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UPRAVLJANJE INSTRUMENTOV NACIONALNE MOČI

ORCHESTRATING THE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

Povzetek   Država mora upravljati instrumente nacionalne moči ob upoštevanju varnostnega okolja v okviru trenutnega procesa vzpostavljanja ravnotežja moči v mednarodni skupnosti. Ob stalnem medsebojnem sodelovanju si države in drugi akterji priza-devajo uresničevati svoje (nacionalne) interese prek odnosov vplivanja ali prisile. V ozadju obeh pristopov so različni instrumenti nacionalne moči, ki jih je mogoče razumeti na tradicionalen ali bolj celovit in prilagodljiv način. Tradicionalni pristop, ki temelji na treh ali štirih instrumentih, je še posebno neustrezen, ko si želimo ustvariti vtis o nacionalni moči držav v razvoju in na novo nastajajočih velikih sil. Nyejevo razlikovanje med trdo in mehko močjo sledi tradicionalnemu konceptu treh (štirih) instrumentov (sredstev) nacionalne moči, vendar pa hkrati uvaja tri različne načine njihovega "prodajanja" – trdo, mehko in bistroumno moč. Skladno s celovitim in bolj prilagodljivim razumevanjem instrumentov nacionalne moči predlagam, da vseh deset instrumentov nacionalne moči razumemo kot primerne za uporabo v obliki vpliva (mehko) ali prisile (trdo), pa tudi na bistroumen način, kot edinstveno mešanico prvih dveh, v kateri mora mehka moč prevladati nad trdo močjo, kolikor dolgo je to mogoče in sprejemljivo.

Ključne besede   *Instrumenti nacionalne moči, država, nacionalni interes, sodobno varnostno okolje, cilji, načini, sredstva, vpliv, prisila, trda moč, mehka moč, bistroumna moč.*

Abstract   The State has to orchestrate the instruments of national power regarding security en-vironment within the on-going process of establishing balance of power in the inter-national community. In continuous interplay, states and other actors try to implement their (national) interests through influence or coercion relationships. In behind of both approaches there are different instruments of national power which could be understood in traditional or more comprehensive and flexible way. Traditional approach, based on three or four instruments, is particularly incorrect if someone would like to get an impression about national power of developing states and newly

emerging powers. Nye`s differentiation between hard and soft power in fact follows traditional concept of three (four) instruments (*means*) of national power, but at the same time he is introducing three different *ways* of "selling" – hard, soft and smart. According to comprehensive and more flexible understanding of the instruments of national power I suggest that all ten instruments of national power are suitable to be projected in influential (soft) or coercive (hard) way and also in a smart way, as a unique mixture of the first two, in which soft power should prevail over hard power as long as possible and acceptable.

Key words   *Instruments of national power, the "State", national interest, contemporary security environment, ends, ways, means, influence, coercion, hard power, soft power, smart power.*

Preface   The process of globalization in all its forms has made the world more interconnected and interdependent, but still it is not common and unique in all its dimensions, including that of security.

Regarding security environment it is necessary to differentiate between diverse security settings, but there is an immense need to shift from previous distinction of "national" and "international" to the distinction of "non-national us" as a broader and at the same time more blurred social categories of networks, partnerships and alliances and "others" still out of them. First, one needs to be aware of what is happening regarding our strengths and weaknesses in the internal environment, influencing our ability to deal with not just security risks and threats, but also opportunities in our external environment in a timely and effective manner.

In security sector, we should be wise enough not to concentrate just on risks and threats but also to understand the great potential of opportunities. Only by following this kind of mindset it is possible to completely understand the importance of dilemma how states should best orchestrate the instruments of national power to provide for their long-term security and influence whilst protecting the common interests and advancing the shared values.

1   UNDERSTANDING THE TOPIC

To better understand the aforementioned topic and dilemma, it could be divided and analysed through distinguishing between desired ends of the subject and ways and means to achieve these ends. The question is about states which are very different, so it is wise to narrow our focus to the very concept of a state. Thus the subject is "the State". Providing long-term security of "the State" is one of its main objectives or main ends.[1] This can also be regarded as one of the most important national interests. To achieve its objectives, "the State" has in its possession the instruments or means of national power.[2] When thinking about best orchestrating these state's instruments

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[1]   *It is not just about defence but about security. This is far wider concept within which it is preferable not just to think about addressing potential or actual threats but also about exploiting possible opportunities.*

[2]   *Power is the ability to influence the behaviour of others to get outcomes one wants. (Nye, 2004, p. 2)*

it is about <u>ways.</u> The dilemma also points out a concept of influence which at the first glance seems to be one of the ends, but in fact it is just one of the possible ways towards the desired ends. Everything else in the dilemma is about wider environment and two <u>side ends</u> - protecting the common[3] interests and advancing the shared values[4] supporting dilemma's main end.

