Viktor Potočnik

ČETRTA GENERACIJA VOJSKOVANJA
PRVI DEL: GEOPOLITIČNI OKVIR SLOVENSKE VARNOSTI

FOURTH GENERATION WARFARE
PART 1: GEOPOLITICAL FRAMEWORK TO SLOVENIAN SECURITY

Povzetek   Pred vami je prvi od treh člankov, ki bodo obravnavali četrto generacijo vojskovanja. Te obsežne teme se bomo najprej lotili s postavitvijo geopolitičnega konteksta za Republiko Slovenijo z vidika novih varnostnih izzivov. Posebej se bomo v prvem delu ukvarjali s kontekstom spopada, na katerega bi se morali pripraviti in se ustrezno organizirati. V naslednjih dveh delih pa bomo podrobneje pogledali izzive, postavljene pred nacionalnovarnostni sistem in Slovensko vojsko v tem geopolitičnem kontekstu. Predstavili bomo nujne spremembe in mogoč pogled na njihovo uresničevanje v nacionalnovarnostnem sistemu in Slovenski vojski znotraj njega.

Ključne besede   *Geopolitika, Republika Slovenija, Slovenska vojska, četrta generacija vojskovanja.*

Abstract   This is the first in a series of three articles dealing with fourth generation warfare. To understand the fourth generation warfare as it applies to Slovenia we will first set the geopolitical context in light of the upcoming security challenges. Specifically, the article in front of you deals with the context of conflict we should organize and prepare for. In the subsequent two articles we will look in more detail at the challenges facing the national-security system as a whole, and the Slovenian Armed Forces in particular. We will put forward proposals for some of the required changes in the national-security system and the SAF.

Key words   *Geopolitics, Republic of Slovenia, Slovenian Armed Forces, fourth generation warfare.*

Introduction   *"Just as Alexander's exploits only reached the Middle Ages as a dim, fantastic tale, so in the future people will probably look back upon the twentieth century as a period of mighty empires, vast armies and incredible fighting machines that have crumbled into dust" (van Creveld, 1991, str. 224).*

Very little has been written on geostrategic and geopolitical situation of the Republic of Slovenia (RS). This is in our opinion essential to understand and grade the long-term suitability of the solutions in its national-security system. Especially the answer to the question of what kind of war can we expect and how do we conduct it? What is war in the 21ˢᵗ century? And what does it all mean for the RS and its armed forces in particular? For the Alliance (NATO) as a whole the answers to the questions above are pretty clear and can be found in the publication such as the Framework for Future Alliance Operations (2015). We, however, do not have such an analysis at a national level to use as a base to transform and/or develop the national-security system and the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) in particular. Pieces of information on the subject can be found in political and strategic documents of the RS. The Resolution on National Security Strategy (2010) and Defence Strategy (2012) include a short geopolitical analysis, a description of security threats and even a statement that the probability of state on state conflict has diminished considerably while at the same time the asymmetric threats coming from non-state actors have grown considerably. (ReSNV, 2010, & OS, 2012) Despite that they do not envision any changes necessary to national-security system corresponding to these new realities. We can only assume that the assessment of the political and strategic level in RS is that the entire national-security system and the SAF within it is perfectly capable of dealing with the new realities and the upcoming threats. The migrant crisis in the EU has proven even to the general public that this could not be further from the truth. The above-mentioned documents are of course political in their nature and from those we have come to expect big words and statements about the changing world, without offering any real solutions or priorities to face those changes.

Therefore, it is our aim to look at these key questions concerning the national-security system in the RS through geopolitics. How geopolitics affects the RS, and how it looks at the threats facing the SAF. We will try to answer the question of what kind of conflict we can expect on the territory of the RS, within the wider conflict expectations of the Alliance. This should provide us with an idea of how to appropriately train, equip and organize the SAF. In the conclusion to this part we will try to offer the direction of the system changes necessary in our national-security system.

1 CURRENT SECURITY (HYBRID) THREATS

To better understand the geopolitical context we have to understand the current and future security environment. The current security environment is diverse, complex and dynamic (Kotnik, 2012, p.14). We believe that the key to understanding it is to first understand that a nation-state is no longer the dominant player in geopolitics. Next to it we have international organizations, international corporations, international non-governmental organizations and other non-state actors (even individuals) with regional and global ambitions. However, all these human actors are not the only ones representing different security challenges. Climate change, natural disasters, and health crisis (epidemic outbreaks) come with their own security challenges independent of human will.

