



Sodobni vojaški izzivi

Contemporary Military Challenges

Znanstveno-strokovna publikacija Slovenske vojske

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MINISTRSTVO ZA OBRAMBO
GENERALŠTAB SLOVENSKE VOJSKE



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PO DESETIH LETIH V ZAVEZNIŠTVU

»Časi velikih govorov so minili. Zdaj moramo preiti od besed k dejanjem. Zdaj je čas, da izpolnimo svoje obljube.«

Anders Fogh Rasmussen

AFTER TEN YEARS IN THE ALLIANCE

“The time for grand speeches is over. We must now put our words into action. Now is the time for us to fulfil our promises.”

Anders Fogh Rasmussen.

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UVODNIK

PO DESETIH LETIH V ZAVEZNIŠTVU

Ko smo v začetku leta napovedali, da bomo tretjo številko Sodobnih vojaških izzivov namenili desetletnici Republike Slovenije v Natu, nismo pričakovali tako dobrega odziva. Prejeli smo članke avtorjev, ki zelo dobro poznajo zgodovino slovenskih prizadevanj za pridružitve zavezništvu, hkrati pa jih je večina pri tem tudi osebno sodelovala. Ker so še vedno prisotni in aktivni na svojem profesionalnem področju, ima njihov pogled v preteklo dogodke posebno osebno noto, pogled v prihodnost pa je obogaten s teoretično in izkustveno noto.

Žal vseh člankov, ki smo jih dobili, ne moremo objaviti. Ključno vodilo pri izboru je bila osredotočenost na obrambno-vojaške vsebine, saj smo želeli pozornost nameniti predvsem vsebinam, ki jim je naša publikacija namenjena in so opredeljene v njenih aktih kot temeljno poslanstvo.

Leta 2009, ko smo s posebno tematsko številko zaznamovali peto obletnico članstva v zavezništvu in šestdesetletnico njegovega delovanja, so bile objavljene teme zelo zanimive državam v regiji Jugovzhodne Evrope, ki so stopale po poti, ki smo jo v Sloveniji že prehodili. Tako računamo, da bo tokratna številka zanimiva ljubiteljem obrambno-vojaških vsebin, mlajšim generacijam in vsem tistim, ki bodo morda še stopili na pot približevanja zavezništvu oziroma vstopanja vanj. Kako uspešni smo bili, lahko ugotovite v nadaljevanju.

Članek z naslovom *Nato po letu 2014 – Nazaj h koreninam ali naprej v prihodnost?* avtorjev **Uroša Lampreta** in **Staše Novak** predstavlja zavezništvo danes, aktualne varnostne trende, ki se pojavljajo v svetu, in odzive nanje. Pravita, da nazaj h koreninam ali naprej v prihodnost ne pomeni dveh različnih smeri, ampak povsem nekaj drugega.

Milan Jazbec v teoretičnem in praktičnem smislu ponudi pregled nad slovenskimi izkušnjami v času, ki je osrednja tema te številke. Uporablja termin učenje iz izkušenj in naslov njegovega članka *Slovenija in Nato – dolga in vijugasta pot* ni zgolj simboličen.

Pregled delovanja Slovenske vojske in njenih izkušenj iz zavezništva je pripravil **Andrej Osterman**. V članku z naslovom *Republika Slovenija v Natu – Slovenska vojska deset let pozneje* je predstavil ključne spremembe in napredek slovenskih oboroženih sil.

Obveščevalno-varnostnemu področju sta se posvetila **Damir Črnčec** in **Janez Urbanc**, ki v članku z naslovom *Racionalizacija obveščevalno-varnostnih struktur v Natu in Evropski uniji* podrobno pojasnita spremembe v organiziranosti in delovanju obveščevalno-varnostne skupnosti v mednarodnem okolju ter slovensko vlogo v njej.

Aljoša Selan je z naslovom *Prispevek Slovenije k programu za reintegracijo in spravo v Afganistanu – pogled svetovalca za analize politik* pripravil predstavitev aktivnosti v tej državi po postopnem umiku zavezniških sil, da bi se njeni prebivalci kar najbolje pripravili na samostojen in kakovosten vsakdanjik.

Normativna vloga zavezništva pri nekonvencionalnih varnostnih grožnjah – kibernetična obramba držav članic je naslov članka **Adriane Dvoršak**. Odpira aktualno problematiko, ki se spreminja tako zelo hitro, da se varnostne strukture že danes zavedajo svoje morebitne ogroženosti. Za učinkovito zaščito bo treba še veliko storiti.

Vsem avtorjem se zahvaljujemo za opravljeno delo in trud, še posebno, da so bili pripravljeni z nami deliti svoje znanje, izkušnje in poglede.

K pisanju vabimo vse tiste, ki morda trenutno samo razmišljate o tem, da bi kaj pripravili, pa se še niste čisto odločili.

Srečno.

EDITORIAL

AFTER TEN YEARS IN THE ALLIANCE

At the beginning of the year, we announced that the third issue of the Contemporary Military Challenges would be dedicated to the tenth anniversary of the accession of the Republic of Slovenia to NATO. However, we did not expect such a good response. We received articles from authors who are very familiar with the history of Slovenia's efforts to join the Alliance; most of them were also personally involved in the process. Since they are still present and active in their professional fields, their views of the past events have a special personal character, while their views of the future are enriched by the theoretical knowledge and personal experience.

Unfortunately, we cannot publish all the articles we have received. The guiding principle in the selection was the focus on the defence and military contents, since we mainly wanted to pay attention to the contents to which this publication is dedicated and which are defined in its acts as its basic mission.

In 2009, we marked the fifth anniversary of Slovenia's membership in the Alliance and the sixtieth anniversary of the Alliance with a special thematic issue. The themes covered were very interesting for the countries of the South Eastern Europe which were treading the path that Slovenia had already travelled. We expect this issue to be of interest to people who like the defence and military themes, to younger generations and to all those who might still be on the road of approximating to or entering the Alliance. By reading the contents below, you can discover how successful we were in ensuring this interest.

The article titled *NATO after 2014 – Back to the Roots or Forward towards the Future?* by **Uros Lampret** and **Staša Novak** presents the Alliance today, the current security trends that are emerging in the world, and the responses to them. The authors claim that back to the roots or forward towards the future does not mean two different directions, but something completely different.

In theoretical and practical terms, **Milan Jazbec** gives an overview of the Slovenian experiences at the time which constitutes the central theme of this issue. He uses the term “learning from experience”, and the title of his article *Slovenia and NATO: the Long and Winding Road* is not merely symbolic.

Andrej Osterman prepared an overview of the operation of the Slovenian Armed Forces and its experiences within the Alliance. In the article titled *Republic of Slovenia in NATO – Slovenian Armed Forces Ten Years Later*, he presented the key changes and progress of the Slovenian military.

Damir Črnčec and **Janez Urbanc** focused on the intelligence and security area. In the article titled *Streamlining the Intelligence and Security Structures in NATO and the European Union*, the authors describe in detail the changes in the organization and the functioning of the intelligence and security community in the international environment, and also the role of Slovenia in it.

In his article titled *Slovenia's Contribution to Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP) – Policy Advisor's Perspective*, **Aljosa Selan** presents the activities in Afghanistan after the gradual withdrawal of the Allied Forces, aimed at the best possible preparation of the country's residents for an independent and quality everyday life.

The Normative Role of the Alliance in Non-Conventional Security Threats – Cyber Defence of the Member States is the title of the article written by **Adriana Dvoršak**. The author raises topical issues which are changing so rapidly that the security structures are already aware of possible threats. There is much that still needs to be done in order to achieve effective protection.

We would like to thank all the authors for their work and efforts, especially for their willingness to share with us their knowledge, experiences and views.

We invite all those who might be thinking about preparing an article, but have not yet decided to do so, to send us their contributions.

Good luck!

NATO PO LETU 2014 NAZAJ H KORENINAM ALI NAPREJ V PRIHODNOST?

NATO AFTER 2014 BACK TO THE ROOTS OR FORWARD TOWARDS THE FUTURE?

Povzetek Naslov kljub vprašaju in možnosti poenostavljenega razumevanja ne predstavlja nujno dileme o prihodnosti razvoja zavezništva. Nazaj in naprej ne pomenita dveh smeri, temveč bolj združevanje naučenih lekcij in poudarjanje veznega tkiva, ki je Nato skozi zgodovino ohranjalo tako močno, ter opremljanje tega zdravega jedra z mehanizmi, ki nas bodo še naprej ščitili pred celotnim spektrom groženj. Pred tistimi, ki jih poznamo, tistimi, ki jih lahko predvidevamo, ter nekako tudi pred tistimi, ki jih ne moremo predvideti. Pri slednjih je ključna beseda fleksibilnost. V takšnem prikazu lahko prepoznamo daljnovidnost zavezniškega koncepta iz leta 2010, ki kljub pretresom v Vzhodni Evropi in na Bližnjem vzhodu ter s tem povezanim povečanim občutkom ogroženosti v nekaterih zaveznicah ostaja temeljni smerokaz organizaciji tudi za prihodnja leta.

Vračanje h koreninam pomeni zagotavljanje prepričljive pripravljenosti na kolektivno obrambo, usmeritev v prihodnost pa možnost uporabe zmogljivosti za obrambo pred spektrom različnih groženj in izvajanje drugih temeljnih nalog zavezništva. Za zagotavljanje verodostojnosti organizacije ni nujna revolucija, temveč preprosta izpolnitev preteklih zavez za zagotavljanje zmogljivosti. Prav s tem so imele članice veliko težav in ravno njihova počasnost je negativno vplivala na zavezniško verodostojnost. S tega vidika je lahko rusko-ukrajinska dinamika samo priložnost za obrambne sisteme, da opozorijo politične elite na pomen obrambe in dejstvo, da ta stane.

Ključne besede *Nato, zasedanje vrha, Strateški koncept, mednarodno varnostno okolje, transformacija, kolektivna obramba, partnerstva.*

Abstract In spite of the question and the possibility of a simplified understanding, the title “Back to the Roots or Forward towards the Future?” is not necessary a dilemma regarding the future development of the Alliance. Back and forward is not about two directions, but more about the need to combine the lessons learned, while

strengthening the bonds that have been underpinning NATO throughout its history, and reinforcing the strong core of the Alliance with the mechanisms that are going to provide the necessary protection against the full spectrum of threats. Threats that are known, the ones we can predict and those that cannot yet be foreseen. The key word for the latter is flexibility. With this in mind, we can clearly recognise the farsighted nature of the 2010 Strategic Concept, which remains the guiding document for the Alliance for the future years despite the turmoil in Eastern Europe and Middle East and the related increased perception of threat felt by some Allies.

Going back to the roots means ensuring a credible preparedness for collective defence, while going toward the future signifies the importance of being able to use the capabilities for defence against the whole spectrum of threats, and perform other core tasks of the Alliance. There is no need for the revolution to ensure the credibility of the Alliance, but there is a 'simple' demand to fulfil the commitments given in the past regarding the provision of capabilities. This has been a challenge for many Allies, and their slowness has had negative implications for the Alliance's credibility. In light of this, the Russian-Ukrainian dynamics can also be an opportunity for the national defence systems to convince the political elites that defence matters and that there are costs associated with it.

Key words *NATO, Summit, Strategic Concept, international security environment, transformation, collective defence, partnerships.*

Introduction In 2010, upon the adoption of the new NATO Strategic Concept, many experts questioned the relevance of the Alliance and importance of defence. Today, however, these voices are much quieter and more isolated.¹ In 2014, the Euro-Atlantic security environment undoubtedly changed, especially the perception of its stability. Russian activities in Ukraine and the subsequent "panic" in some Eastern Allies bring us somehow to the turning point, since on the one hand, NATO is going back to its roots, and on the other hand, the organization as political and defence alliance is further gaining in importance and visibility. Security and defence are "in fashion" again.

Even without the recent violent changes of borders in the East of the Old Continent, the Alliance was at the stage of development when, due to various factors, it should rebalance its posture and future priorities. NATO operation in Afghanistan (*International Security Assistance Force – ISAF*) is coming to an end, along with quite a challenging period in the history of the organization. Until recently, the main challenge was how to, after a strong and financially demanding operational tempo, prevent us from giving in to the temptation of trying to put defence and the related costs on the back burner. Such events would increase the risk and likelihood of a greater divide between Europe and the United States. Also due to the latest security crisis, we avoided that risk for the time being, at least its political aspects, although a risk remains that the different views on the sharpness of resolving the crisis can

¹ See Lampret, Novak, 2010.

again highlight the difference in estimates and ambitions between the two sides of the Atlantic. At the end of the planning cycle of the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) in June 2014, we gained a very representative overview of the availability of individual capabilities, and a clear assessment of the deficits and the associated risks with regard to the level of ambition of the Alliance. At the end of the calendar year, a new NATO defence planning cycle will start, with the preparation of new political guidelines, which will be based on the commonly accepted assessment of the security environment and will, in particular, redefine or confirm the Allied level of ambition.

The dynamics associated with Ukraine introduced something new into the cycle of the Allied planning, especially a re-consideration of the Alliance's defence posture and its geographical balance. In political terms, it will probably be difficult to talk about the reduction of common ambitions, although before the "transfer of sovereignty" over Crimea, some Allies were relatively open to that. Future discussions will certainly have to take into consideration the financial constraints, since the lack of measurable progress in this area will increase the risk of it being "all talk no action". The NATO Summit in Wales should represent a turning point in terms of money. During the months of preparation for this event, there is an increasing pressure on European Allies to finally move from rhetoric to concrete action. Pressures or rather clear expectations are understandable, as they result both from United States announcement of future focus on the Asia-Pacific region and the changed security environment, which is at present perhaps the most important element.

Although we do not expect a major deviation from the development direction outlined by NATO in the 2010 Strategic Concept, we cannot overlook the significance and consequences of the recent Russian actions. The mechanisms available to the Alliance, its mission and tasks will not change significantly. However, the defence posture of the Alliance will change, building on the demonstration of solidarity, internal cohesion and fundamental principles and values of the Alliance. NATO has already responded to the Ukrainian crisis and the planning community cannot simply overlook this crisis. Certainly, in the next medium-term period, one of the scenarios of the use of the Allied Forces will involve a conventional conflict with an Ally that is comparable in terms of technology, at least in individual parts. This will require the maintenance of certain capabilities which have often been arbitrarily abandoned by individual Allies (armoured manoeuvre, helicopters, mine hunters), and undoubtedly the increase in the frequency of exercises, with the inclusion and cooperation of all the three services of the armed forces. In order to maintain credibility, the Allies have to stand together at the forthcoming Summit and indicate the direction of problem-solving and of NATO's role, and in particular to fulfil their commitments. This will of course require adequate resources, for which public support is crucial. Thus, the Summit in Wales requires a multifaceted approach, and public diplomacy is certainly one of those areas where the Alliance simply may not fail.

The current security dynamics also indicates the fact that the need for the ability to carry out collective defence is not a remainder from the Cold War, but the foundation of the future cohesion of the Alliance. The sense of imminent threat in some of the Allies has increased significantly. Therefore, it is necessary to visibly strengthen some segments of defence preparedness which have in the past two decades been neglected, primarily to maintain political unity of the organization.

This is very closely related to the responsibility of all the Allies to provide their own defence capabilities and contribute to the Allied effort in the fulfilment of the three core tasks - collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. To increase the credibility of the defence posture, the costs will be divided among all 28 Allies, despite different national assessments of the security threats posed by Russia's actions in Ukraine. This will present a unique challenge.

This article builds on the achievements of NATO, which, in this year, is celebrating an impressive 65 years, and deals with individual key topics, such as operations, transformation, capabilities, resources, reform and partnerships. Furthermore, it attempts to outline the complexity of the issues as well as key guidelines for further development of this political and military transatlantic Alliance, as it will be confirmed by Heads of State and Government at the meeting in September 2014 in Wales. The conclusion provides a synthesis of thoughts and leads the reader towards the answers to the question about the future of NATO.

This article is based on personal experience of the authors who directly observe the development of the organization from the time before Slovenia's full membership and who have been, for many years, directly involved in the preparation of national guidelines for the current NATO transformation. It relies mainly on the analyses of unclassified NATO documents, statements of the organisation's senior representatives and secondary sources which enable a more comprehensive understanding of the topics covered.

1 NATO TODAY

1.1 Changed Security Environment

The end of the ISAF operation in Afghanistan in 2014 itself provides the opportunity for strategic consideration and shifting of attention of the Alliance to the broad spectrum of potential security threats. The Russian-Ukrainian crisis is only the latest proof that the future is unpredictable, the global security situation multifaceted and intertwined, and the Alliance surrounded by instabilities coming from Ukraine, Syria, Iraq and the Sahel (General Bartels, 21 May 2014).

Despite these changes in the security environment which have mainly been marked by Russian actions in Ukraine, the foundations of NATO remain solid and its role indispensable. As early as in 2010, the NATO Strategic Concept or the fundamental

strategic vision for the future of the Alliance managed to capture the complexity of the contemporary security environment. The concept emphasizes that the possibility of a conventional attack on NATO territory is low, but it should not be neglected. At the same time, other modern threats are also included, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, instabilities and conflicts beyond the Allied borders, cyber threats, threats to energy security and the effects of technology development and climate change (Strategic Concept, 2010).

In the era of globalization, intense interdependence and multinational security challenges, the security environment comprises a wide and constantly changing spectrum of challenges for the Allied territory and population. Therefore, the Strategic Concept emphasizes that the Alliance should be able to fulfil three main tasks – collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. Its main purpose remains the protection of freedom and security of all the members with both political and military means (Strategic Concept, 2010).

Without the crisis in Ukraine, the Alliance and the forthcoming Summit would probably focus on the life after ISAF, transformation, which would arise primarily from the assumption of limited financial resources, and further optimization of defence structures. Numerous mechanisms, initiatives and plans for the future which NATO established based on the decisions taken in Lisbon and Chicago remain relevant despite the crisis, but will need to be re-balanced in relation to the security dynamics in the East. A few months ago, considerations on the reduced participation in operations and the enhancement of readiness (*from deployed to prepared*)² were at the forefront. Now, NATO seeks to enhance preparedness in terms of greater flexibility and faster responsiveness. This includes stemming the reduction in defence spending as well as adopting security reassurance measures for Eastern Allies, along with increasing the responsiveness of the Allied Forces and their presence at the Eastern borders of the Alliance.

These efforts have intensified primarily as a result of Russia resorting to swift military exercises, cyber activities and covert operations to achieve their goals (SACEUR General Breedlove, 22 May 2014). The approach is referred to as hybrid warfare. With such measures in Ukraine, Russia, in the name of protection of the Russian-speaking minorities, has thoroughly undermined the international order formed after the end of the Cold War or as early as after World War II, and violated the principles of the UN Charter, such as the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. With the use of military means to achieve their interests, change of borders in Europe, and disregard for international law, along with the Founding Act of the NATO-Russia Council, Russia has called into question the vision of a free and peaceful Europe (Vershbow, 1 May 2014, and NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen, 1 April 2014).

² See *Munich Security Conference, 2013*.

1.2 Consequences of the Changed Security Environment

In the eyes of the Baltic States, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, as well as the Czech Republic and sometimes Slovakia, which had paid a lot of attention to politics and deterrence measures, including non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe, the perception of threat represented by Russia only further strengthened with the crisis in Ukraine (Kulesa (editor), 2012; Larrabee et al., 2012, p. 75–76; Asmus et al., 2010). To the forefront again came collective defence, "the first among the core tasks of NATO," as represented by these Allies. In such security environment, it is crucial to preserve solidarity, coherence and unity of all 28 NATO Allies. After the speculations about the "retirement" of the Alliance, some estimate that a new *raison d'être* emerged, or the old *raison d'être* returned to the forefront (Vershbow, 1 May 2014).

Thus, the greatest responsibility of the Alliance remains Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, or the protection and defence of the territory and population against external attacks, which is the crucial security assurance for the Alliance, based on which the Allies can count on an appropriate response in the event of threat. Indispensable pillars of the Allied strategy for maintaining the security of member states remain deterrence, based on the appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces, and the concept of the indivisibility of Allied security.

Response to the crisis in Ukraine also confirmed the significance of NATO as an important transatlantic forum for security policy consultations on all matters relating to the territorial integrity, political independence and security of its members, as provided in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. At any time, any Ally can initiate the procedure which, through the sharing of information, exchanging of views and, if necessary, creating a common response, contributes to a better understanding and a more effective management of crises. That is precisely what Poland did on 3 March 2014 due to the situation in Ukraine (NATO, 4 March 2014), which "woke up" the entire Alliance and leads to new decisions regarding the future posture of the Alliance to be approved at the September Summit³.

1.2.1 Resources

Collective defence is ensured through collective responsibility. In the Alliance, each Ally has its own role and each does its best to contribute to collective responsibility, which is called solidarity. NATO membership is not only a privilege, but also an obligation (NATO Secretary General, 9 May 2014). According to NATO Secretary General, if there was ever any doubt about the importance of defence, the crisis in Ukraine finally removed it. This has been confirmed by the Allies themselves through their active involvement in responding to the crisis in Ukraine (NATO Secretary General, 15 May 2014, and NATO, 3 June 2014a).

³ Up until now, Article 4 has been invoked only four times. Before Poland, due to the situation in Syria, Turkey requested on two occasions in 2012 that the North Atlantic Council (NAC) convene under Article 4, which led to the installation of the Allied Patriot missiles on Turkish territory. Previously, Turkey invoked Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty in 2003 due to the situation in Iraq (NATO, 4 March 2014).

During his visit to Brussels, the American President Obama also highlighted the need that all the Allies should contribute their share resulting from their membership in the Alliance by demonstrating the political will to invest in collective defence and to develop capabilities for ensuring international peace and security. Security is not free and all the Allies must demonstrate that they are willing to provide resources for capabilities, personnel, training, in other words, for everything that is required to ensure a credible and effective deterrent posture of NATO (Obama, 26 March 2014a, and Obama 26 March 2014b).

These calls are by no means new; however, they have gained considerably in intensity and importance. With the Russian willingness to intervene with military means in another country, and in light of the fact that in the past five years, Russia increased its defense spending by 10 percent per year, while the Allies drastically reduced their defense budgets (some of them even for more than 40 percent)⁴ and acted on the assumption that Russia is a strategic partner and not an imminent threat to the Alliance, it has become clear that NATO members have to reverse the trend of defense spending and once again shift the focus on the key NATO tasks, especially collective defence (NATO Secretary General, 19 May 2014 and 15 May 2014).

Russian actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine were a "wake-up call" for the Alliance. As stated by NATO Secretary General, Russia thus inadvertently contributed to the consolidation of the transatlantic Alliance. The belief strengthened that security and stability should not be taken for granted. However, the challenges facing the Allies are enormous. The commitment that the Allies should fulfil in the area of defence spending mainly relates to the provision of two per cent of GDP for defence. The first step that is expected today is that those states that have not yet done so should stop the decline in defence spending and start with its increase in a gradual and measurable manner. Collective defence is the object of investments and the question of future priorities, particularly those aimed at NATO goals.⁵ In doing so, it is necessary to strengthen the transatlantic ties, with a clear commitment both of Europe and the United States (NATO Secretary General, 8 April 2014). Key to this is cooperation between NATO and the EU, since the strengthening of the European defence results in the strengthening of NATO. The power of the Alliance today, even more than ever, lies in the solidarity and joint action.

1.2.2 Security Reassurance Measures

On 1 April 2014, as a direct response to the crisis in Ukraine, the NATO foreign ministers renewed their commitment to strengthen the collective defence of the Alliance, reaffirmed their readiness to assist Ukraine and discontinued practical

⁴ *For defence spending of NATO member states, see also NATO, 24 February 2014, and Larrabee et al., 2012, pp. 1 – 3.*

⁵ *Many Allies, such as Lithuania, Latvia and Romania, have already responded with the announcements on the rise in defence investments. Poland is already close to the milestone of 2% of GDP, and Estonia already serves as an "exemplary Ally" (NATO Secretary General, 15 May 2014). Further development of this trend will be seen as early as at the NATO Summit in September.*

cooperation with Russia (NATO, 1 April 2014, SACEUR General Breedlove, 22 May 2014). On 16 April 2014, as the next step, the Alliance adopted a package of reassurance measures that should calm the concerns of mainly Eastern Allies by strengthening the presence in the air (AWACS reconnaissance aircraft, air surveillance or Air Policing), and at sea, and with the increased intensity of training and military exercises (Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum, 27 May 2014). In the spirit of solidarity, all the Allies responded according to the "28 for 28" principle and showed their commitment to the fundamental principles of collective defence (NATO, 3 June 2014b).

In a broader sense, however, in response to the crisis in Ukraine and expressed concerns of some NATO Allies, and taking into account also other security threats and challenges, the Alliance must focus primarily on three elements in the future: enhancing preparedness, defence investments and active maintenance of the transatlantic bond. These should also be the central themes of the Wales Summit.

A large part of the response to the recent Russian actions and the related challenges, and at the same time the general response to the current security environment will be included in the Readiness Action Plan (RAP), which was called so by the NATO Secretary General and will be confirmed at the Summit by the Heads of State and Government. Initial ideas included an overview of the development of the defence and deterrence forces and an overview of NATO Response Force (NRF), aimed at providing faster responsiveness, overview of the threat assessment, exchange of intelligence, early warning and crisis response. The Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) is also being thoroughly examined, aiming to provide more frequent, more visible and more demanding exercises, with greater emphasis in particular on Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. These plans have their price, but the costs of (in) security can be significantly higher, which again leads to the conclusion that there is no collective security without proper investment (NATO Secretary General, 8 April 2014 and 15 May 2014).

1.3 The Legacy of the Present NATO Secretary General

During his term, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen very ambitiously embarked on major reforms of the organization and introduced a number of initiatives that should guide the Alliance in its transformation in the period of limited financial resources, fatigue from participation in the ISAF operation and quite strong indifference of the public. His agenda was to prepare the Alliance for the 21st century (NSC Magazine, June/September 2014, p. 5).

1.3.1 NATO Reforms

Since its establishment in 1949 and until today, NATO has repeatedly successfully adapted to changes in the security environment. The current Strategic Concept, which was adopted under the leadership of Rasmussen, highlights the need for constant reform, which, through the improvement of the structures and working

methods of the NATO Headquarters, its agencies, command structure and resource management, should lead to greater efficiency of organizational operation, flexibility and responsiveness of the decision-making. The 2010 Lisbon Summit gave important guidance for achieving greater efficiency (Lisbon Declaration), with the financial sustainability becoming the driving force and motivation of the majority of the initiated reforms. The need was clearly recognised for the organization to somehow "share" the fate of the national defence systems and measurably optimize its scope and operations.

The reform of NATO's command structure is focused on the achievement of a leaner, more efficient and more economical structure (6800 positions in peace), assuming that the Allies will fully man it. The goal should be reached by 2015. After the initial, more artificial reduction in the number of committees, the NATO Headquarters reform focuses primarily on the appropriate transfer of posts within the International Secretariat according to the priorities of the Alliance, seeking to achieve the optimization of the available human resources. Similarly, it also reduces the number of NATO agencies and improves the process of resource management, especially in programming and ensuring transparency and accountability (Polat, 6 April 2014).

At the Wales Summit, we can again expect that the focus will be on reforms and further guidelines of Heads of State and Government, which will be the basis for future adaptation of the Alliance to the changed security environment, particularly in terms of responding to the crisis in Ukraine. In the spirit of the allied solidarity, we can expect that the focus will no longer be on the tightening of the belt, but mostly on finding an appropriate balance between ensuring efficiency and solidarity, the latter above all in relation to the "dispelling" of the fears and doubts sprouting in some Eastern Allied capitals. Even more, as the Allies are slowly recovering from the financial crisis, they are expected to halt further cuts, reverse the flow of defence spending and start to increase defence budgets.

1.3.2 NATO Transformation

Adapting to changes in the international security environment and other realities (financial, political, and social) is therefore an inherent part of existence and the future of NATO. Transformation is a process that never ends. Flexibility is the key guiding principle of the Alliance, which must continue to be based on the principles and values on which the Alliance was built.

By adopting the goal of **NATO Forces 2020** at the 2012 Chicago Summit, the Allies committed themselves to building "modern, tightly connected forces, equipped, trained, exercised and commanded so that they can operate together and with partners in any environment". The Defence Capabilities Package was also adopted, focusing on the key areas of the development of capabilities necessary for the realization of the set goal (Declaration on Defence Capabilities, Chicago, 2012).

In order to achieve greater effectiveness in achieving the ambitions, the NATO Secretary General successively introduced two initiatives at the Munich Security Conference in 2011 and 2012: **Smart Defence** and the **Connected Forces Initiative (CFI)**, which should complement the process of the development of capabilities within the NATO Defence Planning Process, which according to some no longer fully provided relevant results (remark: not because of the process, but mainly due to the reduction in defence spending and the inability to meet the obligations of the Allies). The initiatives are based on the strengthening of multilateral cooperation, both among the Allies as with other partners, greater level of trust, strengthening of capacity for joint action, and constant review and maintenance of the achieved interoperability. In the light of the changed security environment and the financial challenges, the Allies adopted them as the only possible *modus operandi* for the future (Declaration on Defence Capabilities, Chicago, 2012).

Maintaining and upgrading the experience gained by the allied forces during several decades of participation in operations, the degree of interoperability and the ability to take collective action, both among the Allies as with other partners, which is a unique element and power of the Alliance, are the elements which brought to the forefront above all the Connected Forces Initiative, especially after the end of the ISAF and, last but not least, from the perspective of the response to the events in Ukraine.

Appropriate training and exercises are identified as some of the fundamental elements of building greater responsiveness of the Alliance and enhancing the visibility of defence capabilities. In October 2013, defence ministers adopted a decision on the high visibility exercise in 2015, which will include a large number of land, sea and air forces. Its hosts will be Spain, Portugal and Italy. Since 2016, these exercises will be conducted regularly and will include the training for all kinds of the Alliance missions, Article 5 Operations as well as Non-Article 5 Operations. A new concept of training and exercises up to 2020 will also be in place. The initiative builds on a better use of technology to achieve greater interoperability, for example, the use of modern simulators (NATO, 24 October 2013).

The motor of the Connected Forces are the NATO Response Force (NRF) and Special Operations Forces (SOF). Response Force is a rapidly deployable, technologically advanced multinational force, which comprises land, air and sea components and Special Operations Forces. It has approximately 13,000 members (active part of the Immediate Response Force) provided by the Allies according to the rotation system. After 2014, based on these forces, NATO should build future operational readiness and further transformation. In the changed security environment, we expect that these forces will strengthen the responsiveness and robustness of the organization and its military character. Also increasing are the role and the recognition of the SOF and their Headquarters, which plans and coordinates the allied missions of those forces and contributes to the improvement of cooperation and interoperability between them (NATO, 24 October 2013).

In addition to those initiatives, another one came to life within the Alliance. It was first introduced by Germany and is aimed at strengthening the common European effort in the long-term building of capabilities which are priorities for the Alliance. The concept called the **Framework Nation Concept** focuses on groups of countries which, under the auspices of the framework nation (only those Allies which have very diverse capabilities are suitable for this role), associate voluntarily in order to build comprehensive sets of capabilities and forces. Currently, Germany is establishing a group that will focus mainly on those capabilities which were identified as a priority at the level of the Alliance, whereas the United Kingdom establishes the Joint Expeditionary Force (NATO Secretary General, 3 June 2014), soon to be followed by new announcements of similar groups.

Multinational cooperation and multinational initiatives have become an important aspect of capability building. Their purpose is primarily to focus and combine the efforts to achieve the set goals and to implement NATO's priorities arising from the NDPP. As also highlighted by NATO Secretary General (15 May 2014), they can help strengthen national efforts, but cannot replace credible national investments.

NATO transformation does not take place only in the area of capability development, but in the wider context of ensuring readiness for the challenges of the 21st century, which includes ensuring readiness to respond to all the very diverse security threats. NATO must maintain the ability to provide defence and security of the population which, as stated in the Strategic Concept, also includes the strengthening of capabilities to deal with modern security challenges, such as cyber threats, piracy, terrorism and missile defence.

An area in which NATO has made considerable progress in recent years is **cyber defence**. In June 2014, Defence Ministers adopted an enhanced cyber defence policy, which included the progress made since 2011, when the original policy and its action plan were adopted. The new policy, based on the principles of the indivisibility of Allied security and NATO solidarity, places cyber defence in the framework of collective defence and thus of Article 5, which is a great progress in the mentality of the Alliance and shows the importance NATO attributes to cyber defence. It contains provisions relating to NATO's assistance to Allies in the event of cyber attack and in the development of capabilities. In the spirit of strengthening international security, the Alliance also committed to strengthening partnerships, particularly with the EU, and to cooperating with the industry (NATO Secretary General, 3 June 2014, and NATO, 7 August 2014).

The Allies very ambitiously responded to the challenge, with a clear commitment to continue to build capabilities for preventing and detecting cyber attacks, defence against them and recovery from them (Strategic Concept, 2010). NATO bears responsibility for protecting its networks, while the Allies are responsible for the development of their cyber defense capabilities (*ibid.*). In this area, too, the Allies are increasingly willing to participate in joint, multinational projects. Currently, the

level of development of cyber defence capabilities among allies still differs quite a lot, but it is precisely because of the principle "the Alliance is only as strong as its weakest link" that they are forced to ensure minimum standards of protection and an appropriate level of national cyber defence.

1.3.3 Partnerships

Cooperative security based on cooperation with partners remains one of the three fundamental tasks of NATO. Partnerships are the key to strengthening NATO's readiness for all challenges, as conceived by Secretary General Rasmussen (NSC Magazine, June/September 2014, p. 9). Partnership policy has many dimensions and includes a network of different partners from the Euro-Atlantic area, the Mediterranean and the Gulf region, as well as those belonging to the partnerships called global partnerships, including the collaboration with many international organizations. In the last two decades, with their contributions to the Alliance operations and other measurable efforts in addressing common security challenges, the partners repeatedly demonstrated their value. A concrete confirmation of cooperation was given at the Lisbon Summit in 2010, when the decision was taken to strengthen partnership cooperation, and in 2011, when the new partnership policy of the Alliance was confirmed (NATO, 31 March 2014).

The Allies as well as partners who supported the organization in times when it was most important managed to achieve an enviable level of interoperability through their active participation in operations. Through the mechanisms for strengthening the capabilities for operations (*Operational Capabilities Concept Programme*), the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) has mechanisms in place for certification of contributions from partner countries in accordance with NATO standards. Compliance with these criteria and standards, which are known in advance and are derived from the overarching NATO Education, Training, Exercises and Evaluation Policy, and from the implementing acts, is a good foundation for establishing and maintaining interoperability also in the future. Also important is the participation in the planning mechanism for Partnership for Peace member states, called PARP (*Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process*), which focuses mainly on the building of capabilities and is very similar to the process used by member states. New initiatives, such as the Connected Forces Initiative, Smart Defence and the Framework Nation concept, are also likely to contribute to greater interoperability. The Summit will provide an opportunity for NATO and its partners to reaffirm their commitment to maintain readiness and capacity of collective action in the future (Appathurai, 2014 pp. 35-38).

Moreover, the changed security environment, changed dynamics of participation in operations after ISAF and the reservation of the Allied public in supporting the participation in large-scale operations outside NATO territory contribute to the strengthening of the capabilities of the Alliance for the training of local forces (*defence capacity building*) without extensive logistical presence on the ground (Brattberg, 2013, p. 19). This is already an established practice of the Alliance's

operation; however, it has a new qualitative aspect in the light of the latest changes in the international security environment. Such tasks include counseling, assistance, support, training and exercises in the context of defence and security sector reforms of partner and non-partner countries. In this area, the Alliance has accumulated a lot of experience; however, it is necessary to ensure greater responsiveness and better coordination of all efforts, including in relation to cooperation with other international organizations, as also highlighted in the NATO Comprehensive Approach Concept (Appathurai, 2014, p. 42). In the future, this approach could be used in new missions in Afghanistan, Ukraine and Libya as well as in many other areas.

Furthermore, an additional question opened with Ukraine on the dimension of partnerships, not only in terms of the expectations that partner countries can have towards NATO, but also in the sense of the open-door policy. With the NATO response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it has become clear to everyone that the principle of collective defence continues to apply only for the members and there will be no changes here, even if some countries may wish otherwise. What remains available to partners is NATO assistance in defence reforms, modernization of defence institutions, promotion of integrity, transparency and accountability, and the strengthening of the ability of partner forces to operate together with the Allied forces. Cooperation also takes place in the field of crisis management, assistance in response to natural and other disasters, scientific and technological cooperation as well as response to new security challenges such as terrorism and cyber defence (DSG Vershbow, 13 May 2014).

Nevertheless, we should not ignore the fact that the open-door policy has proved to be one of the most successful policies in history that have contributed to peace and security in Europe. In 2010, the NATO Strategic Concept reaffirmed the commitment to the enlargement to those European democracies which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership and can contribute to Euro-Atlantic security. The process is not yet complete, but the Ukrainian-Russian crisis brought new dynamics in relation to countries aspiring to membership.

2 NATO TOMORROW

The challenges faced by the Alliance "before Ukraine" were quite complex. The strategic environment was very dynamic and unpredictable, ranging from the shift of power from West to East, focus of the United States on the Asia-Pacific region, financial crisis, security challenges that followed the Arab Spring, to the end of ISAF (Brattberg, 2013, pp. 19–20). The events in Ukraine changed the assumptions in ensuring European security, brought collective defence to the forefront and consolidated the transatlantic bond. With a number of security reassurance measures, the Alliance unanimously responded to the requests of its Eastern member states. This will also be reflected in the agenda of the NATO Summit to be held from 4 to 5 September 2014 in Wales in the United Kingdom.

The central theme of the Summit will be *the Future NATO*, which has an impact on all the above-mentioned areas, from the strengthening of transatlantic ties and partnerships, provision of adequate resources for defence, development of capabilities, more training and exercises, to the new allied mission in Afghanistan and the review of relations with Russia. With the new circumstances, more attention will definitely be paid to collective defence, movement and deployment of the Allied forces within the borders of the Alliance, intensity of military exercises and scenarios with high level of intensity and responsiveness of forces, especially the NRF (NATO Secretary General, 26 March 2014, Vershbow, 1 May 2014, and Deputy Secretary General Vershbow, 13 May 2014).

The future of NATO will also be marked by the **start of the term of the new Secretary General** on 1 October 2014. The Allies appointed the former Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg to this function, a person characterised by a history of successful negotiations with Russia, a period of growth in the Norwegian defence spending and transformation of their forces and capabilities into high-intensity and deployable forces and capabilities, NATO's calls to focus on security challenges close to the Allied territory, strong advocacy of transatlantic cooperation, including calls for a more equitable burden-sharing, and commitment to the complementarity of NATO and the EU in the provision of European and wider security. (NATO, 28 March 2014)

2.1 The Future of the Transatlantic Bond

In the consideration of the future of the transatlantic bond, the spine of the Alliance, we have to take into account the dynamics of the last few years. In doing so, we can build on the writing of Howorth (2013, pp. 33–34), which highlights three elements that have marked the posture of the United States in recent years. The first was evident from the NATO operation “Unified Protector” in Libya, in which the United States assumed the role of the “leader from behind”, while the European Allies were in the forefront. In this way, United States, at least on the symbolic level, showed that they are ready to leave the responsibility for the “European scene” to Europe. Another element was the speech of Secretary of Defense Gates in June 2011⁶, in which he very directly warned the European Allies that they must step up their efforts and assume greater responsibility within the Alliance if they want to maintain a strong transatlantic bond. The third element is the strategic guidance document adopted in January 2012⁷, which announced the rebalancing of the United States toward the Asia-Pacific region⁸.

One of the most vulnerable or controversial areas among the Allies remains the defence spending. As we have already mentioned in the chapter on resources, the

⁶ Gates, Robert. *The Security and Defence Agenda: The Future of NATO. Speech by Secretary of Defence, 10 June 2011.* <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1581>, 25 May 2014.

⁷ DoD. *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, Priorities for 21st Century Defence. January 2012.* http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf, 25 May 2014.

⁸ Similarly also Larrabee *e tal.*, 2012, pp. 99 – 101.

United States devote over four percent of GDP to defence spending, while the majority of the other Allies is far from two percent. The executive authorities in Washington are faced with an increased pressure from its legislature (the Congress) to reduce the defence spending and to persuade their European Allies more effectively to reduce this gap. From the American perspective, the changed security environment, in which the sense of threat in the very East of the Old Continent increases, further underlines the need for Europe to show and prove that it is willing to bear its share of the burden (Pifer, 2014).

In the light of the changed posture and the complex security environment, the United States will simply need more assistance from its partners and Allies in the future (Obama, 28 May 2014). In other words, Europe should finally move from being "security consumer" to becoming "security producer". A solid transatlantic bond for the future also depends on the military power of Europe (Brattberg, 2013, pp. 20-21, and Coelmont and Langlois, 2013). There might have been intentions in the past for Europe to assume greater part of the burden also in the wider geographical region (Asia, Africa). Apparently, however, this will not happen in the near future due to the recurring need for appropriate and sufficient forces to operate on the "home" continent.

For quite some time, pressures have been coming from the United States for Europe to take a greater share of the burden. However, due to financial constraints facing Europe and the lack of a sense of threat, these have not fallen on fertile ground. It was not until the outbreak of the recent Russian-Ukrainian crisis that the necessary basis was formed, which may lead to the altered posture of the European Allies, with the corresponding generation of political will and public support to ensure investments in security and defence, both in NATO and the EU. Of course, this conviction is not shared by everyone on the continent, and it also brings with it the risk of new divisions, which already became evident during the preliminary discussions, particularly on the future of relations with Russia.