In the process of dividing and analyzing this multi-layer strategic dilemma and as an attempt to conceptualize this complex issue, I designed scheme 1, within which I tried to summarize my perceptions and conclusions.

Scheme 1: Interplay of ends, ways and means of "the State" in the process of providing its long-term stability and security in the contemporary security environment

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States are still main actors in the international relations and reports of its end have been greatly exaggerated. (Dictionary of International Relations, 1998, p. 512-513) They could be hardly perceived as a uniform category. Besides it seems that in last decades it has become even less uniform as it had been in the past. We face a phenomenon of increasing; let us borrow this term from the ecology, "states' biodiversity". To avoid dealing too much with particularities of different states, I decided "the State", as a neutral concept, is in the centre of our attention. Particularly because there

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[3] When the term "common interests" is used, it refers wider and above, not just national interests.

[4] At this point, it is appropriate to think about a difference between interests and values. Indirectly, the difference between both, interests and values, is implied in the wording "common interests" and "shared values".

is the dilemma if this rich diversity of states, with a rising number of small states, is an advantage or disadvantage or even obstacle for the international community.

2 CONTEMPORARY SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Contemporary security environment is diverse, complex and dynamic. For some people this is threatening by itself, because they would much more prefer an environment full of similarity, simplicity and predictability. But the approach of seeing and admitting just the threats we are familiar with, those that suit our concepts and plans, or those we can afford to deal with considering our available resources should be avoided. Instead, we must recognize and accept the complexity of contemporary and future security issues and deal with them in a comprehensive manner. Our response, however, should not be limited just to the national or state security or even not just to its defence, but it should be extended to the concept of human security. Nevertheless, thinking this way, one should not forget that the state provides indispensable institutional framework for a society and its members. For this reason, state security will always matter as one of the core elements of a more modern and comprehensive concept of human security. And when talking about this overwhelming security approach, we are not focusing on risks and threats caused by instability in globalized world anymore, but we preserve a broader view and, in addition to (potential) enemies, we recognize, understand and harness opportunities of global interdependence.

Baechler (in Goetschel, 1998, p. 270) refers to Holsti (1988) according to whom global interdependence and role of international institutions[5] may be the reason why there has never in the world history been a parallel to the present situation in which states with such extreme differences in population size, politico-military potential and socio-economic development would coexist in a stable situation of mutual peace and national autonomy. Obviously, it is about global interdependence and international institutions. But the achievement and preservation of coexistence and stability are in fact ongoing processes of establishing the balance of power. So the right reason for a balanced world is hidden deeper and is thus less visible. First, it is about sharing and living some fundamental values of conduct within the societies and international community. And second, it is about the willingness of states to submit their narrow national interest in certain or at least, to some degree, common interests of international community or at least narrower alliances or partnerships. In fact, this is all about the states' (predominantly big and powerful ones) ability of self-reflecting their own vital and non-vital national interests, their empathic perception of interests of other states and, above all, their inner strength of self-containment.[6]

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[5] *Institutions can enhance a country's soft power. (Nye, 2004, p. 10)*

[6] *Power is not good or bad per se. It is like calories in a diet: more is not always better. Too much power (in terms of resources) has often proved to be a curse when it leads to over-confidence and inappropriate strategies. (Nye, 2010)*

In the international community, there is a continuous interplay of different states and actors. Their relationships are of different kind and could be divided, according to congruity of their interests, into relationships between allies, partners, friends, rivals,[7] opponents and enemies. This could be regarded as a continuum of congruity of interests. Each responsible actor tends to have as many allies, partners and friends as possible, and as little opponents and, predominantly, enemies as possible.

