Sodobni vojaški izzivi

Contemporary Military Challenges

Znanstveno-strokovna publikacija Slovenske vojske

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Spoštovani bralke in bralci Sodobnih vojaških izzivov!

Pred nekaj meseci je Severnoatlantsko zavezništvo praznovalo svojo 70-letnico.

Ob tej priložnosti je primerno spomniti na temeljni namen zavezništva, ki je živeti svobodno in v miru z vsemi narodi ter vladami. Prav tako si je treba prizadevati za kolektivno obrambo in ohranjanje miru ter varnosti na severnoatlantskem območju.

Temelj zavezništva je upoštevanje 5. člena Natove ustanovne listine. Zagotavljanje kolektivne obrambe je najmočnejša zaveza, ki jo lahko da suverena država drugim. Je jasno sporočilo, da nobena država v zavezništvu med ogrožanjem ne bo ostala sama.

Slovenska samostojnost in obstoj naše države sta utemeljena na lastni obrambi, na obrambi, ki smo jo leta 1991 vodili sami in sami v vojni tudi zmagali. Kompleksnost sveta in narava sodobnih groženj pa nas utrjujeta v prepričanju, da naša obramba in obstoj ne moreta temeljiti samo na lastnih silah, brez zaveznikov in partnerjev. Visoka javna podpora na referendumu 23. marca 2003 je to prepričanje še potrdila.

Članica zavezništva smo postali 29. marca 2004. Petnajst let že uživamo prednosti članstva, kot verodostojna zaveznica pa delimo tudi njegova bremena.

Naša varnost v prihodnosti je povezana s hitrimi spremembami v varnostnem okolju in vedno novimi varnostnimi izzivi.

Evropa je še zmeraj v političnem krču zaradi migracij, ki so bile sprva posledice konfliktov in nestabilnosti v severnoafriškem ter širšem bližnjevzhodnem prostoru, čedalje bolj pa so tudi posledica podnebnih sprememb. Množične migracije postajajo globalni ekonomski dejavnik, ki ga moramo zaznavati tudi skozi prizmo varnosti.

Mednarodne teroristične organizacije tudi v evropskem prostoru predstavljajo in bodo predstavljale tveganje ter izziv, s katerima se je mogoče učinkovito spoprijeti samo s skupnim in enotnim odzivanjem.

Kibernetske grožnje državnih in nedržavnih povzročiteljev vnašajo novo dinamiko v razumevanje varnosti.

Pri tem je treba še izpostaviti, da se je varnostni položaj v Evropi zaradi politike Ruske federacije bistveno spremenil. Zasedba in priključitev Krima ter podpora odcepitvenim silam v Ukrajini, hibridne grožnje, razpad sistema nadzora nad raketnim orožjem zaradi razvoja in nameščanja raket srednjega dosega – vse to je spremenilo naše dotedanje razumevanje ruske politike.

Zaveznice se odzivamo enotno in hitro. Na srečanjih Natovih voditeljev v Walesu, Varšavi in Bruslju smo potrdili zavezanost temeljnim nalogam: kolektivni obrambi, kriznemu upravljanju ter kooperativni varnosti. Odločili smo se za bistveno transformacijo zavezništva, usmerjenega predvsem v izboljšanje naše odvračalne in obrambne drže, temelječe na 360-stopinjskem pristopu.

Zavezništvo postaja vse bolj odzivno in pripravljeno, hkrati pa še vedno zavezano multilateralnemu sistemu nadzora nad orožjem in odprto za dialog z Rusijo. Obenem ohranja politiko odprtih vrat, kar Slovenija dejavno podpira. Ponosni smo lahko, da je bila naša država po Grčiji prva članica zavezništva, ki je ratificirala sporazum z Makedonijo.

Politična enotnost zavezništva je pomembna, enako pomembna pa je tudi ustrezna vojaška moč. Zaveza o povečanju sredstev, sprejeta v Walesu, je temelj oblikovanja naših skupnih zmogljivosti. To velja tudi za Slovenijo. Nujno je večje in stabilno vlaganje v naš obrambni sistem. Ob tem je treba uvesti tudi sistemske in konceptualne spremembe, povezane z odločnimi potezami ter strokovnim in enotnim delovanjem v Slovenski vojski, da se brez večjih zamud zagotovijo zmogljivosti ter pripravljenost, ki bodo temelj naše nacionalne obrambe.

Samo zagotavljanje in razvoj lastnih sposobnosti odzivanja na oborožen napad omogočata učinkovito delovanje kolektivne obrambe ter medsebojne pomoči ob ogroženosti.

Slovenija bo kot verodostojna članica zavezništva še naprej krepila svoje vojaške zmogljivosti in prispevala k zavezništvu z znanjem in strokovnostjo ter sodelovanjem v mednarodnih operacijah in na misijah, vključno s tistimi, ki so namenjene stabilnosti Zahodnega Balkana. Obenem se bo zavzemala za krepitev učinkovitosti zavezništva in dobro sodelovanje z EU.

15 let članstva dokazuje, da je bila odločitev Slovenije, ki je svojo varnost utemeljila tudi v okviru sistema kolektivne obrambe, prava.

Politična enotnost pri vprašanjih varnosti in obrambe, tako v okviru zavezništva, EU kot doma, nadaljnji razvoj vojaških zmogljivosti in pripravljenost delitve bremen v prihodnosti zagotavljajo varnost in blaginjo naših državljanov ter celotnega evro-atlantskega prostora tudi v prihodnosti.

Borut Pahor,
predsednik Republike Slovenije,
vrhovni poveljnik obrambnih sil

Dear Readers of Contemporary Military Challenges,

A few months ago, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization celebrated its 70th anniversary.

This occasion serves as a good opportunity to remember the fundamental purpose of the Alliance: to live in freedom and in peace with all nations and governments, and also to promote collective defence and the preservation of peace and security across the Euro-Atlantic Region.

The Alliance is based on respect for Article 5 of the NATO Charter. To provide collective defence is the strongest commitment a sovereign state can make to other countries. It gives a clear message that, if exposed to a threat, none of the Allies will stand alone.

Slovenia's independence and existence are based on the nation's own defence, led independently in the 1991 war, where Slovenia emerged victorious. The complexity of the world and the nature of current threats, however, make us believe that our defence and existence cannot depend solely on our own forces, without allies and partners. Strong public support in the referendum held on 23 March 2003 only confirmed this conviction.

Slovenia became a member of the Alliance on 29 March 2004. We have already been enjoying the benefits of membership for 15 years, while also sharing its burden as a credible Ally.

Our security in the future will be shaped by rapid changes in the security environment and the ever-emerging new security challenges.

Europe is still facing a political stalemate situation due to migrations, initially resulting from conflicts and instability in North Africa and the wider Middle East, and increasingly due to climate change. Mass migrations are becoming a global economic factor that should also be perceived through the prism of security.

International terrorist organizations pose and will continue to pose a threat and a challenge to Europe. They can only be managed effectively through a joint and uniform response.

Cyber threats posed by state and non-state actors are adding new dynamics to security considerations.

In this regard, it should be stressed that the security situation in Europe has changed fundamentally due to the politics of the Russian Federation. The occupation and annexation of Crimea and support to separatist forces in Ukraine, hybrid threats, the

disbanding of the missile control system following the development and fielding of medium-range missiles – all of this has changed our understanding of Russian policy.

The Allies are responding in a swift and unified manner. At NATO summits held in Wales, Warsaw and Brussels, Heads of States and Governments reiterated their commitment to fundamental tasks: collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. We decided on a profound transformation of the Alliance aimed primarily at improving our deterrent and defence posture based on a 360-degree approach.

The Alliance is improving its responsiveness and readiness, while at the same time remaining committed to the multilateral arms control system and open to dialogue with Russia. It has also retained its open-door policy, which Slovenia actively supports. We take pride in the fact that, following Greece, Slovenia was the first Alliance member to ratify the agreement with North Macedonia.

The political unity of the Alliance is important, and so is appropriate political power. The support of additional funding endorsed at the Wales summit represents the starting point for the development of our joint capabilities. Slovenia is no exception in this regard. It is necessary to increase and stabilize investment in our defence system. This also necessitates system and concept changes, along with decisive moves and the professional and unified operation of the Slovenian Armed Forces in order to ensure the timely provision of capabilities and readiness, which will generate the basis of our national defence.

It is only through the provision and development of our own response capabilities for armed aggression that efficient functioning of collective defence and mutual help in the event of threat will be possible.

Being a credible member of the Alliance, Slovenia will further strengthen its military capabilities and contribute to the Alliance with its knowledge and professionalism, as well as through participation in international operations and missions, including those aimed at achieving stability in the Western Balkans. It will also seek to enhance the efficiency of the Alliance and good cooperation with the EU.

Fifteen years of membership demonstrate that Slovenia made the right decision to ensure its security within the system of collective defence.

Political unity in security and defence issues both within the Alliance, the EU and at home, and the further development of military capabilities and the burden-sharing capacity, will ensure the security and wellbeing of our citizens and the entire Euro-Atlantic Region in the future as well.

Borut Pahor
President of the Republic of Slovenia
Commander-in-Chief of Defence Forces

Spoštovani!

Članstvo Republike Slovenije v Natu predstavlja temeljni okvir zagotavljanja nacionalne varnosti. Z vstopom v to politično-vojaško zavezništvo je naša država pridobila pomembna varnostna zagotovila, ki ob nepredvidljivih razmerah v svetu pridobivajo vse večji pomen. V tem letu, ko praznujemo 15 let od vstopa Slovenije v Severnoatlantsko zavezništvo, se še toliko bolj zavedamo, da lahko sodobne varnostne izzive učinkovito rešujemo samo s skupnimi močmi.

Razlog za slovensko članstvo v Natu je enak kot pred poldrugim desetletjem. Zagotavljanje varnosti in stabilnosti nam omogoča gospodarski in socialni razvoj ter status uspešne in varne države.

Kot članica Nata vplivamo na odločitve glede najpomembnejših varnostnih vprašanj v svetu ter odgovorno prevzemamo svoj del bremena skupne varnosti in obrambe. Pri tem je bistveno sodelovanje slovenskih predstavnikov v mednarodnih operacijah in na misijah, ki pomembno prispeva k ugledu naše države v zavezništvu in širši mednarodni skupnosti.

Prav tako prispevamo k varnosti naše soseščine, še zlasti na Zahodnem Balkanu. Veseli nas, da so se nekatere države iz regije tudi z našo pomočjo in podporo že pridružile zavezništvu.

Nato ni samo vojaška organizacija, temveč je zavezništvo skupnih vrednot, ki temelji na svobodi, demokraciji in sodelovanju ter povezuje države članice že več kot 70 let. Republika Slovenija bo tudi v prihodnosti odgovorno in verodostojno sodelovala pri njihovem varovanju ter krepitvi.

Dr. Miro Cerar,
minister za zunanje zadeve

Dear Readers,

The Republic of Slovenia's membership of NATO is a fundamental framework for providing national security. By having joined this political and military Alliance, our country has secured itself important safety guarantees which are increasingly gaining in importance in the unpredictable circumstances of the world. In 2019, when we are celebrating the 15th anniversary of Slovenia's entry into the North Atlantic Alliance, we are more aware than ever that current security challenges can be successfully met only through collective endeavours.

The reason for Slovenia's membership of NATO is the same as it was 15 years ago; if security and stability are provided, then social and economic development is enabled, which brings us the status of a safe and successful country.

As a NATO member, we have an influence on decisions concerning the most relevant security issues in the world, and take our share of the burden in relation to common security and defence. In doing so, the cooperation of Slovenian representatives in international operations and missions is of crucial importance, contributing greatly to the reputation of our country in the Alliance and the wider international community.

Furthermore, we also contribute to the security of our neighbourhood, particularly in the Western Balkans. We are pleased that some countries from the region have already joined the Alliance, with our support and assistance.

NATO is not just a military organization, but also an Alliance of common values, based on freedom, democracy and cooperation, connecting its members for more than 70 years. The Republic of Slovenia will continue to responsibly and credibly participate in defending and strengthening those values in the future.

Dr Miro Cerar
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Spoštovani bralke in bralci Sodobnih vojaških izzivov!

Pozdravljam odločitev uredništva, da je 15-letnici slovenskega članstva v Natu posvečena številka naše osrednje znanstveno-strokovne publikacije. To nam daje priložnost za razpravo o prednostih, ki jih ima za varnost Slovenije članstvo v tej elitni varnostni organizaciji.

Skozi zastopanje državnih interesov in sodelovanje pri odločanju v Natu vedno znova spoznavam njegov velik pomen pri ohranjanju ter krepitvi varnosti v evro-atlantskem okolju, pa tudi širše. Z gotovostjo lahko trdim, da se je ta vloga skozi leta nenehno krepila in da ima danes v mednarodni skupnosti morda pomembnejšo vrednost kot kadar koli prej.

S članstvom v Natu se Slovenija skupaj z zaveznicami uspešno odziva na grožnje iz katere koli smeri ter si tako še naprej zagotavlja varno in stabilno okolje, ki je prvi pogoj za uspešen celostni razvoj ter blaginjo države in državljanov. Smo del varnostnega okvira demokratičnih in najrazvitejših držav, s katerimi nas ne povezujejo le skupni varnostni izzivi, temveč tudi in predvsem vrednote. Zaradi zavezništva imamo bolj profesionalno in učinkovitejšo vojsko.

Ko smo pred 15 leti vstopili v Nato, se je zdelo varnostno okolje precej predvidljivo. Zdaj ni več tako. Zavezništvo je dokazalo, da se zna prilagoditi. Ob vstopu v osmo desetletje delovanja ostaja steber stabilnosti v nemirnem svetu.

Verjamem, da se bo Slovenija še naprej razvijala kot prepričljiva članica zavezništva, ki ustrezno prispeva k skupni varnosti.

Karl Erjavec,
minister za obrambo

Dear Readers of Contemporary Military Challenges,

I welcome the decision of the editors to dedicate an edition of our central academic and professional publication to the 15th anniversary of Slovenia's membership of NATO. This anniversary provides an opportunity to discuss the advantages Slovenia's membership of this distinguished organization has had.

Through the promotion of the state's interests and cooperation in NATO's decision-making processes, I keep recognizing the Alliance's great importance in preserving and strengthening security in the Euro-Atlantic environment and beyond. I am confident to say that this role has been enhanced through the years, and has become more important in the international community than ever.

By having joined NATO, Slovenia – together with the members of the Alliance – can successfully respond to any threats from any direction, thus managing to keep its environment stable and secure. This is the first condition for successful comprehensive development and the prosperity of citizens. We are part of the security framework of the most developed and democratic countries, with which we share not only common security challenges, but also, and most particularly, values. Thanks to the Alliance, Slovenia's Armed Forces are more professional and more effective.

When we entered NATO 15 years ago, the security environment seemed predictable. But now, this is no longer the case. However, the Alliance has proven its ability to adapt. At its entry into the 8th decade of its existence, it remains a pillar of stability in an unstable world.

I do believe that Slovenia will grow even stronger as a reliable member of the Alliance, contributing appropriately to common security.

Karl Erjavec
Minister of Defence

Spoštovani!

Živimo v zahtevnem zgodovinskem obdobju negotovosti, nepredvidljivosti in raznovrstnih varnostnih tveganj ter groženj. Uresničevanje nacionalnih interesov je vse zahtevnejše, posebno za manjše države, h katerim spada Republika Slovenija. Pri reševanju sodobnih varnostnih izzivov in groženj nas že dobri dve desetletji podpira Nato. Najprej smo bili vključeni v program Partnerstvo za mir, zadnjih 15 let pa smo polnopravna članica te ekskluzivne politično-vojaške integracije.

Nacionalna varnost in predvsem nacionalna obramba Republike Slovenije sta neločljivo povezani z vzajemno obrambo znotraj Evropske unije in predvsem s kolektivno obrambo v okviru Nata. Republiki Sloveniji zaradi članstva v Natu ni treba zagotavljati nekaterih obrambnih zmogljivosti, ki bi jih sicer morali Slovenci razvijati samostojno, če bi si varnost zagotavljali sami.

Kolektivno obrambo v Natu določa 5. člen Severnoatlantske pogodbe, z njim pa je neločljivo povezan tudi 3. člen. Ta navaja, da je za učinkovito obrambo treba vzdrževati in razvijati ustrezne nacionalne vojaške zmogljivosti. Prav te so gradniki skupnih vojaških zmogljivosti zavezništva. Vse to velja tudi za Republiko Slovenijo in našo Slovensko vojsko, katerih najsodobnejše vojaške zmogljivosti morajo po obsegu in vrsti predstavljati ustrezen del skupnih vojaških zmogljivosti zavezništva. Samo tako bomo lahko prevzemali in imeli sorazmeren delež skupnega obrambnega bremena.

Sodelovanje Slovenske vojske z vojskami drugih Natovih članic in predvsem v Natovih odzivnih silah bo tudi v prihodnosti predstavljalo enega pomembnejših mehanizmov ter sredstev za spremljanje in prenos sodobnih vojaških standardov, učenje iz izkušenj ter zagotavljanje višje ravni usposobljenosti in učinkovitosti vojaških zmogljivosti Republike Slovenije. Članstvo Republike Slovenije v Natu namreč zagotavlja Slovenski vojski širši okvir za izboljševanje zmogljivosti, izurjenosti, usposobljenosti, pripravljenosti, povezljivosti, odpornosti in vzdržljivosti za vojaško obrambo domovine v okviru vojaške obrambe zavezništva.

Generalmajorka Alenka Ermenc,
načelnica Generalštaba Slovenske vojske

Dear Readers,

We live in a challenging historical period, marked by uncertainty, unpredictability and a variety of security risks and threats. The pursuit of national interests has become increasingly demanding, particularly for small countries such as the Republic of Slovenia. In addressing contemporary security challenges and threats, Slovenia has enjoyed NATO's support for over two decades; initially, Slovenia joined the Partnership for Peace Programme, and for the last 15 years it has been a fully-fledged member of this exclusive political and military establishment.

National security, and notably the national defence of the Republic of Slovenia, are inseparably linked with mutual defence within the European Union and particularly with NATO's collective defence. Thanks to our membership of NATO, the Republic of Slovenia does not have to provide certain defence capabilities that Slovenes would otherwise need to develop autonomously if they were to ensure their own security.

NATO's collective defence is governed by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which is inseparably linked with Article 3; the latter states that in order to ensure efficient defence, it is necessary to maintain and develop appropriate national military capabilities, which represent the building blocks of the Alliance's joint military capabilities. This also applies to the Republic of Slovenia and our Slovenian Armed Forces, whose cutting-edge military capabilities must, in terms of their size and type, constitute an appropriate part of the Alliance's joint military capabilities. Only in this way will Slovenia be in a position to assume and have a proportionate share of the common defence burden.

The cooperation of the Slovenian Armed Forces with the armies of other NATO members, particularly with the NATO Response Force, will continue to be one of the major future mechanisms and means of monitoring and transferring modern military standards and lessons learned, as well as providing a higher level of competence and efficiency to the Republic of Slovenia's military capacity. The Republic of Slovenia's membership of NATO provides the Slovenian Armed Forces with a wider framework for improving their capabilities, skills, training level, readiness, interoperability, resilience and sustainability for the military defence of the homeland, as part of the Alliance's military defence.

Major General Alenka Ermenc
Chief of General Staff
Slovenian Armed Forces

PETNAJST LET V ZAVEZNIŠTVU

*»Nato ima širok doseg in kljubuje časovnim spremembam,
saj smo se poenotili glede temeljne zaveze
varovati in braniti drug drugega.«*

*Jens Stoltenberg,
generalni sekretar Nata,
Washington, 4. april 2019*

FIFTEEN YEARS IN THE ALLIANCE

*»NATO's reach is vast, and it has stood the test of time –
because we have united around our core commitment
to protect and defend one another.«*

*Jens Stoltenberg
NATO Secretary General,
Washington, 4 April 2019*

VSEBINA
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Liliana Brožič

UVODNIK

PETNAJST LET V ZAVEZNIŠTVU

Leta 2019 prepoznavamo tri pomembne obletnice za Republiko Slovenijo, njene državljanke in državljane, za njen obrambno-varnostni sistem, za pripadnice in pripadnike Slovenske vojske. Prva pomembna obletnica je 70 let Severnoatlantskega zavezništva, drugi dve pa sta 15 let Republike Slovenije v Evropski uniji in Natu.

70 let Severnoatlantskega zavezništva je na prvem mestu zaradi svojega simbolnega pomena. Uradni datum njegovega nastanka je 4. april 1949. Lahko pa zapišemo, da je severnoatlantsko sodelovanje bistveno starejše. Nastalo je v času preseljevanja različnih narodov in narodnosti v Severno Ameriko z ozemelj današnje Evropske unije ter tudi drugih delov sveta. Sorodstvene vezi na obeh straneh Atlantika povezujejo že več generacij, niso pa edine. Prestale so posebne preizkušnje v času obeh svetovnih vojn in postale sodelovanje, ki se je uradno preimenovalo iz sodelovanja v zavezništvo na pogorišču druge svetovne vojne iz enega samega razloga – da se ta nikoli več ne bi ponovila.

Generalni sekretar Nata Jens Stoltenberg je ob 70-letnici zavezništva v Washingtonu povedal, da »ima Nato širok doseg in kljubuje časovnim spremembam, saj smo se poenotili glede temeljne zaveze varovati in braniti drug drugega«. V širšem smislu pa gre pri fenomenu dolgoletnega zavezništva najverjetneje za prizadevanje za ohranjanje, preživetje in razvijanje zahodnoevropske kulturne, zgodovinske, politične, sociološke, varnostne, obrambne, vojaške ter še katere druge identitete. V zadnjem času sta opaznejša geopolitični vidik in pomen zavezništva v odnosu do drugih hitro razvijajočih se političnih akterjev predvsem z vzhoda. Glede na velike spremembe, ki so se zgodile v zadnjih 70 letih, je zavezništvo kot relativno staro v primerjavi z drugimi varnostnimi organizacijami danes v zavidljivi kondiciji.

Dejstvo, da je Republika Slovenija članica Evropske unije in zavezništva že 15 let, se zdi logično še zlasti z zgodovinskega vidika. Predniki, ki so živeli na območju

naše države, so bili del Svetega rimskega cesarstva več kot tisoč let, Avstrijskega cesarstva 63 let in Avstro-Ogrske 51 let. V 20. stoletju smo bili v nekaj različnih obdobjih umeščeni v različne organizacijske strukture z današnjimi državami Zahodnega Balkana, v 21. stoletju pa smo tam, kamor spadamo, v Evropski uniji in zavezništvu. O tem so državljanke in državljani Republike Slovenije odločili na referendumu 23. marca 2003, pri čemer so članstvu v Evropski uniji namenili skoraj 90-odstotno podporo, članstvu v zavezništvu pa 66-odstotno.

Tokratna številka Sodobnih vojaških izzivov je namenjena 15 letom Republike Slovenije v zavezništvu. V letih 2009 in 2014 smo že izdali jubilejni številki ob 5. in 10. obletnici z dotedanjimi izkušnjami, dobrimi in manj dobrimi praksami. Želeli smo jih zapisati, ohraniti v spominu in zapustiti sledi mlajšim generacijam. Še zlasti pa smo naše izkušnje želeli deliti z drugimi državami, ki si prizadevajo postati članice zavezništva, saj jim lahko pomagajo, da nekaterih naših neuspehov ne ponovijo ali pa se jim povsem izognejo.

V tej številki smo k sodelovanju povabili tudi avtorje iz drugih držav, ki z nami delijo svoje izkušnje in poglede na svoje ter naše članstvo v zavezništvu. K temu sta veliko pripomogla David Humar in Primož Šavc, za kar se jima zahvaljujemo.

V uvodu nas **Boris Rutar** s prispevkom *Zveza Nato kot koalicija (voljnih)* seznani s teoretično razliko med terminoma zavezništvo in koalicija s poudarkom na vojaško-obrambnem področju. Na hitro se zdi, da gre za sinonima, vendar avtor z jasnimi primeri iz prakse dokaže, da gre za pomembno razliko tako v teoriji kot praksi.

Leta 2004 so poleg Slovenije postale nove članice zavezništva tudi druge države, ki letos praznujejo 15. obletnico priključitve. Med njimi so tudi Litva, Latvija in Estonija. Njihove izkušnje sta zapisala **Viljar Veebel** in **Illimar Ploom** v prispevku *15 let članstva v Natu in EU: ali so si nacionalne varnostne strategije in obrambni modeli baltskih držav podobni ali se razlikujejo.*

15 let slovenskega članstva *v Natu skozi perspektivo spreminjajočega se varnostnega in geopolitičnega okolja* je naslov prispevka **Uroša Lampreta** in **Blaža Grilja.** V njem povzemata glavne spremembe v mednarodnem varnostnem okolju, ki so med drugim vplivale na organizacijo in delovanje zavezništva. V različnih oblikah so se odražale tudi v naši državi, vplivale so na njeni varnost in obrambo ter delovanje Slovenske vojske.

15 let Republike Slovenije v Natu – kritični pogled na obrambni sistem je prispevek avtorja **Marka Čehovina**, ki je kritičen do sprejemanja političnih odločitev na obrambno-varnostnem področju v domovini in do slovenskih medijev, ki po njegovem mnenju na tem področju svojega poklica ne opravljajo dovolj profesionalno. Razpravlja tudi o specifičnosti razumevanja pojma civilnega nadzora nad oboroženimi silami v Sloveniji.

Med pripravami na vstop v zavezništvo so bile v Republiki Sloveniji po posameznih področjih oblikovane različne ocene o tem, kaj so prednosti in slabosti takšnega zavezništva. Ena najzanimivejših tem je bila zagotovo cena obrambe države. O tem, kako natančne so bile ocene stroškov takrat in kakšna je cena obrambe danes, pišeta **Branimir Furlan** in **Zoran Barjaktarević** v prispevku *Nato in Slovenija 15 let pozneje: kako uspešne so bile napovedi izdatkov za obrambo.*

Alija Kožljak predstavlja svoj pogled na Republiko Slovenijo kot manjšo državo, ki lahko neodvisno od različnih kazalnikov pomembno prispeva k napredku držav na območju Zahodnega Balkana na obrambno-varnostnem področju. Pri tem je zelo nazoren, izhaja iz dejstev ter svojih izkušenj, ki jih je pridobil kot predstavnik Bosne in Hercegovine. Več o tem v prispevku *Ko majhno postane veliko – Slovenija in njenih 15 let v Natu.* Postati članica zavezništva je za vsako državo poseben uspeh, vendar se šele takrat, ko si del velikega kolektiva, pojavijo najzanimivejši izzivi.

Andrej Osterman piše o razvojnih mejnikih Slovenske vojske na nekaterih področjih, na primer o mednarodnih operacijah in misijah, kadrih, standardizaciji, ki jih je v zadnjih 15 letih doletelo največ sprememb, v prispevku *Slovenska vojska 15 let po vstopu Republike Slovenije v Nato.*

Pri praznovanju 15-letnice v Natu je treba, kot pravi **Alojz Šteiner**, izpostaviti še dve obletnici, in sicer 25 let od začetkov mednarodnega vojaškega sodelovanja Slovenske vojske in 10. obletnico, odkar je bila sprejeta deklaracija o izpolnjevanju pogojev vojske za celovito integracijo v zavezništvo. O značilnostih teh dveh za vojsko pomembnih obletnic pa več v prispevku *Slovenska vojaška pot v zavezništvo.*

Neil Grayston v prispevku *Spreminjanje in razvoj Slovenske vojske – pogled iz tujine* z nami deli izkušnje tujega angleškega svetovalca Republiki Sloveniji na njeni poti v zavezništvo. Primerja takratno stanje na obrambno-varnostnem področju, predstavi razvojne mejnike, ugotavlja trenutno stanje in predlaga nekaj usmeritev za prihodnost.

Svoj pogled na zavezništvo in Poljsko ter Slovenijo v njem je opisal **Andrzej Fałkowski** v prispevku *Animus in consulendo liber – V premišljevanju svoboden duh.* Poljska je, tako kot Litva, Latvija in Estonija, z vidika varnostnih tveganj glede na svojo geografsko lego v precej drugačnem položaju kot Slovenija. Hkrati se spoprijema z zelo podobnimi, če že ne enakimi, vprašanji glede nekaterih sodobnih varnostnih tem.

V tej jubilejni številki je veliko zanimivega branja. Prispevki bodo ob naslednji obletnici še zanimivejši, saj bomo lahko primerjali različne prihodnje ugotovitve s tokratnimi in ugotavljali stopnjo napredka.

Liliana Brožič

EDITORIAL

FIFTEEN YEARS IN THE ALLIANCE

The year 2019 marks three anniversaries of great significance to the Republic of Slovenia, its citizens, its security and defence system, and the members of the Slovenian Armed Forces. The first anniversary commemorates 70 years of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the other two relate to the 15 years of Slovenia's membership of the European Union and NATO.

Celebrating 70 years of NATO is of central importance because of the Alliance's symbolic meaning. Although it was officially established on 4 April 1949, it is true to say that North Atlantic cooperation is far older. It began during the mass immigration of members of numerous nations from the territories of today's European Union and other parts of the world into North America. So far, several generations have been connected through family ties on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean; yet, these ties are not the only ones. These relationships overcame terrible ordeals in both World Wars, and resulted in cooperation, later officially named the Alliance, in the aftermath of World War II for one reason only – for it to never happen again.

On the celebration of the 70th anniversary of NATO in Washington, D.C., the NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, said that "[the Treaty's] reach is vast, and it has stood the test of time – because we have united around our core commitment to protect and defend one another". In a wider sense, however, this long lasting Alliance is probably all about striving to safeguard, preserve and develop the Western European cultural, historical, political, sociological, security, defence, military (and so on) identity. Recently, the geopolitical aspect and the importance of the Alliance in relation to other emerging political actors, mainly from the East, have become increasingly important. Nevertheless, despite the major changes it has undergone in the past 70 years, the Alliance, having seemed obsolete to other security organizations, is now as vital as ever.

The fact that the Republic of Slovenia has already been a member of the European Union and NATO for 15 years appears logical, particularly from the historical perspective. The territory of what is now Slovenia, where our ancestors have lived for centuries, was part of the Holy Roman Empire for over a thousand years, the Austrian Empire for 63 years, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire for 51 years. The 20th century saw several different organizational structures, with us as part of them, together with those countries which are now collectively referred to as the Western Balkans. However, the 21st century brought us membership of the European Union and NATO, i.e. a "place" where we can finally belong. On 23 March 2003, a referendum on Slovenia's membership of the EU and NATO was held, asking the citizens of the Republic of Slovenia if they were in favour of joining the two organizations. Almost 90% of voters favoured Slovenia joining the EU, while 66% voted to join NATO.

The current edition of Contemporary Military Challenges is dedicated to the 15th anniversary of Slovenia's membership of the Alliance. In 2009 and 2014, two special thematic issues were published, marking the 5th and 10th anniversaries respectively, highlighting the experience gained, and describing the best and also the less successful practices. We wanted to write them down, to remember them and leave them for generations yet to come. What is more, we wanted to share our experience with other countries aiming to join the Alliance. Our purpose here was to help those countries to not repeat our mistakes, and to assist them in avoiding mistakes altogether.

For this issue, authors from other countries were invited to share their experiences and views of their countries' and Slovenia's membership of the Alliance. Special thanks go to David Humar and Primož Šavc for their invaluable assistance in this regard.

In his introductory article, entitled *The NATO Alliance as a Coalition (of the Willing)*, **Boris Rutar** elaborates the theoretical distinction between an alliance and a coalition, with particular focus on the field of defence and the military. Although at first glance the two terms may seem to be synonymous, the author demonstrates through practical examples that there is a major distinction between them, both in theory and in practice.

The other countries which joined the Alliance together with Slovenia in 2004 are also celebrating the 15th anniversary of their membership in 2019, among them Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Their experiences are described in the article by **Viljar Veebel** and **Illimar Ploom** entitled *15 Years of NATO and EU Membership: Are the Baltic Countries Similar or Different in Terms of Their National Security Strategies and Defence Models*.

Uroš Lampret and **Blaž Grilj** are the authors of an article entitled *15 Years of Slovenian NATO Membership through the Lens of the Changing Global Security and Geopolitical Environment*. This article deals with the key changes in the international

security environment which are affecting the organization and functioning of the Alliance itself. In various ways, these changes are also reflected in Slovenia, affecting its security and defence, and impacting the functioning of the Slovenian Armed Forces.

The article *15 Years of the Republic of Slovenia in NATO – A Critical View on Defence System,* written by **Marko Čehovin,** critically addresses the making of political decisions in the field of security and defence in Slovenia. The author is also critical of the Slovenian media. In his opinion, the media lack an appropriate level of professionalism when reporting on security and defence topics. In addition, he deals with a specificity related to the interpretation of civilian control of the Slovenian Armed Forces.

During the preparations to enter NATO, several assessments in individual fields on the advantages and disadvantages of membership of the Alliance were produced in the Republic of Slovenia. One of the most intriguing topics was undoubtedly the cost of the country's defence. **Branimir Furlan** and **Zoran Barjaktarević** discuss the cost assessment prior to entering NATO and the cost of defence today in their article *NATO and Slovenia 15 Years on: How Accurate Were Projections about Defence Expenditure*.

According to **Alija Kožljak**, the Republic of Slovenia is a small country which can, independently of various indicators, make an important contribution to the progress of countries in the Western Balkans in the field of security and defence. To support his thesis, he draws from his own experience, gained as the military representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina. More on this theme in the article *When Small Becomes Big – Fifteen Years of Slovenia in NATO*.

Every country considers it a great success to become a member of NATO. But the true challenges only arise once it is actually part of a bigger group. **Andrej Osterman** analyzes the developmental stages of the Slovenian Armed Forces in certain fields, such as international operations and missions, personnel, standardization and so on, which have changed most considerably. His article is entitled *The Slovenian Armed Forces 15 Years After the Republic of Slovenia joined NATO*.

According to **Alojz Šteiner**, attention should also be devoted to two additional anniversaries when commemorating the 15 years of NATO membership, ie. the 25th anniversary of international military cooperation of the Slovenian Armed Forces, and the 10th anniversary of the adoption of the declaration on the fulfilment of the conditions for the army to be fully integrated into the Alliance. These two anniversaries, of great significance to the Slovenian Armed Forces, are described in more detail in the article S*lovenia's Military Path to the Alliance*.

In his article entitled *The Reform and Evolution of the Slovenian Armed Forces – a View from Abroad*, **Neil Grayston** shares the experience he gained when he was

appointed by the UK Ministry of Defence to the Slovenian Ministry of Defence to provide assistance with Slovenia's endeavours to join NATO. He compares the state of affairs in the field of security and defence prior to the accession with now, presents the developmental stages, describes the current state of affairs, and suggests various trends for the future.

Andrzej Fałkowski shares his views on the Alliance, and Poland and Slovenia within it, in his article entitled *Animus in Consulendo Liber – A Mind Unfettered in Deliberation*. Poland, together with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, is in a different situation to Slovenia in terms of security risks due to its geographical location. At the same time, however, it faces very similar – it could be said almost identical – challenges related to certain relevant security issues.

To sum up, this anniversary edition offers plenty of good reading. Nevertheless, the next anniversary will provide even more interesting articles, as we will be able to compare the future findings with the current ones, and assess the progress made.

Boris Rutar

ZVEZA NATO KOT KOALICIJA (VOLJNIH)

THE NATO ALLIANCE AS A COALITION (OF THE WILLING)

Povzetek   Prispevek opisuje razliko med dvema konceptoma meddržavnega sodelovanja ob upoštevanju varnosti in njenega izvajanja v Natu. Avtor v prvem delu prispevka natančneje opiše razliko med vojaškim zavezništvom in vojaško koalicijo. Medtem ko je bistvena naloga zavezništva obramba, je koncept koalicije precej primernejši za začasne razmestitve zunaj lastnega ozemlja. V zvezi s tem avtor v drugem delu prispevka analizira preoblikovanje Nata in vpliv operacij kriznega odzivanja na dojemanje ter notranjo strukturo Natove moči. Sistem kriznega upravljanja in Natov koncept nosilne države sta temeljna primera, kako Nato deluje bolj kot koalicija, ne kot zavezništvo.

Ključne besede   *Vojaško zavezništvo, vojaška koalicija, operacije kriznega odzivanja, koncept nosilne države.*

Abstract   The purpose of this article is to describe the difference between two intra-state concepts of cooperation with regard to security and its application in NATO. In the first part of the article the author elaborates the distinction between a military alliance and a military coalition. While an alliance is inherently defensive in nature, a coalition concept is much more suitable for *ad hoc* deployment outside its own territorial space. With regard to this, in the second part the author analyzes the transformation of the NATO Alliance and the impact that Crisis Response Operations have had on the perception and inner power structure of NATO. The Crisis Management System and the Framework Nation Concept are used as primary examples of NATO acting as a coalition rather than an alliance.

Key words   *Military alliance, military coalition, crisis response operations, Framework Nation Concept.*

Introduction   The NATO Alliance is celebrating its 70th anniversary, which for any military alliance is very impressive. Established in 1949, in very different circumstances, it has survived all the turbulent political and societal phases of the last seven decades. As those political changes occurred, NATO was forced to adapt, especially after the end of the Cold War, which brought tectonic changes to the political landscape of Europe – the essential part of the Alliance. Much has been said about the period of adaptation and transformation of NATO after the Cold War, but here we argue that an equal, if not even greater, change to NATO was introduced after the terrorist attack targeted towards the USA on September 11 2001. As Asmus pointed out, "after the collapse of Communism and the Soviet Union, NATO had to reinvent itself politically for the initial challenges of the post-Cold War era… In the wake of 9/11, however, the Alliance faced the need to reinvent itself a second time to face the challenges of the post-post-Cold War era" (Asmus, 2005). Influenced by the new political and pragmatic orientation of the West, NATO sharply changed its *modus operandi* and engaged itself in carrying out Crisis Response Operations. As a consequence, over the last two decades NATO has looked less like an alliance and more like a coalition.

This article is not intended to discuss all the complex and robust mechanisms that constitute NATO's daily work, nor is it intended to analyze the political and military dynamics of NATO. The purpose is rather to emphasize the latest changes in its strategic orientation, which influences how NATO does business today and what its (unintended) consequences are.

1   METHODOLOGY

In order to reach our objective, we will use a qualitative method to confront two concepts of international cooperation. By using a comparison of their attributes and analyzing the relevant literature we will outline the main characteristics that distinguish each concept in order to emphasize the differences that are usually omitted. We will then apply these differences to the NATO Alliance, and, by outlining the historical transformation of NATO after the Cold War, come to the conclusion that the latest *modus operandi* of NATO represents a shift from an alliance towards a coalition posture. To support this conclusion we will analyze Crisis Response Operations and the Framework Nation Concept as prime characteristics of that shift.

2   AN ALLIANCE COMPARED TO A COALITION

There are substantial differences between an alliance and a coalition. We are of course talking about military alliances, although the term is widely used and applied in the sphere of national and international politics. For examples, recall the historical Holy Alliance, the Triple Alliance, the Triple Entente, the West European Union, and many more, as well as the 19th century system of European alliances

introduced and championed by the German Chancellor of the time, Bismarck.[1] In fact, Bismarck made intra-state alliances a principal course of action when defending national interests. Aside from aristocratic medieval reasons to form an alliance, the core motive to make alliances in the Bismarck era was in line with the realpolitik and modern states rivalry of the time. In the 19th century, and even today, a political alliance between states was not separated or disengaged from a military alliance, and one cannot think of any example where one country would form a political alliance with another and at the same time form a military alliance with the allied country's enemy.[2] There are also coalitions; recent examples include the Gulf War Coalition and the Coalition of the Willing. Generally, it is presumed that a coalition refers to the military and an alliance to the political domain, although, as said above, the two go hand in hand.

When war or an imminent crisis occurs, states seek partnership to better protected and to preserve their interests, since neutrality is a very rare commodity. In fact, neutrality is not what one state declares, but rather what other states respect. Countries are more and more likely to solve crises with allies and partners than alone. In fact, 40% of the interstate wars of the past two centuries have been multilateral, and the USA has built coalitions of varying sizes to support nearly half of its own uses of force since 1948, and almost all since the end of the Cold War (Wolford, 2016, p 1). In today's globalized and interdependent world there are very limited possibilities for one country to engage itself in a conflict alone, since acting with partners enhances domestic public approval for the engagement and reduces the possibility of pressure from the international community and civic organizations. In a way such an intervention is also perceived as morally justified, in the sense that if many countries are involved then it cannot be wrong.

In today's general use, the terms military alliance and military coalition are widely synonymous and for most people mean more or less the same thing. The perception is that both serve the same purpose, as two or more countries and their armed forces join together for the common interest. Viewing the matter more closely, however, there are some substantial differences between a military alliance and a military coalition. The main distinction is the purpose of forming either an alliance or a coalition, but there are also matters of the status of the individual partners, the structure of forces, duration, internal command and control, allocation of resources and so on.

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[1] There are many references to the Bismarck's art of making alliances. As Hobsbawm put it, he "remained the undisputed world champion at the game of multilateral diplomatic chess" in Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire: 1875-1914*, Weidenfeld&Nicolson, 1987. See also A.J.P. Taylor: *Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman*, New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1969, and many others.

[2] However, one possible example of this might be Italy. In the First World War Italy was committed by treaty to the Triple Alliance, but joined the Triple Entente (to which it was not committed) to fight its ally. They did something similar again in the Second World War.

2.1 Alliance

According to the US Department of Defense definition, an alliance is "a relationship that results from a formal agreement (e.g. a treaty) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interest of the members" (US DoD, JP 5-0). The purpose of forming an alliance between several partners is in principle defensive in nature. When states recognize a potential threat that is equal to or bigger than a separate state, they join together to better defend themselves, their territory and their integrity. They are willing to share responsibility and obligation with each other in order to protect their territory. A military alliance is therefore an agreement between two or more states and their armed forces to form a military partnership when required (Weitsman, 2003). To be more precise, "defensive and offensive alliances are treaties, a formal promise to cooperate – that is, to form a coalition in the event of war" (Wolford, 2016, p 16). After negotiations and discussion between the interested partners, the alliance is made by signing a formal contract between the parties. The partners are therefore equal. They might not be equal in terms of their size or influence, but they are equal in terms of the responsibilities and obligations that come out of the contract. It is presumed, though, that signing the contract to form an alliance is voluntary for each state, otherwise this would not be called an alliance.

The contract between the partners to form the alliance is signed in peacetime and serves as a formal obligation to each partner. On signing the agreement there is usually no crisis or war on the horizon, or at least not an imminent one, and the enemy might not even be specified. Alliances are made to prepare the parties for a potential crisis or war in the future (Gibles, 2008, p xlix), possibly a distant future or a war that will never take place. In fact, by forming the alliance, the partners give signals to potential enemies that they will be prepared for the conflict. An alliance is therefore a sort of pre-coalition that imposes obligation on the partners in peacetime in order to prepare the alliance to be ready when and if war occurs. It is obvious that the alliance also serves as a deterrent.

But even if war is in the indefinite future, preparation for engagement might call for advance planning and structuring of forces. If the alliance is not merely a political statement, then obligations to the partners require making their personnel and resources available to be used in common. As the partners are equal by contract, then also command and control of the forces, internal dynamics, resources and planning should be an equal burden on all the members of the alliance. Equality also means that the decision-making process is conducted with all partners equally involved. The alliance might have pre-set forces or just "on call" forces, but they all need resources, for example, logistics, investment, manpower and so on, and this is another obligation of all the partners. When the crisis (that leads to war) begins, the partners of the alliance are asked to fulfil their obligations, but the transition from peacetime to a wartime footing is not a very quick or simple process, especially if the alliance has no pre-set forces. Because the alliances that operate in war are usually created during peacetime, the transition is not so easy (Weitsman, 2011).

An alliance is therefore a closed, privileged club of allies. At a minimum, to enter the club requires acceptance by its members and the signing of a contract. It is not very often that an alliance expands, because this could be a lengthy process, but it is even more unusual for members to leave the alliance. This rarely happens even during combat engagement (Gibler, 2003).

2.2   Coalition

In contrast, a military coalition, according to the same US Department of Defense definition, is "an *ad hoc* arrangement between two or more nations for common action" (US DoD, JP 5-0), so a military coalition is a short-term joint venture of two or more states and their armed forces that serves a specific interest or goal and is formed around one nation that assumes the status of lead nation (Watford, 2016). The purpose of forming the coalition is to defend, protect or secure the interests of the coalition's members. Whether offensive or defensive in nature, the purpose of forming coalitions is to engage the partners in achieving the goal of eliminating a threat, which is known, clearly defined, and usually imminent. This may be different from simply defending the territory, and could involve also offensive, pre-emptive, and disruptive actions by the coalition. The coalition is therefore built by the invitation of one nation to others to join it and form a coalition in order to fight an enemy that will threaten the interests of all the members, territorial integrity and freedom being the most important ones. It is obvious, though, that within the coalition the partners are not equal and the lead nation is the most potent one. Within an alliance one nation can assume the role of "first among equals", but this is not the case within a coalition. Even if two or more nations are of equal size and influence, they do not have the same, equal interests at the time of the crisis; so one nation with the greatest interest will emerge as the lead one. It is at the lead nation's discretion to give status to its partners, which means that the lead nation determines what the level and depth of the relationship of each partner to the lead nation will be. Other partners may join the coalition; that is to say they accept the terms and requirements set by the lead nation, and usually there are different modes of relationship within the partners towards the lead nation. There may be negotiations and discussion between the potential partners before forming the coalition, but coalitions are made at the initiation of one nation that becomes the lead nation.

A coalition is formed when crisis or war are in progress or imminent, and this implies a limit to the duration of the coalition, as it serves its purpose only during the engagement. Once the threat no longer exists, there is no reason for the coalition to exist. Forming a coalition may or may not need some kind of contract, since this is a multinational group of partners, but the contract needs to contain the known adversary (or enemy) and the end state. Coalitions are *ad hoc* multinational understandings that are forged to undertake a specific mission and to be dissolved once that mission is complete (Weitsman, 2011).