In describing the current security environment we most often come across the term "hybrid threats". However there is no unifying definition as to what the term means. NATO talks about hybrid warfare, while the EU talks about hybrid threats. At the same time NATO doctrine uses the term asymmetric threat, defining it as "A threat emanating from the potential use of dissimilar means or methods to circumvent or negate an opponent's strengths while exploiting his weaknesses to obtain a disproportionate result" (AAP-06, 2013, p. 2-A-20). We can even say that the 28 NATO member states cannot come to a consensus as to what hybrid threat and hybrid warfare are. (Puyvelde, 2015) Schadlow even says that there is nothing new to the terms, and that in speaking of hybrid threats/warfare we mean nothing but a complex mix of already known forms of warfare (Schadlow, 2015).

We believe that the scope of warfare has changed and that it involves all elements of a functioning society on a level never seen before. The national-security systems need to be ready for an enemy, which will act in not only the military spectrum, but at the same time in information/cyber space, using the psychological and economic operations and all other elements of (national) power at his disposal. And above all he will not recognize any sovereignty of a nation-state, and by that the lines between internal and external security are/will become blurred.

2   GEOPOLITICAL/GEOSTRATEGIC CONTEXT

»Geopolitics is about perspective. It is about how one views the world«
(Sempa, 2002, str. 4).

Size of a county is an important fact in geopolitics, but by far not the most important one. Historically some of the world's largest countries have never been geopolitically important and vice versa some of the smaller ones have been. As Sempa would say »Geographical position—where a country is located relative to other countries—is more important than size« (Sempa, 2002, p. 5). Other factors, influencing its ability to pursue its interest on a world stage include the size of population, economy, technology, military power and the form of rule. However all other factors, except geography, change in time. Only the geographical position remains constant, even though its value can change in time (Sempa, 2002).

At first glance it seems irrelevant to consider geopolitics in cases of a small country like Slovenia, with limited sources to influence or conduct its own geopolitics. That may even be true. However this does not mean that we should be indifferent to world geopolitics. Geopolitics of the great players has a profound influence on small countries like Slovenia. For example, the case of the migrant crisis in 2015, which was not caused or influenced by Slovenia, has had a profound influence on the perceptions of (in)security of its population. Geopolitical theory influences the conduct of nation-states and other players in the international system in choosing their foreign policy, identifying possible threats and responding to them, and finally even how the wars are being conducted. The most famous are the geopolitical theories of sea power by Alfred

Thayer Mahan and World Island by Halford Mackinder. Mahan's theory is based on the premises that the greatness of a nation is directly linked to its ability to control world oceans in peace and war. In that the key role is placed in the ability to control key locations (straits, canals, ports) and in the combat power of fleets (Mahan, 1890). In contrast, Mackinder's theory states that only a land power can have a lead in world affairs. His theory is based on the idea of a world divided into two parts; the World Island, consisting of Eurasian continent and Africa, and Periphery of islands including Americas, Australia, Japan, Great Brittan and Pacific islands. It can be summed up in a statement "Who rules Central and Eastern Europe rules the Heartland. Who rules the Heartland rules the World Island. Who rules the World Island, rules the World." Heartland is the key due to its size and available resources which give it a safe base to develop a superpower. All outside invaders would have a hard time coming to the industrial bases within the Heartland. At the same time the Heartland has the advantage of inner-lines while defending (Huges & Heley, 2015). Nicolas J. Spykman criticized Mackinder that the Heartland is too underdeveloped and inaccessible to play a key role in controlling the world. According to Spykman, the control over Heartland is still important, but to control it one needs to control the Rimland (e.g. Mackinder's Inner crescent). (see Picture 1) Spykman's theory was a base for the US politics of Containment, with which it contained the Soviet influence after the WW II (Gray, 2015). There are a number of other geopolitical theories from Kissinger and Brezinski in US to Ratzel and Haushofer in Germany etc. For our purposes it is also good to know the theories advocating the link on Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo (or today Beijing) axis, which would connect the Eurasian continent into a whole controlling the World island. The latter is of course not in the interest of the US and some other EU players. Without the US, France and UK cannot compete with Germany and Russia, and without the EU, the US are risking of becoming an island off the coast of Eurasia.