The relationships between these actors are very diverse in their contents and intensity, but are always about the implementation of their (national) interests.[8] States try to implement their interests in two very distinctive ways – through influence relationship or coercion relationship, depending on where on the continuum of congruity of interests the other party of relationship lies. In behind of both approaches there are different instruments of national power.

3   INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER – FROM TRADITIONAL TO COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

Common understanding of the instruments of national power is that these are all of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives. The traditional approach towards instruments of national power differentiated just three of them – military, economic and diplomatic power. Recently, the fourth one – information power[9] – has been added, forming the well-known acronym of DIME.[10] However, it is still impossible to describe and understand particular state's position in the international community just by considering these four instruments of national power. Jablonsky (2010, p. 126) suggests that national power is composed of various elements, also referred to as instruments or attributes. The author suggests grouping them into two categories based on their applicability and origin - "national" including geography, resources and population and "social" including economic, political, military, psychological and informational instrument. Even though labelling of these two categories is not the best one, some instruments are not named precisely enough and some are missing, I still consider this approach more complete and fair in comparison with the traditional ones.

The approach with just four instruments of national power is particularly incorrect if one would like to get an impression about national power of developing states

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[7]   *Rivals are an interesting and unpredictable in-between category, which could, predominantly according to our relationship towards them, turn both ways – to become ours friends or opponents.*

[8]   *It is important to be constantly aware of this, because it often seems that relationships are about something completely different. But they are certainly not!*

[9]   *The ability to share information – and to be believed – becomes an important source of attraction and power. (Nye, 2004, p. 31) Despite this statement, the author does not perceive information as a distinctive type of power but just as a part of soft power.*

[10]   *DIME – Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic.*

and newly emerging powers which are maybe not highly rated regarding these four instruments but have, indeed, some other contemporary important advantages, which have lately made them more visible and more respected. It seems as though this traditional four-element conceptualization of national power could be regarded as a "developed-centric approach" including just the elements which are to the best advantage for developed states (military, economy, diplomacy and information technology) and completely abandoning those which are not so strong any more (geostrategic position[11]) or are even weak (natural resources[12], size of population).[13] Thus, I suggest to widen our view and to take into consideration all these before mentioned and some other at least for us important instruments of national power – namely quality of population, socio-cultural and ideological instrument[14], morale[15] - presented all together with their inter-relations more precisely in the scheme 2.

Instruments of national power could be divided into two groups. The objective one joins the instruments which are completely (geostrategic position and natural resources), predominantly (size of population) or partially (quality of population) out of influence of actual authorities of the state. Subjective instruments of national power are, on the other hand, those which actual authorities of the state are capable to shape completely or at least partially (quality of population) according to the state's interests, political ambitions and will.

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[11] Some actors have power or at least a part of it just because of their position on the globe (pirates in Somalia, Turkey, UK, South Africa …)

[12] Natural resources are nowadays, when we cope with their increasing scarcity, per se an instrument of national power. So it is not possible to agree any more with Nye (2004, p. 12) that "coal and steel are not major power resources if a country lacks an industrial base". It is true that, in the past, natural resources were just a potential, if they were not activated. This is in fact the main difference in comparison with the economic power, which represents activated and utilized natural resources. But today, just a possession of natural resources represents an important tool of national power and influence. However, even Nye indirectly (2004, p. 14) admits that natural resources are an important tool of national power claiming that "...some hard-power assets such as armed forces are strictly governmental; others are inherently national, such as oil and mineral reserves,...".

[13] Some actors have power or at least a part of it just because of being in possession of important natural resources (Gulf states or Nigeria because of oil), size of population (China, India …), moral power of their leadership (Saudi Arabia with two Muslim holly cities) or that of their population (Afghanistan with their people with incredible will to persist and resist).

[14] If a country's culture and ideology are attractive, others more willingly follow. (Nye, 2004, p. 10) We perceive socio-cultural and ideological power as outwards oriented power of the society, produced within the society but also reflecting from the society to its environment. Similar by origin but completely different by effect is the moral power, which is also produced within the society but is predominantly oriented inwards to strengthen the society against outer influences and pressures. In its extreme emanation it also reflects to the environment of the society as a special source of deterrence.

[15] Socio-cultural and ideological power and morale power are of central importance while influencing all other four subjective instruments of national power. In its developed, upgraded form it is not just about nation's ability to persists in a determined direction and resist any kind of pressures, but at the same time also about nation's ability to preserve openness for the feedbacks from the environment and flexibility in searching for most effective reactions.