2.2 Relations with Russia

While the transatlantic bond is strengthening⁹, relations with Russia are likely to go through some changes. However, their scope and depth depend primarily on resolving the current crisis in Ukraine. In the current circumstances, the implementation of strategic partnership between NATO and Russia, as laid down by the Allies in the Strategic Concept, is unthinkable (*no business as usual*). The Russian actions in Ukraine brought about the loss of confidence of the majority of the Allied capitals, all of them also condemning Russia's violation of international law. In some instances, things went much further, as the old fears surfaced again, already seeing the outlines

⁹ *The strengthening of the transatlantic bond is also reflected in the reliance, especially of the Eastern Allies, on the capabilities of the United States as the first response to the crisis in Ukraine. In the atmosphere, reminiscent to some of the Cold War, the two short visits of the US President Obama in Europe in March and June 2014 were thus intended to provide persuasive security reassurances and to convey the message that in spite of the announced focus on the Asia-Pacific region, the US will not turn its back on Europe (Obama, 26 March 2014b, Obama, 3 June 2014, and Obama, 3 June 2014b).*

of Russian tanks on the horizon. In spite of all the changes in the safety assessments, the Alliance must evaluate the situation in a sober and thoughtful manner. Russia borders on NATO and remains a key actor in the provision of the Euro-Atlantic as well as wider global security. NATO will have to find a *modus vivendi* also with the current rulers in Kremlin; however, certainly not at the expense of compromising the security of the Allies. A recurrence of the past, a kind of "mini-Cold War", would not be to the benefit of anyone at this moment, other than individual nostalgists on both sides who have never accepted the fact that the bipolar world, so predictable for some, collapsed.

Conclusion For NATO, the period beyond 2014 is above all an opportunity to affirm and strengthen its role of a guarantor of the European security and stability in the wider area. In order to maintain credibility, it is not enough just to build on what we have already done, but most of all to fulfil what we have committed to. Unfortunately, there will be no well-earned respite after the heat of Afghanistan, since we will need to strengthen our efforts in the direction that we have, together and so farsightedly, outlined with the adoption of the Strategic Concept at the Lisbon Summit. What are the strategic challenges that can threaten our "journey"? Their contours are clear and none of them is particularly new. They are all interlinked in some way and can be simplified with a triple axis between the available resources, robustness and durability of the transatlantic bond and the common assessment of threat or its perception. In the absence of the sense of threat, there will be no money. There is also the question whether the Ukrainian crisis is a sufficient incentive for all members to carry out the necessary changes in their budgets. According to the recent signs, only those members reacted quickly who were already at the forefront of recognizing the crisis as the beginning of the "New Cold War".

Even those who are not deprived of sleep due to the Ukrainian crisis should be aware that Europe is facing serious security threats. Syria continues to burn, Islamic extremism is raging in the streets of Iraq and the first consequences of the killings in the Levant have already knocked on the door of the European capitals. Continued lack of European funds is likely to imply the decline in the enthusiasm in Washington for maintaining the imbalance in capabilities and, consequently, the weakening of the transatlantic bond. Undoubtedly, the United States presence in Europe and its defence budget are not led by altruism, but rather the American national interests. However, a more credible European approach to paying the common defence bill is an important evidence of the belief of political elites on both sides of the Atlantic that we are in this boat together and that we have all paid the tickets. Of course, only if we want the United States to stay in Europe, which according to our estimates, is a prerequisite for the continuation of such NATO as we would want it and as our taxpayers deserve. We just have to make sure that they also pay for it.

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SLOVENIJA IN NATO – DOLGA IN VIJUGASTA POT

SLOVENIA AND NATO - THE LONG AND WINDING ROAD

Povzetek Prispevek obravnava proces vključevanja Slovenije v Nato, predvsem v letih 2000–2004. Avtor ga razume v okviru širših sprememb, ki so se zgodile ob koncu hladne vojne, in kot del evropskega integracijskega procesa. Slovenija je bila edina država v širši regiji, ki je postala članica Nata in EU leta 2004, proces pa je trajal dobro desetletje. Za slovenski obrambno-varnostni sistem in za varnost države je bil to najpomembnejši dosežek po osamosvojitvi. Članstvo v Natu je okrepilo slovensko obrambo in vojaško identiteto ter pospešilo različne transformacijske procese, ki so potekali v Slovenski vojski, na primer profesionalizacijo, namestljivost in modernizacijo. Prav tako je oblikovalo razumevanje dejstva, da so vojaške sile orodje zunanje politike in da sta se temeljna zunanjepolitična cilja države (članstvo v Natu in EU) po uresničitvi spremenila v sredstvo za doseg novih ciljev. Leto 2004 predstavlja vrh integracijske dinamike, ki je spremenila evro-atlantski prostor. To je bilo leto stabilizacije, ki je bila dosežena s t. i. velikim širitvenim pokom. Nekatera spoznanja iz Natovih širitvev po koncu hladne vojne niso bila razumljena na Zahodnem Balkanu, kar je vplivalo na zastoj širitvenega procesa. Po širitvi 2004 pa je postala integracijska dinamika v tej regiji vsakdanja, tako je območje dobilo prvič v zgodovini edinstveno priložnost za stabilizacijo. Tudi Slovenija je posredovala svoje širitvene izkušnje državam v regiji. Avtor poleg tega predstavlja še nekatere osebne izkušnje, ki pripomorejo k prikazu posebnosti slovenskega članstva v Natu. V prispevku so uporabljene razne metode, in sicer predstavitev, analiza, komentar, primerjava, generalizacija ter metoda opazovanja z udeležbo.

Ključne besede *Slovenija, Nato, evropski integracijski proces, osebni vtisi, Zahodni Balkan.*

Abstract The paper reflects the Slovenian NATO membership process, primarily during its last period from 2000 to 2004. The author understands this project within the broader scope of changes that followed after the end of the Cold War and as part of the European integration process. It took Slovenia, which was the only dual member in the 2004 enlargements in the region, a decade to gain membership. For the Slovenian defence and military system as well as for the country's security as a whole it was the most important achievement after the independence. It strengthened the Slovenian defence and military identity as well as supported various transformational trends that were going on in the Slovenian Armed Forces, like professionalization, deployability and modernization. It developed the understanding of the armed forces as a foreign policy tool and pushed for new foreign policy goals after the previous ones (NATO and the EU membership) were realized. The year 2004 presents the so far peak in the integration dynamics that has changed the Euro-Atlantic area. It was the year of stabilization, reached by the so-called Big Bang enlargement. Some of the lessons learned from the NATO enlargements were misunderstood in the Western Balkans; hence the enlargement stalemate. After 2004 the integration dynamics became a reality in the region which, for the first time in its history, had a unique opportunity for stabilization. Slovenia shared its experiences and lessons learned with countries in the region. The author also includes a selection of his personal reflections on the process, since they were rather unique for the Slovenian case. The methods used are presentation, analysis, comment, comparison, generalization and the method of observing through one's own participation.

Key words *Slovenia, NATO, the European integration process, personal reflections, Western Balkans.*

Introduction This paper reflects and contemplates a brief period of four years (end of 2000 to the end of 2004), during which crucial steps towards the membership of Slovenia in NATO were accomplished. An analytical presentation of the author, stemming from his professional and personal experiences, would be offered, commented, compared and generalized alongside various events, activities and processes that led to the full matrix of the membership. Those experiences would be backed by some theoretical elaborations and supported, among other things, by numerous references of the author, published during that, but also during later, time, all having in common his academic dealing with the discussed topic. Therefore, among the mentioned methods, the method of observing through one's own participation stands out.

The aim of the author could be understood as a twofold one: from one point of view to add to the process of gaining membership, and from another one to add to the full picture and understanding of the way this process was managed and crafted out.

1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The Slovenian membership in NATO (and that of other countries from 1999, 2004 and 2009 enlargements) was part of broader and intertwined processes that were initiated by the end of the Cold War. The three post–Cold War enlargements (a decade, a decade and a half, and two decades later) stabilized, secured and strengthened a large part of the European continent that used to lie on the Eastern side of the Iron Curtain for practically the major part of the twentieth century. In NATO language, it secured Europe free and whole.¹

The year of 1989 was *Annus Mirabilis* – it brought a great structural and unprecedented change that swept across the continent, released enormous social and political energy, dissolved three multinational socialist/communist regimes, and re-created a vast number of countries, which was all together only a year before unexpected, unpredictable and impossible.² Generally speaking, the security arc that was stretching from the Baltics across the Central and Eastern Europe to the Balkans broke and collapsed, while its dynamics also hit Central Asia with full speed. At the same time – with open space and political dynamics – regional international organizations in the broader European area started to search for new meaning, substances and members. The EU, NATO, the OSCE and the Council of Europe all reached out to the newly re-established countries which were also turning towards them. An almost simultaneous process was launched, partially emerging from the mentioned security and political tectonics. Towards the end of the 1990s, new countries joined previous members and the process started to show concrete results. It slowly became obvious that various integration dynamics and structural momentum was producing what later started to be defined as the European integration process, having in mind the intertwined enlargement dynamics of the mentioned organizations.

An outstanding part of that trend was the quest for security. Since the Peace of Westphalia, there have been three dominant ways of providing security: the system of balance of powers (primarily until the end of the First World War), the system of collective security (since the establishment of the League of Nations), and the system of collective defence (NATO) (Grizold, 2001, p. 141–142). To satisfy the security needs is of primary importance for each state, in particular for small ones, and these presented the majority of those that re-established their statehood after the end of the Cold War.³ All of them showed strong interest in membership in major international organizations. This was understandable, most probably also expected, since “Usually, international institutions are the best friends of small states” (Väyrynen, 1997, p. 42).⁴ Furthermore, the ambition of the NATO membership could be supported by the fact that “for small and medium states entering in the alliances’

¹ For more on some challenges of NATO enlargement compare Bebler, 1999.

² For more on structural, contextual and geopolitical consequences of the end of the Cold War compare Antohi and Tismaneanu, 2000.

³ For more on new small states that re-emerged after the end of the Cold War and their security as well as other related topics comp. Jazbec, 2001.

⁴ For more on small states and their security institutionalization compare Reiter and Gärtner, 2000.

relationship means strengthening of their security situation and partial compensation for their economic inferiority (...)” (Benko, 1997, p. 242). In the case of Slovenia, this aim was also codified in the Defence Act, stating in its second paragraph that the goal of defending a state is also achievable with the inclusion and active participation of the state in international security integrations.⁵

During the overall integration dynamics some specific characteristics of the European security processes that tend to be global were crafted out (comp. Jazbec, 2005 a and 2005 b). They were and still are: complementarity, complexity, complicated nature and intensity, to which one should also add the key role of relations between the USA, Europe and the Russian federation.⁶ The three players have been bound together throughout history and only when they did/do manage to cooperate, security and stability were/are not questioned. Rotfeld (2000, p. 1) also points out their cooperative and competitive nature. Complementarity appeared to be the most important characteristics of the European security processes. It was a policy result, provoked by the rising complexity of contemporary security challenges and threats, and stemmed from different approaches to the provision of security primarily by NATO, the EU, OSCE as well as the UN (collective defence, crisis management, corporate and collective security). Complexity appeared as a result of activities of various players at different vertical and horizontal levels. Participation of different countries in various security arrangements produced a highly complicated security matrix that was supposed to guarantee security and stability, as a result of combined activities of national and international players (comp. Table 3 in Jazbec, 2001, p. 61-62). Complicated nature of those processes derived, and still does, among other things, from the fact that membership of different European countries in NATO and the EU sometimes crucially influences or even blocks cooperation between the two organizations. They cooperate to avoid the duplication of resources and achieve higher efficiency, but differences between the members of one and non-members of another as well as vice versa complicates and slows down the security efficiency.

The case of formation of the European integration process during its initial period in the 1990s was neither easy nor straightforward. Apart from being rather complicated in the eyes of the aspirant countries (at least both for the EU and NATO aspirants), it was also misunderstood by the policy-makers. The most horrifying example is the mismanagement of the war in Bosnia. Its dimensions were so far-reaching that one could dare to say that it was de facto the Third Balkan War of the twentieth century.⁷

The year 2004 presents the so far peak in the integration dynamics that has changed the Euro-Atlantic area. A decade and a half after the big change one could speak of the year of stabilization, reached by the so-called Big Bang enlargement. The

⁵ *Defence Act, Paragraph 2, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 103/04, September 23, 2004.*

⁶ *There has always been a question of what to understand as Europe. For the purpose of this paper we should understand it as the overlapping of membership in NATO, the EU and the OCSE, since all three organizations deal with providing security. To understand it geographically, historically and politically, Simms is very useful (2013).*

⁷ *The genocide in Srebrenica is the gravest example supporting our claim.*

dual enlargement of NATO and the EU definitely marked the post-Cold War period. During the following years, the integration process started to lose its dynamics and as far as the enlargement process is concerned, it lost practically the majority of its original dynamics until now. It just might be the case that it is also losing its broader attractiveness.

2 POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

2.1 General Observations

The observed period and its processes offer much to contemplate. We would try to dwell on some most significant policy implications, having in mind the Slovenian experiences.

First and foremost, membership in NATO was for the Slovenian defence and military system as well as for the country's security as a whole the most important achievement after the independence. It brought Slovenia to the very core of the European integration process (together with the EU membership) and cemented its position in the European social, political, diplomatic and historical context. The latter, in particular, is highly important – throughout its history, Slovenia has always been part of the European dynamics, although not at its physical (geographical) centre.⁸ Hence, one could claim that it could be understood as part of the process that would hardly be questioned at a general level, as a principal goal.⁹ The membership strengthened Slovenian defence and military identity, enriched its tradition and offered possibilities for further development of all related topics.¹⁰ It supported, additionally defined and helped to profile the Slovenian Armed Forces in its various transformational aspects: a) from a conscript to a professional army, b) deployability, c) international engagement, d) modernization, e) further specialization, f) internal and external personnel mobility etc. Moreover, it also definitely constituted the understanding of the armed forces as a foreign policy tool.

Generally speaking, the most outstanding policy implication from the regional point of view would be that in years following the dual enlargement the security ring around the Western Balkans has strengthened and narrowed the security twilight zone that was producing instability throughout the previous years. There has been a clear and strong security belt around the region, consisting of NATO and EU members alike.¹¹ The direct policy consequence of that achievement has been that the region, for the

⁸ *For a thorough overview of the modern Slovenian history comp. Vodopivec, 2006.*

⁹ *Another question is whether there were any operational, political missteps or mistakes while implementing that goal. Vidmajer is of the opinion that the Slovenian political elite never knew well to explain this goal to its public (2012, p. 64).*

¹⁰ *For a concise encyclopedical guide on the Slovenian defence and military intelligence comp. Kranjc, 2005.*

¹¹ *Clockwise: Italy, Slovenia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece, while Croatia and Albania joined NATO in 2009. Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007 and Croatia in 2013. The fact that Macedonia was not – and still has not been – invited to the membership at the Bucharest 2008 Summit presents a strategic security mistake, which de facto prevented the mentioned security belt from growing significantly.*

first time in its history, was given a unique opportunity for the definite stabilization and hence development. One would dare to say that some policy-makers in the region did not comprehend that fact sufficiently.

The next general observation would be that the integration dynamics became a reality in the region. It was accepted and pursued, although with a different speed and different engagement. Moreover, the later integration *fatigue*, a phrase coined by some outside policy-makers, can not change the overall impression. It stands out that there was no major conflict in the region after the dual enlargement.

The third general observation, although not regional but the Slovenian one, was that the dual enlargement meant the fulfilment of the main two Slovenian foreign policy priorities, namely the membership in the EU and in NATO. Presenting, explaining and repeating them at each foreign policy activity became a *mantra* during those years. Nevertheless, reaching that goal never became an ambition only by and for itself, as both memberships, as a target, have never been a sole point in the air which should be reached as soon as possible whatever the costs. They were not only the main foreign policy priorities but, above all, tools for the transformation of societies, economies and also the national defence and security system (Jazbec, 2005 B, 179). That way of primarily policy and less political understanding of the main foreign policy priorities has also led to the next policy step: With this years' fulfilment, both goals were at the same time transformed to means for, among other things, an enhanced role of a security actor in South East Europe and in the Western Balkans in particular (Ibid.). This meant that the foreign policy goals, when reached, were *via facti* transformed into foreign policy means.¹² This simple statement – and highly important, although a primarily overseen lesson learned – pointed out that membership was the beginning of a process and that membership activities should be based on a kind of a road map which would explain what should be achieved by the pure fact of membership. Transformation from foreign policy goals to foreign policy means appeared almost as a kind of a policy puzzle. Such an understanding of the policy conversion was neither perceived nor instrumentalized, and there is an impression that its absence to much extent dictated the Slovenian membership behaviour.¹³ This policy equation helped create and articulate the understanding of peacekeeping operations (and a significant part of the defence policy) as a foreign policy tool that should be planned together with the MFA and not only within the defence – military frame.¹⁴

Concrete Slovenian experiences and lessons learned, since they were spread around the region on purpose, be it politically, diplomatically or academically, added significantly to this picture (comp. Jazbec, 2005 b, 2005 c and 2005 d). The aim of those activities was at least threefold: firstly, to transfer its own enlargement

¹² The author pointed this out – as the first one in the case of Slovenia – at the international conference “Globalized Europe”, organized in late spring 2004 by the University of Primorska, Koper.

¹³ However, this is only an assumption, which the author can not back up by an empirical record.

¹⁴ For more on this see Jazbec, 2009.

experiences to the region; secondly, to express constant support and encouragement to the region's potentials; and thirdly, to promote and explain them to the Euro-Atlantic partners and vice versa. Those experiences also derived from the fact that with the dual enlargement and the membership in NATO and the EU, Slovenia solved its security question. This was strengthened during the next years with the Croatian membership in both organizations. The Slovenian security environment changed during the first decade and a half of the existence of the Slovenian state.¹⁵ One could even say that the traditional security threats that derive from the nature of the nation state disappeared, as far as Slovenia is concerned. This would count as a major achievement of the new state and has not always been perceived so clearly.

2.2 Selected Experiences and Lessons Learned

Further on, let us point out some of the most important experiences and lessons learned.

Firstly, the process of gaining membership lasted for a whole decade. The ambition to become part of the Euro-Atlantic area was for the first time put down in the 1989 May Declaration. The adoption of the Amendments to the Resolution on the Starting Points of Slovenian National Security in January 1994 officially declared membership in NATO as a primary foreign policy goal.¹⁶ A few months later Slovenia joined the first partner countries of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Programme and also started other activities within the NATO cooperation framework – the Planning and Review Process, Individual Partnership Programme etc. At the NATO Madrid Summit in 1997 Slovenia was not invited to membership, although expectations rode very high. Both high expectations and huge disappointment, which followed, were wrong and unnecessary.¹⁷ In autumn 1999 Slovenia, together with other candidate countries, joined the Membership Action Plan (MAP) that was another and demanding tool for the execution of reforms. After comprehensive, systematic and intensive work during the Parliamentary term 2000–2004 Slovenia managed to gain membership invitation at the Prague 2002 Summit. The membership entered into force on March 23, 2004, roughly a decade after its start in the PfP (comp. Jazbec, 2005 d).

Secondly, a number of highly important lessons were learned during the previously mentioned period. The most important one, in particular looking from the distance, was to be realistic. This may sound simple now, but it was a demanding lesson.

¹⁵ For more on this comp. Grizold, 2005.

¹⁶ During the early 1990s, neutrality, as an option, was seriously discussed in parts of the academic and broader audience. Moldova is the only country that emerged after the end of the Cold War and opted for neutrality.

¹⁷ The final decision to extend invitations to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland was achieved close to the Summit. Germany was also pushing for Slovenia, while France conditioned its agreement with Slovenia only if Romania would be included in the package, which at the end left only the three invitees on the list. The decision was political, which can also be argued with the fact that the three countries, as it came out later and was presented many times to the next group of candidates, were not militarily prepared enough for their membership. The author believes that the political aspect of the decision was additionally strengthened by the fact that during the Cold War the Soviet Union expressed enormous political pressure and also intervened in Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, while the West did practically nothing to support them (comp. for example Vidmajer, 2012: 65). Unlike Romania, that fact places Slovenia in a completely different position.

The then seven candidate countries put on paper all possible ambitions and soon the conclusion of the first MAP cycle showed that little of that was realized. Only what was possible to achieve and was backed by available resources out of what was needed, should have been pointed out – that was the immediate lesson. Next, the ability to show constant progress stood up. The MAP process is designed in the way that a candidate country is constantly screened. Therefore, it is rather easy to correct the development process on the basis of regular and frequent consultations with a follow-up reaction, rather than doing it only at the end of each annual process. An inevitable part of this process is also sharing solidarity and knowledge with both the Alliance and individual members. Additionally, cooperation with Parliament is a must. National parliaments are those who adopt the necessary laws and resolutions, exercise democratic control over the armed forces, take the final decision about the level of defence expenditure as well as ratify the membership agreement. Not least important is sharing responsibility with the highest law-making authority. Last but not least, the Slovenian experience points out a highly valuable experience of dealing with the media and public opinion. Slovenia was the only 2004 NATO member country that held a referendum vote prior to the membership (Hungary did it afterwards). An in-depth public awareness campaign was prepared at the government level, with important parliamentary support, for that purpose. During the campaign, numerous public discussions, debates, round tables, live TV and radio shows were organized around the country, with participation of both NATO pros and cons. It should be explicitly pointed out that the ambition for membership was not unanimously shared: part of opinion makers, media and public was undecided and part was against. Rupel points out that “bipartisan cooperation referring to the EU and NATO referendum was exemplary” (2011, p. 93), but also claims that “the transitional left organized intensive campaigns against the agreement with Vatican, then related to Slovenian-Italian and Slovenian-Austrian relations, and finally against NATO membership” (2011, p. 175).¹⁸ Although the fulfilment of both membership ambitions was a parallel process, there were significant differences between them. Vidmajer points out that “NATO membership was already from the beginning less unequivocal in more controversial” (2012, p. 63), meaning that “the NATO equation was significantly more demanding than the EU one” (2012, p. 64). The referendum took place on March 23, 2003 (together with the EU referendum). The turnout was 60%; almost 90% were in favour of EU membership and 66% of NATO. The results proved the governmental policy and equipped Slovenia with a strong political *credo* when entering the Alliance (Ibid.). It would be worth analyzing to what extent the Slovenian political elite has used that *credo* during the years to follow to establish itself as a strong, outstanding and unique partner.¹⁹

Thirdly, there were some important lessons learned during the first membership year, when Slovenia became part of a large and efficient NATO bureaucratic machinery. The lessons could briefly be summarized as follows: an operational (not only

¹⁸ For a more comprehensive overview of the EU and NATO membership issues, primarily from the foreign policy and public opinion points of view, comp. Rupel, 2004.

¹⁹ The author of this paper is not aware of any such analysis.

political) adaptation to the NAC formal meeting's weekly routine; the imbalance between the MFA and the MoD on one side and the country's Mission to NATO on the other; a necessity for an optimal and constant flow of information; principles of the "need to share" and "need to know"; maintenance of a high organizational dynamics (membership is the beginning of a process, not the end); the ongoing communication activities with NGOs, public and the media; relation between running daily business and policy creating activities; the use of multilateral framework for the settling of bilateral issues between member states; learning from previous members, adding one's own experiences and sharing them with candidate and interested countries; the importance of a defence planning system and a defence reform process as hardcore issues of the membership.²⁰

Many of those experiences did not mean anything particularly new at the time when the membership was gained. But they proved to be part of a highly demanding management process of the Alliance's activities. The general message would be a need for a highly serious approach to the membership issue, having in mind realistic planning, efficient execution and an open ear to absorb experiences from others.²¹

During the whole project Slovenia witnessed important aspects of the NATO accession process. Some of the most important would be as follows (comp. Jazbec, 2005 d).

NATO membership was originally conceptualized as a state project. Along with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence, other parts of the state administration were involved. This can be most clearly illustrated by the structure of the MAP document which consisted of the following five areas: political and economic issues, defence, resources, security issues and legal affairs. One could say that the security aspect could have been seen as the most important and comprehensive one. It primarily denoted membership as a structural adaptation of the national security, the defence system and the armed forces in particular to the structure and experiences of NATO as a whole.

The defence and military aspect was just as important, particularly judging from the Ministry of Defence's point of view. It was membership that helped to create and establish a national defence system that would be a logical part of a larger international system with clear and proven rules. The military was being right sized and adapted to the changed nature of security threats. That brought an impact on deployability, moving away from the national territorial dependency of the armed forces. That switch was highly important for the then new members and candidates who had to restructure and reshape their armed forces from socialist to modern ones. Within that context, Slovenia was a kind of an exception because it did not start

²⁰ *More on this in Jazbec, 2006.*

²¹ *Here I do not elaborate on concrete defence and military activities during the reform process like the rightsizing of the Slovenian Armed Forces and achieving their interoperability with the Alliance, although it also presented part of my activities during the period discussed.*

with large dinosaur armed forces at the beginning of its independence. Therefore, it was possible to immediately focus on the establishment process, instead of first dismantling the old military structures. This, in any case, saved a lot of time, resources and energy.

Also important was the organizational aspect. Typical ministries of defence used to be rigid bureaucratic organizations with very low internal dynamics. Fixed hierarchy and tough promotional rules provided slow and not always certain promotion. With membership in the Alliance, this aspect started to change rapidly. One could say that cooperation of armed forces and their bureaucracies stimulated inter- and intra-organizational dynamics. Organizations had to be more flexible, otherwise they could not execute the demanding processes of countering modern security threats. Along with that, the restructuring and downsizing also led to flexibility and were enabling personnel to be seconded more often. When countries entered the Alliance that fact became almost a daily routine and was enhancing the need for constant education and new skills. An important lesson emerged from that change: being part of a large and efficient political, security and military bureaucracy meant following the same rules.

Additionally, the psychological aspect, strongly connected with the educational one, became part of that process of change. Membership in the Alliance and the way it operates offers more promotional opportunities for soldiers. Those opportunities extend out of the national frame and networking spreads within a larger framework which is no longer bound primarily by national limitations. Hence, communication with colleagues within the Alliance in – as far as the then new members are concerned – a foreign language strengthens personal identity, language skills and operational flexibility.

Last but not least, the social aspect should also be pointed out. More relations have been developed, getting stronger and open, and social networking plays an increasingly important role. Only when national armed forces perform in the international arena, it is possible to develop and benefit from the broadening of national social limitations.

3 SOME PERSONAL REFLECTIONS

Since this paper is of an anniversary nature in an anthological issue of this journal (ten years of NATO membership and twenty years of formal cooperation with the Alliance), this should also be an occasion and an opportunity to add a few selected personal reflections and experiences from the period discussed. They would try to present some specifics of the Slovenian case, to which the author had the opportunity to contribute.²²

²² *In this section we primarily use the method of observation through one's own participation (Gilli, 1974). The character of this contribution and the previously mentioned method resulted in more self-quotations than it is usually the case.*

Slovenia was a rare example of having a senior diplomat in the position of the deputy minister of defence.²³ This fact contributed additional dynamics to the bilateral consultations on the defence policy, which the Slovenian Ministry of Defence was, by that time, already exercising with various countries. These consultations were also extended to the corresponding persons in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, when it was possible to arrange it. This practice also provided for a highly useful inside view in foreign affairs for top military personnel included in the consultations. Moreover, continuous exchange of information between the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence was established.²⁴ More or less regular annual consultations with the following countries took place during that period (alphabetically): Austria (most often and on various possible occasions), Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Slovakia, and occasionally Turkey and the USA. These consultations provided a valuable exchange of policy information and analyses, lectures, publications, joint activities and media appearances. They also strengthened the professional and personal network that proved highly useful on various occasions.²⁵ Along with the above mentioned, I had approximately 450 meetings with foreign delegations and visitors discussing a broad range of topics within the defence sector (primarily NATO).

The already mentioned contacts with the Slovenian and foreign media as well as directly with the public in particular strengthened greatly during that period, especially with the Slovenian public. From one point of view, that was a follow-up of campaign activities prior to the referendum on NATO membership, and from another, a way of communication between the defence sector and the taxpayers. It was also a new momentum within the activities of the Slovenian public administration, with the Ministry of Defence never much appreciating having contacts with the media and the public.²⁶ For the Ministry of Defence alone the public debate was important also because it helped establish direct contact between the Ministry and the public.

²³ *The official title in the Slovenian public administration is State Secretary, meaning that the person has less executive authority than a typical deputy minister. I was appointed on December 8, 2000 and stayed in the position until November 30, 2004. My area of responsibility was defence policy (with particular emphasis on international relations and NATO affairs). As far as I can remember, there was also such a case in the Bulgarian and the Romanian ministries of defence.*

²⁴ *One current senior Slovenian diplomat was at that time recruited from the Ministry of Defence.*

²⁵ *Here, one should mention an interesting and important experience for diplomatic human resource management: after finishing my term at the Ministry of Defence I returned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and became a desk officer in the Department for Security Policy. The majority of my above mentioned colleagues were posted abroad as Ambassadors of their respected countries, including the colleague from the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: New York (Polish colleague), Washington (Slovene), India (Czech), Canada (Romanian), Vienna (Bulgarian) and Consul General in Milan (Bulgarian).*

²⁶ *During that period I had approximately one hundred appearances in the media and in public discussions all over Slovenia (once even in four places in one day: Jesenice, Brežice, Ljubljana and Maribor). During the referendum campaign I was careful enough never to push the audience towards the membership, but was trying to present various arguments in its favour with clear, sound and concrete language. At one evening discussion close to Celje I was trying to explain that NATO will not deploy military bases with nuclear weapons in Slovenia, since there were no plans, no need and no financial resources for that. "But let us say, theoretically, that was the case", persisted one of the participants. "In that case", I answered, "you should persuade your member of Parliament to go against such a decision". After a minute or so of silence the gentleman answered, "I believe you, but I do not believe our politicians."*

That alone raised the understanding of projects on the agenda and the support for them. It was very important because of the success of the reform processes taking place and in particular for the professionalization of the Slovenian Armed Forces.

Closely related to the media activities were various publications which I wrote or edited during that period and in the first few following years. The aim of the mentioned activities that were atypical for any State Secretary prior to and after that time was to academically inform, discuss, present and promote the activities, projects and agenda of the Slovenian defence sector as a whole to the domestic and foreign public. In Slovenia there were (and still are) three different media discussing security, defence and military topics: a biweekly popular journal *Slovenska vojska* (The Slovenian Armed Forces), published by the Ministry of Defence; a monthly journal *Obramba* (Defence), published by a private company Defensor; and a quarterly bilingual scientific journal *Sodobni vojaški izzivi* (Contemporary Military Challenges), published by the General Staff of the Slovenian Armed Forces. The first one published 15 articles of this author, the second one 9, and the third one 4. Additional 28 papers were published in different other publications, most of them abroad, making it 56 all together. At the same time, four books were published that also relate closely to these topics (Jazbec, 2001, 2002, 2007a and 2007b). The first one discusses, among other topics, security changes in Europe after the end of the Cold War (my PhD), and its appearance at Ashgate coincided with the beginning of my term at the MoD. The other three were published in Slovenia: the second (revised, expanded and updated PhD) was prepared for the purpose of discussing NATO and related topics with a broader audience.²⁷ The next ones were direct result of my MoD engagement and published afterwards: the third one is a compilation in English of my papers published on various occasions across Europe and the USA, while the fourth one is an academic elaboration of the defence and military diplomacy. From the empirical point of view it stems highly from my then engagement with Slovenian as well as foreign military and defence attaches. With both I have shared numerous individual and group meetings and discussions.

During that period, cooperation with the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) was established and developed. The then Slovenian Ambassador to the UN in Geneva, Gregor Zore, gave me the idea, and soon the project was materialized and formalized. From autumn 2001 I was representing Slovenia in the Foundation Council of the DCAF and Ljubica Jelušič (later Minister of Defence) was in its Advisory Board. In summer 2003 in Slovenia, we organized an echoed international conference on defence reforms in the Western Balkans.²⁸ A few years later, the Slovenian Ministry of the Interior took over the cooperation with the DCAF (what I think was a policy mistake) and its office was opened in

²⁷ Jamea Shea from NATO and Karin Kneissl from neutral Austria contributed forewords. James Appathurai spoke at the presentation of the book.

²⁸ Papers were published in Jazbec, 2003. The conference was organized by Branko Kromar who succeeded me at the DCAF Foundation Council after my term at the MoD ended.

Ljubljana. Whatever the achievement, it was heavily watered down during the next years, which also minimized Slovenian soft power opportunities.

There are two significant peculiarities related to the then Minister of Defence and his core team that should be mentioned. The Minister Anton Grizold, who was already seventh in a row (in eight years only), and his three State Secretaries (for defence policy, for parliamentary affairs, and for acquisition) were the first team ever at the Slovenian MoD to remain in the office for the full parliamentary term, i.e. four years.²⁹ When we combine this with the great expectations of achieving NATO membership, it becomes obvious that much of our work at that time was under additional pressure.

Slovenian first contacts with NATO are linked to the first democratic government that was elected in April 1990 and sworn in in May of the same year. With this fact, the independence of Slovenia became an official policy, while Slovenia was at that time still one of the six Yugoslav republics. That fact did not prevent the process, but proved to be an obstacle. For example, the then Slovenian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dimitrij Rupel (official title “the Republic Secretary for External Affairs”, while the Yugoslav MFA’s official title was “the Federal Secretary of International Affairs”), was not allowed by the Belgrade authorities to be member of the Yugoslav delegation at the Paris Conference for New Europe in autumn 1990. Nevertheless, he managed to be included in the Austrian delegation at the same event (comp. Rupel, 1992). The first contact with NATO authorities was informal and strictly off the record: in early December 1990, one of the deputy assistants general hosted, in his private Brussels residence, the Slovenian ministers of foreign affairs and defence, Rupel and Janša respectively.³⁰ The first official NATO visit to Slovenia was paid by Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, Gebhardt von Moltke, in mid 1993. Since he was on a PfP tour, he could not manage to get the connecting flight to Ljubljana and therefore landed in Klagenfurt. Since I was the Slovenian consul there, I was asked by our authorities to receive him there on behalf of the Slovenian Government.

Last but not least, there is a need to point out that one of the driving forces of the Slovenian membership in NATO was the late State Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Ignac Golob.³¹ He was one of the most experienced Slovenian diplomats and was tirelessly promoting NATO as a solution for the Slovenian security issue. As State Secretaries at both the Slovenian MFA and MoD respectively, the two of us were co-chairing the Intergovernmental Working Group on NATO (the first such body among the all candidate countries of the post-Cold War enlargements) as well as all activities within the MAP, both in Brussels and Ljubljana, on behalf of our Government. He died on the very eve of the Prague

²⁹ *The same happened only with the following minister, Karl Erjavec (2004–2008). All other Slovenian Ministers of Defence served, for various reasons, shorter terms.*

³⁰ *Source known to the author.*

³¹ *He was the Yugoslav Ambassador to Mexico (twice), to the UN in New York and to the CSCE in Vienna as well as State Secretary in the Slovenian MFA in three different Governments. Comp. Čačinovič, 1994, and Golob, 1993.*

Summit 2002 and did not live long enough to witness the invitation for membership that was extended to the seven candidate countries, Slovenia included.³² From this point of view, this paper should be understood as an act of tribute to the late colleague.

Conclusion Achieving Slovenian membership in NATO was both a project and a process. Formally, it took slightly more than a decade: from January 1994, when this ambition was formalized as a foreign policy goal in the Amendments to the Resolution on the Starting Points of Slovenian National Security, to the membership in late March 2004. It was an ups and downs trend: Slovenia was among the first PfP members, the first to establish the Intergovernmental Working Group on NATO, but was not invited at the Lisbon Summit in 1997, although the expectations rode high. During the following years, the topic almost disappeared from political discussions, and a few months before the 2003 Spring referendum the public support fell below 40%; even more, in the early 1990s, neutrality as a foreign policy and security option was discussed. Last but not least, the political ambition to become part of the Euro-Atlantic area was, for the first time, officially presented by the Slovenian opposition in the 1989 May Declaration. This means that the whole process lasted a decade and a half.

With membership in NATO, Slovenia (as the other member countries) gained in stability, security and development opportunities. Its defence and military identity were strengthened and the Slovenian Armed Forces benefited from various points of view (but also contributed some of their experiences to the Alliance, in particular in specialization as offered by divers, helicopter pilots and the alpine training centre). It also brought to the Alliance a huge political *credo* from a strong and clear referendum support for the membership. All these aspects call for an in-depth analytical survey with the aim to empirically determine to what extent and how these advantages were transformed into the policy approach of Slovenia within the Alliance.

The final stage of the Slovenian membership process (2000–2004) had some specifics, when compared to the other then new members. Membership as such gained strong and broad political and public support at a referendum, organized prior to the membership. The then Minister of Defence and his team (the first one until then that remained in office full term) clearly conceptualised and consistently exercised a range of activities. Apart from typical ones, related in particular to the armed forces, constant communication with the public stood out. There were two crucial policy conclusions that emerged towards the end of the process: firstly, when membership as a foreign policy goal was met, it was transformed into a policy means for achieving new goals which, however, remained undefined for a long time; and secondly, the defence policy, in particular because of the participation in peacekeeping operations, was understood as a foreign policy tool and not only as an activity of the defence sector. The process was also accompanied by numerous publications which were

³² *He died after serving in the diplomatic service for consecutive 52 years, what was at that time more than my age (and I was already a senior diplomat). Needless to say I learned much from the experienced colleague.*

discussing and contemplating it, in particular papers published by this author (what was an exemption in the Slovenian case).

Slovenian membership was useful for the broader region, in particular since Slovenia was the only dual member of the 2004 NATO and EU enlargements. Slovenia was dispersing its experiences, know-how and lessons learned throughout the region, be it either directly to the relevant institutions (the MoD and Armed Forces) or to the civil society, the media, academia etc. It has been exercised in forms of consultations, seconding personnel, through diplomatic channels (defence and military attaches in the region included), lectures, interviews, publications etc.

Towards the end of the previous decade the enlargement dynamics slowed down. It was to a certain extent pushed out by the stagnation and enlargement *fatigue* (more as far as the EU is concerned, but it has affected the European integration process and its dynamics as a whole). At the same time, in some parts of the region, there was not enough understanding of the importance of the dual enlargement, its messages and lessons learned. This meant that a certain decline in the enlargement enthusiasm was noticeable on both sides of the coin.

Overall, there is one general lesson learned and conclusion drawn from the discussed project: there exists an absolute necessity for further enlargement – this is not the only, but one of the most important preconditions for development. The enlargement standstill in the Western Balkans during the previous years points this out clearly.

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REPUBLIKA SLOVENIJA V NATU – SLOVENSKA VOJSKA DESET LET POZNEJE

REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA IN NATO – SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES TEN YEARS LATER

Povzetek Republika Slovenija je že deset let članica Nata in članstvo v zavezništvu je znatno prispevalo k razvoju Slovenske vojske. Postala je mednarodno prepoznavna. S sodelovanjem v mednarodnih operacijah in na misijah prispeva tudi k mednarodni varnosti. Od svojega nastanka se preoblikuje in prilagaja novim razmeram ter sodobnim varnostnim izzivom, tako da lahko učinkovito uporabi kadrovske in materialne vire, ki so na voljo za zagotavljanje vojaških zmogljivosti. Sodeluje v mednarodnih vojaških vajah in deluje v Natu in organih ter poveljstvih EU. V Natu in Slovenski vojski potekajo transformacijski procesi, ki so med seboj povezani. Nekatere rešitve za zagotavljanje in razvoj vojaških zmogljivosti se zagotavljajo s sodelovanjem v projektih pametne obrambe, konceptu povezanih sil in konceptu vodilne države. Slovenska vojska se v zadnjih letih srečuje z nenehnim zmanjševanjem finančnih virov, kar otežuje razvoj vojaških zmogljivosti. Zaradi krčenja obrambnega proračuna bo v prihodnosti treba opraviti razmislek o prihodnjih obsegu in strukturi Slovenske vojske ter zagotoviti stabilno financiranje.

Ključne besede *Nato, Slovenska vojska, razvoj, vojaške zmogljivosti, mednarodne operacije in misije, obrambni izdatki, standardizacija, transformacija.*

Abstract The Republic of Slovenia has now been a member of NATO for ten years, and the membership has significantly contributed to the development of the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) which has gained international recognition. By participating in international operations and missions, the SAF also contributes to international security. Since the time of its formation, it has been transforming and adapting to new realities and contemporary security challenges, effectively utilizing the available human and material resources in order to provide the necessary military capabilities. It participates in international military exercises and operates in NATO and EU bodies and commands. Both in NATO and the Slovenian Armed Forces,

interconnected transformation processes are currently under way. Some solutions that aim to deliver and develop the necessary military capabilities are being provided through participation in Smart Defence projects, the Connected Forces Initiative and the Framework Nations Concept. In recent years, the SAF has been faced with the continuous reduction of financial resources, which hinders the development of military capabilities. In the future, due to the defence budget reductions, it will be necessary to think about the scope and structure of the SAF and provide stable funding.

Key words *NATO, Slovenian Armed Forces, development, military capabilities, international operations and missions, defence expenditure, standardization, transformation.*

Introduction The defence system of the Republic of Slovenia (hereinafter Slovenia), whose most important part is the Slovenian Armed Forces (hereinafter SAF), has, in the ten years of membership in NATO, successfully completed its tasks and developed rapidly. In these ten years, the SAF has also become internationally recognized, operating in various international operations and missions, and contributing to stability and security in the near and far international environment. Participation in the international environment is an important indicator and the driver of development in the SAF, both in equipping and military education and training. Full membership in two international organizations, the European Union and NATO, is very important for the SAF, both now and in the future. Slovenia has endeavoured to join NATO for reasons of common values, own national and strategic security interests, and the desire to contribute to the security and stability in the European continent. This orientation is also clear in the Resolution on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia from 2001 and the new Resolution from 2010¹.

For Slovenia, NATO membership signifies security in the context of collective defence and participation in the activities for regional stability and peace in the international community. Slovenia, as a recognizable and active member of NATO, contributes to the sharing of responsibilities and burdens in providing collective defence, based on solidarity between states, and is actively involved in all processes and activities of NATO. Slovenia is thus strengthening its position as a secure and stable country, which has a positive impact on economic cooperation with other countries in various fields, with a significant contribution of Slovenia. Wider global and regional security challenges, military and asymmetric threats, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorist and cyber attacks, rightly strengthen the belief that Slovenia's membership in NATO is indeed necessary.

