Libya increased. As a result, the Tunisian coast has also become a starting point for migration to Europe. According to UNHCR migrants were prevented from leaving for Europe (Infomigrants, 2019).

Italy has taken effective action in the past to reduce migratory pressure, including deepening its cooperation with the Libyan Coast Guard, and is preparing to hand 10 new ships over to North Africa. In addition, the powers of the Minister of the Interior have been extended to restrict or even prohibit certain ships from entering, crossing or staying in waters under national control in the context of maritime and land border controls, if there are risks to public security or national security. Under the mandate, fines could also be imposed on civilian ships transporting migrants to Italy. The UNHCR sharply criticized the security package, which, according to their statements, »undermines the international rules of maritime rescue by criminalizing the ability of ships carrying people in distress at sea to sail in Italian waters.« According to Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), the restrictions introduced have led to an increase in deaths in the Mediterranean (Panebianco, 2019). On 5 August 2019, the upper house of the Italian parliament voted to further tighten migration laws, which made it possible to ban civilian ships arriving on the Italian coast with migrants on board. The package also increased the administrative fine from €150,000 to €1,000,000 and, as an alternative measure, made it possible to seize NGO vessels that transport migrants in the country's territorial waters despite a ban by the Italian authorities. If the captain of the ship did not comply with the prohibition of Italian official and

⁸ In 2020 their number, according to IOM, was 46,247.

military ships, he could be sentenced to 3-10 years in prison under the law.⁹ The law also allowed authorities to eavesdrop on NGOs to expose their contact with human traffickers (Reuters, 2019). Subsequently in Italy, due to domestic political changes, attitudes towards irregular migration were reshaped, with the result that in 2019, under pressure from the European Union, the Ministry of the Interior opened the ports of Messina and Pozzallo in Sicily to Ocean Viking and Alan Kurdi German NGO ships.

Malta is also concerned about the influx of irregular migrants, which showed an large increase in 2019 (3,406) compared to 2018 (1,445). In 2020 the number – due to the Covid-19 pandemic – moderated to 2,281. The Italian restrictions were also in the background of the increase. Recognizing this, Valletta, unlike before, no longer allowed the civilian lifeboat Ocean Viking to refuel in the island nation (Aljazeera, 2019). This move also showed that the country is likely to take stronger action against migration in the future (Mainwaring, DeBono, 2021).

3 WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN MIGRATION ROUTE

By October 2020, 20,500 migrants had arrived in the administrative territory of Spain on the Western Mediterranean migration route. The refugees come primarily from Morocco, Mali, Papua New Guinea, the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, and Senegal. Nearly 1,400 people were registered on the land border between Ceuta and Melilla, and other refugees were registered on the peninsula (Human Rights Watch, 2021, B).

Spain signed a maritime rescue cooperation agreement with Morocco in February 2019, under which both countries' rescue boats will escort illegal immigrants apprehended at sea to a port in the nearest country (European Views, 2019). On 19 July 2019, the Spanish government approved a grant of €30 million for Morocco, which it could use to curb irregular migration. This complements the €26 million package in which Madrid provided Rabat with 750 vehicles, drones, cameras, radar and other technical equipment (Martín, 2019 B).

In addition, the European Union provided €140 million in aid to Morocco to make border control more effective. This has also paid off compared to 2018, as the number of migrants entering Spain illegally fell by 39%. Thanks to the subsidies, the authorities in the North African country are carrying out more and more raids and deportations, while the Royal Moroccan Navy is also involved in the return of migrants wishing to enter Europe by ship. The two countries have reactivated their agreement to repatriate as soon as possible the citizens of a third country that entered the two exclaves, Ceuta and Mellila, illegally by climbing the fence (European Commission, 2018).

⁹ This measure was included in the package after the Italian authorities lifted the coercive measure against the captain of the civilian ship *Sea-Watch 3* in early August 2019.

This move has been urged by Madrid simply because, according to IOM research, barely half of the migrants arriving in Spain remain in the country, with the rest considering France as their destination. At the same time, the international organization believes that tougher action also carries a danger, as migrants are forced to find more dangerous ways to enter Europe (Martín, 2019, A).

In Spain, however, significant changes also took place in the areas of migration and the fight against irregular migration under the Spanish Socialist Workers Party's governance between 2019 and 2020. According to the new cabinet, the rights of people climbing over the fence are limited by the fact that they are physically injured by the barbed wire fence. In addition, the new government's Minister for Social Security and Migration, José Luis Escrivá, told a roundtable discussion at the OECD Country Forum in 2019 that Spain will need 8-9 million new workers over the next thirty years. He considers acceptance by society necessary in order to prevent a huge shortage of people in the labour market, as has happened in Japan due to the aging of the country's society. According to some analyses (Hooper, 2019) the unemployment rate of migrants arriving in Spain is 15% higher than that of the indigenous population, so in 30 years not only lower but 2.5% higher unemployment figures are expected.