Russia is at the core of the Heartland, and as such plays an important role regardless of who rules it or what its current political system is. With that in mind, it is important to know its geopolitical theory. Today, Russia is extremely sensitive to what it considers its "near abroad". The Russia's 'near abroad' is not defined as such, but roughly we can claim it represents all the countries established after the break-up of the Soviet Union. Some of these countries today are members of NATO and others aspire to be one. The central role for Russia and the theory of the World Island plays Ukraine, which among other things represents substantial food reserves for the World Island. Russia is undoubtedly not pleased with NATO's eastward expansion and what it considers interfering in its near abroad (Lukin, 2014). An important role in Russian geopolitical theory is also played by what is referred to as the geopolitics of Islam, which of course Russia is actively opposed to (Dugin, 2015). In combating it, it is considering cooperation with the US, which otherwise are its geopolitical arch enemy (See Picture 1, p. 108).

As already stated, in geopolitics, the geography is not the only important factor. Culture, religion, economy, demographics, climate, natural resources and even history play a role in this respect. And today, we can see the worldwide effects of

climate change, driving the migrations and possibly even changing what is referred to as the Pivot region controlling the World Island. In theory, there are many different opinions as to what the Pivot region is. At the same time, Fukuyama warns that it would be unwise to consider Huntington's model of the clash of civilizations without reservations. Reality is far more complicated (Lukin, 2014, p. 5). The players on the geopolitical chessboard are using all the instruments of national power available (regardless of whether they are a nation-state or not) in the form of influence (soft) or coercion (hard), as well as smart power (Kotnik, 2012).

We, however, believe that all this theory lacks certain modern elements, technology being one of the most obvious ones. In the military sense, cruise missiles, long-range rocket artillery, as well as electronic and cyber warfare render the classical strategic depth irrelevant. The industrial and other potentials in strategic depth are no longer safe, and due to the advances in technology, it is no longer necessary to set foot on enemy territory to economically and socially cripple them. However, technology has had influence on other aspects of geopolitics; modern communication links, satellite links and cyber space with instant access to information. All this provides an option to bypass a certain territory, decreases the importance of geographical location, and globally delocalizes human activity (Balažic, 2001). But only at first glance. As Balažic has stated, there are forces actively opposing this. A decade and a half after Balažic had written his article, we can certainly say that the geographical position is still very relevant in geopolitics and/or geoeconomy.

Non-state actors are relatively new to geopolitics, but they interfere with geopolitical interests of great powers and have completely their own views and strategies. Above all, many of them do not recognize state borders or the rules of warfare set up by nation-states in centuries after the peace of Westphalia (1648). With them and hybrid warfare coming onto the stage, the lines between internal and external security have become blurred. As stated by van Creveld, it is the first duty of any civilized society to protect the lives of its members. Nation-states will have to adapt to that and find the solutions for the new forms of low intensity conflicts with non-state actors or they will disappear (van Creveld, 1991). This, however, is nothing new. Prior to the peace of Westphalia (1648), war in Europe was waged by very different actors; families, clans and tribes, as well as ethnic groups, races, religions and cultures, and even business ventures. Legally and illegally. These wars had often many sides, not just two, and alliances changed all the time. Not only different entities were at war, but the means of conducting war were very different as well. Only a few of these non-state actors had armies in today's sense available to them (Lind & Thiele, 2015).

However, we believe it is not important which theory is right and which is wrong. What is important is to realize that the actors on the geopolitical arena use them to identify their own strategic interests. What they have in common is the struggle for supremacy – locally and/or globally. If globalization is a fact, although many would disagree with that, there is still a question under whose leadership it will happen. It is not self-evident that this will be the USA. Other powers such as Brazil, Russia, India

and China (BRIC) are actively opposed to that. We believe that a multipolar world with several powerful actors pulling their strings is far more probable. Spykman's Rimland represents an area of the greatest competition between great powers, while at the same time containing several powerful actors of its own. The regions of Central and Eastern Europe and the Middle East within it are the key areas affecting the security position of Slovenia.