¹ Paragraph 3 of item 4.1 (Foreign Policy) of the Resolution on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia from 2001 states: "Priority task of the Slovenian foreign policy is the inclusion of the Republic of Slovenia into the European Union and NATO."

Paragraph 1 of item 5.3.8 (Response to Military Threats) of the Resolution on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia from 2010 states: "The response of the Republic of Slovenia to military threats will be based on joined efforts and operations within NATO and the European Union. With a view to preventing military threats, the Republic of Slovenia will continue to actively work for a mutual balance of security and defence interests within NATO, the European Union, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the United Nations and other international regional initiatives and forms of cooperation."

Even NATO is constantly faced with new contemporary challenges, such as new crisis areas, cyber threats, the issue of how to stop reduction in defence spending in some NATO countries and increase the provision of defence resources etc. There is the question of enlarging the Alliance with new members, the consideration and approval of the new readiness action plan etc. The NATO Summit in Wales on 4 and 5 September 2014 was devoted to finding solutions and adopting the highest decisions that will strengthen the Alliance to be able to address modern security challenges of the future.

1 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

The purpose of this article is to review the SAF's progress in certain areas from the time of its entry into NATO, to draw attention to the problem of providing financial resources and reducing defence spending, and to look into the future. In doing so, we want to determine whether NATO membership has allowed the SAF to contribute its share to the Alliance and thus gain added value itself.

In preparing and writing the article, the following methods were used: description, inductive and deductive methods, comparative and statistical methods, and the method of observation through own participation. There are many available statistical data as well as primary and secondary sources in the defence sector and outside, while this article only makes use of several data sources. Given personal experience, the method of observation through own participation was used in the methodological approach, having a significant impact on the selection of data, content and methods for which it has been estimated that they are key for the review of the SAF's progress from the time of its entry into NATO.

2 DEVELOPMENT AFTER JOINING NATO

Since 1991, the SAF has developed intensively, but the transition from the system of own defence to the system of collective defence as well as the transition from a conscript to a professional army has had a significant impact on its development. An important milestone was the period of the first NATO enlargement, when Slovenia was not invited to join NATO. This failure to join NATO was also discussed by the Committee on Defence of the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia². Nevertheless, the SAF, together with the Ministry of Defence and other government bodies continued to intensively prepare for entry into the Alliance. Thus, in 2004, when Slovenia did join the Alliance, its defence system was ready for new requirements. The SAF has constantly been marked by important transformational changes. Significant progress has been made in the area of increasing military

² *The agenda of the 8th meeting of the Committee on Defence of the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia on 24 September 1997 included the following item: Assessment of the failed candidacy of Slovenia to join the first round of NATO enlargement, and development of a strategy for integration into NATO in the post-Madrid period. More on this at: <http://www.dz-rs.si/wps/portal/Home/deloDZ/seje/evidenca?mandat=11&type=magdt&uid=14BAEA86EB1CBDFFC125651C0042E5B7>.*

capabilities; the SAF has acquired new weapons and equipment, and increased the number of professional and contractual members.

The last conscripts finished their mandatory military service in 2003 and since then, we can speak of a professional army. Careers were becoming increasingly more important both for individuals and the organization; they had to be based on the acquired competencies needed to perform a specific duty and the associated advancement in the military hierarchy. With the transition from a conscript to a professional army, major changes were carried out, both in the mindset and the mode of operation. Due to the awareness of how difficult the transition from a conscript to a professional army is, the PROVOJ (professional armed forces) project was established in 2003, the purpose of which was to propose solutions and necessary activities to transition from a conscript to a professional army. The project also included and presented the possible risks.

Moreover, the intensity of individual and collective education and training increased. The SAF General Staff and its three subordinate operational commands underwent transformation with the establishment of the Force Command, thus clearly delineating the powers between the strategic and operational levels. Participation in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme was strengthened. The SAF was becoming more actively and intensely involved in international operations and missions as well as in international military exercises. In 2000, the SAF deployed its first members to Kosovo, and in 2004, to NATO's ISAF mission in Afghanistan.

The SAF increasingly contributed its capabilities to priority international ambitions, thus contributing to the securing of peace in the near and far international region. After joining the Alliance, the SAF was provided with new opportunities for cooperation with other armed forces of NATO member states. It participated in several joint training courses for operation under various conditions, in joint projects and experiments, in the lending of military equipment, in the exchange of data and other activities. Šteiner's opinion on the issue is the following: "In many areas, the beginnings of integration are closing the transition period, with the Republic of Slovenia and its armed forces credibly participating in defence and military structures and joint activities in both NATO and the EU. This particularly includes the activities of joint defence planning, participation in joint commands, integration into the Allied force structure, contribution to response forces, participation in international operations and missions, and the building of national capabilities which, through the doctrines and standards, are interoperable with others in the Alliance." (2011, p. 45).

Professionalization has also affected the command and control system which has to be rapidly responsive in order to allow the SAF to smoothly and properly perform its tasks in Slovenia and abroad. Worth mentioning is also the establishment of the non-commissioned chain of command and the NCO corps. The greatest changes occurred in the transition from a conscript to a professional army. NATO membership has had a significant influence on the processes of professionalization and integration in the SAF.

The Mid-Term Defence Programme 2013–2018, adopted by the Government of the Republic of Slovenia, is an important development document for the SAF. The document defines the objectives and key guidelines for the operation and development of the Slovenian defence system in the mid-term period of 2013–2018. It takes into account Slovenia's financial capabilities in the relevant mid-term period, assuming to only allow for a minimum increase in defence expenditure after 2015.

The Mid-Term Defence Programme 2013–2018, p. 12/53, states: “For the purpose of operating on the Slovenian national territory, the highest unit provided by the SAF will be a special-purpose brigade battle group, while, for SAF operation outside Slovenia, its highest unit will be a special-purpose battalion battle group.”

Since Slovenia joined the Alliance, the SAF has been more successful in some areas of development, and less in others. It is a fact that not enough financial resources have been invested in the modernization of firing ranges and training areas, and in the adaptation of barracks for the needs of a professional army. In the future, the SAF, the Ministry of Defence and other government bodies will be faced with new challenges in this area.

Due to the constant reductions in defence budget as a result of the financial situation in Slovenia, the SAF development challenges will have to be faced and accepted gradually by taking into account the financial and other capabilities, but mainly by applying tolerance and reason. It would also be wise to consider amending the Mid-Term Defence Programme 2013–2018, taking into consideration the real financial capabilities and allowing for mid- and long-term planning. Jelušič wrote: “The financial and economic crisis that we have witnessed will have a negative impact on the pace of development and modernization of the Slovenian defence system. Nevertheless, the development and modernization should not be stopped or frozen for several years, as this would signify a real setback (2009, p. 10).”

3 SAF OPERATION ACTIVITIES IN INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND MISSIONS

Participation in international operations and missions is an important part of the common tasks of the Alliance³. International operations and missions are a place where the SAF can compare itself to its allies both in terms of competence as well as equipment and armament.

³ Article 37, paragraph 1 of the Defence Act states: “Execute obligations assumed by the state in international organizations and through treaties.”

Article 22, paragraph 1, indent 2 of the Service in the Slovenian Armed Forces Act states: “...through participation in operations, missions and other forms of operation appropriate for conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and collective defence.”


“The concept of peace operations, in its broadest sense, encompasses all forms of military and non-military activities taking place in the context of political and diplomatic efforts to establish and preserve peace.” (Jelušič, 2005, p. 12).

The SAF’s participation in international operations and missions is a direct contribution of the SAF to regional and global security, as peace in the narrower and wider region also guarantees peace in Slovenia, with the SAF’s contribution being great and undeniable. From 1997 until today, approximately 4,700 SAF members have participated in international operations and missions, with the daily average of about 380 members. The first SAF unit participated in the peacekeeping operation Alba in Albania in 1997, then in Cyprus, in EU operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the UNTSO military observer mission in Syria, in the NATO KFOR operation in Kosovo since 2000, in the NATO ISAF operation in Afghanistan since 2004, in the NATO operation in Iraq, in the UN peacekeeping mission UNIFIL in Lebanon since 2006, in the EU’s EUFOR operation in Chad in 2008 and 2009, in the naval operation EU NAVFOR Somalia in 2009, in the military observer mission UNSMIS in Syria, in the military operation EUTM Mali in 2012, and in the humanitarian operation Mare Nostrum – Lampedusa in 2013 and 2014. In these 17 years, the SAF has participated in international operations and missions of NATO, the EU and UN. In 2010, the Government of the Republic of Slovenia adopted the Strategy of the Participation of the Republic of Slovenia in International Operations and Missions, which is an important document for the operation of the SAF. The strategic interest of Slovenia is for the Western Balkans to become a peaceful, stable and developmentally progressive area of countries⁴. For this reason, for a number of years, the SAF has had the largest contingent of forces deployed in Kosovo, which is currently totalling 304 members. From the military perspective, participation in international operations and missions in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Chad and Lebanon is very demanding, which is further emphasized by the distance of these countries.

International operations and missions bring a wealth of experience and are a major challenge to most SAF branches and services. The lessons learned through the system of learning from experience have a direct influence on the preparation of new SAF contingents and the SAF development. The year 2013 presented a special challenge to the SAF which prepared the military boat Triglav for participation in the humanitarian operation Mare Nostrum in Lampedusa. This was the first deployment of the military boat Triglav to an international operation. Given the total number of SAF members, counting 7,214 on 1 September 2014, the percentage of SAF participation in international operations and missions is high, which can also be seen from the table below.

⁴ Section 22 (Strategic Interests) of the Strategy of the Participation of the Republic of Slovenia in International Operations and Missions states: “Slovenia’s strategic interests in participating in international operations and missions are determined by its geostrategic position, political, security, economic, development, humanitarian and other interests and principles, including obligations within the international organisations of which it is a member, at the global and regional levels. For all types of international operations and missions, except for rescue operations, strategic interests are defined primarily in South East Europe, as well as in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, Asia, Africa and other regions in the world.”

Figure 1:
Number of
SAF members
participating in
international
operations and
missions (IOM)
Source:
SAF archival
data; data for
2014 covers
the period from
January to May



Each new SAF contingent in international operations and missions acquires new and invaluable experiences which are also relevant to NATO and the EU; each international operation and mission is therefore special and specific. The preparation of each contingent is a unique challenge, as each has its own peculiarities. During preparations, a contingent is given maximum attention in terms of equipment, to ensure the optimum safety of members, and training for the performance of the required tasks. The SAF's participation in international operations and missions has a positive impact on the SAF's development both in terms of equipment and training.

4 IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EXERCISES FOR THE SAF

Each international military exercise presents a special challenge to the SAF. The exercises are part of collective training to achieve the required standards, and to maintain and ensure the operational readiness. The combat orientation of peacetime training of units and commands allows for the implementation of the expected tasks in real combat situations. Through exercises, an individual is trained to understand his or her relationship within the unit and the fact that the performance of his or her task also supports the overall tasks of the team.⁵ Exercises are the highest form of collective training. By participating in NATO exercises, the SAF is meeting the national training objectives and the NATO's Connected Forces Initiative.

⁵ The Greek philosopher Aristotle said: "Excellence is an art won by training and habituation. We do not act rightly because we have virtue or excellence, but we rather have those because we have acted rightly. We are what we repeatedly do. Excellence, then, is not an act but a habit."

On 24 September 1776, in a letter to the President of Congress, George Washington wrote: "To bring men to an appropriate level of subordination is not the work of one day, month or year."

Page 12 of the Bi-Sc Collective Training and Exercise Directive (CT&ED 075-003) states, *inter alia*, that education and training provide a coherent and integrated system of training which directly contributes to the preservation of collectivity of national forces, the NATO Command Structure (NCS) and the NATO Force Structure (NFS), all of which are interoperable and include a full range of capabilities and structures which allow the Alliance to achieve the desired level of ambition in a rapidly evolving and uncertain security environment.

In all these years, the SAF has participated in a number of international exercises. Armed forces find a special challenge in the exercises where, at the end of the operational cycle, units' readiness is tested through the certification process. This is a process in which the use of various methods and examinations helps to determine whether a unit is ready for operation. National and NATO certifications are used.

In 2012, the SAF participated in 36 exercises, and in 2013 in 31 exercises. There are 45 international exercises planned for 2014. By participating in international military exercises, the SAF tests its degree of interoperability with the Allied forces. Great importance is placed on the exercises performed in the Joint Multinational Readiness Centre in Hohenfels, Germany, including different allied troops. This is an example of good practice before deploying a SAF contingent to an international operation or mission. In 2014, the international ISAF operation is gradually coming to an end, and NATO exercises are gaining importance. These exercises will include NATO commands and NATO Response Forces. International military exercises are important not only for the SAF, but also for Slovenia, making an active contribution to the development and effectiveness of NATO's military capabilities.

5 STANDARDIZATION

NATO standardization is very important for the achievement of interoperability among members of the Alliance. The implementation of NATO Standardization Agreements (STANAG) facilitates the attainment of the necessary level of interoperability among Alliance members to allow for the effective performance of common strategic, operational and tactical tasks within the command process, and for the effective use of technical assets, materials and administrative equipment. Interoperability is also an integral component of each NATO military capability, and an integral part of its capability development process. Interoperability is thus implemented through standardization. As I have already mentioned, "NATO STANAG is a unique regulation establishing the mandatory practices or technical requirements in the SAF, as there would be no international connectivity within the Alliance without it. It is therefore necessary to adopt NATO STANAGs into the Slovenian military standards." (Osterman 2010, p. 253)

This implementation process includes a precisely specified manner of producing, certifying and revoking the standardization documents. Operationally, this takes place in various NATO standardization committees and working groups which also

include SAF representatives. The work in various NATO standardization working bodies is continuous and consistent. Undoubtedly, standardization also affects the shaping of SAF capabilities, particularly the purchase of new weapons and equipment, information and communication systems, the operation of logistics, the staff decision-making process etc.

The SAF started to adopt Slovenian military standards when Slovenia was a Partnership for Peace member, while this activity increased with the entry into NATO. Thus, from 2000 to September 2014, 728 NATO STANAGs have been nationally certified and 424 Slovenian military standards adopted. The above figures show that the validation and adoption of STANAGs were very intense.

6 INVOLVEMENT OF SAF REPRESENTATIVES IN NATO COMMANDS AND WORKING BODIES

In the context of NATO's Command and Force Structure, the SAF, by joining the Alliance, also assumed international military obligations. These enable the SAF to actively participate in NATO Commands, which is important for the command and control of NATO and EU military capabilities within various international operations and missions. "The EU military structure is younger and less developed than the NATO military structure. Slovenia participates in its development, planning forces for the EU military structure. Moreover, it participates in the rotation of European military battle groups; during the presidency it was also actively involved in activating the EU-led operation in Chad." (Humar et al., 2009, p. 61).

For the filling of international posts, SAF members are required to have all the professional competences arising from the requirements of each duty or post. From the personnel point of view, the filling of these posts is a demanding process, with certain duties also being deployable. Aside from the permanent duties in NATO Commands, the SAF is temporarily manning individual duty posts in commands with the so-called supplementary staff. The posting usually lasts 3 to 4 years. The experience gained by SAF members in international duty posts is very important for the operation of the SAF at various levels of command and control. When a member terminates his or her international duty, they are assigned to a post in which they can best use the experience acquired abroad. The SAF has gained considerable experience in all the years of operating in NATO and EU structures; it can be said that, within its powers, the SAF is a fully equal partner.

7 TRANSFORMATION PROCESS IN NATO AND THE SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES

The globalization of the world and the emergence of new crisis areas compel the Alliance to follow these trends, despite the fact that, in most NATO countries, less and less resources are being devoted to the development of military capabilities.

Thus, the international environment is constantly changing and becoming more and more unpredictable.⁶ The globalized world is also bringing changes to the armies in terms of their personnel structure, weapons and equipment, education and training methods etc. In recent years, many discussions and meetings in NATO structures have been devoted to this issue. In 2003, NATO established the Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk (USA) which is increasingly gaining importance. Through its projects and experiments, the Command is seeking appropriate solutions for the challenges which NATO will address in the future. It supports activities within the Smart Defence and the Connected Forces Initiative. Major emphasis is placed on the NATO Defence Planning Process and, in this context, on the Framework Nations Concept and the Connected Forces Initiative. With the establishment of the new NATO Command Structure, the Allied Command Transformation also assumed the area of military education and training. With the gradual withdrawal of the Allied forces from Afghanistan, NATO exercises will become increasingly important, as members will be preparing for future international operations and missions. We can conclude that the transformation process in NATO also influences the transformation of the SAF which is part of NATO's defence planning and participates in the Connected Forces Initiative and Smart Defence projects. Šteiner states: "The concept of transformation is characterized by new forms or a paradigm of change, with a tendency to become the new theory of changing the defence and military organization (2011, p. 46)."

Transformation as a concept is often present in the Alliance and national environments. It can be interpreted as a necessary process that allows the armed forces to adapt to changes in the environment, so that they can effectively perform their tasks. Therefore, transformation is a never-ending process, with the environment in which the armed forces operate constantly changing. The key factors in transformation activities are usually the amount of defence expenditure earmarked for the development of the armed forces, and, in relation to this, changes in the global security environment. In recent years, various NATO countries have decreased their defence spending, which is mainly due to the economic and financial crisis.⁷

The transformation of military capabilities as a new concept in the Alliance has been officially known since the NATO Summit in Prague in 2002 when the beginning of the period of the transformation of military capabilities was officially verified (NATO Handbook, 2006, p. 20); this gave rise to the establishment of the Allied Command Transformation (ACT). Clinton provides the following definition of


⁶ Grizold (2005, pp. 22 – 23) states: "... that, after the end of the Cold War, the international security environment has become increasingly unpredictable and uncertain. The fundamental characteristic of this environment is the complexity of security threats, which includes the following essential elements: integration, intertwining and interaction between military and non-military security threats (e.g. military and ethical conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, terrorism, natural and other disasters, famine, infectious diseases, environmental pollution etc.)."

⁷ The Strategic Foresight Analysis 2013 Report, page 29, states that "Governments faced with slow or non-existent growth, rising unemployment and increasing debt burdens will continue to have many competing priorities. Defence spending has continued to decline across the Alliance due to reduced economic growth, and the increasing emphasis on social programmes. There is a risk that, even if economic cycles turn more positive, public opinion may prevent some nations from reinvesting in defence."

transformation: “Transformation is a process that shapes the changing nature of competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations (Clinton, 2009, p. 2).

The SAF must follow the transformation policies taking place in the Alliance. The international financial situation has had a negative impact on defence budgets of most NATO countries (the same happened with the Slovenian defence budget), which in turn negatively impacts the development of military capabilities. The use of financial resources is subject to certain regulations which aim to maximize the impact of the resources used.⁸ The SAF transformation processes are thus directed towards the use of available resources being as efficient and rational as possible, and aims to maintain and achieve the performance objectives adopted during the Alliance negotiations or required for the implementation of the tasks of national importance, such as, for example, protection and rescue. The SAF thus had to transform in a way that it remained as efficient as possible, as the financial resources for its operations had reduced by 40 percent in just a few years. Moreover, government restrictions on employment also led to a smaller number of SAF employees.

Figure 2:
Military defence programme
Source:
SAF archival data⁹




⁸ Kopač (2011, p. 174) believes: “It is a fact that, in the last ten years, the Republic of Slovenia has seen a considerable improvement in the institutional rules that promote a more efficient provision of military capabilities. In this regard, in addition to increasing the awareness that we cannot afford irrational use of public resources, it is important to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic structures. Defence planning is thus developing in accordance with the defence planning process of NATO and the European Union. Military investments are subject to a number of EU directives governing public procurement in general and specifically procurement in the areas of defence and security.”

⁹ The graph presents the SAF budget which, within the state budget, is managed in the context of the Defence and Security policy (07), Military Defence programme (0702).

Therefore, certain issues, with the aim of providing and developing military capabilities, will be resolved through participation in Smart Defence projects, the Connected Forces Initiative and the Framework Nations Concept. It can be established that the transformation processes in NATO also affect the transformation processes in the SAF.

Figure 3:
Percentage of GDP in Slovenia earmarked for defence spending
Source: SAF archival data



It should be noted that defence expenditure in 2009 and 2010 accounted for approximately 1.62 percent of GDP of Slovenia, and 1.04 percent in 2014, which signifies a marked decline in defence spending in a very short period of time¹⁰. The NATO arrangement is that Member States should commit 2 percent of GDP to defence spending.

7.1 Smart Defence, the Connected Forces Initiative and the Framework Nations Concept as Assistance in the Development of SAF Capabilities

Smart Defence includes multinational cooperation in the development, procurement, maintenance and use of capabilities, the implementation of priority tasks in line with the NATO strategic priority tasks and the identified deficits from operations, as well as the specialization of forces and the division of roles among the Allies. Slovenia participates in several projects.¹¹ These projects are included in the first-order set of Smart Defence projects, since proposals have grown and developed into projects with an identified framework nation, participating countries having confirmed their participation, and the agreed scope and purpose of the programme having been

¹⁰ In addition to the SAF budget, defence expenditure includes the defence system management and crisis management programme (administrative part of the Ministry of Defence), military pensions and the budget of the Government Office for the Protection of Classified Information.

¹¹ Smart Defence – presented at the Munich Security Conference in February 2011 by the NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen.

coordinated. One of the major SAF projects is also development of the CBRN defence capabilities. Other projects that the SAF participates in are primarily related to education, training and equipment procurement. In the selection of projects, long- and mid-term development documents must be taken into consideration to ensure that the content matches the objectives set out in these documents. In recent years, Cyber Defence projects are increasingly coming to the forefront in the Alliance, offering a variety of opportunities for the training of SAF members. The selection should be focused on the projects that bring the maximum effect in terms of security provision, taking into account the SAF's financial capabilities.

The Connected Forces Initiative signifies an improvement in interoperability between the Allied and partner forces, and connection between the NATO and national commands through joint education, training, exercises and technological solutions.¹² We believe that exercises are a specific area for verifying and assessing the ability to operate collectively in the Alliance and NATO-led coalitions based on the domains of doctrines, procedures, organizations, training and equipment. In its role, NATO must offer countries the opportunity to improve their interoperability through a range of available, flexible and affordable joint events. These will enable the Alliance and countries to rapidly adapt to any changing circumstances and demands of the emerging challenges. The aim is to maintain and improve NATO's preparedness, interoperability and combat efficiency between the Allied and partner forces and capabilities, through the expanded programme of training and military exercises. In the context of the Connected Forces Initiative, NATO Response Forces will have a central role of a facilitator and demonstrator of operational readiness and will be the benchmark for NATO's transformation. The Initiative enables the SAF to connect with the operational experiences within NATO. In the anticipation of reducing the operational activities of NATO after the completion of the ISAF operation in 2014, this Initiative will gain further importance. This year, the SAF has a section of the Special Operations Unit participating in NATO Response Forces. In the future, the implementation of several large-scale and quality exercises is planned in the context of a wide range of scenarios and consistent with the level of ambition; the SAF thus attaches great importance to the integration of national and NATO exercises. In 2015, the SAF will participate in the international military exercise Trident Juncture 2015.

The Framework Nations Concept aims to provide the European allies, during the period of reducing defence resources and the USA's strategic redirection, the required capabilities in an organized manner and assume a relative burden and responsibility for the common security and defence.¹³ The Concept is focused on the formation of groups of countries under the auspices of framework nations, which would provide comprehensive sets of capabilities. Framework nations with a broader range of capabilities would connect smaller countries with specialized

¹² *Connected Forces Initiative – arises from the Chicago Defence Package adopted in May 2012.*

¹³ *Framework Nations Concept – first discussed at the ministerial meeting in June 2013, presented in detail to Member States in September 2013.*

contributions, bringing them relief and enabling them to focus their resources on the development of specialized capabilities – each ally, however, would have to maintain a credible combat capability. The Concept is an upgrade of the current multinational approaches, as it provides for a long-term partnership in the field of providing the full spectrum of capabilities, while the Smart Defence project and the project of pooling and sharing are focused on the development of individual capabilities. The Framework Nations Concept is a German initiative drawing on the positive experiences gained through the implementation of multinational projects and the establishment of a framework nation in the organization of operational forces and the conduct of international operations and missions. The SAF has a positive experience of cooperation in multinational forces under the auspices of a framework nation, both in the integration of forces within the NATO Response Force and the Multinational Land Force, as well as in international operations and missions. Both the Connected Forces Initiative and the Framework Nations Concept are of great importance to the SAF, especially now that fewer budgetary resources are earmarked for the development and operation of the Slovenian Armed Forces. The importance of these concepts was addressed by the NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the round table in Ljubljana on 24 January 2014.

7.2 SAF Transformation Processes

Since the entry into NATO, the SAF has been constantly changing. In some periods, transformation processes were more intense, in others less. But almost no year passed without any organizational changes in the formation structure of units and commands. These transformations were also considered in the findings of the Strategic Defence Review which was prepared in 2009. Major transformational changes were determined by the adoption of the Mid-Term Defence Programme 2013–2018. By transforming the tactical level of command in the first and second phase, which started in 2012 and was completed last year, the target organizational structure was established, allowing for the efficient performance of the SAF's tasks. This year, the SAF has entered the third phase of transformation. In this phase, the General Staff of the Slovenian Armed Forces has been transformed; a new concept of logistics operations is being established, and the identification of possible process and functional integration with the administrative part of the Ministry of Defence is being implemented. This phase of transformation will end with the establishment of two balanced infantry brigades, as the core of SAF development and operation, and the centralization of logistics support. In the field of civil-military cooperation and the system of protection and rescue, both infantry brigades will be even more spatially positioned.

The SAF entered the year 2014 with the military budget (the military defence programme) of EUR 266 million; in 2013, the military budget amounted to EUR 300 million. Thus, there is a growing gap between the requirements set out in the Mid-Term Defence Programme 2013–2018 and the amount of budgetary resources provided for the realization of this and other documents. This is the complete opposite of the need for the procurement of equipment and weapons, and prevents

the realization of certain requirements. This negative financial trend calls for a rapid transformation and the provision of a sustained system with very limited financial resources; moreover, it calls for the realization of the planned tasks through the timely and effective adoption of measures. The SAF efficiency is also achieved through the rapid response of the command and control system. Irrespective of the reduction of budgetary resources, the SAF will have to maintain and upgrade the already achieved standards in individual and collective competence.

The SAF's transformation is an ongoing process responding to external changes. Looking at the time from Slovenia's entry into NATO until today, the greatest transformational changes were caused by transitioning from a conscript to a professional army, with the development progress of the SAF being very evident. The most important transformation challenge today is how to provide adequate military capabilities to implement tasks in Slovenia and abroad with the available budget funding. The SAF's fundamental future challenge and capability goal for NATO is the establishment of a medium battalion battle group. An important contribution of Slovenia to the Alliance will be the establishment of the Multinational Centre of Excellence for Mountain Warfare in 2015, since the majority of NATO countries have already established various centres which are operating successfully today. Slovenia is the co-founder of some of them¹⁴. We should also not overlook the fact that the SAF plays an important role in its narrow region, providing mentorship to some other countries in the Balkans which are in the process of integration into the Alliance. Moreover, in the past, the SAF initiated the establishment of Multinational Land Force. International activities also affect the SAF's transformation processes in the forefront of which must be the provision of military protection and rescue capabilities, which is one of the SAF's tasks¹⁵. A large part of the equipment at the SAF's disposal thus has dual purpose.

Conclusion NATO has adopted the New Strategic Concept¹⁶ and is using conferences and consultations to discuss various transformation challenges that aim to transform NATO structures. The NATO Command Structure and NATO Force Structure are thus transformed. Due to the decline in defence spending in some NATO countries, Smart Defence, the Connected Forces Initiative and the Framework Nations Concept are gaining importance as cornerstones of joint military capabilities. This trend should also be followed by the SAF, mainly because the defence spending has reduced considerably in recent years and amounts to approximately 1.04 percent of Slovenia's GDP.

¹⁴ Fifteen NATO countries have already established centres of excellence, namely Germany, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Spain, USA, Estonia, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Turkey and Italy. Currently, centres of excellence are being established in Poland, Latvia, Bulgaria, Italy and Slovenia.

¹⁵ Article 37, paragraph 1 of the Defence Act states: "Participate in protection and rescue activities in the event of natural and other disasters in line with its organization and equipment."

¹⁶ Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was adopted at the NATO Summit in Lisbon between 19 and 20 November 2010.

It is thus evident that the SAF has made considerable progress since joining NATO. Due to the continuous shrinking of financial resources for defence, the ratio between the costs of personnel, operational performance and equipment (modernization) is becoming less favourable and is increasingly moving away from the recommended ratio of the Alliance. The SAF must therefore use transformation processes to adapt quickly and maximize the use of resources available for the provision of military capabilities for national needs and the needs of the Alliance. It must be small, efficient, sustainable and as deployable as possible to be able to operate in various scenarios within the Alliance. In the ten years, the SAF has gained a lot of experience in operating within the Alliance. Its proposals and initiatives make it an active creator in NATO. The SAF should also build military capabilities and participate in international military exercises. It must transform the Multinational Centre of Excellence for Mountain Warfare into the NATO Centre of Excellence for Mountain Warfare, continue the work of the School of Foreign Languages, organize other schools for the needs of the region and be a mentor to countries in South East Europe. It must continue to be internationally recognized by its contribution to international operations and missions etc. Slovenia's membership in NATO has enabled the SAF to contribute to the Alliance and thus gain added value itself. The SAF will have to continue the process of professionalization, and occupy higher military positions and posts in the NATO Command Structure and NATO Force Structure, which provide most direct operational experience.

Based on the analyses of projects and in terms of time correlation with the national programmes and available financial, material and human resources, the SAF must participate in Smart Defence projects, the Connected Forces Initiative and the Framework Nations Concept. Due to the lack of financial resources it should take advantage of all the personnel and material resources, allowing for and supporting innovative and creative thinking at all levels of command and control.

Entry into the Alliance has brought changes to the personnel structure which is gaining in quality; there has been an increase in military capabilities in the area of command and control as well as in sustainability, combat power and deployability. Part of military capabilities has dual purpose, providing support to the defence system and the system of protection against natural and other disasters. Due to the rapid reduction of the defence budget or funds earmarked for defence expenditure, further development of the SAF will require deliberation of its future scope and structure, based on stable budgetary financing as the basis for mid- and long-term planning of the development of military capabilities. Due to the major differences between the requirements set out in development guidance documents and the available amount of budgetary resources for the realization, it will, in the future, be necessary to ensure mutual consistency. Today, the lack of financial resources is mainly reflected in certain equipment and weapons necessary for the realization of capability goals, maintenance of military infrastructure etc. The fundamental challenge and objective for the future of the SAF must be the development of planned capabilities both for the needs of the Alliance and the national needs.

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RACIONALIZACIJA OBVEŠČEVALNO- VARNOSTNIH STRUKTUR V NATU IN EVROPSKI UNIJI

STREAMLINING THE INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY STRUCTURES IN NATO AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

Povzetek Kot vsaka organizacija se tudi zveza Nato in EU bolj ali manj stalno spreminjata ter organizacijsko prilagajata novim izzivom in posledično novim prednostim ter nalogam. Obveščevalno-varnostni deli obeh organizacij niso izjema in čeprav radikalne oziroma večje organizacijske spremembe, predvsem zaradi konsenzualnega načina delovanja, niso zelo pogoste ter zahtevajo več časa, se manjše spremembe nenehno dogajajo. V zadnjem času se sicer na obveščevalno-varnostnem področju v obeh organizacijah niso zgodile večje organizacijske spremembe, kljub temu pa se je predvsem znotraj Nata struktura na obveščevalnem področju pomembno kvalitativno dopolnila. Dopolnitev se je zgodila zato, da se k bolj aktivni vlogi pri izmenjavi obveščevalnih podatkov z zavezništvom (še močneje kot v preteklosti) vključijo poleg vojaških oziroma obrambnih tudi civilne obveščevalno-varnostne strukture držav članic. Podoben, čeprav manj očiten, trend je potekal tudi v okviru obveščevalno-varnostnih struktur EU. Vzporedno z zaključevanjem operacij v Afganistanu, s počasnim stabiliziranjem razmer na Zahodnem Balkanu, predvsem pa kot posledica novih/starih izzivov, ki jih povzročajo razmere v povezavi z Ukrajino, postane jasno, da se bo obveščevalno-varnostna struktura v obeh organizacijah, zlasti pa v Natu, v naslednjih letih dodatno spreminjala in izpopolnjevala. Cilj prispevka je poleg prikaza trenutne organiziranosti obveščevalno-varnostne strukture v obeh organizacijah napovedati prihodnje usmeritve na obveščevalno-varnostnem področju.

Ključne besede *Nato, EU, obveščevalno-varnostna dejavnost, Center za fuzijo obveščevalnih podatkov, Civilni obveščevalni odbor, Vojaški obveščevalni odbor, obveščevalni analitični center EU.*

Abstract Just like every other organisation, NATO and the EU are more or less constantly changing and organisationally adapting to new challenges and related new priorities and tasks. The intelligence and security structures of both organisations are no exception and although radical or major organisational changes, mainly due to the consensus mode, are not very frequent and require more time, minor changes and adjustments occur constantly. In recent years, the field of intelligence and security in both organisations has not witnessed any major organisational changes. Nevertheless, especially within NATO, the intelligence structure has significantly increased in quality due to the extra effort to include, in addition to military and defence, civil intelligence and security structures of Member States to play a more active role in the exchange of intelligence with the Alliance. Similarly, although less obviously, a similar trend took place in the context of the intelligence and security structures within the EU. In parallel with the termination of operations in Afghanistan, with a slow stabilisation of the situation in the Western Balkans, and mainly as a result of the new/old challenges posed by the situation in relation to Ukraine, there is no doubt that the intelligence and security structures of both organisations, especially NATO, will be further modified and upgraded over the coming years. The aim of this paper is thus, in addition to outlining the current organisation of the intelligence and security structures in both organisations, to indicate the future trends in the field of intelligence and security.

Key words *NATO, EU, intelligence, security, Intelligence Fusion Centre, Civilian Intelligence Committee, Military Intelligence Committee, EU Intelligence Analytical Centre.*

Introduction The aim of this paper is to analyze the current intelligence and security structures in NATO and the EU, and highlight the importance of cooperation between the intelligence and security organisations of member states in the field of intelligence and security. The analysis is derived from key quality methods, while additional added value to the study is brought by the method of direct participant observation. To a certain extent, the paper also addresses the role of Slovenia's intelligence and security structures vis-à-vis NATO and the EU.

In an article on the same topic published in this publication five years ago¹, the author emphasised that, with the NATO and EU membership, several new doors opened for Slovenia in the intelligence and security structures of both organisations, as Slovenia, as was the case in other areas, joined its partners around the same table. Through the years, Slovenia has developed into a respectful partner and progressed to a country that does not just receive intelligence and intelligence expertise, but is also the provider of intelligence and a country that offers experiences, i.e. it exchanges them through various forms of cooperation within NATO and the EU.

¹ Damir Črnčec: *Izmenjava obveščevalno-varnostnih izkušenj z Evropsko unijo in Natom / Exchange of experiences in intelligence and security with the European Union and NATO, Bilten Slovenske vojske, 2009, pp. 83 – 104.*

Since 11 September 2001 (9/11), the environment has been marked by a global and transnational character of threats. A more intensified cooperation between all institutions facing these threats has, therefore, become necessary. NATO and the EU, however, do not have respective intelligence and security organisations of their own, as do their member states. They both lack their own robust organic collection assets and, especially with regard to raw intelligence data, they both strongly rely on the intelligence and security support from their respective member states. Nevertheless, both NATO and the EU have quite a robust internal intelligence structure and many internal bodies, including analytical, whose mission is to provide intelligence and security information to support decision-makers on all levels. Support ranges from the highest, grand strategic and political level to commanders and decision-makers at the operational and tactical levels in the ongoing operations. In addition to the raw intelligence data and final intelligence products, both organisations also strongly rely on their member states to source or provide the civilian and military personnel who fill the majority of intelligence and security posts in both organisations. As a result, both organisations can only be as good in the intelligence and security field as is the support they both receive from their member states regarding intelligence data, finished intelligence products and personnel. Both organisations in the past faced and likely still face many challenges with regard to the intelligence and support they receive from nations. Furthermore, they also face challenges in their respective internal intelligence and security field. Some examples from the last decades, when both organisations were unable to predict crucial events, include the collapse of the Soviet Union, wars in the territory of former Yugoslavia, the 9/11 attacks, the Russia-Georgia crisis, the Arab Spring and, very recently, the crisis in Ukraine. The "surprise" of these events (which could even be called intelligence failures²) leads to a conclusion that the intelligence and security support in both organisations has been lacking and was, in the past (and likely still is to a certain extent), negatively impacted by intelligence gaps both in analysis and resources. Furthermore, several statements by the highest NATO and EU decision-makers saying that reorganisations in the intelligence and security field were to result in the improvement of intelligence support at all levels as well as in better intelligence and warning, in a way confirm that intelligence support to decision-makers has been lacking.

Slovenia has fully participated in NATO and EU intelligence and security structures since becoming a full member of both organisations. Since then, Slovenia has slowly strengthened its cooperation in the intelligence and security field with these two organisations. The responsibility to provide intelligence to both became one of the main principles that Slovenia has followed in its approach. Moreover, despite the obvious constraints and limitations, Slovenia has begun to fill intelligence and security posts within both NATO and the EU with professionals at strategic, operational and tactical levels, and has become well connected with the intelligence and security structures of both organisations.

² *More on the limits of intelligence and intelligence failures in Peter Gill and Mark Phythian: Intelligence in an Insecure World (2007), pp. 103–124 and in Mark Lowenthal: Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (2006), pp. 99, 113 and 114.*

1 STREAMLINING THE INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY EFFORTS IN NATO

NATO has a robust structure that consists of several bodies tasked to provide intelligence and security support. These bodies exist at various levels inside and outside NATO's chain of command³. All these bodies rely heavily on inputs from the intelligence and security organisations of their member states.

The highest NATO decision-making body is the North Atlantic Council (NAC)⁴. Other major entities at NATO Headquarters (NATO HQ) are the International Staff (IS) and the International Military Staff (IMS)⁵. Intelligence and security structures in support of the highest political and military decision-makers in NATO, providing warning and supporting planning, are embedded in both the IS and the IMS staffs. However, the intelligence analytical capability has historically been less robust and less structured in the IS than in the IMS; the reason for this was primarily the nature of threats the Alliance had to face in the past.

Intelligence and security elements for the direct support of operations, operational planning and intelligence training are mainly embedded in both NATO strategic commands, namely the Allied Command Operations (ACO) and the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and their respective sub-commands⁶. The IS includes a special office responsible for the coordination and implementation of the Alliance security standards. The key structure in the security field is the Allied Command Counter Intelligence (ACCI) as the sole organic unit of NATO, designated for security. The command is located at SHAPE. Its staff also provides security intelligence support to commanders of crisis response operations. The command is tasked with the detection, deterrence and neutralisation of terrorist threats, espionage, sabotage and subversive operations directed against NATO personnel. It provides security intelligence support to all NATO units, commands and personnel of the Alliance and member states.

In the last two decades, NATO has undergone significant organisational changes throughout its structure. Several changes have also occurred in the intelligence and security field. Some of the most recent changes were triggered by the new Strategic concept adopted at the 2010 Lisbon Summit, which determined the vision and goals

³ On NATO Committees, including in the field of intelligence and security, see: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49174.htm.


⁴ The North Atlantic Council (NAC) is the principal political decision-making body within NATO. It brings together high-level representatives of each member country to discuss policy or operational questions requiring collective decisions. In sum, it provides a forum for wide-ranging consultation between members on all issues affecting their peace and security (www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49763.htm).

⁵ The International Military Staff (IMS) is the executive body of the Military Committee, NATO's senior military authority. It is responsible for preparing assessments, evaluations and reports on all NATO military matters, which form the basis of discussion and decisions in the Military Committee (MC) (www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_64557.htm).

⁶ www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52091.htm.

for the Alliance for the next decade⁷. Among other objectives, the new Strategic concept includes the necessity for NATO to have the capacities to successfully perform its task of collective defence and crisis management. The concept calls for the Alliance to be able to defend its members against the full range of threats and to be capable to managing even the most challenging crisis. The Chicago Summit in 2012 further reinforced and refined this objective⁸. But even the most obvious changes in such a robust and bureaucratic organisation have proven to be very time consuming and occur only at a very gradual pace. As a result, changes are often only slight adjustments and streamlining, despite the need for more substantial changes.

Figure 1:
Strategic
Intelligence
and Security
Architecture
within the
NATO Civilian
and Military
Structures
Source:
NATO and
author's own
research



⁷ Lisbon Summit Declaration; issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon; Press Release (2010) 155, issued on 20 Nov. 2010 (www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease).

⁸ Chicago Summit Declaration; issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Chicago on 20 May 2012 (www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87593.htm?mode=pressrelease).

In fact, in the last two decades, the NATO intelligence structure at all levels has, to some degree, faced constant reorganisation. It can be argued that the first big challenge for NATO after the Cold War was to adapt itself to the new reality and to find a new *raison d'être* for its existence. Confusion about the new reality was evident and intelligence was not immune to this confusion. The traditional Cold War threats became less realistic and more unlikely, but a new main challenge arose: the need to adequately tackle transnational threats, especially terrorism. It was obvious that new post-Cold War challenges demanded a completely new approach in the intelligence field, as the traditional and conventional military threat receded with the fall of the Soviet Union. The old NATO intelligence structures were organised to efficiently counter Cold War military threats, mainly the Soviet conventional and nuclear threats. In practice this meant that the intelligence structures were organised under NATO's Military Structure, under the NATO Military Committee. But the new post-Cold War reality was that the challenges for the Alliance were less and less military in nature. It was no longer just about counting opposing soldiers, tanks, planes, ships, but also tackling new and much more complex and difficult emerging threats and challenges. Old Cold War era intelligence analysts often remember the past with much nostalgia and fondness, when the threat was much clearer, and with a classic enemy whose resources, capabilities and intentions were much easier to identify and analyse. The intelligence within NATO at that time consisted mainly of comparing the quantitative data and updating the enemy's order of battle. As a result, the support that these structures could provide to decision-makers was much more concrete and factual.