4 RISKS OF THE LACK OF INTEGRATION

The current European migration and social policy could pose a serious terrorist risk, not primarily to the present but to the future. What is meant here is mainly that second and third generation radicals, who are still causing daily trouble (Haider, 2015) will again be produced by society (Kymlicka, 2010). Immigrants and their descendants, whose number is now more than a million, will not always be satisfied with what Europe has to offer them. They will not be satisfied with their income from work, as human traffickers have fed them with false illusions (Holtgraves, 2012). This could be exacerbated by the relocation of European factories to the east, which, like in France (Aubert & Sillard, 2005), could lead to unemployment. Due to the segregation they face and lack of integration (Brommer, 2016), these people will drift farther and farther away from the majority of society, making them easily radicalized (Wattels, 2018). Some will only require a small push to commit acts similar to the terrorist attack in Brussels in 2016.

This is also supported by the analysis of the Migration Research Institute (Vargha, 2019) which stated that one of the most credible guidelines for integration is the employment rate of people from third-country nationals. Examining this, it can be stated that the indicators are significantly below the average (according to the survey, for example, the employment of Iraqi men in the year of arrival was 70% lower than that of Finnish men of the same age; 10 years later the difference is still 48%).

Islamic State has brought a significant change in the morphology of terrorism, which has been another milestone after Al Qaeda, an organization that globalized terrorism

and posed a greater threat, as it was previously a regional challenge. While Al Qaeda has led large-scale, precisely planned actions against Western targets that require huge attention and organizing skills, IS has simplified the attacks that could be linked to it. Thus, instead of hijackings – except in one or two cases – and the use of bombs, it has encouraged its adherents to acts committed with stabbing and cutting tools, firearms and transport vehicles.¹⁰ While Al Qaeda sent or built terrorist cells, IS targeted easily radicalized, mostly second and third generation Muslims who were already living in the country they wanted to attack. These people have good local knowledge, contact systems, and travel opportunities (Besenyő, 2017).

However, the terrorist attack in Paris on 13 November 2015 also drew concern that there has been a change in the status of the perpetrators. According to the results of our previous research, only one of the 56 perpetrators of the terrorist attacks against the “West” was an irregular migrant, while two perpetrators were third-country nationals who were not legally resident during the Paris assassination (Böröcz, 2016).

This trend is further reinforced by the terrorist attacks in Brussels on 22 March 2016, where, in addition to perpetrators who were European citizens with migrant ancestry, foreign fighters also took part in the assassination, taking advantage of the migrant crisis. They were transported by Salah Abdeslam from Budapest to Western Europe.

In view of the above, it would be useful to set up an appropriate system which, on the one hand, provides adequate procedural guarantees for international protection for third-country nationals and, on the other, provides the authorities with the appropriate means to take action against abusers if necessary. Registers of countries of origin, including photographic and biometric data where possible, should be created, making them available to host countries, and developing an appropriate repatriation system. It would also be useful to develop a procedure that would start outside Europe. We should create a dignified environment throughout the whole process for migrants. In order to curb abuses and corruption, law enforcement forces should be subject to continuous and international scrutiny. It would be important to properly prepare migrants, which would require respect for the achievements of the citizens, cultures, religious freedom and democracy in host countries. It should also be possible to withdraw previous benefits from offenders, for example, legal residence permits. However, this is not possible in the absence of, among other things, a common legal basis supported by the Member States without exception.

Conclusion Improper management of irregular migration will be a major concern for Europe in the future, an idea we have already set out in several studies. Lack of employment will result in financial backwardness for newcomers, leading to segregation, which reinforces the hopelessness of micro-communities. One of the best recruitment bases, according to the current trend of modern terrorism, is a multi-generational immigrant

¹⁰ *Conference on Current Challenges in Counter-Terrorism, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem, 2016.*

of Muslim descent living with a sense of rootlessness and unable to integrate into the majority society.

Effective control and management of external borders is an effective tool for curbing irregular migration and the human trafficking, prostitution and terrorism based on it. However, a high degree of respect for human rights, which sometimes seems excessive, may counteract this precautionary measure.

An important factor is that in several Member States, political forces have turned this into a domestic political issue. They did so because, in the run-up to the elections, they could also claim the votes of Muslim minorities with the right to vote, thus securing their victory. The issue can also be ideologized, as a number of studies have concluded that an aging Europe and the resulting future labour shortages will become unmanageable, as by 2050 it will have reached 15%. Experts have suggested the introduction of flexible forms of employment to solve this problem. In contrast, some Member States' policies seek to counteract this economic risk with foreign nationals.

My view is reinforced by the statement of Fabercie Leggeri, Director of FRONTEX. This expert believes that if the European Commission could conclude an agreement with the countries of the region, especially with regard to Libya, and build a new base, as in Albania, it could extend its mission to another continent in the Mediterranean. To do this, we must first create stability in civil war affected Lybia. The new FRONTEX centre could only be effective with the support of a strong local Coast Guard. The Agency intends to provide assistance not only in border protection, but also in border management, increasing the number of FRONTEX personnel from 1,500 to 10,000, while also trying to modernize border control capacities as planned (Bewarder, 2019).

In addition to the current immigration policy, I believe that there is a lack of appropriate state level actions to improve the integration of individuals, even by introducing various programmes with the involvement of society. The preparation, elaboration and introduction of these, which could steer the current bad trend in a new direction, are also invisible.

What has been explained above shows how much of a security risk is posed by irregular migration, and also that the community will have to work with this modern social phenomenon for many years to come

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