At the same time, the climate change could induce some unexpected factors into geopolitical equations. With them, the Pivot land could change – where to, however, still remains uncertain. Access to water could become a major factor. At the same time, the rise of temperature in the Arctic Circle, could drastically change the position of the Heartland (Russia), if it would suddenly gain a permanent and uninterrupted access to world oceans in the North. Climate change may also have a magnifying effect on migrations currently driven largely by globalization and desire for a better life, and, on a smaller scale, the wars in the Middle East and Asia. Migrations could, especially in Central Europe, completely change the demographic picture. Some may consider the current migrant predictions for 500 million EU irrelevant. However, as every organized football supporter will tell you, you need only a small group of a few hundred well-organized supporters on a stadium to have the whole thing of tens of thousands people on their feet and screaming. In this regard, the peaceful majority is irrelevant. This also explains what happened in eastern Ukraine, where the Russian speaking population was minority and peaceful in practically all the regions. However, a few thousand Russian Special Forces and various volunteers have turned things upside down. Having this in mind, it would be ill-advised to underestimate the organizational capabilities and motivation of Islamic fighters fighting in the Middle East for more than a decade, who instinctively understand modern warfare. We believe they will prove to be a huge headache for us.

3 GEOPOLITICAL POSITION OF SLOVENIA

In geopolitical terms, Slovenia lies within the Rimland, i.e. within the area whose control means the control over the World Island. To be more exact, Slovenia lies on the edge of this area, and edges are often more exposed to major earthquakes. Looking at Mackinder's theory, we lie on the edge of Central and Eastern Europe. We are also situated on the edge of the Balkan Peninsula, where, according to Huntington, three major civilizations meet (western Christianity, Orthodoxy and Islam) (Huntington, 1996). The territory of Slovenia also represents the crossroads of the four major geographical features: the Alps, the Balkan Mountains, the Mediterranean and the Pannonian lowlands. Slovenia is also at the crossroads of three major cultures: Romanic, Germanic and Slavic. We can also find influences of both Central and Southern Europe, each with its distinctive functioning patterns. Slovenia also represents the shortest communication link from Central to Southern Europe and across the Balkans to the Middle East. Two pan-European traffic corridors run across

Slovenia, namely the fifth and the tenth (Godec, 2010).[1] The German geopolitical thought has always considered Slovenia to be a part of their "Mittleeuropa", stretching from the Baltic to the Adriatic (Balažic, 2001, p. 235). Italy, on the other hand, is within NATO a strategic partner for Slovenia on the Alliance's southern flank. As stated by Balažic, Slovenia is "geopolitically positioned between the Alps and the Adriatic, and between Pannonia and Padania, which represents an intersection of a relative stability with patches of instability, the latter stretching from the Balkans to the borders of China" (Balažic, 2001, p. 232). Slovenia is in a classical geopolitical sense a midget; however at one point before the outbreak of the great economic crisis in 2007, it had the opportunity to become a geoeconomical regional power (Balažic, 2001). Unfortunately, this status and opportunity was unwisely wasted. Slovenia is also with no strategic resources of its own, with the exception of water and wood (Ponjavič, 2012, p. 44), which have to be protected rather than used and do not represent a viable source form which to finance national-security system.

Slovenia lies in the intersections of many interests. In the European part of NATO, we have several militarily relevant players; three major ones (UK, France and Germany), and Italy together with Poland. While France and UK have not only regional but also global ambitions and Germany is a bit reserved in its global ambitions, Italy and Poland on the other hand represent two different orientations within the Alliance. Italy focuses on the south and the Mediterranean, while Poland focuses on the east and Russia. Considering the current security challenges and their geographical position, this is perfectly normal. All other Alliance members more or less follow one of the two (Keohane in Thränert, 2016). For Slovenia, both Italian and German geopolitical orientations are important, and they are both the result of US geopolitics (Balažic, 2001). Such is our geostrategic position. This, however, means that we are torn between orienting to the south and/or east and we have no easy pick.