New threats demanded a different intelligence approach in NATO since these new, transnational threats in many NATO nations were often the domain of civilian intelligence, security and law enforcement structures and not of military/defence intelligence structures. In order to successfully counter these new threats, the military/defence structures had to reach out to their counterparts in the civilian structures. These processes, however, required time even at national levels, and it is not surprising that even more time was needed within NATO.

The new approach to threats and how to counter them demanded a more holistic approach; this means cooperation not just between civilian and military intelligence structures but also a more tense cooperation between the intelligence and law enforcement agencies, the judiciary etc. At the national level, some NATO countries' intelligence, security and CI structures successfully underwent the required reorganisations and built bridges between the civilian and military intelligence and security organisations in order to more effectively counter the new threats. However, the intelligence reform and similar changes in NATO require much more time and are much more difficult, mainly due to the fact that NATO, through the decades, has become a very bureaucratic organisation and also due to the consensual nature of adopting decisions. Furthermore, there was even a certain reluctance in some nations for really substantial changes and several legal issues in some member states. As a result, the changes are not always the best, but only the best possible, since

all member states must agree on them. Consequently, sometimes even very logical solutions are not easy to reach and are burdened with national agendas and old, traditional divisions between the civilian and military intelligence structures.

Nevertheless, in recent years NATO has taken some important steps to take its intelligence capability to the next level. Probably the most important step was the decision of member states on the need to bring on board national civilian intelligence structures. Until quite recently, NATO did not have a common forum with civilian intelligence organisations. It had the AC46 body⁹, but this body consisted of mostly national security and counterintelligence (CI) services/agencies, and its primary task was dealing with security and CI issues and not with the provision of intelligence warning or intelligence analysis in support of planning and decision-making. Thus, an important addition to intelligence analysis at the NATO HQ was the establishment of a new body, namely the Civilian Intelligence Committee (CIC)¹⁰, which consists of national civilian intelligence, security and CI services of member states. This body essentially replaced the previous AC46 with the task to handle the civilian intelligence issues in NATO. It reports directly to the NAC and advises it on matters of espionage and threats which may affect NATO. Each NATO member state is represented in the CIC by its security and intelligence services. Furthermore, building on successful lessons learned from the Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit (TTIU) as a body in which civilian and military structures came together to commonly deal with the threat of terrorism, the concept developed even further and the TTIU transformed into the Intelligence Unit (IU)¹¹. The IU is an analytical body with the task of providing intelligence support to the highest decision-making bodies in the NATO HQ on strategic issues of concern with intelligence-based analyses. The IU also supports senior civilian and military decision-makers in NATO (primarily the NAC and the MC, although reports of assessed intelligence may also be provided to other intelligence users at the NATO HQ) with intelligence-based analyses addressing terrorism, instability, proliferation and other regional and transnational issues of concern to the Alliance. It is a group of professional and skilled intelligence analysts from the NATO nations' civilian and military/defence intelligence structures. They still rely heavily on inputs from nations, but they produce non-agreed intelligence products¹² in close cooperation with the IMS Intelligence Division. The IU liaises on a regular basis with and obtains inputs from NATO member countries' security and

⁹ *NATO's Special Committee (AC46) was the body representing chiefs of national counterintelligence services; it was created in 1952 to combat intelligence threats to the Alliance. It had begun exchanging information on international terrorism as early as 1970. The plan to revise and broaden its mandate was going on for years... (Eric Terzuolo, NATO and Weapons of Mass Destruction; Regional alliance, global threats (2006), Routledge, p. 23).*

¹⁰ www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_69278.htm.

¹¹ www.qual.fr/permlinks_job_analyst-intelligence-unit-iu-brussels-nato-international_2754.html.

¹² *With regard to the level of the final agreement on the threats and risks to the Alliance among the NATO member states, different intelligence and security bodies in NATO produce the so-called NATO Agreed Intelligence (NAI) and/or NATO non-agreed intelligence. NAI usually covers a 10-year timeframe and is updated annually with the main objective to support NATO Defence Planners. It is called NAI because the final assessments are the result of the consensus reached among all NATO member states (www.nato.int/docu/comm/2008/0803-science/pdf/tohmas_brevick.pdf). On the other hand, NATO non-agreed intelligence production is the intelligence that is not agreed among all the NATO member states.*

intelligence services, including through the existing mechanisms of the NATO CIC and the Military Intelligence Committee (MIC)¹³, in order to maintain and develop the flow of intelligence reporting to and within the Alliance. In addition, it liaises with the intelligence services of the Partnership for Peace/Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (PfP/EAPC) and the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) nations.

Under the NATO Military Committee, the IMS Intelligence Division did not face significant changes or a major reorganization. Nevertheless, it re-aligned to be the integral part of the wider intelligence and security architecture at the NATO HQ. It continues to provide intelligence support for the MC and the NAC at the strategic level by providing Intelligence and Warning (I&W) and analytical assessments. For coordination of intelligence support at the NATO HQ level, between the CIC and the MIC, a new coordination body was established, called the NATO Intelligence Steering Group. It consists of the key heads of intelligence bodies and key NATO decision-makers and its task is to coordinate activities in order to prevent the duplication of efforts between NATO's civilian and military intelligence structures. It is chaired by the NATO Deputy Secretary General.

Intelligence in the NATO command structure, including its Allied Command for Operations (ACO) and Allied Command for Transformation (ACT) and their subordinate commands, also underwent a quite substantial streamlining in the last few years. At the Lisbon Summit in 2010, the Heads of States and Governments decided that the changing global environment required NATO to enhance its contribution to a comprehensive approach to crisis management, as part of the international community's effort, and to improve NATO's ability to deliver stabilisation and reconstruction effects¹⁴. Among other things, the Summit called for changes in intelligence structures inside SHAPE J2 and in its subordinate Joint Force Commands (JFCs). As a consequence of the difficulties the ACO was facing in providing timely and robust intelligence support to NATO operations, especially the ISAF mission in Afghanistan and to a lesser extent the KFOR mission in Kosovo, and due to the difficulties in reaching an agreement on how to quickly reorganise and improve NATO intelligence structures and intelligence support, the majority of NATO nations supported the establishment of a new organisation, the Intelligence Fusion Centre (IFC), which was later renamed the NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre (NIFC)¹⁵. The NIFC was created to facilitate the sharing and fusion of intelligence, to contribute to filling intelligence gaps within the ACO, and to support the planning and execution of current operations. It is directed by the MC to significantly contribute to, but not replace, the NATO ACO key intelligence activities. It remains outside the formal NATO chain of command and NATO's permanent and crisis manning structures,

¹³ *Military Intelligence Committee (MIC) comprises of the heads of military intelligence services of NATO member countries. It meets regularly in the format of the heads of intelligence services, heads of NATO military intelligence structures and heads of operational commands (www.mod.gov.al/arkiv/eng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2216:meeting-of-the-nato-military-intelligence-committee-held-in-tirana&catid=329&Item=673).*

¹⁴ www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease.

¹⁵ *More about the NIFC, its mission and vision, role and history at web.ifc.bices.org/about.htm.*

but it falls under the operational command of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The NIFC supports the SACEUR and the ACO by providing intelligence to warn of potential crises and to support the planning and execution of NATO operations, including direct intelligence support to NATO Special Operations Forces. With all-source intelligence fusion, the NIFC mission is to deliver timely, relevant products to enhance NATO's situational awareness and operational effectiveness. The NIFC is a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) organisation located in the United Kingdom with the United States being a framework nation. It became fully operational in December 2007. It comprises over 200 military and civilian intelligence and support professionals from 26 of 28 NATO nations and one NAC-approved non-NATO nation. Whether forward deployed or providing reach-back for deployed NATO forces, the task of the NIFC analysts is to collaborate with a wide range of partners to produce intelligence assessments to enhance NATO's situational awareness. The NIFC is manned 24 hours per day, seven days a week and supports NATO operations across three continents. Many NIFC assessments have also been made available to military planners in the EU. The NIFC uses both classified and open-source information to give NATO forces the most accurate and timely intelligence support available. Each of NATO's current operations is commanded by a designated Joint Task Force headquarters, and the NIFC is tasked to provide intelligence support to each of them. In practice, the NIFC provides daily support to ISAF and routine support to the KFOR mission. Furthermore, the NIFC support has been the key contributor to Operation Ocean Shield through close cooperation with the NATO Maritime Command at Northwood, UK. It also provides support to Operation Active Endeavour and its mission to conduct maritime operations in the Mediterranean Sea to demonstrate NATO's resolve to help deter, defend, disrupt and protect against terrorism etc. One of the newest NIFC tasks is to support NATO Special Operations Forces. In this regard, the NIFC is responsible for providing direct intelligence support to NATO Special Operations Forces under the direction of the NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ). The NIFC has supported NATO Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan with intelligence and deployed intelligence professionals. Slovenia has been an active participant in the NIFC since its establishment, where it currently fills two posts.

NATO has recently streamlined its command structure in order to make it more affordable, while protecting its levels of operational capability and capacity. These reforms have reduced the overall number of staff from 13,000 to 8,800 posts NATO-wide, but have also created a more deployable and streamlined command configuration, including in the intelligence field¹⁶. In the centre of the new streamlined NATO command structure and of special importance to the improved intelligence support is the Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre (CCOMC)¹⁷, with the task to monitor emerging challenges in a more comprehensive and effective way.

¹⁶ *More about the NATO Command Structure Review:* www.jfcnaples.nato.int/page352335714.aspx and www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52091.htm.

¹⁷ www.aco.nato.int/natos-military-committee-visits-the-ccomc-at-shape.aspx; www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_86912.htm?selectedLocale=en; theleadersclub.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/LEADER-CLUBamended.ppt.

The CCOMC was established in 2012 and is the new integrated NATO centre tasked to support the Alliance with an improved approach to emerging security challenges and crises, while helping deliver a more flexible and agile responses to crises. The CCOMC is divided into five task groups focusing on Crisis Identification, Current Operations, Estimations and Options, Response Direction and Crisis Review. The CCOMC's main tasks are to provide command and control to NATO operations at the strategic level, situational awareness, strategic estimation of potential crises, management of multiple crises simultaneously, evaluation of the strategic risk to ongoing NATO operations and contribution to all SACEUR missions and tasks in peace, crisis and conflict. It fulfils its role by performing active and comprehensive situational awareness of the security environment and by producing fused assessments and crisis evaluations. The Centre collaborates and cooperates in an integrated manner, bringing together military and civilian expertise. In comparison to intelligence and security structures at the level of the NATO HQ and partially the strategic level in the ACO, the intelligence at the level of subordinate commands, this is at the JFCs level, did not undergo the required changes, at least not so far. Nevertheless, several significant changes at the JFCs level would be needed in order to improve the intelligence process and support to the operations and prevent the unnecessary duplications.

2 INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY EFFORTS IN THE EU

In comparison to NATO, the intelligence and security structure in the EU is much less robust and consists of only a few bodies. At the top of the structure is the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN)¹⁸ which operates as part of the European External Action Service (EEAS). It was formed in March 2012 and has only around 70 employees. The INTCEN's mission is to provide intelligence analysis, early warning and situational awareness to the EU High Representative and the EEAS, to various EU decision-making bodies in the fields of Common Security and Foreign Policy (CSFP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and Counter-Terrorism, as well as to the EU Member States¹⁹. The INTCEN does this by monitoring and assessing international events, focusing particularly on sensitive geographical areas, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other global threats. The INTCEN has its roots in the European Security and Defence Policy of 1999, which put a group of analysts working on open-source intelligence in the organisation called the Joint Situation Centre. The organisation slowly grew and developed and started to produce classified products. It relies completely on inputs received from the EU Member States, military intelligence, non-military intelligence and diplomatic reporting²⁰. It is divided into two divisions. The first is Analysis Division, responsible for providing strategic analysis based on


¹⁸ www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-223-eu-intcen.pdf.

¹⁹ www.mfa.bg/uploads/files/1384440855EEAS-2013-AD-33.pdf.

²⁰ *The INTCEN does not have a collection capability, it doesn't deal with personal data and does not carry out clandestine operations; the operational level of intelligence is the EU member states' responsibility. INTCEN only deal with strategic analysis (more in the interview with Ilkka Salmi, Director INTCEN: www.mo.be/node/37891).*

the input from the security and intelligence services of Member States. It is composed of various sections, dealing with geographical and thematic topics. The second division is the General and External Relations Division which deals with support. It has three sections, dealing with IT questions, internal and external communication as well as the open-source office responsible for open-source analysis. Inside the EU Military Staff (EUMS) operates a small intelligence body, the EUMS Intelligence Directorate, with the task of providing military intelligence. In principle, it is divided into a support part and an analytical/production part. It cooperates closely with the EU INTCEN in the framework of the so-called Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC)²¹. In this framework, both civilian and military intelligence inputs are used to produce all-source intelligence assessments.

Figure 2: Intelligence and Security Architecture in the EU



²¹ www.mo.be/node/37891; www.asktheeu.org:8080/en/request/637/response/2416/attach/html/5/EU%20INTCEN%20Factsheet%20PUBLIC%20120618%201.pdf.html.

The only EU organic intelligence asset and its only real collection capacity is the EU Satellite Centre (EU SATCEN)²² which provides satellite imagery and analysis. Furthermore, it assures technical development activities in direct support of its operational activities and specialised training for the imagery analysts from Member States. The SATCEN is located in Torrejón de Ardoz near Madrid, Spain, and consists of imagery analysts, geospatial specialists and supporting personnel from the EU Member States. It was established in 1992 and incorporated as an agency into the EU on 1 January 2002. The SATCEN's areas of priority reflect the key security concerns as defined by the European Security Strategy, such as the monitoring of regional conflicts, state failure, organised crime, terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Centre, for example, provides support to EU deployed operations (such as the EU NAVFOR - Operation Atalanta) and humanitarian aid missions. The Centre is also an important early warning tool, facilitating information for early detection and possible prevention of armed conflicts and humanitarian crises. Slovenia actively participates in both main EU intelligence and analytical bodies, the INTCEN and EUMS Intelligence Directorate, while, on several occasions in the past, it also actively participated in the work of the SATCEN.

Conclusion

With the Ukraine crisis and consequently the ongoing political discussions about the need to reconsider Russia as a partner in the Euro-Atlantic integrations, there is a realistic possibility we will again see at least some streamlining, but possibly even some more substantial changes with regard to the intelligence and security structures, especially in NATO, but also, although to a lesser extent, in the EU. This streamlining/changes would be introduced with the aim to reflect the new emerging geopolitical reality and to meet the new needs of decision-makers and defence planners.

The current financial constraints must not prevent Slovenia from continuing its active participation within the intelligence and security structures of both NATO and the EU. An active approach, consisting of even more intelligence sharing and filling intelligence and security posts within both NATO and the EU with highly motivated professionals at the strategic, operational and tactical level, must remain one of the priorities for our decision-makers, especially among those shaping our foreign, national security and defence policy. It is not just about being part of the process, showing the flag or maintaining credibility within both organisations as a good and responsible partner. It is, in fact, all this but also much more - it is to remain capable of providing the best possible intelligence and security support to our troops deployed on missions abroad, regardless of whether they serve under the NATO or EU flag, and to be able to provide adequate support to decision-makers at the national level with regard to the ongoing and future missions, and even about national security. Moreover, Slovenia should go even further and should dare to fill more leadership intelligence posts and posts with more responsibilities and more internal as well as external visibility. This should certainly be our way forward, with a higher level of ambition when filling the international intelligence positions. In

²² More at www.eusc.eu.

difficult times, when rationalisation and reductions at all levels of the public sector are inevitable, decision-makers should really think twice when making decisions about cutting the already limited and scarce resources for intelligence and security, especially since Slovenia's participation in international missions abroad will, in one way or another, likely keep decreasing in the future. Providing effective and capable intelligence at the highest levels means better strategic decisions and better strategic planning. At the operational level it means better operational planning and better operational decisions, while at the tactical level it provides a safer execution of a concrete mission for the soldiers and literally saves the soldiers' lives. To be well-placed inside the intelligence and security system in international organisations is of paramount importance.

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PRISPEVEK SLOVENIJE K PROGRAMU ZA REINTEGRACIJO IN SPRAVO V AFGANISTANU – POGLED SVETOVALCA ZA ANALIZE POLITIK

SLOVENIA'S CONTRIBUTION TO AFGHANISTAN PEACE AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAMME – POLICY ADVISOR'S PERSPECTIVE

Povzetek Članek izhaja iz teoretičnega okvira spreminjajoče se narave vojne, gradnje miru in protiuporniškega delovanja in je uporabljen kot temelj za razlago enotnega programa za razorožitev, demobilizacijo in reintegracijo (DDR) Programa za reintegracijo in spravo v Afganistanu. Razloženi so temeljni koncepti, strukture in procesi tega programa, predstavljena pa je tudi vloga slovenskega političnega svetovalca v Celici za reintegracijo pri poveljstvu Mednarodnih varnostnih sil za pomoč (Isaf). V prispevku so pojasnjeni glavni izzivi in dinamika enotnega in kompleksnega programa ter delovanja političnega svetovalca. Program za reintegracijo in spravo v Afganistanu je pomemben mednarodno financiran projekt, ki je pripomogel k vrnitvi tisočev nekdanjih borcev s terena ter k podpori lokalnim skupnostim in reintegraciji. Članek obravnava pomanjkanje ustrezne preglednosti in merljivosti dosežkov programa, ki še ni odpravljeno. Pri prizadevanjih za nadaljnje oblikovanje učinkovitega in smotrnega programa ima Isaf zelo pozitivno podporno, strokovno in izvršilno vlogo. Končna analiza razkriva, da je uspešnost programa tesno povezana z verodostojnostjo afganistanskih oblasti in potrebo po boljšem upravljanju.

Ključne besede *Protiuporniško delovanje, Afganistan, Isaf, DDR, APRP, politični svetovalec, Slovenija, poslovni primer.*

Abstract This article uses theoretical framework of the changing nature of war, peace-building and counterinsurgency as a foundation for explaining a unique disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme – Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme. It explains basic concepts, structures and processes of the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme. Additionally, it presents the role of the Slovenian policy advisor in the International Security and Assistance Force Headquarters' Force Reintegration Cell. Main challenges and the dynamics of the unique and complex programme and of the policy advisor's work are laid

out. Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme is an important internationally funded project which has removed thousands of former fighters from the field and has helped to provide support to local communities and reintegrees. The lack of adequate transparency and measurability of the Programme's achievements has been addressed but not yet resolved. ISAF has been playing a very positive supporting, expert and facilitating role in an effort to help further develop a more effective and efficient programme. In the final analysis the overall success of the programme is significantly correlated to the Afghan authorities' credibility and the need for improved governance.

Key words *Counterinsurgency, Afghanistan, ISAF, DDR, APRP, policy advisor, Slovenia, business case.*

Introduction The report of the panel on United Nations Peace Operations (2000, p. 7), the so-called "Brahimi Report" considers disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants as key to immediate post-conflict stability and reduced likelihood of conflict recurrence. Banholzer (2014) cites Casas-Casas and Guzman-Gomez: "DDR contributes to achieving a lasting peace process where those involved directly in the conflict can break with the past". Thus, DDR is often actually embedded in broader peace operations. Additionally, it contributes to state building because it involves a shift from formal and informal rules of militant groups to the laws defined by the state.

Over the past several decades of warfare in Afghanistan, low- to senior-level fighters have regularly changed sides. Reintegration is an integral part of the Afghan culture. The concept of truce is encompassed in the Pashto word "tiga", which means "placing the stone". The word symbolizes the process of utilizing a respected elder or peacemaker to mediate a dispute among disagreeing parties (Jones, 2011). Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP)¹ is a five-year (2010-2015) internationally funded programme aimed at honourably removing insurgents from the battlefield and peacefully returning them to their local communities, thus transitioning communities from conflict to peace. APRP is part of a long term political process to bring peace to Afghanistan and is part of a wider strategy to improve justice, governance and development. The programme is led and implemented by the Afghan Government. The funding for the programme is at about 175 million USD². The political guidance for the APRP comes from the 70-member High Peace Council (HPC) appointed by the President. Programme policies are planned, executed and supervised by the Joint Secretariat (JS) in Kabul and the practical implementation is

¹ *Since 2001, various programmatic approaches to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate anti-government fighters and local militia members in Afghanistan have had mixed results, plagued by poor design, weak oversight and limited implementation support from the Government and International Community (ICG, 2011: 18).*

² *The international donors have pledged 220 million USD to APRP, of which 176 mio USD has been granted by mid-2013. As of June 2013, around 84 mio USD has been spent. The 12 donor countries are: Japan (the largest contributor at 52.1 mio USD), United States, Australia, Finland, Germany, Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands, Republic of Korea, Spain, United Kingdom and Estonia.*

led by 25-30 member Provincial Peace Councils (PPC), consisting of civil society members, tribal leaders, local elders and the religious community, and the Provincial Joint Secretariat Teams (PJST) in Afghan provinces. PJSTs provide technical and administrative support to the Governors and the PPCs, and help manage reintegration activity in the province by linking with district and community structures, which exist throughout Afghanistan. Linking provincial peace efforts with civil society is essential for APRP success. JS is responsible for providing programme support to these sub-national level structures. ISAF³, through its Force Reintegration Cell (F-RIC), has been a supporting partner in the “Afghan Led – Afghan Owned” APRP process. In the period of April to October 2013, the Republic of Slovenia had a policy advisor in the small community of nations participating in the F-RIC, thus contributing tangibly to the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Programme.

1 CHALLENGING PREPAREDNESS FOR COMPLEX OPERATIONS THROUGH CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

In the words of Clausewitz, war is a chameleon, continuously changing and adapting. It is thus natural for war to change in style⁴. The most striking phenomenon in the twenty-first century is the asymmetry between extremely high-tech warfare and new forms of organized violence, which indirectly eradicate the impact of the most sophisticated weaponry. The phenomenon referred to as “new wars” also involves the erosion of all the traditional parameters of war that distinguish between lawful and unlawful actors, states and private protagonists, soldiers and civilians, intra- and inter-state wars, and political and lucrative objectives. In her definition of new wars, Mary Kaldor uses the term “war” to “emphasize the political nature of this type of violence, even though the new wars involve a blurring of the distinction between war, organized crime and large-scale violations of human rights” (Blin, 2011, pp. 289 – 290). Taking this into consideration, there is empirical evidence, though the analytical literature is still scant, of the emergence of a fifth generation of peace operations⁵. What makes this type of missions specific is their hybrid character – these missions deploy troops and police personnel under mixed command, with both the United Nations and regional organizations deploying troops to the same missions under a separate chain of command and distinct forms of mandate. These missions reflect a growing shift in the division of labour in the global system of peace operations (Kenkel, 2013). Re-emergence of counterinsurgency presents an important contribution to the convergence of different forms of intervention currently referred to in policy circles as the “integrated mission”. First proposed in the UN-commissioned “Brahimi report” (2000), the integrated mission is an “overall

³ *The APRP programme document defines the role of ISAF, stating that »the UN and ISAF will coordinate international community support behind the Afghan lead. ISAF and UNAMA will be participating in the Joint Secretariat to provide assistance with information, security operations, strategic communications and to assist the Government delivery down to the local level« (APRP, 2010).*

⁴ *Blin predicts that guerrilla warfare, in new forms, is very likely to become the most common type of armed conflict in the coming decades.*

⁵ *Firstly, being traditional peacekeeping, secondly, civilian tasks, thirdly, peace enforcement, fourthly, peace-building, and fifthly, hybrid missions.*

political-strategic crisis management framework” whose task is to bring “resources and activities closer together and ensure that they are applied in a coherent way across the political, military, developmental and humanitarian sectors” (Eide et al, 2005, p. 5). Counterinsurgency is part of a deepening nexus between security and development, which merges the social reconstruction and reform of societies and peoples to the strategies of war and interventions. It is articulated as a military doctrine, yet the forms of engagement that it calls forth are mostly non-military. It relies heavily on civilian practices. The forms of engagement prized in counterinsurgency are traditionally civilian and quasi-civilian roles and activities, overseen and performed by military personnel. Arguably, the civilian interventions integral to counterinsurgency render *policy as a war by other means*. It deepens partnerships with non-military actors on the battlefield and relies on the use (and misuse) of civilian expertise. Modern counterinsurgency represents a civilianisation of warfare that is rooted in liberal peace interventionism (Bell, 2011, pp. 310 – 316). Since the end of the Cold War, the rationale that security requires development, and vice versa, has spread exponentially. It has become axiomatic, forming the basis of international development policy for many Western states. The aim of counterinsurgency doctrine is not battling an opposing force, but “conflict transformation”, that is, the process of “reducing the means and motivations for violent conflict while developing more viable, peaceful alternatives for the competitive pursuit of political and socioeconomic aspirations” (Bell, 2011, p. 324). Local leadership, coupled with citizen engagement, has proven the only way to ensure that international investment in stability and reconstruction helps to catalyse sustainable change. Security provision alone is insufficient for rebuilding – the private sector, religious networks, women’s groups, and the international community must all be engaged in creating the foundations for long-term stability (Forman and Danan, 2013, pp. 42 – 43).

Thus, considering the many complexities and challenges of counterinsurgency, in his COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency Guidance (2010), General David Petraeus as Commander of ISAF emphasized the need to learn and adapt. His basic statement in the guidance was that the decisive terrain is the human terrain and that people are the centre of gravity. He explained that only by providing them security and earning their trust and confidence can the Afghan government and ISAF prevail. He urged for close working relationship of ISAF personnel with international and Afghan partners, civilians as well as the military, and called for promotion of local reintegration, also by supporting partners’ addressed grievances.

However, in examining lessons learned from counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, Greentree explains that the problem is not so much in recognizing what must be done, but rather in actually changing organizations and the way they do business (2013, p. 96). The main question is whether long-term transitional and developmental perspectives are given the necessary attention when planning for and implementing integrated missions, including post-mission commitment and involvement of national governments, the civil society and regional organizations (Eide et al, 2005, p. 14).

Outcomes in contemporary operations are not about absolutes. The aims of contemporary military operations are changing from pursuing concrete military strategic objectives and “victory” to establishing certain conditions from which political outcomes can be decided (Egnell, 2009, p. 11). The indicators of effectiveness of the conduct of contemporary operations at strategic level are (Egnell, 2009, p. 14): the importance of clear and achievable political aims; civil-military cooperation and coordination; the importance of strategic narrative. The tactical level indicators are: civil-military cooperation in terms of unity of command and effort; the hearts and minds approach – force protection and minimum use of force; cultural understanding of the local context; adaptability and learning.

It is crucial to note that the nature of civil-military relations within a particular state has an important impact on the effectiveness of its armed forces within the contemporary strategic context of complex and irregular peace operations⁶. In short, complex peace operations take place among the people and involve both sub-state and supra-state actors in a struggle for legitimacy and far-reaching political changes. For the most part they involve low-intensity, counterinsurgency type operations between the regular armed forces of the west and loosely formed networks of insurgents employing asymmetric tactics. An integrated approach to civil-military relations that provides an extensive interagency system and integrated civil-military structures within the ministry of defence is more likely to produce armed forces that are “fit for purpose” and effective in operations. Integrated structures provide more accurate interpretations and adjustment to the functional imperative of the armed forces, where instruments of national power are better suited to deal with particular challenges of the contemporary strategic context. Also, integrated systems provide more inclusive command and control structures at the strategic level, causing all relevant actors in complex operations to be coordinated through integrated assessment, planning and execution of operations – providing what is often referred to as a comprehensive approach to operations. This requires well-functioning interagency structures and cooperative working culture of trust and mutual understanding. Multifunctional operations require integrated multifunctional bureaucracies. All this refutes the normative Huntingtonian argument regarding the benefits of objective civilian control through a divide between the military and civilian leadership (Egnell, 2009, pp. 4 – 10).

Adding to the organizational challenges is the complex issue of managing relationships. When examining peace-building, fundamental differences between societies – particularly behavioural and normative distinctions between liberal pluralist democracies and groups dominated by intolerant ideological, nationalist and religious frameworks – are often underestimated. The social-psychological approach to peace generally assumes the existence of a common foundation based

⁶ *Complex peace operations are operations in the contemporary strategic context, describing situations in which the Western armed forces are likely to find themselves involved in the future, operations other than war, such as: complex irregular warfare, asymmetric warfare, stability and support operations, humanitarian interventions, small wars and low intensity conflicts as well as peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace support operations.*

on shared human values. Harold Saunders, a former senior diplomat in the US State Department and a strong supporter of the social-psychological approach to peace, observed that “until relationships are changed, deep rooted human conflicts are not likely to be resolved”. (Steinberg, 2013, pp. 36 – 37). Providing security and building institutions is undoubtedly important to peace-building. But a stable order cannot be reached unless the psychological sources of conflict are addressed too. It should be stressed that therefore the task of politicians, diplomats and mediators is – or at least ought to be – to create a space where grievances can be freely expressed, and corresponding emotions can be collectively and emphatically worked through. At stake is not only the cessation of violence, but more importantly, that adversaries are encouraged to come together in the hope that their relations can be realized anew (Hutchinson and Bleiker, 2013, pp. 81 – 88).

Many of the challenges noted in this chapter are well illustrated through the frequently unpredictable and very complex dynamics and interface between Afghan political realities, ISAF’s counterinsurgency mission, the International Community’s versatile, and frequently dispersed endeavours and their role in the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Programme.

2 THE GRADUAL BEGINNING


The APRP story begins in President Karzai's 2009 Inauguration Speech, where he called for the need to “reach out to all of our countrymen, especially our disenchanting brothers”. At the national consultative peace Jirga held in Kabul in June 2010, attended by 1600 delegates from all elements of the Afghan society, the main topic was establishing a framework for national peace. The Jirga provided the president with a strong mandate to pursue peace. On 29 June 2010, the President signed a decree that detailed the APRP structure and directed its implementation. The representatives of the international community endorsed the APRP at the 20 July 2010 Kabul Conference. On 6 September, the Afghan Government issued a “joint order” providing detailed instructions to the ministries and provincial Governors on how to implement APRP, thus providing the actual starting point for a gradual implementation of the programme. The High Peace Council⁷ was established in October 2010, and it provides advice to the President, as well as guides, oversees and ensures the APRP implementation (F-RIC, 2012).

According to the programme document, the APRP aims to “promote peace through a political approach. It will encourage regional and international cooperation, create the political and judicial conditions for peace and reconciliation, and encourage combatant foot soldiers and commanders, who previously sided with armed

⁷ While the HPC is the highest body within the peace and reintegration process, its primary focus has been on negotiations with the Taliban and perhaps less with the reintegration process (Zyck, 2012). On 20 September 2011, the former Afghan President and HPC Chair Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani was assassinated by a suicide bomber while entering his home in Kabul. The attack also injured Minister Masoom Stanekzai, the chief executive officer of the APRP Joint Secretariat. Salahuddin Rabbani, the former HPC Chair's son became the new HPC chairman.

opposition and extremist groups to renounce violence and terrorism, to live within the laws of Afghanistan, and to join a constructive process of reintegration and peace” (APRP, 2010).

Table 1:
APRP structure
(F-RIC, 2012)



The first reintegree joined the programme in October 2010, and the first HPC annual budget was approved in January 2011, followed by a wider programme budget in June 2011. In September, the first APRP-funded Line Ministry⁸ Community Recovery project was started in Badghis by the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled (MoLSAMD) – a vocational training programme in 23 centres for a total of 400 reintegrees and community members (F-RIC, 2012).

The APRP is frequently misunderstood in reporting by academia and the media, for it is a broad-based, ambitious and complex programme which was developed in the middle of the conflict. According to Jones (2011, p. 21), there are “tremendous difficulties involved” in the reintegration efforts in Afghanistan.

⁸ Line ministries included in the APRP are: Ministry of Defence (MoD), Ministry of the Interior (MoI), which oversee the Afghan army and police, as well as ministries involved more fully in promoting social and economic development, such as the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAIL), Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled (MoLSAMD), Ministry of Rehabilitation and Rural Development (MRRD) and the Ministry of Public Works (MoPW).

3 THE THREE-PHASED CONCEPT

The APRP concept is outlined in the 2010 APRP Programme document and explained in more detail in documents such as the 2012 F-RIC Guide to APRP.

Social Outreach, Confidence Building and Negotiation are about opening a dialogue through a variety of outreach sources in order to build confidence, and identify and negotiate grievances. This phase involves building capacity at the national, provincial, district and community levels, including within the ANSF, to understand the APRP and the reintegration process. Once an insurgent declares he wishes to leave the insurgency, the Afghan intelligence and security service (NDS) verifies the individual, and the elders acknowledge and confirm acceptance back into the local community. Under the political authority of the HPC, the APRP seeks to enable local initiatives to initiate reintegration. The PPC utilizes a network of Government and civil society leaders at the local levels to reach out to insurgents, address their grievances and encourage them to stop fighting. Reintegration includes overcoming distrust on all sides. It must be an all-Afghan process, involving many discussions and lots of time.

Demobilization is the most standardized of all phases and begins with the vetting of potential reintegrees. The key part of that is done by the national intelligence and security service, the NDS as well as the MoI, MoD and the JS. The information and background data is collected from the potential reintegree at the provincial level. Formal enrolment includes an intent-to-reintegrate form, individual survey conducted by reintegree candidate with the assistance of the PJST, biometric data collection, small arms registration and heavy weapons turn-in. The reintegration candidates are then provided basic Transition Assistance⁹ (TA). Provinces and affected communities' leadership must consider security needs of reintegrees at this stage, including possible short-term relocation to safe houses. The TA lasts for three months during which time the goal is to enrol the reintegration candidates in Disengagement Training, which includes modules on dispute resolution, social responsibility and religion. Afterwards follows a formal reintegration, with political amnesty for insurgent offences provided, but criminal offenses may be subject to later prosecution. Enrolment in the APRP also results in the reintegrees being removed from targeting lists by the ANSF or international forces.

Peace Consolidation and Community Recovery includes the provision of assistance to those communities which are receiving reintegrated fighters. It is about the eligibility of a former insurgent and his community to receive small grants¹⁰ of up to 25,000 USD, or for larger communities the sum of up to 200,000 USD. The focus is on what the Community experiencing reintegration wants or needs¹¹. Depending on district


⁹ This is 120 USD per month for three months.

¹⁰ Small Grants APRP projects are not to be mistaken with other, wider-Ministerial development projects.

¹¹ A community may desire vocational training so that its people can learn agricultural techniques, manufacturing, welding, demining or they may simply need schools for their children or adult literacy programmes. Communities and not reintegrees make decisions on what community projects they want or need. To a large extent it is about improving access to basic services, education, training and long-term employment.

location, long-term development projects are accessible through line ministry projects. Community recovery is designed to consolidate peace by demonstrating peace dividends and benefits to reintegree communities and is a supporting factor of grievance resolution. The activities include agricultural services, rehabilitating and maintaining agricultural and transport infrastructure, and community based development activities. The activities must be linked with overall long-term GIRoA development programmes. Planning and implementing community recovery projects (in which reintegrees and other community members can participate) demand close collaboration of all involved (civil society leaders, the communities, PJST, PPC, JS, district and provincial government bodies).

Table 2:
APRP phases
and processes



4 PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION AND DELIVERY

Only the Afghans are eligible for APRP, which is based on the reality that most Afghan insurgents are fighting in or near their communities, and only a minority is ideologically motivated. Most insurgents fight because of grievances¹², typically

¹² A 2011 RAND study examined 36 insurgent reintegree cases, prior to APRP establishment, when another programme was in place. Of these, 71% had reintegrated in order to pursue the resolution of grievances. 36% reintegrated because they believed the Taliban and other insurgent groups were losing the war. 33% reintegrated because they felt coerced into doing so (being specifically targeted by the Afghan or international forces). The insurgents could specify multiple reasons for reintegrating (Zyck, 2012).

of local origin¹³. The APRP seeks to enable sustainable support to local agreements where communities, supported by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), reach out to insurgents in order to address their grievances, encourage them to stop fighting, and re-join their communities with dignity and honour. Grievance resolution and alternatives to fighting, as well as justifiable confidence in survivability of the integration process are keys to successful implementation of the APRP. Reintegration removes fighters from the battlefield and possibly enhances conditions for high-level reconciliation or peace agreement. In general, the reintegration and reconciliation can be viewed as two sides of the same coin, one inevitably affecting the other. Jones (2011) believes that effective reintegration cannot be separated from reconciliation with insurgent leaders.

To deliver the programme, the HPC and JS are partnered with security and non-security ministries. For appropriate and structured execution of the Programme the Joint Secretariat is divided into Policy, Administration and Finance, Operations, Development and Communications Departments¹⁴. At the provincial level, Governors have the lead directing the PPCs and PJSTs, with support from the participating line ministry directorates.

The largest source of funding for the APRP is the internationally funded finance mechanism¹⁵. The APRP Reintegration Trust Fund Finance Mechanism disburses funds to the Joint Secretariat through the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme)¹⁶. The JS then distributes these funds at the provincial level to the PJSTs, managing four different accounts: Operational Expenditure (salaries, office rent, utilities, outreach...), Float and Outreach Account (rapid reaction accounts for governors to use for outreach, grievance resolution...), Transition Assistance Account and Small Grants Account (project funding). Other financial mechanisms are also in place (F-RIC, 2012).

According to JS reports, a cumulative total of 7,796 ex-combatants have renounced violence and joined the peace programme by the end of 2013¹⁷. In 2013, a key development within the APRP was engaging mid-level insurgent leadership, where 400 commanders enrolled in the Commanders Programme¹⁸. The UNDP annual

¹³ These can be anger against the ANSF or ISAF for the death of a family member, lack of access to development resources due to discrimination by a Government official, conflicts with the neighbouring communities over land or water, complex and long standing tribal blood feuds. The fundamental premise of APRP is that addressing these would remove the motivation to fight. Therefore, the Governors and PPCs have broad latitude to conduct their activities, including mapping, resolving grievances, generating local peace deals, thus removing peripheral fighters from the battlefield, which allows the ANSF to focus their efforts on core Taliban insurgency (Zyck, 2012).

¹⁴ This structure is reflected on the ISAF HQ Force Reintegration Cell side.

¹⁵ Supplementing the APRP is the U.S. funded Afghanistan Reintegration Programme (ARP), designed to be used for gap filling, fast implementation and capacity building.

¹⁶ The UNDP provides programmatic and operational assistance to the APRP Joint Secretariat and other APRP partners at the national and sub-national levels to enable them to effectively implement key components of the APRP. In addition, the UNDP manages Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund (the so-called "Window B").

¹⁷ SIGAR report puts that number at 8,503 by March 2014 (SIGAR, II/2014).

¹⁸ This programme is designed to mobilize and influence wider support for peace efforts within insurgent networks, with former commanders conducting peace campaigns in the communities to persuade others to join the APRP.

report also explains that “Line Ministries' projects provided 3,400 reintegrees and 34,000 community members with direct benefits such as access to improved services, work or livelihood opportunities and vocational training opportunities¹⁹. 1,200,000 community members will benefit from the 168 line ministry projects directly”. The UNDP APRP 2013 annual report states that although significant progress has been made, there remain implementation risks and issues, including the question of continued funding, loss of logistical support due to international community drawdown, increased political dynamics due to the elections, lack of qualified staff in a few key positions and inadequate information gathered to measure the true impact of the project (UNDP, 2013).

All in all, within the APRP, as the UNDP (2013) reports, 164 Small Grants Projects have been implemented and 82 projects have been completed. These projects are designed to provide livelihood assistance to former combatants and reach out to more than 170,000 beneficiaries in communities throughout the country. SIGAR (II/2014) July 2014 Quarterly Report refers to 53 Small Grants Projects and 1,162 Afghan government projects under way in 32 provinces and 190 districts.

5 ISAF PERSPECTIVE

The ISAF main effort in support of the APRP has been to weaken the insurgency, reduce violence, and improve security by supporting and building a self-sustaining, effective GIRoA implementation of the APRP in order to enable reintegration to take place on the greatest scale possible, and undermine the resilience and capability of the insurgency. ISAF's role is to team with the Afghans at every level, and coordinate security operations with the local political peace processes. ISAF helps Afghans in communicating the programme and its opportunities to the Afghan people, and supports its implementation. The desired end state of the APRP from the ISAF point of view was an enduring and fully enabled GIRoA programme that operates without ISAF assistance and continues to draw insurgents out of the fight permanently, thereby improving security and development, and acting as an accelerant to conflict resolution. The ISAF objectives²⁰ regarding the APRP have thus been (F-RIC, 2012):

- To assist in the establishment of an effective, self-sustaining and robust GIRoA programme that is enabled by structures at the national and sub-national levels that delivers reintegration efficiently and effectively;
- To educate and persuade target audiences to engage in and support the APRP and create conditions for grievance identification and resolution;

¹⁹ For example, MoLSAMD's vocational education training (15 projects) was provided to 1,278 reintegrees and 2,562 (681 women) community members in skills demanded in local market (tailoring, carpentry, embroidery, carpet weaving, vehicle repair, plumbing, electronics repair...). 58 reforestation (planting pistachio and pine trees), 13 fruit orchard and 17 irrigation projects of MAIL provided short-term work opportunities to 13,000 community members and 1,200 former fighters. Former fighters and community members worked on routine maintenance of over 1,500 km of roads (MoPW provided 1,058 community members with full-time employment on routine road maintenance).

²⁰ F-RIC POLAD objectives and engagements clearly reflect these goals, mainly in helping build a sustainable Afghan capacity in the policy and strategic communications fields.

- To assist GIRoA, if required, in demobilization of insurgents;
- To sustain reintegration through supporting GIRoA community recovery efforts;
- To sustain the Afghan and International Community political will at all levels to ensure lasting commitment to reintegration.