We should not look at a coalition simply as a derivative of an alliance, but rather as an independent entity (Wolford, 2016, p 16), because it has a specific, unique

algorithm which corresponds to the question of why countries form a coalition. There has been broad academic research on the complexity of this question, because the answer is not straightforward. To simplify the issue, we can say that for the nation that aspires to become the lead nation, forming the coalition serves as a vehicle to achieve a specific goal. Junior partners are invited because of their niche capabilities, geopolitical location, historical partnership, or merely for public relations reasons. The lead nation is willing to share with them, at its discretion, resources and responsibilities, as well as profits and gains. In short, the coalition format gives the lead nation far more freedom to manoeuvre than an alliance, since it is not constrained by any provision of a contract or by cooperation in the decision-making process. On the other hand, under the umbrella of the lead nation, the junior partner(s) join the coalition because they can identify with the necessity to fight the threat; because they have an interest in engaging in operations but do not possess sufficient means and capabilities; because they want to participate in future profits and gains; or merely just to please the lead nation and/or domestic public opinion.

Each partner within the coalition has a special relationship with the lead nation, but the lead nation has special relationship with no-one. The numbers of coalition members can therefore easily expand or decline due to the one-way relationship with the lead nation.[3] The transition from crisis to war is relatively easy, since the majority of activities depend on the lead nation. In most cases it occurs as if just the lead nation were making the transition to war, with the other nations in support. It is obvious then, that command and control, logistics, preparation of the battlefield and so on is primarily the lead nation's responsibility, and it is up to it to decide how much information it is willing to share with each partner.

3 NATO AS AN ALLIANCE

Following the characteristics of an alliance, we can easily identify NATO as a true alliance; NATO has become the reference for alliances in modern times.[4] First, it is based on a treaty, which sets conditions and obligations for all members. The core element of the Alliance is set in the famous North Atlantic Treaty Article V, which ties the members of the Alliance together by declaring mutual intra-dependency in the event of war. The statement that the "parties agree that an armed attack against one of them, … shall be considered an attack against them all," effectively expresses the defensive nature of the Alliance. The threat or enemy was not

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[3] *For instance, a nation may only politically support the coalition's cause, and not actually participate in the military activities, but it still counts as a coalition member. This could be the case with the Coalition of the Willing against Iraq, where Sweden, Slovenia, Norway and Croatia politically supported the coalition but did not participate in any activities.*

[4] *One can argue that also Warsaw Pact was an alliance, at least by its name – Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. However, the Warsaw Pact was heavily influenced by the USSR, which occupied all the key positions so that the members of the Pact were not equal. And no alliance attacks and occupies one of its own members, which the Warsaw Pact did with Czechoslovakia and Hungary.*

specifically stated[5] (although it was clear to everybody) so no particular interest of any member, apart from territorial defence, could be implied. Based on Article IV, the Treaty ensures the equality of each member by imposing a consultation-based decision-making process, and in Article IX ensures that they are equally represented in the North Atlantic Council as the governing body. The duration of the Alliance is not mentioned, although the Treaty provides the opportunity for each member to evaluate its membership after 20 years. Since the role of the Council, in which each member has a voice, was to set up subsidiary bodies and implementation measures for defence, collective responsibility and burden sharing between all members is implied.

Among the most prominent and important implementation measures of the Treaty was to establish a NATO Command Structure (NCS) and a NATO Force Structure (NFS). To become more than just a political declaration, the NATO Alliance needed real power behind political will. The NATO Command Structure represented the ability of the Alliance to fully control the security architecture of all the member states. Not only did the establishment of the NCS and the NFS give NATO real power, at the same time it bound the member states and their military forces together in true alliance. By organizing NATO HQs at all levels in different countries, by manning them proportionally with personnel from all member states, by enforcing common standards and doctrine, by practising interoperability between different armed forces, by sharing the financial and resource burden between members, and especially by practising a consensus decision-making process, NATO demonstrated its potency and preparedness to do the job it was created for – to execute Article V if required and decided on. Furthermore, NATO was perceived and acted as a political alliance by promoting common values, namely a liberal democratic political system, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights, which were the political glue of the Alliance.

Throughout the 70 years of the Alliance, the major influence and burden has been, and still is, on the shoulders of the USA. Acting as a majority shareholder in NATO, the USA has been the driving force and pillar of all NATO activities, and today's Western military doctrines and structures are heavily adjusted to US influence. Nevertheless, throughout at least the first four or five decades, the USA acted as a benevolent force and the common denominator of NATO, respecting established procedures to keep NATO potent and homogenous. Although heavily influenced by the USA, NATO was nonetheless perceived as an Alliance of the West, not just the USA.

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[5] *In the Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (2012) it is clearly stated (in para.2) that "The Alliance does not consider any country to be its adversary," https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87597.htm.*

4   A COALITION WITHIN AN ALLIANCE

After the fall of the Berlin Wall there were some serious debates about the future of NATO, mostly referring to the understanding that viewed NATO as connected to the Cold War world order and therefore a relic of the past. Precisely because NATO was perceived as a model military alliance, as well a promoter of Western values, it was necessary for NATO to remain part of the security architecture of the West, and although the period after the end of the bipolar world was declared a "peace dividend", this did not mean that all the threats were gone. Political changes in Europe soon brought new security challenges, this time in the shape of a crisis, at a level below war. NATO had to adapt to this challenge. In its Strategic Concept of 1991, NATO acknowledged its role to "improve and expand the security of Europe", and, based on its experience in the Balkan engagements (Bosnia, Serbia/Kosovo) the Security Concept of 1999 called for NATO to commit itself, not only to the defence of its member's territories, but also to "stand ready to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management". The Strategic concept of 2010 went even further, to adopt a "comprehensive, all-encompassing approach to crisis management, enhancing greater interoperability between NATO and partner forces" (NATO, Strategic concepts).

4.1   Out of area operations

The solution to the dilemma about the future of NATO after the Cold War was depicted in the now famous statement by American Senator Richard Lugar, "out of area or out of business" (Medcalf, 2008, p 67), which became the new reality of NATO. The transformation in this new direction was twofold; by expansion of NATO to new member states and signing cooperation agreements with as many entities as possible on the one hand, and on the other hand by conducting military interventions under the auspices of Crisis Response. Today, NATO is about to accept its 30th member state[6] and has cooperation agreements with over 40 non-member states (NATO, organization). Since the end of the Cold War NATO has conducted more than a dozen "missions and operations" outside its territory, and has currently about 20,000 soldiers engaged in these operations (NATO, operations). How has NATO conducted these missions and operations? The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept was endorsed by NATO Heads of States in 1994, recognizing the need for deployable, multinational and multi-service forces in support of missions below the level of war, namely peace support, humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement (NATO Handbook 2001, p 249-254). There are two important features in the CJTF concept: first, it was designed with the notion of deploying troops outside NATO territory; and second, it was designed to incorporate partners of NATO (out of the Partnership for Peace initiative) and others. The US military elaborated the Combined Joint Task Force concept primarily as an instrument to facilitate NATO's undertaking of

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[6] *NATO has begun accession preparations with North Macedonia.*

non-Article V military missions, and only secondarily as a means of developing ESDI[7] within NATO. (Grant, 1999)

In its first intervention outside its territory, in Bosnia in 1995 (preceded by air support to UNPROFOR[8] and IFOR[9]) NATO created SFOR[10] as a separate, *ad hoc* contingent to carry out a mission mandated by the UN. Generated troops from most of the NATO countries and some non-NATO members participated. Although only intended for a duration of one year, the mission continued for several years. Later in the 1990s NATO conducted an air campaign in Serbia and a ground campaign in Kosovo. Also in KFOR[11], an *ad hoc* contingent was generated to conduct a mission on the ground in Kosovo in which many NATO countries participated alongside some non-NATO countries. The same was the case in other NATO Crisis Response Operations, from the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) to ISAF/RSM[12] in Afghanistan. As the official NATO website states, "the NATO force generation process, which is still in use today, was developed during the NATO-led operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and later in Kosovo".

In fact, all contingents that have been engaged in Crisis Response Operations have been generated *ad hoc*, from NATO and often from its partner countries, for a specific mission and (at least initially and declaratively) for a limited period of time, led by "framework nations" as the driving force of the troop contingent. On the official NATO website we can read that "NATO provides the framework within which members can work and train together in order to plan and conduct multinational crisis management operations, often at short notice", and, further, that "personnel serving in a NATO operation are referred to as NATO forces, but are actually multinational forces from NATO countries and, in some cases, partner or other troop-contributing countries". "Force generation" is the procedure by which the Allies (and partner countries) resource the personnel and equipment needed to carry out North Atlantic Council-approved operations, and "national capitals take the final decision on whether to contribute to a NATO-led operation or mission" (NATO, Crisis management).

This looks very much like coalition operations. The key word here is NATO-led, which means it is not only NATO, but equally also its partners which belong to a variety of formal cooperation agreements. For partners which are not members of the Alliance, it is obvious that they could work with NATO only in coalition. Furthermore, the NATO member countries themselves are working in coalition. The force generation process means that NATO countries firstly form a coalition

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[7]   *European Security and Defense Identity.*

[8]   *United Nation Protection Force.*

[9]   *Implementation Force.*

[10]   *Stabilization Force.*

[11]   *Kosovo Force.*

[12]   *International Security Assistance Force/Resolute Support Mission.*

among themselves and then form a coalition with its partners. NATO-led does not mean an alliance in coalition with partners, but rather a NATO 'inner' coalition in coalition with others. Although still under the Alliance's framework, in Crisis Response Operations NATO has adopted the logic of coalition to operate outside its territory. All missions abroad are organized around lead nations (usually with a strong particular interest) which provide bulk capabilities and occupy specific territory. The remainder of the participants, those who wish to participate, are tied to each lead nation and have the option to disengage from the mission if they so wish. The line between member and non-member state has become less and less important, especially in relation to an operationally strong non-member state.[13]

This became even more emphasized after the attack on the USA in 2001, which brought further transformation of the Alliance's engagement in Crisis Response Operations. The decision of the USA to wage a war (against terrorism) exclusively in the coalition setting also affected the Alliance. The USA administration "questioned the continued relevance of multilateral alliances, notably NATO, as a primary foundation for American national security policy (Stuard, 2009, p 27). As a consequence, not only did some of the Alliance member states (the USA, the UK, Poland etc.) form separate coalitions (e.g. Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom) when deploying troops to military missions, but also NATO's role in those operations was reduced to that of coalition partner. For instance, NATO-led ISAF in Afghanistan was operating alongside Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) led by the USA. Forty states participated in Afghanistan, only 28 of them NATO members.[14] From 2008 onwards, American generals were operational commanders of both OEF and ISAF, so, speaking ironically, in Afghanistan the NATO Alliance was in coalition with itself.

With regard to military interventions, many authors have made very clear arguments in favour of coalitions versus alliances (Weitsman 2011, Grant 1999, Watford 2016). The simple fact is that a coalition is more effective in *ad hoc* operations than an alliance, and better serves the interests of the lead nation. From the perspective of the coalition leader(s), there are fewer caveats,[15] less discussion, less sharing of information and more operational freedom if a contingent is formed as a coalition to wage war outside national territory. In addition, to avoid legal constraints, the coalition intervention outside the territory must be conducted by all-volunteer forces. Strong states therefore use coalitions when they want to fight wars efficiently, and alliances when they are more concerned about managing broader political issues (Weitsman, 2011, p 48).

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[13] For instance, Austria in KFOR.

[14] See Report Towards Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 2009, p 27. Montenegro changed its status from non-member to member.

[15] For instance, in ISAF there were 50-80 caveats that limited the NATO Commander (Weitsman, p 47).

Crisis Response Operations are not main, traditional military tasks such as attack and defence. Nevertheless, over the past three decades NATO has been primarily engaged in carrying out those operations. The implication here is that "NATO is a highly useful Alliance with great utility during peacetime because of its focus on political effectiveness, but during wartime, more flexible and adaptable institutional structures are necessary for effective war prosecution – more emphasis on operational effectiveness is necessary". (Weitsman, 2011, p 49). The invention of non-Article V and NATO-led operations, accompanied by the transformation of all NATO national militaries into all-volunteer forces, set the NATO Alliance to organize itself and conduct Crisis Response Operations under the logic of coalition warfare. This has an impact on the perception of NATO as a defensive Alliance, and on its unity and cohesion. For an outside observer NATO can be perceived as an interventionist force; from its inner power structure NATO could be perceived as being merely a toolbox where powerful member states can find the right instrument to serve their purposes; and (most) member states could question the value of NATO as a servant of their interests.

4.2   Framework Nation Concept

Based on the Chicago Summit of 2012, where NATO leaders recognized the importance of the initiative by the Secretary General named "Smart Defence" (Hlatky, 2012), they approved the Framework Nation Concept (FNC) as a facilitator of the multinational project under the Smart Defence Initiative in 2014 (NATO, Wales summit declaration, para 67). The purpose of Smart Defence is to overcome capabilities gaps between NATO member states, identified in the NATO defence planning process. The defence planning process aims to ensure that the Alliance possesses the necessary capabilities to achieve its ambitions, as assigned by the highest Allied political authorities.

According to the FNC, member states (only the European ones) should organize in groups or clusters in order to synchronize their capabilities to overcome the constant shortage in NATO's defence planning goals, and to become more effective and sustainable. Each cluster is led by a framework nation; this is one of the large member states that provide military backbone capability (command and control, logistics, etc.), and the remainder of the smaller member states are to plug in to each cluster by providing specific capabilities.

Although still under Alliance provisions, it is obvious that the FNC came in the form of a coalition structure. Powerful states assumed the role of the lead nation and set conditions for smaller ones to join them. Based on the military principle "fight as you train", it is understood that cooperation between states within each cluster will not stop only at procurement and equipment, but will necessarily also spill over into procedures, standards and tactics.

What interoperability is for an alliance, smart defence is for the FNC. The difference is that interoperability is a necessary standard relevant across the all member states,

but smart defence is linked to the framework nation. This does not mean that smart defence is not interoperable, but achieving it goes through the framework nation, which could have (unintended) implications. It is implied that within the FNC smaller nations should be interoperable with the lead nation, but it is only assumed that the lead nations will be interoperable between themselves, especially since each cluster is developing its own priorities for cooperation – for Germany it is multinational formations and structure as part of collective defence, for the UK it is an expeditionary force, and for Italy it is a stabilization operation. The FNC is therefore a regionalization of NATO that could threaten the interoperability and the political cohesion of the Alliance (Glanz, 2019).

If the coalition settings of NATO were so far reserved for Crisis Operations and therefore for deployment outside NATO territory, then the FNC concept brings the coalition format right inside NATO. Although the FNC appears to be a very pragmatic and attractive concept, it affects the inner structure of the NATO Alliance; being a prime example of the coalition concept within the Alliance, it might put to the test the postulate of the Alliance itself. In the future, the equality of the member states may not be self-evident, unity may become fragmented (regionalized), and consensus may only be necessary between the lead nations.

Conclusion   NATO is still regarded as the best possible and the best workable alliance for almost all its member states[16], especially with regard to collective defence. Since small nations usually have no luxury to shape and lead intra-state arrangements, it is understandable that they are very sensitive about these issues, so they are in a way the real indicator of the true value of the arrangements, especially if unity is the core value, as is the case in NATO. However, the constant transformation of the Alliance towards a more effective fighting force in Crisis Response Operations, and the experience of participation in those operations in the past few decades, has made public opinion in some smaller countries slightly derail support for NATO membership. [17]

One of the reasons for the perception that the Alliance's *modus operandi* in Crisis Response Operations does not reflect the true nature of the Alliance, lies, as we have described, in the shift from an alliance principle towards a coalition one. Selectively choosing engagements, often based on the geopolitical preferences of the powerful members, constantly reshaping and reorganizing its military posture, long-term commitments with dubious outcomes and consequently a significant burden on resources, has made public opinion in some member states doubtful whether Crisis Response Operations strengthen or weaken the NATO Alliance. In fact, according to the Transatlantic Trends 2014 Report, when asked what kind of missions NATO should conduct in the near future, the majority of respondents – 59% of Americans

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[16] *Paw Research center; https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/07/09/nato-is-seen-favorably-in-many-member-countries-but-almost-half-of-americans-say-it-does-too-little/.*

[17] *Slovensko javno mnenje 2013; https://www.cjm.si/ul/2013C/SUM_2013_13_M.pdf , and Center for Insight In Survey research at https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/four_country_full_presentation_may_24_2017.pdf.*

and 73% of Europeans – answered that territorial defence should be the core task of the Alliance.[18] This outcome could also provide the answer to why many (exclusively European) states have a hard time allocating 2% of GDP to defence spending. The question that the public have is what is it for – to conduct Crisis Response Operations or collective defence? Smaller countries in NATO perfectly understand the fact that they could never be a lead nation nor could they assume the heaviest political and military burdens within the Alliance. As a matter of fact, there are only a few member states that are capable of leading the Alliance; all the rest are there to support the cause. It is therefore more for the most powerful states to preserve and retain the principles of the Alliance – equality, unity and burden-sharing.

Since the early 1990s, and especially after 9/11, the NATO Alliance has gone through some substantial transformations. Alongside the process of globalization, the West has also acknowledged security challenges as global, which has forced NATO to adapt to contain these challenges. By its decision to go outside its territory and conduct non-Article V Crisis Response Operations, NATO transformed its *modus operandi* towards a coalition rather than an alliance. It was then just a matter of time before the coalition concept was brought within the NATO structure, and the FNC does exactly that.

There will be challenges to NATO security in the future, though most likely no longer at the sub-state, local, technically inferior and power projection limited level. Lessons learned from the era of Crisis Response Operations could be that an alliance far better guarantees security and cohesion between its member states than a coalition, so the next transformation of NATO could be a step back to basics – or better, back to alliance.

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15 LET ČLANSTVA V NATU IN EU: ALI SO SI NACIONALNE VARNOSTNE STRATEGIJE IN OBRAMBNI MODELI BALTSKIH DRŽAV PODOBNI ALI SE RAZLIKUJEJO

15 YEARS OF NATO AND EU MEMBERSHIP: ARE THE BALTIC COUNTRIES SIMILAR OR DIFFERENT IN TERMS OF THEIR NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES AND DEFENCE MODELS

Povzetek   Čeprav je baltskim državam varnost zagotovljena v okviru Nata in z aktivnim sodelovanjem na ravni EU na področju varnostne ter obrambne politike, kar krepi varnost v baltski regiji, so Estonija, Latvija in Litva še vedno zelo ranljive za ruska dejanja ter posredovanja. Rusiji predstavljajo neposredno točko za stike z Natom in EU, zaradi česar so med najpomembnejšimi državami, v katerih Rusija preizkuša vzajemne zmogljivosti in čeznje pošilja strateška sporočila svojim »nasprotnikom«. Članek omogoča poglobljeno primerjavo varnostnih groženj, nacionalnih varnostnih strategij, obrambnih modelov, značilnih za zadevne države, in pričakovanj strateškega partnerstva baltskih držav.

Ključne besede   *Baltske države, Nato, Rusija, obramba, varnost.*

Abstract   Although the Baltic countries are granted security guarantees within the NATO framework, as well as through active cooperation at the EU level in the field of security and defence policy, enhancing security in the Baltic Sea region, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are still very vulnerable to Russian actions and interventions. They constitute Russia's direct point of contact with both NATO and the EU and are, therefore, among the primary subjects to the interests of Russia to test mutual capabilities and to send strategic messages to its "opponents". This article offers an in-depth comparison of the security threats, national security strategies, country-specific defence models, and expectations of strategic partnership of the Baltic countries.

Key words   *Baltic States, NATO, Russia, defence, security.*

Introduction The Baltic States enjoy security guarantees directly within the NATO framework, and indirectly through membership of the EU and active cooperation in the field of security and defence policy. Despite the existence of these guarantees, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are still very vulnerable to Russian actions and interventions. As they constitute Russia's direct point of contact with the West, they are among the primary subjects for Russia to test mutual capabilities and to send strategic messages to its "opponents". Although during the past decades military conflict between Russia and one of the Baltic countries was mostly considered an unlikely event, this situation has changed and transformed into a relatively likely threat. This has prompted the Baltic States to take all measures to defend themselves against potential Russian aggression.

Besides the renewal of national security concepts, this should also involve revisions to defence-related research at the national level, paying greater attention to a broad range of topics such as hybrid threats, Russia´s "Anti-Access/Area Denial" concept around the Baltic States, and tensions related to the massive Zapad-2018 exercise in the region. This can only be done based on a full picture of the potential security threats and how the national security models of the Baltic countries are expected to work in times of crisis.

Since their vulnerability concerns the wider NATO, a comprehensive overview of the potential threat scenarios in the Baltic countries, their national defence models, country-specific vulnerabilities, and the potential of strategic cooperation to diminish regional security threats stemming from Russia are also useful to the wider Euro-Atlantic community.

1 SECURITY THREATS IDENTIFIED IN THE BALTIC COUNTRIES OVER THE LAST FIVE YEARS

The multitude of global security threats in various domains are pointed out in the key strategy documents of all three Baltic countries. They range from traditional conventional military threats to threats in the cyber domain, including the economy and the coherence and resilience of society. The national security concepts point out regional issues such as the unity of the Euro-Atlantic community (National Security Strategy of Lithuania, 2017, pp 4-6; (National Security Concept of Estonia, 2017, pp 3-6), and also global issues such as the possible threats of international terrorism (The National Security Concept of Latvia, 2015, pp 6-28).

The National Security Strategy of Lithuania highlights a few dozen of these threats and risk factors which must be given particular attention, such as conventional military threats, covert military and intelligence threats, threats to the unity of the Euro-Atlantic community, regional and global instability, terrorism, extremism, radicalization, information threats, cyber threats, economic and energy dependence, economic vulnerability, the development of unsafe nuclear energy projects near the borders of the country, social and regional exclusion, poverty,

the demographic crisis, corruption, organized crime, emergency situations at the national or international level, and a crisis of values (National Security Strategy of Lithuania, 2017, pp 4-6). Similar threats and risks associated with the uncertain security situation in the Euro-Atlantic region, the uncertain state of the global economy, political radicalization and the polarization of politics, ideological and religious extremism, globalization, migration flows, developments in cyberspace, technology-related threats, organized crime and corruption, and so on are also mentioned in the National Security Concept of Estonia (National Security Concept of Estonia, 2017, pp 3-6).

However, the security concepts of all three Baltic countries sometimes reflect an understanding relatively common to the formerly occupied countries of the Soviet Union, putting forward the nation as the primary subject and object of national security. In this regard, to quote the National Security Concept of Estonia: "The objective of the Estonian security policy is to secure the Nation's independence and sovereignty, the survival of the people and the state, territorial integrity, constitutional order and the safety of the population" (National Security Concept of Estonia, 2017, p 2). The National Security Strategy of Lithuania, in turn, states that the violation of vital interests of national security, such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, democratic constitutional order, civil society, respect for human and citizens' rights and freedoms and their protection, and peace and welfare in the state, poses a threat to the existence of the state and society, and should be therefore safeguarded by employing all lawful means (National Security Strategy of Lithuania, 2017, p 3). The National Security Concept of Latvia stresses the need to protect the basic values established in the Constitution of Latvia, such as the independence of the state, the democratic system, territorial integrity, and the internal security of the country in terms of preventing threats to internal security (The National Security Concept of Latvia, 2015, p 6).

The Special Eurobarometer Survey on Security from 2017 indicates that there are significant differences between Estonia and the other two Baltic countries in the way that security challenges at the EU level are seen (see Figure 1).

Whereas on average, in the EU as well as in Latvia and Lithuania, all these five topics are considered to be "very important" to the internal security of the EU by at least half of the survey's respondents, Estonians do not see it in a similar way. In Estonia, for all five topics, the proportion of respondents who think that these challenges are very important to the internal security of the EU is significantly lower. This difference between Estonia and the other two Baltic countries could potentially be explained by the tendency either for Estonians to consider the EU as a secure place compared to Latvians and Lithuanians, or for Estonians to think that other security threats are more important than those listed.

Finally, Russia is considered the main security threat to world peace and stability as far as the security concepts of all three Baltic countries are concerned. The only

slight difference between Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania is that Latvia and Lithuania go into more detail in describing Russia's influence in its neighbouring countries, while Estonia remains more modest in this respect (Veebel and Ploom, 2016).

Nevertheless, Russia is considered the main security threat to peace and stability by all three Baltic countries. This vision is also reflected in the country-specific results of a survey on security threats in the EU conducted by ECFR in July 2018. Besides the Baltic countries, several other EU countries, such as Finland, Poland, and Romania, consider Russia to be the main security threat. At the same time, countries such as Portugal, Greece, Cyprus, Italy and Hungary do not see Russia as posing a threat to their society. The survey therefore reflects the polarization of European countries, where Eastern European countries are more concerned about Russia, and Southern European countries are mostly concerned about jihadists and terrorism. However, the views differ in detail with regard to migration, cyber-attacks, the role of Turkey, and so on. The survey also concludes that Estonia and Lithuania are especially worried about Russian meddling in their domestic politics (Dennison et al., 2018).

2   THE POTENTIAL RUSSIAN THREAT AND CRITICAL RESPONSE CAPABILITIES IN THE BALTIC STATES

Both the systematic development of the national defence forces, and the debates on national security guarantees, are clearly driven in all three Baltic countries by the fear of potential Russian aggression. The National Security Concept of Latvia is the most detailed key strategy document in this respect, drawing to an extent on the steps and policies taken by Russia in Ukraine (The National Security Concept

of Latvia, 2015, pp 5-28). The National Security Concept of Latvia makes the following observations (Ibid.): Russia has developed high readiness and mobile military units; Russia uses complex hybrid measures aimed at gradually weakening the country by instrumentalizing the potential of protests and discontent in society; its other measures include economic sanctions, the suspension of the energy supply, humanitarian influence, informative propaganda, psychological influence, cyber-attacks, aggressive influence agents, external diplomatic and military pressure, and the enforcement and legitimization of alternative political processes; creating a conflict area near its border, in which the transition from peaceful existence to crisis and later to war is very difficult to identify; and the creation of a fictional notion that NATO causes external threats due to its internal policy, allowing the Russian government to rally society and make it loyal to the current government (Śliwa, Veebel and Lebrun, 2018).

The National Security Strategy of Lithuania also stresses Russian aggression against its neighbouring countries, the annexation of Crimea, the concentration of modern military equipment in Russia, its large-scale offensive capabilities, and exercises near the borders of Lithuania, especially in the Kaliningrad Region. It also highlights Russia's capacity for using both military and economic, energy, information, and other non-military measures in combination against its neighbours, and Russia's ability to exploit and create internal problems for the neighbouring states, as well as Russia's readiness to use nuclear weapons even against states which do not possess them (National Security Strategy of Lithuania, 2017, pp 2-3).

The National Security Concept of Estonia also argues that Russia is interested in restoring its position in the global arena and is not afraid to come into sharp opposition to Western countries and the Euro-Atlantic collective security system. The strategy document admits that Russia uses political, diplomatic, information, economic, and military means to achieve its objectives, as well as the fact that Russia has strengthened its armed forces and increased its military presence on the borders of NATO member states (National Security Concept of Estonia, 2017, pp 3-5). However, the overall tone of the Russian-related statements in the National Security Concept of Estonia seems to be slightly more modest than those of Latvia and Lithuania.

The question of whether and how Russia could attack the Baltic countries has also gained a lot of attention among military analysts and researchers. Just to name a few, Shirreff (2017) predicted that in the worst case scenario, Russia would seize the territory of Eastern Ukraine, open up a land corridor to Crimea and invade the Baltic countries. Luik and Jermalavičius (2017, p 236) suggested that Russia's posture and capabilities could allow the country to seize its Baltic neighbours, establishing a relatively quick *fait accompli* which it would then defend by issuing nuclear threats. Drawing on multiple game models, Shlapak and Johnson (2016) estimated that the longest it would take Russian forces to reach the outskirts of the Estonian and/or Latvian capitals of Tallinn and Riga would be 60 hours. They

also argue that such a rapid scenario would leave the Alliance with only a limited number of options. Thus, implicitly underpinning these discussions, the threat that Russia could use its military capabilities to attack the Baltic countries appears to be a realistic consideration.

In the event of a conventional conflict, the early stage of resilience is mostly based on the local military forces of Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania. Here, their disproportional conventional capabilities come to the fore. In peacetime, the Latvian National Armed Forces should consist of 6500 professional soldiers, 8000 home guards and 3000 reserve soldiers. Alas, the number of combat-ready home guards and reserve soldiers can be estimated as only half that, given the still relevant conclusions of the State Audit Office in 2015 and the high rate of no-show of reserve soldiers for training (State Audit Office, 2015). The Estonian Armed Forces include about 6000 personnel (including active conscripts), 37,800 conscripts registered for compulsory military service, and 15,000 members of the voluntary Estonian Defence League. The wartime structure of Latvia's Armed Forces is considered to be approximately 17,500 men and women, whereas in reality only approximately one-half to a maximum of two-thirds of that number is correct. The wartime structure of Estonia's armed forces is estimated to reach 60,000, whereas its high readiness reserve is 21,000 personnel (Estonian Defence Forces, 2018). The Lithuanian Land Forces are comprised of around 3500 regulars and civilians, about 4800 volunteers and about 4000 conscripts (Lithuanian Armed Forces, 2019). In this respect, the conventional balance in the Baltic area is not achievable for the Baltic countries, either in total or even with the pre-positioned battalions of other NATO member states. The one and only argument which could partially speak in favour of credible deterrence in terms of conventional forces is that NATO has a much higher capability of additional long-term deployment when sufficiently mobilized (Veebel and Ploom, 2018).

3   THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR THREATS AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE FOR THE BALTIC STATES

The situation becomes even more unbalanced if the nuclear capabilities of the "opponents" are compared. In principle, it is expected that the nuclear weapons capabilities of NATO ensure that any kind of aggression against its members is not a rational option (NATO, 2010). The Alliance's Strategic Concept states that the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States, but also the independent strategic forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contributing to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies (NATO, 2015).

To this effect, some arguments have been highlighted in analyses and reports that refer to the overall vulnerability, if not outright weakness, of the idea of nuclear capabilities being taken as a supreme guarantee of NATO's credible deterrence. Firstly, the Alliance itself does not possess nuclear weapons and so it cannot provide

either legal or political assurances to its member or other states on how nuclear weapons belonging to specific member states might be used (Chalmers, 2011, pp 55-56). Moreover, among the owners of nuclear capabilities in NATO there is only partial consensus about the extent to which nuclear forces are "assigned" to NATO. Whereas the nuclear weapons of the United Kingdom have been formally assigned to NATO, and the country has confirmed that the weapons could be used for the purposes of international defence of the Atlantic Alliance in all circumstances, the nuclear weapons of France are not assigned to NATO and are aimed at contributing merely to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies. Secondly, nuclear issues are politically highly sensitive. Russia has used increasingly intimidating rhetoric, which creates concerns that it may lower the threshold for using nuclear weapons (Rathke, 2016). The purpose of such rhetoric could be interpreted as preparing not only the international audience, but also its own population, for a situation where there would arise a need to find a handy justification. It is noteworthy that Russia has already conducted some large-scale military exercises that included a simulation of a limited nuclear strike against the Alliance. The country has also invested in nuclear modernization and exercises involving nuclear forces in order to send signals to NATO, thereby pushing the overall vision of a nuclear disarmament deal into the background. This could seriously endanger the respective international norms, or amount to a no lesser deed than breaking the taboos currently preventing the use of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, several countries are attempting to gain nuclear weapons capability. This causes political tensions and imbalances in the international arena, and refers to the potential escalation and counterbalancing of nuclear weapons. Thirdly, in practice the role of nuclear weapons in the NATO doctrine has gradually decreased over the past two or three decades. The number of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe in the early-1990s was about 2500, but the figure has decreased since then and was only 180 in 2016. Thus, should the United States want to use these weapons, it would take weeks or even months to be actually able to do it (Sauer, 2016).

In the light of this, it is justified to ask for a revision of policies and strategies related to nuclear deterrence in the Alliance. This issue has also been addressed in the most recent Nuclear Posture Review of the US Department of Defense from February 2018, referring to the rapid deterioration of the current threat environment and asking for the initiation of the sustainment and replacement of the US nuclear forces (Department of Defense, 2018, p 2). This step is extremely important for the Alliance in general, because the nuclear capabilities of the United States make an essential contribution to the nuclear deterrence capabilities of the Alliance as a whole. Furthermore, the Review states that the United States will apply a tailored approach to effectively deter across a spectrum of adversaries, threats, and contexts, as well as sustaining and replacing its nuclear capabilities, modernizing NC3, and strengthening the integration of nuclear and non-nuclear military planning (Department of Defence, 2018, p 4). However, it definitely takes both time and resources to achieve this. Under current circumstances there may not be enough time for that, as Russia is already using a consistent strategy of "testing the preparedness"

of its neighbours, and initiating regional conflicts with an interval of only a few years (i.e. in the Baltic region in 2007, in Georgia in 2008, in Ukraine in 2013, and so on).

The question of whether nuclear weapons could be used in possible warfare scenarios, and whether the Baltic countries could be in particular danger in that regard, have been also addressed in both political and military circles, as well as being discussed in many studies and reports. For example, Luik and Jermalavičius (2017, pp 237-238) emphasised that Russia's political rhetoric includes nuclear threats towards the Baltic countries, making them particularly vulnerable. A report published by the RAND Corporation in 2016 argued that Russia's next likely targets were the Baltic countries, and that the nuclear forces of NATO do not have enough credibility to protect them (see, Shlapak and Johnson, 2016, p 7). Thompson (2016) suggested some reasons why the greatest danger exists with regard to the Baltic countries, from their high strategic significance, to the future disposition of the Baltic countries, to the incorporation of new technologies in the forces of both Russia and NATO.

However, the idea that the Baltic countries could be under a potential nuclear attack that could evolve to a nuclear war still seems a bit unrealistic and irrational. This conviction relies on the argument that, although both potential conflict parties, i.e. NATO and Russia, have the striking capability, there exists no rational reasoning to execute a nuclear strike even as a measure of last resort. In fact, it is hard to believe that Russia has any rational motivation to use nuclear weapons in the Baltic countries while a large proportion of the population of the Baltic countries are Russian-speaking. Likewise, its territorial proximity and Russia's most likely further ambition to legitimate the annexation come into play. From a rational choice perspective, it is rather unlikely that Russia would use its nuclear capabilities in a potential conflict with the Baltic countries. While this can be called good news, the bad news is that the nuclear deterrence that is considered a core component of NATO's credible deterrence strategy could not provide any additional value for the Baltic countries either. There will arise questions of morality, disproportionality, and escalation for the Alliance, should NATO weigh up using nuclear attack as a preventative measure.

Furthermore, several logical gaps exist in the chain of argument justifying the Alliance's authorization of the use of nuclear weapons against Russia in the event that the latter had fully or partially invaded the Baltic countries. Firstly, there is the question of how the strategic use of nuclear weapons against Russia could become believable as a rational choice in the context of a regional conflict with low intensity. Secondly, how would it help to solve a conflict that had already started or serve the interests of the regional NATO member states? Thirdly, what would be the possible positive outcome for NATO having initiated a full-scale (or tactical) nuclear attack against Russia to stop the occupation of the Baltic countries?

Intriguingly, it must be acknowledged that, contrary to the arguments outlined above, the Baltic countries appear to be strongly convinced that NATO is ready to

use nuclear weapons to protect them. According to a survey conducted by Veebel (2018) in Estonian and Latvian military circles in December 2017, there was a relatively strong belief in Estonian and Latvian military circles that NATO was ready to use its nuclear weapons. The main argument consisted of a belief that without an appropriate response the Alliance would end its existence as a collective security network. Besides this, the respondents shared an understanding that the Russian leadership is convinced that NATO, and particularly the political leaders of the United States, are determined to use nuclear weapons to defend the Baltic countries. At the same time, the Russian leadership was seen as not having a rationale to use nuclear weapons against the Baltic countries and the prepositioned NATO units there. Equally, it was assumed that Russia is not ready to conduct a tactical nuclear strike in the region in order to avoid an escalation of threats and retaliation, and has other, more reasonable conventional options. These views appear to testify that, at least for the Estonians and Latvians, nuclear deterrence remains quite an abstract concept without any profound strategic perception of how nuclear deterrence would work in practice, in terms of the expected effects, targets, damage and risks. From this angle, it seems to be a sign of "self-deterrence," referring to deterrence by figments of the imagination (Veebel, 2018).

From Russia's perspective, its nuclear forces serve as a tool to achieve political objectives by intimidating its neighbouring countries and their NATO allies, referring to the combination of the country's evolved nuclear doctrine and increasingly intimidating rhetoric (Rathke, 2016). After Russia received a clear message from the NATO Warsaw Summit in 2016, and having thereafter witnessed the Alliance taking a significant step back in its nuclear language (see Andreasen et al., 2016), it cannot be excluded that the country interprets this as a message stating that the Baltic countries are not strategically important to the Alliance.

4   THE KEY FEATURES OF THE NATIONAL DEFENCE MODELS IN THE BALTIC STATES

Considering the fact that the three Baltic States are attempting to protect themselves against the same potential threat – possible aggression from the Russian side – and are hoping for the same allies from the EU and NATO, it is definitely intriguing that they seem to have chosen different approaches in developing their respective national defence models. However, it should be noted that these three countries do not constitute pure examples of fundamentally different approaches when choosing between a professional army and a conscription service.

Although the potential threats from Russia are similar for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the countries have adopted different national defence models. While Estonia has followed a total defence approach with a strong focus on territorial defence, a compulsory military service and a reservist army, Latvia has opted for a solely professional army with a considerably smaller amount of supporting manpower, and Lithuania has used a mixed system. As far as discussing the security choices of

a small country bordering an aggressive and resurgent neighbour is concerned, the Estonian and Latvian defence models constitute a particularly intriguing pair while Lithuania represents a compromise between them.

After the restoration of independence in 1991, NATO membership and the principle of collective defence based on Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty became the main foreign policy objectives for the Baltic States, as local political elites were convinced that the Organization would have a pivotal and strategic role in strengthening their independence and sovereignty, as well as in confronting potential existential threats from the Russian side. NATO membership, combined with EU accession, was also strongly supported by the public. After successful reforms and relatively smooth accession negotiations, all three countries joined NATO in 2004. Paradoxically, this main strategic achievement left the Baltic States without a clear long-term vision of what should be the future goal of the countries' security and defence policies. This is mainly because over the decade when the Baltic States were preparing to join NATO, the Alliance transformed. The same applies to the visions and perceptions of the organization (and of the so-called Western world as a whole) towards Russia. During this time, NATO repositioned itself from an organization committed to the principle of collective defence to a multi-tasking body dealing with issues beyond the original collective defence, e.g. anti-terrorism activities, peacekeeping missions, and crisis management. Similarly, in the early 2000s Russia was rather considered as a partner, not as an adversary (Veebel and Ploom, 2018b). Thus, in 2004 the Baltic States did not, in fact, join the same organization that they were expecting to join in the early 1990s, i.e. an organization with a primary focus on the principle of collective defence, as well as an organization with the capability and willingness to defend its member states in response to a military attack by an external party.

This fundamental shift has left visible traces, particularly in the evolution of the Latvian national defence model. The country has linked its security to NATO membership and Article 5. This has also been reflected in the subordination of national defence activities to the global role of NATO, supplemented by cooperation efforts between Russia and NATO. In practice, this has resulted in greater attention being paid to expeditionary capabilities. Moreover, participation in international missions and operations (particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq) became the central axis of Latvian defence activities (Andžāns and Veebel, 2017). Symbolically enough, the former camouflage of Latvian uniforms was changed to a desert pattern (though a new pattern, closer to the domestic terrain, was presented in December 2015). Therefore, due to the greater focus on out-of-area international missions and operations, the principle of territorial defence was fundamentally neglected in the Latvian defence model.

Subsequently, compulsory military service was abolished in favour of entirely professional armed forces, from 2007 onwards. In the 2000s, Latvian defence expenditure amounted to a maximum of 1.6% of its gross domestic product

(GDP). The defence budget was considerably reduced from 2009 onwards, due to the economic and financial crisis. The lowest point of defence expenditure was reached in 2012, when it amounted to 0.88% of GDP (i.e. 232 million USD; see, NATO, 2017, p 7). The further decrease in defence expenditure from 2009 onwards is yet more remarkable bearing in mind that the Russo-Georgian War in 2008 had exacerbated threat perceptions in Latvia. However, no action was taken to increase the defence budget. Among the reasons were the recent outbreak of the economic and financial crisis, and the United States' attempt to "reset" its relationship with Russia.

A significant change occurred only after Russia´s intervention in Ukraine. This event indivertibly changed the threat perceptions of both the Latvian political elite and society at large. In the light of these developments, the defence budget was increased from 1.04% of GDP (295 million USD) and further increased in the subsequent years (see Figure 2). This increased defence budget has therefore only recently allowed Latvia to strengthen its national armed forces. For example, it was only agreed in 2014 to procure armoured vehicles (123 used reconnaissance combat vehicles, namely Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked) – the CVR(T)) for the first time since independence was regained. Up until then, the Latvian National Armed Forces were the only NATO armed forces without armoured vehicles. Since then, there have also been procurements in small arms, trucks, Carl Gustavs (man-portable reusable anti-tank rocket launchers), Spike guided missile systems, and so on. Recently, in 2017, an agreement was reached to buy 47 second-hand self-propelled M109 howitzers and Stinger man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS). Military personnel were also expanded from 4600 in 2014 to 5700 in 2017, and the training of reserve soldiers was resumed in 2015. Additionally, the number of volunteers willing to serve in the Latvian National Guard (Zemessardze) reached 7900 in 2017 (LETA, 2017).

Similarly to Latvia, the dynamically changing global security environment and the shift in the main goals of NATO has put significant pressure on the rationale of staying true to Estonia's national defence model. However, Estonia's response was substantially different from Latvia's. Although NATO and Article 5 constitute a core element of the Estonian national defence model, and the country actively contributes to the Alliance's international operations, Estonia did not neglect the territorial defence principle at any stage during the observed period. From the 2000s onwards, along with NATO membership, particular attention was devoted to the development of its initial independent defence capabilities. Estonian territorial defence is based on the following principles: a) the defence forces are divided into two parts: general units and territorial defence units; b) the country's territory and units are divided into military-territorial formations; and c) on the basis of the military-territorial formations, management is organized in a way that would allow it to function even after the collapse of the national defence system in crisis situations, e.g. when the political or centrally-coordinated military leadership is interrupted, or NATO assistance is delayed (Estonian Ministry of Defence, 2017a).

In more detail, Estonia uses a mixed model of a professional military contingent, a conscript army and reservists (as does Lithuania). The average number of personnel in the regular armed forces in Estonia during peacetime is about 6500, half of them conscripts. At the end of 2016, there were 3200 active servicemen (professional soldiers) (Defence Resources Agency of Estonia, 2017, Figure 4). The conscript army is compiled based on compulsory military service for men between 18 and 27 years of age. After completing conscription, draftees join the reserve forces. In recent years, the number of individuals annually entering the conscript service amounted to roughly 3300 men (Defence Resources Agency of Estonia, 2017). The planned size of the operational (wartime) armed forces personnel is 21,000. After mobilizing the reserves, the wartime structure of the armed forces is estimated to reach 60,000 personnel, of which the high readiness reserve is about 25,000 strong (The Estonian Defence Forces, 2016). Altogether, 269,586 people were listed as reservists in the register by the end of 2016 (Defence Resources Agency of Estonia, 2017 p 7).

Since the 2000s, Estonia has undertaken to develop its initial independent defence capabilities, which are reflected in its defence expenditure. All incumbent governments have sought to gradually increase (and, later on, maintain) defence expenditure close to or at least equal to 2% of GDP. However, due to the economic crisis, a setback in the defence budget was also manifest in Estonia, and defence expenditure was cut three times in 2009, by an overall amount of 37.63 million EUR. However, the magnitude of the decrease in defence expenditure was significantly lower in Estonia than in Latvia. Even during the crisis years, in Estonia defence expenditure was maintained at least at the level of 1.68% of GDP.

The Estonian defence budget in real terms has been higher than in Latvia since 2009, notwithstanding its smaller economy and the smaller number of inhabitants compared to Latvia (NATO, 2010, p 4; NATO, 2017, p 7). Moreover, the country managed to recover quickly and to once again refocus on the target of 2% of GDP. Since 2015, Estonia has spent more than 2% of the country's GDP on national defence (NATO, 2017, p 8).

This stable and steady increase in defence expenditure has allowed Estonia to retain very formidable territorial defence capabilities. Its Defence Forces were already better equipped in the early 2000s when, for example, in 2004 and 2005 second-hand Patria Pasi XA-180, and in 2010 Patria Pasi XA-188 armoured personnel carriers (APCs) were procured, both currently numbered at 136. As the crisis in Ukraine unfolded, further steps were taken to strengthen the land forces. In 2014 Estonia agreed to buy 44 second-hand Combat Vehicle CV 90 infantry fighting vehicles and a further 37 hulls of the same type of vehicle, along with Javelin man-portable anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) systems. In 2017, a decision to buy 12 new K9 Thunder self-propelled 155 mm howitzers was announced, among other measures. A significant part of the wartime structure of the Estonian military forces is also formed by the Estonian home guard, known as the Estonian Defence League *(Eesti Kaitseliit)*, functionally a close equivalent to Latvia´s Zemessardze. There are about 16,000 members of the Estonian Defence League; together with youth and women's organizations, it numbers approximately 25,000 (Veebel and Ploom, 2017), which means that the organization is about twice as big as the Latvian home guard.

The key strategy documents in national defence in Estonia, such as the currently valid version of the National Security Concept from 2017, and the National Defence Strategy from 2011 (Estonian Ministry of Defence, 2017), state that the country's defence is grounded in a broad concept of security, involving the principles of whole-of-government and whole-of-society, putting emphasis on the combination of military and non-military capabilities and resources. The same applies to the National Security Concept of Latvia from 2015, which also clearly refers to a broad concept of security (National Security Concept of Latvia, 2015). Thus, next to NATO's collective defence principle, the Baltic States recognize the role of a broad conception of security, a national comprehensive approach, progressing in this direction in their own way. The Estonians appear to be strongly convinced that conscription is essential, and hence keep training large-scale reserve units in order to mobilize them in the event of a potential conflict (e.g. Laar, 2011). Military service also enjoys significant public support (more than 90% according to recent polls; see Kivirähk, 2018). It is considered of vital importance in Estonia for maintaining the country's initial independent defence capabilities should a military conflict occur. Latvia, on the other hand, abolished conscription in 2007. One cannot discount the impact of neighbouring Lithuania and Sweden having decided to return to conscription, thus making Latvia the only country belonging to the Baltic Sea region's Nordic and Baltic countries to solely rely on professional armed forces.