Because of this east-south division, our national-security system and the SAF within it need a clear prioritization of threats and geostrategic direction. This can only be given by a responsible and informed politics – statesmanship. Indecision and division in our orientation (east vs. south) are a cause for discomfort, confusion, irrational spending of limited resources and inability to make the right decisions at the right time. The confusion is clearly visible in our contributions to NATO force and command structures. We have a battalion battle group affiliated into the Alliance's southern flank (NRDC-ITA[2]), we are contributing to Italian-led VJTF[3], and together with Italy as a lead nation participate in EU defence capabilities. At the same time, we have affiliated NBC battalion to MNC NE[4], declared that we will participate in the eFP[5] and are exploring options of how to contribute further to the Alliance's

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[1]   *To this corridors additional two TEN-T corridors are linked; Baltics-Adriatic & Mediteranium corridor.*

[2]   *NRDC-ITA – NATO Rapid Deployment Corps Italy*

[3]   *VJTF- Very high readiness Joint Task Force*

[4]   *MNCE – Multinational Corps Northeast*

[5]   *eFP=enhanced Forward Presence*

eastern flank.[6] As these two represent dramatically different operational zones, the confusion in the SAF is complete. Hopefully, everyone can see at first glance that the SAF is not in a position to simultaneously participate in both operational zones. The SAF is in dire need of a clearly defined strategic direction.

4   FOURTH GENERATION WARFARE – WAR WE CAN EXPECT

In the fourth-generation warfare (4GW) nation-states are faced with a broad spectrum of threats from high-intensity conflict to terrorism. To understand why we are speaking of 4GW, we first have to determine how we understand the first three generations of warfare. The first generation is represented by armies fighting in a highly regulated battlefield using the tactic of line and column. It sets the foundation of what we today understand as the military culture – uniforms, drill, saluting. The second generation warfare is represented by armies cultivating the doctrine of firepower and attrition. The French developed such an army during the First World War. This is an army that has an inward focus, stressing the power of orders, rules, processes and procedures. Most of the nation-state armies today, including the US Armed Forces and all NATO countries, fit within this category. The third generation is represented by armies cultivating maneuver warfare, started by the Germans during the First World War, and fully developed during the second. Maneuver warfare is outward focused, on a situation, the enemy and the result. Leaders on all levels are expected to produce results regardless of the details of the orders given to them. The third generation values initiative and self-discipline as opposed to following procedures and imposed discipline. All 4GW armies are free of the first generation culture of order, focused outward not inward as second generation armies, value initiative and self-discipline and are therefore highly decentralized. Second generation armies are largely helpless against them.

We will analyse 4GW in more detail in our next article. For now we have to understand that at the core of 4GW lies not a military evolution but a political, social and moral revolution; crisis of the legitimacy of the state (Lind & Thiele, 2015). The goal in 4GW is the destruction of the moral fibre, which enable the society to exist (Vandergriff, 2006, p. 45). Hybrid warfare is a tool used by actors in 4GW. Hybrid warfare as we understand it combines conventional forces and technologies with non-state actors, criminal groups, Special Forces operations, information operations, cyber-attacks and other sources of asymmetric warfare. In it, we have not only many players at the same time, but also many different sides. The essence of hybrid warfare is not that the asymmetric approach dominates the conventional one, but that the

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[6]   *At this point one should distinguish cooperation in terms of training and exercises conducted within the framework of RAP (Readiness Action Plan) and it's »Assurance Measures«, and the participation in NCS (NATO Command Structure) and NFS (NATO Force Structure) designated for the NATO eastern flank. Training and exercises regardless of location provide us with enhancing our capabilities and Alliance interoperability, while at the same time sending a clear message of Alliance unity to our adversaries. On the other hand participation in selected NCS and NFS gives a message of a strategic direction, and we should be very careful with assigning our very limited resources to those.*

actors are choosing a method that is best suited for the moment chosen and for which they believe will give them the best results with the minimum of effort required.

In a world as interconnected as ours, nation-states have no economic and political motivation to entangle themselves in classical state-on-state high intensity wars. This, however, does not mean that they would not be ready to use all the instruments of national power (DIME + 6)[7] indirectly or directly through proxies (proxy wars), if they had such a geopolitical or other interest. And more importantly, nation-states have lost their monopoly over the use of force in pursuing their goals. Non-state actors such as various religious movements (e.g. ISIS), terrorist organizations (e.g. Al Kaida) and criminal gangs (e.g. drug cartels) have the resources and the motive to use force and destabilize nation-states (Sokolosky, 2015).