Scheme 2:
Comprehensive
national power
as an outcome
of synergy of
instruments of
national power

COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL POWER

GENERAL SYNERGY

DIPLOMATIC POWER

INFORMATION POWER

COMPREHENSIVE IDEOLOGICAL POWER

ECONOMIC POWER

MILITARY POWER

PARTICULAR SYNERGIES (black and red arrows)

POWER OF QUALITY OF POPULATION

POWER OF SIZE OF POPULATION

POWER OF NATURAL RESOURCES

POWER OF GEOSTRATEGIC POSITION

OBJECTIVE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

SUBJECTIVE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

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National power is not just about size or scope of the instruments of national power, but also about their quality, usefulness of each of them and quality of their combination in realisation of the envisioned ends. These ten[16] instruments of national power contribute to the comprehensive national power, each of them separately and at the same time through their mutual dual interplays (marked with thin black and red arrows) providing particular synergies, which at the end all together provide general synergy of instruments of national power.

I would like to point out that all instruments of national power are relevant, although in different degrees in different contexts, predominantly depending on the features of key actors and their desired outcomes. At this point, it is right to emphasize that the instruments of national power are not an end in themselves. They are the tools of state politics and used to directly or indirectly control and manipulate our environment and provide

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[16] *In this scheme, I integrated socio-cultural, ideological and morale instrument in a single, comprehensive instrument, combining state's leadership, its institutions and civil society, not to make the presentation over-complicated.*

basic goods for the state, society and its citizens – (1) long-term stability and security, (2) democracy and liberties and (3) economic prosperity and welfare.

4 DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN HARD AND SOFT POWER

Another conceptualisation of national power has been proposed by Nye (2004) as a differentiation between hard and soft power. According to our understanding, it represents *the bridge* between the means of national power and the ways in which they are used. When his two schemes of the power itself and three types of power (Nye, 2004, p. 8, 31) are combined, one can see that the author in fact follows the traditional concept of three instruments (means) of national power. On the one side, he regards the military and the economy as hard power[17] and, on the other side, diplomacy backed by socio-cultural and ideological elements as soft power. So at first, it seems he is just offering a well-known product in a nicer package. But in fact, it is more than that, because at the same time he is introducing the idea of how to sell. In fact, he commences with two different *ways* of "selling" - hard and soft - and at the end adds the third, the smart one, as an unlimited number of possible combinations of the initial two ways.

According to Nye (2004, p. 15, x, 1, 5), soft power is the ability to get the outcomes we want without having to force people to change their behaviour through threats and coercion (stick in the form of military power) or payment (carrot in the form of economic power). Instead of sticks and carrots, which represent hard power, it is better to rely on attraction and seduction based on country's culture, political ideals and policies.[18] Soft power in facts rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others.[19] At this point, I would like to warn not to mix or exchange the terms of power and force, because they are not synonyms at all.

Nye (2004, p. 7) believes that hard and soft powers are related, because they are both the aspects of the ability to achieve one's purpose by affecting the behaviour of others. The distinction between them is one of *degree*, both in the nature of the behaviour and in the tangibility of the resources. In this respect, he differentiates between command power – the ability to change what others do – and co-optive power – the ability to shape what others want. Here it is quite obvious that hard and soft powers are no longer just synonyms for hard and soft means of national power, but rather two distinctive ways in which different means of national power can be utilized.

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[17] This conclusion can also be derived from Nye's (2004, p. 14) statement that "…some hard-power assets such as armed forces are strictly governmental; others are inherently national, such as oil and mineral reserves,…".

[18] In pursue of their national interests European small states have to relay predominantly on soft power. But in doing so, they have to be patient. As Harvey (2010, p. 8) wisely stated "sustaining and strengthening a country's soft power is a cumulative process, with long-term benefits appearing gradually."

[19] But at the same time Nye (2004, p. 6) himself warns us that "soft power is not merely the same as influence. … It is also ability to attract … in behavioural terms soft power is attractive power."