The Estonian defence model enables the mobilization of a large number of people whereas the Latvian model does not, and once again the Lithuanian model is a compromise between Estonia´s and Latvia´s models. All three are by their nature still fully non-aggressive, without any room for pre-emptive initiatives, extra territoriality or asymmetrical tools, not to mention the difference in scale and numbers compared to the Russian military forces. In light of this, conventional rebalancing is unachievable.

Finally, yet importantly, besides the financial considerations, the way the Baltic countries understand the nature of a potential threat from Russia's point of view – i.e. coming back to the potential scenarios of aggression from the Russian side – could be of great importance when explaining the differences between the national defence systems. In principle, all three states recognize various facets of asymmetric warfare implemented by Russia, such as attacks in cyberspace, psychological warfare, propaganda, the use of intelligence services and economic instruments, and so on. It can also be assumed that their opinions converge with regard to what a direct potential conflict would look like. Considering Russia's previous military experiences in conducting regional military operations in Georgia and Ukraine, it could take different forms: a full-scale or a geographically limited direct conventional attack could ensue involving all military domains, namely air and sea among others (e.g. the Russo-Georgian War in 2008), or asymmetrical and formally unannounced warfare may result in limiting involvement to the land and cyber domains (e.g. the Russo-Ukrainian War since 2014).

In the event of the first-case scenario, the defence of the Baltic States would almost entirely depend on the allied capabilities, the United States in particular; in all likelihood, the indigenous armed forces could assist the allies in ground and support operations. If Russia, however, was to employ a kind of second-case scenario, then national capabilities would play a much more significant role, as the capabilities of the antagonists would be levelled by the absence of formidable military capabilities in the air and sea domains. Baltic security and defence models have significant limitations with regard to fundamental dilemmas in deterrence. Bearing in mind that all three models are oriented towards guaranteeing territorial defence, the practical question remains whether in real terms they are aimed at: a) defending the geographical territory of countries in order to avoid all possible losses of territory; b) defending the countries' territories to the fullest extent possible, but also accepting some losses; or c) providing sufficient deterrence to avoid any attack. From the perspective of the armed forces, the preferred option would surely be the third one; however, the credibility of the current models to provide reliable deterrence is questionable. None of the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian defence models consist of independent retaliation capabilities, which would tempt Russia to opt for painless testing-risking.

5 EXPECTATIONS OF THE BALTIC COUNTRIES WITH REGARD TO STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH NATO AND THE EU

According to the national public opinion surveys available, the key factor in ensuring the security of the Baltic countries is clearly supposed to be NATO. Regular public opinion polls in Estonia indicate that about 55-60% of the respondents (and 75-78% of the respondents with Estonian citizenship) consider NATO to be the main security guarantee in Estonia, whereas only about 40% mention the EU or the role of Estonia's independent national defence capabilities. About 20-25% of the respondents state that Baltic cooperation is important (Kivirähk, 2018). Besides this, the Eurobarometer survey from early 2014 indicated that people in Estonia are rather undecided, as 47% of the survey respondents were in favour of the European armed forces and 44% of the respondents opposed the idea. At the EU level, this result is still slightly positive, considering that on average 46% of the respondents in the EU-28 supported the idea and 47% were against it (Eurobarometer 2014, T22).

Similar evidence has been found in public opinion polls in Latvia and Lithuania. According to a public opinion poll conducted in Latvia in 2016, 59% of the interviewed Latvian residents consider that NATO contributes to Latvia's security, and the share of Latvian residents supporting NATO is stable (Latvian Ministry of Defence, 2016). Besides this, in an older survey, "The Opinion of the Inhabitants of Latvia on National Defence Issues", which was conducted in Latvia in 2015, 46% of respondents felt a NATO-backed protection from military threats. In response to the question "In which spheres do you personally feel NATO-backed protection and guaranteed security?", 35% of respondents said that they felt NATO-backed air and maritime security. The prevention of international conflicts was mentioned by 30%, while 23% mentioned the prevention of the spread of terrorism and mass acts of terrorism. When describing what should be the main tasks of NATO, 63% of respondents indicated that NATO member states must ensure and strengthen its collective security (Sargs.lv, 2015).

In a survey conducted in Lithuania in 2015, around 81% of the respondents supported or fully supported Lithuania's NATO membership. Only one in ten Lithuanian citizens claimed the opposite. About 82% of the respondents supported or fully supported the permanent presence of NATO allies in the territory of Lithuania, whereas 13% of respondents disapproved it. According to the survey, 72% of the Lithuanian population felt that NATO should send more personnel and equipment to Lithuania, while about 19% objected to it (Ministry of National Defence, 2016). According to the most recent public opinion survey in Lithuania, conducted in 2018, support of NATO by the Lithuanian people is at its highest of the last five years, as 86% of the population are in favour of Lithuania's NATO membership. About 76% of the respondents in Lithuania think that the German-led multinational NATO enhanced Forward Presence Battalion Battle Group deployed in Lithuania ensures deterrence against hostile countries (Ministry of National Defence of Lithuania, 2016). In this respect, public expectations in the Baltic

countries are definitely running high as far as the security guarantees of NATO are concerned.

Besides this, a survey of the ECFR indicates that the Baltic countries are definitely interested in gaining additional security guarantees at the EU level. On the one hand, as far as the perceptions of the Baltic countries of the EU as a security actor is concerned, the Baltic countries consider the EU as a transatlantic geopolitical project that needs to increasingly provide its own security, with NATO remaining the backbone of European security (Dennison et al 2018) (see Figure 3).

Figure 3:
Perceptions
of the EU as a
security actor
Source:
Dennison et al.,
2018.

On the other hand, at the national level, all three Baltic countries support the PESCO initiatives, to a greater or lesser extent. Estonia sees PESCO as an essential initiative that could significantly contribute to national security, and is particularly interested in establishing a so-called "military Schengen Area," which would help EU member states' military units pass through one another's territory (Veebel 2017). Latvia was initially reluctant to participate in PESCO. Nonetheless, as long as PESCO enhances Latvian security and supplements NATO's role, the country will see the initiative as a useful way to strengthen relations with its European allies. Lithuania supports closer EU cooperation on security and defence, and is leading a PESCO project on cyber rapid response. It also participates in the military mobility project – which, according to the country's Minister of Defence, is in the interests of both NATO and the EU.

Conclusion   In recent decades, the military reforms and development in the Baltic States have followed the NATO preferences and assessment system, drawing on the official strategic-level documents of NATO, and priorities and needs have been defined. This has been the way to determine what is effective and what contributes best to progress and outcome in terms of sufficient defence and credible deterrence. In practical terms, the reforms in the Baltic militaries have mostly been focused on the ability to fit into the solidarity-based deterrence model, to have niche capabilities, to be able to receive allied forces and to assure the local population that the best choices have been made. This is called "collective credible deterrence"; this article has pointed out that a closer look may reveal it as mainly an exercise in assurance or reassurance.

However, NATO's assessment and force development priorities are in many aspects still based on the pre-Georgian understanding of how, if at all, the aggression against member states might or will happen. As a result, while we are flexing our muscles according to 2009/2010 priorities, Russian military planners are redesigning and improving on their much younger 2015 military doctrine, which benefits as much as possible from the lessons of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. As a result, what might look like a mighty financial effort from the Baltic States may in some aspects prove quite useless in Russian eyes. On the other hand, we might miss some available opportunities for increasing deterrence with reasonably low additional costs.

While the existing conventional reserves of the NATO member states are sizeable, safe and quick deployment is a critical variable in the event of a conflict scenario in the Baltic States. This might be problematic considering the very limited safe transportation options available in the region. The Baltic States, neighbouring the North-West military district of Russia, are one of the few areas where, compared to NATO's similar needs and options, Russian options in resupplying, logistical support and regrouping of military forces are very promising, especially concerning safety and alternative logistical options. The Russian advantage could actually be even growing, should Russia believe that there exists a winning regional strategy for conflict with NATO, and focuses on rapid improvement of its anti-access/area denial capabilities near the Baltic borders.

From the perspective of the Baltic States' security, even when all of it fits well into the universal systematic force building logic according to the highest NATO standards, there is a need to consider also the alternative view. This view says that it is not NATO that needs to be convinced of our growing capabilities, but rather Russian political leaders and military planners.

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15 LET SLOVENSKEGA ČLANSTVA V NATU SKOZI PERSPEKTIVO SPREMINJAJOČEGA SE VARNOSTNEGA IN GEOPOLITIČNEGA OKOLJA

15 YEARS OF SLOVENIAN NATO MEMBERSHIP THROUGH THE LENS OF THE CHANGING GLOBAL SECURITY AND GEOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

Povzetek   Nato leta 2019 praznuje svojo 70-letnico obstoja. V tem času se je spoprijel z raznovrstnimi varnostnimi in političnimi izzivi, ki so zaznamovali njegova delovanje in razvoj ter usmerjali tok sprememb in prilagoditev na dinamično varnostno okolje. Prav tako letos tudi Republika Slovenija praznuje 15 let svojega članstva v zavezništvu. Od prvotne hladnovojne vloge zavezništva pa do danes se je mednarodno varnostno okolje temeljito spremenilo. Zavezništvo se je okrepilo ter razširilo z novimi članicami, ni več stroge blokovske delitve med vzhodom in zahodom, varnostno okolje pa so zaznamovali nove grožnje ter tudi ostanki starih. Republika Slovenija je leta 2004 postala enakopravna članica zavezništva in tako prevzela del odgovornosti za zagotavljanje skupne varnosti. Kot polnopravna članica Nata je Slovenija prispevala ter vplivala na ključne odločitve in zaveze, sprejete v okviru zavezništva v preteklih 15 letih. Še vedno pa se spoprijema z izzivi izpolnjevanja nekaterih skupaj sprejetih zavez, med katerimi so gotovo najodmevnejši tisti, ki zadevajo višino izdatkov za obrambo. Hkrati lahko ugotovimo, da so širše varnostne in geopolitične spremembe pomembno vplivale tudi na varnost in obrambno politiko Republike Slovenije ter na nacionalni razvoj zmogljivosti in načrtovanja. Kot ugotavljata avtorja, kljub spremenjenemu varnostnemu okolju oziroma prav zaradi njega Nato ostaja najustreznejši okvir za celostno zagotavljanje obrambe Republike Slovenije.

Ključne besede   *Nato, Slovenija, obramba, varnostno okolje, prilagoditev.*

Abstract   The year 2019 marks the 70th anniversary of NATO; furthermore, 2019 also marks 15 years of Slovenian membership of the Alliance. NATO has faced a diverse array of security and political challenges throughout its history, which have guided a constant adaptation of its defence posture and working practices. Since the initial Cold War role of the Alliance the international security environment has changed

significantly. The Alliance has been enlarged and strengthened by new members, the strict block divisions between the East and the West have ceased to exist, and the security environment has evolved through new and old security threats. Slovenia became an equal member of the Alliance in 2004, when it took up an important share of responsibility for common security. As a full member of NATO, Slovenia has contributed to and influenced key Alliance decisions. Nevertheless, Slovenia still struggles to fulfil some of the commitments it made, particularly when it comes to defence spending. At the same time we may note that broader security and geopolitical changes have also had a significant impact on the security and defence policy, as well as on the development of national capabilities and defence planning of the Republic of Slovenia. As noted by the authors, in spite of the changes in the international security environment or, even more, particularly because of them, NATO remains perhaps more than ever before the most appropriate framework for the comprehensive defence of the Republic of Slovenia.

Key words   *NATO, Slovenia, defence, security environment, adaptation.*

Introduction   The retired marine General and former US Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, in his efforts to convey the message of the enduring importance of the Alliance to the highest ranking members of the US government and public, stated that "if NATO did not exist today, we would have to build it" (Mattis 2017; Tertrais, 2019, p 4). While the message might have been oriented towards an internal US audience and placed in the specific political framework of the current US administration, it conveyed the broadly relevant observation of the increasing trend of global instability and complexity, as well as the growing interdependency of emerging global threats, which do not allow for Allies bickering between themselves but call for an even closer cooperation. At the same time, in his term of office as General, Mattis never forgot to restate the importance of fair burden sharing between the Alliance members, which should not be over-dependent on US resources and capabilities. This in itself was a decade-long endeavour, but has particularly gained momentum in the last decade and especially during the latest US administration, while also being closely related to the increasing urgency of the development of appropriate and sufficient Alliance defence and deterrence capabilities.

The Alliance has come a long way since its formation in 1949. It has been able to survive through the era of the Cold War and find a new/old *raison d'être*, in spite of some critics calling it an obsolete relic of the past. Moreover, it has proven to be a relevant actor in peace, stability and security beyond its initial framework, continuing to attract the aspirations of the new members which have expanded the "Euro-Atlantic Family" to today's 29 members – soon to be 30. The Alliance of today is indeed not the Alliance of 1949, nor that of 2004 when Slovenia joined NATO as a fully-fledged member. The contemporary security environment which indivisibly impacts the process of transformation and adaptation of the Alliance is fundamentally more complex and interdependent, with elements of renewed struggle

between great and rising global (but also regional) powers, and the geopolitics of the past again gaining prominence. The Alliance furthermore continues to face persistent and evolving complex security challenges emerging from destabilized and failed states, particularly along its southern neighbourhood, ranging from violent uprisings, civil wars, instability, regional conflicts, irregular mass migrations, human and drug trafficking, organized crime and terrorism. All these and many other aspects of today's vastly changed security environment shape the way we perceive security and defence and the role of NATO.

As we will argue in this article, the Atlantic Alliance, amid the changing security landscape and threats, remains relevant and essential, perhaps more than ever before. As an Alliance of democratic countries which share common values, it continues to represent the fundamental guarantor of peace and stability in an increasingly uncertain and complex geopolitical environment. On the occasion of Slovenia's 15th anniversary of NATO membership we paraphrase the aforementioned statement of General Mattis: if today Slovenia was not yet a member of NATO, it would be in our best national security interest to ask for membership without delay.

As we will argue later in this article, this is not only a politically sound statement, but first and foremost a conclusion reached through the analysis and examination of the current international security environment and its trends, NATO's role in this changing geopolitical landscape, and the national security system and interests of the Republic of Slovenia. In this article, we aim to examine different aspects of the changing security environment since Slovenia's accession to NATO, Alliance adaptation, and the consequent implications for Slovenian defence policy and planning. A special focus will be made on several important milestones and broader trends that have shaped both NATO and Slovenia's perspectives and defence policies, continuous adaptation and transformation. The article is primarily based on the authors' extensive professional experience and involvement with NATO and national defence policies. It furthermore relies heavily on the analysis of relevant public documents and statements by senior leaders and representatives, as well as other relevant academic and professional papers.

1 SLOVENIA'S NATO MEMBERSHIP IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE WIDER INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SETTING

In order to be able to thoroughly analyze contemporary discussions on Slovenia's role in NATO, we must first take a brief look back at the time of Slovenia as a newly independent state. It was a time when the Slovenian leadership was searching for a suitable international framework to implement its fundamental national security interests. As noted by several authors, a broad national foreign and defence policy early adopted a key priority to join the Euro-Atlantic integrations, primarily NATO and the EU (Grizold and Vegič, 2002; Bebler, 2009; Jelušič, 2009 etc.). Nonetheless, while NATO might have been the most reasonable way forward for Slovenia, at least according to the vast majority of national defence and international affairs experts,

it was not the only option to be discussed in a wider public discourse at the time (Bebler, 2002, pp 639-644; Grizold and Vegič, 2002, p 384). As noted by Grizold and Veglič, several theoretical concepts on national defence circled in Slovenian public and political spheres following Independence in 1991. Among other alternative concepts, the authors mention the formation of self-sustaining defence forces, gaining the status of armed or unarmed neutrality, and reaching bilateral security assurance agreements with other states (Grizold and Vegič, 2002, p 384).

In 1994, interest in joining the Euro-Atlantic path solidified among the Slovenian political leadership, and became the formal political goal of the Republic of Slovenia through the Supplements to the Resolution on the Starting Points for a National Security Plan, adopted by Slovenia's National Assembly (Grizold and Vegič, 2002, p 384). In the same year Slovenia began formal cooperation with NATO by becoming one of the first partners within the framework of the then newly established Partnership for Peace Programme (NATO PfP) on 30th March 1994. Partnership for Peace, which celebrates its 25th anniversary this year, was established, among other things, as a response to a growing interest in NATO membership among the post-Cold War independent (eastern) European states. As was early recognized, the intention of the PfP was not to substitute (eventual) full membership, but to be a comprehensive mechanism to prepare interested countries for their potential membership, while also enabling a wide framework of cooperation for partner states who did not intend to join NATO. Individual partnership plans (IPAP), together with the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) (and alongside the later adopted Membership Action Plans), formed a core of national reform efforts on the path towards NATO. While partner nations indeed, and reasonably, do not undergo the same planning and coordination processes as Allies, PARP is notably the closest a partner country can get to the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), and as such served as important guidance for national defence planning at the time (Šavc, 2009).

The National Strategy for Accession to NATO from 1998 further defined the strategic priorities of Slovenian efforts to join the Alliance, stating, among other things, that NATO membership would guarantee Slovenia a long-term stable political-security environment which would foster comprehensive social development, a higher degree of national security, a role and responsibility in international discussions on relevant security challenges in Europe, and so on. It also noted the economic and scientific benefits that would be part of Slovenia's accession to NATO (National Strategy for the Accession of the Republic of Slovenia to NATO – Nacionalna strategija Republike Slovenije za vstop v NATO, 1998). In addition to this, as noted by Bebler, accession to NATO was to a large extent viewed as an important aspect of the country's general political integration into the community of Western democratic states (Bebler, 2009). The results of the 2003 referendum proved to be largely positive, with 66.08% of voters in favour of NATO (MZZ, 2019). Slovenia joined NATO in 2004 as part of the largest enlargement in NATO history, along with Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia, bringing NATO to 26 member countries.

And the rest is history – or not quite. By becoming a NATO member, the real work for Slovenia had only really begun. While indeed it took a decade of challenging reform and adaptation processes to finally gain membership in 2004, by becoming a full NATO member Slovenia took over a sizeable amount of responsibility and commitment to the sustainment of Euro-Atlantic security and stability. Slovenia joined NATO in the post 9/11 era, with a substantial amount of Alliance efforts shifted towards out-of-area operations and peace building missions, including in the Western Balkans. This had a significant impact on Slovenia's early efforts and contributions to the international framework (even before formal accession to NATO), through extensive participation in a number of missions and operations (e.g. ALBA, SFOR, KFOR, etc.) (Jelušič, 2009). As a newly joined Ally, Slovenia was also quick to take on responsibilities as part of the coalition forces in Afghanistan, joining the ISAF mission in March 2004 (Grizold and Zupančič 2009). Contribution to international operations and missions is known to be a strong point of Slovenia's NATO membership, with average participation relative to the number of troops higher than the Alliance average (MORS, 2017).

The process of accession to NATO undeniably had an important impact on the overall defence system of the Republic of Slovenia, and while not the sole factor, it can be argued that NATO accession was (and continues to be) one of the key drivers of the professionalization and (ongoing) reforms in the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF). While membership brought with it several demanding commitments, some of which Slovenia still struggles to fulfil, it also gave Slovenia an opportunity to voice its security concerns at the "top table" while being seated among equals.

2   15 YEARS ON – NATO IN A CHANGED SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Since its founding in 1949, NATO has gone through extensive processes of change and adaptation, both with regard to adjusting to the evolving security environment, and in line with political directions from the growing forum of leaders of the Allied nations. As noted by Stavridis, the original Alliance was optimized for the lengthy, bipolar Cold War, and had a relatively simple mission: stop the Soviets (Stavridis, 2019). For a long time this has been no longer the case, and the scope and objectives of the Alliance have since vastly expanded. As argued by the present authors, we can frame the recent transformation and adaptation of the Alliance along three key turning points or milestones.

The first fundamental turn in Alliance history was the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War period. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and discontinuation of the Warsaw Pact brought fresh air of peace and stability to the European continent while presenting NATO with its first "crisis of identity" while it was readapting to its new role in the broader Euro-Atlantic Security infrastructure (Robertson, 2004, pp 25-26). If, for some critics, it seemed that the further role of NATO was to some extent redundant, the wars of former Yugoslavia served as a wake-up call and a reminder of the continual necessity for the Alliance, even if

in a drastically different role than during the Cold War period. The next notable milestone in NATO's transformation and adaptation process was the 9/11 attacks and the wake of the global fight against terrorism (Robertson, 2004, p 27). It marked the first, and until now the only, invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, and the start of a lengthy engagement in NATO's out-of-area mission in Afghanistan. This brings us to the last and perhaps key turning point – the root of the present shift of focus back to defence and deterrence: Russian aggression in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea (Burns and Lute, 2019, pp 38-40).

As is noted in various perspectives, the international security environment today is vastly different from some 15 years ago when Slovenia became a fully-fledged member of the Alliance. While there are indeed areas of positive development in certain parts of the globe, of which for us the most relevant is surely the overall stabilization of our near neighbourhood in the Western Balkan region (WB), the world is undeniably more dangerous and complex today than was in 2004. For a start, one cannot fail to notice increasingly competitive geopolitical relationships between key global (and regional) powers, sometimes verging on open belligerency, which through the interconnectedness of today's security environment presents a highly combustible mixture of interdependent state and non-state actors and threats. We must be aware of and open to the persistence of schisms and tense relationships between some of the key global actors (including among certain Allies, and also in our close neighbourhood of the WB), while witnessing a more general decline in multilateralism on a global scale and certain worrying signs of desire in some circles to go back to the failed mechanisms of isolation and re-nationalization of defence policies.

While, as noted, the Alliance is known for its continuous adaptation, modernization and transformation, there is undeniably no other single event that has changed the course of NATO to the same extent as Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, making the 2014 Wales Summit perhaps one of the most important summits in NATO's recent history (Rasmussen 2014). As was clearly and unmistakably noted by the Wales NATO Summit Communiqué, Russia's aggressive actions, the destabilization of the wider Eastern Ukraine, and the illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea represent a gross violation of international law and a worrisome threat for broader European security and stability (Wales Summit Declaration, paragraph 16). As a consequence, relations between NATO and Russia drastically deteriorated. Some commentators might even go so far as to compare current relations between NATO and Russia as a return to a "new Cold War period". Understanding Russia's revisionist aspirations and aggressive posture in disregard of accepted international norms, no matter what we call it, led Alliance leaders to re-shift the focus of the Alliance back to its "core business" – deterrence and defence. Despite this, it would not be accurate to claim that we have found ourselves in a new "Cold War era". The balance of global actors, geopolitical framework and ideological base of the conflict are fundamentally different from during the Cold War, and so are the actions of the actors involved. NATO and

Russia had, prior to 2014, in fact proceeded on a path of cooperation and dialogue following the end of the Cold War. The NATO-Russia Council (NRC), established in 2002, was a prime example of such cooperation. It was suspended following Russia's illegal military intervention in Ukraine and its violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Alliance nevertheless agreed to keep some channels of communication open at ambassadorial level and above, the so-called "double-track" approach, to allow the exchange of views and prevent misunderstandings which might lead to an undesired escalation (Wales Summit Declaration, paragraphs 21-22). Still, the NRC at ambassadorial level meets only sporadically and with limited effect, as the positions of the parties on the majority of issues are far apart, particularly when it comes to the main issue for discussion – the situation in Ukraine.

Challenges from the East are indeed top priority for the Alliance as a whole, and the major driving factor of current adaptation processes. It is also an open secret that the Allies on the eastern flank of the Alliance, with recent historical memory of life under Russian oppression, are the ones who are most directly affected by and concerned with the Russian threat. Russian actions in Ukraine, and their previous travails in Georgia, showcased the Russian leadership's will and determination to actively pursue its political objectives and sphere of influence (particularly in the area deemed by Russia as its 'near-abroad'). At the same time, challenges stemming from revisionist Russia transcend the concerns of neighbouring countries and manifest themselves in several different forms, most notably as part of modern hybrid warfare. Recent publicly renowned cases include the Salisbury chemical attack[1] and cyber activities against the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (*OPCW*) in The Hague (Omand, 2018). While the challenges presented by complex and evolving threats from the East might sometimes seem distant to the Slovenian public, it would be naive to think that countries such as Slovenia are either immune or unrelated, particularly when taking into consideration various elements of transnational modern hybrid activities.

A distinct but at the same time closely connected issue is the alleged ongoing Russian violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), and the US decision to withdraw from it. While NATO is not a party to the treaty, it is without any shred of doubt that without the INF the security balance in Europe has the potential to noticeably change. International control of nuclear proliferation itself forms one of the foundations of the Euro-Atlantic security infrastructure. The new reality brought NATO into a position where it will have to comprehensively re-examine its strategies and find a feasible and acceptable solution to present a security dilemma in the absence of an adequate treaty (NAC Statement on Russia's failure to comply with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, 2019). Lurking behind are also Russia's stated objectives of building new, hyper-modern

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[1] *The attempted murder of a former Russian military intelligence officer and agent of the British Secret Service, Sergei Skripal, and his daughter using the military grade nerve agent novichok, on 4 March 2018 in Salisbury, England (Omand 2018).*

capabilities that might arguably also have an impact on the strategic equilibrium (Mackinnon, 2019). It is not an unwarranted pessimism to expect that the diplomatic efforts to find a new international solution to succeed the INF treaty will be long and perplexing (potentially including more parties that have developed adequate intermediate nuclear capabilities in the meantime).

While Russia's approach to international security and affairs might be a crucial strategic challenge for the Alliance, international terrorism is and will most likely remain the most imminent threat to NATO countries (Brussels Summit Declaration, paragraph 10), as we can also witness in the daily news. The lethality of terrorist acts, the spread of the religious ideology behind those horrific acts, and the influence that they have on home fronts and abroad is a clear testament to the scale and complexity of what the Allies are facing, both individually and with the support of other Allies. In fact NATO has been reinforcing its framework for countering terrorism quite substantially in recent years. For a start, we should not neglect the fact that the first and only invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty has in fact been in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 against the USA. The fight against terrorism today spans numerous NATO work strands. It is understandably tightly connected to the work of projecting stability and cooperative security (a commonly agreed core task of NATO) as the (in-)stability of the Alliance neighbourhood often forms a flourishing environment for the development of violent extremism and radicalism that might manifest in terrorist actions. NATO's Southern periphery is deemed to be particularly vulnerable in that sense, with regional instability, failed states, internal conflicts, displaced people and irregular migrations spanning from North Africa and Sahel to the Middle East (The Secretary General's Annual Report, 2018). These challenges indeed transcend the issue of terrorism and demand a comprehensive approach in addressing the root causes of the instability. It would be hubris to think that NATO alone can resolve the situation.

The Alliance is at best just one of the actors playing a relevant, although only a rightly limited role in supporting regional and international efforts for stabilization and development, notably through various cooperation platforms (e.g. the Mediterranean dialogue initiative) and other forms of engagement. When talking about the South we cannot omit irregular migration – a challenge which is very well known and very often on the mind of the average Slovenian when they think about security. While NATO again is not a key player when it comes to irregular migration, it does have a role, particularly through maritime security (e.g. in the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean) and the prevention of human trafficking, including indirectly through its contribution to the stability and security of the countries of origin (Stoltenberg, 2016). This role did not come naturally to the minds of many inside the Alliance's circles, and it took the migrant crisis of 2015, its vast scale and repercussions from the non-availability of security and defence personnel to any other possible contingencies, to convince them that this was not something NATO could turn its back on.

The persistent nature of modern conflict, in spite of the development of new advanced weapons, is thus moving away from direct conflict between superpowers towards complex, indirect and highly interconnected engagements, many times below the threshold of war. Once known also as unconventional warfare or non-linear war, hybrid threats are increasingly recognized as a fundamental challenge for modern (democratic) societies (Hybrid CoE, 2019). Modern hybrid threats, which are particularly renowned for their cyber components, also open new fields of power competition, which may have additional geopolitical consequences, while at the same time impacting on all international actors regardless of their size. Artificial intelligence (AI) and the development of the next generation telecommunication networks (5G) are just two fields of advanced technology prone to competition with substantial potential for military applications and consequently the future of NATO. Through the ever increasing integration of advanced network-connected technologies, not only in the form of military capabilities but throughout all aspects of modern society (e.g. the Internet of Things – IOT), states are increasingly becoming vulnerable to new forms of threats and challenges that surpass traditional military effects. From critical infrastructure to wider society resilience, NATO is increasingly forced to look beyond traditional, narrow military power and start dealing with, at least at first hand, "softer" aspects of power which are often prerequisites for the sustainable enablement and functioning of modern armed forces. The NATO Cyber Defence Pledge, adopted in 2016, for example, signifies a recognition of this new reality and aims to ensure that the Alliance keeps pace with the fast-evolving cyber threat landscape, as well as developing and sustaining sufficient capabilities for defence in cyberspace. It particularly notes the increased interconnectedness, which in turn means that the Alliance is only as strong as its weakest link (NATO Cyber Defence Pledge, 2016). This further signifies the importance of keeping up with the fast pace of development even for smaller countries with limited capabilities.

To conclude this short overview of the changed strategic environment over the past 15 years of our membership of NATO, we cannot omit a brief look at our immediate neighbourhood. The Western Balkans was and remains the region of strategic interest for Slovenia. Its importance, due to its near proximity and economic, political, cultural and security relevance, is undeniable, not only for Slovenia but for the wider European region. Most of the region has gone through a transformation and reform process since the end of Yugoslav wars in the 1990s, but the results are at best mixed. It was NATO that played a key role in stopping the bloodshed of the Western Balkans, and it is still a key guarantor of peace, security and stability in the region. In spite of visible progress, the region is however still faced with persistent challenges, underlying ethnic tensions, high levels of corruption and pockets of instability with the potential to quickly erupt into broader regional destabilization. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo still host substantial numbers of NATO troops (including a significant number of Slovenian soldiers) who remain, if more subtly, as a key guarantee of peace and stability. It is therefore even more important to note that several countries from the region have made commendable progress along their Euro-Atlantic path, a goal that has been consistently supported by Slovenian

governments ever since its admission to NATO. Croatia, Albania and most recently Montenegro have joined the Atlantic family, with North Macedonia (following the resolution of the prolonged name issue with Greece, in which NATO played a very important and visible role) expected to follow soon. While their addition to NATO might not bring major strategic effects to the wider geopolitical chessboard (as was, in the case of Montenegro, publicly questioned by US President Trump (King, 2018)), nevertheless their accession to NATO is of tremendous importance for the stability and security of the region, while in turn also bringing a relevant added value to broader Alliance efforts.

3   NATO AT 70 – REMAINING VITAL AND RESOLUTE

Even if at first glance the Alliance today seems substantially different from the one Slovenia joined 15 years ago, its fundamentals are still unchanged and unshaken. The inside buzz, however, is marked by a renewed sense of urgency and the importance of collective defence and increased focus on strengthening the capabilities which can ensure the survival of the Alliance in today's security environment. If the Alliance of 2004 was still very much characterized by counter insurgency, the global fight against terrorism and NATO's out of area operations, the Alliance of today is turning back to its original roots, taking care of the resilience and collective defence of its European members. This is profoundly changing and impacting the development of the Alliance's capabilities and tools, which is very much reflected in growing expectations of the fulfilment of more demanding capability goals, as developed through the NATO defence planning process and fair burden sharing, as well as contributions to key allied tools and initiatives. The 2014 Wales Summit was a major turning point in this sense, beginning a lengthy process of transformation and bringing about some of the key initiatives that have shaped the Alliance for the years to come (Braus, 2018).

3.1   Reinforcement of NATO's deterrence and defence posture

First in the line of the key new initiatives deriving from Wales was the NATO Readiness Action Plan (RAP). RAP is perhaps the most direct response to the changed security environment, which has brought additional assurance measures to NATO member countries, particularly those in Central and Eastern Europe. The adaptation moves included a measurable reinforcement of the NATO Response Force (NRF), the establishment of a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), and enhanced Standing Naval Forces. It also established eight NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs) in Central and Eastern Europe, and two Headquarters for the Multinational Corps.

Furthermore, the Wales summit was crucial for the agreement on the NATO Defence Investment Pledge, which represents a key commitment of Allied nations to a more balanced sharing of costs and responsibilities through investment in national and joint capabilities. In accordance with the Defence Investment Pledge (paragraph

14 of the Wales declaration), the Allies agreed to reverse the trend of declining defence budgets, to make the most effective use of funds, and to further a more balanced sharing of costs and responsibilities. It recognizes that overall security and defence depends both on how much the Allies spend and how they spend it, so it sets further guidelines that increased investments should be directed towards meeting capability priorities, while also noting the importance of the contribution to NATO's missions and operations (i.e. deployment of those capabilities). The aim of the Alliance according to the Pledge is thus to move towards the 2% guideline of defence spending, with 20% spending on major new equipment, including related Research and Development, up to 2024. This is an ambitious goal and a very challenging endeavour for many of the Allies, including Slovenia. Spending only 1.01% of its GDP on defence, Slovenia remains at the bottom of the Allies table when it comes to defence investment, far from the agreed 2% guideline (The Secretary General's Annual Report, 2018). With a current objective of reaching 1.5% of GDP on defence by 2024, Slovenia, while not alone, will face increased Allied scrutiny and critique if it fails to stick to its own commitments to adequately invest in national defence capabilities.

A lesser known, but in the light of capabilities and larger formations development equally relevant initiative is the Framework Nations Concept (FNC). This, originally a German idea, predates the Ukrainian crisis of 2014, and was developed to address the strengthening of the capabilities of the European Allies, the "European pillar of the Alliance". It builds on the recognition that smaller nations (referring in particular to European members of the Alliance) cannot on their own develop sufficient capabilities, and need partners for that. The benefit from cooperation with "larger framework nations" is thus twofold, and contains both capability development and the joint application of modern capabilities that the Alliance lacks overall, putting Europe back on the map as a military might (Zapfe and Glatz, 2017, pp 1-4). Three groupings of the FNC formed in 2014, centred around Germany, Italy and Great Britain. While the scope and intensity of cooperation varies between the different groupings, the overall idea proved to be beneficial and is bringing practical results. Slovenia is currently a member of both the German and the Italian FNC groupings, where it is aiming for jointly useful cooperation while developing specialized capabilities which could be made available to both NATO and the EU.

One of the most visible and direct reassurance measures originating from the NATO Warsaw Summit, particularly affecting the Alliance's most Eastern members, is the establishment of the enhanced and tailored Forward Presence (eFP, tFP). NATO's Forward Presence in the Eastern part of the Alliance has four multinational battlegroups deployed in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, and led by the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany and the United States. While it is no secret that a force some 4500 troops strong would hardly be sufficient to independently defend our Eastern Allies against possible Russian aggression, their role is commonly referred to as a "trip-wire" that would trigger an immediate Allied response to any aggression through

rapid reinforcements of larger response structures (The Secretary General's Annual Report, 2018, pp 13-15). Slovenia early recognized the fundamental importance of Allied cohesion and solidarity with our Eastern members, deploying some 50 members of the SAF as part of the Canadian-led battlegroup in Latvia.

Understanding of the critical importance and necessity for rapidly available deployable forces in high readiness was further recognized at the most recent Brussels summit by the development of the additional NATO Readiness Initiative (NRI).[2] This initiative, also known as the "Four Thirties", envisions the development of an additional 30 combat naval vessels, 30 heavy or medium battalions, and 30 air squadrons, as well as the necessary logistical support, at 30 days' readiness or less (The Secretary General's Annual Report, 2018, pp 14-15). While the necessity for increased readiness has become evident through the changing threat landscape, it remains to be seen how the Allies will manage to fill these substantial and perplexing demands which add to already substantial commitments, something which might prove particularly challenging for smaller nations with limited capabilities.

3.2   Coping with ongoing internal challenges

As in any family, the Alliance is by no means immune to internal challenges and mild friction between its Allies. It could even be said that one of NATO's largest contributions to the security and stability of the European continent is in fact managing and preventing disputes between its historically belligerent Allies, bringing them together under a joint collective defence umbrella and establishing a platform for meaningful cooperation and trust. The other foundations of the Alliance are of course the common set of values of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, clearly set in the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty. In spite of this, we should not blind ourselves that all those challenges have long been put aside.

Perhaps more than ever before, the Alliance is today faced with pressures of uncertainty and ambiguity when it comes both to upholding our shared values and keeping up with the commitments of cooperation and collective defence. Firstly, our analysis would not reflect reality if we failed to acknowledge the unconventional approach of the new President of our biggest and most powerful Ally, Donald Trump. President's Trump's initial public reservations towards unconditional commitment to collective defence indeed raised several eyebrows or even questions about the future of the Alliance (e.g. Gray, 2017). It is his unpredictability and what often seems impulsive reactions (as most clearly demonstrated at the May 2017 and July 2018 NATO Summits) which worries Allied leaders. It is no overstatement that an Alliance based on 70 years of well-crafted diplomatic culture and procedures has been struck hard by President Trump's bluntness and, as some might say, eccentric approach to diplomacy; nevertheless, his most critical request for fair burden sharing and increased defence spending by NATO's European members is neither

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[2]   *Not to be mistaken for the NATO Readiness Action Plan (RAP), in spite its close interconnectedness.*

new nor unconventional. Rather, it is a long-term appeal by several succeeding US presidents for their European Allies to take up their part of the commitment, with the current President having his own way of stating this.

On the other hand, internal challenges expand way beyond the influence and impact of the current US administration. Upholding common values of democracy and the rule of law may not be equally forcefully pursued in all the Alliance capitals, as some critics would claim, which makes them even more vulnerable and precious. While it is irrational to expect that these issues would be given public scrutiny at the level of the Alliance, they are to be considered when debating the coherence, unity and also the strength of NATO, as they are the bedrock of our resilience and collective defence and will be key elements in upholding the coherence of Alliance actions in the future.

3.3   Evolving relations with other actors

Any analysis of the Alliance which does not take into consideration the new role of China would also surely miss some important perspectives, to say the least. While the scale, scope and nature of the relationship between NATO and China are very formal, distant and limited, it is a fact that China is increasingly expanding its influence as one of the biggest players in geopolitics of this century. With a population of roughly 1.3 billion and a GDP of 12.24 trillion USD (World Bank 2019), China is a "rising dragon" that has woken up, wants to take back its "rightful" place on the world stage, and is convinced that its rise is not possible without the appropriate "giant leap" in defence capabilities that such a future role will warrant. It is simply impossible to predict the nature of the future relationship between China and NATO, but what is clear is that it will be heavily influenced by the two, not necessarily connected, bilateral relationships of US/China and EU/China. Another important aspect of the future determinants of the relationship is the role of China in the Pacific, where, despite the fact that the geographic area is not covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, some would see possible tensions with the US and/or other close NATO partners (e.g. Australia, Japan, etc.) as unavoidable. In this respect the development of a potential Russia-China defence relationship needs to be closely observed and properly understood. The recent Vostok 2018 exercise with the participation of the Chinese Armed Forces was a strong example of an upgrading phase in the defence relationship between Russia and China (Yang, 2018). Last but not least, the Belt and Road initiative is perhaps the most visible sign of increased Chinese economic ambitions, including in Europe (particularly in the fields of investment, transport, finance, science, education, and also culture), encompassing sub-regional initiatives such as 16+1. Such lucrative, at least at first sight, opportunities for cooperation may (and to certain extent already do) also affect the internal cohesion and unity of the Alliance. This in turn, combined with the potential development of dependencies through Chinese investments (e.g. 5G technologies), will have important implications that should also be considered when discussing future relations and their influence on the security environment (including the role of NATO). On the other hand, one should not push aside

the sovereign interests of every ally (and the EU as an organization) to develop relationships which have the potential to bring along vast economic benefits and development.

Finally, with NATO at 70, we must not fail to highlight the growing relationship with the EU. While NATO is still considered to be the main cornerstone of the European and Euro-Atlantic security framework, the EU is increasingly positioning itself as an actor in security and defence affairs. The idea of security cooperation and integration is not new to the European nations. It used to be considered, however, that it was somehow limited to specific "softer roles" in comparison to the Alliance. Hence, the role of the EU has, until recently, been reflected more in the framework of "soft power", while NATO with its robust command and force structure has been called upon when the full spectrum of military powers has been demanded. Perhaps the best example of this was showcased in the case of the Western Balkans, where the EU failed to develop tools which would enable it to prevent the ethnic violence and political tensions that led to the prolonged Yugoslav wars, and only NATO was able to stop the violence and enable the conditions that paved the way to peace and stabilization.

The EU Global Strategy (2016) intends to change that by stating, among other things, that "…as Europeans we must take greater responsibility for our security. We must be ready and able to deter, respond to, and protect ourselves against external threats. While NATO exists to defend its members – most of which are European – from external attack, Europeans must be better equipped, trained and organized to contribute decisively to such collective efforts, as well as to act autonomously if and when necessary. An appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy is important for Europe's ability to foster peace and safeguard security within and beyond its borders…" (A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy, 2016, pp 19-21).

A clear declaration of commitment to a more proactive and capabilities-based role of the EU has since materialized through the declaration of Permanent Structured Cooperation in the field of Defence (PESCO). What has particularly set PESCO apart from other forms of defence cooperation is its legally binding nature. Other new initiatives, such as the European Defence Fund (EDF) and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), are set to bring both additional funds and coherence in planning to European defence cooperation. While it is still to be seen how the aforementioned initiatives will evolve, as they are still in the early stages of their lifetime, one thing is clear: the EU is ambitious to step up its role in the field of defence.

This of course brings up the question of the relationship between NATO and the EU, which is particularly relevant to Slovenia and other nations which are members of both organizations. With NATO (as also noted by the EU Global Strategy) remaining the key framework for the collective defence of the majority of EU members (being

both NATO and EU members), a framework of cooperation rather than competition has been set as the norm from the very beginning. Particularly for smaller nations with limited defence capabilities (like Slovenia), a single set of forces is imperative for the sustainability of the defence sector (and commitments to both NATO and the EU), and thus must be properly understood. This spirit of cooperation and recognition of the mutually beneficial potential of enhanced cooperation was recognized by the 2016 Joint EU-NATO declaration (and the renewed declaration of 2018), which solidifies these principles and sets a framework for the development of a total of 74 concrete proposals for cooperation in 7 fields (EEAS 2019).[3] With diverse and multidimensional threats ahead, close cooperation between the EU and NATO should and already seems to be a new normal. Important joint initiatives such as in the field of military mobility reinforce the necessity of mutual cooperation. Nevertheless, while there are several exemplary cases of EU-NATO cooperation already available, further steps are necessary to transmit that to all levels – something which will need robust political support from all NATO and EU countries if we want it to succeed.

Conclusion   Changes in the international security environment and new relationships in the geopolitical power struggle will continue to fundamentally affect the European security infrastructure in the future. Much has already been said on the foreseeable key threats and challenges of the future (including in this article). The continually evolving security environment will shove NATO deeper into "troubled waters" where its true adversaries and their intentions will become ever more ambiguous, hidden behind a clutch of hybrid threats and unconventional conflicts. New developments in technology will find their prominence in the conflicts of the future. NATO will have to find a way and the balance to keep up and retain dominance in the global race for rapid development of state-of-the-art capabilities. A myriad of new and well-known actors will most likely continue to test the Alliance's coherence, unity and resolve; as the latter is rightly assessed to be the organization's centre of gravity, it is not just the deterrence posture that will need to evolve, but also the ways and means for dialogue and consultation.

While the future brings no lack of challenges and tests of different natures and volume, NATO's track record of continual and timely adaptation and an appropriate response where and when needed provides grounds for optimism about its future. Even more, with a number of challenges ahead, the purpose and necessity of the Alliance is becoming ever more evident. Maybe this is especially crucial for the smaller nations, to whom the Alliance continues to offer the most viable framework for the development of comprehensive national security structures.

Membership of the Alliance requires well-planned investment in our defence capabilities, fair burden sharing, and taking an equal share of responsibility for our own security. The times when nations could be merely passive observers are indeed

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[3]   *1. Countering hybrid threats; 2. Operational cooperation including at sea and on migration; 3. Cyber security and defence; 4. Defence capabilities; 5. Defence industry and research; 6. Exercises; 7. Supporting Eastern and Southern partners' capacity-building efforts.*

over (if they ever existed), and it is high time that the Allies took up a fair share of the burden, both practically and financially. While NATO can and indeed is a tough actor with the appropriate tools to streamline national planning efforts, it is up to individual nations to recognize and at the appropriate political level prioritize the development of sufficient national defence capabilities – first and foremost for the individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack, as stipulated by Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. As is evident from the above analysis, Slovenia, both as part of the Alliance and through its national defence policies, recognizes the evolving nature of international security threats, its interconnectedness and indivisibility. These, however, have yet to be met by sufficient financial investment, which was jointly committed to in the Wales Summit Pledge on Defence Investment.

As is evident from this short overview of the present and future challenges, the "price" we pay for our collective defence as members of NATO is still lower by far than it would be if we were to develop and sustain all the required capabilities by ourselves, or in the worst case scenario, than the price of insecurity. NATO may not be perfect, and it indeed is not free-of-charge, but to paraphrase Churchill: it is still by far superior to all other options of keeping the liberal democracies safe and secure. We thus confidently claim that if Slovenia were not a member of NATO today, it would be in its best national interest to join it.

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Marko Čehovin

15 LET REPUBLIKE SLOVENIJE V NATU – KRITIČNI POGLED NA OBRAMBNI SISTEM

15 YEARS OF THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA IN NATO – A CRITICAL VIEW ON DEFENCE SYSTEM

Povzetek   Kmalu po osamosvojitvi, še bolj izrazito pa po vstopu v Nato, je bilo vprašanje obrambe in zagotavljanja varnosti v Sloveniji postavljeno na stran. Pozabilo se je, da je vojska temeljni element državnosti in da smo bili Slovenci z oboroženo silo večkrat v zgodovini prisiljeni (o)braniti svoj obstoj. Pomanjkljivo financiranje je v kombinaciji s pomanjkljivim delovanjem kadrovskega sistema vsako leto potiskalo obrambni sistem v spiralo iskanja končnega dna. V zavezništvu smo si z neizpolnjevanjem zavez o višini in strukturi obrambnih izdatkov v zadnjih letih zapravili velik del kredibilnosti.