Russian Federation is a threat to Slovenia, because it represents a direct military threat to our allies within its near abroad. This has to be perfectly clear at least to our statesmen if not to the general population and politicians. Not even at the height of its might as Soviet Union, Russia never set foot on our territory (with a small exception of Prekmurje). In the current geostrategic situation and with the current geopolitics of the Russian Federation, the probability of the SAF facing armed units of the Russian Federation on the territory of Slovenia is almost non-existent. However, Slovenia is NATO and EU member, and therefore a potential Russian enemy. It is in our strategic interest that NATO and the EU remain firm and cohesive. Without them, we are extremely vulnerable militarily, politically and economically. Without NATO, Slovenia loses the nuclear umbrella, loses the security of its airspace, and loses the security provided by the large community. As such, it would become susceptible to all kinds of threats from conventional attacks (even from its now Alliance neighbours) to low intensity conflicts. This means that Slovenia has to be ready to carry its fair share of burden in the defence of all members of the Alliance, even those within the Russian near abroad. Even though their security interests at first glance have nothing to do with Slovenia or even actively oppose our security interests, the failure of the Alliance in those states would mean the failure of the Alliance as a whole. And that could lead into the disintegration of the Alliance and Slovenia would all of a sudden have to face all the threats on its own, with the national-security system as it is. A functioning Alliance is an absolute priority for Slovenia, and we have to demonstrate that to our allies. Only actions matter in this regard, and the actions are linked to fulfilling our commitments and obligations towards our allies. This, however, does not mean that by fulfilling them we will meet all our security needs.

For Slovenia (and the SAF), climate changes, migration trends, and demographic and social changes in the region of the western Balkans, at the edge of which we are situated, and along the southern flank of NATO (from Turkey to Libya), represent

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[7] *In addition to classic instruments of national power (diplomacy, information, military, economics) Kotnik lists additional six instruments (moral power, socio-cultural and ideological power?, natural resources, geostrategic position, size and quality of population). (Kotnik, 2012, p.19)*

more direct future security challenges. As the violence in the Middle East does not seem to be losing ground, we can expect to see changes along civilization boundaries and in the key regions that will bring more conflicts within some countries on the one hand, and between state and non-state actors (the latter originating within or outside the countries in question) on the other, i.e., more low-intensity conflicts that have represented the bulk of fighting since 1945 (See Picture 2, p. 108).

Slovenia as a transit country could expect to see various aggressive groups with different (even criminal) background. Undoubtedly, they are already operating on our territory despite the formal assessment that the security situation is under control. Slovenia may not be the final destination for these groups. Nevertheless, it does represent a transit and logistical hub, maybe even a safe zone to recuperate and train. However, if they assessed that their interests were significantly endangered, we should expect a violent reaction in terms of taking control over the key locations in all directions in order to continue the transfer of people, money, arms and other resources into what they see as their objectives, or in order to control some of the key resources – e.g. water. These are non-state, even criminal, groups with semi-military or paramilitary formations with strong identity/ideology, a clear goal and a stable source of income. In short, some of the more common actors in 4GW warfare dominated by low-intensity conflicts.

Picture 2 represents the geographical position of Slovenia and its security perspective in terms of key security events in the regions affecting our geopolitical assessment[8]. As stated before, in geopolitics, solely a geographical perspective is not enough even though it represents the base. We believe that the combination of geographical position together with some of the key security events and migration currents gives us a relevant security perspective for Slovenia.

Slovenia cannot have a national-security system designed for an area long gone by. It simply is not reactive enough and it does not provide a sufficient pool of people to guarantee the security of individuals and a society as a whole. Let us again emphasize – at the core of 4GW there lies a crisis of the legitimacy of a state. Citizens denying the legitimacy of a state, from whatever reasons, knowingly or unknowingly destabilize the basic fabric linking the society as a functioning whole, and many of the players in 4GW are more than ready to take advantage of that. A small country like Slovenia has to ensure its own legitimacy and actively take over the responsibility to provide its own security and the security of the citizens. This responsibility cannot be transferred to a one or two subjects within the country (be it Police or the military), let alone to transfer it entirely onto other alliance members.