Among other things, ISAF has been partnering with the UNDP and JS in the context of focused APRP provincial training programmes. ISAF has also been providing expanded logistical support to PPCs and PJSTs so they can travel widely and implement the APRP in remote areas as well.

6 AFGHANISTAN PEACE AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAMME CHALLENGES

The APRP is considered to be a crucial element of the stabilization of Afghanistan and intends to integrate the political process of negotiation or reconciliation with armed groups and the reintegration of insurgent fighters. It integrates both civilian and military stakeholders and brings together governance, economic and security oriented processes within multi-layered institutional architecture. It absolutely requires courageous Afghan leaders to make bold decisions, to reject the cycle of violence, and work to build local and national peace processes. It requires huge energy to overcome the inertia of war and great persistence to build confidence and trust at a necessary level to achieve some form of momentum (Zyck, 2012).

In her analysis of the various disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes Banholzer has come up with several recommendations in order for these programmes to be successful. “A wider recovery strategy” that places DDR in a “multi-dimensional peace-building framework” is essential for success. Additionally, “functional government institutions” help to ensure that states can fulfil their commitments and provide security to former combatants. Also, the “presence of institutionalised conflict-solving mechanisms” helps prevent minor conflicts. Furthermore, “DDR works best in stabilising peace” and should as such best be “launched after the end of hostilities”. Finally, “training and economic reintegration programmes must match the needs of people on the ground and skills training should be relevant to local markets”. She also adds that DDR programmes need to be accompanied by thorough evaluation processes (Banholzer, 2014, pp. 1 – 2). Gonzalez Palau notes that often DDR process begins when economy is weak, which is why reintegrees become frustrated when vocational training or short-term financial support they receive do not ultimately lead to suitable, if any, jobs. DDR programmes must thus be viewed as long-term undertakings requiring continued support (Gonzalez Palau, 2012). On the basis of analysing open sources, Zyck (2012) assessed and raised a number of concerns regarding the functioning of the APRP, noting that “poorly designed, inadequate or unfulfilled promises of reintegration assistance could discourage its members from reintegrating and could deepen grievances”. Also, “unprotected, poorly prepared or poorly treated former

insurgents would become powerful information operations opportunities for the insurgents”²¹. Main challenges of the APRP have thus been (Zyck, 2012):

- Attacks against reintegrating fighters (lack of systematic solution for providing security to former fighters and their families);
- Amnesties for reintegrating insurgents (no clear policy in place to ensure that insurgents who join the APRP would not ultimately be prosecuted for past actions, since there is no distinction between insurgent and criminal offences);
- Limited Afghan Government commitment (strong role of provincial Governors - their influence on provincial structure enables them to obstruct the APRP progress, therefore their buy-in is vital for programme success);
- “Fake Insurgents” reintegrating (it is difficult to clearly identify hard-core insurgents entering the programme from those people who are not insurgents but claim so in order to gain APRP benefits);
- Lack of synergies with a political process (differences of opinion among international actors and within the GIROA whether the majority of reintegration should proceed or follow a wider peace or reconciliation agreement);
- Inability to address key grievances (many insurgent grievances, including the Afghan Government’s corruption or bad performance, cannot be readily addressed within the scale of the APRP “grievance resolution” process);
- Weak monitoring and evaluation (the M&E systems have not been put in place at the beginning of the APRP).

On the issue of insurgent intake Derksen notes that many reintegrees are not “genuine Taliban but criminals or members of self-defence groups”²², few of whom signed up from the south and southeast, the heartlands of the insurgency. In her view the main reason for the disarmament and reintegration initiatives failing are not flaws in the programmes but an extremely adverse political context without the peace agreement (Derksen, 2014, pp. 2 – 3). Some authors see preventive benefits to reintegrating non-insurgency groups or individuals, who have been otherwise disintegrated from social and political processes of Afghanistan (Checchia, 2012).

It is also interesting to note some observations on issues of relationship among Afghan central and local leadership. International Crisis Group report from the beginning of 2012 blames the central Government for the APRP ineffectiveness due to the failure to obtain sufficient local buy-in and the absence of vigorous support from the centre. It calls for substantial delegation of power to the local authorities (ICG, 2012, p. 22). Afghan Governors’ national conference report from June 2013 similarly criticizes the Afghan Government for lack of coordinated approach towards peace building and lack of consultation with provincial structures about project implementation. It further notes that employment opportunities provided to reintegrees are not

²¹ SIGAR (II/2014) quotes a report published in June 2014 by Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) and 11 Afghan civil society groups, in which interviewed reintegrees stated that the APRP failed to deliver on its promises and left them feeling used, unsupported in the long run, and vulnerable to attack for their cooperation with the Afghan government.

²² SIGAR report (II/2014) quotes State Department and F-RIC saying that the APRP has a robust vetting process to confirm that individuals who want to join the programme are actually insurgents.

sustainable and that the reintegrees' activities are not being tracked. Finally, the Government is supposedly not adequately working on communicating the "pro-development ideology" to the general public (IDLG, 2013).

7 FORCE REINTEGRATION CELL POLICY ADVISOR DYNAMICS

It was into this unprecedented, complex, dynamic and challenging environment that the Slovenian Policy Advisor (POLAD) in Force Reintegration Cell (F-RIC) arrived in Kabul in April 2013. What followed were weeks of intensive familiarization process, studying the whole spectrum of APRP documentation, from the APRP programme documents, APRP bi-monthly reports and other policy documents, to the operational and classified material on the ISAF side, before starting to build key relationships with the JS counterparts. Thus began the forming of a comprehensive perception of a unique nature of the programme but also numerous contradictions, subtle layers and very difficult implementation challenges.

Gradually, the POLAD was increasingly being included in various policy discussions within the Force Reintegration Cell and could contribute advice regarding the daily activities within the F-RIC and with our Afghan and international partners. Continuous participation and engagement was expected when POLAD became one of the section heads²³. At this point, the primary POLAD "job requirements" were complete English language interoperability (written and spoken proficiency) with the Staff and comprehension of policy issues, including the discrepancies between the normative versus the actual dynamics on the ground. Comparing or aligning the planning segment of the APRP with the nominal reporting and actual "output" metrics - such as ISAF reporting from the provinces, the JS bi-monthly reporting and the UNDP reporting - as well as discussions with the more experienced colleagues, provided for a good picture regarding the weak links of the APRP, such as the virtually non-existing monitoring and evaluation of the programme²⁴.

Because of the programme delays, primarily of financial nature, a major issue was the need for financial improvements to enable a swifter and uninterrupted processing

²³ *Sitting at the F-RIC leadership desk during regular staff meetings several times a week were the F-RIC director, his deputy and the section chiefs, among them Programmes, Operations, Support and Policy, surrounded by other staff. All but the Slovenian Policy Head were US or UK senior experts.*

²⁴ *In February 2013, the UNDP published its long awaited independent MTE, the mid-term evaluation of the programme, with many recommendations. At the inaugural Project Board meeting on 2 June, the donors asked for a detailed description of the actions that had already been undertaken by the JS. The implementation was regularly postponed, but during the June - July timeframe the Afghan side presented the MTE recommendation action plan specific actions undertaken with a projection that the majority of the points be completed by the August - September timeframe. The UNDP 2013 annual report states that "the JS was able to successfully implement most of the 40+ recommendations of the plan and to incorporate some of the suggestions into the Business Case". The success of the business case is thus also in integrating various disconnected parts of the APRP into a whole. The crux of the problem was the weak Monitoring and Evaluation capacity of JS, which has gradually been improving, providing greater visibility and measurability of the programme's achievements. The M&E was also one of the weak areas depicted in the MTE and remained so at the end of 2013, others being (UNDP, 2013): inadequate social outreach, too few armed groups joining the programme, too few communities receiving recovery projects, gender issues.*

of the APRP funds being funnelled into the JS system and into the provinces. This was not easy due to the JS and PJST lack of capacity and skill as well as due to the very strict and somewhat rigid UNDP rules for finance reconciliation.²⁵ The intensive dynamics at F-RIC focused on the future improvements of the APRP which was showing a serious lack of capacity to smoothly implement all the processes envisaged by the APRP Programme document. April and May saw significant and far-reaching developments. In order to overcome the regular programme cash-flow bottlenecks and improve the ability to reconcile trust fund advances with expenses receipts, the Financial Improvements task force developed financial improvements recommendations that were solidified by the agreement of the senior leaders of the JS, UNDP and F-RIC. Within this process, the F-RIC experts played an important role in devising proposals and driving the dynamics and processes forward, also by influencing the strategic decision making.

Due to the fact that disturbances in the stable financing of the APRP and the lack of robust monitoring and evaluation were vital issues with possibly damaging policy implications, these were the two fields that the POLAD was initially focusing on with the F-RIC Programmes Department seasoned experts. Also, after thoroughly discussing the POLAD's previous experiences and expertise with the F-RIC director it was decided that the focus areas and regular engagements with the JS staff shall be on the Policy and Strategic Communications sides, primarily with the two department heads²⁶ and later on also with the second JS deputy CEO in charge of Policy. In May it became obvious from our interactions with the donor nation representatives that the APRP funding should become more dependent on specific, visible and measurable results. The element that significantly changed the future of the APRP was the end of May Donor letter to minister Masoom Stanekzai, the JS CEO, which for the first time put conditionality on the future APRP funding, calling for JS to present a clear Business Case and contingency planning for the future of the programme. In short, the APRP international partners were calling for more transparency and progress. It was agreed by the donor representatives and the JS leadership that the APRP Business Case should be developed in close cooperation and support of the F-RIC experts. The document was to be the basis for future funding and international support. It was agreed that the F-RIC POLAD will be the primary F-RIC advisor and point of contact supporting the development of Business Case under the lead of the JS CEO minister Stanekzai, with primary JS focal point being the Policy Department at JS.

What followed was a very intensive series of planning events initiated by the JS and dedicated in one way or another to regaining the programme's momentum and focusing on the future of APRP. The APRP Strategic Conference (28 May) identified successes and challenges of the programme, and saw commitment of the APRP CEO

²⁵ *Quarterly tranches of money were funnelled to JS, where the JS had to show 80% of the expensed receipts for the quarter before receiving the next tranche of money.*

²⁶ *Thus began a culturally specific gradual process of frequent interactions slowly increasing confidence building and gradually heading up to discussing and resolving the actual APRP issues at hand. The process of slowly gaining acceptance with the Afghan partners was in somewhat of a contrast with the relatively short-term rotational nature of ISAF personnel postings.*

that the Business Case will soon be presented to the Financial Oversight Committee. The APRP Inaugural Project Board Meeting (2 June) came up with a renewed donor pressure, discussion about the UNDP Mid-Term Evaluation implementation action plan and the devising of the Business Case methodology. The PPC/PJST Conference (5 – 6 June) manifested very transparent and critical consultations between the central and local APRP leadership structures, identifying challenges on the ground, providing more guidance to the provinces, and discussing strategic communication challenges, lack of coordination and the importance of the programme's credibility. The F-RIC POLAD participated in all these events in order to maintain continuity, an integrated overview of developments at all levels and in all formats, with a purpose of providing a coherent overall picture of developments, agreements, promises, criticisms and proposals, for use in all future interactions. The overarching aim was to be able to participate actively, fully and credibly in preparing the APRP Business Case.

The following four-month period saw a wide spectrum of activities dedicated to preparing the Business Case, with the F-RIC being heavily involved in advising the JS on the best approach to complete the document, including its methodology. Initially, the aim of the APRP CEO was to have a political document that will represent the consensus of the HPC on the future of the programme. The donors on the other hand expected a specific, project-oriented document. Initial drafts lacked realism and went beyond the APRP basic programme framework. The F-RIC was trying to manage expectations and steer towards progress and finding a common ground. A key challenge proved to be the lack of evidence on the workings of the programme and a plan or rationale on how different elements of the programme will be implemented. The JS avoided presenting several financially supported options (contingency planning was demanded by the Donor Letter) and was very selective and slow in accepting recommendations, but donors called for further revisions of the document. The second donor letter helped streamline and focus further JS/UNDP/F-RIC coordination on the Business Case. Eventually, the JS accepted the majority of the donor recommendations, although significant time was lost. Two programme options were presented along with financial projections, which were more realistic than with the first proposal. In subsequent interactions, donor representatives called for the JS to articulate the APRP to post-APRP transition plan and also asked for the Implementation Plan. Throughout this process, the F-RIC experts played an active and constructive supporting and facilitating role, discussing challenges, options and possible solutions with the JS on daily basis, as well as listening in on the Donor concerns. In mid-October, the Donors finally agreed to the Business Case narrative as the Afghan side was finishing the Appendixes to the document. The result was not only a stable financial framework for going forward, but also increased mutual understanding among different parties and increased capacity of the JS for strategic self-reflection.

8 AFGHANISTAN PEACE AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAMME POLICY TASKS AND CHALLENGES

The main continuous task of the F-RIC POLAD, apart from the internal ISAF policy dynamics and information sharing, was following the policy developments and related strategic communications efforts on the JS and HPC side by interacting with the heads of departments and other personnel. This also included providing suggestions on development of the Monitoring and Evaluation²⁷ system of the APRP to improve the capacity on the JS side to measure the effectiveness of various segments of the APRP by analyzing field visit findings, APRP processes and management practices and such. The POLAD attended a variety of meetings with the UNDP and JS and other entities, such as the EU, the Embassies and the NGOs. Financial Oversight Committee, Technical Committee, Project Board, the JS – UNDP – F-RIC tripartite and other meeting formats were regularly attended in order to provide for continuity, insight and a comprehensive and integrated understanding of the real time dynamics and challenges of the programme. Later on, these issues were considered in preparing the Business Case document.

The Joint Secretariat as a very hierarchical type of a structure to a large extent prevented bottom-up expert initiatives or decision making, which translated into substantial passivity and delays in the functioning and processing within the organization. The somewhat static nature of the JS was also manifested through lack of sufficient coordination among and within various JS departments and wider, among various Government departments. The flow of information was not as effective and the level of professionalism not as high as it should be. This called for more interaction with the JS CEO, which seemed to create positive dynamics and progress. Another challenge was a wide spectrum of varying interests on the Afghans side, sometimes preventing focusing on the logical and goal-related activities for ensuring the maximum effectiveness of the APRP. Throughout the majority of activities there was a clear manifestation of the lack of ownership of the processes, which made work slow and difficult, especially since any effective project implementation – which in the final analysis is the ultimate goal – ultimately depends on effective leadership and participant buy-in. These challenges were diverse, numerous and constant. With the F-RIC being just one of the supporting actors in the APRP, the scope of possibility for facilitating change was not too wide, although it was well used through constant interaction, support, presence and influencing.

²⁷ *The UNDP 2013 annual report states that “the current JS report format does not clearly identify the outputs, baselines, targets and indicators that form the basis of the programme strategy, and as such it is difficult to measure progress against specific targets. However, the M&E unit of the JS is now in the process of formulating these measurable indicators in their M&E framework, which will be advanced in 2014” (UNDP, 2013). My personal observation is that this has been happening at a far too slow a pace, at a very late stage of the programme.*

9 AFGHANISTAN PEACE AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAMME SUCCESSES

Despite setbacks and complexities, there were significant successes with the APRP in 2013²⁸. The UNDP Mid-Term Evaluation and Business Case provided a mutually enhancing framework for facilitating the progress of the APRP.

A number of tools were developed and implemented in 2013 to review and provide oversight of programme implementation and increase efficiency and effectiveness. These were, among others, revisions of various standard operating procedures, in vetting, small grant projects, prioritization of districts, increasing the length of TA assistance to 6 months, staff performance assessments, provincial banking and transfer protocols developed to ease the financial delays, guidelines for civil society groups to access the APRP funds, and monitoring and evaluation field visit checklists (UNDP, 2013).

The UNDP 2013 annual report touches upon the whole Business Case dynamics which lasted from spring to autumn, concluding that “intensive collaboration and coordination was required in the development of the Business Case. All of these changes led to a more involved partnership”. Under “lessons learned”, the report further articulates that “developing the Business Case, which sets out the strategic direction of the APRP for the last 2 years of the programme, was a huge collaborative effort on the part of the JS and resulted in an important and substantive document. It was also a process that allowed significant learning, and JS will be much better placed to develop the next key document – the transition plan – because of the experience of developing the Business Case. All the lessons learned from producing the Business Case can be applied to the task of developing the transition plan” (UNDP, 2013).

In my view this evaluation best describes the successful efforts of the F-RIC experts who put their safety at risk while consistently providing their substantial expertise, knowledge and experience, primarily through intensive and continuous support to the JS personnel through embedding and partnering for a greater success of the APRP.

Conclusion The Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme has been an important internationally funded project which has removed thousands of former fighters from the field and has helped provide support to local communities and reintegrees. The original APRP concept was ambitious and the following implementation and successes ambiguous and in some areas slow. As Derksen (2011) notes, the APRP was initially hastily implemented to respond to donor imperatives. Many segments of the programme, such as security provision and grievance resolution infrastructure, were lagging behind the actual pace of the reintegration. There have also been many complaints about both the Joint Secretariat ineffectiveness and inefficiency and lack

²⁸ *The UN Security Council Resolution 2120 (2013) which extends authorization for ISAF until December 2014 “recognizes the increased number of reintegrees that have joined the APRP” and encourages “further efforts to address the remaining operational challenges” and further encourages “the international community to support this Afghan-led effort”.*

of capacity in the provinces, as well as lack of communication and distrust between different APRP implementing partners.

But many things have progressed visibly since then. The conditionality regarding further financial support of the international donors provided an important new stimulus to the programme. The serious issue of the lack of adequate transparency and measurability of the Programme's achievements has been addressed but not yet resolved. ISAF has been playing a positive facilitating and supportive role in an effort to help further develop a more effective and efficient programme. If properly executed, the APRP could influence or provide a notable stimulus to the high-level reconciliation process. On the other hand, it might also provide a very useful in-place and verified tool for a possible reintegration flow following a high-level reconciliation peace deal. In the final analysis, the overall success of the programme is also significantly correlated to the Afghan central and local authorities' credibility and improved governance.

The efforts for long-term stabilization of Afghanistan, within which reconciliation, reintegration, peace talks, capacity building, local ownership and local development play an integral part, are fully complementary with the foreign and defence policy principles and goals of the Republic of Slovenia. Therefore, very active and noticeable participation in the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme was not only a significant and unique personal and professional challenge but – more importantly – an opportunity for national strategic positioning and promotion of the policies and activities of the Republic of Slovenia and the Ministry of Defence in the bilateral and multilateral international fora and at home.

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NORMATIVNA VLOGA ZAVEZNIŠTVA PRI NEKONVENCIONALNIH VARNOSTNIH GROŽNJAH – KIBERNETIČNA OBRAMBA ČLANIC

THE NORMATIVE ROLE OF THE ALLIANCE IN NON-CONVENTIONAL SECURITY THREATS – CYBER DEFENCE OF MEMBER STATES

Povzetek Vloga mednarodnih varnostnih organizacij je oblikovanje konsenza o vrednotah, normah in pravilih, ki se nanašajo na kibernetško bojevanje. Nato proizvaja kibernetške politike, skrbi za izobraževanje in izmenjavo informacij, tudi s publicistično dejavnostjo, nekoliko manj pa je razvil operativne zmogljivosti za skupno kibernetško obrambo in kibernetško bojevanje.

V Natu lahko pričakujemo pobude za tesno sodelovanje pri kibernetški obrambi in gradnji skupnih kibernetških zmogljivosti, kar je racionalen odgovor na nekonvencionalne grožnje. Pridobitve članic, ki bodo izšle iz sodelovanja na področju kibernetškega bojevanja, se bodo med seboj razlikovale. Največ pridobitev avtorica pripisuje ZDA, ker je njihova ekonomija najbolj odvisna od informacijsko-komunikacijskih tehnologij, najbolj globalizirana in domnevno najpogostejša tarča kibernetških napadov.

Ključne besede *Kibernetška obramba, mednarodne varnostne organizacije, mednarodno pravo.*

Abstract The role of international security organizations is to create a consensus on values, norms and rules relating to cyber warfare. NATO produces cyber policy and provides for education and the exchange of information also through publicistic activity. To a lesser extent it has also developed operational capabilities for joint cyber defence and cyber warfare.

NATO can expect initiatives for close cooperation in cyber defence and the establishment of common cyber capabilities, which are all rational responses to unconventional threats. The benefits stemming from such cooperation differ by state. The author is nonetheless convinced that the United States will benefit the most from the said cooperation as their economy is the most dependent on information and communication technology, the most globalised and allegedly the most frequent target of cyber attacks.

Key words *Cyber defence, international security organizations, international law.*

Introduction Amid a growing number of cyber attacks, reflections on cyber conflicts and, consequently, the most effective national organization for their prevention and management are becoming more frequent. Although Slovenia is responding to the phenomenon of cyber conflicts, its responses are not proactive. On the other hand, its active adjustment to external influences can be easily perceived. The paper focuses on the role of international security organizations in the management of the member states' behaviour in cyber conflicts on the one hand, and on national security needs on the other. At the abstract level, we will address the role of international organizations in the formation of consensus on values, norms and rules referring to cyber warfare, or the normativisation and the structure-unit relationship. At the practical level, we will address the relationship between NATO and Slovenia.

In international organizations, consensus is built around an institution's legitimacy for cooperation in the field of unconventional threats and a member state's participation in policy programming. The attainment of consensus is part of the output of international security organizations that may be dissected into policy programming, information activity and operations (Rittberger & Zangl, 2006). International security organizations' information activities are also the categorization of actions that will be perceived by member states as activities leading to cyber conflicts, the dissemination of information and the analysis of examples and good practices.

Until now, the international community has not been able to produce a unique interpretation of the current rules and principles of international law regarding cyber conflicts and cyber warfare. However, the areas of international law that are especially important for the development of international norms in cyberspace may nonetheless be identified: *jus ad bellum*, *jus in bello* and the neutrality of a state. The nature of cyberspace as such hinders the implementation of the principles of necessity, proportionality, distinction and neutrality in cyber warfare. In the international community, however, the legal discourse is not a quest for an objective truth waiting to be discovered (Johnstone, 2003), but rather a discourse on committed acts and practices that originate from common understanding and beliefs forming the background of cyber conflicts and cyber warfare. We must distinguish between the legislative and normative role at the national level and normativisation, i.e. the full process, from the introduction of the principles of international law to the creation of international rules and treaties, at the international level. The discussions on the role of national legislation and national development are not the subject of this paper.

Nonetheless, we will try to define the strategic, directional, developmental and doctrinal role of the armed forces, this definition pertaining more to the military science than the international political sciences. At the national level, the strategic role of the armed forces consists of the development of the national strategy for cyber security and defence. It refers to the modernization of the legislation on information

society and defence with a view to providing support to national measures, and reflects the level of national dependence on information and communication technology. The military sub-system's developmental role is oriented towards ensuring the Slovenian Armed Forces with a position and a role in the provision of effective response to cyber threats, and towards the organizational placement and coordination of all capabilities for incident management and cyber security provision. The directional role is defined by the formation of objectives, different forms of civil-military cooperation and the identification and definition of goals in cyber incidents management. The doctrinal role includes the development of optimum techniques, tactics and procedures (TTP) for the provision of national security.

The paper is based on a constructivist theory of international relations (Onuf, Kratochwil) and post-structuralism (Der Derian) in which the use of statistical data is more of an exception than a rule. Slovenian contribution to science that should be mentioned in this context is the Svete's concept of information and communication technologies in the form of social and technical networks, which is also based on constructivism (Svete, 2005). The paper uses the descriptive and the comparative method, focusing on the following research questions:

- (1) Are large states leading in the normativisation of unconventional security threats in international organizations?
- (2) Are the changed challenges in the environment facing the international security organization with new security needs of their members?

1 ORIGIN OF CYBER WARFARE RULES

The member states' benefits deriving from their participation in international security organizations differ. Cyber conflict management turns out to be most profitable for the USA, as their economy is the most dependent on ICT, the most globalised and allegedly the most frequent target of cyber attacks. Hence, the USA are most interested in the promotion and most eager to promote such conversion of national needs in the international arena, as they will benefit the most from it. For the USA, intergovernmental negotiations are one of the most beneficial standard ways of conversion of the member states' needs into the result of the international community's work increasing national and international security; in NATO, the USA have resources for effective mobilization at their disposal. To complete the picture, let us list other manners of conversion of such needs: polling, use of standardized procedures and regulations, management policy and rational choice (Rittberger & Zangl, 2006).

Small countries with a low level of involvement in the international economic flow, whose economies are not strongly based on ICT, and countries that are less at risk due to their peaceful external policies, are less interested in the participation in the field of cyber defence. Their motivation to participate is additionally reduced by

the security dilemma which has an overall negative influence on cooperation. In a cyber security dilemma, certain dimensions are accentuated, since the relativization of the level of threat is even greater than for conventional threats, the secrecy and the lack of transparency in the use of cyber weapons are large and they even provide the national security system with a decisive advantage (Axelrod & Iliev, 2014). However, unlike with conventional threats, here exists a possibility of restoration of the information structure. The cyber security dilemma reduces the possibility of cooperation between the states.

NATO produces cyber politics (Nato, 2011), provides for education and the exchange of information in the excellence centre, and the publicistic activity. It is a little less involved in the development of the member states' operational capabilities for joint cyber defence and cyber warfare. In the field of operations (computer network operations – CNO), NATO, as documented, supported the USA's activities in the context of the Allied Force operation in 1999 (Lambeth, 2002) through offensive methods, but did, however, not respond to Estonian calls for assistance in 2007 (Meyer & Ummelas, 2007, May 17). In 2014, the USA expressed doubt whether Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty may be invoked in the event of a cyber attack. Following the Ukrainian crisis and the strained security situation of East European member states, a predominant belief emerged in the America's elite that Article 5 might lead to failure; as affirmed by the former head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) John McLaughlin, a direct call for solidarity might thoroughly shake NATO's foundations (Calabressi, 2014).

Essential for the understanding of the method of warfare and the introduction of organizational changes is the understanding of cyberspace in relation to the new assignments of the armed forces. Notions from the field of cyber security help define the phenomenon, overcome conceptual problems in cyber defence and cyber warfare, study new concepts such as cyber resistance, and indicate new possibilities for the management of cyber threats (Rantapelkonen, 2014). The nature of cyber defence is oriented inwards. Nevertheless, as stated in the comparison study of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), armed forces carry out the new non-conventional internal assignments without armament (Schnabel & Hristov, 2010). Even the offensive cyber weapons cannot be classified as classic armament, as they are in fact a computer programme called “weaponized code” in jargon. Numerous companies develop codes for attacking vulnerabilities in target operations systems and applications. Military and intelligence organizations buy such equipment on the open market, at which the USA lead in terms of value and the complexity of the purchase (Menn, 2013).

How are the armed forces to perform their new assignment, which is something in between computer forensics and deliberate cooperation, with top-notch mathematicians and computer experts and the purchase of appropriate offensive code on the open market? The American model that again offers itself does not correspond to the capabilities and the needs of a small state with limited resources as Slovenia. On

the inside, the Slovenian Armed Forces require organizational solutions that enable intensive cooperation with other competent bodies in state administration, new partners among the telecommunication companies and companies for information security, and a system-based approach in the provision of human resources.

Table 1:
Average number
of affected users
by sector in
2013
Source:
Symantec, p. 41
(Symantec,
2014).

| Sector | Average number of identities per incident |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| accounting | 673,916 |
| administration and human resources | 150,650 |
| agriculture | 37,000 |
| civil society and non-profit sector | 34,614 |
| computer hardware | 100,000 |
| computer software | 12,761,182 |
| education | 100,267 |
| finance sector | 11,884,222 |
| government sector | 99,893 |
| healthcare | 67,519 |
| tourism | 2,034,232 |
| information technology | 4,500,230 |
| insurance business | 114,775 |
| police | 1,119 |
| military | 26,500 |
| retail trade | 8,692,318 |
| social networks | 16,083,333 |
| telecom | 3,029,286 |
| transportation business | 243,390 |
| engineering | 20,000 |

Table 2:
Statistics
of relevant
incidents in
Slovenia
Source:
SI-CERT, p. 10
(SI-CERT, 2014).

| TYPE OF INCIDENT | 2012 | 2013 |
|--------------------------------------|------------|------------|
| scanning and attempt of scanning | 51 | 43 |
| botnet | 12 | 16 |
| Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) | 47 | 76 |
| harmful code | 258 | 417 |
| service abuse | 9 | 8 |
| hacking | 76 | 61 |
| abuse of a user's account | 9 | 37 |
| webpage defacement | 125 | 80 |
| attacks on the application | 17 | 22 |
| Total technical attacks: | 604 | 760 |
| identity theft | 67 | 56 |
| fraud | 161 | 210 |
| spam | 74 | 50 |
| phishing | 139 | 209 |
| dialer | 1 | 0 |
| Total frauds, deceptions: | 442 | 525 |

Attacks on military networks, as recorded by Symantec in 2013, were not widespread (Internet Security Threat Report (ISTR), 2014). On the basis of the data in Table 1, most cyber attacks are qualified as criminal acts. Social networks are that sector in which most users are infected and in which the infections are spreading the most. As the reporting of an attack to the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) is currently voluntary, states seldom report of attacks on the critical infrastructure. The EU is now starting to gradually strain this legislation.

According to the SI-CERT data listed in Table 2, there were altogether 1,513 incidents in Slovenia in 2013, which means a **21 percent increase from 2012 when 1,250 incidents were dealt with**. What stands out in particular is the increase of the harmful code incident, and an over 50 percent increase of phishing and the number of internet frauds and deceptions (SI-CERT, 2014).

In the international sense, our question is how the states should act to each other in a cyber environment, at which we perceive the characteristics of a bad cyber neighbourhood, the increasing distrust in internet services due to cyber crime, resistance to mass control and other transnational phenomena. Values in the background of international discussions are subjective; however, international law on cyber conflicts is not an objective reality waiting to be discovered but rather a product of customs, norms and the resulting rules. Hence, the rules of cyber warfare collected and presented in the NATO Talinn Manual will also most likely influence the establishment of international law.

The emerging rules of cyber warfare address questions on which consensus is yet to be reached among the professionals, in the institutions of the Slovenian Armed Forces and the state, the politics and international organizations. To the author's belief, the most important questions for Slovenia are those pertaining to ethics and norms as well as their resultant which is an optimum structure for the provision of national cyber security. In terms of cyber security provision, the armed forces are only in the second place; primary security refers to information security which is the responsibility of companies, individuals and the police. Non-military actors also play an important role in cyber defence (computer network defence – CND); however, offensive operations already call for activities governed by the international law, the answers to which may be found in the Talinn Manual. These are: types of warfare, allowed use of cyber weapons, prohibitions, definition of the intermediate area of intelligence activities that are subject to civilian and military intelligence agencies, and the protection of individual groups, such as reporters, humanitarian and medical workers, children and other.

International organizations classify categories of problems defining their priority order and identifying their actors (Sil & Katzenstein, 2010). With its cyber policy, NATO follows this logic of problem classification. We could even claim that NATO forms recommendations for the management of actors, i.e. members of the Alliance. The author offers two examples of recommendations that have not yet been issued

despite a clearly expressed need in the environment, namely the recommendations for the limitation of purchase on the black market and the export of technologies for mass control to authoritarian states.

1.1 Armed Conflict

Let us move from the formation of rules for international cyber conflicts to a more detailed definition of procedures and rules in NATO. The manual does not define NATO's rules for offensive operations, yet it authorises the use of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty only if the conditions regarding the criteria for an armed attack are met.

1.1.1 Criteria for an Armed Attack: Effect, Conduct

The answer to the question whether a cyber attack may qualify as an armed attack depends on its scope and effect – something we could verify objectively only after the attack. However, the group of participating experts agreed that an estimate of reasonably predictive consequences of such an attack suffices for making a decision on whether the measure meets the conditions for an armed attack. If we make an unambiguous conclusion; the decision whether a cyber attack is an armed attack is a matter of consequence assessment. Schmitt (Schmitt, 2014) claims that a response with force, whether kinetic or not, may be justified only when cyber operations present an armed attack. A response using force is a subject of the international humanitarian law; however, we still lack responses regarding the consequences of cyber operations.

Additional criteria for an armed attack refer to the characteristics of the conduct of a cyber attack, that is the operation of a computer programme *weaponized code*. These assessments are listed in the manual: we are referring to necessity and proportionality (rule 14), imminence and directness (rule 15). However, each individual offensive cyber activity must be analysed before it could be defined as an armed attack by a state or by NATO member states. Forensic definition of an armed attack, appropriate international legal argumentation and diplomatic action are of great importance when referring to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Essential for the activation of the article from the formal point of view is the invitation of the state under attack and the agreement of member states on whether the attack meets NATO criteria. When justifying its decision, the state under attack may resource to the following questions (Schmitt, 2013):

- What is the damage caused and the number of victims due to the attack?
- How quickly did the malicious code cause an effect?
- Did cyber attack cause an effect directly or was the effect increased due to any other reasons?
- How invasive was the activity? Was it oriented towards a specific protected network?
- How measurable is the effect? Is the calculation of the effect reliable?¹
- Did the activity have a military character?

¹ *Poor defence adds to the effect.*

- Could the act qualify as use of force under the international law?
- Is the state involved directly or indirectly?

For such interdisciplinary reasoning, participation of experts from different fields is essential. The definition of the level of invasiveness, in particular, requires the cooperation of information security experts who by default assess and analyse each attack according to the selected standards.² The experts that often come from the private sector enjoy international reputation and provide their advice to a number of different governments that require their assistance.

To this end we will try to systemise the needs of small and large states in the provision of national cyber security, with the researchers of the relationship between states and networks already being aware of the fact that security and securitization have become leading elements in internet management (Mueller, 2010). The taxonomy of cyberspace management will be used for sorting key activities of state actors in the provision of national security. The units are divided into two groups; the groups of small and large states at which the group of large states includes NATO members such as France, Canada, Germany, Great Britain and the USA, while all other members belong to the group of small states.

Table 3:
The taxonomy
of cyberspace
management
for purposes of
national security

| | Strategic objective | Jurisdiction | Management control |
|------------------------|--|--|--|
| Large states | predominant in the cyberspace | Strive towards extraterritoriality of the national legislation, unilateral globalism | high, formal, hierarchical |
| Small states | choice between proactive adaptation and accommodation and the emerging regime | erodes | based on trust, reciprocity, resources sharing |
| Regardless of the size | digital human rights (privacy, mass control, data protection), programming of joint resources for network management (TRIPS, IP, DPI, international institutions such as WIPO, ICANN, WTO, IGF), adjustment of the content, response to security globalisation (uninterrupted cooperation of the international community, shared values, norms and principles, stability and immunity of networks) | | |

² *Characteristic information for an attack model and the selection of forensic experts are: the classification of an attack, description of the code functioning, target vulnerability, method of attack, the attacker's objective, sources, skills and knowledge for the implementation of attack, solutions for stopping the malicious code, description of circumstances and references.*

Based on the taxonomy of cyberspace management for purposes of national security presented in Table 3, it can be concluded that cyberspace has confronted the states with new security requirements that they were not familiar with at the time before the national economies became vitally dependant on cyberspace. Table 3 depicts key activities of states in cyber management from the aspect of network security provision. It should be mentioned that only state actors, and not non-governmental organizations, are included in the table, and as far as priority management tasks are concerned, national security is essential, while any solutions of technical and operator problems are neglected.

Network security is a security requirement that states try to meet in the international arena. It is such a great challenge that NATO officially recognised it as a new security requirement of member states in the context of the policy *Defending the Networks* (NATO, 2011). The new security requirement of states is stability and the immunity of networks. It was named by NATO as the standardization of processes leading to the increase in the immunity of national networks and the critical infrastructure, which is the purpose of cyber defence. The purpose of all defence politics, activities and measures is to increase immunity. The latter is considered a capability to predict natural disasters or man-made disasters, to avoid them, minimize them and recover from them (O'Neil, 2009).

The need for state security is thus realized through the conversion of a state's requirements by interfering with the management of networks and the world web, the regulation of content, the allocation of domains and the monitoring of other management means. As claimed by Mueller, there exists a possibility of occurrence of a regulatory coalition between the content regulators, the defenders of intellectual property and the defenders of security for hierarchic control over the internet based on the national principle (Mueller, 2010).

1.2 Use of Force

A cyber attack is considered use of force, regardless of the type of weapons used, which in our case is a computer programme, also called the "weaponized code". The use of force is prohibited in the international environment; however, in accordance with the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice, in general all activities not expressly forbidden by international law are allowed (The Case of the S.S. *Lotus*, France v. Turkey). It is therefore important to know which Slovenian cyber activities could be considered as the use of force before the Permanent Court of International Justice, as they would also be perceived as such by the UN and NATO. A response that is in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter is allowed for a cyber attack that is considered as the use of force. The use of force, however, is not yet equal to an armed attack in the event of which a signatory of the North Atlantic Treaty could ask for collective defence based on Article 5.

However, no state, even if its national scientific circles, professionals and the politics fail to reach a consensus on whether cyber operations (CNO) are to be considered as the use of force, can plead ignorance before an international court. States are obliged to comply with the international law under which false consciousness cannot be considered protective consciousness. The use of force is hence perceived as a key concept for the establishment of cyber defence at the national level.³

The behaviour of a state in the cyber environment is founded on its strategic culture; however, certain activities, such as spying (computer network exploitation – CNE), are expected and silently approved of in international relations. Such activities also exist in the part of the international law referring to cyber warfare. However, a preventive attack on a potential attacker who has cyber capabilities at his disposal but who has no intent to commit an armed attack is in contradiction with the international law.⁴

The technical characteristics of the course of an attack, e.g. for the zero-day vulnerability, render the incorporation of cyber attacks into the time and cause-effect dimension difficult. There is a very thin line between the use of force and an armed conflict that is especially difficult to define in a cyber environment. Any incorrect or biased interpretations may cause a decline of confidence in international law and in the abilities of international security organizations to manage the behaviour of states at a normative level.

Cyber warfare allows for actions that might not even be possible in a kinetic environment, but can be expected in a cyber conflict. Following is a list of a number of interesting and inspiring legitimate ruses:

- Transmission of false information and intelligence;
- Transmission of false orders or an intent to issue an order;
- Establishment of virtual networks, simulated by non-existing forces;
- Use of faulty identifiers and computer networks (e.g. Honeypots also used by the police in peacetime);
- Use of virtual cyber attacks under the condition that panic does not spread among the civilian population;
- Use of enemy markings, signals and paroles, but not the markings of humanitarian or medical organizations.

In cyber environment, psychological operations units obtained a new important dimension for the development of the skill of deception. It is wise to ask oneself how much a small state can influence the perception of the state's soft (cyber) power through deception using the new policy to its benefit. Digital diplomacy is a good start, while the system answer is once again the development of appropriate constructivist theories and models. Recent attempts can be found in the models

³ *More on the permissibility of offensive activity (computer network attack CNA) in the context of cyber defence (CND) in Slovenia can be found in the discussion on the development of offensive cyber capabilities in the author's published papers (Dvoršak, 2014).*

⁴ *Compare the justification of the attack on Iraq in 2003 and the response of the old Europe stating that the sole existence of the weapons of mass destruction is not merely a *causis belli*.*

of social and technical networks (Svete, 2005) and the military-industrial-media-entertainment-net (MIME-net) (Der Derian, 2001). The likely responses of a state to cyber operations are limited by international law. It is therefore clear that spying does not classify as an armed conflict or an armed attack under Article 51 of the UN Charter, hence no response based on the law of armed conflict is justifiable. Mutual spying is acceptable. It is a little less clear what the case with the purchase of equipment and programmes is and the information and communication technology that does not correspond to integrity requirements. In short, is responsibility attached only to the purchaser or do the states that have asked the manufacturers to install the malicious code on the new equipment also bear part of that responsibility? A similar ethical question appeared when companies of the West European states exported mass control technology to non-democratic regimes.

The most tangible result of NATO cyber politics is the preservation or reproduction of security at the national and regional level. In its representative and perceptive dimension, security is not a measurable value for constructivists, but merely a feeling of security inherent to the entities of security, i.e. citizens of NATO member states, national elites and the international elite. We have perceived conflicts between the interests of the economic and technical elite in the export of technology for mass control and the interests of citizens due to non-democratic potential of these technologies, used by the political elites for control of the citizens in both authoritarian and non-authoritarian states.

1.3 Sabotage

Let us look at an example of sabotage that is seldom addressed in the literature on armed conflicts. The situation is even more fluid with the sabotage of critical infrastructure and dual-use technology in the time of peace. For purposes of defining sabotage in military networks, Article 5 of the IV Geneva Convention should be taken as a basis. The convention states that an individual shall lose protection provided by the conventions if he carries out activities hostile to the security of a state (Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949).

An activity hostile to the security of a state offers two presumptions. First, that a certain fact has already taken place or that a certain event has already occurred, which has already been established. Second, that the adjective hostile does not indicate an intention or the finality of this event that is hostile or in other words malicious.

It is difficult to offer a unified definition of committed acts with hostile intent. It is most likely that the IV Geneva Convention included all intelligence activities and sabotage inherent to the hostile state in this definition. Indirectly, Article 5 defines sabotage as an act the intent or objective of which is to damage material property of the opponent's armed forces or the property used by the armed forces. In contemporary cyber defence language, sabotage affects the integrity and accessibility of networks, while the CNE, on the other hand, affects the confidentiality of networks and data.

In accordance with the interpretation in the Talinn Manual, a state under attack has the right to damage assessment even prior to the actual occurrence of such damage. According to NATO's manual that, in wartime, equates the dual-purpose technology with the technology used exclusively by the armed forces, counter-intelligence activities are intended also for the detection of sabotage and dual-use technology, which represents a large part of ICT and technology that serves as a basis for critical infrastructure and certain companies in state ownership. Due to the above-mentioned, the author believes that the discussion regarding sabotage is particularly interesting for the importing states, Slovenia included, and less interesting for exporters of top-notch technologies.