Slovenija je z vstopom v Nato zelo veliko pridobila. V geopolitičnem smislu se je (ponovno) pozicionirala kot del najrazvitejšega sveta. Največji prispevek članstva je kolektivna varnost, kar ima več multiplikativnih učinkov, tudi ekonomske. Obramba je danes veliko cenejša, kot bi bila sicer. Slovenija je po 15 letih članstva v Natu še vedno razpeta med mirovnim idealizmom in realizmom, ki zgodovinsko izraža, da potrebuje zaveznike. Obrambni sistem je treba prenoviti, preoblikovati in povezati v celoto ter uresničiti to, kar je bilo že večkrat ugotovljeno. Politične elite pa morajo te izzive prepoznati, voditi in usmerjati.

Ključne besede   *Obrambni sistem, Nato, kritična analiza, reforme.*

Abstract   Shortly after Independence, and even more profoundly after joining NATO, the issue of defence and security in Slovenia was set aside. It has been quickly forgotten that an army is a fundamental element of statehood, and that several times in history Slovenes have been forced to defend their existence with an armed force. "Budgetary malnutrition", in combination with malfunctioning human resource management, has pushed the defence system into a spiral quest for the lowest point. By failing to fulfil its commitments on the level and structure of defence spending, Slovenia has lost much of its credibility in the Alliance in recent years.

Slovenia gained a great deal by joining NATO. Geopolitically it has (re)positioned itself as part of the most developed world. The most significant benefit of membership is collective security, which has brought manifold effects, including economic ones; defence is much cheaper today than it would be if Slovenia were not a member of the Alliance. After fifteen years of NATO membership, Slovenia is still divided between peace idealism and realism that historically confirms that allies are required. The defence system needs to be renovated, transformed and integrated, and solutions that have been repeatedly already identified must be implemented. The role of the political elites is to recognize, lead and guide these challenges.

Key words   *Defence system, NATO, critical analysis, reforms.*

"Criticism may not be agreeable, but it is necessary. It fulfils the same function as pain in the human body. It calls attention to an unhealthy state of things."

Winston Churchill

Introduction   It was Sunday, 23 March 2003. For Slovenia, after the plebiscite for independence in 1990, this was the greatest referendum day. Political elites in Slovenia had unanimously agreed to formally ask the population the strategic question of entering the strongest political and military Alliance. Slovenia was actually one of the few invitees to conduct a referendum, after Hungary, Slovakia and Spain. The result was quite hard to forecast, so the NATO referendum was set up at the same time as the referendum to enter the EU[1].

After the successful referendum, the majority of Slovenian political elites still did not really adopt NATO membership as part of their political agenda. At the beginning of the 21st century, the legacy of the Yugoslavian policy of non-alignment and the peace movement ideas from the independence era, infused with a romantic illusion of a neutral "second Switzerland", were still very much alive in Slovenia. As the President of Slovenia, Borut Pahor, recognized in his speech for the 15th anniversary of Slovenia joining NATO, "at that time, as well as today, part of the Slovenian public fostered a belief that our so-called Western identity would not be compromised if we remained militarily neutral or exempt from the military cooperation of most Western world countries," (Pahor, 2019a).

After Independence, and even more profoundly after joining NATO, the question of defence was set aside in predominant political discourse in Slovenia. Periodically

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[1]   *The question in the NATO referendum was: "Do you agree that the Republic of Slovenia should become a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)?", while the question for the EU referendum was: "Do you agree that the Republic of Slovenia should become a member of the European Union (EU)?" (Poročilo o izidu glasovanja in o izidu referenduma, 2003).*

it was the exclusive theme of those on the right wing of the political spectrum. This is the main reason why there is a great lack of expertise in defence policy, which is reflected in a dearth of appropriate experts, mainly in the headquarters of political parties, but also in Parliament. For instance, Jelušič warns of the risk of civilian-political control being taken over by Parliaments (from Governments), as they lack professionalism and expertise (1998, p 81). Even the Members of Parliament themselves believe that they lack expertise and that their professional development is left to their own initiative (Prebilič 2007, pp 103-104). These institutions are therefore not capable of critically observing, defining and supervising these issues in a satisfactory way, and the frequent rotations of the political elites do not help in any way to improve the situation (yet).

Bearing in mind the importance of the defence sector as one of the key pillars of statehood, a questionable professional level of media supervision is unfortunately not improving the situation. The media should play the role of the "fourth branch of government" in a democratic system. From a long-term perspective, the long-lasting trend of lowering the quality and level of professionalism of the media is worrisome. Nationwide there are fewer journalists who are able to understand, comprehend, interpret and critically judge defence issues than there are fingers on one hand.

Lack of knowledge, professionalism and supervision has also resulted in malfunctioning human resource management which, together with "budgetary malnutrition", is pushing the defence system further into a spiral quest for the lowest point every year. The Strategic Review of the Defence Sector had already identified the absence of a comprehensive human resource policy a decade ago (Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia, 2009, p 13). The shortcomings in the same field were also identified in the Strategic Defence Review in 2016, claiming that the efforts in the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) should be "directed to the planning of career paths, providing high-quality and stable leadership, education, and improving the status of active component members" (Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia, 2016, p 7).

In a Report on the Readiness of the Slovenian Armed Forces in April 2019, the General Staff, without any appropriate reactions, once more graded itself on average "unsatisfactory" for readiness in wartime and "satisfactory" for readiness in peace. The same has been the case for a number of consecutive years. The President of Slovenia and Supreme Commander of the SAF explained during a speech: "the key issues for these kind of grades were insufficient manning and deficiency in arms and equipment" (Pahor, 2019b). While the core essence of the army is exactly wartime activities, the logical and legitimate question occurs – do we need (this kind of) an army?

The fact is that Slovenia has obviously not fulfilled very clear commitments on the level and structure of defence expenditure for many years. Therefore, Slovenia is

losing credibility and the positive image that it has nurtured for many years as the most developed part of "Eastern Europe". At operational-technical levels the Allies are very straight and are sending us unambiguous messages. One of these, which due to special circumstances[2] was even made public, was the Draft Overview of the NATO Defence Planning Capability Review 2015/2016 for Slovenia. In this report NATO experts were very straightforward, claiming that "Slovenia's proportion of defence expenditure spent on major equipment is totally inadequate", and that "the overall lack of investment in defence is at odds with the need to meet the challenges of the new security environment" (NATO, 2016, p 8). Five years ago NATO experts were also very clear, and in writing informed the Slovenian political elites that "much more defence spending is required, especially if Slovenia wishes, and wishes to be seen, to deliver fully the assigned NATO Capability Targets. Until then, other Allies will likely have to continue to shoulder Slovenia's share of the burden" (ibid.). Since then the situation has not in any way improved – more likely the opposite.

1 DECLARATION FOR PEACE

When the referendum was held back in 2003, there was still a vivid memory of the Declaration for Peace of 1991, which among other things demanded the demilitarization of Slovenia. The Declaration was signed not only by groups of oppositional parties and movements, but – what is even more important – by four out of the five members of the collective presidency of Slovenia, which at that time was also the Supreme Commander of the SAF, including the President of the collective presidency, Milan Kučan, who later become the first President of independent Slovenia.

The Declaration, which was published in 1991 all over the media including local ones, among other things promoted "Slovenia without an army and military industry" during the crucial era of independence. The Declaration proposed a new "peace" article in the new Slovenian Constitution, which would contain the text, "Slovenia is a demilitarized state" (Deklaracija za mir, 1991). The Declaration named the question of having an army as "one of the fundamental development dilemmas", claiming that Slovenia could not compete in any way with its neighbours in military strength, and that the "establishment of its own army would drastically threaten the current modest accumulation of Slovenian economy and population" (ibid.). Luckily, the attempt was not successful. The Declaration for Peace, which was published a couple of months before the Declaration of Independence, was bluntly characterized as "shame" and "treason" by probably the most important founding father of the Slovenian state, Jože Pučnik (Pučnik, 1999). As another founding father, the main creator of the Slovenian Constitution and the first speaker

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[2] *On behalf of Slovenia, the former leadership of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia proposed that in 2016 NATO should not put a Confidential classification on the report. This enabled the Ministry of Defence to publish the Draft Overview of the NATO Defence Planning Capability Review 2015/2016 for Slovenia on its website.*

of the Slovenian Parliament, France Bučar, colourfully expressed, Slovenia had "appeared as an undesired, illegitimate child in the old European family. What to do with it? The masters of Europe at that time, the great western countries, tried everything to carry out an abortion before its birth" (Bučar, 2007, p 315). This "abortion" would have definitely been successful if Slovenia had not won the Ten Days War in 1991 with armed military resistance.

2   ILLUSIONS OF NEUTRALITY

The referendum that was implemented on 23 March 2003 was a success. With its relatively high threshold (60%), the decision on the strategic Euro-Atlantic future received high legitimacy. Although the question on EU membership on that Sunday enjoyed much higher support (89%), public support for NATO membership was still high, with two-thirds voting for it (66%) (Poročilo o izidu glasovanja in o izidu referenduma, 2003). Euro-Atlantic optimism certainly had a strong impact on the overall result of the NATO referendum, and the EU referendum held on the same day exploited this optimism with the promised prospects of accession to the EU.

The most important element which contributed to lowering public support for NATO was the Yugoslavian legacy of non-alignment, which also fed the illusion of a second, "neutral" Switzerland during the process of Slovenia's independence. The second element was the collective disappointment of 1999, when Slovenia (although economically the most developed) did not receive an invitation to join NATO together with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland when the first NATO enlargement after the Cold War took place. Slovenia was invited to join NATO during the fifth and largest NATO enlargement in 2003, together with Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia. Slovenia became a NATO member on 29 March 2004, after completing all the legal procedures for accession and depositing the instruments of the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington, along with the other six invited countries.

3   POLITICAL ELITES IN RELATION TO THE DEFENCE SYSTEM

Since Independence, the Slovenian political elites have not been able to gather sufficient political courage to properly, uniformly and unambiguously inform the public that Slovenia needs a national army which will actively engage in international cooperation and which will be able to defend the motherland. As a consequence, 15 years after joining NATO, public support for membership is rather low. In May 2018 a survey was published (by Valicon) showing that 59% of the Slovenian population believe that Slovenia does not benefit from NATO membership and support the idea of leaving NATO. On the other hand, only 41% of the population believe that Slovenia should strengthen its status in NATO and "assign more money to the Alliance from the budget" (Večer, 2018, p 3). Although the question (published in one of the most important Slovenian dailies) was

manipulative, misleading and incorrect[3], the result is still rather worrisome and also reflects the low level of media professionalism in Slovenia (see Introduction).

In Slovenian political space there are still lively debates questioning whether Slovenia needs its own army. Political elites are unable to spread uniform and unambiguous answers and are mainly avoiding the debates, lacking not only the knowledge and ability to articulate the position, but also the political courage. On the other hand it seems that recently we may have observed a positive change, as the current Prime Minister has publically expressed that after 30 years "it is clear that we not only need the Slovenian Armed Forces, but we need to modernize, develop and above all trust it" (Šarec, 2018).

It is historical fact that during the last hundred years the Slovenian nation has been forced many times to defend its national existence with an armed force. It is completely illogical that most of the people who are still advocating demilitarization are at the same time praising the partisan combat which was really the key element to defending Slovenian national existence during the Second World War. They praise national and international historical icons of armed resistance, but at the same time they are advocating the position that Slovenia does not need its own military force.

There are a number of formal documents endorsed by the political elites in Parliament where it is clearly stated that Slovenia needs its own armed forces. For instance the "Resolution of General Long-term Development and Equipping Programme of the Slovenian Armed Forces up to 2025", endorsed by Parliament, even clearly defines the main purpose of the Slovenian Armed Forces, namely to "contribute to the implementation of interests and national security objectives of the Republic of Slovenia through military capabilities" (Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia, 2011, p 8). However, on the other hand, the political elites are not loud enough in public to highlight the fact that the army is a fundamental element of statehood, and that in the world there are really very few demilitarized nations (exactly 15), almost exclusively on remote islands (except for the pocket states of Andorra, Lichtenstein and Vatican City). Concerning military neutrality, it should be very clear that this is a result of specific historical circumstances, where other, mightier nations have imposed it or a mutual agreement was made about it for geopolitical reasons (Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland). Moreover, according to the World Bank, these neutral states have on average an even higher defence budget than Slovenia, not only nominally, but also as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (World Bank, 2019). They also, with the exception of Ireland, have compulsory enlistment of people in a military service (military conscription).

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[3] *Slovenia needs to assign more resources to its own army (not to the Alliance) and to fulfil its own commitments.*

4   THE CHALLENGES OF FULFILLING THE COMMITMENTS

At the NATO Summit in Wales in 2014, heads of states and governments – including Slovenia – agreed to reverse the trend of declining defence budgets. They agreed the members would, within a decade (i.e. up to 2024), a) halt any decline, b) increase defence budgets with the aim of moving towards the 2% of GDP guideline, and c) structurally adapt defence budgets to spend 20% or more on major new equipment (NATO, 2014).

Although this commitment was made at the highest political level, Slovenia was one of the few NATO countries which in the following years actually lowered its defence budget, both in terms of the percentage of GDP (to 0.93%) and in nominal terms. In 2016 and 2017 the defence budget was slightly increased to 1% of GDP, but in 2018 the budget was again decreased below 1% of GDP (see index: http://www.mo.gov.si/si/o_ministrstvu/). Compared to the other Allies, in 2018 only Spain (0.93%), Belgium (0.93%) and Luxemburg (0.54%) were behind Slovenia in the proportion of GDP set aside for defence. If we compare data from 2011 and 2018, we can see that in 2011 Montenegro, Luxemburg, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia were behind Slovenia in the nominal weight of the defence budget, while in 2018 only Luxemburg and Montenegro were behind Slovenia (NATO, 2019).

With regard to the structure of defence expenditure, Slovenia has been the worst of all the Allied countries for a number of years. In 2018 only 8.2% of total defence expenditure was designated for equipment (NATO, 2019), while on the other hand personnel costs came to almost 80%.

These facts have not remained hidden from the other Allied states and NATO Headquarters. Slovenia has been reminded of its commitments as to the level and structure of defence expenditure at various levels and in internal reports (NATO, 2016). Among other things, during his visit in March 2019 on the occasion of the celebration of 15 years of NATO membership, the former NATO Secretary General, George Robertson, was very blunt when he publically stated that "Slovenia is not even close to fulfilling the obligations that you made to NATO 15 years ago" (Kosec, 2019). Unfortunately, even when analyzing hard facts, it must be concluded that Slovenia is becoming irrelevant to the Alliance.

5   BENEFITS OF NATO MEMBERSHIP

It should be noted that Slovenia has gained a great deal by joining the Alliance. Geopolitically it has (re)positioned itself as part of the most developed world. In this context it is understandable that in 2003 the NATO referendum was held at the same time as the EU referendum. All the countries from the other side of "the Iron curtain" which joined NATO have later also joined the EU, including Slovenia.

The most significant benefit of membership is the collective security brought with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, as all of the Allies should defend Slovenia in the event of an armed attack.

As a consequence Slovenia has become economically more attractive. It has received better credit ratings (resulting in lower interest rates), which have had a positive impact on the whole Slovenian economy. Slovenia has become a country with lower risk levels for foreign investments. Membership of NATO has also brought opportunities for the Slovenian defence industry, and possibility for participation in the scientific and technological events of the most developed world.

Internationally, the foreign policy potential and position of Slovenia has been greatly improved. Slovenia has gained a seat behind the joint table together with the militarily and politically strongest states. The possibility of participation in decision-making about the most important questions of world security issues has emerged. Even the strongest players often listen to the positions of Slovenia, mostly on the security issues in our immediate neighbourhood, the Western Balkans.

Defence is much cheaper today than it would be otherwise. The SAF no longer needs to develop and invest in the whole spectrum of the defence system, especially those parts which are often financially the most demanding (military aviation, maritime components, anti-aircraft systems, and so on). Besides this, membership of NATO has in fact enabled Slovenia to abolish the conscript system and professionalize the army. Young boys do not need to enlist and lose six months of their lives in the army; they are available earlier in the labour market, which also has a positive effect on the Slovenian economy.

Membership of NATO also offers more intense cooperation in international military operations and missions. Currently almost 350 members of the SAF (or 5% of all the forces) are deployed abroad (86% in NATO-led operations and missions) (see index: http://www.slovenskavojska.si). This puts Slovenia among the top nations compared to the other Allies. Participation in international operations "has been demonstrated as being very beneficial from the systematic point of view, as it was for a long time a driving engine for the transformation of the Slovenian Armed Forces and defence system" (Čehovin, 2017, p 230).

Conclusion

After fifteen years of NATO membership, Slovenia is still divided between peace idealism, which was part of the Slovenian independence story, and realism, which historically inexorably confirms that allies are needed, and that Slovenians have been forced many times to defend their own existence with military power.

Although we are celebrating 15 years of Slovenia's strategic decision to enter the Alliance, unfortunately there are (still) not many reasons to be sincerely contented with that. A lot of time for urgent defence sector reforms has been lost. The aftertaste is bitter, as Slovenia does not have the military force it should and could have. As has

been identified in the latest Strategic Defence Review in 2016, "the defence system of the Republic of Slovenia has been stopped in its development. Currently, it does not achieve the required level of capacity to tackle the future threats and risks to national security, nor can it fulfil all the assigned objectives and tasks and establish all the necessary defence capabilities of the state" (Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia, 2016, p 8). Unfortunately, in Slovenian politics there is not enough human resource potential able to engage appropriately in defence policy. When formally accepting a number of strategic documents, including the strategic defence reviews of 2009 and 2016 (see Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia, 2009 and 2016), the political elites have in fact formally recognized the very poor situation of the defence system while being unable or unwilling to implement the identified proposals.

No amendments to the Law on Defence, no so-called White Book or any other formal strategic document will change the situation in the defence system. Slovenia already has a number of good strategic defence documents, but unfortunately they are more or less ignored. Every new Government in the last decade has obliged themselves to implement the defence reforms, but none of the really needed reforms were made. Almost all the Governments initially wanted to implement the integration of the military and civil parts of the Ministry of Defence, but they very soon lost interest and courage. The processes are duplicating and the functioning of the defence system is far from optimum. On the other hand, some of the defence reforms were entirely left to the General Staff of the SAF and the results were defective (for instance, the Force Command was abolished in 2013, and then after a few years re-established in 2017; also some of the key specialized battalions – such as chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear – have been abolished).

The defence system has been underfinanced for a decade. After 2010 the defence budget fell from 1.61% of GDP (583 million EUR) to 0.93% of GDP (361 million EUR) in 2015. In 2018 it slowly rose to 0.99% of GDP (448 million EUR). Today, in nominal terms the defence budget is around 150 million EUR lower than it was a decade ago (see index: http://www.mo.gov.si/si/o_ministrstvu/).

The defence system needs to be renovated, transformed and integrated, and the solutions repeatedly identified in the strategic defence reviews need to be implemented (see Defence Sector Strategic Review 2009 and Strategic Defence Review 2016; Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia, 2009 and 2016). According to the latest Strategic Defence Review an improvement in defence expenditure will not automatically improve defence capacity. The review also concluded that there is a need for systematic changes (Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia, 2016, p 8). Nevertheless, the financing of the defence system needs to be greatly improved with regard to the level of GDP, as well as the structure of the budget, which includes raising the budget for defence equipment. Human resource management needs to be improved and a better financial position for military personnel should be achieved. There are a lot of challenges that need to be faced. The role of the political elites

is to recognize, lead and guide the solutions to these challenges; they will not just happen by themselves. If there are no changes, the defence system will continue to decompose to the point of no return. A grounded hope exists that in 2018 the Slovenian defence system has already reached its lowest point and that the extra financial input promised in 2019 by the current Government is a sign of the difficult and lengthy recovery process on the horizon.

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NATO IN SLOVENIJA 15 LET POZNEJE: KAKO USPEŠNE SO BILE NAPOVEDI IZDATKOV ZA OBRAMBO

NATO AND SLOVENIA 15 YEARS ON: HOW ACCURATE WERE PROJECTIONS ABOUT DEFENCE EXPENDITURE

Povzetek   Finančne posledice članstva v Natu so bile pred letom 2004 predmet razprave o razlogih za članstvo Slovenije v zavezništvu. Zato so se oblikovale ocene, na podlagi katerih so različni avtorji in ustanove napovedovali finančne obveznosti ter obrambne izdatke nove članice. Avtorja tega prispevka na podlagi primerjave ocen in stanja po 15 letih ugotavljata, kako uspešne so bile te napovedi. Prepoznavata objektivne okoliščine, na podlagi katerih se je izoblikovala (ne)uspešna napoved. Pri tem ugotavljata boljšo kakovost opredeljevanja obrambnih izdatkov kot prispevkov za Nato. Obenem opozarjata na nevarnost napačnega razumevanja resničnega zmanjšanja obrambnih izdatkov v Sloveniji kot posledice članstva.

Ključne besede   *Obrambni izdatki, finančni prispevki, članstvo v Natu.*

Abstract   The financial consequences of NATO membership had been a subject of debate in the reasons for Slovenian accession to the Alliance before 2004. In order to provide projections of financial obligations and defence expenditure of a new NATO member, some authors and institutions had developed appropriate financial assessments. Based on an analysis of the available sources the authors of this article try to find out how accurate those projections were. They recognize objective circumstances responsible for more or less accurate projections, observing a higher quality of assessments about future defence expenditure than those dealing with financial contributions to NATO budget. Among other messages they call for attention in avoiding possible wrong conclusions that the actual reduction of defence budget that had happened in reality is not a consequence of NATO membership as some projected.

Key words   *Defence expenditure, financial contributions, NATO membership.*

Introduction On 29 March 2004 Slovenia became a full member of NATO. The accession process included, among other things, the country's entrance into the NATO Partnership Programme in 1994, the Planning and Review Process (PARP) in 1997, which was one of the "key tools available for accession", and the conclusion of five Membership Action Plans (MAP) (Šavc, 2009, p 52). Previously Slovenia had experienced a "shock" in 1997 when it was not invited into NATO, because "it had neither the luck nor the geostrategic position of three new members"[1] (Kožar in Šavc, 2009, p 52); because "Slovenian foreign policy was too isolationistic and excluded from contributions to international security" (Jelušič, 2009, p 8); and because, among other things, "the USA did not support the accession of more than three members" and, for NATO, Slovenian membership "did not mean anything significant from the geopolitical and military perspective" (Bebler, 2009, pp 110-111).

In spite of this disappointment, political and other efforts in Slovenia continued towards the strategic goal of NATO membership, which was eventually the priority of all Governments after Independence in 1991, and "enforced by Parliament's resolutions on Slovenian membership of Euro-Atlantic integrations" (Bebler, p 107). The political will of the Alliance was confirmed by the signature of the Accession protocol on March 26 2003 by all members (ibid. p 113). The political will of Slovenia was confirmed the same year by 66% of voters, during the national referendum on NATO and the EU (Jelušič, 2009, p 7).

During the accession process, as in some other new NATO member countries, an intensive political, expert, and public debate on the "pros and cons" of NATO membership took place. Among the topics, a discussion on future defence expenditure and the financial consequences of NATO membership can be found. For this purpose some expert studies were prepared, which were intended to provide more accurate projections (assessments) to enable a better understanding of how NATO membership could impact the country's defence expenditure, and how much it would contribute to the Alliance's budget.

The purpose of this article is to answer the question of how accurate the projections of the financial costs associated with the defence of Slovenia as a new NATO member were. Based on a comparative analysis of financial projections (assessments) of defence expenditure in the last year before entering NATO (2003) and defence expenditure 15 years later (2018), we tried to evaluate the differences between the projected and the actual defence expenditure. An additional motive for the analysis was represented by the fact that during the 5th and the 10th anniversaries of NATO membership, no-one addressed this question. It should be noted that the authors have no intent of evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of NATO membership based on financial data, because NATO membership must be analyzed through the broader field of different aspects (political, security, economic, military, social, geopolitical, etc.) and not only from the financial perspective.

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[1] *The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.*

1   2003: PROJECTIONS AND ACTUAL DEFENCE EXPENDITURE

Based on data acquired from the MOD, defence expenditure in Slovenia in 2003 was 369 million EUR[2] in total, or 1.4% of GDP. The MOD budget was 321 million EUR or 5.14% of the Government budget, from which the Slovenian Armed Forces were allocated 251 million EUR or 78% of the MOD budget (approximately 4% of the Government budget) (MOD, 2019). The analysis shows that in 2003 approximately 56% of expenditure was allocated to personnel, 22% to operations and 22% to investments (Barjaktarević, 2003, pp 5-6).

Some public statements associated with the projections of financial costs after accession to NATO were collected and published by Kovačič, Gregorčič and Fabjančič (2002, pp 65-69 and 72):
– The "membership fee" for NATO "is something between 0.5 and 1% of the national defence budget, which is for Slovenia between 1.5 and 3 million USD" (around 1.4-2.8 million EUR[3]).
– NATO membership "in the long run reduces the defence expenditure of NATO members".
– New NATO members should contribute "only 2.5% of income" to the NATO budget.
– "An effective system of armed neutrality should cost Slovenia approximately 3-4% of GDP."
– "From 2000 to 2010 the Slovenian defence budget will be increased from 1.46% to 2.3% of GDP."
– "Together with the membership fee, the Slovenian defence budget should be increased by an additional 0.75 GDP due to NATO membership."
– Costs associated with the accession would be "even higher than 100 million USD annually in the current decade" (around 95 million EUR).
– Due to the professionalization of the Slovenian Armed Forces the total defence needs will be "2.5-3% of GDP in total".
– "In the next four years Slovenia can afford defence expenditure at a level of 1.7% of GDP, maximum".
– New NATO members are expected "to increase expenditure on defence".

In 1998, the Centre for Strategic Studies of the Ministry of Defence prepared an Assessment of Costs for Slovenian Accession to NATO[4]. In their introductory remarks, the working group responsible for the development of the assessment pointed out a problem of methodology, because "accurate and comprehensive procedures and methods for the calculation of costs do not exist" and the working group could only rely on "the national development and development trends and

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[2] *Defence expenditure comprises the MOD Budget (excluding the finances of the Administration for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief (URSZR) and the Inspectorate for Protection against Natural and other Disasters (IRSVNDN)), and includes expenditure for the Directorate for the Security of Classified Data (UVTP), and military pensions. The Slovenian currency of the time, Tolar (SIT), has been converted to EUR using the formal exchange rate published by the Bank of Slovenia on 31 December, i.e. 1 EUR = 236.6903 SIT).*

[3] *USD were converted to EUR using the European Central Bank (ECB) exchange list, 31 December 2002.*

[4] *Orig. "Ocena stroškov vključevanja Slovenije v Nato".*

experiences of other countries". Therefore the paper is an "expert's compromise", which "emphasizes the NATO enlargement costs at the strategic level" (Kromar, Dobravc, Vuk and Arnejčič, 1998, p 3). They referred to the National Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia for NATO membership[5], which projected the percentage of defence expenditure for 2003 to be at the level of 2.3% of GDP. Projections developed in the Ministry of Defence for the period 2000-2003 showed that there was a planned level of 1.91% of GDP for 2003[6] (ibid. p 14). In discussing the NATO budget they quote that "something between 0.5 and 1% of the national defence budget" should be allocated to this purpose, and, for example, contributions to NATO in 2003 should be 3-5.8 million USD, which is around 2.8-5.5 million EUR[7]. In order to understand their assessments it should be noted that they predicted Slovenia would "become a full NATO member in 2000" (ibid. pp 29 and 31). This means that their assessment for 2003 actually represents the projected defence expenditure and financial obligations of Slovenia as a NATO member.

At least two additional assessments developed within the Ministry of Defence later were associated with NATO membership. One of these was intended for discussion by the Parliament's Defence Board and the Board for International Relations. It talks about the expected financial obligations and burdens coming from the process of accession to NATO. An analysis of this assessment shows that it originated from US studies on NATO enlargement. It defines financial costs as direct (linked to NATO membership) and indirect (they exist even if the country is not in NATO). Direct costs are contributions to the NATO civilian and military budget and the NATO investment programme (NSIP), and costs for national missions to NATO HQ (MOD, 1997, p 3). It was assessed that the total direct costs for Slovenia "would be around 8-10 million USD (7.6-9.5 million EUR) annually in the next 10 years", from which "around 65% would be allocated to contributions, infrastructure and the required transformation of the armed forces" (ibid. p 5). From graphs nos. 9 and 10 which were enclosed it can be seen that the direct costs (derived from the US study on NATO enlargement) would be from 1.45 to 1.88 million USD (1.3-1.7 million EUR). This assessment has limited value for the purposes of this article, because it neither defines the percentage of GDP that Slovenia should dedicate to defence nor does it address the structure of defence expenditure, and as for contributions to the NATO budget, one can only guess because the authors of the assessment did not explain the direct costs in detail.

The second assessment by the Ministry of Defence was prepared by a working group which mainly focused its efforts on Slovenian contributions to the NATO budget. With regard to the projections of defence expenditure, it used the revised national report on defence planning and capabilities conducted within the Planning and Review Process (PARP). The working group used the assumption that Slovenia

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[5] *Orig. "Nacionalna strategija Republike Slovenije za vstop v Nato".*

[6] *They also mention 2.06% of GDP, but this number cannot be used for the purposes of this article because it also includes expenditure on the Natural and Other Disasters relief system.*

[7] *ECB, 31 December 2002.*

"would be a full NATO member in 2005". Because at the time an accurate sharing of the NATO budget was not known, the working group prepared the projection that contributions to the NATO budget should range from 5 to 10 million USD (4.77-9.54 million EUR) (Kovač and others, 2002, p 2), which means that the percentage dedicated to those contributions would be 0.09-0.1% of GDP, or 5.4-6.6% of defence expenditure (ibid. p 5).

Zorko carried out research on defence expenditure and pointed out that Slovenia "dedicated the highest percentage in its history" in 1992, when it reached 2% of GDP. Analyzing defence expenditure from Independence (1991) to 2003, he found that the lowest level was 1.23% in 2000. In 2003, a year before the accession to NATO, it was 1.57% of GDP (Zorko, 2004, pp 32 and 36). He explained the growth in defence expenditure as a consequence of the professionalization of the Slovenian Armed Forces (employment of soldiers and termination of compulsory military service), and their equipping and modernization. He used figures from the projected defence expenditure after accession to NATO of 1.63% of GDP up to 2% in 2008 (ibid., p 40). With regard to the contributions to the NATO budget, he used formal data published by the Government, which stated that the allocated percentage for Slovenia within the total NATO budget should be 0.26%, and so Slovenia should contribute to the civilian budget, military budget and the NATO security investment programme (NSIP) in 2006 the total amount of 2,833,120 EUR (Ibid. pp 45-48).

A study prepared by the US Congressional Budget Office in 1996 involved only the Visegrád group of countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) and can only indirectly show expectations of the growth in defence expenditure for Slovenia as a new NATO member. This study states that all new NATO members should increase current defence expenditure (e.g. Poland by 1.4%, the Czech Republic 1.1%, Slovakia 1.5% and Hungary 1.1%) (SPO, 1996, p 40).

An assessment of future defence expenditure was also prepared by the RAND Corporation, which pointed out, among other things, the economic advantages of NATO membership: (1) in the long run NATO members can reduce defence expenditure because of specialization and a lack of the need to develop all capabilities; (2) membership allows for relocation of defence sources for other purposes (3) it enables the possibility of acquiring sensitive technologies; and (4) NATO membership provides a safe environment which is attractive to foreign investment (Larrabee, Peters and Zycher, 2002, pp 23-24). When assessing defence expenditure, the RAND team used Slovenian plans which were provided by the Annual National Programme of the Republic of Slovenia for the implementation of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) 2001-2003. The transformation of the Slovenian Armed Forces was incorporated into this document, requiring around 41.9 million USD per year in the period 2002-2007 (ibid. p 7). They recognized a disproportion in the projected defence budget, with the planned development of the armed forces having a planned growth of only 17.2 million USD per year. Taking into account the costs associated with the change in military structure, there should have been, for example, in 2003, a

required percentage of defence expenditure of 1.67% of GDP, and 1.76% of GDP in 2005. The data for 2006 and 2007 were not available to the RAND team[8] (ibid. p 13).

At the end of the accession talks between the NATO teams and new members it was agreed that Slovenia's contribution to the NATO budget should be 0.26% of the NATO budget, or 0.3018% for those projects in which not all NATO members participate (e.g. 2,506,950 EUR in 2005 and 2,833,120 EUR in 2006) (NATO, 2003).

2   15 YEARS LATER: DEFENCE EXPENDITURE IN 2018

Defence expenditure in Slovenia in 2018 was 463 million EUR or 1.01% of GDP. The Ministry of Defence spent 454 million EUR, or 4.8% of the state budget. Around 360 million EUR were allocated to the Slovenian Armed Forces, which was 79% of the Ministry's budget. The Slovenian Armed Forces spent 3.81% of the state budget. The structure of defence expenditure in 2018 was as follows: 71% on personnel, 21.9% on operations and 7.1% on investments (MOD, 2019).

In 2018 Slovenia contributed 0.54 million EUR to the NATO civilian budget, 2.4 million EUR to the NATO military budget, and 1.4 million EUR to the NATO Security investment programme; 4.4 million EUR in total. Besides this, Slovenia paid costs for strategic transportation, the NATO Command structure, the Centres of Excellence and some other projects. Total contributions to NATO were 8.2 million EUR (MOD, 2019), which is around 1.8% of the defence budget. It should be noted that the contributions to the NATO civilian and military budgets and the investment programme follow the agreed Slovenian share (0.26% in general), while other costs depend on the country's will to join certain common projects (e.g. strategic transportation) or the use of NATO agencies for certain projects (e.g. maintenance or the modernization of equipment). Questions about the costs associated with NATO membership were also raised by Members of Parliament[9].

3   ANALYSIS

Slovenia had begun to increase defence expenditure some years before its accession to NATO. By the end of the accession process in 2003, it had reached a level of 1.4% of GDP. This trend of growth in both nominal and relative terms continued during the first seven-year period of membership, and was mainly the result of the professionalization of the armed forces, participation in multinational operations and missions, and the modernization of the armed forces (see figures in Figure 1). The growth was planned through national strategic guidance and planning documents for the whole 15 years and more, as a result of the national intent to develop the required defence capabilities of the country, which set priorities on the professionalization

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[8]   *All data was provided by the Ministry of Defence.*

[9]   *The Ministry of Defence has answered questions received from Parliament four times: on 23 June 2016, 18 July 2016, 17 January 2018 and 13 March 2018.*

and modernization of the armed forces. A target level of 2% of GDP was already set by national plans for 2008 – way before the NATO members decided at Wales 2014 that this level should be a commonly agreed obligation.

The highest level of defence expenditure in the last 15 years was achieved in 2010 (1.61% of GDP). After 2010, defence expenditure began to decline and in 2015 reached its lowest level in the history of the independent Slovenian state (0.93% of GDP). The reason for the decline was mainly the financial and economic crisis. In 2016 growth was observed once more, primarily due to additional finances the MOD received to cover the costs associated with the deployment of the Slovenian Armed Forces to national borders during the migration crisis, and because of the political awareness of the need to invest more into national defence which was, among other things, recognized during the regular annual readiness report of the armed forces to the President of the Republic, and through the findings of the Strategic Defence Review conducted in 2016[10] (Government of Slovenia – GOS, 2016). However, the gap in the development of military capabilities due to the financial crisis, in spite of the current strong political will for continual growth in defence expenditure, cannot be filled for another ten years, and even longer may be needed for the modernization of the armed forces.

Figure 1: Slovenian defence expenditure 2003-2018
Source: MOD, 2 February, 2019.

[10] Among other findings of the Strategic Defence Review was also the conclusion that "there is a need to correct the mid-term projections of defence expenditure. In order to economically use the already established capabilities of the Republic of Slovenia, and for the establishment of the priority capabilities Slovenia needs for national purposes and the fulfilment of obligations within NATO and the EU, there should be at least a nominal growth in the defence budget of 30-45 million EUR annually".

The analysis of the MOD budget shows that in the last 15 years the highest percentage of the state budget allocated to defence was in 2008 (6.45%), and the lowest in 2015 (3.51%) (see Figure 2). The rises and falls in the defence budget correspond to changes in the percentage of defence expenditure within GDP in general. It should be noted that the Government of the Republic of Slovenia actually began to reduce the defence budget in 2009, which was two years before the decline in defence expenditure in relation to GDP could be observed; the relatively high percentage of GDP in 2009 and 2010 was successfully maintained due to certain outside factors (e.g. Slovenia received a patrol ship and some air defence weapons to the amount of 53 million EUR from Russia, as a bilaterally agreed solution to paying debts from the time of Yugoslavia). We can observe nominal growth from 2015 onwards; however, defence expenditure is still not at the same level as before the financial crisis. Moreover, the percentage of the state budget dedicated to defence after 15 years is still lower than before NATO membership.

Figure 2:
Defence budget in relation to the state budget and GDP
Source:
MOD, 21 February, 2019.

An analysis of assessments developed to answer the question of the defence expenditure Slovenia, as a full NATO member, should dedicate shows that all authors projected an enhancement in defence expenditure. There was a certain agreement that enhancement was required due to the professionalization of the Slovenian Armed Forces after the termination of conscription, its modernization, enhanced participation in multinational missions and operations (mainly NATO), contributions

to the NATO budget, and costs associated with working positions within the NATO structure. There were differences in views on the amount of additional growth there should be, which ranged from 0.6 to 1.6% of GDP, or from half to more than twice the budget of the year before NATO accession. In total they projected defence expenditure at 2-3% of GDP (see Figure 3).

In reality defence expenditure within the last 15 years has never reached the level forecast; in fact it reached a level higher than before accession by only about 0.15% of GDP. At the end of this period they had reached a level even lower, by only about 0.3% of GDP compared to the level before NATO membership. Simply put, those who assessed that there would be a need to enhance defence expenditure were right, but they all projected a higher level than has been actually been reached. The closest to the real figures were those who projected a required level of 2% of GDP. This was the level defined, among other things, by the Resolution on the General Long-Term Programme for the Development and Equipping of the Slovenian Armed Forces 2025[11] adopted by Parliament (Parliament, 2010). This is also the target level Slovenia set along with other NATO members at Wales 2014[12] (NATO, 2014).

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[11] _The resolution, among other things, states: "The changes in the level of defence expenditure in the Republic of Slovenia should be heading towards 2% of GDP in the long-term. This is to enable the Republic of Slovenia to strive for fulfilment of its political obligations within the Alliance. Due to economic circumstances and the wider social situation, the realization of this ambition could be implemented even after 2025"._

[12] _During the NATO summit in Wales the allies agreed that those "currently meeting the NATO guideline to spend a minimum of 2% of their GDP on defence will aim to continue to do so", while those who do not should "aim to move towards the 2% guideline within a decade"._

Observing the trend of defence expenditure through the 15 years one can come to the incorrect conclusion that NATO membership has resulted in reduced defence expenditure. It is true that because of NATO Slovenia does not need to develop certain capabilities or procure specific equipment for national defence (e.g. fighter aircraft for air defence); however, Slovenia is well behind the national plans in the development of its planned capabilities, as was also recognized by the Strategic Defence Review in 2016[13]. Some of these capabilities are also purposed for the defence of the Alliance, within the framework of NATO capability targets.

There is a need to recognize a difference between the required level of defence expenditure and the level that politics is willing to allocate to defence. After political decisions in Parliament and in NATO talks, 2% of GDP is what we may consider to be the required level. It is apparent that the growth in defence expenditure should continue. We can read how this growth is planned in the Mid-Term Defence Programme 2018-2023 which, among other things, expects that defence expenditure will grow "about 43 million EUR annually on average to reach a nominal level of 679 million EUR in 2023". This means that in 2023 there will be more financial resources in nominal terms available for defence than in any other year since Independence. What that will be as a percentage of GDP is hard to assess, because we do not know what GDP will be in that year. According to the current projections mentioned in the Mid-Term Defence Programme it should be 1.11% of GDP, and the goal is "to reach 1.2% of GDP in 2025" (GOS, 2018, p 15). In this case, defence expenditure in 2023 in relative terms will be lower by 0.2% of GDP than in the last year before Slovenia's accession to NATO.

The Mid-Term Defence Programme, in its introductory remarks, emphasizes that the "fulfilment of obligations agreed in Wales on the growth in defence expenditure in order to reach 2% of GDP will be achieved in phases", which leads to the conclusion that in the next mid-term period there is no possibility of establishing the required defence capabilities, and the trend of growth should continue taking into account the politically reasonable level[14]. Therefore Slovenia will not be able to meet some forecasts of a long-term reduction in defence expenditure as a result of NATO membership.

Analyzing the projections of Slovenian contributions to the NATO budget, we compared payments for the civilian budget, the military budget and the security investment programme, because they are derived from the constant share the allies agreed among themselves, and because other payments depend on the national will to join certain NATO programmes. The authors who prepared assessments of the costs associated with NATO membership and projected contributions to the NATO

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[13] *"The defence system of the Republic of Slovenia has stalled in its development. It currently does not reach the required level of ability to deal with future threats and risks to the national security, and cannot achieve all the assigned goals and tasks or set up all the necessary defence capabilities."*

[14] *At the end of 2018 the Government of Slovenia announced that the target level of expenditure is 1.5% of GDP in 2025. This decision is waiting to be incorporated into appropriate strategic guidance and planning documents.*

budget could not have had the possibility of knowing about those "other payments", and they relied on data on contributions to the NATO budget by NATO members comparable in size to Slovenia. The structure of the contributions Slovenia provided in 2018 is shown in Figure 4.

ANA Trust Fund,
641.300 €, 7.8%

Other,
641.300 €, 2%

Civilian Budget,
544.088 €, 6.6%

NATO Agencies,
434.774 €, 5.3%

Military Budget,
2.399.163 €, 29.1%

NATO Command Structure,
536.699 €, 6.5%

Strategic Transport,
2.056.504 €, 25%

NATO Security Investment
Program (NSIP),
1.458.933 €, 17.7%

Contributions to the NATO budget: 4.402.184 € (53,4 %)
Total contributions to NATO: 8.239.215 €

Based on an analysis of projections of the percentage of GDP dedicated to defence, we found relatively synchronized perspectives between authors, which is not the case when they talk about contributions to the NATO budget, where we can observe very large differences and projections ranging from 1.4 to almost 10 million EUR. Even within the Ministry of Defence two projections differ significantly (one talks about 1.3-1.7 million EUR and the other 4.77-9.54 million EUR). These projections are shown in Figure 5.

The closest assessment to reality is the one which talks about 2.8-5.5 million EUR (the actual contributions to the NATO budget in 2018 were around 4.2 million EUR). In reality the total amount paid to NATO in 2018 was 8.2 million EUR. The difference between 4.2 and 8.2 million comes from other payments (e.g. for the NATO Command structure, the new NATO Headquarters, the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund, the development of common capabilities, and so on).

When "judging" the (un)successful projections we should take into account the difficulties the authors were facing when developing those projections. Until 2003

when the final accession talks (negotiations) ended, the authors were not in a position to know what the agreed share for Slovenia within the total NATO budget would be. They also could not predict the NATO enlargement process (as the share directly depends on the number of NATO members).

Figure 5: Projected and actual contributions to the NATO budget
Source: The authors, using available resources (see sections 2 and 3).

Conclusion

Based on our analysis of the assessed and actual Slovenian defence expenditure and financial obligations in NATO, we conclude that the projections about defence expenditure were relatively accurate. They all talked about required growth. The authors of these projections generally argued that the required level after accession should be above 2% of GDP. This is above the level that is today a commonly agreed target line within the Alliance, also set by national strategic guidance and planning documents.

The fact that after an initial rise in defence expenditure Slovenia began to reduce it, and that today the share of the state budget dedicated to defence is lower than before accession to NATO, does not confirm the forecast that defence expenditure would decline as a result of NATO membership. The reduction is a result of the financial crisis and political decisions. There is a need for further growth in defence expenditure, not because it was agreed within the alliance, but because national assessments emphasise that defence capabilities and the readiness of the armed forces are not at the planned level or the level required by the changing international security environment.

Projections about Slovenia's contributions to the NATO budget were less accurate. Almost all authors projected a lower amount of payment than is experienced today. We can assume the methodology for calculating those contributions was not so familiar to them at the time, and also that the data of comparable allied countries were of limited value for the accuracy of the projections[15]. In addition, the authors had no possibility of taking into account future obligations derived from changes in NATO's financial policy, costs associated with the requirement to deploy military and civilian personnel to NATO Headquarters and institutions and their operational costs, and the national decision to take part in different projects or use the services of NATO agencies.

The assessments of the future costs of new NATO members were developed in the period 1997-2003 in circumstances that probably did not provide all the possibilities for a detailed understanding of NATO's financial mechanisms. In spite of this fact and other objective obstacles some of them were close to today's reality. The question remains for further research of whether they (those both accurate and inaccurate) played any role within the decision-making process during the accession period. Arguments for and against NATO membership included the financial aspects of membership; however, there was no intensive debate about the financial consequences in all the questions addressed during the national debate on the reasons to join NATO.

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Alija Kožljak

KO MAJHNO POSTANE VELIKO – SLOVENIJA IN NJENIH PETNAJST LET V NATU

WHEN SMALL BECOMES BIG – FIFTEEN YEARS OF SLOVENIA IN NATO

Povzetek

Prispevek analizira članstvo Slovenije v Natu z zunanjega, zlasti regionalnega, vidika. Konceptualni okvir temelji na teoretičnih izhodiščih mednarodnih odnosov, ki pomagajo razumeti dogodke, povezane s procesi vključevanja v Nato. Metodologija za analizo je predvsem kvalitativna raziskava z nekaterimi primarnimi in sekundarnimi viri.

Besedilo prispeva k razpravam, ali majhne države zagotavljajo stalno varnost v zavezništvu. Zato preučuje primer Slovenije pri njenih prizadevanjih, da bi bila zanesljiva članica Nata. Pri tem obravnava njen trud in njeno vlogo v evro-atlantskih prizadevanjih držav Zahodnega Balkana.

Obravnava tudi vprašanje, koliko Slovenija pravzaprav sledi svojim nacionalnim interesom, prispeva k uresničevanju ambicij sosednjih držav glede Nata in krepi regionalno stabilnost, pri čemer je njena podlaga velika organizacija.