Slovenian national-security system and the SAF as its integral part are modelled to react to a second generation conflicts, and are totally inappropriate for 4GW hybrid conflicts (in its low- and high-intensity version). The political debates and statements

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[8]   *The circles represent an approximate distance of 500 km and 1000 km respectively from Slovenian borders.*

during the recent migrant crisis show complete political unawareness of the scope and nature of the problem, when, during such crisis, we could follow a debate on the formal status of the armed forces, on whether or not SAF members can even participate in internal security matters. At the same time, nothing was said about the required system level changes, to ensure appropriate responsiveness to 4GW threats.[9] The existing solutions are inappropriate and do not allow an effective reaction to 4GW threats when required. [10] Even the highly contested powers granted to SAF in Article 37a of the Defence Act are in fact totally irrelevant.[11] SAF members (by law required to be unpunished citizens of the Republic), in spite of Article 37a, do not even have the powers granted to municipally constabulary or department store security guards.[12]

Conclusion   »It takes farsightedness and guts to build an armed force that will only be called to fight *in, say, a decade. One has to guess, as best one can, what resources will be available, what kind of* opponent the forces will be called on to face, and what kind of environment they will have to *operate in*« (van *Creveld, 1991, p. 117).*

In 4GW, there are no clear boundaries between war and peace, or between military and non-military means to conduct wars. The lines between external and internal security are blurred. Countries that choose to wait with the activation of their full security potential until a state of emergency or formal war is declared are doomed to lose. A nation-state must ensure its own legitimacy and must set up a national-security system in which there is no strict division between the actors in peace (police) and the actor in war (military). In 4GW we are faced with warfare that recognizes no clear limits and touches all the segments of a society. That means, there are no more safe zones or protected groups, and no clear limits between peace, crisis and war. Therefore, it is crucial that nation-state's institutions entrusted with security have all the necessary powers to protect the citizens and the whole society in all eventualities that may arise. The national-security system actors in Slovenia need to be uniformly

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[9] *We do not consider a parliamentarian »science fiction« debate on National guard to be a relevant debate on system level changes.*

[10] *As already stated, the line between peace and war in 4GW is blurred. Waiting for a state of emergency or war to be declared in order to effectively put the armed forces into use, is putting the latter in an impossible position. The public expects and demands the Army to be used as soon as the problem arises, without waiting for politicians to make up their mind.*

[11] *Defence Act Article 37a. grants the following special powers to the Army: to warn, to direct, to temporarily limit the movement of persons; to participate in controlling groups and masses. Following that, we could find no source detailing these powers and the SAF had a few problems formulating the Rules of Engagement within these powers. SAF members also have no power to identify a person nor do they have any power to use force when necessary.*

[12] *The requirements for municipal constabulary are set in Article 2 of the Policy on conditions to work as a municipal constable, and for Security guards in Article 32 of Private Security Act. Based on these the security guards and constables do not need to be citizens of Slovenia and they can be previously punished for smaller crimes. At the same time they have far bigger powers when dealing with citizens. Article 10 of the Municipal constabulary Act lists the powers of constables: warning; verbal order; establishing identity; security check; confiscation of objects; holding a suspect of a crime; the use of force, handcuffs, and pepper spray. While the security guards have the following powers according to Article 45 of Private Security Act: warning, verbal order, establishing identity, overall check; denying access to or exit from a secured area; holding a person; the use of physical force; the use of handcuffs.*

directed. Not through a single Department/Ministry, as suggested by Podbregar (Podbregar, 2011), but in a way that will allow one institution/department to direct and coordinate all the activities of different institutions/departments in a national-security system. Only this will ensure appropriate coordination and responsiveness. Not as it is now the case in Slovenia where as a matter of principle all the players are equal (with one in the lead) and a consensus is required on principle before anything can move forward. Looking for a consensus takes too much time, time that is not available. With that in mind, a democratic society must not forget that there is a need for civilian control over the uniformed structures [13]. Perhaps in a small country like Slovenia this is even a bit easier, since none of the subsystems is uncontrollably big. We will discuss in more detail the key elements of 4GW and the changes they require in national-security system in our next article.