5 FLEXIBLE UNDERSTANDING OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

At this point, I suggest accepting the view that all ten instruments of national power ((1) morale, (2) socio-cultural and ideological, (3) information, (4) diplomatic, (5) economic and (6) military power, (7) natural resources, (8) geostrategic position, (9) size and (10) quality of population) are suitable to be projected in an influential (soft) or coercive (hard) way and also in a smart way, as a unique mixture of the first two. Which way to choose in establishing influence relationship, coercion relationship[20] or smart relationship, depends on the particular context[21] and desired ends.[22] Even Nye (2004, p. 26) admits this between the lines when he states that "hard power can sometimes have an attractive or soft side". So instruments of "hard" power can also be used in a soft way and vice versa, instruments of "soft" power also in a hard way. It is thus possible to establish an influence relationship and attraction through military power, if our military is so well organized, trained and equipped that, to others, it represents a kind of a "role model" to be followed or is used as a "common good" such as a tool for humanitarian assistance. Similarly, it is possible to establish coercion relationship and threat by moral power, if it is highly aggressive and used for nurturing fear and backing hate speech like in North Korea.

Nye (2004, p. 3) argues that practical politicians and ordinary people (sic!) often turn to a simple definition of power as the possession of capabilities or resources that can influence the outcomes. I disagree with this characterisation of ordinary and simple. It is just a broader and more concrete understanding of power. The same author also thinks, when defining power as a synonym of the resources it produces, there is a paradox that those best endowed with power do not always get the outcomes they want. But it is always the case that the mere possession of something does not necessarily grant success. Some states can have huge and very professional military, but are still not producing the desired outcomes. It is not a paradox per se, but very similar to the difference between potential (static) and kinetic (dynamic) energy in the physics. So it would be wrong to claim that potential energy does not exist and

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[20] *On the contrary, some authors (Dictionary of international relations, 1998, p. 447) suggest to distinct between influence relationship and power relationship. In my opinion, this approach is not the right one, because it suggests that influence requires something else than power. In fact, power lies in the very basement of any relationship, because we always back our interference in social dynamics with some kind of power. What makes difference is (1) type of power used, (2) quantity and intensity of power and (3) the way of use of particular sort of power. This is in fact implied in the statement that "influence is then, in one sense, a non-coercive form of power" (Dictionary of international relations, 1998, p. 447, 249). Influence relationships, in this non-coercive sense, are likely to be particularly prevalent among allies, coalition partners and actors with "special relationships", like UK and USA (Dictionary of international relations, 1998, p. 249, 506-508). Thus it is not possible to differentiate sharply and precisely between hard and soft instruments of power, despite some are by nature more "hard" (geostrategic position, natural resources, size of population, military, economic) and other more "soft" (quality of population, diplomatic, information, socio-cultural and ideological, morale).*

[21] *The effectiveness of any power resource always depends on the context in which the relationship exists. (Nye, 2004, p. 2, 12)*

[22] *I believe we can for example use geostrategic position in a soft way by allowing others to pass and use it or to cooperate in exploitation of our territory in an extent which exceeds normal obligations according to international law. But geostrategic position can be used in a hard way by limiting or denying someone's access and holding a position just for us, imposing some conditions of passing by blackmailing, or even by letting others to use it for direct or indirect pressure on third party.*

affect the environment, because it is not observable in a similar way as the kinetic one. Again, I believe it is preferable to follow a broader definition, which embraces more traditional as well as contemporary conceptualizations of power, acknowledging that in the interplay of hard and soft power, the latter one is gaining importance. This is especially true in the times of open-conflict absence between great powers or as US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated "Military alone cannot win the peace". (Steele, 2008, p. 3) Similarly, Nye (2004, p. xii) has written: "Winning the peace is harder than winning a war, and soft power is essential to winning the peace."

Conclusion Our future is about providing comprehensive human security and common interests not just by addressing potential or actual threats in coercive relationships by containing, deterring, low- or high-intensity intervening, but also by preventing threats and exploiting opportunities in influence relationships. Because of huge diversity of states and their interests, there are no widely valid and indisputable answers to how instruments of national power should be best orchestrated. Nevertheless, it is wise to conclude that it is essential to approach security issues cautiously and comprehensively, both while assessing and (re)acting, always with a gradual and sometimes simultaneous use of two or even more instruments of national power. We have to behave as conductors - orchestrating all instruments of national power in a well-balanced and well-tuned, smart way in which soft power will prevail over hard power as long as possible and acceptable.

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