Po nekaterih predhodnih trditvah je v prispevku na kratko opisana pot vključevanja, ki jo je Slovenija opravila v obdobju od razpada Jugoslavije do vstopa v Nato. Avtor se nato osredotoči na njeno delovanje v soseščini, nazadnje pa na kratko oriše tudi vlogo Slovenije kot zagovornice in podpornice regije.

Prispevek se konča z ugotovitvijo, da Slovenija kljub svoji majhnosti in obsegu delovanja zagotavlja določene zmogljivosti, zaradi katerih je ugledna članica zavezništva.

Ključne besede

Slovenija, Nato, regija, Balkan, članstvo.

Abstract

This paper analyzes Slovenia's membership of NATO from an external, rather regional perspective. The conceptual context is based on theories of international relations, simplifying the understanding of developments related to the NATO integration processes. The methodology used for this analysis is mainly qualitative research, by means of several primary and secondary sources.

In this context, the paper contributes to debates on whether small states serve as consistent security providers in the Alliance; hence, it examines Slovenia's case in its efforts to be a reliable member of the Alliance. Correspondingly, it studies Slovenia's attempts and its role in the Euro-Atlantic efforts of the Western Balkan countries. Likewise, the paper further examines to what extent, using the large organization as a platform, Slovenia pursues its own national interests, contributes to achieving the NATO ambitions of neighbouring countries, and strengthens regional stability.

After some preliminary arguments, the paper briefly describes Slovenia's integration path, from Yugoslavia to NATO. It then elaborates Slovenian engagements in the neighbourhood, before attempting to provide a short illustration of the role of Slovenia as an advocate of the region.

The paper concludes that, despite its size and scope, Slovenia provides specific capacities that have verified the country as a respected member of the Alliance.

Key words *Slovenia, NATO, region, Balkan, membership.*

Introduction Even though NATO changed its mission considerably when the Cold War ended, developing the concept of "cooperative security"[1] and adapting to the emergence of asymmetric threats, today, 25 years later, we are once more facing the significance of the NATO military purpose, which is yet again to protect the dispersion of Russian influence in Europe. There has been a great deal of interest in terms of integrating ex-Yugoslav states into Euro-Atlantic society, expressed by most western countries, as well as by the Alliance *per se*. In addition to the benefits that each new member gains, despite some hesitations, many researchers argue that the integration of the entire Western Balkans[2] would undoubtedly be beneficial for the wider region and beyond.

Seemingly, the common security umbrella has been perceived as a prerequisite to preventing fragility in the region, but at the same time, to enhancing neighbourly relationships, boosting economic development and improving overall welfare.

Although Realpolitik claims that international organizations are "… slaves to nation-states and tools of great powers" (Shapiro, 2017), small countries can still obtain influence through powerful international organizations, as NATO certainly is, to realize their own national interests.

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[1] *"In the early 1990s, many strategic thinkers were caught up in a tide of optimism generally hailed as the New World Order. The term Cooperative Security became a catch phrase for a rather idealistic approach to the swiftly changing international climate." (Cohen and Mihalka 2001, p 4).*

[2] *The term Western Balkans is both geographic and political. It was initially employed by US and European policymakers to describe the part of the Balkan Peninsula that has remained outside both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) since the early 1990s. It included all seven states which were formed during the collapse of Yugoslavia (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia) together with Albania, which was emerging from international isolation. (Bugajski, 2017).*

Thus, in order to compensate for a lack of visibility and foreign appreciation, a small state must find unconventional ways to gain international attention in order to convince powerful countries of its relevance. There are numerous appropriate approaches for small states to be internationally recognized, including lobbying in international organizations, friendships with great powers, or the cooperation of several states, which are suggested by Alan Henrikson. Henrikson further suggests that "One of the most popular approaches that successful small states followed to address this problem is the so-called 'niche diplomacy', by which they are focusing their resources within one area in order to get the best returns and the widest international recognitions" (Lakatos, 2017, p 59). To a great degree, this could explain Slovenia's efforts to become part of one of the most recognized regional organizations by name, even global by perception, i.e. NATO.

1 FROM YUGOSLAVIA TO NATO

The new mission of NATO that emerged after the culmination of the bipolar system was largely focused on the promotion of security and democracy in Europe and beyond. This also included a significant enlargement of the Alliance, with a clearly expressed interest in embracing Central and Eastern European countries, primarily the ex-Warsaw pact states and ex-Yugoslavia. In fact, the interest in enlargement was mutual, and not only in countries that were part of or under the huge influence of the Soviet Union, but also in the ex-Yugoslav republics, including Slovenia.

Later came the dissolution of Yugoslavia, which would not have echoed so loudly in comparison with the collapse of the Soviet Union if the republics had succeeded in finding a peaceful solution.

Slovenia, as the most western republic of ex-Yugoslavia, was utterly oriented towards its own independence, undoubtedly seeing before it its Western European future. Such intentions were visible even during the existence of the Yugoslavian federation; however, the overall circumstances, including global and regional developments, were not as much in favour of that until these two dissolutions occurred. From the perspective of size and population, Slovenia was generally considered a rather small state, determined to achieve independence and western associations. Euro-Atlantic integration was apparently the best-matched vehicle for attaining that strategic goal.

Although Slovenia immediately expressed its interest in joining both the European Union and NATO, political debate, as well as public opinion, varied on the benefits of affiliating with these organizations. The motivation to join the European Union was never seriously questioned, but this was not the case with NATO. Highlighting the significance of the Alliance, it was argued that, in addition to the security benefits, for Slovenia as well as for the region, "NATO membership would improve relations with other NATO members, especially neighbouring Italy, vital relationships for a small, trade-oriented country such as Slovenia,"

(Veltman, 2003). This suggests that by emphasizing the importance of the Alliance as a security umbrella, Slovenia's ambition to join NATO was augmented.

"The great interest shown in becoming part of the organization was mainly because the new NATO was seen as an organization that would provide rock-solid security by enabling democracy and a market economy where the favourable security environment would allow many businesses to safely invest capital in these countries and provide them with prosperity" (Delova, 2009, p 1).

When the first post-Cold War enlargement of NATO occurred in 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined the Alliance[3]. What characterized this enlargement was a set of preconditions that aspirant countries had to fulfil in order to obtain membership. This conditionality would remain as an adopted philosophy for future NATO enlargements. Slovenia also applied for the first wave of enlargement, despite the internal dilemmas, and mainly fulfilled all the preconditions; however, it was not invited to join.

While Slovenia quickly succeeded with democratic reforms and achieved the highest per capita GDP in Central and Eastern Europe at that time (Šabič and Bukowski, 2002), apparently the strongest voices within the Alliance did not recognize the benefits of embracing Slovenia. The arguments for excluding Slovenia from the first wave of enlargement were related to defence competences and Slovenia's ability to afford the costs of membership. One of the major reasons explaining the initial denial to bring Slovenia into NATO in the first wave was that the country would "not make any appreciable gain in geopolitical and military terms' and it would only bring cost to the Alliance" (Bebler, 1999, p 39). Accordingly, even though Slovenia was not too poor, and would not be the smallest member, one could claim that the country was generally still too minor for the Alliance's interests. In addition to this, many argued that Slovenia did not have any concrete backers among the big powers; even on the contrary, France required a Romanian invitation together with Slovenia, which also complicated the aspirant ambitions of the country[4].

Initial reservations about Slovenian membership did not last long. Alongside its continued progress, and increased cooperation with the Alliance, there were also some external developments that enhanced the inclusion of Slovenia in the new enlargement wave. Instability in the region, including the Kosovo crises, as well as the 9/11 terrorist attacks, augmented Slovenia's cause, and at the same time increased domestic support for joining NATO. It was therefore undeniably in line with expectations that the invitation to join the Alliance came during the NATO Prague summit in 2002.

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[3] *On 10 December 1996 NATO decided to invite Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic to apply for membership at the Madrid summit, scheduled for July 1997.*

[4] *From discussion with Slovenian Military representative to NATO and EU, BG D. Humar.*

The importance of building bridges and linking concurring nations in the newly established international environment was recognized by the big powers. Thus, the US specifically acknowledged the importance of small states, whether because of their location, resources or other capital that a country could bring to the Alliance. "Nobody is bigger than the United States of America. No big power more appreciates small powers. No small state will find a better friend than the United States" (Carafano, 2017).

Hence, Slovenia was warmly welcomed as a new NATO member, whose potential and significance had been recognized. Being the first country from the region to join the Alliance, Slovenia's experience was also quickly respected in the region. In fact, this success of Slovenia served as a tangible motivating factor for other ex-Yugoslav countries, including Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Firstly, although some of them were far behind Slovenia's successes, NATO membership was perceived as an achievable goal. Secondly, because of their common past, Slovenia was inevitably considered as an imminent supporter of other countries from the region.

2   ENGAGEMENTS IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD

Taking into consideration that "peace, security and prosperity are the three pillars of Slovenia's foreign policy" with the strategic interests of Slovenia being "to ensure security and stability around the globe, but particularly in Europe", it is clear why NATO remains the most relevant arrangement for guaranteeing Slovenia's national security (The Foreign Policy of the Republic of Slovenia, 2015).

Originally, Slovenia strove to associate with initiatives from other regions, with a more Western European affiliation, including the Central European Initiative and the Central European Free Trade Agreement. Although geographically Slovenia partly belongs to the Balkan peninsula, from the perspective of other ex-Yugoslav states this move has been understood as a sign of hesitation in Slovenia to be considered as a Balkan country. This was emphasized by highlighting differences between the rest of Yugoslavia, developing a distinct discourse, distant from the Balkan region. An example of this was "the rejection of participation in the South-East Europe Cooperation Initiative (SECI)" (Bojinović and Šabič, 2017, p 53). Slovenia even refused to join the Balkan Countries' CHODs Conference on Military Cooperation, even though "the main aim of this initiative is to promote the stability, cooperation and well-being of the countries in this region," (Balkan countries CHODs forum).

Although initial Slovenian foreign policy slanted towards an "away from the Balkans" approach (Bojinović and Šabić, 2017), Slovenia soon made a move back towards the Balkan region. This was already announced by the Declaration on Foreign Policy from 1999, where an active role of the state in the South-East European group of countries was highlighted (Declaration on Foreign Policy 1999).

Being aware of its limited resources to implement these goals, Slovenia projected its specific capabilities. "That niche was the Western Balkans," (Bojinović and Šabič, 2017, p 58).

Notably, Slovenia's reservations about the Balkans changed into a more creative way of considering the region. It also seems that a new platform – South-East Europe – became much more acceptable for Slovenia to affiliate with, hence regional forums, such as the Stability Pact for South-East Europe, later the Regional Cooperation Council, the South-East European Defence Ministerial, the South-East Europe Cooperation Programme, and some others proved appropriate settings for cooperation.

Thus, in addition to the Alliance's arrangements, there have been a number of regional forums where Slovenia has actively participated. Most of these settings have also been used as a platform to bring the region closer to the Euro-Atlantic society. The engagement of Slovenia in the region was visibly enlarged, particularly once the country had become a fully-fledged member of NATO.

This put this young country in a position to trace the Euro-Atlantic path for others, but at the same time, to build its own international image. Participation and facilitation in regional activities, and direct engagement in common missions and tasks in the countries from the region, with backing of these countries in their attempts to join NATO, were some of Slovenia's most notable efforts.

The appreciation that came with membership of NATO and the EU also stimulated Slovenian officials to lead or host various initiatives related to the Euro-Atlantic integration of the region. Slovenia's proactive attitude has been truly acknowledged by both particular countries and the NATO authorities, so triggering its significant involvement in the integration processes of the Western Balkan states. It has been accepted as beneficial for all: Slovenia, countries from the region, and the Alliance as a whole.

However, in order to implement these ambitions, considerable resources are required. Indeed, there has been constant demand to achieve a defence expenditure share which is in accordance with the NATO guide of 2% of the countries' GDP. Slovenia regularly strives to reach that objective; however, it seems that is too demanding, bearing in mind that Slovenia consistently allocates only around 1% for defence. In such circumstances, it has been imperative for Slovenia to find a way to justify its effective contribution to the Alliance, compensating for its defence expenditure shortfall. As Grizold stated, "Although Slovenia will never be able militarily to match the capabilities of the larger NATO members, it, and no doubt other small countries, can contribute far more than its size would suggest by playing to its strengths, specializing to a certain extent and concentrating on niche areas. Indeed, it is itching to be given the opportunity and assume its responsibilities," (Grizold, 2002). Certainly, Slovenia has assumed responsibilities,

and among other things, played an important role in the integration processes, offering in this way an additional value to the Alliance.

By increasing its participation in NATO activities and projects, Slovenia demonstrated its tangible involvement in the Alliance. "Membership of today's NATO is not only about security guarantees, but increasingly about influence and participation,'' (Honkanen, 2002, p 15). Hence, by participating in the decision-making process of the Alliance, Slovenia has been able to influence it. Furthermore, it empowers the country to engage in the region, contributing to the Alliance's efforts, while at the same time sharing experience with countries from the region and enhancing their aspirant positions. A common history with the ex-Yugoslav republics was the key prerequisite to comprehending developments in neighbouring countries. It is argued that "Slovenian membership of NATO can help bring a lasting peace to the whole Balkan region, better ensuring Slovenian security in the long run," (Veltman, 2003).

Subsequently, Slovenia participated in most NATO projects in the region, which includes missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Serbia and Kosovo. Taking an active part in NATO engagements in Bosnia and Herzegovina, from SFOR to NATO HQ Sarajevo, as well as the EU operation ALTEA, Slovenia proved its political orientation towards supporting reforms and security in the host nation, and also towards validating Slovenian defence and military relevance within the Alliance.

Slovenian military participation in the KFOR mission (Kosovo Force) was perceived as an additional quality, which is related to the fact that Slovenian presence has been never misjudged by the host nation (unlike Croatia for instance)[5]. Involvement in the NATO mission in North Macedonia[6] – the NATO Military Liaison Office in Skopje[7] – represents a higher level of contribution from Slovenia, providing military advice to defence structures in the host nation, in this way enhancing security reforms and supporting the NATO membership aspirations of North Macedonia. Again, there are paybacks for all: Slovenian status within the Alliance has been improved by the continual appointments of Slovenian senior officers as commanders of NATO Headquarters in Skopje. They have undeniably been representing NATO as an organization and implementing the policy of the

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[5] As an outcome of the recent conflict, Serbia has considered Croatia's eventual engagement as partial.

[6] In accordance with the Prespa agreement, which was ratified by the parliaments of Greece and North Macedonia by 25 January 2019 and went into force on 12 February 2019, replacing the interim accord of 1995. It sees the country's constitutional name, then the Republic of Macedonia, changed to the Republic of North Macedonia (European Western Balkans, 2019).

[7] NHQS was created in April 2002 by the amalgamation of two HQs, namely KFOR REAR and AMBER FOX. The mission is to advise the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's Government Authorities on military aspects of Security Sector Reform in order to contribute to further Euro-Atlantic Integration and provide support to NATO-led operations within the Balkans Joint Area of Operations. As of April 1 2012, the mission's name is NATO LIAISON OFFICE SKOPJE, which is more representative of its mission (NATO Liaison Office Skopje, 2019).

Alliance by accomplishing this mission.[8] Still, having its representatives heading a NATO command has also been an excellent opportunity for Slovenia to underscore its own national interests in the region and beyond.

Even in non-aspirant countries such as Serbia, Slovenia has been welcome to take part via the NATO Military Liaison Office in Belgrade. The experience and prestige that Slovenia gained in previous missions, as well as the constant support of particular intentions expressed by respective countries, made Slovenia highly qualified to take part in assisting the implementation of defence reforms in Serbia, as well as the reform and modernization of the Serbian Armed Forces.

Slovenian membership of NATO and the EU has also been very well used to protect Slovenia's national interests, even disputing some regional issues. One example was a border dispute with Croatia, "when Slovenia, a European Union member state, blocked the negotiation progress of Croatia, an EU candidate state." (Croatia Country Study Guide, Volume 1: Strategic Information and Developments, 2013, p 30) The issue was resolved when the two countries agreed with the EU to settle the dispute with an obligatory arbitration. Similarly, some political parties from Slovenia threatened to block Croatian accession to NATO in January 2009, causing a delay to the Assembly session supposed to ratify the accession protocols. However, after NATO expressed concerns, the Slovenian Parliament finally ratified Croatia's NATO accession (Croatia-Slovenia border disputes, 2019).

By engaging in the region, Slovenia has further improved its international image and gained additional influence by becoming a well-recognized 'insider'. Through this, Slovenia has come to the position of not only being able to contribute to preserving security in the region, but also to better protecting its own comforts, using common instruments from both organizations, NATO and the EU. Furthermore, enjoying the benefits and responsibilities of membership, Slovenia quickly extended its contribution to the level of direct assistance to countries from the region in opening the Alliance's door, by being a NATO contact embassy, deploying its advisors or promoting overall progress towards NATO.

3   SLOVENIA AS AN ADVOCATE OF THE REGION

New security dilemmas which appeared in the 21st century required an appropriate response, which also became a big challenge for NATO. After coping with multiple challenges and risks, including the fight against terrorism, NATO again faced the

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[8]   *A joint statement by the EU Special Representative and Head of Delegation of the EU, Erwan Fouéré; the NATO HQ Skopje Commander and Senior Military Representative, David Humar; the Head of the OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje, Ambassador Jose-Luis Herrero; and the United States Ambassador, Philip T. Reeker: We recognize and welcome the positive progress the country has made in improving interethnic relations since the signature of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. The Agreement and relevant constitutional provisions remain indispensable to building a peaceful, just and cohesive multiethnic society (OSCE, 12 August 2010).*

necessity of protecting its own area[9]. The area of the Western Balkans, which had begun its integration into the Alliance precisely through Slovenian membership, has faced strong Russian influence, particularly during the last decade, with Russia's obvious intent being to expand its control across this part of Europe and beyond. There is also a growing awareness that the fragility of the region could affect security and stability, as well as there being concerns about the occurrence of extreme organizations, supported from abroad, in the region. The strategy of intense cooperation and the open-door policy therefore extended the Alliance's relevance. As NATO secretary General Stoltenberg stated, "NATO enlargement is not a provocation. We respect the right of every sovereign nation to decide their own destiny, without force and without interference," (Stoltenberg, 2019).

Consequently, assisting countries from the region to overcome existing obstacles on their Euro-Atlantic road became an imperative for Slovenian foreign policy, triggering an intensification of activities in order to embrace them into the Alliance.

Indeed, since 2004, when Slovenia became a fully-fledged NATO member state, the region has had its promoter. In addition to other constant efforts, Slovenia's proactive role in the region has been proven by competition with other NATO members for assuming the role of the NATO Contact Point Embassy. Tackling 'bigger' players has been perceived as a very demanding challenge from the outside. However, a number of factors predisposed Slovenia to be a credible competitor and even to win the position. A relevant explanation of this triumph could be presented by two assessments, one observed from NATO, and the other from a regional perspective. Firstly, without any doubt, NATO appreciated Slovenia's rapid reform accomplishments, as well as its insider knowledge of the region, which boosted Slovenian relevance. Secondly, countries from the region not only appreciated Slovenia's accomplishments, but also Slovenia's truly impartial position in the sense of the inter-ethnic disputes that constantly occur between the ex-Yugoslav republics.

Thus, after just two years in the Alliance, Slovenia became a provider of a new quality of benefits, with an enhanced status for pursuing the integration process of other countries. An appropriate understanding of the situation of the NATO area and its immediate proximity brought Slovenia to be a NATO proxy for the region, being recognized as one of the best explainers of the situation.

Accordingly, on 1 January 2007, the Embassy of the Republic of Slovenia in Skopje assumed the role of NATO Contact Point Embassy to the Republic of Macedonia (Ministrstvo za zunanje zadeve, 2007). This insider position empowered Slovenia to effectively arrange appropriate activities (debates, seminars, meetings, conferences) to bring the country closer to the Alliance. At the same time, it enabled Slovenia to encourage progress within this particular country and accordingly, to promote

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[9] *The area of the Western Balkans could geographically even be considered as being within NATO.*

every improvement achieved among the other members and the NATO authorities, in this way becoming an efficient bond between NATO and the host nation. As the Macedonian Minister of Defence, Radmila Sekerinska, recently claimed, "Macedonia has the unreserved support of Slovenia for its efforts towards accession to the European Union (EU) and NATO membership," (Xinhua.net, 2019).

Active preparation brought about good results; however, due to the bilateral dispute with Greece, Macedonian membership was vetoed for a long time. Nevertheless, after the internal political balance had changed in Macedonia, announcing a more flexible position with regard to the name disagreement with Greece, Slovenia stepped in once again, joining the overall international efforts to find a solution to eliminate the veto against NATO membership. Slovenia's engagement was also evidenced by the statement of the Slovenian Foreign Minister, Miro Cerar, who said: "It is an extremely important step forward that confirms the will to permanently tackle the name issue and thus to allow Macedonia to move forward on its path to the Euro-Atlantic associations," (Total Slovenia News, 2018). Direct involvement was also expressed by Slovenian civilian and military diplomats from NATO HQ Brussels, who travelled to Skopje and worked with the Macedonian authorities on specific issues, in order to overcome obstacles to joining the Alliance. Obviously, Slovenia's advisory role and the constant sponsorship of Macedonia directly contributed to the recent achievement of its receiving an invitation to NATO membership.

Slovenia's backing role has been particularly noticeable with regard to assisting Montenegro. Continuing with a similar practice of serving as a NATO Contact Point Embassy, Slovenia completed two appointments in Montenegro, from 2011 until 2014. An intensive engagement was carried out by repeatedly positioning high level civilian or military advisors to the Ministry of Defence of Montenegro. This concrete Slovenian assignation, which has already lasted for a decade, provided an additional quality of direct assistance to Montenegrin efforts to join NATO. Slovenia undoubtedly earned credits for the great advancement that Montenegro achieved, which encouraged the Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic to knock on the Alliance's door in January 2014, clearly expressing the desire for Montenegro to join NATO.

Slovenia's proactive sponsoring continued, as was highlighted by a letter to the NATO Secretary General, co-signed by Slovenian and Croatian Foreign and Defence Ministers on 29th May 2014, "stressing the importance of inviting Montenegro into NATO" during NATO's 2014 Summit in Wales (The Slovenia Times, 2014).

Although NATO did not offer membership to any new countries that year, the Alliance announced at the summit that it would soon be embracing Montenegro by opening intensified talks with the country. Intensive cooperation was also sustained between Slovenia and Montenegro within NATO HQ in Brussels, with constant engagement between the two delegations to NATO, as well as of the two capitals, paving the way to Montenegro's fully-fledged membership. NATO issued a formal invitation

on 2 December 2015, and after the ratification process, Montenegro officially joined NATO on 5 June 2017. Slovenia completed its sponsorship by being one of the first two countries to ratify the Protocol on the Accession of Montenegro to NATO, on 8 June 2017, the day after Iceland finalized its ratification (Government of the Republic of Slovenia, 2016).

Bosnia and Herzegovina also enjoyed intensive backing from Slovenia in its efforts to extend its relationship with NATO. In 2015, Slovenia was also a candidate for the NATO Contact Point Embassy for Bosnia and Herzegovina; however, on that occasion the UK won that position. This occurred for two reasons: firstly, the UK had already begun sponsorship of the UK-German initiative to intensify Euro-Atlantic integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and secondly, Slovenia preferred a more realistic course of action and focused on some other countries from the region where success was faster to achieve. Nevertheless, it did not damage Slovenian support for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Since the Membership Action Plan (MAP) was provisionally granted to Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Tallinn in 2010, with the condition of registering prospective immovable military property in the state, Slovenia has constantly advocated the progress made in that country, striving to convince the Allies to activate the MAP. The implementation of this precondition was indeed complex; however, Bosnia and Herzegovina found it very difficult to convince the Allies of the difficulty of the process. Thus, working closely with its Bosnian counterparts, the Slovenian delegation to NATO in Brussels appropriated various activities in order to find a way to unblock the process. Alongside the presentation of progress made by Bosnia and Herzegovina in numerous areas, especially in the field of defence and military operations, Slovenian civilian and military officials constantly backed Bosnia and Herzegovina during NAC and ministerial meetings, summits and other similar occasions. One of the initiatives which first smashed the principally rigid position of the member states on the fulfilment of the 'Tallinn precondition' was launched in cooperation with the Slovenian Ambassador to NATO, Jelko Kacin, who arranged the circulation of the 'Progress Paper of Bosnia and Herzegovina', including an explanation of the tangible completion of the Tallinn precondition. This continued with a series of meetings at NATO HQ with officials from Bosnia and Herzegovina, facilitated by the Slovenian delegation, resulting in a 'reinterpretation' of the Tallinn precondition. The intention was to combine all the progress made, including its well-perceived contribution to the NATO operation, with a presentation of the advancement and explanation of the objective complications in registering military property. This kind of backing could only be made by NATO members who really understood the complexity of the legal and administrative procedures in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who were aware of the mentality of the people there, and at the same time, who knew the political difficulties imposed by the Dayton constitution. Slovenia had not only the competence to understand all this, but also the privilege to be accepted as the most unbiased country from the region, without hidden interests, which could not be said about some other neighbouring countries.

Finally, at the end of 2018, NATO offered Bosnia and Herzegovina the opportunity to submit their first Annual National Programme. Slovenia was again one of the upbeat advocates in obtaining a consensus between the Allies. It is now up to the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina to respond properly and to obtain the activation of the MAP.

Slovenia was the first ex-Yugoslav country to recognize Kosovo as an independent state, which caused an instant dissatisfaction response from Serbia. Despite frequent calls from Serbia to revoke its recognition of Kosovo, Slovenia's sustained policy has been confirmed by the recent statement of the Foreign Minister, Miro Cerar, who said: "I think we had good grounds to recognize Kosovo as a state," (N1, 2019).

However, Kosovo remains an issue where Slovenia's balanced approach could be challenged, taking into consideration the constant efforts of Kosovo to join NATO, with parallel intent from Serbia to block any kind of endeavour to gain overall international recognition, including Euro-Atlantic ambitions.

Clearly, Slovenia has been very proactive in supporting countries from the region towards enhanced cooperation with NATO, as well as obtaining membership of the Alliance. The spectrum of the support has encompassed various measures and activities, including advice, administrative assistance, expertise, lobbying, and official advocacy by acting as the NATO Contact Point Embassy.

This has been also demonstrated by the NATO Secretary, General Stoltenberg, speaking to the Slovenian President, Borut Pahor, highlighting that Slovenia does "play an important role in the Western Balkans. You (Slovenia) help to address the challenges we face in that region. You are contributing significantly to our mission in Kosovo, KFOR, and you play an important role in bringing the region closer to the rest of Europe and the transatlantic family".[10]

Conclusion

Despite the fact that after the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact the geopolitical position of Slovenia initially seemed moderated, this young republic swiftly prospered, and confirmed its worth to the Alliance. Also, although Slovenia has been considered as a relatively small state, it has shown that the size and population are not the only factors that matter. Apparently, there were other potentials that quickly verified Slovenia as a valuable member of the Alliance.

NATO membership obviously triggered greater engagement of Slovenia in the Western Balkans, which became a sort of Slovenian niche capability, directly contributing to enhancing stability and peace in the region. Using the advantages of NATO membership as well as the common past of the region, Slovenia has been

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[10] *Joint press point with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the President of the Republic of Slovenia, Borut Pahor. NATO, 20 February 2019.*

welcomed by both the Alliance and the Balkan countries to engage in their Euro-Atlantic efforts.

With an improved international image, and the opportunity to participate in NATO decision-making processes, Slovenia took responsibility for being an advocate for the region. Through this, it has supported the reforms and integration of each country individually. While implementing its national interests, Slovenia has contributed to the overall attempts of the Alliance to enhance regional security and stability, as well as the expansion of the Alliance, but at the same time, Slovenia has strengthened its own international position.

The road from small to big is not an easy endeavour, but obviously is achievable. Slovenia has clearly verified this, which could be a good pattern for others, both in the region and beyond. However, such undertakings are never completed. Still, after 15 years in the Alliance, there are challenges that will require continuous efforts and constant proof. They undoubtedly include an increase in defence expenditure, perseverance in offering adequate niche capabilities, and sustaining a balanced approach in the region.

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SLOVENSKA VOJSKA 15 LET PO VSTOPU REPUBLIKE SLOVENIJE V NATO

THE SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES 15 YEARS AFTER THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA JOINED NATO

Povzetek   Republika Slovenija je 15 let članica Nata. Članstvo v zavezništvu je veliko prispevalo h kakovostnemu razvoju Slovenske vojske. S sodelovanjem v mednarodnih operacijah in na misijah prispeva k mednarodni varnosti. Pred vstopom v Nato in po njem se Slovenska vojska prilagaja in preoblikuje glede na novonastale razmere ter varnostne izzive, tako da se lahko učinkovito odzove. Sodeluje na mednarodnih vojaških vajah in jih organizira ter deluje v Natovih predstavništvih, poveljstvih in enotah. Natova odvračalna drža krepi zavezništvo in zahteva učinkovito odzivanje na nove vire ogrožanja. Varnostno okolje se hitro spreminja, pri tem pa hibridne in kibernetske grožnje postajajo vse nevarnejše. Proces dolgotrajne prilagoditve Nata zahteva od članic pripravljenost za odzivanje na vse morebitne vire ogrožanja v krogu 360 stopinj. Republika Slovenija aktivno sodeluje tudi v projektih pametne obrambe, konceptu povezanih sil in konceptu vodilne države. Obrambni proračun se je po letih padanja spet začel zviševati, kar bo v naslednjih letih lahko pozitivno vplivalo na razvoj vojaških zmogljivosti za nacionalne potrebe in potrebe zavezništva. Članstvo v Natu je za Republiko Slovenijo še vedno najučinkovitejša in najracionalnejša rešitev zagotavljanja nacionalne varnosti, vendar mora država nositi tudi solidaren del bremena.

Ključne besede   *Nato, Slovenska vojska, vojaške zmogljivosti, odvračalna drža, prilagajanje.*

Abstract   The Republic of Slovenia has been a NATO member for 15 years. Its NATO membership has significantly contributed to the quality development of the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF), which has made a contribution to international security by taking part in international operations and missions. Before and after joining NATO, the SAF has adapted and transformed in view of the newly created settings and security challenges in a way to respond to them effectively. It has participated in and

organized multinational military exercises, and has been operating within NATO representations, commands and units. NATO's deterrence posture strengthens the Alliance and requires an effective response to new sources of threat. The security environment is changing rapidly with hybrid and cyber threats becoming increasingly dangerous. NATO's long-term adaptation process requires members to respond to all potential sources of threat with a 360-degree approach. The Republic of Slovenia is also actively involved in the Smart Defence project, the Connected Forces Initiative and the Framework Nations Concept. The years-long decline in the defence budget has been reversed, which can, in the upcoming years, have a positive impact on the development of military capabilities for national needs and for the needs of the Alliance. For the Republic of Slovenia, NATO membership is still the most effective and rational solution to ensure its national security; however, the nation should lend solidarity by taking its share of the burden.

Key words *NATO, Slovenian Armed Forces, military capabilities, deterrence posture, adaptation.*

Introduction The international security environment is changing and there are an increasing number of new threats and crisis hotspots that affect both individual nations and NATO as a whole. For this reason, NATO is constantly facing new challenges. Adjustments in the Alliance's posture enable an effective countering of the potential sources of threat and allow it to operate in a changed security environment. An open-door policy and enhanced cooperation with partners allow the Alliance to expand, and to facilitate security stability in both immediate and broader regions. Collaboration between member states is based on trust, solidarity, unity and cohesion. The decisions taken in consensus must be affordable, sustainable and credible. In order to ensure collective security, members are expected to lend solidarity by taking their share of the burden, and to provide for the development of their own defence systems; Article 3 of the Washington Treaty declares that: »In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.«

By becoming a member of NATO, the Republic of Slovenia assured its safety as part of a collective defence system. By participating in NATO activities, it contributes to peace and stability in the regional and global environment. Over 15 years, the Republic of Slovenia has become a recognizable and active member of NATO, contributing to the provision of collective defence by making visible contributions on the part of the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF). In this way, it has strengthened its international position as a safe and stable country, which has also had a positive impact on its economic development. Despite the positive contribution and the assumption of its share of the burden, the Republic of Slovenia will have to increase defence spending in relation to its GDP. Considering today's and the future's regional and global security challenges, military and asymmetric threats, such as regional

conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorist and cyber attacks, and more, the public increasingly and justifiably believes that the Republic of Slovenia's membership of NATO is necessary. From the point of view of the benefits and invested financial resources, this is currently the most rational and effective way for Slovenia to provide for its security. Slovenia has striven to join NATO and the EU for the common values and its own national and strategic security interests, as well as for the desire to contribute to security and stability in the European continent and beyond. This orientation was supported by the citizens of the Republic of Slovenia in a referendum of 2003[1].

Since Slovenia's accession to NATO in 2004, its defence system, with the SAF constituting the major part of it, has been successfully carrying out its mission and tasks, and has achieved high-quality progress in this regard. In 15 years, the SAF has become a respected and recognizable partner in the Alliance and internationally. It also enjoys a good reputation at home and actively participates in many international operations and missions (IOMs), thus making its contribution to stability and security. It actively supports the system of protection against natural and other disasters and the internal security system by providing assistance to the police in the protection of the state border. This cooperation serves as an important guide and developmental drive for the SAF, both in equipping and in military education and training.

The purpose of this article is to present the progress made by the SAF in the period of Slovenia's membership of NATO. In this context, we highlight the key problems of providing sufficient financial and human resources. We will try to determine whether the contribution of the Republic of Slovenia has been recognized by the Alliance, and what has been achieved by the SAF in terms of quality. In the conclusion, part of the findings also incorporates recommendations for the future. In preparing the paper, we used the methods of comparison, statistics and description, as well as inductive and deductive methods and the participant observation method, which influenced the selection of the key data which enable the establishment of the quality progress of the SAF.

1 THE SAF AFTER JOINING NATO

In 1995, the Territorial Defence was renamed the SAF. The essential milestones that influenced its development were the transition from a system of defence of its own territory to a system of collective defence; a transition from conscription to a

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[1] *In the referendum held on 23 March 2003, Slovenians conclusively opted both for EU and NATO membership. This confirmed the two main objectives of Slovenian foreign policy. With a 66% turnout, almost 89.61% of voters voted for EU membership and 66.05% for NATO membership. The result of the referendum was binding and unrepeatable for the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia. Three days after the referendum, on 26 March 2003, a protocol on the accession of the Republic of Slovenia to NATO was signed. The National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia ratified the North Atlantic Treaty on 24 February 2004, and the Republic of Slovenia solemnly deposited its instrument of accession in Washington on 29 March 2004, together with other acceding countries. In doing so, it became a fully-fledged member of NATO.*

professional armed forces, and the Republic of Slovenia's membership of NATO[2]. Throughout this time, the SAF had been facing various transformational changes, which also contributed to its progress in the enhancement of military capabilities. The SAF acquired new weapons and equipment, and increased the competences of its active and contract reserve members.

The accession of the Republic of Slovenia to NATO was followed by the adoption of key steering documents by the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia, such as the Resolution on the General Long-Term Development and Equipping Programme of the SAF (ReSDPRO SV), the latest version of which is valid until 2025. The Government of the Republic of Slovenia also adopted several medium-term developmental documents, the most recent one being the Medium-Term Defence Programme 2018-2023, which on page 6/31 stipulates: »The development of defence capabilities will take place within the defence resources available by 2023, and will be primarily targeted at achieving the level of defence ambitions as set out in the ReSDPRO SV 2025, taking into account NATO's 2017 capability targets for the Republic of Slovenia and the decision of the Republic of Slovenia to join PESCO.« In determining the ambitions, effort was made to take into consideration the financial capabilities of the Republic of Slovenia in individual medium-term periods. Nevertheless, there was a certain gap between the ambitions and the available resources.

During these 15 years, the intensity of individual and collective military training has increased. There have been several transformations at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Cooperation within the programme Partnership for Peace (PfP) has intensified. Compared to the period prior to Slovenia's membership of NATO, participation in IOMs and multinational military exercises abroad has also increased significantly.

The SAF contributes its capabilities within NATO and the EU, thereby ensuring its military contribution to peace and stability in the regional and global security environment. The Republic of Slovenia's membership of NATO has enabled the SAF to explore new opportunities for cooperation with the armed forces of other NATO member states. The integration has also enabled its participation in joint projects, data exchange and other activities. In 2015, the Republic of Slovenia accredited the NATO Mountain Warfare Centre of Excellence, while SAF members are also present in five other NATO Centres of Excellence (COEs)[3]. Up to 2010, an intensive process of integration into NATO took place, leading eventually to the signing of

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[2] *The last conscripts completed their mandatory military service in 2003. The SAF is now a fully professional armed force complemented by a contractual reserve and, if necessary, augmented by a strategic reserve.*

[3] *SAF members are present at the NATO Mountain Warfare COE in Slovenia; the NATO Humint COE in Romania; the NATO Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence COE in the Czech Republic; the NATO Counter-Intelligence COE in Poland; and the NATO Civil-Military Cooperation COE in the Netherlands.*

a declaration on the completion of the integration programme[4]. Consequently, the Republic of Slovenia, as well as the SAF, fulfilled the formal requirements for integrated operation within the Alliance. The integration process had a positive effect on the command and control system and, in addition, to the establishment of the non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps and the NCO chain of command; many other developmental changes occurred.

In the period since the Republic of Slovenia joined the Alliance, the SAF has been more successful in some areas of development and less in others. The cutting of the defence budget over the years as a result of the economic recession and its impact on the Republic of Slovenia has also severely affected the SAF. A critical point was the building of two medium infantry battalion groups. There has also been a lack of investment in other equipment and weapons, modernization of shooting ranges, training areas and other ranges, and the adaptation of military barracks to the needs of a professional armed force. In the upcoming years, it will be important to overcome all of these hindrances to the development of the SAF. A few years ago, the Professor and former Minister of Defence, Ljubica Jelušič, said: »The financial and economic crisis we are now facing will have negative implications for the speed of development and modernization of the Slovenian defence system. However, we should not stop or even freeze the development process for a number of years, for this would actually represent a regression" (2009, p 14).

In the past two years the Republic of Slovenia has been allocating more funds for defence in nominal terms. Nevertheless, this is still not enough, since the loss over the previous years was extremely high and has caused a delay in the replacement of obsolete equipment and weapons, and in building new military capabilities, which also affects the SAF's combat power. The current positive financial trend is still not enough to initiate the modernization process. Additionally, due to the strengthening of the economy, the lack of personnel joining the SAF is becoming increasingly critical.

1.1   Participation in international operations and missions

The participation of the SAF in IOMs represents a direct contribution of the Republic of Slovenia to ensuring peace, stability and security in the regional and global security environment. In this respect, the SAF makes a visible and recognizable contribution and is, as such, a recognizable partner among the Allies, both in terms of its competence and its equipment and weapons. Activities within IOMs are an

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[4]   *Šteiner's opinion on the issue is the following: "In many areas, the beginnings of integration are closing the transition period, with the Republic of Slovenia and its armed forces credibly participating in defence and military structures and joint activities in both NATO and the EU. This particularly includes the activities of joint defence planning, participation in joint commands, integration into the Allied force structure, contribution to response forces, participation in international operations and missions, and the building of national capabilities which, through the doctrines and standards, are interoperable with others in the Alliance." (2011, p 45).*

important part of the Alliance's common tasks.[5] Ljubica Jelušič stated: »The concept of peace operations, in its broadest sense, encompasses all forms of military and non-military activities that take place in the context of political and diplomatic efforts to establish and preserve peace." (2005, p 12).

In 15 years, the Republic of Slovenia, mainly SAF members, has participated in the IOMs of NATO, the EU, the UN and in the Global Coalition against Daesh. In 2009, the Government of the Republic of Slovenia adopted the Strategy of the Participation of the Republic of Slovenia in International Operations and Missions, which is, in addition to laws, another foreign-policy steering document regulating the participation of the SAF in IOMs.[6]

Since 2004, the SAF has taken part in the EU's operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina; in the military observation mission UNTSO in the Middle East and UNSMIS in Syria; in NATO's Joint Enterprise operation in Kosovo as KFOR; in North Macedonia and Serbia; in NATO's operations in Afghanistan and Iraq; in the UN peacekeeping mission UNIFIL in Lebanon; in the EUFOR operation in Chad in 2008 and 2009; in the maritime military operation EU NAVFOR Somalia in 2009; in the military operation EUTM Mali; in the humanitarian operation Mare Nostrum in Lampedusa in 2013 and 2014; in the Global Coalition against Daesh in Iraq; in the EU Operation EU NAVFOR MED/Sophia in the Mediterranean Sea; and in NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence in Latvia. For many years, the largest SAF contingent has been deployed in Kosovo. To date, over 13,500 SAF members have participated in IOMs since the first time the Republic of Slovenia deployed its troops in an IOM in 1997.

In the past 15 years, the average annual share of SAF members per rotation in the IOMs has been large, and also recognized within NATO. The Resolution on the General Long-Term Development and Equipping Programme of the SAF up to 2025 stipulates, *inter alia*, that the SAF should have up to 7,600 active component members, while the number currently stands at about 6,600. After 2004, the average annual deployment was between 3 and 6%. The statistical overview of the average number of SAF personnel participating in IOMs is shown in the table below, broken down by year.

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[5] *Article 37, paragraph 1 of the Defence Act states: "Carry out obligations assumed by the state in international organizations and through treaties."*

Article 22, paragraph 1, indent 2 of the Service in the SAF Act states: "...through participation in operations, missions and other forms of operation appropriate for conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and collective defence."

[6] *Section 22 (Strategic Interests) of the Strategy of the Participation of the Republic of Slovenia in International Operations and Missions states: "Slovenia's strategic interests in participating in international operations and missions are determined by its geostrategic position, political, security, economic, development, humanitarian and other interests and principles, including obligations within the international organisations of which it is a member, at the global and regional levels. For all types of international operations and missions, except for rescue operations, strategic interests are defined primarily in South-East Europe, as well as in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, Asia, Africa and other regions in the world."*

Year	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Number of deployed personnel	247	273	324	751	456	512	459	442	424	402	419	402	332	300	350

Lessons learned in IOMs are used in the pre-deployment training of future contingents, equipping, and the development of military education and training.

1.2 The positive impact of multinational military exercises on the readiness of the SAF

Multinational military exercises play an increasingly important role in NATO. They contribute to better readiness of forces and their ability to deploy. An important contribution to this progress has been made by the new NATO Collective Training and Exercise Directive, which covers a broader spectrum, enables better connections, extended long-term planning and much more. The SAF also follows this trend by acting as a participant, organizer or co-organizer of multinational military exercises. By taking part in them, it tests its interoperability with other armed forces. The SAF is aware that multinational military exercises also contribute to security and stability, as well as building interoperability among Alliance members and other partner countries. Multinational military exercises constitute part of collective training, which facilitates the meeting of the required standards through which the operational readiness of armed forces can be maintained. According to Osterman, »the combat orientation of the peacetime training of units and commands allows for the implementation of the expected tasks in real combat situations« (2014, p 51). When the SAF organizes or participates in NATO exercises, it also meets national targets and targets set by NATO's Connected Forces Initiative. The intensity of the SAF's participation in activities abroad is shown by the fact that, in 2016, the SAF participated in 27 multinational military exercises, in 2017, in 32, and, in 2018, in 20 multinational military exercises.

With regard to these exercises, it is important to mention the US centres in Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels. The SAF makes a standing contribution of an M-84 Tank Platoon to the Joint Multinational Readiness Centre, thereby enabling more effective collective training of other member states. Additionally, the SAF has had a very successful and years-long cooperation with the United States European Command, the Colorado National Guard, and the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team of the US Armed Forces.

Multinational military exercises are not only important for the SAF, but also for the Republic of Slovenia, as by organizing them we make an important contribution to the readiness of the Alliance's military capabilities. Additionally, as a host country, we provide all the necessary logistical support to other armed forces when located in the Republic of Slovenia. In 2018, for example, the Republic of Slovenia, through the Port of Koper, provided a logistical shift for the NATO exercise »Trident Juncture 2018«. In the coming years, the SAF is also expected to actively participate in NATO exercises and other exercises as an organizer or co-organizer[7]. In this way, it can serve as a link to the partner countries in the Balkans and beyond.

1.3 Standardization as the cornerstone of interoperability

The adoption of common standards facilitates interoperability in NATO, and therefore standardization can be termed the cornerstone of interoperability. With the implementation of NATO STANAGs, members of the Alliance can more easily achieve the necessary levels of interoperability for the effective implementation of joint activities. Interoperability is an integral part of any NATO military capability.

The SAF actively participates in the procedures for adopting NATO STANAGs, which, following the prescribed procedures, become Slovenian Military Standards (SVS) and are, according to Osterman[8], regulations of their own. The interoperability process is also carried out with the standardization process. The SAF adopts and implements NATO standards that are needed to achieve the due interoperability of the SAF for its operations within NATO and also to support target objectives. In 15 years, the Republic of Slovenia has confirmed and adopted a large number of NATO STANAGs at the national level. A statistical overview of the number of these standards is shown in the table below, broken down by year.

Table 2:
A statistical overview of the number of standards
Source: MoD - Standardization and Codification Section.

Year	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Adopted SVSs	18	35	50	25	46	51	52	41	46	42	29	33	32	62	42
Nationally confirmed STANAGs	9	74	66	42	44	120	165	59	57	59	49	61	301	147	97

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[7] *Since 2012, the SAF has organized the military exercise "Adriatic Strike", which is occasionally included in the list of NATO exercises. In addition, it has collaborated with the USA and Croatia in the organization of the multinational military exercise "Immediate Response".*

[8] *Osterman states, "A NATO STANAG is a unique regulation establishing the mandatory practices or technical requirements in the SAF, as there would be no international connectivity within the Alliance without it. It is therefore necessary to adopt NATO STANAGs into the Slovenian military standards." (2010, p 253).*

The Alliance seeks to further enhance interoperability between its members, so standardization in NATO is becoming an increasingly important domain[9]. In this respect, the SAF also makes a contribution by delegating an average of 90 representatives to take part in the work of various standardization working bodies. Since the SAF is primarily a land force, the most important ones for the SAF are the Joint Standardization Board and the Land Standardization Board.