The militarisation of the cyber environment through sabotage, the testimonials of which are presented in Snowden's public disclosures, increased America's military domination in cyberspace, which can be understood as its legitimate objective. On the other hand, sabotage reduced the security of national networks, which is most often discussed and written by information security experts. All this is also in direct contradiction with the national security interests of states that are distinct net importers of ICT. The arrangement for the provision of the dual-use technology and ICT falls behind the capabilities of the exporting states, in terms of legislation and institutions, to use such technology for their own purposes, either peaceful or hostile. In the future, the tasks and responsibilities of national institutions most responsible for cyber security will increase. In addition, the type of inter-institutional cooperation and the organization of structures providing cyber security in an operational manner will also change, while fresh winds in the theoretical field have been called for for quite some time. The manners in which both large and small states respond to the globalization of security already differ from one another; however, non-state actors, private companies and non-governmental organizations will most likely intervene in the solution of these interests even further.

Conclusion The intent of this paper is to highlight certain discrepancies between the Talinn Manual and the security requirements of small states. The basic contradiction in the provision of collective security is the conversion of the needs of member states into a relative feeling of security of two entities, e.g. the national economic elites and the citizens. The second contradiction is the structure of such a security organization that would support only America's leading role in the provision of global security and not attempt to meet security requirements of other member states.

NATO can expect to see activities for the increase of cyber capabilities of member states and the search for effective response to non-conventional threats. However, it would be unreasonable to expect that all offers will be equally beneficial to all member states. In the future, members of the Alliance will be faced with the challenge to determine which requirements from the environment are met by the Alliance, if any at all, and which objectives should be met through the Alliance's activities. Events in the environment are a severe test of whether the activities in NATO are oriented enough towards the security of the citizens of the European member states.

The most important finding for Slovenia at the abstract level is how consensus-based decision making influences the interests of smaller members and how important a state's position in the organization is (agency vs. structure). These are the questions that are essential for the future of the Alliance.

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Uroš lampret

Uroš Lampret je diplomant Ekonomske fakultete in Fakultete za družbene vede. Leta 2000 se je zaposlil v Službi za mednarodne odnose Ministrstva za obrambo, opravil enoletni staž v Mednarodnem sekretariatu zavezništva na sedežu Nata, se pridružil obrambnemu oddelku Stalne misije RS pri zvezi Nato, leta 2009 prevzel vodenje Oddelka za severnoatlantske integracije in leta 2011 mesto vodje Sektorja za evroatlantske integracije v Direktoratu za obrambno politiko. Od avgusta 2013 je vodja obrambnega oddelka na Stalnem predstavništvu RS pri zvezi Nato in EU.

Uroš Lampret graduated from the Faculty of Economics and the Faculty of Social Sciences. In 2000 he was employed by the International Relations Service at the Ministry of Defence, then he completed one-year internship at the International Secretariat at NATO HQ and joined the Defence Section of the Republic of Slovenia's Permanent Mission to NATO. In 2009 he was appointed head of the North-Atlantic Integration Section and in 2011 became head of the Euro-Atlantic Integration Division within the Defence Policy Directorate. Since August 2013, he has been in charge of the Defence Section at the Republic of Slovenia's Permanent Mission to NATO and the EU.



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Andrej Osterman

Brigadir dr. Andrej Osterman je leta 1986 končal študij na Pravni fakulteti v Ljubljani, leta 2004 magistrski študij prava in leta 2010 doktorski študij na Fakulteti za logistiko v Celju. Končal je več vojaških izobraževanj. Vojaško kariero je začel v Teritorialni obrambi Republike Slovenije leta 1981 kot rezervni častnik. V njej se je zaposlil leta 1991. V dosedanji vojaški karieri je opravljal različne štabne in poveljniške dolžnosti. Trenutno je namestnik načelnika GŠSV. Napisal in objavil je več člankov in s prispevki sodeloval na domačih in mednarodnih konferencah.

Brigadier General Andrej Osterman, PhD, graduated in 1986 from the Faculty of Law in Ljubljana. In 2004 he completed his master studies in law and in 2010 earned his PhD degree from the Faculty of Logistics in Celje. He received comprehensive military education and training. He began his military career in the Territorial Defence Forces of the Republic of Slovenia in 1981 as the officer of reserve forces, where he was employed in 1991. Throughout his military career, he has served in various staff and command duties, and is currently holding the position of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Slovenian Armed Forces. He is the author of several articles, and has lectured at domestic and international conferences.



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Janez Urbanc

Janez Urbanc je leta 1996 diplomiral iz obramboslovja na Fakulteti za družbene vede Univerze v Ljubljani. Kot strokovnjak na področju obveščevalne dejavnosti z več kot 15-letnimi izkušnjami je opravljal različna dela in naloge. Med drugim je več let sodeloval v različnih obveščevalnih organih Nata in EU. Od novembra 2010 do julija 2014 je delal v Natovem centru za obveščevalno fuzijo pri Kraljevem vojnem letalstvu v Molesworthu v Združenem kraljestvu.

Janez Urbanc graduated from the University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Studies in 1996 with a degree in Defence Sciences. He is the intelligence professional with more than 15 years of experiences and has served in multiple intelligence duties and assignments. Among other duties he for several years participated in the work of many intelligence bodies in both NATO and the EU. From Nov 2010 until July 2014 he worked in the NATO Intelligence Fusion Center at RAF Molesworth, United Kingdom.



Aljoša Selan

Mag. Aljoša Selan je diplomiral in magistriral na področju političnega liderstva. Od leta 2000 dela na področju obrambne politike. Končal je različna usposabljanja iz obrambnega menedžmenta v ZDA in Veliki Britaniji. Več let je bil stalni soproedsedujoči pobude Southeast Europe Clearing-House. Vodil je Sektor za evroatlantske integracije, trenutno pa vodi Sektor za mednarodne operacije in misije v Direktoratu za obrambno politiko. V letih od 2011 do 2012 je bil obrambni svetovalec na Ministrstvu za obrambo Črne gore. Leta 2013 je v poveljstvu Isafa v Kabulu deloval kot svetovalec za analize politik.

Aljoša Selan, MSc, earned his Bachelor and Master's Degrees in political leadership studies and has been involved in defence policy since 2000. He completed different courses in defence management in the U.S. and the United Kingdom. For several years he has acted as a permanent Co-Chair of the Southeast Europe Clearing-House Initiative. He was in charge of the Euro-Atlantic Integration Division and is currently heading the International Operations and Missions Division at the Defence Policy Directorate. From 2011 to 2012 he functioned as Defence Advisor at the Ministry of Defence of Montenegro, and performed the function of Policy Advisor at ISAF HQ in Kabul in 2013.



Adriana Dvoršak

Mag. Adriana Dvoršak je magistrirala iz evropskih študij na šoli za podiplomske evropske študije v Belgiji. Raziskovalno se ukvarja z vplivom informacijsko-komunikacijskih tehnologij na mednarodne odnose in mednarodno varnost. S pisnimi prispevki o nacionalni varnosti v globalni informacijski družbi je sodelovala na različnih konferencah z mednarodno udeležbo, med drugim na nacionalni konferenci Fakultete za varnostne študije Informacijska varnost – smernice za prihodnost in na mednarodni konferenci Inštituta za korporativno varnost Informacijska varnost – danes in jutri.

Adriana Dvoršak, MSc, earned her Master's Degree in European Studies from the College of Europe in Belgium. In her research work she deals with the impact of information and communication technologies on international relations and security. As the author of written articles on national security in the global information society she has participated in various international conferences, and has among other things presented the topic Guidelines for the Future at the national conference of the Faculty of Criminal Justice and Security, and the topic Information Security – Today and Tomorrow at the international conference of the Institute for Corporate Security Studies.

Navodila avtorjem
za oblikovanje prispevkov

Instructions for the authors
of papers

NAVODILA AVTORJEM ZA OBLIKOVANJE PRISPEVKOV ZA SODOBNE VOJAŠKE IZZIVE IN VOJAŠKOŠOLSKI ZBORNIK

Vsebinska navodila

Splošno

Sodobni vojaški izzivi je interdisciplinarna znanstveno-strokovna publikacija, ki objavlja prispevke o aktualnih temah, raziskavah, znanstvenih in strokovnih razpravah, tehničnih ali družboslovnih analizah z varnostnega, obrambnega in vojaškega področja.

Vojaškošolski zbornik je vojaškostrokovna in informativna publikacija, namenjena izobraževanju in obveščanju o dosežkih ter izkušnjah na področju vojaškega izobraževanja, usposabljanja in izpopolnjevanja.

Kaj objavljamo?

Objavljamo prispevke v slovenskem jeziku s povzetki, prevedenimi v angleški jezik, in po odločitvi uredniškega odbora prispevke v angleškem jeziku s povzetki, prevedenimi v slovenski jezik.

Objavljamo prispevke, ki še niso bili objavljeni ali poslani v objavo drugi reviji. Pisec je odgovoren za vse morebitne kršitve avtorskih pravic. Če je bil prispevek že natisnjen drugje, poslan v objavo ali predstavljen na strokovni konferenci, naj to avtor sporočiti uredniku in pridobiti soglasje založnika (če je treba) ter navesti razloge za ponovno objavo.

Tehnična navodila

Omejitve dolžine prispevkov

Prispevki naj obsegajo 16 strani oziroma 30.000 znakov s presledki (avtorska pola), izjemoma najmanj 8 strani oziroma 15.000 znakov ali največ 24 strani oziroma 45.000 znakov.

Recenzije

Prispevki se recenzirajo. Recenzija je anonimna. Glede na oceno recenzentov uredniški odbor ali urednik prispevek sprejme, če je treba, zahteva popravke ali ga zavrne. Pripombe recenzentov avtor vnese v prispevek.

Zaradi anonimnega recenzentskega postopka je treba prvo stran in vsebino oblikovati tako, da identiteta avtorja ni prepoznavna.

Avtor ob naslovu prispevka napiše, v katero kategorijo po njegovem mnenju in glede na klasifikacijo v COBISS spada njegov prispevek. Klasifikacija je dostopna na spletni strani revije in pri odgovornem uredniku. Končno klasifikacijo določi uredniški odbor.

| | |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| Lektoriranje | Lektoriranje besedil zagotavlja OE, pristojna za založniško dejavnost. Lektorirana besedila se avtorizirajo. |
| Prevajanje | Prevajanje besedil ali povzetkov zagotavlja OE, pristojna za prevajalsko dejavnost oziroma Šola za tuje jezike Centra vojaških šol. |
| Navajanje avtorjev prispevka | Navajanje avtorjev je skrajno zgoraj, levo poravnano. <i>Primer:</i> Ime 1 Priimek 1, Ime 2 Priimek 2 V opombi pod črto se za slovenske avtorje navede, iz katere ustanove prihajajo. Pri tujih avtorjih je treba navesti tudi ime države. |
| Naslov prispevka | Navedbi avtorjev sledi naslov prispevka. Črke v naslovu so velike 16 pik, natisnjene krepko, besedilo naslova pa poravnano na sredini. |
| Povzetek | Prispevku mora biti dodan povzetek, ki obsega največ 1200 znakov (20 vrstic). Povzetek naj na kratko opredeli temo prispevka, predvsem naj povzame rezultate in ugotovitve. Splošne ugotovitve in misli ne spadajo v povzetek, temveč v uvod. |
| Povzetek v angleščini | Avtorji morajo oddati tudi prevod povzetka v angleščino. Tudi za prevod povzetka velja omejitev do 1200 znakov (20 vrstic). |
| Ključne besede | Ključne besede (3-5, tudi v angleškem jeziku) naj bodo natisnjene krepko in z obojestransko poravnavo besedila. |
| Besedilo | Avtorji naj oddajo svoje prispevke na papirju formata A4, s presledkom med vrsticami 1,5 in velikostjo črk 12 pik Arial. Na zgornjem in spodnjem robu naj bo do besedila približno 3 cm, levi rob naj bo širok 2 cm, desni pa 4 cm. Na vsaki strani je tako približno 30 vrstic s približno 62 znaki. Besedilo naj bo obojestransko poravnano, brez umikov na začetku odstavka. |
| Kratka predstavitev avtorjev | Avtorji morajo pripraviti kratko predstavitev svojega strokovnega oziroma znanstvenega dela. Predstavitev naj ne presega 600 znakov (10 vrstic, 80 besed). Če je avtorjev več, se predstavi vsak posebej, čim bolj zgoščeno. Avtorji naj besedilo umestijo na konec prispevka po navedeni literaturi. |

Strukturiranje besedila

Posamezna poglavja v besedilu naj bodo ločena s samostojnimi podnaslovi in ustrezno oštevilčena (členitev največ na 4 ravni).

Primer:

1 Uvod

2 Naslov poglavja (1. raven)

2.1 Podnaslov (2. raven)

2.1.1 Podnaslov (3. raven)

2.1.1.1 Podnaslov (4. raven)

Oblikovanje seznama literature

V seznamu literature je treba po abecednem redu navesti le avtorje, na katere se sklicujete v prispevku, celotna oznaka vira pa mora biti skladna s harvardskim načinom navajanja. Če je avtorjev več, navedemo vse, kot so navedeni na izvirnem delu.

Primeri:

a) knjiga:

Priimek, ime (lahko začetnica imena), letnica. *Naslov dela*. Kraj: Založba.

Na primer: Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

b) zbornik:

Samson, C., 1970. Problems of information studies in history. V S. Stone, ur. *Humanities information research*. Sheffield: CRUS, 1980, str./pp. 44–68. Pri posameznih člankih v zbornikih na koncu posameznega vira navedemo strani, na katerih je članek, na primer:

c) članek v reviji

Kolega, N., 2006. Slovenian coast sea flood risk. *Acta geographica Slovenica*. 46-2, str. 143–167.

Navajanje virov z interneta

Vse reference se začenjajo enako kot pri natisnjenih virih, le da običajnemu delu sledi še podatek o tem, kje na internetu je bil dokument dobljen in kdaj. Podatek o tem, kdaj je bil dokument dobljen, je pomemben zaradi pogostega spreminjanja www okolja.

Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, str. 45–100. <http://www.mors.si/index.php?id=213>, 17. 10. 2008.

Pri navajanju zanimivih internetnih naslovov v besedilu (ne gre za navajanje posebnega dokumenta) zadošča navedba naslova (<http://www.vpvs.uni-lj.si>). Posebna referenca na koncu besedila v tem primeru ni potrebna.

Sklicevanje na vire

Pri sklicevanju na vire med besedilom navedite le priimek prvega avtorja in letnico izdaje. *Primer: ... (Smith, 1997) ...*

Če dobesedno navajate del besedila, ga ustrezno označite z narekovaji, v oklepaju pa poleg avtorja in letnice navedite stran besedila, iz katerega ste navajali.

Primer: ... (Smith, 1997, str. 15) ...


Pri povzemanju drugega avtorja napišemo besedilo brez narekovajev, v oklepaju pa napišemo, da gre za povzeto besedilo. *Primer: (po Smith, 1997, str. 15).* Če avtorja navajamo v besedilu, v oklepaju navedemo samo letnico izida in stran (1997, str. 15).

Slike, diagrami in tabele

Slike, diagrami in tabele v prispevku naj bodo v posebej pripravljenih datotekah, ki omogočajo lektorske popravke. V besedilu mora biti jasno označeno mesto, kamor je treba vnesti sliko. Skupna dolžina prispevka ne sme preseči dane omejitve.

Če avtor iz tehničnih razlogov grafičnih dodatkov ne more oddati v elektronski obliki, je izjemoma sprejemljivo, da slike priloži besedilu. Avtor mora v tem primeru na zadnjo stran slike napisati zaporedno številko in naslov, v besedilu pa pustiti dovolj prostora zanjo. Prav tako mora biti besedilo opremljeno z naslovom in številčenjem slike. Diagrami se štejejo kot slike. Vse slike in tabele se številčijo. Številčenje poteka enotno in ni povezano s številčenjem poglavij. Naslov slike je naveden pod sliko, naslov tabele pa nad tabelo. Navadno je v besedilu navedeno vsaj eno sklicevanje na sliko ali tabelo. Sklic na sliko ali tabelo je: ... (slika 5) ... (tabela 2) ...

Primer slike:



Slika 5: Naslov slike

Primer tabele:

Tabela 2: Naslov tabele



Opombe pod črto

Številčenje opomb pod črto je neodvisno od strukture besedila in se v vsakem prispevku začne s številko 1. Posebej opozarjamo avtorje, da so opombe pod črto namenjene pojasnjevanju misli, zapisanih v besedilu, in ne navajanju literature.

Kratice

Kratice naj bodo dodane v oklepaju, ko se okrajšana beseda prvič uporabi, zato posebnih seznamov kratic ne dodajamo. Za kratico ali izraz v angleškem jeziku napišemo najprej slovensko ustreznico, v oklepaju pa angleški izvornik in morebitno angleško kratico.

Format zapisa prispevka

Uredniški odbor sprejema prispevke, napisane z urejevalnikom besedil MS Word, izjemoma tudi v besedilnem zapisu (text only).

| | |
|--|---|
| Naslov avtorja | Prispevkom naj bosta dodana avtorjeva naslov in internetni naslov ali telefonska številka, na katerih bo dosegljiv uredniškemu odboru. |
| Kako poslati prispevek | Na naslov uredništva ali članov uredniškega odbora je treba poslati tiskano in elektronsko različico prispevka. |
| Potrjevanje sprejetja prispevka | Uredniški odbor avtorju pisno potrdi prejetje prispevka. Avtorjem, ki sporočijo tudi naslov svoje elektronske pošte, se potrditev pošlje po tej poti. |
| Korekture | Avtor opravi korekture svojega prispevka v treh dneh. |
| Naslov uredniškega odbora | Ministrstvo za obrambo Generalštab Slovenske vojske Sodobni vojaški izzivi Uredniški odbor Vojkova cesta 55 1000 Ljubljana Slovenija Elektronski naslov Odgovorna urednica: liliana.brozic@mors.si |

Prispevkov, ki ne bodo urejeni skladno s tem navodilom, uredniški odbor ne bo sprejemal.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE AUTHORS OF PAPERS FOR THE CONTEMPORARY MILITARY CHALLENGES AND THE MILITARY EDUCATION JOURNAL

Content-related instructions

General

The Contemporary Military Challenges is an interdisciplinary scientific expert magazine, which publishes papers on current topics, researches, scientific and expert discussions, technical or social sciences analysis from the field of security, defence and the military..

The Military Education Journal is a military professional and informative publication intended for education and informing on achievements and experiences in the field of military education, training and improvement.

What do we publish?

We publish papers in Slovene with abstracts translated into English. If so decided by the Editorial Board, we also publish papers in English with abstracts translated into Slovene.

We publish papers, which have not been previously published or sent to another magazine for publication. The author is held responsible for all possible copyright violations. If the paper has already been printed elsewhere, sent for publication or presented at an expert conference, the author must notify the editor, obtain the publisher's consent (if necessary) and indicate the reasons for republishing.

Technical instructions

Limitations regarding the length of the papers

The papers should consist of 16 typewritten double-spaced pages or 30,000 characters. At a minimum they should have 8 pages or 15,000 characters and at a maximum 24 pages or 45,000 characters.

- Reviews** All papers are reviewed. The review is anonymous. With regard to the reviewer's assessment, the Editorial Board or the editor accepts the paper, demands modifications, if necessary, or rejects it. Upon receiving the reviewers' remarks, the author inserts them into the paper.
Due to an anonymous review process, the first page must be designed in the way that the author's identity cannot be recognized.
Next to the title, the author should indicate the category the paper belongs to according to him and according to the classification in the COBISS¹. The classification is available on the magazine's internet page and at the responsible editor. The Editorial Board determines the final classification.
- Proofreading** The organizational unit responsible for publishing provides the proofreading of the papers. The proofread papers have to be approved.
- Translating** The translation of the papers or abstracts is provided by the organizational unit competent for translation or the School of Foreign Languages, Military Schools Centre.
- Indicating the authors of the paper** The authors' name should be written in the upper left corner, aligned left.
Example:
Name 1 Surname 1,
Name 2 Surname 2,
In the footnote, Slovenian authors should indicate the institution they come from. Foreign authors should also indicate the name of the state they come from.
- Title of the paper** The title of the paper is written below the listed authors. The font in the title is bold, size 16 points. The text of the title is centrally aligned.
- Abstract** The paper should have an abstract of a maximum 1,200 characters (20 lines). The abstract should include a short presentation of the topic, particularly the results and the findings. General findings and reflections do not belong in the abstract, but rather in the introduction.
- Abstract in English** The authors must also submit the translation of the abstract into English. The translation of the abstract is likewise limited to a maximum of 1,200 characters (20 lines).
- Key words** Key words (3-5 also in the English language) should be bold with a justified text alignment.
- Text** The authors should submit their papers on an A4 paper format, with 1.5 line spacing, fontArial size 12 points. At the upper and the bottom edge, there should be approx. 3 cm of space; the left margin should be 2 cm wide and the right margin 4 cm. Each page consists of approx. 30 lines with 62 characters. The text should have a justified alignment, without indents at the beginning of the paragraphs.

¹ Co-operative Online Bibliographic System and Services

A brief presentation of the authors

The authors should prepare a brief presentation of their expert or scientific work. The presentation should not exceed 600 characters (10 lines, 80 words). If there are several authors, each should be presented individually, as shortly and as comprehensively as possible. These texts should be placed at the end of the paper, after the cited literature.

Text structuring

Individual chapters should be separated with independent subtitles and adequately numbered.

Example:

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Title of the chapter (1st level)
- 2.1 Subtitle (2nd level)
- 2.1.1 Subtitle (3rd level)
- 2.1.1.1 Subtitle (4th level)

Referencing

In the bibliography, only the authors of references one refers to in the paper should be listed, in the alphabetical order. The entire reference has to be in compliance with the Harvard citing style.

Example:

Surname, name (can also be the initial of the name), year. *Title of the work*. Place. Publishing House.

Example:

Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

With certain papers published in journals, the author should indicate, at the end of each reference, a page on which the paper can be found.

Example:

Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. 45-100.

Referencing internet sources

All references start the same as the references for the printed sources, only that the usual part is followed by the information about the Internet page on which the document was found as well as the date on which it was found. The information about the time that the document was found on the Internet is important, because the WWW environment changes constantly.

Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. p. 45-100. <http://www.mors.si/index.php?id=213>, 17 October 2008.

When referencing interesting WWW pages in the text (not citing an individual document) it is enough to state only the Internet address (<http://www.vpvs.uni-lj.si>). A separate reference at the end of the text is therefore not necessary.

Citing

When citing sources in the text, indicate only the surname of the author and the year of publication. *Example:* (Smith, 1997) ...

When making a direct reference to a text, the cited part should be adequately marked with quotation marks and followed by the exact page of the text which the citing is taken from.

Example: ...(Smith, 1997, p.15) ...

Figures, diagrams, tables

Figures, diagrams and tables in the paper should be prepared in separate files which allow for proofreading corrections. The place in the text where the picture should be inserted must be clearly indicated. The total length of the paper must not surpass the given limitation.

Should the author not be able to submit the graphical supplements in the electronic form due to technical reasons, it is exceptionally acceptable to enclose the figures to the text. In this case the author must write a sequence number and a title on the back of each picture and leave enough space in the text to include it. The text must likewise contain the title and the sequence number of the figure. Diagrams are considered figures.

All figures and tables are numbered. The numbering is not uniform and not linked with the numbering of the chapters. The title of the figure is stated beneath it and the title of the table is stated above it.

As a rule, the paper should include at least one reference to a figure or a table..

Reference to a figure or a table is: ... (Figure 5) (Table 2)

Example of a figure:





Figure 5: Title of the figure

Example of a table:

Table 2: Title of the table



Footnotes

The numbering of the footnotes is not related to the structure of the text and starts with number 1 in each paper. We want to stress that the aim of the footnotes is to explain the thoughts written in the text and not to reference literature.

Abbreviations

When used for the first time, the abbreviations in the text must be explained in parenthesis; therefore no additional list of abbreviations is needed. If the abbreviations or terms are written in English, the appropriate Slovenian term should be written along with the English original and possibly the English abbreviation in the parenthesis.

Format type of the paper

The Editorial Board accepts only the texts written with a MS Word text editor and only exceptionally those in the 'text only' format.

| | |
|---|--|
| Author's address | Each paper should include the author's address, e-mail or a telephone number, so that the Editorial Board can reach him or her. |
| Sending the paper | A print or an electronic version of the paper should be sent to the address of the Editorial Board or the members of the Editorial Board. |
| Confirmation of the reception of the paper | The Editorial Board sends the author a written confirmation regarding the reception of the paper. The authors who also list their e-mails receive the confirmation via e-mail. |
| Corrections | The author makes corrections to the paper within three days. |
| Editorial Board address | Ministry of Defence Slovenian Armed Forces General Staff Contemporary Military Challenges Editorial Board Vojkova cesta 55 1000 Ljubljana Slovenia Electronic address: Editor in Chief: liliana.brozic@mors.si |

The Editorial Board will not accept papers, which will not be in compliance with the above instructions.

NATO PO LETU 2014 NAZAJ H KORENINAM ALI NAPREJ V PRIHODNOST?

NATO AFTER 2014 BACK TO THE ROOTS OR FORWARD TOWARDS THE FUTURE?

Povzetek Naslov kljub vprašaju in možnosti poenostavljenega razumevanja ne predstavlja nujno vprašanja o prihodnosti razvoja zavezništva. Nazaj in naprej ne pomenita dveh smeri, temveč bolj združevanje naučenih lekcij in poudarjanje veznega tkiva, ki je Nato skozi zgodovino ohranjalo tako močno, ter opremljanje tega zdravega jedra z mehanizmi, ki nas bodo še naprej ščitili pred celotnim spektrom groženj. Pred tistimi, ki jih poznamo, tistimi, ki jih lahko predvidevamo, ter nekako tudi pred tistimi, ki jih ne moremo predvideti. Pri zadnjih je ključna beseda prilagodljivost. V takšnem prikazu lahko prepoznamo daljnovidnost zavezniškega koncepta iz leta 2010, ki kljub pretresom v Vzhodni Evropi in na Bližnjem vzhodu ter s tem povezanim povečanim občutkom ogroženosti v nekaterih zaveznicah ostaja temeljni smerokaz organizaciji tudi za prihodnja leta.

Vračanje h koreninam pomeni zagotavljanje prepričljive pripravljenosti na kolektivno obrambo, usmeritev v prihodnost pa možnost uporabe zmogljivosti za delovanje pred spektrom različnih groženj in izvajanje drugih temeljnih nalog zavezništva. Za zagotavljanje verodostojnosti organizacije ni nujna revolucija, temveč preprosta izpolnitev preteklih zavez za zagotavljanje zmogljivosti. Prav s tem so imele članice veliko težav in ravno njihova počasnost je imela/in ima negativne posledice na zavezniško kredibilnost. S tega vidika je lahko rusko-ukrajinska dinamika samo priložnost za obrambne sisteme, da opozorijo politične elite na pomen obrambe in dejstvo, da ta stane.

Ključne besede *Nato, zasedanje vrha, Strateški koncept, mednarodno varnostno okolje, transformacija, kolektivna obramba, partnerstva.*

Abstract Question in the title “Back to the Roots or towards the Future?” is not necessary a dilemma regarding the future of the Alliance. It is more about the necessary combination of both. The need to tie together the lessons learned, while strengthening the bonds that have been underpinning NATO throughout its history, and reinforcing

the strong core of the Alliance with the mechanisms that are going to provide the necessary protection against the full spectrum of future threats. Threats that are known, the ones we can predict and those that are not yet foreseen. The starting point for the latter is flexibility. With this in mind we can clearly recognise the value of the 2010 Strategic Concept, which remains the guiding principle for the Alliance despite the events in Eastern Europe and Middle East and the increased security threats felt by some Allies.

Going back to the roots means a credible preparedness for collective defence, while going forward to the future signifies the importance of being able to use the capabilities to engage in the whole spectrum of possible missions and core tasks as indicated in the Strategic Concept. There is no need for the revolution to ensure the credibility of the Alliance, but there is a 'simple' demand to implement the commitments given in the past regarding the development of capabilities. This has been a challenge for many Allies, which has had/has already negative implications for the Alliance's credibility. In light of this the crisis in Ukraine can also be an opportunity for the national defence establishments to convince the political elites that defence matters and that there are costs associated with it.

Key words *NATO, Summit, Strategic Concept, international security environment, transformation, collective defence, partnership.*

Uvod Če so se mnogi poznavalci leta 2010 ob sprejetju novega Strateškega koncepta Nata spraševali o relevantnosti zavezništva in pomenu obrambe, so danes ti glasovi precej tišji in bolj osamljeni.¹ Evroatlantsko varnostno okolje, predvsem zaznavanje njegove stabilnosti, se je leta 2014 nedvomno spremenilo. Rusko delovanje v Ukrajini in posledična *panika* v nekaterih vzhodnih zaveznicah nas nekako ponovno vodijo v prelomnico, saj se Nato po eni strani vrača h koreninam, po drugi pa pomen organizacije kot politično-obrambnega zavezništva dodatno postaja pomembnejši in prepoznavnejši. Varnost in obramba sta ponovno popularni.

Tudi brez zadnjih nasilnih sprememb mej na vzhodu stare celine je bilo zavezništvo na tisti stopnji razvoja, ko bi moralo zaradi različnih dejavnikov ponovno uravnotežiti svojo držo in prihodnje prednostne naloge. Operacija Nata v Afganistanu (*International Security Assistance Force – Isaf*) se zaključuje in z njo tudi precej zahtevno obdobje v zgodovini organizacije. Še pred kratkim je bil poglavitni izziv, kako preprečiti, da se po močnem in finančno zahtevnem operativnem tempu odpovemo skušnjavi, da se obramba in z njo povezni stroški poskušajo potisniti na stranski tir. Takšen razvoj dogodkov bi povečal nevarnost in verjetnost močnejšega razkoraka med Evropo in ZDA. Temu, vsaj njegovim političnim vidikom, smo se tudi na račun zadnje varnostne krize trenutno izognili, čeprav ostaja nevarnost, da bi različni pogledi na ostrino reševanja krize lahko ponovno izpostavili različne ocene in ambicije med obema stranema Atlantika. Konec planskega cikla Natovega procesa obrambnega planiranja junija 2014 (*NATO Defence Planning Process*

¹ Glej Lampret, Novak, 2010.

– NDPP) podaja zelo reprezentativen presekok stanja po razpoložljivosti posameznih zmogljivostih ter jasno ocenjuje primanjkljaje in s tem povezana tveganja glede na zastavljeno raven ambicij zavezništva. Konec koledarskega leta se bo v Natu sprožil nov planski cikel s pripravo novih Političnih smernic, ki bodo temeljile na skupno sprejeti oceni varnostnega okolja in predvsem ponovno opredelile ali potrdile zavezniško raven ambicij delovanja (*Level of Ambition*).

Dinamika, povezana z Ukrajino, je v cikel zavezniškega načrtovanja pripeljala nekaj novega, predvsem ponoven razmislek o zavezniški obrambni drži in njeni geografski uravnoteženosti. Prav tako bo politično verjetno težko govoriti o zmanjševanju skupnih ambicij, čeprav so bile pred *prenosom suverenosti* nad Krimom nekatere zaveznice do tega razmeroma odprte. V prihodnjih razpravah bo vsekakor treba upoštevati finančne omejitve, saj se bo brez merljivega napredka na tem področju okrepila nevarnost, da bi vse ostalo pri besedah. Prelomnico pri denarju naj bi prineslo ravno vrhunsko srečanje Nata v Walesu. V mesecih priprav na ta dogodek se stopnjujejo pritiski na evropske zaveznice, da končno preidejo od retorike h konkretnim dejanjem. Pritiski oziroma bolj rečeno jasna pričakovanja so sicer razumljiva, saj izhajajo tako iz ameriške najave prihodnje osredotočenosti na azijsko-pacifiško območje kot tudi iz spremenjenega varnostnega okolja, kar je v sedanjem trenutku mogoče najpomembnejši element.

Čeprav ne pričakujemo večjega odklona od smeri razvoja, ki si jo je Nato načrtoval v Strateškem konceptu leta 2010, vseeno ne moremo spregledati pomena in posledic, ki jih prinašajo nedavna ruska dejanja. Mehanizmi, ki jih ima zavezništvo na voljo, njegovo poslanstvo in naloge, se ne bodo bistveno spreminjali. Spremenila pa se bo obrambna drža zavezništva, ki bo izpopolnjevala izkazovanje solidarnosti, notranjo kohezijo ter temeljna načela in vrednote zavezništva. Nato se je na ukrajinsko krizo že odzval in tudi planska skupnost te krize preprosto ne more spregledati. Zagotovo bo v naslednjem srednjeročnem obdobju eden od scenarijev uporabe zavezniških sil vključeval konvencionalni spopad s tehnološko primerljivim zaveznikom, vsaj na posameznih področjih. To bo zahtevalo ohranjanje nekaterih zmogljivosti, ki so jih posamezne zaveznice samovoljno precej opuščale (oklepni manever, helikopterji, minolovci), in nedvomno povečanje pogostosti in zahtevnosti vaj z vključevanjem in prepletanjem vseh treh zvrsti oboroženih sil. Ohranjanje kredibilnosti od zaveznic zahteva, da na prihodnjem vrhunskem srečanju strnejo vrste, nakažejo smer reševanja in vloge Nata ter predvsem svoje zaveze tudi uresničijo. To bo seveda zahtevalo ustrezne vire, za katere je ključna tudi javna podpora. Tako se bo vrhunškega srečanja v Walesu treba lotiti z različnih vidikov, gotovo pa bo javna diplomacija ena izmed tistih, pri katerih zavezništvo preprosto ne sme zgrešiti.

Aktualna varnostna dinamika kaže tudi na dejstvo, da potreba po sposobnosti za izvajanje kolektivne obrambe ni ostanek hladne vojne, temveč temelj prihodnje kohezivnosti zavezništva. Občutek neposredne ogroženosti v nekaterih zaveznicah se je precej povečal, zato je treba, predvsem zaradi ohranjanja politične enotnosti

organizacije, prepoznavno okrepiti nekatere segmente obrambne pripravljenosti, ki so bili v preteklih dveh desetletjih zapostavljeni.

To je zelo tesno povezano z odgovornostjo vseh zaveznic, da zagotovijo svoje obrambne zmogljivosti in prispevajo k zavezniškim naporom pri uresničevanju treh temeljnih nalog – kolektivne obrambe, kriznega upravljanja in sodelovanja s partnerji. Za povečanje verodostojnosti obrambne države bo račun razdeljen med vseh 28 zaveznic, kljub različnim nacionalnim ocenam varnostne ogroženosti zaradi ruskih dejanj v Ukrajini. To bo svojevrsten izziv.

Članek se opira na dosežke Nata, ki letos praznuje 65 let, pri čemer se dotakne posameznih ključnih tem, kot so operacije, transformacija, zmogljivosti, viri, reforme in partnerstva. Prav tako poskuša prikazati zapletenost vprašanj in ključne smernice nadaljnjega razvoja tega edinstvenega politično-vojaškega čezatlantskega zavezništva, kot ga bodo na svojem zasedanju potrdili predsedniki držav in vlad septembra 2014 v Walesu. Sklep ponuja sintezo razmišljanj in vodi bralca do odgovorov na vprašanje o prihodnosti Nata.

Članek temelji na osebnih izkušnjah avtorjev, ki neposredno spremljata razvoj organizacije še iz časov pred polnopravnim slovenskim članstvom in sta bila več let tudi neposredno vključena v oblikovanje nacionalnih vodil aktualne transformacije Nata. Opira se predvsem na analize dokumentov Nata, ki niso označeni s stopnjo tajnosti, nastopov visokih predstavnikov te organizacije in sekundarnih virov, ki omogočajo celovitejše razumevanje obravnavane tematike.

1 NATO DANES

1.1 Spremenjeno varnostno okolje

Konec operacije Isaf v Afganistanu leta 2014 sam po sebi daje priložnost za strateški razmislek in preusmerjanje pozornosti zavezništva na širok seznam morebitnih varnostnih groženj. Rusko-ukrajinska kriza je samo zadnji dokaz, da je prihodnost nepredvidljiva, globalna varnostna situacija kompleksna in med seboj prepletena, zavezništvo pa obdano z nestabilnostmi, ki prihajajo iz Ukrajine, Sirije, Iraka in Sahela (gen. Bartels, 21. maj 2014).

Kljub omenjenim spremembam varnostnega okolja, ki so jih zaznamovale predvsem ruske akcije v Ukrajini, ostajajo temelji Nata trdni in njegova vloga nepogrešljiva. Strateški koncept Nata oziroma temeljna strateška vizija prihodnosti zavezništva je že leta 2010 zajela kompleksnost sodobnega varnostnega okolja. Koncept izpostavlja, da je možnost konvencionalnega napada na ozemlje Nata majhna, vendar je ne smemo zanemariti. Hkrati pa so vključene tudi druge sodobne grožnje, kot so na primer širjenje orožja za množično uničevanje, terorizem, nestabilnosti in konflikti zunaj zavezniških mej, kibernetске grožnje, grožnje energetske varnosti ter vplivi razvoja tehnologije in klimatskih sprememb (Strateški koncept, 2010).

V obdobju globalizacije, intenzivne medsebojne odvisnosti in transnacionalnih varnostnih izzivov obsega varnostno okolje širok in nenehno spreminjajoč se seznam izzivov zavezniškemu ozemlju in prebivalstvu, zato Strateški koncept izpostavlja, da mora biti zavezništvo sposobno uresničevati tri glavne naloge – kolektivno obrambo, krizno upravljanje in skrbeti za kooperativno varnost. Njegov temeljni namen pa ostaja varovanje svobode in varnosti vseh članic tako s političnimi kot z vojaškimi sredstvi (Strateški koncept, 2010).

Če krize v Ukrajini ne bi bilo, bi se zavezništvo z naslednjim vrhom verjetno usmerilo v življenje po Isafu, v transformacijo, ki bi izhajala predvsem iz predpostavke omejenih finančnih virov, in v nadaljevanje optimizacije obrambnih struktur. Številni mehanizmi, pobude in načrti za prihodnost, po katerih je Nato deloval na podlagi odločitev, sprejetih v Lizboni in Chicagu, kljub krizi ostajajo relevantni, vendar jih bo treba na novo uravnotežiti glede na varnostno dinamiko na Vzhodu. Če je bilo še pred nekaj meseci v ospredju razmišljanje o zmanjševanju sodelovanja v operacijah in o krepitvi pripravljenosti (*from deployed to prepared*)², se Nato zdaj usmerja h krepitvi pripravljenosti v smislu večje prilagodljivosti in hitreje odzivnosti, ki vključuje tako zaustavitev zmanjševanja obrambnih izdatkov kot tudi sprejemanje ukrepov varnostnih zagotovil za vzhodne zaveznice, vključno s povečanjem odzivnosti zavezniških sil in njihove prisotnosti na vzhodnih mejah zavezništva.

Ta prizadevanja so se okrepila predvsem kot posledica ruskega zatekanja k bliskovitim vojaškim vajam, kibernetiskim aktivnostim in prikritim operacijam za doseganje njihovih ciljev (SACEUR gen. Breedlove, 22. maj 2014). Pristop označujemo s terminom hibridno vojskovanje. S takšnimi ukrepi v Ukrajini je Rusija v imenu zaščite rusko govorečih manjšin temeljito posegla v mednarodni red, ki se je oblikoval po koncu hladne vojne oziroma že po koncu druge svetovne vojne, vključno s kršenjem načel Ustanovne listine Organizacije združenih narodov, kot sta načeli suverenosti in ozemeljske celovitosti. Z uporabo vojaških sredstev za doseganje svojih interesov, s spreminjanjem mej v Evropi, z nespoštovanjem mednarodnega prava, vključno z Ustanovno listino Sveta Nato-Rusija, je postavila pod vprašaj vizijo svobodne in mirne Evrope (Vershbow, 1. maj 2014, in generalni sekretar (GS) Nata Rasmussen, 1. april 2014).

1.2 Posledice spremenjenega varnostnega okolja

Dojemanje grožnje, ki naj bi jo predstavljala Rusija, se je v očeh baltskih držav, Poljske, Romunije, Bolgarije pa tudi Češke in na trenutke Slovaške, ki so že prej veliko pozornosti namenjale politiki in ukrepom odvratanja, vključno z nestrategskim jedrskim orožjem v Evropi, s krizo v Ukrajini samo še okrepilo (Kulesa, ur., 2012; Larrabee in drugi, 2012, str. 75–76; Asmus in drugi, 2010). V ospredje je znova prišla kolektivna obramba, *prva med temeljnimi nalogami Nata*, kot jo predstavljajo omenjene zaveznice. V takšnem varnostnem okolju je ključno ohranjanje solidarnosti,

² Glej Münchenska varnostna konferenca, 2013.

koherentnosti in enotnosti vseh 28 zaveznic v Natu. Po ugibanjih o *upokojitvi* zavezništva se je po ocenah nekaterih pojavil nov *raison d'être* oziroma v ospredje je prišel njegov stari *raison d'être* (Vershbow, 1. maj 2014).

Največja odgovornost zavezništva tako še vedno ostaja 5. člen Severnoatlantskega sporazuma oziroma zaščita in obramba ozemlja ter prebivalstva pred zunanjimi napadi, ki je za zavezništvo ključno varnostno zagotovilo, na podlagi katerega zaveznice lahko računajo na ustrezen odziv, če bi bile ogrožene. Nepogrešljiva stebra zavezniške strategije ohranjanja varnosti članic ostajata odvrčanje, ki temelji na ustrezni kombinaciji jedrskih in konvencionalnih sil, ter koncept nedeljivosti zavezniške varnosti.