The decision makers in Slovenia will have to realize the importance of the right balance of the instruments of national power. Neglecting one, in our case military, leaves consequences on all the others. A much broader consensus has to be reached realizing that military instrument of national power is not just about hard power and its ability to conduct wars. It also preforms various other soft functions in support of the other instruments of national power. We cannot deny its great symbolic value in support of diplomatic instruments[14], economic instruments, the moral power and socio-cultural influence on society's consciences. Other small countries like Switzerland and Singapore, can serve as an example in how this is to be done.

We believe that Slovenian national-security system is not ready for 4GW threats, that it is not in control of what is going on and that it is completely inappropriate to effectively face them. In 4GW, we are talking about conflicts that are military by nature, even though they are also being conducted by non-state actors and by instruments that are not strictly military. Slovenian police is not organized, equipped or trained to combat 4GW enemies. The SAF is a bit better organized and equipped for 4GW opponents, but it is at the same time totally untrained to face them.[15] As for the intelligence agencies, we can only guess in what state they are, but we have no reason to assume the conditions are any better than in the uniformed structures. Here, a careful observer can detect a systematic neglect of capabilities.

To be successful in 4GW, the SAF will have to adapt. A change in the organizational culture, which is now a typical second-generation culture focused on the processes, formality and waiting for orders, is of essential importance. This is not to say that processes need not be known, that procedures are not there to ensure security of own

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[13] *This is most often done through the authority to allocate resources and controlling their spending.*

[14] *Even a relatively small military contribution goes a long way in diplomatic terms.*

[15] *The statement is impossible to verify through open sources. The information on such level of capabilities is confidential in any country. We, however, do not base our statement on such information, even if it does exist in Slovenia. We base it on a comparative analysis of what we believe is necessary for the success in 4GW as well as on the publicly available reports on the condition of different elements of Slovenian national-security system. We will explain this statement further in our next articles.*

forces or that orders are not important. On the contrary, this only means that they are not the beginning and the end of things, and that initiative, self-discipline and focus on the result are of far bigger importance. For that a leap forward in military education and training will be necessary. It will have to create self-disciplined, thinking and adaptable leaders, capable of reacting to all variations of hybrid warfare in a timely and accurate manner. For this purpose, we would recommend that the "Adaptability Course Model" be examined (Vandergriff, 2006). We will discuss the necessary changes and possible solutions in more detail in the last (third) article of this series.

All this still leaves the question of quality vs. quantity open. Do we need a small professional structure or do we need a larger segment of society involved in national-security system. We believe it is not a question of either-or, but a question of how to have both, as stated by Kotnik in his article (Kotnik, 2015). The legitimacy of a country, in the security sense, can only be ensured if a large enough portion of the population is included in security structures in any of the many possible ways. In addition, 4GW is largely represented by low-intensity conflicts, where the control of territory with soldiers is absolutely essential to ensure the legitimacy of the state. Modern technology can help in the surveillance of the territory, but it cannot be used as a substitute for human presence. On the other end of 4GW spectrum, however, we have conventional high-intensity conflicts. The SAF can only take part in these with highly trained and suitably equipped formations - e.g. battalion battle groups. And the SAF can only enter these as a part of the Alliance in which it will take its fair share of the burden. Slovenia cannot act alone in any kind of global or regional high-intensity conflict. A place at the table when such a conflict is over will only be earned if we carry our fair share of the burden. And this part of the SAF needs to be and needs to stay professional. It also needs to have the absolute priority in terms of capability building. Without the Alliance, the price of security is going to be considerably higher or we will stay without it and without our own country. We also have to realize that Alliances are not forever. And when they are gone, one has to build new ones under new conditions and with new obligations. Or one has to fully rely on its own forces. The latter is usually unavoidable in a short term. And that is why Slovenia's national-security system cannot be based solely on our Alliance contributions, but has to have the capabilities to act independently in defence of the country when and if required.

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Slika 1:
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str. 118.

Picture 1:
World according
to Spyman
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Polelle, Raising
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Consciousness,
p. 118.

Slika 2:
Geopolitični
položaj Slovenije
v luči sedanjih
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Picture 2:
Geopolitical
position of
Slovenia in
light of existing
security threats
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