1.4 The presence of SAF members in NATO Command Structure and Force Structure, representations and other structures

Soon after its creation, NATO established its command structure and structure of military forces. By joining the Alliance, the SAF also took on a proportionate share of international military duties. These enable SAF representatives to play an active part in NATO commands and units. In 2019, the SAF is manning 25 such duties. Part of these duties is within various COEs, offices and headquarters, while the rest of the 25 duties are in the representation offices in Brussels, Mons and Norfolk. SAF personnel must have all the necessary competencies arising from job descriptions in order to take on these international duties. Lessons learned from duties abroad are important for the SAF's operation at different levels of command and control. On completing their international military duties, SAF members are, if possible, posted to positions where their acquired experience can be used. Given the positive feedback so far, and the number of military representatives abroad, we can conclude that the SAF has made a visible contribution to NATO. Given the total number of SAF members, the proportion of members on duties abroad amounts to between 1% and 1.5%. The statistical overview of the number of SAF personnel abroad is shown in the table below, broken down by year.

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Number of SAF members abroad	15	60	80	91	83	78	74	67	60	71	65	64	69	70	73

Table 3:
The statistical overview of the number of SAF personnel abroad
Source: SAF General Staff/ Joint Personnel Division.

SAF members work in the Permanent Representation of the Republic of Slovenia to NATO and the EU in Brussels, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Mons, the Allied Joint Force Command Naples and elsewhere.

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[9] The Republic of Slovenia is also a member of the EU, and EU military capabilities are also built and operational on the basis of NATO STANAGs, which further increases their importance.

2   NATO'S ADAPTATION TO NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES

In this decade, the Alliance has organized several NATO summits, namely in Chicago (2012), Wales (2014), Warsaw (2016) and Brussels (2018). In addition to significant changes in the security environment, this period has also been marked by the economic downturn, which in most NATO member states resulted in reduced defence spending. However, after the adoption of a joint commitment to allocate 2% of GDP to defence, the situation improved. After the NATO Summit in Wales, NATO members began to adapt. Prior to that, however, NATO had concentrated primarily on crisis response activities, and focused its attention on the operation in Afghanistan. The new era requires NATO to be ready for all potential sources of threat. This need was also dictated by the Ukrainian crisis in the East and the deterioration of relations with Russia[10]. The long-term adaptation of the Alliance's posture is required by the changed security environment, which calls for political, military and institutional adaptation[11]. A new cycle of defence planning began as early as in 2014[12]. In this regard, the steps that the Alliance has taken to strengthen mutual trust between the Allies (Reassurance Measures), so that they provide the necessary military contribution to counter threats and work with partner countries, are very important for the strengthening of the Alliance.

NATO is thus confronted by changed security challenges in the East and various threats from the South. In the light of the various security challenges, NATO has also begun to apply adjustments on its southern flank in such a way that it can adequately react in the event of a threat. The new reinforced deterrence posture is based on the action plan of readiness and the commitment to increase investment in the development of defence capabilities. The deterrence and defence activities must be adapted to each case of threat individually, so that it can use different leverages and power levels. NATO must be able to respond to threats with a 360-degree approach, since threats can be posed both by state and non-state actors. Strategic communications also plays an important role in responding to threats. The long-standing operation

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[10] *NATO, 2018; Deterrence and defence: "Russia has become more assertive with the illegal annexation of Crimea and destabilisation of eastern Ukraine, as well as its military build-up close to NATO's borders. In parallel, to the south, the security situation in the Middle East and Africa has deteriorated due to a combination of factors that are causing loss of life, fuelling large-scale migration flows and inspiring terrorist attacks in Allied countries and elsewhere."*

[11] *Military adaptation refers to the strengthening of NATO's deterrence and defence posture, which includes the implementation of commitments adopted at the NATO Summit in Wales. Political adaptation, however, refers to ensuring and strengthening interoperability and an enhanced dialogue with partners, cooperation with international organizations, continuation of the open-door policy, etc. Institutional adjustment refers to the implementation of various reforms.*

[12] *NATO, 2018; NATO Defence Planning Process: "The aim of the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) is to provide a framework within which national and Alliance defence planning activities can be harmonised to enable Allies to provide the required forces and capabilities in the most effective way. It should facilitate the timely identification, development and delivery of the necessary range of forces that are interoperable and adequately prepared, equipped, trained and supported, as well as the associated military and non-military capabilities, to undertake the Alliance's full spectrum of missions."*

in Afghanistan still remains one of the Alliance's priorities; however, the coalition forces are gradually transforming and decreasing its scope[13].

Looking through the prism of adaptation, NATO needs additional military capabilities, which are also linked to the new multi-annual cycle of the NATO Defence Planning Process. In planning, the primary focus should be put on the accurate Strategic Foresight Analysis and the realistic planning of the Level of Ambitions. Increased cooperation between member states and partner countries is becoming increasingly important, which also adds to their interoperability.

NATO is aware of the current and potential future threats in this changed security environment, which will not see a successful response unless a Comprehensive Approach is used. This can be achieved only through broader cooperation between NATO and other international organizations that are aiming for the same goal. In this respect, the focus is on cooperation with the European Union, which has formally been in place since 2001. Several common documents have already been adopted as a result of this cooperation[14].

2.1 NATO's activities to respond to new sources of threat

NATO must be prepared in such a way as to be able to effectively respond to new potential sources of threat. In the long run, it needs to adapt by providing a rapidly responsive robust defence, which can support an effective deterrence and defence posture, while at the same time allowing responses to crisis response tasks. In this way, it can maintain its military presence in the countries where this will be required. This will require additional military contributions from NATO members, as it will be the only way to effectively implement immediate assurance measures[15]. In addition to other documents, the NATO Summit in Wales also saw the adoption of the Readiness Action Plan, the Connected Forces Initiative and the Framework Nations Concept, which will contribute to more effective cooperation and more rational development of military capabilities. In the implementation of these and other documents an important role is played by the NATO Response Force and its organic Very High

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[13] *The Republic of Slovenia began to participate in the operation in Afghanistan in 2004. The number of SAF personnel gradually increased so that between 2009 and 2011 the Slovenian contingent on average numbered over 90 members. Later, the number began to decrease so that the contingent now includes up to 10 SAF members.*

[14] *In 2018, the Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation was adopted, which also includes maritime responses in the Mediterranean.*

[15] *NATO, 2018; Projecting Stability: Adapting the NATO Readiness Action Plan: "A number of immediate assurance measures were implemented as part of the effort to reassure NATO's Central and Eastern European members that they would be protected from any potential aggression from Russia. These measures included bolstering land, maritime and air activities in the relevant areas and undertaking a series of exercises focused on collective defence. The RAP also included longer-term adaptation measures to meet the evolving threat, including significantly improving the capability of the NATO Response Force (NRF); creating a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF); establishing a number of NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs) in Eastern Europe; plus a range of measures designed to enhance the capabilities of the Alliance's multinational forces. In each of these areas, much progress has been made."*

Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), which adds to the responsiveness[16]. The Republic of Slovenia also makes a contribution to these forces[17]. The situation in the broader global security environment requires rapid and effective adaptation. To this end, the majority of member states are gradually increasing their defence spending towards 2% of GDP. The success of the implementation of these commitments depends on the willingness and ability of members to provide the necessary resources. However, the implementation of these commitments can be impeded by excessive ambition or insufficient resources. In this respect, the greatest burden is borne by member states contributing the major part of the VJTF, as well as those who are or will be in the process of constructing a reception and accommodation infrastructure for NATO military forces on their territories (Host Nation Support). Increased attention is being devoted to the improvement in interoperability, which is also associated with standardization. Additionally, common multinational military exercises and provision of personnel for the available posts in NATO structures are gaining importance. Maintaining the high readiness of forces, an increased number of multinational military exercises far from the units' home locations, and the deployment of forces represent and will continue to represent a major expense for the member states. It will also be important to ensure greater strategic mobility (land, air and maritime), since the effectiveness of forces is dependent on it. The new concept of NATO's response forces also requires member states to improve their Host Nation Support system, used by NATO forces on a permanent or temporary basis or when in transit.

In addition to developing military capabilities and improving responsiveness, NATO is constantly striving to prevent and mitigate various tensions and conflicts in individual regions through bilateral and multilateral cooperation. A good example of partnership cooperation is that with the Mediterranean Dialogue countries.

2.2   A changed security environment

In recent years, the security environment has been significantly changed by globalization and polarization, and the emergence of new threats and crisis areas, which have also affected security[18]. Consequently, the provision of security will gain importance in the transformation of both the national and the international

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[16] *NATO, 2018; NATO Response Force/Very High Readiness Joint Task Force: "Following the Wales Summit in 2014, Allies decided to enhance the NRF by creating a Spearhead Force within it. The Very High Readiness Joint Task Force was formed to better respond to the changing security environment to the east and south of the Alliance's borders."*

[17] *In 2019 the SAF is contributing its transport helicopter as its main capability.*

[18] *NATO, 2107, p 75; The Strategic Foresight Analysis (SFA): "The SFA highlights and discusses several debated issues, such as the fate of globalization, the impact of polarization, the future of AI, the rise of China and the redistribution of geostrategic power. While the West might be less dominant in the future economic order, NATO Allies can still influence the future security environment by the strategic choices that they make today. Although the levels of violence linked to armed conflict have shown a decreasing trend, the security environment around the Euro-Atlantic region has become more volatile, with a growing potential for interstate conflict and increased terrorism threat, polarization and regionalization. Rapid, and in some cases disruptive, changes associated with the shifts of power and challenges to the existing world order are likely to take place in the next two decades. In this context, NATO will continue to provide the main framework for collective defence of the Euro-Atlantic region."*

environment. This is also noted by Jacob: »Security commands profound power in transforming national, international and global political orders over the world,« (2019, p xxvi). The deterioration of relations between NATO and Russia, the crisis in Ukraine, security challenges in the Middle East, and the instabilities on NATO's southern flank require mutual trust, increased responsiveness of NATO forces, and an enhanced capacity for rapid military intervention. On NATO's southern flank, an increased number of new threats are emerging from terrorist groups such as Al Qaida and other extremist groups which connect with the local population in the territories of North Africa and the Middle East. All of this poses a potential threat to the spread of terrorism into Europe. Africa is a particularly sensitive area here, with its years-long conflicts between various ethnic groups, illegal activities, such as arms, drugs and other trafficking, poverty, climate change and other factors generating additional tensions in this part of the world. Threats are scattered, numerous and of various intensities. Despite the defeat of ISIL in 2019, the situation in Syria and Iraq continues to create conditions for the operation of ISIL dispersed groups, which can pose a serious threat and increase instability in the broader global security environment. A global coalition was formed to fight against Daesh. A specific security problem and a potential terrorism threat were represented by former ISIL fighters returning home to European countries, some also NATO members.

In 2015 and 2016, a major flow of migrants from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and other fragile countries to Europe occurred due to the unstable situation in the Middle East and North Africa. The Balkan route remains one of the main land routes towards Western Europe and poses a security risk for the countries, which Kešetović and Ninković also note: »Migrations, especially the irregular ones, have huge security repercussions. Politicians can discuss illegal migration, and a certain public can regard it as a threat to the political, societal, economic and cultural security of the state and society" (2016, p 106). NATO has joined the Sea Guardian operation to address the migrant problem in Libya and the Aegean Sea[19].

Hybrid and cyber threats are becoming increasingly present, as the development of information technology is extremely fast. Both individual states and NATO must therefore be able to counter such threats through effective situational awareness. Notwithstanding the fact that NATO's focus remains in this area, it is still the primary responsibility of member states to deal with such threats. They therefore need to improve the resilience of their own and the common information systems, and provide security to critical infrastructure, which is also noted by Cavelty: »Despite the increasing attention, cyber security is gaining security policy and despite the possibility of a major, systemic, catastrophic incident involving critical infrastructure, computer network vulnerabilities are predominantly a business and espionage problem at the moment,«(2019, p 424). In order to provide efficient cyber defence, it is important to ensure closer cooperation with partners, international

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[19] *NATO, 2018; Operation Sea Guardian. "Through Operation Sea Guardian, NATO is contributing to the maintenance of a secure and safe maritime environment, while collaborating with other actors, such as the European Union (EU) by providing support for instance to Operation Sophia in the Central Mediterranean."*

organizations and industry[20]. It is important to build and develop defensive and offensive cyber capabilities, part of which should be combined at the NATO level. This, however, depends on the will and readiness of member states. Countering cyber and hybrid threats is primarily the responsibility of the attacked state, which can request assistance from another NATO member. Today's threats are different from threats in the past, because they were clear and it was quickly possible to recognize the location from which they came. Today, however, this is no longer the case.

2.3 Enhancing military responsiveness as a reaction to new security challenges

Enhanced military responsiveness is a reaction to new security challenges. To this end, NATO has modernized and improved the responsiveness of the existing NATO Response Force. This has been achieved with the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, and by assigning greater importance to the second echelon (Initial Follow-On Forces Group). The C2 operational structure with standing reception and integration units (NATO Force Integration Unit) has been upgraded and the utilization of the existing corpus structure has been improved. As human and material resources are limited, the efficiency is provided through Advanced Planning.

Consequently, in 2017, NATO established an Enhanced Forward Presence in Poland, Estonia, Latvia and elsewhere. The primary purpose of forward presence is to deter threats with an unambiguous account of determination, ability and solidarity. The Alliance thus demonstrates its ability to respond to new threats in a quick and effective manner. In some countries, NATO Force Integration Units[21] have been established. These units are intended to serve as a permanent link between the NATO Response Force capabilities and the national capabilities, where the deployment of forces is expected. Their mission is to receive and accommodate the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, and possibly activate the subsequent NATO Response Force echelons. In this respect, NATO members in which NATO Force Integration Units are located bear the main burden of manning, while part of the burden is also shared by other members [22].

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[20] *In order to improve its situation, in 2016 the Republic of Slovenia adopted the Cyber Security Strategy, which provides an overview of the existing situation, defines the vision and sets goals.*

[21] *NATO, 2018; NATO Force Integration Units: "As part of NATO's adaptation to security challenges from the east and the south, the Alliance has opened eight Force Integration Units in Sofia (Bulgaria), Tallinn (Estonia), Riga (Latvia), Vilnius (Lithuania), Bydgoszcz (Poland) and Bucharest (Romania), Bratislava (Slovakia), and Székesfehérvár (Hungary). These small units represent a visible and persistent NATO presence in these member countries.*

"The primary mission of NFIUs is to foster collaboration between national forces and the NATO High Readiness Forces in times of military-political crises. Specifically, these small units provide broad planning support to facilitate the rapid deployment of Allied forces to the Eastern part of the Alliance and support collective defence planning. They also work with host nations to identify logistical networks, transportation routes and supporting infrastructure."

[22] *As part of the standing military forward presence, the Republic of Slovenia deployed its first SAF contingent to Latvia in 2017. In Hungary, it provides permanent manning of a duty in the NFIU.*

Increased potential for terrorist threats on the southern flank, migration, illegal trade and other factors bring new security challenges for the Alliance. In order to strengthen and respond more effectively to threats, a NATO-led Hub for the South was set up in 2017. The Hub constitutes part of NATO's command structure, within the Allied Joint Force Command Naples, and also includes SAF personnel.

NATO has increased the number and status of multinational military exercises. In a qualitative sense, they have been upgraded by the new NATO Doctrine for Education, Training, Exercise and Evaluation, which provides a broader spectrum, interoperability, and a more extended planning period for exercises[23]. International exercises also contribute to security stability, build connectivity between Alliance members and partner countries, and contribute to the visibility of the implementation of Assurance Measures.

2.4   Adaptation of the SAF to new security challenges

New security challenges in the international security environment are increasingly unpredictable, which is also noted by a number of authors, such as Grizold, a Professor and former Minister of Defence[24]. NATO needs to adapt and be prepared to respond adequately to these security challenges. The Alliance is a community of countries, including the Republic of Slovenia, which operates on the principle of solidarity, unity and cohesion. In a broader sense, this means that if NATO members are adapting, NATO is adapting. Consequently, the SAF, as part of the defence system, is constantly facing new challenges. These require constant adaptation by adjusting the organizational structure and maximizing the available human and material resources for the construction and combat effectiveness of military capabilities built for national needs and for the needs of the Alliance. This is also our binding obligation according to Article 3 of the Washington Treaty. Only in this way can the Republic of Slovenia provide effective deterrence to various threats, which is also noted by Rode: »But deterrence – created by both our own capabilities and those gained through NATO membership – is our best way forward,« (2018, p 46). The SAF has been organizationally adjusting in such a way that it is able to perform its legally mandated tasks. Additionally, it follows NATO's modern trends in the field of military education and training, both individual and collective, with the goal of acquiring its combat character. Due to the economic downturn, defence-related financial resources were reduced

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[23] *NATO, 2018, p 1; NATO Education Training Exercise and Evaluation (ETEE): "NATO Education Training Exercise and Evaluation (ETEE): NATO plans and conducts education, individual and collective training, exercises and evaluation at strategic, operational and tactical levels. Therefore, policy documents exist to provide a guideline to all ETEE related activities. The overarching document is the MC 458/2, NATO ETEE Policy and all Bi-SC directives are derived from it."*

[24] *Grizold states: "...that, after the end of the Cold War, the international security environment has become increasingly unpredictable and uncertain. The fundamental characteristic of this environment is the complexity of security threats, which includes the following essential elements: integration, intertwining and interaction between military and non-military security threats (e.g. military and ethical conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, terrorism, natural and other disasters, famine, infectious diseases, environmental pollution etc.)" (2005, pp 22-23).*

by around 40%. Consequently, the financial plan of the Ministry of Defence in 2010 amounted to 552.6 million EUR, and in 2014 to only 339.9 million EUR. Over the past two years, the defence budget has been rising again; however, not enough to eliminate the past backlogs. Moreover, the current economic growth in the Republic of Slovenia has changed the situation on the labour market, and the public sector salary system, which also includes the SAF, has not adapted, as the economic principle of supply and demand would require[25]. A number of measures have been adopted; however, they have not brought about a significant improvement. In addition to ensuring the necessary number of personnel, the level of defence expenditure, with a due share for the development and modernization of the SAF, is also an important factor to be considered in transformation processes. Despite the positive budgetary trend over the past two years, it remains a major challenge for the Republic of Slovenia to provide sufficient and stable budgetary funding for the development of the necessary military capabilities for both national and NATO needs, considering the major lag in modernization. Bearing in mind the accepted 2% commitment, defence expenditure in the Republic of Slovenia is not growing fast enough.

The table shows the implementation of the MOD's financial plans from 2008 to 2017, and defence expenditure in nominal terms and percentages as well as the adopted changes to the 2018 financial plan.

Table 4:
MOD's financial plans and defence expenditure from 2008 to 2017
Source:
Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia (www.mo.gov.si/si/o_ministrstvu/).

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
MoD financial plan (million EUR)	546.3	549.8	552.6	448.3	396.7	350.7	339.9	343.9	389.2	406.6	435.6
RS def. exp. (million EUR)*	566.2	575.1	583.0	478.9	423.0	381.7	366.5	361.4	406.2	425.5	448.6
RS def. exp. (% of GDP)*	1.49	1.59	1.61	1.30	1.17	1.05	0.97	0.93	1.00	1.00	0.99

In addition to providing the necessary personnel, the main financial challenge for the future is the building of two medium infantry battalion groups representing the SAF's backbone, as well as the replacement of spent equipment and armaments.

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[25] *Močnik, 2018, p 76: ":The worse scenario concerning the SAF is one where the military organization loses more than 6% of their troops each year, while on the other hand achieving a low level of Recruitment Successful Rate (RSR1) with those individuals who fail to qualify for a job in other sectors of society.*

"The armed forces as an organization in states does not have a direct obligation to compete with non-military organizations in terms of salaries, deferred compensations and benefits in-kind, because this is under the direct responsibility of the government, which sets up conditions for them in society."

Due to its limited financial resources, the Republic of Slovenia can provide certain military capabilities by participating in Smart Defence projects, the Connected Forces Initiative and the Framework Nations Concept[26].

Smart Defence includes multinational cooperation in the development of individual military capabilities in their procurement, maintenance and sharing. It is implemented in accordance with the adopted NATO strategic priorities, through projects incorporated in the first set of smart defence projects. As cyber threats are becoming increasingly dangerous, Cyber Defence projects are the ones that offer member states different opportunities for cooperation. In selecting its projects, the Republic of Slovenia pursues long-term and medium-term development goals laid down in the documents. The Connected Forces Initiative allows for improved interoperability between member states and partner nations. Its aim is to improve the readiness, interoperability and combat effectiveness of NATO and the Allied and partner forces with an extended training programme and multinational military exercises. Within this Initiative, the SAF is taking an active part in multinational military exercises. In the period of reduced defence resources and strategic reorientation of the United States, the Framework Nations Concept provided an organized way of ensuring European allies had the required capabilities and enabling them to assume a proportionate share of the burden and responsibility for common security and defence. The concept enabled the formation of groups of countries under the aegis of a framework nation providing comprehensive military capabilities. In this context, framework nations with a broader range of military capabilities and the main contribution collaborated with smaller nations that make smaller and more specialized contributions. This concept offered a long-term partnership in the provision of the full spectrum of military capabilities. With its contributions the SAF takes part in multinational forces led by a framework nation in pooling forces within NATO's response forces, multilateral land forces and IOMs.

Conclusion During the 15-year period of the Republic of Slovenia's membership of NATO, the SAF has made substantial progress in terms of quality. Some of its military capabilities, sustainability, deployability and other features have increased. Significant progress has been achieved in individual and collective training and building the NCO chain of command. During this period, the SAF has gained abundant experience from its Allies, as well as shared its own experience with other partners both as a participant, organizer or co-organizer of various multinational military exercises, camps, and other events, as noted by Jazbec: "Slovenia was dispersing its experience, know-how and lessons learned throughout the region, be it either directly to the relevant institutions (the MoD and Armed Forces) or to civil society, the media, academia etc." (2014, p 43). It has also become recognizable and respected in international settings. It has been deploying personnel to numerous

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[26] *Smart Defence was presented by NATO Secretary-General Andres Fogh Rasmussen at the Munich Security Conference in February 2011; the Connected Forces Initiative originates from the Chicago Defence Package, adopted in May 2012, and the Framework Nations Concept was first discussed at the Ministerial Meeting in June 2013 and presented to member states in more detail in September 2013.*

IOMs and contributing its representatives to NATO's command structure and force structure, standardization bodies and elsewhere. Through bilateral and multilateral cooperation, it has been striving for a noticeable role in the more immediate region. The Republic of Slovenia's membership of NATO enables the SAF to contribute to the Alliance on a daily basis, as well as to improve its own quality. Despite the delay in the modernization of the SAF, which has been hindering its combat power, the SAF has, through the integration process, achieved the necessary interoperability so that it can smoothly collaborate with the armed forces of other NATO member states. Like other NATO armed forces, the SAF continues to adapt by making maximum use of all its available human and material resources, with the aim of providing military capabilities both for national needs and the needs of NATO. Part of the SAF's capabilities is double-faceted, enabling effective support of the system of protection against natural and other disasters and the internal security system.

Due to the reductions in defence expenditure, the ratio between personnel, operations, and investment costs has worsened. From the 2014 and 2018 Annual Reports of the Ministry of Defence, it can be seen that the SAF's financial plan, which falls under the financial plan of the Ministry of Defence, amounted to 265.7 million EUR in 2014, 80% of which was spent on personnel costs, 19% on operations and 1% on investments. Over the past two years, however, financial assets and the spending ratio have improved. In 2018, the financial plan for the SAF amounted to 360.7 million EUR, 71% of which was spent on personnel costs, 22% on operations, and 7% on investments[27]. In this regard, the key problems lie in the lack of equipment and weapons to build major military capabilities, in the overuse of part of the equipment and weapons, and in the lack of personnel. All of the above result in the poor readiness posture of the SAF.

In the future, the SAF will have to be effective, sustainable and deployable. It will be necessary to increase its combat power and maintain its combat character so that it will be able to participate in operations of different spectra and greater intensity. Due to the lack of personnel and financial resources, the SAF must now use its available human and material resources in the most efficient and rational manner. To add to its quality, it must remain active and recognizable in the international environment through IOMs, multinational military exercises and other activities. It is important that it remains actively present in the Slovenian environment and enjoys a good reputation among Slovenian citizens. In accordance with the regulations and decisions of the competent authorities, it must support the system of protection against natural and other disasters as well as the internal security system. Due to the growing shortage in human resources, however, the competent authorities in the Republic of Slovenia must establish normative and other conditions for the military profession to become competitive in the labour market, which will provide the necessary personnel for the SAF. Furthermore, to enable the modernization

[27] *The Annual Report of the Ministry of Defence for 2014, p 79 and the Annual Report of the Ministry of Defence for 2018.*

it is important to establish stable and adequate financing, which will facilitate an increased combat power of the SAF. In doing so, the SAF and politicians will have to promptly and thoroughly reflect on which military capabilities will be developed with these financial resources. The resource will always be constrained; therefore it is important to take advantage of the opportunities offered by various projects within NATO and the EU.

During Slovenia's membership of NATO, the SAF has gained a great deal in terms of quality development, which has also been recognized within NATO, the EU and elsewhere. Despite the constant new challenges that the Republic of Slovenia is facing, NATO membership remains the most effective and rational solution to ensure its national security. However, the Republic of Slovenia must be solidary in assuming its share of the burden within NATO, and allocate more resources to defence spending than it is allocating now.

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Alojz Šteiner

SLOVENSKA VOJAŠKA POT V ZAVEZNIŠTVO

SLOVENIA'S MILITARY PATH TO THE ALLIANCE

Povzetek   Leta 2019, ko Severnoatlantsko zavezništvo oziroma Nato praznuje 70-letnico svojega obstoja, v Sloveniji zaznamujemo 15-letnico članstva. Pri tem je treba izpostaviti še dve obletnici, in sicer 25 let od začetkov mednarodnega vojaškega sodelovanja Slovenske vojske in 10. obletnico, odkar je bila sprejeta deklaracija o izpolnjevanju pogojev vojske za celovito integracijo v zavezništvo. Poleg tega ima slovenska vojaška pot v zavezništvo še nekaj drugih zanimivosti in posebnosti, ki jih predstavljamo v prispevku.

Ključne besede   *Razvojna pot Slovenske vojske, pridruževanje, integracija, polnopravno članstvo, tranzicija, transformacija.*

Abstract   In 2019, while the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is celebrating the 70th anniversary of its existence, Slovenia is celebrating the 15th anniversary of membership of it. Two more anniversaries must also be highlighted: namely the 25th anniversary of the beginning of international military cooperation by the Slovenian Armed Forces, and the 10th anniversary of the adoption of the declaration on the fulfilment of the conditions for the army to be fully integrated into the Alliance. In addition, the Slovenian military path to the Alliance has several other interesting facts and special features that are presented in this article. These include the relatively short transition from the army consisting solely of a military reserve and later a conscript army, to a professional army with a voluntary reserve; the accelerated and incomplete process of functional professionalization; and the successful integration into NATO, followed by rather irresponsible abandonment of the commitments given to the Alliance with regard to financial investments and capability building.

Key words   *Development path of the Slovenian Armed Forces, accession, integration, full membership, transition, transformation.*

Introduction This contribution is based on the research for the book I wrote on the development of the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) and their pathway between transition and transformation (Šteiner, 2015). The article focuses on the characteristics of three milestones: the 25th anniversary of the beginning of the international military cooperation of the SAF; the 15th anniversary of full membership; and the 10th anniversary of the adoption of the declaration on the fulfilment of the conditions for the army to be fully integrated into the Alliance.

After the end of the Cold War, by 2019 NATO had enlarged from 16 to 29 member states[1]. Slovenia has been a member since 2004, and belongs to the group of countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which have small armed forces. The SAF belongs to the group of armies created after the formation of new democratic states at the end of the Cold War and bipolarity. This is not its only speciality, since the SAF has undergone a very dynamic development path in the past. This ended with the transition to a fully professional army, complemented by a voluntary reserve, and integration into NATO and the military structures of the EU. The country has entered into the Alliance, which is primarily a political and only later a defence and military process. In the case of Slovenia, the developmental processes of the SAF had many transformational characteristics during the transition period or afterwards. Because of this, the army has changed to a great extent in terms of its structure and organizational characteristics since the beginning of the 1990s, and is practically unrecognizable in comparison with its beginnings (Šteiner, 2015, p 20). At the same time, the developmental path of the SAF and Slovenian transformational changes are closely related to the Alliance and the process of integration into it, which will be demonstrated in the continuation of the article.

When we observe Slovenian military development (1991-2019) and its characteristics, we find an intertwining of the social, defence and military transition at the very beginning of the process of Slovenian independence and democratization. Moreover, we can ascertain the interdependence of these processes (Ibid, p 46) and cases where the developments in the military-defence area were steering developments in other social areas[2]. The political, economic and social models, as well as those of defence, all changed. This intertwining also continued intensively in a third process, called Europeanization (Bebler, 2005). In the defence and military sphere, this is characterized by joining NATO, and the integration into NATO and the military structures of the EU. The process until accession in 2004 is called the association, and integration into NATO is the process that takes place after accession. The terms association and integration explain the entire period and both processes related to NATO (Šteiner, 2015, p 46).

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[1] *The Republic of North Macedonia is in the process of ratification in national parliaments as the 30th member state of NATO.*

[2] *The fulfilment of conditions for participating in the Partnership for Peace (PfP), and later in the implementation of the Membership Action Plans (MAP), also had a significant impact on areas that are not just defence and military. See: Slovenia and NATO (http://nato.gov.si/slo/).*

1 25 YEARS OF SLOVENIAN INTERNATIONAL MILITARY COOPERATION

Firstly, the outstanding Slovenian transition milestones of its entry into the international environment, which were achieved predominantly by 2008, must be mentioned. On 22 May 1992, the Republic of Slovenia became the 176th member of the United Nations Organization, having joined the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) a short while earlier, on 24 March 1992, which at the same time marks the beginning of Slovenia's entry into international and global security[3]. With the accession to the Partnership for Peace programme in 1994, the path of cooperation and accession to NATO ended on 29 March 2004 when the Republic of Slovenia became a full member. The Association Agreement between Slovenia and the EU was confirmed in the Slovenian Parliament on 15 July 1997, and Slovenia entered the EU on 1 May 2004. At the same time, Slovenia entered the European Monetary Union on 27 June 2004 and introduced the common European currency on 1 January 2007. Slovenia presided over the OSCE in 2005, when it coordinated and led a number of activities of this organization, and it chaired the EU Council in the first half of 2008.

Slovenian politics took its first steps in the international environment in the field of defence and the military as early as in 1994, mainly due to the existing efforts towards enlarging the Alliance. The enlargement process and the geostrategic position of Slovenia prevailed over the military readiness and ability of the Republic of Slovenia and its army, which was called the Territorial Defence of Slovenia until 15 January 1995. However, in these processes the army was an important carrier of implementation solutions from the very beginning. At the time when the first activities related to the Partnership for Peace (PfP) began, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Slovenia were of a conscript type, and a large, reserve-based wartime structure with 77,000 members was foreseen for a crisis and military response. Such a structure and extent were primarily a response to threats to Slovenia arising from the spreading armed conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the fact that such a young and non-established country had to provide its national defence by itself.

In addition to Slovenia's entry into the NATO PfP programme, integration with neighbouring and other countries[4] began in the field of defence and the military (Grizold, 2005, p 117). With intensive assistance from the countries with which Slovenia began to cooperate (the USA, Canada, Germany, the UK, France, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Israel and others), the need to abandon models of military organization and patterns of action from the past was gradually recognized. The effects

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[3] *This cooperation also involved the exchange of military data. Slovenia submitted the first data presented in the AEMI (Annual Exchange of Military Information) to the OSCE, and thus to the international environment, in December 1992.*

[4] *The USA supported the Mil to Mil programme, which was mainly implemented through the partner National Guard of Colorado.*

were reflected in reforms in the defence and security sector, further reorganization of the army, gradual distancing from territorial organization, and the pluralism of taking examples from abroad (Šteiner, 2000, pp 34-37).

The changes that followed included: the adaptation of military structures; preparations for participation in peacekeeping operations abroad; integration into international military exercises; and the use of opportunities for training and education of military personnel in foreign educational centres and military schools. On the basis of the Defence Act, the Territorial Defence Republic Headquarters (RŠTO/RSTD) was renamed the General Staff of the SAF (GŠSV/GSSAF) at the beginning of 1995, while its role remained unchanged, which also applied to its position in the Ministry of Defence.

In response to the »No« to Slovenia in Madrid in 1997, when it did not receive an invitation to join NATO, new and deeper reforms began. Important innovations were brought in by the Strategy of the Military Defence of the Republic of Slovenia in 1998. The Strategy redefined the aims of the military defence and the basic function of the SAF, set a basis for its different organization, and defined a number of basic external and internal activities for the transformation of the SAF on the path to NATO membership. The most important features were the provisions for ensuring an increased share of the professional structure; reorganization of reserve forces and announcements of the introduction of changes related to military service, introducing a new personnel structure in the permanent structure of the army; and in the projection of a gradual increase in defence expenditure (Šteiner 2000, p 28). On these starting points, the first General Long-Term Programme for the Development and Equipping of the SAF was prepared and adopted in February 2000[5].

A different and extremely intensive »second cycle« of preparations for joining NATO was associated with the beginnings of professionalism and the transformation of the SAF. It also involved changing the command structure and the army, and dividing the structure of the forces into deployable and in place forces.

The period of the conscript army ended in 2003[6] when it was clear that the draft system with general military obligation could not ensure the adequate manning of military units, although during the process of approaching the Alliance, the structure of the SAF decreased by more than half. The transitional changes up to 2002 are considered to have been progressive and relatively slow. The speed of the changes increased following the NATO Summit in Prague in November 2002, when a decision was made to invite Slovenia to join the Alliance as a full member.

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[5] It was amended in 2004 and again later in 2010 (see: ReDPROS and ReSDPRO SV 2025).

[6] The decision was adopted by the National Assembly in October 2002 with the amendment of the Military Service Act. It envisaged that conscription would cease to be implemented by the end of 2003, obligatory military service by the end of June 2004, and obligatory service in the reserve force of the Slovenian Armed Forces by the end of 2010. The last conscripts completed obligatory military service in October 2003, i.e. one year before the announced deadline, and the substitute civilian service in December 2003.

The entry to the Alliance in 2004 coincided with joining the EU, and represented an important development milestone. The changes were accelerated further by the process of integration, for which a special Accession and Integration Plan (AAIP) was prepared in 2005 and completed in February 2010. The intensive five-year period of integration activities was set up as a comprehensive process consisting of several procedures and activities (Šteiner, 2013, p 18). At this point, we could complete the timeline of developments and connections to the international environment, and limit it to only 15 years. But we face a decade that stands out.

With the onset of the economic crisis and the recession in 2009, the period of growth that had characterized the entire development up to then ended in 2011 and, consequently, reinforcements for the army were reduced. The main characteristics of the following procedures were: structure adjustment, personnel consolidation, accelerated and sometimes forced continuation of professionalization procedures, reduction of operating costs, and the maintenance of vital parts of the military system and their activities.

The practice of inadequate financing of defence expenditure and the military budget then continued from 2014 to 2017, and was at »zero growth« and below 1% of GDP. Thus, according to the indicators, especially when it came to investing in investments and development[7], and also according to the structure of expenditure, the Republic of Slovenia fell close to the bottom of the countries in the Alliance. Financial investments after 2017 were rather the consequence of the growth in Gross Domestic Product than real efforts to reduce the 10-year development gap and stagnation.

In addition, the SAF decreased the personnel capacity of the members of both the permanent and reserve structures. The personnel plan for the army was 96% (8737 members) implemented at the end of 2013 and 91.5% (8326 members) at the end of 2014, yet at the end of 2018 it was only 82% (7460) implemented[8]. This also indicates important changes in the labour market and unsuccessful responsiveness in the defence and military sector. It must be added that the departure of trained personnel directly reduces the readiness of the army, which has failed to attain an adequate assessment of readiness for the last four years.

2 PERIODS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF SLOVENIA'S ACCESSION TO NATO AND THE INTEGRATION OF THE SAF

Slovenia joined the Partnership for Peace in 1994 based on the NATO PfP Framework Document and the Slovenian Presentation Document, and with a clear definition

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[7] *See information on the website of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia: Financial plans and defence expenditure of the Ministry of Defence from 2008 to 2018 (http://www.mo.gov.si/si/o_ministrstvu/).*

[8] *See the Annual Reports of the Ministry of Defence from 2011 to 2017 (http://www.mo.gov.si/si/zakonodaja_ in_dokumenti/) and official data on the personnel capacity of the Slovenian Armed Forces (http://www. slovenskavojska.si/o-slovenski-vojski/).*

that the country was a candidate for NATO. On this basis and following additional proposals from NATO, the first Individual Partnership Programme (IPP) was created that same year[9], which included the defined political aims of the country, the military and other capacities available for PfP, and the objectives of cooperation and activities in this regard[10].

2.1 Development periods on the route to NATO

In 1995, the SAF and the defence system participated in the joint exercises which were available to the PfP countries (Grizold, 2005, p 101), bringing the army to the international scene.

This was followed by inclusion in the Planning and Review Process (PARP) within the framework of the PfP, in which Slovenia began to cooperate in 1996. For some time, this process was a central mechanism for the reform of the Slovenian defence system and the reorganization of the SAF, and also for the establishment of more transparent defence and force planning. For this purpose, the Partnership Working Programme (PWP) was also set up within the PARP, in which defence policy issues, defence planning and reform efforts in the field of defence and especially in the military were addressed for five years, along with mechanisms for displaying defence resources, their deployment within the defence system and for military purposes. A particularly important and detailed part was the connectivity and achievement of the requirements for forces the state could devote to partner multinational exercises and NATO-led operations. The programme was also used as a basis for assessing achievements and forming assessment reports at the level of the Ministry of Defence, and for forwarding the issues within the competence of the SAF to partners in the Alliance. The partners reviewed and assessed the reports following a special assessment process, and sent the findings back to the partner country. The course of the described assessment in the partner countries was very similar to that of the members of the Alliance.

At the same time the accession to PARP was linked to the political level and to the involvement in the decision-making process that took place through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)[11]. Plans and assessments were confirmed by this authority. At the same time, international agreements had to be adopted at the national level, which enabled the SAF to participate in the PfP; the most important of these were the Security Agreement, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and the Brussels Agreement on the status of missions in third countries. This was followed by a gradual adaptation of a series of national regulations, such as memoranda and technical agreements for participation in PfP exercises and in crisis response operations, transit agreements, standardization agreements, and so on (Šteiner, 2015, p 83).

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[9] *IPP was replaced by the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) after 2002.*

[10] *See also: EPA 1414 of 14/03/1996.*

[11] *The role of the NACC has been carried out by the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) since 1997.*

At the NATO summit in 1997 in Madrid, Slovenia and Romania did not receive an invitation to accession, which three Eastern European countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland did. This caused initial disappointment which did not prevail for long. In 1998, Slovenia hosted the Cooperative Adventure Exchange-98 military exercise as the first partner country, and at the same time examined the concept of host nation support (Grizold, 2005, p 102), the ability to cooperate in the international environment, and the degree of connectivity achieved, especially in logistics and communications. This exercise on Slovenian soil thereby took advantage of numerous opportunities for the public promotion of international cooperation and the meaning and advantages of the Alliance.

At the NATO summit in Washington in 1999, the Membership Action Plan (MAP) was adopted, which included Slovenia. This milestone marks the end of the first period of the Slovenian way to NATO. According to MAP, which represented the programme by which NATO defined the envisaged state of the next member. Slovenia had prepared Annual National Programmes (ANPs) for membership since 2000. National programmes covered five areas: (1) political and economic matters, (2) defence and military matters, (3) security matters, (4) legal and (5) financial matters.

Annual National Programmes were created in a special process of dialogue with NATO, on the basis of which the state defined the aims in the aforementioned areas and the implementation tasks, including deadlines, thus approaching the envisaged end state and the standards within this state (Šavc, 2009, pp 45-46). The programmes of activities by field and the assessment of progress towards achieving aims and fulfilling tasks were created by the state itself. NATO managed the development of the progress assessment and its confirmation by the competent working body and at the political level[12]. A comparison between the PARP and the process of accepting and assessing the MAP shows a higher level of complexity and responsibility, although there were many similarities in the implementation work.

In October 2002, at the NATO Summit in Prague, Slovenia was invited to join the Alliance, and finally became a full member in 2004[13].

Five Annual National Programmes significantly contributed to the image of the Slovenian national security system, defence, and military organization and their changes. The period between 2000 and 2004 is the second period on the way to NATO, in which the MAP was intensively implemented and the partnership aims of the forces were met. At the same time, this was the period when the transformation of the SAF prevailed, and there was also a significant change in the manning system with the transition to professional manning and a voluntary reserve, which triggered the process of the professionalization of the army. In this way, the structural aspect of professionalization was at the forefront, while the more demanding functional aspect depended on several factors, which will be explained in the continuation.

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[12] *The special working body was the Defence Review Committee (DRC), and the political body was the NACC/EAPC.*

[13] *Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania were invited together.*

The time after joining NATO from 2005 to the end of 2010 is the third period on the path of NATO accession, in which the integration process is at the forefront. At the same time, this is the period when the transition and transformation changes are most intertwined. The Accession and Integration Plan (AAIP) was prepared for this period, which envisaged an extensive list of integration activities by the end of 2010. After five years of implementation, the plan was implemented by the end of 2009, one year before the deadline; the special Alliance Declaration on the Integration of the SAF in NATO was signed on 10 February 2010.[14]

The fourth period starts in 2010 and coincides with the officially announced beginning of the transformation of the army[15]. This period represents a decade of inter-allied cooperation of the Republic of Slovenia and the full participation of the SAF in NATO. Unfortunately, due to the effects of the economic crisis and the intensive reduction of investment in the defence sector, the development of the army was halted and the trend of change reversed, so that developmental stagnation and efforts for the survival of the defence and military system are at the forefront, rather than transformation. The described development periods are presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1:
Presentation of periods during the accession and integration of the Republic of Slovenia into NATO
Source:
Adopted to Šteiner, 2015, p 86.

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
[14] On the importance of the Declaration on the Integration of the Slovenian Armed Forces in NATO, see: Pišlar and Grmek 2010, pp 12-14.

[15] The Resolution on the General Long-Term Programme for the Development and Equipping of the Slovenian Armed Forces until 2025 (2010), which was adopted on 7 December 2010, formally defined the transformation as the aim of further changes and development of the defence and military system.

2.2   Some highlights

If the military development periods of Slovenia are observed from the aspect of change, the periods that persist until 2004, when NATO and EU accession activities were implemented, can be marked by transition changes. After 2005, the integration process, along with the implementation of the project of army professionalization (abbreviated to PROVOJ), brought changes of a transformational nature, although it still very much clung to transitional, i.e. adaptation changes (Šteiner, 2013, p 9).

The period between 1994 and 2004, when the activities related to Slovenia's first steps in the international environment and association with the Alliance began, is a typical transition period, which was developmentally dynamic and exceptionally varied from the organizational and functional aspect. In the industrialized countries in Europe, mass armies were already intensively decreasing at that time and obligatory military service was being abandoned, while in Slovenia the conscript army was only just being established. In Slovenia, the concept of a mass army and manning disappeared soon after the turn of the millennium, due, among other reasons, to recommendations from abroad. In the period from 1994 to 2004, two models of military organization were established in Slovenia, the first related to the establishment and strengthening of a permanent army, and the second to the transition to professional manning and the beginning of army professionalization.

After 1995, the SAF continued to reduce its wartime structure, while its peacetime structure and operational capabilities without prior mobilization were strengthened. After beginning international military cooperation in 1994, the quarter-of-a-century long development of the SAF can be considered as a path from a militia territorial army, to a permanent army of the universal conscript – type II and type I according to Haltiner (Haltiner and Tresch in Bebler 2005, pp 285-301) – with a corps and division model of military structures, to a professional army and a voluntary reserve with a brigade and ultimately intertwining brigade and regiment model.

Significant changes occurred after the NATO Summit in Wales in 2014. They referred to readiness, insurance, integration and adaptation. These are the new centres of gravity, which are reflected in constantly ready forces, the provision of readiness of forces and initiatives, concepts, and programmes of joint training. The positions for strengthening national defence forces and focusing on international special forces must also be highlighted. Activities to improve the readiness of forces and joint training were important before, but they were more related to crisis response missions and operations; this time, however, they are more closely linked to readiness and the provision of deterrence and collective defence. This shift, which began after 2012 and is referred to as from a *»campaign footing«* to a *»contingency footing«,* means a change in focus from operations to deployable forces in the structure of armies, their more realistic preparation, and combat readiness to operate in the home area or in its vicinity (ACT, 2015). This could also be called a period of return to collective defence, with a focus on threats from the East and South of the Alliance.

When we observe the developmental periods of the army and indicate the dynamics of change, it should be added that the quantity of activity and change was at the forefront, and less their quality, which is also a feature of accelerated transition periods.

3 THE IMPACT OF NATO ACCESSION AND INTEGRATION ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A POST-MODERN ARMY IN SLOVENIA

The establishment of a post-modern army in Slovenia is of a transformational nature. This is closely connected to the Slovenian path to NATO and belongs to the accession and integration into NATO. The second milestone is connected to the establishment of a professional army, supplemented by a contractual reserve structure, which we also designate as professionalization.

3.1 Characteristics of integration into the Alliance in the Slovenian case

It should be highlighted that in the Alliance there is no uniform definition of what falls into the integration process. For the analysis of the Slovenian case (Šteiner, 2015, p 155), nine areas were selected, which were also included in the Accession and Integration Plan (AAIP). These areas are shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Integration areas of Slovenian accession and integration into NATO Source: Šteiner, 2015, p 155)

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
[16] NATINADS – NATO Integrated Air Defence System and AP – air policing represent an integrated air defence and control system and airspace management and protection system.

[17] NSIP - NATO Security Investment Programme is an Alliance programme of joint investments.

The process of integration into the Alliance has enabled Slovenia and its army to integrate credibly into defence and military structures and NATO's joint activities, and to participate in them. This involves, in particular, activities of joint defence planning, participation in joint commands and their activities, integration into the Alliance structure of forces, provision of a contribution to the response forces, participation in international operations and missions, and the building of national capabilities that, through doctrines and standards, can be connected to others in the Alliance. At the same time, Slovenia benefits from the joint control and protection of its airspace and NATO investment in airport facilities. Integration into the Alliance created the conditions and the need to change the national security strategy and consequently the military doctrine (Šteiner, 2011, pp 5-6).