Odzivanje na krizo v Ukrajini je potrdilo tudi pomen Nata kot pomembnega čezatlantskega foruma za varnostna politična posvetovanja o vseh zadevah, ki se nanašajo na ozemeljsko integriteto, politično neodvisnost in varnost članic, kot to določa 4. člen Severnoatlantskega sporazuma. Katera koli zaveznica lahko kadar koli sproži postopek, ki z delitvijo informacij, izmenjavo mnenj in, če je treba, z oblikovanjem skupnega odzivanja prispeva k boljšemu razumevanju in učinkovitejšemu upravljanju kriz. Ravno to je storila Poljska 3. marca 2014 zaradi razmer v Ukrajini (Nato, 4. marec 2014), kar je *prebudilo* celotno zavezništvo in vodi v nove odločitve, povezane s prihodnjo držo zavezništva, ki bodo potrjene na septembrskem vrhu.³

1.2.1 Viri

Kolektivna obramba se zagotavlja s kolektivno odgovornostjo. V zavezništvu ima vsaka zaveznica svojo vlogo in vsaka po svojih močeh prispeva h kolektivni odgovornosti, kar se imenuje solidarnost. Članstvo v Natu ni le privilegij, temveč tudi obveznost (GS Nata, 9. maj 2014). Če je bil kdaj dvom o pomenu obrambe, naj bi ga kriza v Ukrajini dokončno pregnala, meni generalni sekretar Nata in potrjujejo tudi zaveznice z aktivnim sodelovanjem pri odzivanju na krizo v Ukrajini (GS Nata, 15. maj 2014, in Nato, 3. junij 2014 a).

Tudi ameriški predsednik Obama je med svojim obiskom Bruslja izpostavil, da morajo vse zaveznice prispevati svoj delež, ki izhaja iz članstva v zavezništvu, tako da pokažejo politično voljo za investiranje v kolektivno obrambo in za razvoj zmogljivosti za zagotavljanje mednarodnega miru in varnosti. Varnost ni zastoj in vse zaveznice morajo pokazati, da so pripravljene zagotoviti vire za zmogljivosti, osebje, usposabljanje, skratka za vse, kar je nujno za zagotovitev verodostojne in učinkovite odvrčalne držo Nata (Obama, 26. marec 2014 a, in Obama, 26. marec 2014 b).

³ Do danes je bil 4. člen uporabljen samo štirikrat. Pred Poljsko je leta 2012 Turčija zaradi razmer v Siriji dvakrat zaprosila za sklic Severnoatlantskega sveta (NAC) na podlagi 4. člena, kar je privedlo do namestitve zavezniških raket Patriot na turškem ozemlju, in še leta 2003 zaradi razmer v Iraku (Nato, 4. marec 2014).

Ti pozivi nikakor niso nekaj novega, sta se pa precej okrepila njihova intenzivnost in pomen. Z rusko pripravljenostjo, da posreduje z vojaškimi sredstvi v drugi državi, in v luči dejstva, da je Rusija v zadnjih petih letih povečala svoje obrambne izdatke za 10 odstotkov na leto, medtem ko so zaveznice drastično zmanjšale svoje obrambne proračune (nekateri tudi za več kot 40 odstotkov)⁴ in delovale ob predpostavki, da je Rusija strateški partner in ne neposredna grožnja za zavezništvo, je postalo jasno, da morajo članice Nata spremeniti trend obrambnih izdatkov in znova preusmeriti pozornost na ključne naloge Nata, še posebno kolektivno obrambo (GS Nata, 19. maj 2014 in 15. maj 2014).

Ruske akcije na Krimu in vzhodu Ukrajine so *prebudile* zavezništvo. Kot je dejal generalni sekretar Nata, je Rusija s tem nenamerno prispevala k utrditvi čezatlantskega zavezništva. Utrdilo se je prepričanje, da varnost in stabilnost nista samoumevni. Vendar so izzivi pred zaveznicami ogromni. Zaveza, ki naj bi ji zaveznice na področju obrambnih izdatkov sledile, se v glavnem nanaša na zagotavljanje dveh odstotkov BDP za obrambo. Prvi pričakovan korak danes je, da tiste članice, ki tega še niso naredile, ustavijo padec obrambnih izdatkov in jih začnejo postopno in merljivo zviševati. Kolektivna obramba je predmet investicij in vprašanje prihodnjih prioritet, predvsem tistih, usmerjenih v cilje Nata.⁵ Pri tem je treba utrjevati čezatlantsko vez, z jasno zavezanostjo tako Evrope kot tudi ZDA (GS Nato, 8. april 2014). Ključno pri tem je tudi sodelovanje med Natom in EU, s krepitvijo evropske obrambe se namreč krepi tudi Nato. Moč zavezništva se, danes še bolj kot prej, skriva v solidarnosti in skupnem delovanju.

1.2.2 Ukrepi varnostnih zagotovil

Zunanji ministri Nata so 1. aprila 2014 kot neposreden odziv na krizo v Ukrajini obnovili zavezo o krepitvi kolektivne obrambe zavezništva, potrdili pripravljenost pomagati Ukrajini in prekinili praktično sodelovanje z Rusijo (Nato, 1. april 2014, SACEUR gen. Breedlove, 22. maj 2014). Kot naslednji korak je zavezništvo 16. aprila 2014 sprejelo paket vojaških ukrepov oziroma varnostnih zagotovil, ki naj bi pomirila skrbi predvsem vzhodnih zaveznic z okrepitvijo prisotnosti v zraku (izvidniška letala AWACS, nadzor zračnega prostora oziroma *Air Policing*) in na morju ter s povečano intenzivnostjo usposabljanj in vojaških vaj (Zavezniško združeno poveljstvo sil Brunssum, 27. maj 2014). V duhu solidarnosti so se odzvale vse zaveznice po načelu vsi za enega in pokazale zavezanost k temeljnim načelom kolektivne obrambe (Nato, 3. junij 2014 b).

V širšem smislu pa se mora zavezništvo kot odgovor na krizo v Ukrajini in na izražene skrbi nekaterih zaveznic Nata ter upoštevajoč tudi druge varnostne grožnje in izzive v prihodnje usmeriti predvsem na tri elemente: krepitev pripravljenosti,

⁴ Glede obrambnih izdatkov članic Nata glej tudi Nato, 24. februar 2014, in Larrabee in drugi, 2012, str. 1 – 3.

⁵ Številne zaveznice, kot so Litva, Latvija in Romunija, so se že odzvale z najavami o zviševanju investicij v obrambo. Poljska je že blizu mejniku 2 odstotka BDP, Estonija pa je že primer zgleadne zaveznice (GS Nata, 15. maj 2014). Kako se bo ta tok razvijal naprej, bo pokazal že septembrski vrh Nata.

investicije v obrambo in aktivno ohranjanje čezatlantske vezi, kar naj bi bile tudi osrednje teme vrha v Walesu.

Velik del odgovora na nedavna ruska dejanja in z njimi povezane izzive ter hkrati tudi širši odgovor na aktualno varnostno okolje bosta vključena v tako imenovani Akcijski načrt pripravljenosti, kot ga je poimenoval GS Nata, ki ga bodo potrdili predsedniki držav in vlad na vrhu. Začetne zamisli so vključevale pregled razvoja sil za obrambo in odvrčanje oziroma pregled odzivnih sil Nata (*NATO Response Forces – NRF*), namenjenih zagotavljanju hitreje odzivnosti, pregled ocene ogrožanja, izmenjavo obveščevalnih podatkov, zgodnje opozarjanje in krizno odzivanje. Pod drobnogledom je tudi pobuda povezanih sil (*Connected Forces Initiative – CFI*), s katero naj bi zagotavljali pogostejše, zahtevnejše in vidnejše vaje, z večjim poudarkom predvsem na 5. členu Severnoatlantskega sporazuma. Ti načrti imajo svojo ceno, vendar so stroški (ne)varnosti lahko bistveno večji, kar znova vodi do ugotovitve, da brez ustreznega investiranja ne more biti kolektivne varnosti (GS Nata, 8. april 2014, in 15. maj 2014).

1.3 Zapuščina sedanjega generalnega sekretarja Nata

Generalni sekretar Nata Anders Fogh Rasmussen se je v svojem mandatu zelo ambiciozno lotil obsežnih reform organizacije in posredoval številne pobude, ki naj bi usmerjale zaveznitvo pri njegovi transformaciji v obdobju omejenih finančnih virov, utrujenosti od sodelovanja v operaciji Isaf in precej velike ravnodušnosti javnosti. Njegova agenda je bila pripraviti zaveznitvo za 21. stoletje (NSC Magazine, junij/september 2014, str. 5).

1.3.1 Natove reforme

Od ustanovitve leta 1949 do danes se je Nato že večkrat uspešno prilagodil spremembam varnostnega okolja. Tudi aktualni strateški koncept, ki je bil sprejet pod vodstvom Rasmussena, izpostavlja potrebo po nenehni reformi, ki naj bi z izboljšanjem struktur in delovnih metod sedeža Nata, njegovih agencij, poveljniške strukture in upravljanja virov vodila v večjo učinkovitost organizacijskega delovanja, prilagodljivost in odzivnost odločanja. Vrh v Lizboni leta 2010 je dal pomembne usmeritve za doseganje večje učinkovitosti (Deklaracija iz Lizbone), pri čemer je finančna vzdržnost postala gibalno in motiv glavne sproženih reform. Jasno je bila prepoznana potreba, da mora organizacija nekako deliti usodo nacionalnih obrambnih sistemov in merljivo optimizirati svoja obseg in delovanje.

Reforma Natove poveljniške strukture je usmerjena v doseganje manj številne, učinkovitejše in varčnejše strukture (6800 mest v miru) ob predpostavki, da bodo zaveznice v celoti popolnile to strukturo. Cilj naj bi bil dosežen do leta 2015. Reforma Natovega sedeža je po začetnem, bolj umetnem, zmanjšanju števila odborov usmerjena predvsem v ustrezno premeščanje delovnih mest znotraj mednarodnega sekretariata glede na prednostne naloge zaveznitva, s katerim želi doseči optimizacijo razpoložljivih človeških virov. Podobno se zmanjšuje tudi število Natovih agencij in

izboljšuje proces upravljanja virov, predvsem pri programiranju ter zagotavljanju preglednosti in odgovornosti (Polat, 6. april 2014).

Na vrhu v Walesu lahko ponovno pričakujemo, da bo poudarek na reformah in nadaljnjih usmeritvah predsednikov držav in vlad, ki bodo podlaga za prihodnje prilagajanje zavezništva spremenjenemu varnostnemu okolju, še posebno z vidika odzivanja na krizo v Ukrajini. Pri tem lahko v duhu zavezniške solidarnosti pričakujemo, da se ne bo več poudarjalo *zategovanje pasu*, temveč predvsem iskanje ustreznega ravnotežja med zagotavljanjem učinkovitosti in solidarnostjo. Zadnje predvsem v luči pomirjanja strahov in odganjanja dvomov v nekaterih vzhodnih zavezniških prestolnicah. Celo več, ker zaveznice počasi okrevalo po finančni krizi, se pričakuje, da bodo zaustavile nadaljnje reze, preusmerile trend obrambnih izdatkov in začele povečevati obrambne proračune.

1.3.2 Transformacija Nata

Prilagajanje spremembam mednarodnega varnostnega okolja in drugim realnostim (finančnim, političnim, socialnim) je torej inherenten del obstoja in prihodnosti Nata. Transformacija je proces, ki se nikoli ne konča. Prilagodljivost je ključno vodilo zavezništva, ki mora še naprej temeljiti na načelih in vrednotah, na katerih je bilo zavezništvo tudi vzpostavljeno.

S sprejetjem cilja **Natove sile 2020** na vrhunskem srečanju v Chicagu leta 2012 so se zaveznice zavezale k ustvarjanju: »sodobnih, tesno povezanih sil, ki bodo ustrezno opremljene, usposobljene, izurjene, ki bodo imele ustrezno poveljniško strukturo ter bodo sposobne skupnega delovanja in sodelovanja s partnerji v vsakem okolju«. Sprejet je bil tudi tako imenovani obrambni paket zmogljivosti, ki se osredinja na ključna področja razvoja zmogljivosti, nujnih za uresničevanje cilja (Deklaracija o obrambnih zmogljivostih, Chicago, 2012).

Da bi dosegli večjo učinkovitost pri doseganju ambicij, je generalni sekretar Nata na Münchenski varnostni konferenci v letih 2011 in 2012 zaporedoma predstavil dve pobudi – **pametno obrambo** (Smart Defence) in **pobudo povezanih sil** (Connected Forces Initiative – CFI), ki naj bi dopolnili proces razvoja zmogljivosti v okviru Natovega procesa obrambnega planiranja, ki po mnenju nekaterih ni več v celoti zagotavljal ustreznih rezultatov (op. ne zaradi procesa, temveč predvsem zaradi zmanjševanja obrambnih izdatkov in nezmožnosti izpolnjevanja obveznosti zaveznic). Pobudi temeljita na krepitvi večnacionalnega sodelovanja, tako med zaveznicami kot z drugimi partnerji, na poglobljeni ravni zaupanja in krepitve sposobnosti skupnega delovanja ter stalnega preverjanja in ohranjanja dosežene interoperabilnosti. Z vidika spremenjenega varnostnega okolja in finančnih izzivov so ju zaveznice sprejele kot edini mogoč *modus operandi* za prihodnost (Deklaracija o obrambnih zmogljivostih, Chicago, 2012).

Ohranjanje in izpopolnjevanje pridobljenih izkušenj, ki so jih zavezniške sile pridobile iz večdesetletnega sodelovanja v operacijah, stopnja povezanosti in

sposobnosti skupnega delovanja, tako med zaveznicami kot z drugimi partnerji, ki je enkratna prvina in moč zavezništva, so elementi, ki so, še posebno po koncu Isafa in ne nazadnje tudi z vidika odzivanja na dogodke v Ukrajini, postavili v ospredje predvsem pobudo povezanih sil.

Ustrezna usposabljanja in vaje so prepoznani kot eden temeljnih elementov vzpostavljanja večje odzivnosti zavezništva ter krepitve vidnosti obrambnih zmogljivosti. Oktobra 2013 so ministri za obrambo sprejeli odločitev o vaji visoke stopnje prepoznavnosti (*high visibility exercise*) leta 2015, ki bo vključila veliko kopenskih, pomorskih in zračnih sil, njene gostiteljice pa bodo Španija, Portugalska in Italija. Od leta 2016 bodo takšne vaje potekale redno, vključevale pa bodo urjenje za vse vrste zavezniških misij, tako operacije po 5. členu kot operacije zunaj tega člena. Pripravljen bo tudi nov koncept usposabljanja in vaj do leta 2020. Pobuda zahteva boljšo uporabo tehnologije za doseganje večje povezljivosti, na primer z uporabo mrežno povezljivih simulatorjev (Nato, 24. oktober 2013).

Gibalo pobude povezanih sil so Natove odzivne sile (NRF) in specialne sile (*Special Operations Forces – SOF*). NRF so hitro premestljive tehnološko napredne večnacionalne sile, ki združujejo kopenske, zračne in pomorske komponente ter specialne sile. Štejejo približno 13.000 pripadnikov (aktivni del t. i. Sile za takojšnje posredovanje (IRF)), ki jih zagotavljajo zaveznice po sistemu rotacij. Po letu 2014 naj bi Nato na temelju teh sil izpopolnjeval prihodnjo operativno pripravljenost in nadaljnjo transformacijo. V spremenjenem varnostnem okolju pričakujemo, da se bodo prav s temi silami krepili odzivnost in robustnost organizacije ter njen vojaški pečat. Povečujeta pa se tudi vloga in prepoznavnost specialnih sil in njihovega poveljstva, ki načrtuje in usklajuje zavezniške misije teh sil ter prispeva k izboljšanju sodelovanja in povezljivosti med njimi (Nato, 24. oktober 2013).

Poleg omenjenih pobud je v zavezništvu zaživela še ena, ki jo je najprej predstavila Nemčija in je usmerjena v krepitev skupnih evropskih naporov pri dolgoročni vzpostavitvi zmogljivosti, ki so prednostne za zavezništvo. Tako imenovani **koncept vodilnih držav** se osredotoča na skupine držav, ki se pod vodstvom vodilne države (za to vlogo so primerne le tiste zaveznice, ki imajo veliko zmogljivosti) prostovoljno združujejo za gradnjo celovitih sklopov zmogljivosti in sil. Trenutno Nemčija ustvarja skupino, ki bo usmerjena predvsem v tiste zmogljivosti, ki so bile na ravni zavezništva prepoznane kot prednostne, Velika Britanija pa oblikuje skupne ekspedicijske sile (GS Nata, 3. junij 2014). Kmalu naj bi sledile tudi nove najave podobnih skupin.

Večnacionalno sodelovanje in večnacionalne pobude so postali pomemben vidik gradnje zmogljivosti. Njihov namen je predvsem usmeriti in združiti napore za doseganje zastavljenih ciljev zmogljivosti in uresničevanje prednostnih nalog Nata, ki izhajajo iz Natovega procesa obrambnega planiranja. Kot izpostavlja tudi generalni sekretar Nata (15. maj 2014), lahko pomagajo krepiti nacionalne napore, vendar ne morejo nadomestiti ustreznih nacionalnih investicij.

Transformacija Nata ne poteka zgolj na področju razvoja zmogljivosti, temveč v širšem sklopu zagotavljanja pripravljenosti na izzive 21. stoletja, kar vključuje tudi zagotavljanje pripravljenosti za odzivanje na vse zelo različne varnostne grožnje. Nato mora ohraniti sposobnost zagotavljanja obrambe in varnosti prebivalstva, kar, kot je zapisano v Strateškem konceptu, vključuje tudi krepitev zmogljivosti za spopad s sodobnimi varnostnimi izzivi, kot so kibernetične grožnje, piratstvo, terorizem in raketna obramba.

Področje, na katerem je Nato v zadnjih letih dosegel velik napredek, je **kibernetična obramba**. Ministri za obrambo so junija 2014 sprejeli okrepljeno politiko kibernetične obrambe, v katero so vključili napredek, ki je bil dosežen od leta 2011, ko sta bila sprejeta prvotna politika in njen akcijski načrt. Nova politika na podlagi načel nedeljive varnosti in solidarnosti umešča kibernetično obrambo v okvir kolektivne obrambe in s tem 5. člena, kar je velik napredek v razmišljanju zavezništva in izraz pomena, ki ga pripisuje kibernetični obrambi. Vsebuje določila, ki se nanašajo na Natovo pomoč zaveznicam ob kibernetičnem napadu in pri razvoju zmogljivosti. V duhu krepitev mednarodne varnosti se je zavezništvo zavezalo tudi h krepitevi partnerstev, še posebno z EU, in k sodelovanju z industrijo (GS Nata, 3. junij 2014, in Nato, 7. avgust 2014).

Zaveznice so se zelo ambiciozno lotile izziva z jasnimi zavezami k nadaljnji gradnji zmogljivosti za preprečevanje in odkrivanje kibernetičnih napadov, obrambo pred njimi in okrevanje po njih (Strateški koncept, 2010). Nato je pri tem odgovoren za zaščito svojih omrežij, medtem ko so zaveznice odgovorne za razvoj svojih zmogljivosti kibernetične obrambe (*prav tam*). Tudi na tem področju so zaveznice vedno bolj pripravljene sodelovati v skupnih, večnacionalnih projektih. Razvitost zmogljivosti kibernetične obrambe je med zaveznicami trenutno še vedno precej različna, vendar so ravno zaradi načela *zavezništvo je močno tako, kot je močan njegov najšibkejši člen* primorane zagotoviti minimalne standarde zaščite in primerno raven nacionalne kibernetične obrambe.

1.3.3 Partnerstva

Kooperativna varnost, ki temelji na sodelovanju s partnerji, ostaja ena izmed treh temeljnih nalog Nata. Partnerstva so ključ do krepitev Natove pripravljenosti na vse izzive, kot si jo je zamislil generalni sekretar Rasmussen (NSC Magazine, junij/september 2014, str. 9). Partnerska politika ima številne razsežnosti in obsega mrežo različnih partnerjev z evroatlantskega območja, iz Sredozemlja in zalivske regije ter tistih, ki spadajo med tako imenovana globalna partnerstva, vključeno je tudi sodelovanje s številnimi mednarodnimi organizacijami. Partnerji so v zadnjih dveh desetletjih s svojimi prispevki v zavezniške operacije in druge merljive napore pri skupnem spopadanju z varnostnimi izzivi večkrat dokazali svojo vrednost, konkretno potrditev pa je sodelovanje dobilo na vrhunskem srečanju v Lizboni leta 2010, ko je prišlo do odločitve za krepitev partnerskega sodelovanja, in leta 2011, ko je bila potrjena nova partnerska politika zavezništva (Nato, 31. marec 2014).

Tako kot zaveznice so tudi partnerice, ki so organizacijo podpirale takrat, ko je bilo to najbolj pomembno, z aktivnim delovanjem v operacijah dosegle zavidljivo stopnjo interoperabilnosti. Z mehanizmi za krepitev zmogljivosti za operacije (*Operational Capabilities Concept Programme*) ima Natovo poveljstvo za operacije (SHAPE) na voljo mehanizme certifikacije prispevkov partnerskih držav skladno s standardi Nata. Spoštovanje teh vnaprej znanih meril in standardov, ki izhajajo iz krovne Natove politike izobraževanja, usposabljanja, vaj in evalvacije ter izvedbenih aktov, je dober temelj za delovanje in ohranjanje interoperabilnosti tudi v prihodnje. Prav tako je pomembno tudi sodelovanje v planskem mehanizmu za države članice Partnerstva za mir, imenovanem PARP (*Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process*), ki se osredinja predvsem na delovanje zmogljivosti in je zelo podoben procesu, ki ga uporabljajo članice. K večji povezanosti bodo gotovo prispevale tudi nove pobude, kot so pobuda povezanih sil, pametna obramba ter koncept vodilnih držav. Vrh bo ponudil priložnost Natu in partnerjem, da ponovno potrdijo zavezo, da se pripravljeno in zmogljivost skupnega delovanja ohranita tudi v prihodnje (Appathurai, 2014, str. 35 – 38).

Še več, s spremenjenim varnostnim okoljem in spremenjeno dinamiko sodelovanja v operacijah po Isafu ter z zadržanostjo zavezniških javnosti do podpore sodelovanju v operacijah velikega obsega zunaj ozemlja Nata se krepijo zmogljivosti zavezništva za usposabljanje lokalnih sil (*defence capacity building*) brez obsežne logistične prisotnosti na terenu (Brattberg, 2013, str. 19). To je že uveljavljena praksa delovanja zavezništva, vendar ima nov kakovostni vidik glede na aktualne spremembe mednarodnega varnostnega okolja. Takšne naloge obsegajo svetovanje, pomoč, podporo, usposabljanje in urjenje v sklopu reform obrambnega in varnostnega sektorja partnerskih in nepartnerskih držav. Zavezništvo si je s tega področja že nabralo številne izkušnje, zagotoviti pa je treba večjo odzivnost in boljše uskladitev vseh naporov, tudi v odnosu do sodelovanja z drugimi mednarodnimi organizacijami, kot je izpostavljeno tudi v zavezniškem konceptu celostnega pristopa (Appathurai, 2014, str. 42). V prihodnje bi se ta pristop lahko uporabil v novih misijah v Afganistanu, Ukrajini in Libiji ter na številnih drugih območjih.

Poleg tega se je pri Ukrajini odprlo dodatno vprašanje o partnerstvih, ne le glede pričakovanj, ki jih lahko imajo partnerske države do Nata, temveč tudi v smislu politike odprtih vrat. Z odzivom Nata na ruski vdor v Ukrajino je postalo vsem jasno, da ostaja načelo kolektivne obrambe le za polnopravne članice in tu sprememb ne bo, čeprav bi si mogoče nekatere države želele drugače. Partnerjem ostajata na voljo Natova pomoč pri obrambnih reformah, modernizaciji obrambnih institucij, uveljavljanju integritete, preglednosti in odgovornosti ter krepitev sposobnosti partnerskih sil, da delujejo skupaj z zavezniškimi. Sodelovanje poteka tudi na civilno-kriznem področju, pri pomoči ob naravnih in drugih nesrečah, znanstvenem in tehnološkem sodelovanju ter spopadanju z novimi varnostnimi izzivi, kot sta terorizem in kibernetna obramba (DSG Vershbow, 13. maj 2014).

Kljub temu ne smemo mimo dejstva, da se je politika odprtih vrat v zgodovini izkazala kot ena najuspešnejših politik, ki so prispevale k varnosti in miru v Evropi. Strateški koncept Nata je leta 2010 znova potrdil zavezanost k širitvi na evropske države, ki so sposobne prevzeti obveze, ki izhajajo iz članstva, in prispevati k evroatlantski varnosti. Proces še ni končan, se je pa z ukrajinsko-rusko krizo pojavila nova dinamika v odnosu do držav, ki si prizadevajo za članstvo.

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Izzivi, s katerimi je bilo soočeno zavezništvo pred dogodki v Ukrajini, so bili precej kompleksni. Strateško okolje je bilo zelo dinamično in nepredvidljivo, od premika moči z zahoda na vzhod, usmerjanja ZDA na azijsko-pacifiško območje, finančne krize, varnostnih izzivov, ki so sledili arabski pomladi, do zaključevanja operacije Isaf (Brattberg, 2013, str. 19–20). Dogodki v Ukrajini so spremenili predpostavke pri zagotavljanju evropske varnosti, postavili v ospredje kolektivno obrambo in utrdili čezatlantske vezi. Zavezništvo se je s številnimi ukrepi varnostnih zagotovil enoglasno odzvalo na zaprosila svojih vzhodnih članic. Temu primerno bo obarvana tudi agenda vrhunskega srečanja Nata, ki bo od 4. do 5. septembra 2014 v Walesu v Veliki Britaniji.

Osrednja tema vrha bo *Prihodnji Nato*. Posega na vsa prej omenjena področja, od krepiteve čezatlantske vezi in partnerstev, zagotavljanja ustreznih virov za obrambo, razvoja zmogljivosti, večjega števila usposabljanj in vaj, do nove zavezniške misije v Afganistanu in pregleda odnosov z Rusijo. V novih okoliščinah bo vsekakor več pozornosti namenjene kolektivni obrambi, premeščanju in nameščanju zavezniških sil znotraj meja zavezništva, intenzivnosti vojaških vaj in scenarijem visoke stopnje intenzivnosti ter odzivnosti sil, predvsem NRF (GS Nata, 26. marec 2014, Vershbow, 1. maj 2014, in Vershbow, 13. maj 2014).

Prihodnost Nata bo zaznamoval tudi **prihod novega generalnega sekretarja** 1. oktobra 2014. Zaveznice so na to funkcijo imenovale nekdanjega norveškega predsednika vlade Jensa Stoltenberga, ki ga spremljajo zgodovina uspešnih pogajanj z Rusijo, obdobje rasti norveških obrambnih izdatkov in transformacija njihovih obrambnih sil v visoko intenzivne in premostljive zmogljivosti, pozivi Nata, da se usmeri na varnostne izzive blizu zavezniškemu ozemlju, močno zagovarjanje čezatlantskega sodelovanja, vključno s pozivi za pravičnejšo delitev bremen, ter zavzemanje za komplementarnost Nata in EU pri zagotavljanju evropske in širše varnosti (Nato, 28. marec 2014).

2.1 Prihodnost čezatlantske vezi

V premisleku o prihodnosti čezatlantske vezi, hrbtenice zavezništva, moramo upoštevati dinamiko zadnjih nekaj let. Pri tem se lahko opremo na pisanje Howortha (2013, str. 33 – 34), ki izpostavlja tri elemente, ki so v zadnjih letih zaznamovali držo ZDA. Prvi je bil razviden iz Natove operacije *Združen zaščitnik* v Libiji, v kateri

so ZDA prevzele vlogo *vodenja od zadaj*, medtem ko so bile evropske zaveznice v ospredju, s čimer so ZDA vsaj na simbolni ravni pokazale, da so pripravljene prepustiti odgovornost na evropskem prizorišču Evropi. Drugi element je bil govor obrambnega sekretarja Gatesa junija 2011,⁶ v katerem je zelo neposredno posvaril evropske zaveznice, da morajo okrepiti svoje napore in prevzeti večjo odgovornost znotraj zavezništva, če želijo ohraniti močno čezatlantsko vez. Tretji element so Strateške smernice, sprejete januarja 2012,⁷ ki so najavile preusmeritev ZDA na azijsko-pacifiško območje.⁸

Med najbolj izpostavljenimi oziroma spornimi področji med zaveznicami ostajajo obrambni izdatki. Kot smo omenjali že v poglavju o virih, ZDA namenjajo za obrambne izdatke več kot štiri odstotke BDP, medtem ko je večina drugih zaveznic daleč od dveh odstotkov. Izvršilna oblast v Washingtonu se spopada z okrepljenimi pritiski svoje legislature (kongresa) po zmanjševanju obrambnih izdatkov in z učinkovitejšim prepričevanjem svojih evropskih zaveznic, da zmanjšajo ta razkorak. Ob spremenjenem varnostnem okolju, ko se občutek nevarnosti povečuje prav na vzhodu stare celine, je v ameriških očeh še toliko bolj izpostavljena potreba, da Evropa pokaže in dokaže, da je pripravljena nositi svoj delež bremena (Pifer, 2014).

V luči svoje spremenjene drže in kompleksnega varnostnega okolja bodo ZDA v prihodnje potrebovale preprosto več pomoči partnerjev in zaveznic (Obama, 28. maj 2014). Preneseno to pomeni, da naj se Evropa dokončno pomakne od *uporabnika varnosti do proizvajalca varnosti*. Trdna čezatlantska vez za prihodnost je odvisna tudi od vojaške moči Evrope (Brattberg, 2013, str. 20–21, in Coelmont in Langlois, 2013). Mogoče je bilo nekoč mišljeno, da bo Evropa prevzela večji del bremena tudi v širšem geografskem smislu (Azija, Afrika), vendar se to, kot kaže, v bližnji prihodnosti ne bo zgodilo, saj se vrača potreba po ustreznih in zadostnih silah za delovanje na domači celini.

Pritiski ZDA, naj Evropa prevzame večji del bremena, so se pojavljali že nekaj časa, vendar zaradi finančnih omejitev, s katerimi se je Evropa spoprijemala, in pomanjkanja občutka ogroženosti niso naleteli na plodna tla. Šele z izbruhom nedavne rusko-ukrajinske krize je prišlo do potrebne podlage, ki lahko vodi v spremenjeno držo evropskih zaveznic, z ustreznim ustvarjanjem politične volje in podpore prebivalstva za zagotavljanje investicij v varnost in obrambo, tako v Natu kot EU. Seveda to prepričanje na celini ni enotno in prinaša tudi nevarnost novih delitev, ki so se ob preliminarnih razpravah, predvsem o prihodnosti odnosov z Rusijo, že pokazale.

⁶ Gates, Robert. *The Security and Defence Agenda: The Future of NATO*. Govor obrambnega sekretarja, 10. junij 2011. <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1581>, 25. maj 2014.

⁷ DoD. *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, Priorities for 21st Century Defence*. Januar 2012. http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf, 25. maj 2014.

⁸ Podobno tudi Larrabee in drugi, 2012, str. 99 – 101.

2.2 Odnosi z Rusijo

Medtem ko se krepi čezatlantska vez,⁹ bodo odnosi z Rusijo verjetno doživeli nekaj sprememb, vendar sta njihova obseg in globina odvisna predvsem od reševanja aktualne krize v Ukrajini. Uresničevanje strateškega partnerstva med Natom in Rusijo, kot so ga zaveznice določile v Strateškem konceptu, je v sedanjih razmerah nepredstavljivo (*no business as usual*). Po ruskih akcijah v Ukrajini se je v večini zavezniških prestolnic izgubilo zaupanje in vse zaveznice so tudi obsodile rusko kršitev mednarodnega prava. Ponekod so šle stvari še precej dlje, saj so se spet pojavili stari strahovi, ki na obzorju že vidijo obrise ruskih tankov. Kljub vsem spremembam varnostnih ocen mora zavezništvo situacijo ocenjevati trezno in preiščeno. Rusija meji na Nato in ostaja ključen akter pri zagotavljanju evroatlantske in tudi širše globalne varnosti. Nato bo tudi s sedanjimi oblastniki v Kremlju moral poiskati *modus vivendi*, seveda pa ne na račun kompromisov o zavezniški varnosti. Ponovitev preteklosti, neke vrste *mini hladna vojna*, ne bi v tem trenutku koristila nikomur, razen posameznim nostalgikom na obeh straneh, ki nikoli niso sprejeli dejstva, da je za nekatere tako predvidljivi bipolarni svet razpadel.

Sklep Za Nato je obdobje po letu 2014 predvsem priložnost, da potrdi in okrepi svojo vlogo garanta evropske varnosti in stabilnosti v širšem prostoru. Za ohranjanje kredibilnosti ne bo dovolj samo izpopolnjevanje tega, kar smo že naredili, temveč predvsem uresničiti, kar smo si obljubili. Žal ne bo zasluženega predaha po vročini Afganistana, temveč bo treba okrečiti napore v smeri, ki smo jo skupaj in tako daljnovidno načrtali na vrhunskem srečanju v Lizboni s sprejetjem Strateškega koncepta. Kateri so tisti strateški izzivi, ki lahko ogrozijo našo pot? Njihovi obrisi so jasni in noben ni posebna novost. Vsi so med seboj nekako povezani in lahko jih poenostavimo s trojno osjo med razpoložljivimi viri, robustnostjo in vzdržljivostjo čezatlantske vezi ter skupno oceno grožnje oziroma njenega zaznavanja. V odsotnosti občutka ogroženosti denarja ne bo. Ali je ukrajinska kriza zadostna spodbuda za vse članice, da opravijo nujne spremembe v svojih proračunih, je prav tako vprašljivo. Na podlagi zadnjih znakov so se hitro odzvale le tiste članice, ki so bile že tako v ospredju prepoznavanja krize kot začetka *nove hladne vojne*. Tudi tistim, ki jim ukrajinska kriza ne jemlje spanca, bi morale biti jasno, da so pred Evropo resne varnostne grožnje. Sirija še naprej gori, islamski ekstremizem divja po ulicah Iraka in prve posledice morije v Levantu so že potrkale na vrata evropskih prestolnic. Nadaljevanje pomanjkanja evropskih sredstev verjetno pomeni upad navdušenja v Washingtonu za vzdrževanje neravnovesja v zmogljivostih in tako posledično krhanje čezatlantske vezi. Seveda ameriške prisotnosti v Evropi oziroma njihovega obrambnega proračuna ne vodi altruizem, temveč predvsem ameriški nacionalni interesi. Kljub temu pa je verodostojnejši evropski pristop k plačevanju skupnega obrambnega računa pomemben dokaz prepričanja političnih elit na obeh straneh

⁹ Krepitev čezatlantske vezi se kaže tudi v naslanjanju, predvsem vzhodnih zaveznic, na zmogljivosti ZDA kot prvi odgovor na krizo v Ukrajini. V ozračju, ki nekatere spominja na hladno vojno, sta bila tako nekajdnevna obiska ameriškega predsednika Obame v Evropi marca in junija 2014 namenjena podajanju in prepričljivosti varnostnih zagotovil ter prenašanju sporočila, da ZDA kljub najavljeni usmerjenosti na azijsko-pacifiško regijo Evropi ne bodo obrnile hrbta (Obama, 26. marec 2014 b, Obama, 3. junij 2014 a, in Obama 3. junij 2014 b).

Atlantika, da smo v tem čolnu skupaj in da smo vsi plačali karte. Seveda le, če želimo, da ZDA ostanejo v Evropi, kar pa je po naši oceni predpogoj za nadaljevanje takšnega Nata, kot bi si ga želeli in kot ga naši davkoplačevalci tudi zaslužijo. Moramo jih le še prepričati, da to tudi plačajo.

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REPUBLIKA SLOVENIJA V NATU – SLOVENSKA VOJSKA DESET LET POZNEJE

REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA IN NATO – SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES TEN YEARS LATER

Povzetek Republika Slovenija je že deset let članica Nata in članstvo v zavezništvu je precej prispevalo k razvoju Slovenske vojske, saj je postala mednarodno prepoznavna. S sodelovanjem v mednarodnih operacijah in na misijah prispeva tudi k mednarodni varnosti. Od svojega nastanka se preoblikuje in prilagaja novim razmeram in sodobnim varnostnim izzivom, tako da lahko učinkovito uporabi razpoložljive kadrovske in materialne vire, da bi zagotavljala vojaške zmogljivosti. Sodeluje na mednarodnih vojaških vajah in deluje v organih in poveljstvih Nata ter EU. V Natu in Slovenski vojski potekajo transformacijski procesi, ki so med seboj povezani. Nekatere rešitve, ki imajo za cilj zagotavljanje in razvoj potrebnih vojaških zmogljivosti, se zagotavljajo s sodelovanjem v projektih pametne obrambe, s konceptom povezanih sil in konceptom vodilne države. Slovenska vojska se v zadnjih letih srečuje z nenehnim zmanjševanjem finančnih virov, kar otežuje razvoj vojaških zmogljivosti. Zaradi krčenja obrambnega proračuna bo v prihodnosti treba razmisliti o obsegu in strukturi Slovenske vojske ter zagotoviti stabilno financiranje.

Ključne besede *Nato, Slovenska vojska, razvoj, vojaške zmogljivosti, mednarodne operacije in misije, obrambni izdatki, standardizacija, transformacija.*

Abstract The Republic of Slovenia has now been a member of NATO for ten years, and the membership has significantly contributed to the development of the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) which has gained international recognition. By cooperating in international operations and missions, the SAF also contributes to international security. From the time of its formation, it has been transforming and adapting to new realities and contemporary security challenges, effectively utilizing the available human and material resources in order to provide the necessary military capabilities. It participates in international military exercises and operates in NATO and EU bodies and commands. Both in NATO and the Slovenian Armed Forces, interconnected transformation processes are currently under way. Some solutions that

aim to deliver and develop the necessary military capabilities are being provided through participation in Smart Defence projects, the Connected Forces Initiative and the Framework Nations Concept. In recent years, the SAF has been faced with the continuous reduction of financial resources, which hinders the development of military capabilities. In the future, due to the defence budget reductions, it will be necessary to think about the scope and structure of the SAF and provide stable funding.

Key words *NATO, Slovenian Armed Forces, development, military capabilities, international operations and missions, defence expenditure, standardization, transformation.*

Uvod Obrambni sistem Republike Slovenije, katerega najpomembnejši del je Slovenska vojska (SV), je v desetih letih članstva v Natu uspešno opravil svoje naloge in se pospešeno razvijal. SV je v teh desetih letih postala tudi prepoznavna v mednarodnem okolju, saj deluje v različnih mednarodnih operacijah in na misijah ter prispeva k stabilnosti in varnosti v bližnjem in daljnem mednarodnem okolju. Sodelovanje v mednarodnem okolju je pomemben usmerjevalec in razvojno gonilo SV, tako pri opremljanju kot načinu vojaškega izobraževanja in usposabljanja. Polnopravno članstvo v dveh mednarodnih organizacijah, Evropski uniji in Natu, je za SV zelo pomembno tako danes kot v prihodnje. Slovenija si je za vstop v Nato prizadevala zaradi skupnih vrednot, lastnih nacionalnih in strateško-varnostnih interesov ter zaradi želje po prispevanju k varnosti in stabilnosti na evropski celini. Ta usmeritev izhaja tudi iz Resolucije o strategiji nacionalne varnosti Republike Slovenije iz leta 2001 ter nove iz leta 2010¹.

Članstvo v Natu pomeni za Republiko Slovenijo varnost v okviru kolektivne obrambe in ji omogoča sodelovanje pri aktivnostih zagotavljanja regionalne stabilnosti ter miru v mednarodni skupnosti. Kot prepoznavna in aktivna članica Nata pripomore k delitvi odgovornosti in bremen pri zagotavljanju kolektivne obrambe, ki temelji na solidarnosti med članicami, ter aktivno sodeluje v vseh procesih in aktivnostih Nata. Tako si utrjuje položaj varne in stabilne države, kar pozitivno vpliva na gospodarsko sodelovanje z drugimi državami na različnih področjih, k čemur je tudi SV veliko prispevala. Širši globalni in regionalni varnostni izzivi, vojaške in asimetrične grožnje, kot so širjenje orožja za množično uničenje ter teroristični in kibernetični napadi, upravičeno utrjujejo prepričanje, da je članstvo RS v Natu nujno.

Tudi Nato se nenehno srečuje z novimi sodobnimi izzivi, kot so nova krizna žarišča, kibernetične grožnje, kako zaustaviti zmanjševanje obrambnih izdatkov v nekaterih

¹ V Resoluciji o strategiji nacionalne varnosti Republike Slovenije iz leta 2001 je v točki 4.1 Zunanja politika v tretjem odstavku navedeno: »Prednostna naloga slovenske zunanje politike je vključitev Republike Slovenije v Evropsko unijo in Nato.«

V Resoluciji o strategiji nacionalne varnosti Republike Slovenije iz leta 2010 v 5.3.8 točki Odzivanje na vojaške grožnje je v prvem odstavku navedeno: »Odzivanje Republike Slovenije na vojaške grožnje bo temeljilo na skupnih prizadevanjih in delovanju v okviru Nata in Evropske unije. S ciljem preprečevanja vojaških groženj bo Republika Slovenija še naprej dejavna pri medsebojnem uravnoteženju varnostno-obrambnih interesov v okviru Nata, Evropske unije, Organizacije za varnost in sodelovanje v Evropi in Organizacije združenih narodov ter drugih mednarodnih regionalnih pobud in oblik sodelovanja.«

državah Nata in povečati zagotavljanje virov za obrambo itn. Postavljajo se vprašanja o širitvi zavezništva z novimi članicami, o obravnavi in potrditvi akcijskega načrta pripravljenosti itn. Zasedanje njegovega vrha v Walesu 4. in 5. septembra 2014 je bilo namenjeno tudi iskanju rešitev ter sprejemu najvišjih odločitev, ki bodo okrepile zavezništvo za spoprijemanje s prihodnjimi varnostnimi izzivi.

1 METODOLOŠKI PRISTOP

Namen prispevka je opraviti pregled napredka SV na nekaterih področjih od vstopa v Nato, opozoriti na problem zagotavljanja finančnih virov oziroma na zmanjševanje obrambnih izdatkov ter pogled v prihodnost. Pri tem želimo ugotoviti, ali je članstvo v Natu SV omogočilo, da prispeva svoj del oziroma doprinos v zavezništvo in tako tudi sama pridobi na dodani vrednosti.