During the accession and integration, through mechanisms such as the PARP, IPP, ANP/MAP, AAIP and the aims of the forces, lessons were learned in the Slovenian defence and military system which were very important for providing the conditions for transformation. The PARP and ANP/MAP contributed to the transformation and establishment of a comparable and transparent methodology of defence and force planning. Subsequently, the implementation of the AAIP was linked to the achievement of the force goals (later capability goals). This was a focal point for the design and construction of new capabilities that could be used for national and Alliance needs, and would ensure the foreseeable contribution of the country to the joint allied forces structures and international operations and missions.

Since Slovenia's involvement in international operations and missions and its contribution is not addressed in detail here, this is merely referred to as an important and outstanding characteristic. It should also be pointed out that the SAF joined the first international operation in 1997 when it participated in the Alba operation in Albania.[18] In twenty-two years (1997-2018), it has participated in 28 operations and in missions on three continents, and by the end of 2018, more than 12,800 people had been sent on them (Maraš, 2017, pp 47 and 51; International operations and missions).

International operations and missions were a key driver of change, an important promoter of development, and an effective tool for transforming the army, integrating it into the command structures of the Alliance and the multinational force structures and for providing connectivity in the military field. Particular emphasis should be given to the connection of international operations and missions to defence planning, building of military capabilities for them, and the achievement of connectivity, integration into multinational command structures, and affiliation to multinational force structures[19].

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[18] For more details, see Maraš, 2017.

[19] For more details, see Šteiner in Maraš 2017, pp 63-66.

The next important aspect of integration concerns the access to and exchange of experience gained during joint military education, training, exercises, practical capability building procedures, and operations in international operations and missions, as well as those resulting from the implementation of numerous and comprehensive IPP, ANP and AAIP plans.

The provision and maintenance of the connectivity of national commands and units enable the Alliance to operate jointly, and they are achieved through training, joint exercises and operational activities, which, together with standardization procedures, contributes to an accelerated transformation.

Additionally, Slovenia contributed financial resources to the financing of joint projects through the NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP), while at the same time receiving funds from it.

3.2   NATO and changing the means of manning and professionalization of the SAF

In changing the means of manning and professionalization of the SAF, influences from the international environment were important, in particular the PfP programme and the experiences of the countries that abandoned the conscript system at that time and introduced voluntary manning with professional members and contract reservists. In Slovenia, the formation of the first professional units of the army began in 1991 and continued in 1995, under the recommendations of the PfP, by the formation of the 10th battalion for international cooperation, which was an attempt to complete the first Slovenian battalion with a permanent structure. At the same time, there were also studies and analyses of the changes in the means of manning of the army. Nevertheless, Slovenia at first tried to achieve entry into NATO only by adapting the conscript system, and gradually upgrading the already well-established combined manning of the army and the structure of forces and military personnel adapted to it.

The planned approach to changing the means of manning of the army and its professionalization began in 2001 with the Programme of Measures to Improve the Readiness of the SAF from 2001 to 2004 (Government of the Republic of Slovenia 2001). On this basis, and on the basis of the results of a study of the possibilities of transition to manning with professional soldiers (Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia 2001) and other analyses, the Resolution on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia (2001), the General Long-Term Programme for the Development and Equipping of the SAF (2001), the Concept of the Development of the SAF until 2004 (Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia 2004) and the documents defining them: the scope and structure and organization-mobilization development of the army, and the direction and aims of its development and transformation, were adopted.

Within the dynamics of professionalization, the Ministry of Defence and the SAF studied different variants. From the proposal submitted to the Government, it can be seen that Version A was based on a gradual transition from the then combined system of manning of the army to professional manning with a voluntary contractual reserve in the period 2002-2009. This approach was, by its extent and dynamics, comparable to countries that had already taken a decision or made a transition to professional manning. Version B envisaged an accelerated transition to a professional army in the period from 2002 to 2006, in line with the starting points and solutions offered by the amendment to the Military Service Act proposed by a group of Deputies in February 2002.

After considering the final version of the material, the Government (Šteiner 2015, p 92) adopted resolutions for the implementation of amendments and supplements to the system of completing the SAF, which concerned: (1) Amendments and supplements to the General Long-Term Programme for the Development and Equipping of the SAF for the period up to and including 2015; (2) The definition of milestones in the course of changes to military service, which had to be implemented one year after the entry into force of the amendments, and the amendment to the Military Service Act; (3) The total size of the SAF, which amounted to 26,000 members, was expected to be reduced to approximately 18,000 members by the end of 2007, after full membership of NATO; (4) The commitment to fulfil the normative, personnel, financial, material and other conditions for the implementation of the transition to completing the army with professional members and a voluntary reserve, including the resolution of personnel incompatibilities in the army and the ministry.

To achieve this, the Ministry of Defence undertook the change in the means of manning the army by creating a special project and project organization entitled Transition to a Professional Army, Supplemented by a Voluntary Reserve (Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia 2002a). By November 2002, the project team had prepared a Project Preparation Study: PROVOJ – Professional Armed Forces Supplemented by a Contractual Reserve (Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia 2002b). The project defined the strategic plan, organized the work with project managers, sub-project managers and project works custodians, and defined interconnections.

The launch of the implementation of the project was set for February 2003, and the PROVOJ project dynamics were set by the end of 2010 (Ibid., p 12). An examination of this shows that in the project as many as 11 out of 14 milestones were expected to be completed by the end of 2004. Most of the set milestones, ten of them, were focused on structural professionalization; only four were on functional professionalization, and of them only two had a completion date after 2004. By 2010, the planned operational capabilities of the SAF should have been achieved and its annual manning (Ibid., p 20) ensured, which was also in line with the later Accession and Integration Plan (AAIP). This meant that the aspects of professionalization related to manning and changing its structure were at the forefront.

The next change in the project originated from the intermediate report on the implementation of the PROVOJ project, dated the end of 2004, when it was found that some sub-projects were being poorly implemented. To improve the situation with regard to these irregularities, some measures were implemented in March 2005. The method of project management was changed, and the project management team dismissed[20]. Monthly monitoring of the situation and undertaking of measures concerning individual sub-projects was organized. The activities were focused on ensuring sufficient staffing of professional members and voluntary contractual reservists, and on other outstanding issues of functional professionalization, such as entering and leaving the army, moving to the civil environment at the end of an army contract, preparation of legislation on service in the SAF, the normative regulation of the special features of military service abroad in international operations and missions, and supplementing the Rules on Service in the SAF (Šteiner 2015, p 95).

In 2007, a decision was made to place the project tasks of professionalization among the regular tasks of the Ministry and the army in order to abandon special transparent reports on their implementation, which some designate as early formal completion of the project (Kotnik, 2012, p 22). In the Slovenian case, criticism can also be made that professionalization was imposed, was too fast and incomplete (Ibid.) and was unfinished in the functional sense. Regardless of the above, it is important to emphasize as a positive fact that the processes of professionalization finally became an integral part of the transformation of the army. In addition, transformational changes which were wider in their nature had already started.

The PROVOJ project was formally completed in 2009, when the final report was prepared (GSSAF, 2009). It outlined the aims achieved, and also those that were still being implemented or had not been realized at all. It should be emphasized that some aims were simply not feasible, mainly due to the effects of the economic crisis, especially in the areas of the implementation of integral care for members, support for exits from the system, the payment system[21], and the establishment of a personnel competence model and a comparable education system based on national professional qualifications.

4 THE POSITIVE IMPACTS AND THE DEFICIENCIES OF SLOVENIA'S JOINING PROCESS AND MEMBERSHIP OF THE ALLIANCE

The starting point is that Slovenia gained the status of a safe country with a low level of business risk, the opportunity to participate in the scientific, technological and information environment of the most developed countries, and economic cooperation with the most developed countries, including in the military field.[22]

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[20] *The project office continued work until the end of June 2010.*

[21] *See also Kotnik (2012, 22-23).*

[22] *See: Slovenia and NATO (http://nato.gov.si/slo/).*

4.1 Key positive achievements

From the transformational aspect, the key positive achievements in the field of defence and the military in the Republic of Slovenia are:

1. The preparation of missing strategic documents and updating of the current ones in the field of national security, including new doctrines: military doctrine, the doctrine of military logistics and the doctrine of the military strategic reserve[23];
2. The transformation and alignment of the national defence planning process with the Alliance, and linking it to the planning of forces and building the operational capabilities of the army;
3. The changed readiness of the army, its responsiveness and capabilities of operating with peacekeeping capacities, including the alignment of the national readiness test with NATO CREVAL and TACEVAL;
4. Structural and process integration into the Alliance, as presented in Figure 2;
5. The implemented tasks of the professionalization project and improvement in the professional army structure, together with the provision of starting points for the continuation of professionalization;
6. The achieved level of relations and rights of the professional army (professional members) and the social and functional imperative;
7. Participation in international operations and missions, and the implementation of foreign policy directives of the country in contributing to international security and stability by improving the quality of the military contribution and increasing the complexity of tasks;
8. Effective implementation of military support to the system of protection against natural and other disasters, and the balancing of engagement in the international environment and the tasks of defence readiness in national territory;
9. Reforms and improvements in the system of military education[24] and training, and the alignment of it with the Alliance, which enables connectivity, cooperation and the use of experience and reliance on common capacities in this field;
10. The ability to follow the Alliance's trends, the inclusion in initiatives, projects, concepts and programmes, and the effects of this on the transformation of the SAF;
11. The adoption and enforcement of national safety rules and their alignment with the Alliance, and the improvement in the infrastructure and technical conditions for them;
12. The transfer of Slovenian experience to other partner countries.

It should also be added to the above that the army maintained a high level of the confidence of the Slovenian public. In addition, the credibility of the army within the Alliance, and in international operations and missions has been preserved.

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[23] *Military Doctrine (2006), Doctrine of Military Logistics (2008) and the Doctrine of the Military Strategic Reserve (2012).*

[24] *It should be noted that in the military education system not all possibilities are being exploited and implemented, especially in the basic training of professional and reserve officers and non-commissioned officers.*

Up to the end of the integration process, Slovenia was a good example of objectivity in what it promised and what it managed to achieve, as well as what the Alliance is returning to it in the form of greater security or support with capabilities that the state does not provide or will not develop[25], as is the case for air defence and airspace protection capabilities.

4.2 Cases of deviations and aims that are not achieved

Cases of deviations and objectives that were not achieved:

1. The provision of political attention and support to accepted commitments;
2. The unachieved planned share of defence expenditure in GDP, thereby increasing the gap between planned and real defence expenditure;
3. The reduction in the already adopted defence budgets, and making significant interventions in the investments for designing the envisaged capabilities;
4. Lagging behind in achieving the adopted capability objectives;
5. Paralyzing the already reduced modernization due to complications or scandals in equipping projects;
6. Limitations to or non-achievement of employment of the planned number of permanent personnel and achievement of the planned extent of the contractual reserve of the SAF;
7. Changes and transition to a new competence model in the broad sense of the word, and in the normative regulation of the status of military professionals;
8. The implementation of normatively set mechanisms of integrated care for the professional army and its family members.

Conclusion On the developmental axis of the SAF, which was described and explained at a distance of 10, 15 and 25 years, it can be concluded that the beginning was a very dynamic period of change of a transitional nature, which was very intensive from 1999, when the Republic of Slovenia was invited to join NATO at the second attempt. This was followed by integration, completed by the beginning of 2010. At that time, the SAF in the Alliance were an example of good practice in achieving the development challenges and objectives of capabilities and connectivity. After 2010, we witnessed a decade of developmental stagnation and reliance on what had been achieved in the process of accession and integration, or conditionally speaking, the utilization of the peace dividend. Time will tell whether the state interfered too much with defence expenditure and disproportionately reduced them to the detriment of its defence and military readiness during the period of the economic crisis. This kind of behaviour cannot be assessed positively.

In assessing and comparing other indicators of achievements and deficiencies in the development of the SAF and the Slovenian defence system, it can be concluded that there are more positive solutions and cases than deficiencies. Critics who bet on a self-sufficient armed forces without integration into international alliances would

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[25] *See also Young, 2019.*

oppose this line of thinking, and argue that the national army has disappeared, that it is poorly prepared for the defence of the country, and is lagging behind in development. They would ignore the fact that in the former common state (i.e. Yugoslavia) we contributed around 4.5% of GDP to federal defence structures in the 1980s, and up to 1% for the structures of territorial defence in the federal republic, but even then Slovenia was not defensively self-sufficient. Compared with investments in the military budget in the last ten years, since we have been integrated into the Alliance, this is five times less.

We have established that we relied on some achievements too much and allowed ourselves to miss some development opportunities. As mentioned above, from being an example of good practice a decade ago, we fell to the bottom of member states with regard to positive indicators of defence expenditure and investments in military capabilities. The professionalization of the army was not entirely completed, despite a good approach to a comprehensive project. Moreover, at the peak of the economic crisis, the important transformation efforts were brought to an end and were superseded by survival efforts. The economic crisis was mainly reflected as a financing crisis and a crisis of political consensus on investing in the defence sector. The future will show whether we are back at the very beginning, or at the beginning of the end due to missed opportunities. But the warnings are completely recognizable.

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SPREMINJANJE IN RAZVOJ SLOVENSKE VOJSKE – POGLED IZ TUJINE

THE REFORM AND EVOLUTION OF THE SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES – A VIEW FROM ABROAD

Povzetek   Republika Slovenija je članica zveze Nato 15 let. Med pripravami na članstvo v Natu je morala Slovenska vojska opraviti korenito spremembo, in sicer preoblikovanje iz teritorialne obrambe v vojsko, ki lahko prispeva k Natovim misijam. Spremembe so postale še toliko nujnejše po odločitvi vlade leta 2002, da se ukine naborništvo in v celoti uvede poklicna vojska.

Spremenjena struktura sil Slovenske vojske je bila potrjena leta 2003, torej pred pridružitvijo Slovenije Natu leta 2004. Slovenska vojska se je v prvih petih letih članstva v Natu kljub nekaterim izzivom razvijala v pravo smer in izdatki za obrambo so se sorazmerno večali. V naslednjih petih letih pa je gospodarska kriza, ki je prizadela večino držav članic Nata, še zlasti negativno vplivala na nadaljnji razvoj Slovenske vojske, kar se je odražalo v občutnem zmanjšanju sredstev za obrambo.

Danes, po 15 letih članstva v Natu, si Slovenska vojska še ni opomogla po varčevalnih ukrepih na obrambnem področju. Poraba znaša približno en odstotek BDP in ne zadostuje za podporo načrtov Slovenske vojske glede sil, zaradi česar ta ne more učinkovito prispevati k Natu. Nujna je odločitev o velikosti in obliki Slovenske vojske v prihodnosti, ki bi ustrezala načrtom za prihodnje obrambne izdatke.

Ključne besede   *Nato, Slovenija, profesionalizacija, obrambno načrtovanje, obrambni izdatki, misije, struktura sil, demokratični nadzor.*

Abstract   The Republic of Slovenia has been a member of NATO for 15 years. In preparing for NATO membership the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) were required to prepare for radical change, from a territorial defence force to one that could contribute to NATO missions. The need for change became even more significant after the government decision in 2002 to end conscription and move to a fully professional SAF.

A revised force structure for the SAF was agreed in 2003, prior to Slovenia joining NATO in 2004. Progress in developing the SAF in the first five years of NATO

membership, while encountering a number of challenges, showed a positive trend, with a commensurate increase in defence expenditure. In the following five years the economic crisis which affected most NATO countries had a particularly damaging effect on the continued development of the SAF, with very severe reductions in defence expenditure.

Today, after 15 years of NATO membership, the SAF has still not recovered from the cuts made in defence spending. Spending remains close to 1.0% of GDP and is inadequate to support the force plans of the SAF. The SAF is unable to make an effective contribution to NATO and a decision needs to be made on the future size and shape of the SAF which matches plans for future defence expenditure.

Key words   *NATO, Slovenia, professionalization, defence planning, defence expenditure, missions, force structure, democratic control.*

Introduction   Slovenia became a member of NATO on 29 March 2004. In marking the 15 years of Slovenia's membership of NATO, it is necessary to look at the state of its armed forces prior to joining NATO, and how they have subsequently evolved. This paper therefore reviews Slovenia's developments in its defence forces from joining the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) in 1999 to the end of 2018, which is the latest point for which information is available.

NATO too has changed more than once over this period. In the 2000s its focus was on moving from an organization that had its origins in the defence of Europe to one that required deployable forces for out-of-area operations. With operations in Iraq and Afghanistan now significantly reduced and a perceived increased territorial threat from Russia, NATO has partially moved back to its traditional role, although with a focus on more adaptable forces which can deal with new threats, such as cyber security.

I will look in detail at the challenges Slovenia faced in meeting the requirements of the NATO Membership Action Plan in the period prior to membership, drawing on my personal experience as UK Defence Advisor to the Slovenian Ministry of Defence (MOD) between 2000 and 2003. Many of the decisions made then about the size and structure of the armed forces remain relevant today.

I will also draw on my experience from late 2003 to June 2013 as head of the team responsible for the UK MOD's bilateral defence relations with various European countries, including Slovenia. Finally, I have drawn on the papers written for this publication for the 5th and 10th anniversaries of Slovenia's NATO membership and the annual MOD reports, which are publically available up to 2017.

I will conclude by looking at how Slovenia might best adapt its forces to meet the new threats NATO faces.

1 THE YEARS 1999-2004

1.1 The initial challenges

At the 1999 Washington summit, which resulted in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic joining NATO, new guidelines for membership with individualized »Membership Action Plans« (MAP) for Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia were issued.

In the years leading up to NATO enlargement, the UK MOD funded a programme of assistance for prospective NATO members with the aim of ensuring that the nations concerned had the appropriate systems and structures in place to meet the requirements for NATO membership. Under this programme I was appointed as a defence advisor to the Slovenian MOD in August 2000.

I had previously led a team working with a number of other NATO candidate countries, where our focus was on ensuring the government and legal structures were in place for the democratic control of their armed forces. This was less of a concern in Slovenia, where democratic control was already well embedded in the parliamentary system, and my role was initially to provide advice and assistance on the development of an effective defence planning system for the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF). This role expanded over my three years in Slovenia to cover a wider range of issues concerned with the reform and development of the SAF.

The defence planning system was still under development. Although, technically, the lead for defence planning was the MOD, in practice most of the relevant expertise was in the General Staff (GS). This in itself was a problem, as relations between the military-led GS and the civilian-led MOD could be tense. I was familiar with this problem from my experience with other countries seeking NATO membership, whose military, in less democratic times, had not been accountable to the civil authorities.

Since being invited to join the MAP process in 1999, Slovenia had made little progress in the development of its armed forces. They had evolved from the territorial defence forces that Slovenia had had as part of former Yugoslavia, and their focus, understandably, remained on the defence of national territory and borders. However, this was not the type of force that the NATO Alliance was seeking.

A further challenge for Slovenia, unlike most of the other candidates for NATO membership at that time, was that, due to its very different history, the population did not perceive the external threat to its territory as coming from Russia, and they remained to be convinced about the need for NATO membership. Expenditure on defence was, therefore, not a high priority. Furthermore, as the SAF had evolved from the territorial defence force, there was only a limited history and tradition on which to base its future development.

In 2000 the SAF was still a conscript army with professional officers and NCOs. This was not unusual in NATO at that time, and there was no particular pressure from NATO for Slovenia to develop fully professional armed forces. However, Slovenian law severely restricted the roles in which conscript soldiers could be used, meaning that Slovenia's ability to contribute to NATO operations would also be severely restricted.

Slovenia had a General Election due to take place in October 2000, and the period leading up to this, after my arrival in August 2000, was typical of many democratic countries in that few decisions were being taken until the election was decided. Unfortunately, this hiatus exacerbated the challenges with respect to the urgent need to develop an effective defence plan for the SAF.

Following the election and the appointment of a new government in December 2000, some changes to the organization and personnel in the MOD produced a clearer lead for defence policy and planning. Defence policy and planning are interconnected processes with several levels. The policy lead lay clearly with the MOD. In theory, the strategic planning level also rested with the MOD and lower level force planning with the GS, but the MOD lacked expert personnel for this process; thus, most of the planning process was in fact undertaken in the GS.

This disconnect was to prove a problem in making genuine progress. Part of the problem arose from the lack of experience and knowledge of working at senior levels in defence. In the former Yugoslav army, officer numbers were set according to population percentages. This meant that Slovenians occupied less than 10% of the senior military positions. The consequence was that this percentage produced insufficient numbers of ex-Yugoslav military with experience at senior levels in the newly formed SAF. Certainly by 2000, when I arrived in the Slovenian MOD, I found few officers who had the necessary expertise and experience to lead the reform and development of the SAF. There were some exceptions, but they did not carry sufficient authority and influence.

1.2 The NATO planning and review process (PARP) and the NATO membership action plan (MAP)

From 1999 Slovenia sought to match its defence planning process and its defence reforms to the requirements of the NATO PARP and MAP annual reviews. One negative aspect of this was that insufficient consideration was being given to how meeting the NATO requirements fitted with national requirements, and how the nation perceived its defence needs. The stated long-term ambition of reaching the NATO target of 2.0% of GDP spent on defence rather obscured whether the current level of expenditure (which was closer to 1.0%) was being used effectively.

The combination of the lack of high level expertise in defence, the poorly defined split between policy and strategic planning in the MOD and force planning in the General Staff, and a lack of commitment to defence funding by the government considerably hindered progress in defence reform from 1999 to 2001. However, some

progress had been made in establishing the basis for Slovenia's first professional infantry battalion (the 10ᵗʰ Battalion) and by 2002 it was able to persuade the NATO assessment team that it was heading in the right direction.

In April 2002 the Slovenian government decided to abolish conscription and make the SAF a fully professional force by 2010 (conscription actually ended in 2003, as it proved impossible to continue it once the decision on ending it had been made). This decision was politically rather than militarily driven, and required the SAF to make a significant change to its force structure plans. While NATO would certainly welcome the ultimate goal of a fully professional force, there would undoubtedly be turbulence in the short term and a need for the defence planning process to be significantly improved.

It is fair to say that NATO's own approach to force planning did not help with Slovenia's development of its defence plans. NATO's approach to defence planning is derived from the policies and plans of its larger members. Many of the smaller NATO nations endeavour to shape their entire defence force structure around NATO requirements. However, the leading NATO nations, notably the USA, the UK, and France, all derive their force structure plans from national defence strategies and then commit to NATO those forces they consider appropriate. This works to the disadvantage of the smaller nations, sometimes producing unrealistic defence plans.

A particular example of the conflict in the defence planning process is that NATO defence planners find themselves unable to say to the smaller nations that they should not spend resources on supersonic combat aircraft. Such aircraft can consume a disproportionate amount of the defence budget, but provide very little added value to NATO's force structure, as the larger nations have sufficient combat aircraft to meet NATO's requirements. Even if they did not, a single squadron of aircraft, which is unlikely to be as well-equipped and advanced as those of the leading nations, is not of much use for high intensity combat operations.

The major nations are also those who are the producers of advanced combat aircraft and they have, therefore, been unwilling to discourage countries from purchasing unnecessary aircraft.

1.3 The impact of the decision to create a professional SAF

Subsequent to the decision to create a professional SAF, a decision was made by the Slovenian government to undertake a Strategic Defence Review (SDR). This was a logical development, but progress was slowed by the lack of an over-arching Defence Strategy needed to provide the basis for the SDR. Slovenia remained unclear as to how it wished to contribute to NATO missions once it became a member.

One particular challenge arising from the move to a fully professional force was the need to develop a new training programme and organization, as training for professional soldiers at the private soldier level is more thorough and intensive than

it is for conscripts. It also required a different approach to NCO and officer training. Additionally, an organization for recruitment would need to be developed. Of course, forming a fully professional SAF would require the force structure to be radically changed, and accurate costings would be needed if it was to be achieved within existing government budget plans.

Another key issue that needed to be addressed was the equipment programme. Some of the SAF equipment was old and needed replacing, but other equipment had been purchased after Independence without a clear idea as to whether such equipment met either the current or future requirements of the SAF. The most notable example of this was (and still is) the Pilatus PC-9 training aircraft. These aircraft had been purchased with the long-term ambition that the SAF would eventually possess jet fighters, without any assessment having been undertaken as to whether this was a realistic aim.

The combination of moving to a professional SAF and of being able to provide forces for NATO operations meant that much of the SAF's equipment did not meet either of these requirements.

1.4 The referendum on NATO and EU membership

In 2003, as it became clear that Slovenia was likely to be accepted for both NATO and EU membership, the government decided that it should seek the consent of the population. Accordingly, a referendum was held on 23 March 2003.

While there appeared to be little doubt that EU membership would win favour, NATO membership was more open to debate. As part of former Yugoslavia, Slovenia's recent history had been of neutrality (more strictly "non-alignment") and, as part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, it had been on the front line of a war which was not of its choice. It was understandable, therefore, that some of its population would have reservations about joining a military organization in which Slovenia would be a minor player.

The MOD and the SAF were clear that Slovenia was too small to be able to defend itself effectively against external aggression without placing an unreasonable burden on the economy, and that joining NATO provided the most effective guarantee for national security. A campaign was thus undertaken to persuade the population that the potential benefits of NATO membership more than offset any commitments that Slovenia would be required to make to NATO.

The referendum campaign may have been helped by the decision to create a fully professional SAF, as it meant that there would be no question of unwilling conscripts being deployed on NATO operations. The outcome of the referendum was clear support for NATO membership, with 66% in favour. While not as emphatic as the nearly 90% in favour of EU membership, this was a good result given Slovenia's history.

1.5   Control and leadership of the SAF

One of the criteria for NATO membership was that a country should have clear democratic control of its armed forces. While none of the former communist countries which were now seeking NATO membership had been under military dictatorship, in many of them the military had wielded disproportionate power and had not been under the control of a parliament. In NATO's history there have been times when a member state has not had a democratic government. By the time of enlargement, however, all NATO countries were governed by democratically elected politicians. In the lead-up to the NATO 2004 enlargement, in which the applicants were also seeking EU membership, the overriding requirement of the many criteria set out for membership was for democratic government.

The application of democratic control to the armed forces of a country was frequently referred to wrongly as "civilian control". This was a misinterpretation of the term "civil control", which, in common use, simply means oversight of the armed forces by elected representatives. NATO countries vary in the roles their civilians play in defence, but they are not generally expected to run their armed forces.

By the time Slovenia joined the MAP it had in place a strong system of political and parliamentary control of its armed forces. Indeed concerns were expressed that the level of civilian control of the SAF meant that the views of the military in the development and deployment of the SAF were under-represented. There was certainly a strong divide between the MOD and the GS prior to NATO membership, which did not help in developing plans for the SAF and ensuring that it had the necessary resources.

The SAF officer corps suffered from a lack of a coherent identity, partly due to the diverse backgrounds of the officers and partly to a lack of tradition. Consequently there was no "esprit de corps". This manifested itself in the failure, on occasion, of the GS to provide a single coordinated military perspective to the MOD, and thus led to civilians taking decisions on military issues.

1.6   The new force structure

The force structure that evolved from the decision to create a fully professional SAF presented a number of challenges. The existing structure, based around a conscript force, contained too many officers and also too many civilian staff. Slovenia's employment laws would make reducing the numbers difficult to achieve. For example, plans were made for civilian numbers to be reduced by more than 500 by 2008 through natural processes, without a change in the law. This seemed highly unrealistic. This reduction represented about 25% of the workforce, and the age profile was unlikely to provide sufficient retirements in that period.

The reduction in the surplus number of officers by 2010 was a more realistic objective. However, it meant that major distortions in the organization of the SAF would continue throughout the years when it was undergoing its most significant reform.

The ultimate aim following professionalization was to create a two brigade force structure, each centred around a motorized infantry battalion, an aim which remains unchanged.

2 POST-2004 – DEVELOPMENTS AFTER NATO MEMBERSHIP

2.1 Overview

As noted in the introduction, NATO has changed during the period under review. Slovenia has struggled to respond to this changing environment and, since joining NATO, has continued to plan for the same force structure that was confirmed prior to becoming a NATO member. This is despite an economic crisis making force structure plans and associated equipment plans unaffordable. The following sections look briefly at some of the key issues that arose in the first ten years of Slovenia's NATO membership.

2.2 2004-2008/9: The first five years

A fairly comprehensive review of Slovenia's first five years of NATO membership was published in Bilten Slovenske vojske in November 2009. At that time, a number of challenges facing Slovenia's development of its armed forces were recognized, but the overall mood seemed positive. To quote:

"After 5 years of membership in NATO, the SAF is close to finishing the formal part of the integration. The next part leads towards increasing efficiency and affiliation of declared capabilities within the NFS." (Humar, D., et al, 2019, p 68)

Slovenia's defence expenditure up to 2008 had shown small but steady growth, reaching just over 1.5% of GDP in that year, and had yet to be hit by the economic downturn. The annual MOD report for 2008 does reflect that the final budget allocation was lower than planned, but still shows general progress and is positive overall about the development of defence plans and the SAF.

2.3 2009/10-2014: The next five years

Although, as already noted, Slovenia faced challenges in the first five years of its NATO membership, the SAF had been evolving in the right direction. The next five years were to prove more difficult. Like most NATO members, Slovenia was affected by the economic crises that arose from 2008 and afterwards. However, Slovenian defence expenditure suffered some of the most severe cuts. Defence expenditure continued to grow slightly until 2010, reaching a peak of just over 1.6% of GDP.

However, expenditure both in 2009 and 2010 was subject to in-year reductions against the figure originally planned, necessitating adjustments to defence plans (Annual Reports of the Ministry of Defence for 2009 and 2010). Defence expenditure then experienced an abrupt downturn, sinking to less than 1.0% of GDP in 2014.

The impact of the cuts has been cumulative and can be clearly seen in the papers written for this publication on the 10th anniversary of Slovenia's NATO membership. The situation in 2014 was clearly articulated in this extract:

"The SAF entered the year 2014 with the military budget (the military defence programme) of EUR 266 million; in 2013, the military budget amounted to EUR 300 million. Thus, there is a growing gap between the requirements set out in the Mid-Term Defence Programme 2013-2018 and the amount of budgetary resources provided for the realization of this and other documents. This is the complete opposite of the need for the procurement of equipment and weapons, and prevents the realization of certain requirements." (Osterman, 2014, pp 58-59)

These reductions in defence expenditure were not matched by reductions in SAF personnel numbers. The inevitable consequence was, and continues to be, that personnel costs, which in 2010 were about 52% of the budget, grew to consume a disproportionate part of the budget, with inevitable reductions in expenditure on new equipment, equipment maintenance, and training.

2.4 Deployments on NATO and EU missions

Prior to joining NATO Slovenia had already deployed military personnel under the PfP banner, and had thus gained some experience of military operations outside its national territory. It had also provided some personnel for UN and OSCE missions.

Since joining NATO and the EU, Slovenia has deployed SAF personnel on a number of missions. Slovenia made its first large scale deployment in 2007 to KFOR in Kosovo, demonstrating its commitment to deploying on NATO missions. This deployment has continued to the present day. Slovenia has predominantly taken part in missions in the Western Balkans. While it is possible to criticize Slovenia for not having contributed more to the higher risk missions, in particular Afghanistan, there is a degree of logic in concentrating on the Western Balkans in that local knowledge and language skills mean that Slovenia can contribute most effectively to these missions.

While the SAF has undoubtedly gained knowledge and expertise through these deployments, they will not have equipped them with the skills and training needed for the more complex NATO missions. The SAF has no recent experience of exercising at battalion level with other NATO forces for high intensity combat operations.

3   THE CURRENT STATE OF THE SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES

Having decided to create a fully professional SAF in 2002, as already noted, progress initially appeared to be good. There was an understanding of the radical changes that the SAF would have to undergo to reach its planned state, and defence funding assumed an upward gradient. Slovenia, like the majority of European countries, was hit by the wider economic crisis of 2008, and suffered a recession in 2012-13 and was obliged to reduce government expenditure. However, defence appears to have been particularly badly hit by these cuts. From reaching a peak of 1.62% of GDP in 2010 it fell to 0.93% of GDP in 2015, despite GDP having returned to growth by then. While defence expenditure has returned to growth since 2016, as the table below shows, it still represents less than 1.0% of GDP.

Table 1:
The Proportion of the MoD's Financial Plan in the National Budget and GDP in Millions of Euros
Source:
Annual Report of the Ministry of Defence for 2017, p 87.

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
National Budget	9,314,513	9,654,921	9,797,661	9,000,298	9,156,852
MoD Financial Plan	350,703	339,949	343,939	389,227	406,569
DEFENCE EXPENDITURE	381,658	366,460	361,376	406,166	422,277
GDP in Million EUR	36,239	37,615	38,837	40,418	43,278
% of the MoD's FP in the NB	3.77	3.52	3.51	4.32	4.44
% of the MoD's FP in GDP	0.97	0.90	0.89	0.96	0.94
% of DE in GDP	1.05	0.97	0.93	1.00	0.98

GDP in Slovenia has grown relatively strongly by European standards since 2013, and the unemployment rate has been falling steadily in the same period. However, improved GDP has not led to significant increases in the defence budget, and better employment opportunities within the wider economy have made recruitment to the SAF more challenging. While actual defence expenditure has risen to EUR 422.3 million, this is still below the EUR 552 million figure for 2010, which, of course, does not take into account inflation.

Slovenia was already spending more than the NATO recommended 50% of the defence budget on personnel when the decision to move to a fully professional SAF was made. Professional soldiers will only be attracted to the armed forces if salaries are competitive with the civilian sector, particularly in areas requiring specialist skills, such as communications. With a much lower defence budget than originally planned, personnel costs currently consume more than 60% of the defence budget, despite personnel numbers being below the planned requirement. What is left is completely inadequate to meet the costs of maintaining and purchasing new equipment and professional military training.

Even with personnel costs taking the majority of the defence budget, it appears that, in a growing economy, pay is still inadequate to attract and retain personnel, and shortages exist. Spending on capital equipment appears to be virtually non-existent, and it is unlikely that there are sufficient funds for training. The current state of the SAF might, therefore, be assessed as not meeting either NATO requirements or national defence requirements. The planned small boosts in defence funding are unlikely to significantly improve the situation.

The latest year for which personnel figures are available is 2017. The tables below come from the MOD 2017 Annual Report.

<table>
<tr><td>Status</td><td>Situation as of 31 December 2017</td><td>Situation as of 31 December 2016</td><td>Difference</td></tr>
<tr><td>Officers</td><td>1071</td><td>1061</td><td>10</td></tr>
<tr><td>NCOs</td><td>1970</td><td>1960</td><td>10</td></tr>
<tr><td>Soldiers</td><td>2711</td><td>2886</td><td>-175</td></tr>
<tr><td>Senior Military Specialists</td><td>261</td><td>255</td><td>6</td></tr>
<tr><td>Junior Military Specialists</td><td>318</td><td>315</td><td>3</td></tr>
<tr><td>Civilian Personnel</td><td>446</td><td>443</td><td>3</td></tr>
<tr><td>TOTAL</td><td>6777</td><td>6920</td><td>-143</td></tr>
</table>

Table 2: Comparison of the SAF Active Component in 2017 and 2016 Source: Annual Report of the Ministry of Defence for 2017, p 93.

Category	Officers	NCOs	Soldiers
2017	1	1.8	2.5
2016	1	1.9	2.7
2015	1	1.9	2.8
2014	1	1.8	2.8

Table 3: Ratio between Officers, NCOs and Soldiers

Unless there has been a significant change in 2018, it is clear that the SAF is unable to meet its personnel requirements, and that the trend in the ratio between officers and soldiers is in the wrong direction. The report also notes a significant increase in the average age of SAF personnel.

The SAF is only able to conduct low intensity operations and cannot make any useful contribution to any high intensity NATO operation that might arise. This means Slovenia is not assuming its fair share of the NATO burden, even by wider European standards (i.e. acknowledging that the USA already assumes a disproportionate part of the NATO burden).

Slovenia is currently only capable of undertaking low-level peace support operations, and has a very limited capability to deploy SAF personnel. Peace support operations are not NATO's primary role; indeed this is where the EU or the UN tends to take the lead, and thus Slovenia's contribution to NATO is negligible.

The latest publically available MOD report, for 2017, makes clear that the SAF has suffered severe deterioration in its levels of training and equipment:

"In 2017 the downward trend of aging and wear of weapons and equipment, the aging of the armed forces, and the inadequate ratio of the personnel structure between officers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and soldiers continued. The economic measures had a negative impact on the planned provision and maintenance of capabilities, and on training in accordance with current professional military standards. The failure to update the SAF has led to a technological lag in comparison to modern armed forces, and has hindered the SAF's interoperability within the Alliance." (Annual Report of the Ministry of Defence for 2017, p 17).

The list of equipment purchased in 2017 was notable for its lack of any major capital equipment, and comprised mainly uniforms, pistols, and soft-shell passenger vehicles. The 2017 Annual Report shows less than 5.0% of defence expenditure being allocated to equipment and infrastructure.

Conclusion and the way forward

The decision to join NATO forced Slovenia to make radical changes to its approach to defence. It had to move from what was essentially a territorial defence force, based around the ability to mobilize a significant number of soldiers who had completed military service, to a smaller, fully professional armed service. It also meant a change to national defence thinking, away from solely defence of national territory to being willing to deploy to other countries in support of NATO operations. Joining the EU with its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) further underlined the need for change.

Today Slovenia has completed the transition from a conscript army based on territorial defence forces to an all-volunteer force intended for a wider range of operations, including contributing to NATO forces. However, they are not fit for purpose. More than 60% of the defence budget is spent on personnel costs, leaving very little for new equipment, maintenance of existing equipment, and training. Increasing the defence budget to address these shortfalls (and to get closer to the NATO target of 2.0%) is an obvious solution. No country can double its defence budget overnight, and existing government plans, according to the 2016 MOD Annual Report, appear to be aiming for 1.2% of GDP. Therefore, other solutions need to be considered.

I am sure the Slovenian leadership will point out that Slovenia is not alone in failing to meet NATO targets – Germany is the prime example. However, Slovenia must decide whether it wants to take defence seriously. After all there are countries, such

as Costa Rica, which have no army at all. The best way forward may be to abandon the ambition for a two brigade structure and concentrate on one properly equipped and trained brigade. NATO does not necessarily seek larger force numbers; its key requirement is for highly trained and deployable forces. One well-equipped and trained battalion is of more use to NATO than three or four battalions which are poorly equipped and trained. Irrespective of what NATO wants, the Slovenian MOD has a duty of responsibility to the Slovenian tax payer to provide value for money. The present SAF does not do that.

The threat in Europe has grown. Thus, while the threat to Slovenia was low when it joined NATO, it could be considered to have increased in the last few years. Although there are laggards – notably Germany – Europe as a whole has significantly increased its defence expenditure in recent years, largely as a response to a perceived increase in the threat from Russia. Slovenia's security is threatened by attempts to destabilize Europe and undermine its collective defence. Slovenia's security is also threatened by events outside Europe which can, for example, lead to refugee influxes into Europe. Slovenia, therefore, needs to be prepared to deploy forces on operations outside its national boundaries.

Employment law and conditions of service make it difficult to achieve a rapid reduction in personnel numbers, and stopping recruitment would lead to an unbalanced structure. However, it is clear some action needs to be taken. Personnel numbers are currently below the force structure requirement and this presents an opportunity for change. Any increase in defence funds might best be used to pay for the early retirement of surplus officers. A decision on a revised force structure could be adopted quickly, with the aim of working towards it over the next few years. A decision to sell the Pilatus PC-9s and close the unit would also save money.

As I understand it, the division of responsibilities between the MOD and the GS remains a source of friction and a barrier to the effective management of defence. This problem would be best resolved by merging the MOD and the GS; if countries the size of the UK can manage with a combined MOD/GS structure, there is no reason why this cannot be achieved in Slovenia. A merged organization would be better placed to deliver the restructuring of the SAF I have proposed in the preceding paragraph.

Slovenia should also consider where it can add best value. It has expertise in CBRN and Mountain Warfare and should discuss with NATO the option of primarily focusing on these areas. However, Slovenia should not seek to avoid committing personnel to the front line; otherwise it risks being seen as avoiding dangerous tasks.

In conclusion, radical decisions need to be taken urgently in order to turn the SAF into an effective armed force.

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Andrzej Fałkowski

ANIMUS IN CONSULENDO LIBER –
V PREMIŠLJEVANJU SVOBODEN DUH

Povzetek   Preteklo je 15 let, odkar se je Slovenija z nekaterimi drugimi državami pridružila Natu. Tako politične elite kot navadni državljani razumejo organizacijo Severnoatlantske pogodbe kot zaščitnico. Toda pred kom ali čim nas mora Nato zaščititi? Zakaj so se Slovenija in druge države iz nekdanjega komunističnega bloka pridružile zavezništvu? Kakšno je njegovo resnično stanje? Namen tega prispevka je pogled na Nato z vidika izkušenj, pridobljenih v 12 letih na treh različnih položajih v Natovem poveljstvu.

Ključne besede   *Nato, soglasje, član, diplomacija.*

Abstract   It has been 15 years since Slovenia, alongside several other countries, joined NATO. Both political elites and ordinary citizens see the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a protector. However, what does NATO have to protect us from? Why did Slovenia and the other countries from the former communist hemisphere join the Alliance? What are the realities of the organization? This contribution proposes a look at NATO from the perspective of 12 years of experience serving in three different positions at NATO HQ.

Key words   *NATO, consensus, member, diplomacy.*

Introduction   NATO's goals have varied throughout history, and have always been adapted to the circumstances in the course of the organization's existence. The initial goals, defined at its creation, have evolved or disappeared, and today's aims are considerably different. The question is whether the overall security situation has changed the organization, or whether the organization has exercised significant influence over the security surroundings.

In general, several important periods can be distinguished in NATO's development. While the first 40 years of the organization's existence were dominated by the Cold War *modus operandi* and a "simple" bipolar World, the next 20 – with my country, Poland, and Slovenia already having joined NATO – were marked by the expansion of tasks and operational engagement out of area (non-Article 5 operations), a gradual abandonment of static forces, a reduction in structures and defence spending in member states, and so on. At the time, a popular saying scattered across NATO corridors and meetings was: "either out of area or out of business". NATO was at the height of an identity crisis. Additionally, a preference for fostering deployable forces rather than building a new NATO defence infrastructure was all-encompassing. I remember our late Chief of Defence (ChoD) General Franciszek Gągor saying, "You need concrete to take off", during one of the NATO Military Committee ChoD sessions, in response to the ongoing discussion on limiting investment in NATO static installations and predominantly developing deployable forces.

Finally, the most recent period of NATO's growth, spreading over more than the last 10 years, has marked a gradual return to the roots of NATO, and thus the mission of collective defence in the fast-changing geostrategic situation.

While one can say that the very existence of NATO probably prevented the deterioration of the security situation in the treaty area, we should also stress that, simultaneously, the security situation within NATO's zone of influence has been shaped by the ever-evolving defensive capabilities of the Alliance and its democratic values.

1   WHY JOIN AT ALL?

The most important argument for joining a defensive alliance is to protect one's country against an external threat. This idea united most of the populations and political circles (even those opposing each other) from the accession countries, and finally prevailed prior to them joining NATO. Nevertheless, the process was in itself complicated. Initially, NATO was not widely open to further expansion. Some of the member states simply did not want to accept new countries into the NATO circle. Notwithstanding hardship, the candidates were able to prove that they were worth admitting and that the Alliance was also going to benefit from the expansion.

From NATO's perspective, the most serious threat to the democratic world was, and still is, invariably Russia. However, this perception varies in, on the one hand, countries remote from Russia, such as Portugal or even Slovenia and the other Balkan countries, and, on the other hand, Poland, and also Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, namely those countries at the Eastern flank, which are exposed to or even directly neighbour this threat. The fear of the Russian "bear" did not end in 1989. Is this the only reason for the accession of 13 (soon to be 14) new members since 1999?

At the time of the 1999 enlargement, many years had passed since the previous expansion (the last country to have joined NATO was Spain, in 1982) and the member countries had forgotten all about it. An additional layer of complexity was added by the fact that this time it concerned states from the former communist bloc, which had been strongly linked to or, for some, even part of the Soviet Union before its disintegration in 1991 (with Russia as its legal successor). When our countries joined, in fact in batches (in 1999, 2004, 2009, 2017 respectively), they simply wanted to escape the geostrategic vacuum in which they no longer belonged to the Eastern sphere of influence but were not yet part of the democratic world. No one likes to live in limbo or to constitute a "no man's land". It did not seem reasonable to remain within the shackles of the past with all the traumatic experience attached to that; naturally, falling within the zone of influence of stronger players was a much better choice.

Looking from the perspective of the last 15 years, one can see that the context of the Russian aggressive actions in Ukraine or Georgia gave us the reassurance that joining NATO was worthwhile. However, there has not been a proper verifying factor. The Russians did not attempt to attack any NATO state, but that is, paradoxically, the whole point. We can assume that this is the result of two important assets that the Alliance presents – deterrence and credible defence.

Let us imagine that a defined and specific threat like Russia does not exist. In the 1990s and today, most of our political class would still prefer integrating into the Western sphere of security. Decades of life under communism have fostered in us an incredible need to westernize and to make sure that we belong to the same zone every step of the way.

Were these the only flywheels that drove other potential NATO members? Even if we had not been threatened by any danger, we would still have joined the Alliance. Slovenia, not surrounded by any enemies or entities who would like to challenge the West, is a good example. It is noteworthy that within Slovenia there were no factors triggering the need for an external stabilizer like NATO, and yet the country wanted that membership. Its situation is similar to the most recent newcomer, North Macedonia, which wanted to confirm its place in what is broadly understood as Western Europe. Although the Balkans were perceived as a historically unstable region, the reason for joining NATO went deeper. It is the particular effect of the fall of communism in Europe; everyone wants to belong to the West, not to the East.

In addition to this, NATO constitutes a good driving force. It obliges members to modernize and develop in such a way that they do not feel too complacent. There is always room for improvement, modernization and transformation. The Alliance points out technological trends to its members, and teaches them about cyber threats or hybrid wars. Furthermore, being in NATO also carries a certain prestige and gives its members a sense of choice.

2   A BUMPY ROAD TO BECOMING A MEMBER OF THE CLUB

How difficult and uncertain were the roads and measures for the accession of our countries, including for Slovenia? It can certainly be claimed that the post-1999 opening to the whole group of former communist countries was the result of a very long and complex process that paved the way.

At the beginning, a spearhead in the form of Czechia, Hungary and Poland was trying very slowly to open the door to NATO. It is not an overstatement to say that we were not wanted. Later, it somehow became a little easier. This does not mean that it was altogether easy, or that accession was automatic. However, through our persistence, we kept one foot in the door in order to keep it ajar for the next arrivals. Progressively, better and less ambiguous procedures and expectations were outlined for such an event.

Earlier, picturing the group of countries from our region as part of NATO was simply a disturbing vision. We were considered unreliable; only as trustworthy as post-communists can be. We were a potential burden to the Alliance. Opponents of our accession were aware that we would not facilitate the defence of NATO, but would only make it more difficult, especially at the beginning. We would not increase the Alliance's combat potential at once, and territorially we would induce its extension, and consequently weaken it. We were, in a sense, worsening the security situation "well set" in the Cold War paradigm.

On 20 December 1991, the Allies established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in order to create a space for dialogue and collaboration with NATO's former Warsaw Pact counterparts. "The NACC was a manifestation of the 'hand of friendship' extended at the July 1990 summit meeting in London, when Allied leaders proposed a new cooperative relationship with all countries in Central and Eastern Europe in the wake of the end of the Cold War" (NACC, 2017). The existence of the NACC was the impulse for the creation of a "light involvement", in the form of the Partnership for Peace (PfP, 1994) as a practical programme that would transform the relationship between NATO and the participating states. This was also a test for the newcomers to prepare them for practical cooperation within NATO.

The PfP constituted a kind of 'sandpit' or hallway of NATO: »Show us how you're doing in the kindergarten, maybe we'll let you into the serious adult organization,« or »Stay in the hall for a little bit before entering the parlour«. We were patiently, although reluctantly, staking out. We showed that we were worthy of joining the big league. Paradoxically, today, Russia is also a member of the PfP, alongside such countries as Ukraine and Georgia. So what is the stand of NATO and the countries directly suffering from Russia's aggressive behaviour on its participation in the PfP? Are we still trying to play the conciliator's role?

In the end, what changed the opinion of the entire NATO community and gave the final push to open the door? A breakthrough in the way the West was thinking about NATO enlargement very possibly came from the geostrategic calculations that played a crucial role. It is always better to have the borders of the security zone moved ~600-700km to the East. But that was not the only reason. It is likely that the prospect of potential economic gains in this part of Europe was also a factor. Once the doubts of some countries were dispelled, a consensus on enlargement could finally be reached.

3   WHAT DOES NATO PROTECT US FROM?

NATO analyses potential threats and challenges. While some of them do constitute a direct threat to certain countries, this is not really the case for others. Today, NATO countries are particularly afraid of, for example, terrorist attacks, because for various reasons they might become possible targets themselves. The Mediterranean countries, Slovenia included, are not particularly afraid of the threat emanating from the East, because they are not directly exposed to it. Likewise, Poland is not disturbed by the problems in the Mediterranean, because it does not belong to this region. Unwanted immigrants, Islamic State or the crisis in the Middle East are not priority threats for certain countries.

For this reason some joint activities aimed at solving these problems should rather be seen as a manifestation of Allied solidarity and reciprocity. Members give their support to the general direction of these activities, and provide advice and physical backing, but they are not particularly active in seeking to solve these specific problems.

4   WHO CAN WE COUNT ON?

NATO increases the defence capabilities of its member countries. All the members are 100% convinced that they would not be able to defend themselves against potential aggression from Russia (with the possible exception of the US). Some even say that dealing with aggression coming from smaller countries would turn out to be problematic. Only external help and support could save an attacked state in the situation of a protracted conflict. In this context, one question inevitably remains: can we count on all members of the Alliance when the time comes?

Theory and practice do not necessarily go hand in hand. Theoretically and officially we can count on the help of all member states and their military (and economic) might as one united institution and Alliance. However, we, i.e. those of us in the Eastern part of Europe, do not necessarily think that certain powerful European countries, even neighbouring ones, would help us individually in the event of Russian aggression, and even if they did, their individual help would not be sufficient. Hence, in practice, our hopes and calculations mainly rely on American

help. WWI and WWII are the best examples of this transatlantic help. Indeed, one can clearly feel that the hopes of some governments are located in the United States. This is manifest in these countries' everyday politics, which encompass various areas of interest going beyond the security sector. It is interesting to note that one of the informal meanings of the NATO acronym, used as a gentle tease in certain meetings, is ''Need America To Operate". This does not call for any further explanation.

5 A SPLIT MEANING OR NOT?

As if contradicting the very idea of an Alliance, NATO functions as something that I call a "terminological dichotomy", and I am not only thinking of the two official languages, namely English and French. This duality has several dimensions.

Firstly, there is the very nature of NATO. Although in the perception of its potential adversaries NATO remains a military organization only, it is, in fact, a political-military alliance. This is why the two most important collegial and decision-making bodies at the top of the Alliance are the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the military authorities, the latter, paradoxically, consisting of three separate bodies: the Military Committee (MC), the Allied Command Operation (ACO), and the Allied Command Transformation (ACT).

Secondly, there is NATO's "dual personality". NATO should not be seen as yet another international organization, but rather as an Alliance of the richest (and strongest) countries in the world. NATO as an international organization (and therefore the "framework" only – the NATO Command Structure has less than 10 thousand soldiers) might not strike its observers as representing the importance and strength of the defensive force that the idea of the Alliance bears (~3.2 million troops) (see 'Defence Expenditure…', 2019). In other words, we may have a small organization, but a huge Alliance nonetheless. We must, however, concede that NATO is a relatively small organization to deal with macro issues.

As such, it represents an elite and is egalitarian at the same time, as it includes less prosperous countries with smaller armed forces (or without one at all – Iceland). The collective defence spending indicates its wealth; NATO estimates that the total of all member states' defence budgets was about €900 billion in 2018 (see 'Defence Expenditure…', 2019). In comparison, the numbers deflate drastically if we only take into account the organization's civil and military budgets – €1.65 billion – and its NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP) – €700 million (see 'NATO agrees…', 2019 and Haltiwanger, 2019).

Within the Alliance, we are dealing not only with the reconciliation of external security interests in accordance with democratic standards, but also with the divergent interests of the member states, which are not always in unspoilt, friendly relationships.

NATO is a melting pot where subtle diplomacy – embodied by the presence of several thousand diplomats and even statesmen (occasionally including Heads of State and Government) – meets the brute force resulting from its military nature and the capabilities it exemplifies.

The Alliance is also about empathy, tolerance, sensitivity and willingness to help others, which, paradoxically, are carried through power and even violence represented by NATO armed forces.

NATO's "dual personality" is also apparent in its operations. NATO is mainly associated with the well-known Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which in its most general outline introduces the principle of solidarity and collective defence between members, already described at the time of Alexander Dumas and his Three Musketeers in »all for one and one for all«. However, there are also operations meant to bring peace, sometimes far away from the Alliance's treaty boundaries, which are known as non-Article 5 operations (see The North Atlantic Treaty,1949).

Another example of NATO's duality lies in the fact that it is not only about the collective defence embodied in the principles of Article 5, but also about the responsibility of the allies to build their own defence. This aspect can even be seen as self-defence resulting from Article 3 of the Treaty (Ibid., 1949).

NATO as an organization applies standards, but it also respects the diversity resulting from the legacy of the States' internal systems, and affordability relating to the variability in wealth and development of the individual members.

NATO reflects the polarization materialized in military realism vs. the excessive optimism of diplomats and their tendency to use the armed forces, or vice versa. On the other hand, in NATO we have political and civilian control over the enthusiasm of military skirmishers.

It would be difficult not to mention the sadness and sorrow caused by the deaths that have occurred in NATO operations, but neither could we omit the joy resulting from having been able to prevent some human suffering in different parts of the world.

6 MYTHS OR TRUTHS ABOUT NATO

Ironically, many myths have surrounded the functioning of such a serious organization. Most of them should be dispelled and rejected. A good number of these myths originate in a lack of inside knowledge of the organization, or are spread by people who manifest a marked scepticism towards its very existence.

Although it may seem surprising and even shocking, NATO does not have a single and only boss. The head(s) of NATO are its 29 member countries, and a specific

type of board of directors, which takes all its decisions by consensus. This does not mean that NATO's Secretary General does not have any role to play. The Secretary General is the organization's plenipotentiary with the authority to act on its behalf, as well as to implement all decisions taken jointly, but they do not have the power to make decisions on their own. Although they do not have voting powers, they might, in practice, inspire, motivate, push or even tip the scale by their actions.

NATO as an organization does not have much money; it is not a wealthy organization. Its budgets come from the contributions paid in instalments by the member states. As mentioned above, the real financial strength of the Alliance lies in the sum of the defence budgets of all the member countries.

As such, NATO does not have its own, ready to use, armed forces. Rather, it has an organizational framework of the command structure, numbering no more than 10,000 staffers. The strength of the Pact is, yet again, the sum of the components brought in by the member states. In this case, the sum of their respective armed forces appears in the eyes of the Alliance's potential adversaries as the "sum of all fears".

In the same vein, NATO as an organization does not possess armaments and equipment. The rare exceptions comprise 14 AWACS aircraft (see AWACS, 2019), several UAVs (see AGS, 2019), and radar, sensors and installations related to NATO infrastructure. The real "heavy metal" weaponry is, once again, in the possession of the member states.

There is another methodological mistake in our way of thinking about NATO, especially in societies that had to work hard to »deserve« their membership. We often hear that »NATO told us to do this and that« or that »NATO requires so-and-so from our country«, etc. Nothing could be more misguided. NATO is about us, and if we disagree, the other members are not able to force us to do anything we do not want or are not able to do.

7 IS NATO A "TALKING SHOP" ONLY?

Another witty meaning of the NATO acronym is "No Action, Talks Only". This misconception undoubtedly falls under the list of myths about the organization, though admittedly this might have been the state of affairs during the Cold War. The logic behind such an attitude is easily understandable: it is always better to talk (e.g. on the basis of Article 4 of the Atlantic Charter, which comes down to consultations relevant to the Alliance) rather than to shoot at each other. Paradoxically, the "talks only" posture ended when NATO began to implement its non-Article 5 operations. Although there is much room for improvement in NATO proactivity – rather than reactivity – it seems that nowadays it is more appropriate to translate the acronym of NATO as "Now Action, Talks Over". There are various ways in which NATO has demonstrated that action is part of its core business.

Its activities relating to threat analysis, appropriate capability building, advanced planning, striving for interoperability, maintaining readiness and, finally, acting when necessary, all show that NATO's efforts have greatly surpassed those of pure "talk".

8 CONSENSUS – STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS?

Not only do "the mills of God grind slowly", but also NATO's decision-making process could constitute another example of its dual personality. It can be as time consuming as it is, euphemistically speaking, deliberate. When a given situation allows for some leeway in terms of time, seemingly trivial items can stay on the organization's agenda for years. On the contrary, in the event of an urgent need, decisions are taken quickly. A cascade decision-making system and a large number of committees favour this approach. Either way, the principle of consensus occupies a central place in the overall process. Should the consensus rule be considered as a strength or a weakness of the Alliance? Consensus must be reached for every NATO decision. Each country has an equally strong voice, which can trigger such situations as, for instance, the long-term blocking of North Macedonia's accession due to the well-documented disagreement on the name of the country. Nevertheless, it shows the high level of sovereignty that this organization leaves to its members. The unanimity rule is meticulously followed. Of course, as everywhere, there is strong pressure on the "opponents", but ultimately every member retains the right to a sovereign national position.

Consensus can, on the one hand, be considered a weakness. It can be a burden which weighs on the Alliance. In contrast, no comparable constraint encumbers, for instance, Putin's actions. On the other hand, the consensus is NATO's strength. Once all member states grant a motion, everybody defends such a decision individually, regardless of how turbulent the negotiations were and how much diplomatic effort had to be carried out.

It is almost proverbial, but if you cannot reach consensus negotiating at the table, you have to act unofficially, behind the scenes. In other words, corridor diplomacy also plays an important role in the Alliance's decision-making process. To paraphrase, the Partnership for Peace sometimes stands, in NATO slang, for »Eating for Peace« or »Drinking for Peace«. This clearly shows that formal receptions and dinners are more than mere courtesy meetings and may significantly influence certain decisions of the organization. Therefore, when asked about the time spent working for the Alliance, some people give the amusing answer of "5 or 10 kg" as an indicator of their civilian and military diplomatic experience within NATO.

9   IS NATO CHANGING FAST ENOUGH?

Probably not. I do not think, however, that this is a feature peculiar to NATO, but is rather a characteristic of all organizations with a global reach. Like others, NATO often faces criticism related to its slowness, excessive bureaucracy, oversized aspirations, and so on.

On the surface, NATO is conservative. While it is indeed stable, contrary to appearances it is under constant transformation. It even has a strategic command (ACT – Allied Command Transformation) responsible for this on-going transformation, like a watchdog monitoring the requirements and proposing adjustments in accordance with its motto: "Improving Today, Shaping Tomorrow, Bridging the Two" (see ACT, 2019). NATO embodies this never-ending transformation not only because the international security situation is changing dynamically and because there is an urgent need for rapid adaptation; it also changes by adjusting, for example, to the external economic environment, technological progress or even the arrival of new members, who bring a new, regional perspective to the table, sometimes from a completely different angle.

The NATO phenomenon

Participation in the North Atlantic Alliance represents prestige and keeping up with technology as well as military trends and doctrines.

In my view, NATO is a real cradle of strategic thinking and the best "defence university" one can imagine, where the only graduates are the few lucky ones – appointed civilians or military personnel – who have had the opportunity to scroll through its corridors and conference rooms. It is also a great diplomatic academy, a real life course of diplomacy of the highest level, very different from classical bilateral diplomacy and the highest-level school of democratic and civilian control over the military. Additionally, it is also a school of strategic patience, due to the specificity of the decision-making process.

NATO is an amalgam, a combination of the glow of diplomatic parlours with the mud and sweat of the military training fields – and with the blood and suffering of those who died or were injured fighting for democratic values.

Has the Alliance been effective over the 70 years of its existence? If we were to rate it in absolute terms, i.e. of whether there was a war or not – it has certainly proved to have fulfilled its role. The apocalypse of a Third World War, a resort to weapons of mass destruction, and an attack from the side of powerful adversaries have been avoided. Quite idealistically, one can only hope that this situation will remain unchanged.

This can lead to one general conclusion: that the North Atlantic Pact should not only remain a political and military club, but that it must also continue its ongoing adaptation to the ever-changing international environment.

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Boris Rutar

Polkovnik dr. Boris Rutar je v Slovenski vojski zaposlen od leta 1994. Izobraževal se je na ustanovah Command and General Staff College (Ft. Leavenworth, 1999), Joint Special Operation University (Hurlburt Field, 2001), Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey, 2002) in Peace Operation Institute (Newport, 2010). Med letoma 2005 in 2009 je služboval v Natovem poveljstvu kopenske komponente v Madridu, leta 2010 je postal poveljnik slovenskega kontingenta na Kosovu, leta 2013 pa je bil del kontingenta na poveljstvu Isafa v Afganistanu. Trenutno je obrambni ataše v Republiki Italiji. Leta 2008 je doktoriral na oddelku za sociologijo Filozofske fakultete Univerze v Ljubljani.

Colonel Boris Rutar, PhD, *has been employed in the Slovenian Armed Forces since 1994. He received his education at the Command and General Staff College (Ft. Leavenworth, 1999), the Joint Special Operation University (Hurlburt Field, 2001), the Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey, 2002), and the Peace Operation Institute (Newport, 2010). In addition to serving in the NATO Land Component Command (Madrid, 2005-09), he was the commander of the Slovenian contingent in Kosovo (2010) and a member of the ISAF Command contingent in Afghanistan (2013). He is currently serving as the Military Attaché to the Italian Republic. He earned his PhD at the Department of Sociology at the Faculty of Arts of the University of Ljubljana.*

Viljar Veebel

Dr. Viljar Veebel je raziskovalec na oddelku za politične in strateške študije na baltski visoki šoli za obrambne študije ter predavatelj na estonski šoli za diplomacijo. Zaposlen je kot pridružen nacionalni raziskovalec na evropskem svetu za zunanje odnose. Doktoriral je iz politologije na univerzi v Tartuju. Kot akademski svetovalec dela za estonsko vlado pri Konvenciji o prihodnosti Evrope, kot raziskovalec pa za OVSE, Švedsko agencijo za mednarodno razvojno sodelovanje, evropski svet za zunanje odnose, estonski inštitut za zunanjo politiko in svetovalno družbo Eurasia Group.

Viljar Veebel, PhD, *is researcher of the Department of Political and Strategic Studies at the Baltic Defence College and a lecturer in Estonian School of Diplomacy. He works also as associated national researcher for European Council on Foreign Relations. He holds doctoral degree in political science from University of Tartu. He has worked as academic advisor of the Estonian government in the European Future Convention and as researcher for OSCE, the European Council on Foreign Relations, Estonian Foreign Policy Institute and Eurasia Group.*

Illimar Ploom

Dr. Illimar Ploom je raziskovalec na oddelku za strateške študije na estonski nacionalni obrambni akademiji. Dela tudi kot pridružen nacionalni raziskovalec na talinski univerzi za tehnologijo. Doktoriral je iz politologije na ustanovi St. Hugh's College Univerze v Oxfordu. Najpomembnejša področja njegovega raziskovalnega dela so odpornost in celovit obrambni pristop, evropska varnost in obrambne pobude.

Illimar Ploom, PhD, *is researcher of the Department of Strategic Studies at the National Defence Academy of Estonia. He works also as associated national researcher for Tallinn University of Technology. He holds doctoral degree in political science from University of Oxford St. Hugh's College. His main research interests include resilience and comprehensive defense approach, European security and defense initiatives.*

Uroš Lampret

Uroš Lampret je vodja Sektorja za Nato na Ministrstvu za obrambo Republike Slovenije. Na Ekonomski fakulteti Univerze v Ljubljani je diplomiral iz poslovnih ved, prav tako je diplomiral iz obramboslovja. Pred zdajšnjo zaposlitvijo na Ministrstvu za obrambo je bil med letoma 2013 in 2018 obrambni svetovalec slovenske delegacije pri zvezi Nato, od leta 2008 do leta 2013 pa je bil zaposlen na različnih vodilnih položajih na Direktoratu za obrambno politiko. Kot eden izmed prvih dveh predstavnikov Ministrstva za obrambo je leta 2002 končal letno pripravništvo v Natu.

Uroš Lampret *is Head of the NATO Department of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia. He holds a BA in Business Studies from the Faculty of Economics and a BA in Defence Studies from the University of Ljubljana. Prior to his current position at the Ministry of Defence, he was the Defence Counsellor of the Slovenian Delegation to NATO 2013-2018, and held various executive positions in the Defence Policy Directorate between 2008 and 2013. He was also one of the first two representatives of the MoD to finish a yearly internship in the NATO IS, in 2002.*

Blaž Grilj

Blaž Grilj dela kot svetovalec v Sektorju za Nato na Direktoratu za obrambno politiko Ministrstva za obrambo. Na Fakulteti za družbene vede Univerze v Ljubljani je diplomiral in magistriral iz obramboslovja. Pred zaposlitvijo na Ministrstvu za obrambo je delal kot strokovni sodelavec na Fakulteti za družbene vede.

Blaž Grilj *works as an advisor in the NATO Department, Defence Policy Directorate at the Ministry of Defence. He holds a BA and an MA in Defence studies from the Faculty of Social Studies of the University of Ljubljana. Prior to his current assignment at the Ministry of Defence, he worked as a Research Assistant at the Faculty of Social Sciences.*

Marko Čehovin

Mag. Marko Čehovin je politolog in nekdanji dolgoletni uslužbenec Direktorata za obrambno politiko na Ministrstvu za obrambo Republike Slovenije. Znanstveni magisterij je opravil na področju menedžmenta neprofitnih organizacij na Fakulteti za družbene vede Univerze v Ljubljani. Večkrat je sodeloval v poveljstvih mednarodnih operacij in misij. Med letoma 2010 in 2011 je bil civilni svetovalec poveljnika Natovega poveljstva v Skopju, leta 2015 je postal posebni svetovalec poveljnika Kforja na Kosovu, od leta 2017 do leta 2018 pa je opravljal naloge civilnega svetovalca vodje Natove povezovalne pisarne v Skopju.

Marko Čehovin, MSc, *is a political scientist, employed for many years in the Directorate for Defence Policy, Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia. He earned his master's degree in the management of non-profit organizations from the Faculty of Social Sciences in Ljubljana. He has been deployed many times in headquarters of international operations and missions as Civilian Advisor to the Commander of the NATO Headquarters Skopje (2010-2011), Special Advisor to the Commander of the KFOR in Kosovo (2015) and Civilian Advisor to the Chief of the NATO Liaison Office Skopje (2017-2018).*

Branimir Furlan

Brigadir dr. Branimir Furlan se je Slovenski vojski pridružil leta 1991. Na svoji vojaški poklicni poti je opravljal različne dolžnosti. Med drugim je bil direktor štaba GŠSV, namestnik načelnika GŠSV in poveljnik sil SV. Trenutno je svetovalec ministra za obrambo. Diplomiral je leta 1986 na tehnični vojaški akademiji v Zagrebu, magistriral pa je leta 2001 na Army War College. Doktoriral je leta 2012 na Fakulteti za družbene vede Univerze v Ljubljani. Je prejemnik številnih medalj in priznanj ter avtor člankov in vojaške strokovne literature.

Brigadier General Branimir Furlan, PhD, *joined the SAF in 1991. He has performed several duties during his military career. The most recent ones include Director of Staff at SAF General Staff, Deputy Chief of the General Staff and Force Commander. Currently, he is Adviser to the Minister of Defence. He graduated in 1986 from Technical Military Academy in Zagreb, completed master's studies at Army War College in 2011 and obtained his PhD in 2012 at the Faculty of Social Sciences. He has received numerous medals and decorations and authored a number of articles and pieces of military professional literature.*

Zoran Barjaktarević

Podpolkovnik Zoran Barjaktarević je leta 1985 končal letalsko tehnično vojaško akademijo. Slovenski vojski se je pridružil leta 1991 in je opravljal različne dolžnosti na področju zračne obrambe, obrambnega planiranja ter finančnega načrtovanja. Sodeloval je pri pripravi vseh pomembnejših strateških dokumentov Slovenske vojske v zadnjih petnajstih letih. V tujini je opravljal dolžnost svetovalca za Partnerstvo za mir v Natovi povezovalni pisarni v Beogradu, prav tako je bil vodja projekta procesa obrambnega načrtovanja v Zavezniškem poveljstvu za transformacijo. Je predavatelj na Natovem tečaju obrambnega planiranja v Natovi šoli v Oberammergau.

Lieutenant Colonel Zoran Barjaktarević *graduated from the military air force academy in 1985. Having joined the Slovenian Armed Forces in 1991, he has performed various duties in the fields of air defence, defence planning and financial planning. He has participated in the preparation of all key strategic documents of the SAF in the last fifteen years. He served abroad as a Partnership for Peace Advisor at the NATO Liaison Office in Belgrade and as a Defence Planning Process Project Manager at the Allied Command Transformation. He is an instructor at the NATO Defense Planning Course at the NATO School Oberammergau*

Alija Kožljak

Upokojeni polkovnik dr. Alija Kožljak je magistriral iz varnostnih ved na sarajevski univerzi in iz mednarodnih odnosov na ustanovi Kings College v Londonu. Na sarajevski univerzi je doktoriral iz politologije. Več kot 30 let je bil zaposlen na obrambnem ministrstvu Bosne in Hercegovine, prav tako je bil njen Natov vojaški predstavnik. Dela kot gostujoči profesor na mednarodni univerzi Burch v Sarajevu. Objavil je več knjig in člankov o varnostnih strategijah arhitekture organizacij, zunanji politiki in mednarodnih organizacijah.

Colonel (Ret.) Alija Kožljak, PhD, *holds an M.A. in Security studies, University of Sarajevo and an M.A. in International relation - Kings College London, UK. He Holds a Ph.D. in Political science from the University of Sarajevo. He has served as a military officer at the Ministry of Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina for more than 30 years. He also served as the Military Representative of BiH to NATO. He is engaged as the visiting professor at the International Burch University in Sarajevo. He has published several books and articles that examine E-A security strategies, foreign policy and international organizations.*

Alojz Šteiner

Upokojeni generalmajor dr. Alojz Šteiner je doktor znanosti s področja obramboslovja. Diplomiral je na Fakulteti za sociologijo, politične vede in novinarstvo Univerze v Ljubljani, magistriral na industrijskem kolidžu oboroženih sil na nacionalni obrambni univerzi v Washingtonu v ZDA in doktoriral s temo Transformacija oboroženih sil po koncu hladne vojne – primer Slovenske vojske na Fakulteti za družbene vede v Ljubljani. V svojih delih obravnava predvsem razvoj in spreminjanje oboroženih sil. V slovenskih obrambnih silah je bil zaposlen med letoma 1979 in 2014, zdaj pa je predsednik Zveze slovenskih častnikov.

Major General (Ret.) Alojz Šteiner, PhD, *holds a PhD in defence studies. He obtained the BA degree from the Faculty of Sociology, Political Science and Journalism in Ljubljana, master's degree from the Industrial College of Armed Forces, National Defense University, Washington, USA, and PhD in Transformation of armed forces in the post-Cold War period – the case of the Slovenian Armed Forces from the Faculty of Social Sciences in Ljubljana. He writes in the field of development and transformation of armed forces. He was a member of the Slovenian Armed Forces between 1979 and 2014 and is currently the President of the Military Officers Association of Slovenia.*

Andrej Osterman

Generalmajor dr. Andrej Osterman je leta 1986 končal študij na Pravni fakulteti Univerze v Ljubljani, leta 2004 magistrski študij prava in leta 2010 doktorski študij na Fakulteti za logistiko v Celju. Končal je več vojaških izobraževanj. Vojaško poklicno pot je začel v Teritorialni obrambi Republike Slovenije leta 1981 kot rezervni častnik. V njej se je zaposlil leta 1991. V dosedanji vojaški karieri je opravljal različne štabne in poveljniške dolžnosti. V obdobju med letoma 2014 in 2018 je bil načelnik Generalštaba Slovenske vojske. Napisal in objavil je več člankov ter s prispevki sodeloval na domačih in mednarodnih konferencah.

Major General Andrej Osterman, PhD, *graduated from the Faculty of Law in Ljubljana in 1986, earned a Master's Degree in Law in 2004 and completed his PhD studies at the Faculty of Logistics in Celje in 2010. He has completed several military training courses. He started his career as a reserve officer in the Territorial Defence of the Republic of Slovenia in 1981, where he was subsequently employed in 1991. During his career, he has performed various staff and command duties. From 2014 to 2018, he served as the Chief of General Staff of the Slovenian Armed Forces. He has authored and published a number of articles and participated in both national and international conferences with his contributions.*

Neil Grayston

Neil Grayston je bil pred upokojitvijo junija 2013 zaposlen na obrambnem ministrstvu Združenega kraljestva. Leta 1997 je bil vodja skupine za svetovanje pri obrambnih reformah nekdanjih držav Varšavskega pakta in gibanja neuvrščenih, ki so si prizadevale za članstvo v Natu. Med letoma 2000 in 2003 je bil napoten na Ministrstvo za obrambo Republike Slovenije za zagotavljanje podpore in pomoči pri preoblikovanju vojske. Po vrnitvi v Združeno kraljestvo je postal vodja skupine, odgovorne za dvostranske odnose ministrstva za obrambo Združenega kraljestva z nekaterimi evropskimi državami, vključno s Slovenijo.

Neil Grayston *retired from the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence in June 2013. In 1997 he took on the role of leading a team providing advice on defence reform to former Warsaw Pact and non-aligned nations seeking NATO membership. Between 2000 and 2003 he was loaned to the Slovenian MOD to provide assistance with their defence reform programme. On his return to the UK he headed a team responsible for the UK MOD's bilateral relations with various European countries, including Slovenia.*

Andrzej Fałkowski

Upokojeni generalpodpolkovnik dr. Andrzej Fałkowski je leta 1997 doktoriral iz ekonomije. V preteklosti je bil med drugim poljski vojaški predstavnik v Natu in vojaških odborih EU v Bruslju, namestnik generalštaba poljskih oboroženih sil, obrambni, vojaški, pomorski in letalski ataše v Washingtonu, direktor sektorja za logistiko in sredstva pri Mednarodnem vojaškem štabu Nata v Bruslju. Delal je tudi kot gostujoči visokošolski predavatelj in višji mentor na Poljskem ter v tujini. Objavil je več člankov na področju strategij in obrambne ekonomije. Trenutno je član svetovalnega odbora za obrambno reformo za Ukrajino.

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Andrzej Fałkowski, PhD, *got his PhD in Economics in 1997. In the past, he was i.a. the Polish Military Representative to the NATO and EU Military Committees in Brussels, Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, Defence, Military, Naval and Air Attaché in Washington D.C., Director of the Logistics and Resources Division of the NATO IMS in Brussels. He also worked as a visiting academic lecturer and senior mentor in Poland and abroad. He has published many articles on strategy and defence economics. Currently, he is a member of the Defence Reform Advisory Board for Ukraine.*

Navodila avtorjem
za oblikovanje prispevkov

Instructions for the authors
of papers

NAVODILA AVTORJEM ZA OBLIKOVANJE PRISPEVKOV ZA SODOBNE VOJAŠKE IZZIVE IN VOJAŠKOŠOLSKI ZBORNIK

Vsebinska navodila

Splošno

Sodobni vojaški izzivi je interdisciplinarna znanstveno-strokovna publikacija, ki objavlja prispevke o aktualnih temah, raziskavah, znanstvenih in strokovnih razpravah, tehničnih ali družboslovnih analizah z varnostnega, obrambnega in vojaškega področja.

Vojaškošolski zbornik je vojaškostrokovna in informativna publikacija, namenjena izobraževanju in obveščanju o dosežkih ter izkušnjah na področju vojaškega izobraževanja, usposabljanja in izpopolnjevanja.

Kaj objavljamo?
Objavljamo prispevke v slovenskem jeziku s povzetki, prevedenimi v angleški jezik, in po odločitvi uredniškega odbora prispevke v angleškem jeziku s povzetki, prevedenimi v slovenski jezik.
Objavljamo prispevke, ki še niso bili objavljeni ali poslani v objavo drugi reviji. Pisec je odgovoren za vse morebitne kršitve avtorskih pravic. Če je bil prispevek že natisnjen drugje, poslan v objavo ali predstavljen na strokovni konferenci, naj to avtor sporoči uredniku in pridobi soglasje založnika (če je treba) ter navede razloge za objavo.

Tehnična navodila

Omejitve dolžine prispevkov

Prispevki naj obsegajo 16 strani oziroma 30.000 znakov s presledki (avtorska pola), izjemoma najmanj 8 strani oziroma 15.000 znakov ali največ 24 strani oziroma 45.000 znakov.

Recenzije

Prispevki se recenzirajo. Recenzija je anonimna. Glede na oceno recenzentov uredniški odbor ali urednik prispevek sprejme, če je treba, zahteva popravke ali ga zavrne. Pripombe recenzentov avtor vnese v prispevek.
Zaradi anonimnega recenzentskega postopka je treba prvo stran in vsebino oblikovati tako, da identiteta avtorja ni prepoznavna.
Avtor ob naslovu prispevka napiše, v katero kategorijo po njegovem mnenju in glede na klasifikacijo v COBISS spada njegov prispevek. Klasifikacija je dostopna na spletni strani revije in pri odgovornem uredniku. Končno klasifikacijo določi uredniški odbor.

Lektoriranje

Lektoriranje besedil zagotavlja OE, pristojna za založniško dejavnost. Lektorirana besedila se avtorizirajo.

Prevajanje

Prevajanje besedil ali povzetkov zagotavlja OE, pristojna za prevajalsko dejavnost oziroma Šola za tuje jezike Centra vojaških šol.

Navajanje avtorjev prispevka	Navajanje avtorjev je skrajno zgoraj, levo poravnano. *Primer:* Ime 1 Priimek 1, Ime 2 Priimek 2 V opombi pod črto se za slovenske avtorje navede, iz katere ustanove prihajajo. Pri tujih avtorjih je treba navesti tudi ime države.
Naslov prispevka	Navedbi avtorjev sledi naslov prispevka. Črke v naslovu so velike 16 pik, natisnjene krepko, besedilo naslova pa poravnano na sredini.
Povzetek	Prispevku mora biti dodan povzetek, ki obsega največ 1200 znakov (20 vrstic). Povzetek naj na kratko opredeli temo prispevka, predvsem naj povzame rezultate in ugotovitve. Splošne ugotovitve in misli ne spadajo v povzetek, temveč v uvod.
Povzetek v angleščini	Avtorji morajo oddati tudi prevod povzetka v angleščino. Tudi za prevod povzetka velja omejitev do 1200 znakov (20 vrstic).
Ključne besede	Ključne besede (3–5, tudi v angleškem jeziku) naj bodo natisnjene krepko in z obojestransko poravnavo besedila.
Besedilo	Avtorji naj oddajo svoje prispevke na papirju formata A4, s presledkom med vrsticami 1,5 in velikostjo črk 12 pik Arial. Na zgornjem in spodnjem robu naj bo do besedila približno 3 cm, levi rob naj bo širok 2 cm, desni pa 4 cm. Na vsaki strani je tako približno 30 vrstic s približno 62 znaki. Besedilo naj bo obojestransko poravnano, brez umikov na začetku odstavka.
Kratka predstavitev avtorjev	Avtorji morajo pripraviti kratko predstavitev svojega strokovnega oziroma znanstvenega dela. Predstavitev naj ne presega 600 znakov (10 vrstic, 80 besed). Če je avtorjev več, se predstavi vsak posebej, čim bolj zgoščeno. Avtorji naj besedilo umestijo na konec prispevka po navedeni literaturi.
Struktu-riranje besedila	Posamezna poglavja v besedilu naj bodo ločena s samostojnimi podnaslovi in ustrezno oštevilčena (členitev največ na 4 ravni). Primer: 1 Uvod 2 Naslov poglavja (1. raven) 2.1 Podnaslov (2. raven) 2.1.1 Podnaslov (3. raven) 2.1.1.1 Podnaslov (4. raven)

Oblikovanje seznama literature

V seznamu literature je treba po abecednem redu navesti le avtorje, na katere se sklicujete v prispevku, celotna oznaka vira pa mora biti skladna s harvardskim načinom navajanja. Če je avtorjev več, navedemo vse, kot so navedeni na izvirnem delu.

Primeri:

a) knjiga:

Priimek, ime (lahko začetnica imena), letnica. *Naslov dela*. Kraj: Založba.

Na primer:Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

b) zbornik:

Samson, C., 1970. Problems of information studies in history. V S. Stone, ur. *Humanities information research*. Sheffield: CRUS, 1980, str./pp 44–68. Pri posameznih člankih v zbornikih na koncu posameznega vira navedemo strani, na katerih je članek, na primer:

c) članek v reviji

Kolega, N., 2006. Slovenian coast sea flood risk. Acta geographica Slovenica. 46-2, str. 143–167.

Navajanje virov z interneta

Vse reference se začenjajo enako kot pri natisnjenih virih, le da običajnemu delu sledi še podatek o tem, kje na internetu je bil dokument dobljen in kdaj. Podatek o tem, kdaj je bil dokument dobljen, je pomemben zaradi pogostega spreminjanja www-okolja.

Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, str. 45–100. http://www.mors.si/index.php?id=213, 17. 10. 2008. Pri navajanju zanimivih internetnih naslovov v besedilu (ne gre za navajanje posebnega dokumenta) zadošča navedba naslova (http://www.vpvs.uni-lj.si). Posebna referenca na koncu besedila v tem primeru ni potrebna.

Sklicevanje na vire

Pri sklicevanju na vire med besedilom navedite le priimek prvega avtorja in letnico izdaje. *Primer:* … (Smith, 1997) …

Če dobesedno navajate del besedila, ga ustrezno označite z narekovaji, v oklepaju pa poleg avtorja in letnice navedite stran besedila, iz katerega ste navajali. *Primer*: … (Smith, 1997, str. 15) …

Pri povzemanju drugega avtorja napišemo besedilo brez narekovajev, v oklepaju pa napišemo, da gre za povzeto besedilo. *Primer*: (po Smith, 1997, str. 15). Če avtorja navajamo v besedilu, v oklepaju navedemo samo letnico izida in stran (1997, str. 15).

Slike, diagrami in tabele

Slike, diagrami in tabele v prispevku naj bodo v posebej pripravljenih datotekah, ki omogočajo lektorske popravke. V besedilu mora biti jasno označeno mesto, kamor je treba vnesti sliko. Skupna dolžina prispevka ne sme preseči dane omejitve.

Če avtor iz tehničnih razlogov grafičnih dodatkov ne more oddati v elektronski obliki, je izjemoma sprejemljivo, da slike priloži besedilu. Avtor mora v tem primeru na zadnjo stran slike napisati zaporedno številko in naslov, v besedilu pa pustiti dovolj prostora zanjo. Prav tako mora biti besedilo opremljeno z naslovom in številčenjem slike. Diagrami se štejejo kot slike. Vse slike in tabele se številčijo. Številčenje poteka enotno in ni povezano s številčenjem poglavij. Naslov slike je naveden pod sliko, naslov tabele pa nad tabelo. Navadno je v besedilu navedeno vsaj eno sklicevanje na sliko ali tabelo. Sklic na sliko ali tabelo je: … (slika 5) … (tabela 2) …

Primer slike:

Primer tabele:

Tabela 2: Naslov tabele

Slika 5: Naslov slike

Opombe pod črto

Številčenje opomb pod črto je neodvisno od strukture besedila in se v vsakem prispevku začne s številko 1. Posebej opozarjamo avtorje, da so opombe pod črto namenjene pojasnjevanju misli, zapisanih v besedilu, in ne navajanju literature.

Kratice

Kratice naj bodo dodane v oklepaju, ko se okrajšana beseda prvič uporabi, zato posebnih seznamov kratic ne dodajamo. Za kratico ali izraz v angleškem jeziku napišemo najprej slovensko ustreznico, v oklepaju pa angleški izvirnik in morebitno angleško kratico.

Format zapisa prispevka

Uredniški odbor sprejema prispevke, napisane z urejevalnikom besedil MS Word, izjemoma tudi v besedilnem zapisu (text only).

Naslov avtorja

Prispevkom naj bosta dodana avtorjeva naslov in internetni naslov ali telefonska številka, na katerih bo dosegljiv uredniškemu odboru.

Kako poslati prispevek

Na naslov uredništva ali članov uredniškega odbora je treba poslati tiskano in elektronsko različico prispevka.

Potrjevanje sprejetja prispevka

Uredniški odbor avtorju pisno potrdi prejetje prispevka. Avtorjem, ki sporočijo tudi naslov svoje elektronske pošte, se potrditev pošlje po tej poti.

Korekture

Avtor opravi korekture svojega prispevka v treh dneh.

Naslov uredniškega odbora

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Prispevkov, ki ne bodo urejeni skladno s tem navodilom, uredniški odbor ne bo sprejemal.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE AUTHORS OF PAPERS
FOR THE CONTEMPORARY MILITARY CHALLENGES
AND THE MILITARY EDUCATION JOURNAL

Content-related instructions

General

The Contemporary Military Challenges is an interdisciplinary scientific expert magazine, which publishes papers on current topics, researches, scientific and expert discussions, technical or social sciences analysis from the field of security, defence and the military..

The Military Education Journal is a military professional and informative publication intended for education and informing on achievements and experiences in the field of military education, training and improvement.

What do we publish?

We publish papers in Slovene with abstracts translated into English. If so decided by the Editorial Board, we also publish papers in English with abstracts translated into Slovene.

We publish papers, which have not been previously published or sent to another magazine for publication. The author is held responsible for all possible copyright violations. If the paper has already been printed elsewhere, sent for publication or presented at an expert conference, the author must notify the editor, obtain the publisher's consent (if necessary) and indicate the reasons for republishing.

Technical instructions

Limitations regarding the length of the papers

The papers should consist of 16 typewritten double-spaced pages or 30,000 characters. At a minimum they should have 8 pages or 15,000 characters and at a maximum 24 pages or 45,000 characters.

Reviews

All papers are reviewed. The review is anonymous. With regard to the reviewer's assessment, the Editorial Board or the editor accepts the paper, demands modifications, if necessary, or rejects it. Upon receiving the reviewers' remarks, the author inserts them into the paper.

Due to an anonymous review process, the first page must be designed in the way that the author's identity cannot be recognized.

Next to the title, the author should indicate the category the paper belongs to according to him and according to the classification in the COBISS[1]. The classification is available on the magazine's internet page and at the responsible editor. The Editorial Board determines the final classification.

Proofreading   The organizational unit responsible for publishing provides the proofreading of the papers. The proofread papers have to be approved.

Translating   The translation of the papers or abstracts is provided by the organizational unit competent for translation or the School of Foreign Languages, Military Schools Centre.

Indicating the authors of the paper   The authors' name should be written in the upper left corner, aligned left.
Example:
Name 1 Surname 1,
Name 2 Surname 2,
In the footnote, Slovenian authors should indicate the institution they come from. Foreign authors should also indicate the name of the state they come from.

Title of the paper   The title of the paper is written below the listed authors. The font in the title is bold, size 16 points. The text of the title is centrally aligned.

Abstract   The paper should have an abstract of a maximum 1,200 characters (20 lines). The abstract should include a short presentation of the topic, particularly the results and the findings. General findings and reflections do not belong in the abstract, but rather in the introduction.

Abstract in English   The authors must also submit the translation of the abstract into English. The translation of the abstract is likewise limited to a maximum of 1,200 characters (20 lines).

Key words   Key words (3-5 also in the English language) should be bold with a justified text alignment.

Text   The authors should submit their papers on an A4 paper format, with 1.5 line spacing, fontArial size 12 points. At the upper and the bottom edge, there should be approx. 3 cm of space; the left margin should be 2 cm wide and the right margin 4 cm. Each page consists of approx. 30 lines with 62 characters. The text should have a justified alignment, without indents at the beginning of the paragraphs.

A brief presentation of the authors   The authors should prepare a brief presentation of their expert or scientific work. The presentation should not exceed 600 characters (10 lines, 80 words). If there are several authors, each should be presented individually, as shortly and as comprehensively as possible. These texts should be placed at the end of the paper, after the cited literature.

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[1]   *Co-operative Online Bibliographic System and Services*

Text structuring

Individual chapters should be separated with independent subtitles and adequately numbered.

Example:

1 Introduction
2 Title of the chapter (1st level)
2.1 Subtitle (2nd level)
2.1.1 Subtitle (3rd level)
2.1.1.1 Subtitle (4th level)

Referencing

In the bibliography, only the authors of references one refers to in the paper should be listed, in the alphabetical order. The entire reference has to be in compliance with the Harvard citing style.

Example:

Surname, name (can also be the initial of the name), year. *Title of the work.* Place. Publishing House.

Example:

Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

With certain papers published in journals, the author should indicate, at the end of each reference, a page on which the paper can be found.

Example:

Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp 45-100.

Referencing internet sources

All references start the same as the references for the printed sources, only that the usual part is followed by the information about the Internet page on which the document was found as well as the date on which it was found. The information about the time that the document was found on the Internet is important, because the WWW environment changes constantly.

Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. p 45-100. http://www.mors.si/index.php?id=213, 17 October 2008.

When referencing interesting WWW pages in the text (not citing an individual document) it is enough to state only the Internet address (http://www.vpvs.uni-lj.si). A separate reference at the end of the text is therefore not necessary.

Citing

When citing sources in the text, indicate only the surname of the author and the year of publication. *Example:* ….. (Smith, 1997) …

When making a direct reference to a text, the cited part should be adequately marked with quotation marks and followed by the exact page of the text which the citing is taken from.

Example: …(Smith, 1997, p 15) …

Figures, diagrams, tables

Figures, diagrams and tables in the paper should be prepared in separate files which allow for proofreading corrections. The place in the text where the picture should be inserted must be clearly indicated. The total length of the paper must not surpass the given limitation.

Should the author not be able to submit the graphical supplements in the electronic form due to technical reasons, it is exceptionally acceptable to enclose the figures to the text. In this case the author must write a sequence number and a title on the back of each picture and leave enough space in the text to include it. The text must likewise contain the title and the sequence number of the figure. Diagrams are considered figures.

All figures and tables are numbered. The numbering is not uniform and not linked with the numbering of the chapters. The title of the figure is stated beneath it and the title of the table is stated above it.

As a rule, the paper should include at least one reference to a figure or a table.. Reference to a figure or a table is: … (Figure 5) ……… (Table 2) ………

Example of a figure: Example of a table:

Table 2: Title of the table

Figure 5: Title of the figure

Footnotes

The numbering of the footnotes is not related to the structure of the text and starts with number 1 in each paper. We want to stress that the aim of the footnotes is to explain the thoughts written in the text and not to reference literature.

Abbreviations

When used for the first time, the abbreviations in the text must be explained in parenthesis; therefore no additional list of abbreviations is needed. If the abbreviations or terms are written in English, the appropriate Slovenian term should be written along with the English original and possibly the English abbreviation in the parenthesis.

Format type of the paper

The Editorial Board accepts only the texts written with a MS Word text editor and only exceptionally those in the 'text only' format.

Author's address

Each paper should include the author's address, e-mail or a telephone number, so that the Editorial Board can reach him or her.

Sending the paper

A print or an electronic version of the paper should be sent to the address of the Editorial Board or the members of the Editorial Board.

Confirma-tion of the reception of the paper	The Editorial Board sends the author a written confirmation regarding the reception of the paper. The authors who also list their e-mails receive the confirmation via e-mail.
Corrections	The author makes corrections to the paper within three days.
Editorial Board address	Ministry of Defence Slovenian Armed Forces General Staff Contemporary Military Challenges Editorial Board Vojkova cesta 55 1000 Ljubljana Slovenia Electronic address: Editor in Chief: liliana.brozic@mors.si

The Editorial Board will not accept papers, which will not be in compliance with the above instructions.

Sodobni vojaški izzivi – 21/št. 3

Vsebina