Za pripravo prispevka so bile uporabljene metode deskripcije, induktivna in deduktivna, primerjalna, statistična in metoda opazovanja z lastno udeležbo. Na voljo je veliko statističnih podatkov, primarnih in sekundarnih virov v obrambnem resorju in zunaj njega, v tem članku so bili uporabljeni le nekateri podatki. Glede na osebne izkušnje je bila pri metodološkem pristopu uporabljena metoda opazovanja z lastno udeležbo, ki je pomembno vplivala na izbiro podatkov, vsebin in metod, za katere je bilo ocenjeno, da so ključne za pregled napredka SV od vstopa v Nato.

2 RAZVOJ PO VSTOPU V NATO

SV se je vse od leta 1991 naprej intenzivno razvijala, vendar sta prehod iz sistema lastne obrambe v sistem kolektivne obrambe ter prehod iz naborniške v poklicno vojsko bistveno vplivala na njen razvoj. Pomemben mejnik je bilo obdobje prve širitve, ko RS ni dobila povabila za vstop v Nato. O tem neuspehu je razpravljala tudi odbor Državnega zbora RS za obrambo², vendar se je SV skupaj z Ministrstvom za obrambo in drugimi državnimi organi še naprej intenzivno pripravljala za vstop v zavezništvo, tako da je bil leta 2004, ko je RS vstopila v zavezništvo, obrambni sistem RS pripravljen na nove zahteve. SV so ves čas zaznamovale pomembne transformacijske spremembe. Napredek je bil dosežen predvsem na področju povečevanja vojaških zmogljivosti, SV je pridobila novo oborožitev in opremo ter povečevala število poklicnih in pogodbenih pripadnikov SV.

Zadnji naborniki so obvezno služenje vojaškega roka končali leta 2003. Od takrat lahko govorimo o poklicni vojski. Za posameznika in organizacijo je postajala poklicna kariera vse pomembnejša, temeljiti je morala na pridobljenih kompetencah, potrebnih za posamezno dolžnost in s tem povezano napredovanje v vojaški hierarhiji. S prehodom iz naborniške v poklicno vojsko so bile izvedene velike spremembe

² Odbor Državnega zbora RS za obrambo je na 8. seji 24. septembra 1997 obravnaval: Ocena neuspele kandidature RS za vključitev v prvi krog širitve Severnoatlantske zveze ter oblikovanje strategije za vključevanje v Nato v pomadrijskem obdobju. Več o tem na: <http://www.dz-rs.si/wps/portal/Home/deloDZ/seje/evidenca?ma ndat=II&type=magdt&uid=14BAEA86EB1CBDFFC125651C0042E5B7>.

tako v miselnosti kot v načinu delovanja. Zaradi zavedanja, kako zahteven je prehod iz naborniške v poklicno vojsko, je bil leta 2003 vzpostavljen projekt PROVOJ, katerega namen je bil predlagati rešitve in potrebne aktivnosti za prehod iz naborniške v poklicno vojsko. V tem projektu so bila predstavljena tudi tveganja.

Povečala se je tudi intenzivnost individualnega in kolektivnega izobraževanja in usposabljanja. Opravljeno je bilo preoblikovanje Generalštaba SV in njemu podrejenih treh operativnih poveljstev, in sicer z ustanovitvijo Poveljstva sil, s čimer so se jasno razmejile pristojnosti med strateško in operativno ravnanje. Krepilo se je sodelovanje v Partnerskem programu za mir (PzM). V mednarodnih operacijah in na misijah je SV vedno bolj aktivno sodelovala in se tudi intenzivno vključevala v mednarodne vojaške vaje. Leta 2000 je prvič napotila svoje pripadnike na Kosovo in leta 2004 še v Afganistan v Natovo operacijo Isaf.

SV je vse bolj prispevala svoje zmogljivosti v prednostnih mednarodnih ambicijah in tako zagotavljala svoj prispevek k zagotavljanju miru v bližnji in bolj oddaljenih mednarodnih regijah. Vstop v zavezništvo ji je prinesel nove možnosti za sodelovanje z drugimi oboroženimi silami držav članic Nata. Sodelovala je na več skupnih usposabljanjih za delovanje v različnih razmerah, pri skupnih projektih in eksperimentih, na področju izposoje vojaške opreme, pri izmenjavi podatkov in drugih aktivnostih. O tem Šteiner meni: »Začetki integracije na številnih področjih končujejo tranzicijsko obdobje, saj Republika Slovenija in njena vojska verodostojno sodelujeta v obrambno-vojaških strukturah in skupnih aktivnostih tako v Natu kot EU. Pri tem gre zlasti za aktivnosti skupnega obrambnega načrtovanja, sodelovanja v skupnih poveljstvih, povezovanje v zavezniško strukturo sil, zagotavljanje prispevka v odzivnih silah, sodelovanje v mednarodnih operacijah in na misijah ter graditev nacionalnih zmogljivosti, ki so prek doktrin in standardov povezljive z drugimi v zavezništvu.« (2011, str. 45).

Profesionalizacija je vplivala tudi na sistem kontrole in poveljevanja, ki mora biti hitro odziven, saj le tako SV lahko nemoteno izvaja svoje naloge doma in v tujini. Omeniti je treba tudi vzpostavitev podčastniške linije in podčastniškega zbora. Prav pri prehodu iz naborniške v poklicno vojsko so bile spremembe največje. Članstvo v Natu je imelo in ima še vedno pomemben vpliv na procese profesionalizacije SV ter integracijo.

Pomemben razvojni dokument za SV je Srednjeročni obrambni program 2013–2018 (SOPR 2013–2018), ki ga je sprejela Vlada RS. Dokument določa cilje in ključne usmeritve delovanja in razvoja obrambnega sistema RS v srednjeročnem obdobju 2013–2018. Pri tem upošteva finančne zmožnosti RS v tem srednjeročnem obdobju, za katere se predvideva, da bodo omogočile minimalno rast obrambnih izdatkov šele po letu 2015.

SOPR 2013–2018, str. 12/53, navaja: »Za potrebe nacionalnega ozemlja RS bo najvišja enota, ki jo zagotavlja SV, namensko oblikovana brigadna bojna skupina,

za delovanje SV izven območja države pa bo njena najvišja enota namensko organizirana bataljonska bojna skupina.«

Od vstopa RS v zavezništvo do danes je bila SV na nekaterih področjih razvojno bolj uspešna, na drugih manj. Dejstvo je, da ni bilo vloženih dovolj finančnih virov v modernizacijo strelišč in vadišč ter poligonov in prilagoditev vojašnic za potrebe profesionalne vojske. V prihodnosti SV in ministrstvo ter druge državne organe na tem področju čakajo še novi izzivi.

Zaradi nenehnega krčenja proračunskih virov, namenjenih obrambnim izdatkom, kar je posledica finančnih razmer v RS, bo treba razvojne izzive za SV sprejemati postopno, strpno in razumno ter ob upoštevanju finančnih in drugih zmožnosti. Prav tako bi bilo smiselno razmišljati o spremembi SOPR 2013–2018, ki bi upošteval realne finančne zmožnosti ter omogočil srednjeročno in dolgoročno načrtovanje. O tem je Ljubica Jelušič zapisala: »Finančna in gospodarska kriza, ki smo jima priča, bosta imeli negativne posledice za hitrost razvoja in modernizacijo slovenskega obrambnega sistema, vendar ga ne bi smeli ustaviti ali celo zamrzniti za več let, saj bi to pomenilo resnično nazadovanje.« (2009, str. 10).

3 DELOVANJE SV V MEDNARODNIH OPERACIJAH IN NA MISIJAH

Delovanje v mednarodnih operacijah in na misijah je pomemben del skupnih nalog v zavezništvu³. Mednarodne operacije in misije so prostor, v katerem se SV lahko primerja z našimi zavezniki tako na področju doseganja usposobljenosti kot v opremi in oborožitvi.

»Pod pojmom mirovne operacije (angl. Peace Operations) v najširšem pomenu besede lahko razumemo vse oblike vojaških in nevojaških aktivnosti, ki potekajo v kontekstu političnih in diplomatskih prizadevanj za vzpostavitev ter ohranjanje miru.« (Jelušič, 2005, str. 12).

Delovanje SV v mednarodnih operacijah in na misijah je neposredni prispevek SV k regionalni in širši globalni varnosti v svetu, saj mir v ožji in širši regiji zagotavlja tudi mir v Sloveniji, pri čemer je prispevek SV velik in nedvomen. Od leta 1997 do danes je v mednarodnih operacijah in na misijah sodelovalo okoli 4700 pripadnikov SV, dnevno povprečje pa znaša okoli 380 pripadnikov. Prva enota SV je leta 1997 sodelovala v mirovni operaciji Alba v Albaniji, nato na Cipru, v Bosni in Hercegovini v operacijah EU Althea, v Siriji, na vojaški opazovalni misiji UNTSO, na Kosovu v Natovi operaciji Kfor od leta 2000, v Afganistanu v Natovi operaciji Isaf od leta 2004 naprej, v Iraku v Natovi operaciji, v Libanonu na mirovni misiji OZN Unifil od


³ V 1. odstavku 37. člena Zakona o obrambi je določeno: »izvršuje obveznosti, ki jih je država sprejela v mednarodnih organizacijah in z mednarodnimi pogodbami«.

V 1. odstavku druge alineje 22. člena Zakona o službi v Slovenski vojski je določeno: »s sodelovanjem v operacijah, misijah in drugih oblikah delovanja, primernih za preprečevanje sporov, ohranjanje, vsiljevanje in vzdrževanje miru ter v kolektivni obrambi«.

leta 2006, v Čadu v operaciji EU Eufor v letih 2008 in 2009, v Somaliji v pomorski vojaški operaciji EU Navfor Somalia leta 2009, v Siriji na vojaški opazovalni misiji UNSMIS, v Maliju v vojaški operaciji EUTM Mali leta 2012 in v humanitarni operaciji Naše morje v morju pri otoku Lampedusa v letih 2013 in 2014. SV je v teh 17 letih tako sodelovala v mednarodnih operacijah in na misijah Nata, EU in OZN. Vlada Republike Slovenije je leta 2010 sprejela Strategijo sodelovanja Republike Slovenije v mednarodnih operacijah in misijah, ki je pomemben dokument za delovanje SV. Strateški interes Slovenije je, da Zahodni Balkan postane mirno, stabilno in razvojno napredujoče območje držav⁴, zato ima SV že vrsto let na Kosovu največji kontingent sil, ki danes šteje 304 pripadnike. Sodelovanje v mednarodnih operacijah in na misijah v državah, kot so Afganistan, Irak, Čad in Libanon, je z vojaškega vidika zahtevnejše, k čemur prispeva še oddaljenost.

Mednarodne operacije in misije prinašajo bogate izkušnje in so velik izziv za večino rodov in služb SV. Pridobljene izkušnje prek sistema učenja iz izkušenj neposredno vplivajo na pripravo novih kontingentov SV in tudi na njen razvoj. Leto 2013 je bilo za SV poseben izziv, saj sta bila izvedena priprava in sodelovanje vojaške ladje Triglav v humanitarni operaciji Naše morje – Lampedusa pri Lampedusi. To je bila prva napotitev vojaške ladje Triglav v mednarodno operacijo. Glede na skupno število pripadnikov SV, ki jih je bilo 1. septembra 2014 7214, je delež sodelovanja SV v MOM velik, kar je razvidno tudi iz preglednice.

Preglednica 1:
Število
pripadnikov SV
v MOM
Vir:
Arhivski podatki
SV, podatek
za leto 2014
vključuje
obdobje
januar–maj.



⁴ V Strategiji sodelovanja Republike Slovenije v mednarodnih operacijah in misijah je v 22. točki Strateški interesi določeno: »Strateške interese RS za sodelovanje v mednarodnih operacijah in misijah določajo njen geostrateški položaj, politični, varnostni, gospodarski, razvojni, humanitarni in drugi interesi in načela ter njene obveznosti v okviru mednarodnih organizacij na globalni in regionalni ravni, katerih članica je. Za vse vrste mednarodnih operacij in misij, razen za reševalne operacije, so strateški interesi prednostno opredeljeni v Jugovzhodni Evropi kot tudi v Vzhodni Evropi in na Kavkazu, Sredozemlju, na Bližnjem vzhodu, v Aziji, Afriki in drugih območjih po svetu.«

Vsak nov kontingent SV v mednarodnih operacijah in na misijah pridobiva nove neprecenljive izkušnje, ki so pomembne tudi za Nato in EU, zato sta vsaka mednarodna operacija in misija posebni. Priprava vsakega kontingenta je svojevrsten izziv, saj ima vsak kontingent svoje posebnosti. Med pripravami se mu nameni največja pozornost tako pri opremljanju, s katerim se pripadnikom zagotavlja optimalna varnost, kot pri usposabljanju za izvedbo pričakovanih nalog. Sodelovanje SV v mednarodnih operacijah in na misijah pozitivno vpliva na razvoj SV pri opremljanju in usposabljanju.

4 POMEN MEDNARODNIH VOJAŠKIH VAJ ZA SV

Vsaka mednarodna vojaška vaja je poseben izziv za SV. Vaje so del kolektivnega usposabljanja, s katerim dosegamo zahtevane standarde, prek katerih se vzdržuje in zagotavlja pripravljenost za delovanje. Bojna usmerjenost usposabljanja enot in poveljstev v miru omogoča usposobitev za izvajanje pričakovanih nalog v realnih bojnih okoliščinah. Z vajami usposobimo posameznika, da razume svojo povezanost znotraj enote in da izvedba njegove naloge podpira tudi skupne naloge skupine.⁵ Vaje so najvišja oblika kolektivnega usposabljanja. S tem, ko sodelujemo na Natovih vajah, izpolnjujemo nacionalne cilje usposabljanja in Natove cilje povezanih sil (angl. Connected Forces Initiative).

V direktivi za kolektivno usposabljanje in vaje (Bi-Sc Collective Training and Exercise Directive – CT&ED 075-003) je na str. 12 med drugim navedeno, da se z izobraževanjem in usposabljanjem zagotavlja koherenten in celosten sistem usposabljanja, ki neposredno prispeva k ohranjanju kolektivnosti nacionalnih sil, Natove poveljniške strukture (angl. Nato Command Structure – NCS) in Natove strukture sil (angl. Nato Force Structure – NFS), ki so vse medsebojno povezljive ter vključujejo celoten spekter zmogljivosti in struktur, ki zavezništvu omogočajo doseganje ravni ambicij v hitro razvijajočem se in negotovem varnostnem okolju.

V vseh teh letih je SV sodelovala na številnih mednarodnih vajah. Poseben izziv za vojske so vaje, na katerih se v zaključku operativnega cikla v enotah s postopkom certificiranja preveri njihova pripravljenost. To je postopek, pri katerem se z uporabo različnih metod in vpogledov ugotavlja, ali je enota pripravljena za delovanje. Izvajamo nacionalno in Natovo certifikacijo.

SV je leta 2012 sodelovala na 36 vajah, leta 2013 na 31, za leto 2014 pa je načrtovano sodelovanje na 45 mednarodnih vajah. Na mednarodnih vojaških vajah SV preverja tudi stopnjo interoperabilnosti oziroma povezljivosti znotraj zavezniških sil, pri čemer so pomembne vaje, ki jih skupaj z zavezniki izvaja tudi v Združenem centru

⁵ Grški filozof Aristotel je dejal: »Odličnost je umetnost, pridobljena z usposabljanjem in izpopolnjevanjem. Ne ravnamo pravilno zaradi prirojene odličnosti, ampak smo odličnost pridobili, ker smo ravnali pravilno. Smo to, kar vedno znova ponavljamo. Odličnost torej ni dejanje, ampak navada.«
George Washington je 24. septembra 1776 v pismu predsedniku kongresa zapisal: »Pripeljati može do ustreznega nivoja subordinacije ni delo enega dneva, meseca ali leta.«

za bojno usposabljanje v Hohenfelsu v Nemčiji. To je primer dobre prakse pred napotitvijo kontingenta SV v mednarodno operacijo ali na misijo. Leta 2014 se postopoma zaključuje mednarodna operacija Isaf in zato Nato tem vajam pripisuje vse večji pomen. V vaje bodo vključeni Natova poveljstva in Natove odzivne sile. Mednarodne vojaške vaje niso pomembne samo za SV, temveč tudi za Slovenijo, saj se tako kaže aktiven prispevek k izgradnji in učinkovitosti vojaških zmogljivosti zavezništva.

5 STANDARDIZACIJA

Natova standardizacija je zelo pomembna za doseganje interoperabilnosti oziroma povezljivosti članic znotraj zavezništva. Z implementacijo Natovih STANAG-ov članice zavezništva lažje dosegajo potrebne ravni medsebojne povezljivosti za učinkovito izvajanje skupnih strateških, operativnih in taktičnih nalog v postopkih poveljevanja ter ob učinkoviti uporabi tehnike, materiala in administrativne opreme. Povezljivost oziroma interoperabilnost je tudi integralna komponenta vsake Natove vojaške zmogljivosti in sestavni del procesa razvoja zmogljivosti Natovih sil. Proces povezljivosti se tako izvaja s procesom standardizacije: »Nato STANAG je svojevrsten predpis, ki določa tudi obvezujoča ravnanja ali tehnične zahteve v SV, saj brez njih ni mednarodne povezljivosti znotraj zavezništva. Zato je potrebno Natove STANAG-e prevzemati v SVS (slovenskih vojaških standardih).« (Osterman 2010, str. 253).

V tem procesu izvajanja je natančno določen način nastajanja, potrjevanja in preklica standardizacijskih dokumentov. Operativno to poteka v različnih Natovih standardizacijskih odborih in delovnih skupinah. V teh organih delujejo tudi predstavniki SV. Delo v različnih delovnih telesih Nata za standardizacijo poteka neprekinjeno in ustaljeno. Nedvomno standardizacija vpliva tudi na oblikovanje zmogljivosti SV, predvsem na nakupe nove oborožitve in opreme, informacijsko-komunikacijske sisteme, delovanje logistike, proces štabnega odločanja itn.

SV je sprejemala SVS STANAG-e že v času članstva RS v Partnerstvu za mir, po vstopu v Nato pa se je aktivnost še povečala. Tako je bilo od leta 2000 do septembra 2014 nacionalno potrjenih 728 Natovih STANAG-ov ter sprejetih 424 SVS STANAG-ov. Iz tega podatka izhaja, da je bilo potrjevanje in sprejemanje STANAG-ov zelo intenzivno.

6 VKLJUČENOST PREDSTAVNIKOV SV V NATOVA POVELJSTVA IN DELOVNA TELESA

V okviru delovanja Natove poveljniške strukture in Natove strukture sil je SV z vstopom v zavezništvo dobila tudi mednarodne vojaške dolžnosti. Te SV omogočajo aktivno delovanje v Natovih poveljstvih, kar je pomembno za poveljevanje vojaškim zmogljivostim Nata in EU v okviru različnih mednarodnih operacij in misij.

»Vojaška struktura v EU je mlajša in manj razvita kot vojaška struktura v Natu. Slovenija tudi sodeluje pri njenem razvoju, zato tudi načrtuje sile za EU vojaško strukturo. Slovenija sodeluje pri rotaciji evropskih vojaških bojnih skupin in med predsedovanjem je aktivno sodelovala pri aktiviranju operacije pod pristojnostjo EU v Čadu.« (Humar in drugi, 2009, str. 61)

Za popolnitev mednarodnih dolžnosti morajo imeti pripadniki SV vse strokovne kompetence, ki izhajajo iz zahtev za posamezno dolžnost. S kadrovskega vidika je popolnjevanje teh dolžnosti zahteven proces. Nekatere od teh dolžnosti so tudi premestljive. Poleg stalnih dolžnosti v Natovih poveljstvih v SV začasno popolnjujemo tudi posamezne dolžnosti v poveljstvih s tako imenovanim dopolnilnim osebjem. Napotitev navadno traja od tri do štiri leta. Izkušnje, ki jih pripadniki pridobijo na mednarodnih dolžnostih, so zelo pomembne za delovanje SV na različnih ravneh vodenja in poveljevanja. Ko pripadnik zaključi opravljanje mednarodne dolžnosti, se razporedi na dolžnost, na kateri bo lahko pridobljene izkušnje v tujini čim bolj izkoristil. V vseh letih delovanja v strukturah Nata in EU si je SV pridobila precej izkušenj in lahko trdimo, da smo v okviru svojih pristojnosti povsem enakopraven partner.

7 TRANSFORMACIJSKI PROCESI V NATU IN SLOVENSKI VOJSKI

Zaradi globalizacije sveta in nastajanja novih kriznih žarišč mora temu slediti tudi zavezništvo, in sicer kljub temu, da se v večini držav članic Nata vse manj sredstev namenja za razvoj vojaških zmogljivosti. Tako se mednarodno okolje nenehno spreminja in postaja vse bolj nepredvidljivo.⁶ V globalnem svetu se spreminjajo tudi vojske, in sicer v kadrovske sestavi, oborožitvi in opremi, načinih izobraževanja in usposabljanja itn. V zadnjih letih je veliko razprav in sestankov v strukturah Nata namenjenih temu vprašanju. Nato je leta 2003 ustanovil Poveljstvo za transformacijo v Norfolku v ZDA, ki postaja ve pomembnejši. S svojimi projekti in eksperimenti išče ustrezne rešitve na izzive prihodnosti, s katerimi se bo spoprijelo zavezništvo. Podpira aktivnosti znotraj pobude »pametna obramba« (angl. Smart Defence) in koncept povezanih sil (angl. Connected Forces Initiative). Vse večji poudarek je namenjen procesu Natovega obrambnega načrtovanja (angl. Nato Defence Planning Proces) in v okviru tega načrtovanja konceptu vodilnih držav ter konceptu povezanih sil. Z vzpostavitvijo nove Natove poveljniške strukture je to poveljstvo prevzelo tudi področje vojaškega izobraževanja in usposabljanja. S postopnim umikanjem zavezniških sil iz Afganistana bodo Natove vaje postajale vse pomembnejše, saj se bodo članice pripravljale za prihodnje mednarodne operacije in misije. Lahko sklenemo, da ima proces transformacije v Natu vpliv tudi na transformacijo SV, ki je del Natovega obrambnega načrtovanja, sodeluje v pobudi povezanih sil in projektih

⁶ Grizold (2005, str. 22–23) ugotavlja: »... da je mednarodno varnostno okolje postalo po koncu hladne vojne vse bolj nepredvidljivo in negotovo. Temeljna značilnost tega okolja je kompleksnost ogrožanja varnosti, ki zajema naslednje bistvene elemente, kot so povezovanje, prepletanje in medsebojno učinkovanje vojaških in nevojaških groženj varnosti (npr. vojaški in etični konflikti, širjenje orožja za množično uničevanje, organiziran kriminal, terorizem, naravne in druge nesreče, lakota, nalezljive bolezni, onesnaževanje okolja itn.).«

pametne obrambe. O tem Šteiner meni: »S pojmom transformacija se označujejo nove oblike oziroma paradigma sprememb s težnjo, da postanejo nova teorija spreminjanja obrambno-vojaške organiziranosti.« (2011, str. 46).

Transformacija je kot pojem pogosto prisotna v zavezništvu in nacionalnih okoljih. Razlagamo si jo lahko kot nujen proces, ki omogoča oboroženim silam prilagajanje na spremembe v okolju, tako da oborožene sile lahko učinkovito izvršujejo svoje naloge. Zato transformacija oziroma preoblikovanje ni nikoli končan proces, saj se okolje, v katerem delujejo oborožene sile, nenehno spreminja. Ključni dejavniki transformacijskih aktivnosti so navadno višina obrambnih izdatkov, namenjenih za razvoj oboroženih sil, ter v povezavi s tem spremembe v globalnem varnostnem okolju. V različnih Natovih državah se v zadnjih letih zmanjšujejo izdatki, namenjeni za obrambo, kar je predvsem posledica gospodarske in finančne krize.⁷


Transformacijo vojaških zmogljivosti kot nov pojem v zavezništvu uradno poznamo od vrha Nata v Pragi leta 2002, ko je bilo obdobje začetka transformacije vojaških zmogljivosti tudi uradno verificirano (Nato Handbook, 2006, str. 20), zatem pa je bilo oblikovano tudi Zavezniško poveljstvo za transformacijo (angl. Allied Command Transformation – ACT). Transformacijo Clinton razume kot: »Transformacija je proces, ki oblikuje spreminjajočo se naravo tekmovalnosti in sodelovanja skozi nove kombinacije konceptov, zmogljivosti, ljudi in organizacij.« (2009, str. 2).

Tudi SV mora slediti transformacijskim usmeritvam, ki potekajo v zavezništvu. Mednarodna finančna situacija je negativno vplivala na obrambne proračune v večini držav Nata, enako pa se je zgodilo tudi z obrambnim proračunom RS, kar vse negativno vpliva na razvoj vojaških zmogljivosti. Poraba finančnih virov je podvržena nekaterim predpisom, ki imajo za cilj doseganje čim večjega učinka porabljenih virov.⁸ Zato so transformacijski procesi v SV usmerjeni k temu, da je raba razpoložljivih virov čim bolj smotrna oziroma racionalna, njen namen je ohranjanje in doseganje ciljev zmogljivosti, ki jih je sprejela v pogajanjih v zavezništvu ali pa jih potrebuje za opravljanje nalog, ki so nacionalnega pomena, kot sta na primer zaščita in reševanje. Prav zato se je morala SV preoblikovati tako, da je ostala čim bolj učinkovita, saj so se finančni viri za njeno delovanje v nekaj letih zmanjšali kar za 40 odstotkov. Z vladnimi omejitvami pri zaposlovanju pa se je zmanjšalo tudi število zaposlenih v SV.

⁷ V *Strategic Foresight Analysis 2013 Report* je na strani 29 med drugim navedeno, da se države, ki se spoprijemajo s počasno rastjo oziroma te ni, rastočo nezaposlenostjo in vedno večjo zadolženostjo, srečujejo z različnimi prednostnimi nalogami. Izdatki, namenjeni za obrambo, se po celotnem zavezništvu še naprej znižujejo zaradi slabše gospodarske rasti in večjega poudarka na socialnih programih. Obstaja tudi tveganje, da čeprav se bodo gospodarski kazalniki dvignili, lahko javno mnenje prepreči ponovne naložbe v obrambne namene.

⁸ Kopač (2011, str. 174) meni: »Dejstvo je, da so se v Republiki Sloveniji v zadnjih desetih letih precej izboljšala institucionalna pravila, ki spodbujajo učinkovitejše zagotavljanje vojaških zmogljivosti. Pri tem je poleg povečanja zavedanja, da si ne moremo dovoliti neracionalne porabe javnih virov, pomembno tudi naše vključevanje v evroatlantske integracije. Obrambno planiranje in načrtovanje se tako razvijata skladno s procesom obrabnega planiranja in načrtovanja Nata in Evropske unije. Področje vojaških investicij je precej podvrženo številnim direktivam Evropske unije, ki urejajo javna naročila na splošno oziroma posebej naročanje na področju obrambe in varnosti.«

Preglednica 2:
Program vojaška
obramba
Vir:
Arhivski
podatki SV.



Prav zato se bodo lahko nekatere rešitve za zagotavljanje in razvoj vojaških zmogljivosti uresničevale s sodelovanjem v projektih pametne obrambe, konceptu povezanih sil in konceptu vodilne države. Lahko ugotovimo, da transformacijski procesi v Natu vplivajo tudi na transformacijske procese v SV. Pri tem je treba omeniti, da so v letih 2009 in 2010 obrambni izdatki predstavljali približno 1,62 odstotka BDP RS, leta 2014 pa še okoli 1,04 odstotka BDP RS, kar pomeni izrazito padanje obrambnih izdatkov v zelo kratkem obdobju. V Natu velja dogovor, da naj bi države članice namenjale za obrambne izdatke dva odstotka BDP.

7.1 Pametna obramba, koncept povezanih sil in koncept vodilne države kot pomoč pri razvoju zmogljivosti SV

Pametna obramba (angl. Smart Defence) obsega večnacionalno sodelovanje pri razvoju, nabavah, vzdrževanju in uporabi zmogljivosti, izvajanje prednostnih nalog skladno s strateškimi prednostnimi nalogami Nata in opredeljenimi primanjkljaji iz operacij ter specializacijo sil oziroma delitev vlog med zaveznicami. Slovenija sodeluje v več projektih.⁹ Ti projekti so vključeni v nabor projektov pametne obrambe prvega reda, saj so predlogi prerasli v projekte, pri katerih je znana vodilna država, sodelujoče države pa so potrdile svoje sodelovanje. Dogovorjen obseg in namen programa sta bila usklajena. Eden izmed pomembnejših projektov SV je tudi razvoj zmogljivosti JRKBO. Drugi projekti, pri katerih sodeluje SV, so namenjeni zlasti izobraževanju, usposabljanju in nabavi opreme. Pri izboru projektov je treba slediti tudi dolgoročnim in srednjeročnim razvojnim dokumentom, tako da se vsebina ujema s cilji, navedenimi v teh dokumentih. V zadnjem obdobju v zavezništvu vse pogosteje stopajo v ospredje projekti kibernetične obrambe (angl. Cyber Defence),

⁹ *Smart Defence – generalni sekretar Nata Andres Fogh Rasmussen, jo je predstavil na Münchenski varnostni konferenci februarja 2011.*

pri čemer se nam ponujajo različne možnosti tudi za usposabljanje pripadnikov SV. V izboru se je treba usmeriti v tiste projekte, ki z vidika zagotavljanja varnosti prinašajo največji učinek, ob tem pa je treba upoštevati tudi finančne zmožnosti.

Povezane sile (angl. Connected Forces Initiative) pomenijo izboljšanje interoperabilnosti med zavezniškimi in partnerskimi silami ter povezanost med Natovimi in nacionalnimi poveljstvi prek skupnega izobraževanja, usposabljanja in vaj ter tehnoloških rešitev.¹⁰ Menimo, da so vaje specifično področje, na katerem se preverja in ocenjuje zmožnost skupnega delovanja v zavezništvu in koalicijah pod vodstvom Nata, temelječih na domenah doktrin, procedur, organizacij, usposabljanja in opreme. Nato mora v svoji vlogi ponuditi državam priložnosti, da izboljšajo interoperabilnost prek skupine dostopnih, prilagodljivih in cenovno ugodnih skupnih dogodkov. Ti bodo zavezništvu in državam omogočali hitro prilagajanje morebitnim spremenjenim okoliščinam in zahtevam novih izzivov. Cilj pobude je ohranjanje in izboljšanje Natove pripravljenosti ter povezljivosti in bojne učinkovitosti med zavezniškimi in partnerskimi silami ter zmogljivostmi, in sicer prek razširjenega programa usposabljanj in vojaških vaj. V okviru povezanih sil bodo imele Natove odzivne sile osrednjo vlogo operativnega spodbujevalca in demonstratorja pripravljenosti in bodo merilo uspešnosti Natove transformacije. Pobuda omogoča SV povezavo z operativnimi izkušnjami v okviru Nata. V pričakovanju zmanjševanja operativnih aktivnosti Nata po koncu operacije Isaf leta 2014 bo ta pobuda postala še pomembnejša. SV ima to leto v Natovih odzivnih silah oddelek Enote za specialno delovanje. V prihodnosti je načrtovana izvedba več vaj večjega obsega in kakovosti ter v okviru širokega nabora scenarijev skladno z ravnjo ambicij, zato SV pripisuje velik pomen povezovanju nacionalnih in Natovih vaj. Leta 2015 bo SV sodelovala na mednarodni vojaški vaji Trident Juncture 2015.

Koncept vodilnih držav (angl. Framework Nations Concept) je, da evropskim zaveznicam v obdobju krčenja obrambnih virov in strateške preusmeritve ZDA organizirano zagotovijo zahtevane zmogljivosti in prevzamejo sorazmerno breme ter odgovornost za skupno varnost in obrambo.¹¹ Koncept je usmerjen na oblikovanje skupin držav pod okriljem vodilne države, ki bi zagotovile celovite sklope zmogljivosti. Vodilne države s širšim spektrom zmogljivosti bi povezovale manjše države s specializiranim prispevkom, s tem pa bi se slednje razbremenile in sredstva usmerile v razvoj specializiranih zmogljivosti – vendar bi morala vsaka zaveznica ohranяти kredibilno bojno zmogljivost. Koncept je nadgradnja trenutnih večnacionalnih pristopov, saj predvideva dolgoročno partnerstvo na področju zagotovitve celotnega spektra zmogljivosti, medtem ko sta projekta pametne obrambe ter združevanje in souporaba usmerjena v razvoj posameznih zmogljivosti. Koncept vodilnih držav je nemška pobuda, ki izhaja iz pozitivnih izkušenj, pridobljenih z izvajanjem večnacionalnih projektov, in iz uveljavitve vodilne države pri organiziranju operativnih sil in izvajanju mednarodnih operacij in misij. SV ima pozitivne izkušnje

¹⁰ *Connected Forces Initiative – izhaja iz Čikaškega paketa obrambnih zmogljivosti, sprejetega maja 2012.*

¹¹ *Framework Nation Concept – prvič obravnavan na ministrskem sestanku junija 2013, državam članicam podrobneje predstavljen septembra 2013.*

s sodelovanjem v večnacionalnih silah pod okriljem vodilne države tako na področju združevanja sil v Natovih odzivnih silah kot v večnacionalnih kopenskih silah in pri delovanju v mednarodnih operacijah in na misijah. Oba koncepta, povezane sile in koncept vodilnih držav, sta velikega pomena za SV, predvsem zdaj, ko se vse manj proračunskih sredstev namenja za razvoj in delovanje Slovenske vojske. O pomenu teh konceptov je na okrogli mizi v Ljubljani 24. januarja 2014 spregovoril tudi generalni sekretar Nata Anders Fogh Rasmussen.

7.2 Transformacijski procesi v SV

SV se od vstopa v Nato neprestano spreminja. V nekaterih časovnih obdobjih so bili procesi preoblikovanja intenzivnejši, v drugih manj. Skoraj pa ni bilo leta, v katerem ne bi bilo organizacijskih sprememb v formacijski strukturi enot in poveljstev. V teh preoblikovanjih so se upoštevale tudi ugotovitve iz Strateškega pregleda obrambe, ki je bil pripravljen leta 2009. Večje transformacijske spremembe je določal sprejem SOPR 2013–2018. S preoblikovanjem taktične ravni poveljevanja v prvi in drugi fazi, ki se je začela leta 2012 in je bila izvedena lani, je bila vzpostavljena ciljna organizacijska struktura, ki omogoča učinkovito izvajanje nalog SV. Letos je SV vstopila v tretjo fazo preoblikovanja oziroma transformacije. V tej fazi je bil preoblikovan Generalštab Slovenske vojske, vzpostavlja se nov koncept delovanja logistike in izvaja identificiranje mogoče procesne in funkcionalne integracije z upravnim delom ministrstva. Preoblikovanje se bo končalo z izgradnjo dveh uravnoteženih pehotnih brigad kot jedra razvoja in delovanja SV ter s centralizacijo logistične podpore. Obe pehotni brigadi bosta na področju civilno-vojaškega sodelovanja ter v sistemu zaščite in reševanja še bolj prostorsko umeščeni po svoji domicilni odgovornosti.

SV je v leto 2014 vstopila z vojaškim proračunom, ki znaša 266 milijonov evrov; za primerjavo je proračun SV leta 2013 znašal 300 milijonov evrov. Tako prihaja do vse večjega razkoraka med zahtevami, navedenimi v SOPR 2013–2018, in višino zagotovljenih proračunskih virov za realizacijo tega in drugih dokumentov. To je popolno nasprotje, predvsem na področju potrebe po nabavi opreme in oborožitve ter onemogoča uresničitev nekaterih zahtev. Ta negativni finančni trend zahteva pospešeno transformiranje in tako z zelo omejenimi finančnimi viri zagotavljanje vzdržnosti sistema, s pravočasnim in učinkovitim sprejemanjem ukrepov pa uresničitev načrtovanih nalog. Učinkovitost SV se dosega tudi s hitro odzivnostjo sistema poveljevanja in kontrole. Ne glede na zmanjšanje proračunskih virov bo morala SV ohraniti in tudi nadgraditi že dosežene standarde v individualni in kolektivni usposobljenosti.

Transformacija SV je stalen proces kot odgovor na zunanje spremembe. Če pogledamo čas od vstopa v Nato pa do danes, je prehod iz naborniške vojske v poklicno povzročil največje transformacijske spremembe, razvojni napredek SV je bil očiten. Danes pa je najpomembnejši transformacijski izziv, kako z razpoložljivim proračunskim financiranjem zagotoviti ustrezne vojaške zmogljivosti za uresničevanje nalog doma in v tujini. Temeljni izziv SV za prihodnost nam kot cilj zmogljivosti za zavezništvo

ostaja izgradnja srednje bataljonske bojne skupine. Pomemben prispevek RS v zavezništvu bo tudi ustanovitev centra odličnosti za gorsko bojevanje leta 2015, saj je večina držav članic Nata že ustanovila različne centre in ti danes uspešno delujejo – pri nekaterih je RS tudi soustanoviteljica.¹² Pav tako ne gre prezreti dejstva, da ima SV pomembno vlogo tudi v ožji regiji, saj je mentorica nekaterim drugim državam na Balkanu, ki so v procesih vključevanja v zavezništvo, prav tako pa je bila v preteklosti pobudnica za ustanovitev mednarodne brigade (angl. Military Land Forces). Mednarodne aktivnosti vplivajo tudi na transformacijske procese v SV, v katerih mora biti v ospredju tudi zagotavljanje vojaških zmogljivosti za potrebe zaščite in reševanja, saj je to ena izmed nalog SV.¹³ Velik del opreme, ki jo ima, je tako tudi dvonamenski.

Sklep Nato je sprejel nov strateški koncept¹⁴ in na konferencah ter posvetih razpravlja o različnih transformacijskih izzivih, ki imajo za cilj preoblikovanje Natovih struktur. Tako se preoblikujeta Natova poveljniška struktura in Natova struktura sil. Zaradi padanja obrambnih izdatkov v nekaterih državah Nata postajajo vse pomembnejši pametna obramba, koncept povezanih sil in koncept vodilne države kot pomembni gradniki skupnih vojaških zmogljivosti. Temu mora slediti tudi SV, predvsem zato, ker so se obrambni izdatki v zadnjih letih precej zmanjšali in znašajo približno 1,04 odstotka BDP RS.

Zato ugotavljamo, da je SV po vstopu v Nato dosegla precejšen napredek. Zaradi nenehnega krčenja finančnih virov za obrambo razmerje med stroški za kader, operativno delovanje in opremljanje (modernizacijo) postaja vse slabše in se vse bolj odmika od priporočenega razmerja v zavezništvu. SV se mora zato hitro prilagajati in čim bolj izkoristiti vire, ki jih ima, da bi zagotovila vojaške zmogljivosti za nacionalne in zavezniške potrebe. Biti mora majhna, učinkovita, vzdržljiva in čim bolj premestljiva, da bo sposobna delovati v različnih scenarijih znotraj zavezništva. V teh desetih letih si je pridobila veliko izkušenj v delovanju znotraj zavezništva. S svojimi predlogi in pobudami je aktivni ustvarjalec v Natu. Delovati mora kot soustvarjalka vojaških zmogljivosti in organizatorka ali udeleženka mednarodnih vojaških vaj. Preoblikovati mora Večnacionalni center za gorsko bojevanje v Natov center odličnosti za gorsko bojevanje, nadaljevati delo Šole za tuje jezike, organizirati druge šole za regionalne potrebe in biti mentorica državam v Jugovzhodni Evropi. Še naprej mora biti mednarodno prepoznavna s svojim prispevkom v MOM itn. Članstvo RS v Natu je SV omogočilo, da prispeva svoj delež v zavezništvo in tako tudi sama pridobi dodano vrednost. Nadaljevati bo morala proces profesionalizacije, v Natovi poveljniški strukturi in Natovi strukturi sil zasesti višje vojaške položaje ter mesta, ki ji prinašajo največ neposrednih izkušenj za delovanje.

¹² V Natu ima 15 držav že ustanovljene centre odličnosti. Te države so: Nemčija, Norveška, Nizozemska, Belgija, Francija, Španija, ZDA, Estonija, Litva, Češka, Slovaška, Madžarska, Romunija, Turčija in Italija. V ustanavljanju so še centri odličnosti na Poljskem, Latviji, Bolgariji, Italiji in Sloveniji.

¹³ V 1. odstavku 37. člena Zakona o obrambi je določeno: Ob naravnih in drugih nesrečah v skladu s svojo organizacijo in opremljenostjo SV sodeluje pri zaščiti in reševanju.

¹⁴ *Strategic Concept for the defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization* je bil sprejet na Natovem vrhu (Nato Summit) v Lizboni med 19. in 20. novembrom 2010.

Na podlagi analiz projektov in z vidika časovnega ujemanja z nacionalnimi programi in razpoložljivimi finančnimi, materialnimi ter kadrovske viri mora sodelovati v projektih pametne obrambe, konceptu povezanih sil in konceptu vodilne države. Zaradi pomanjkanja finančnih virov mora izkoristiti vse kadrovske in materialne vire in pri tem omogočiti ter podpirati inovativno in kreativno razmišljanje na vseh ravneh vodenja in poveljevanja.

Od vstopa v zavezništvo se je spremenila kadrovska struktura, ki postaja kakovostnejša, povečale so se vojaške zmogljivosti na področju poveljevanja in kontrole, povečale so se vzdržljivost, bojna moč ter premestljivost. Del vojaških zmogljivosti je dvonamenski, kar zagotavlja podporo obrambnemu sistemu in sistemu varstva pred naravnimi in drugimi nesrečami. Zaradi hitrega zmanjševanja obrambnega proračuna oziroma sredstev, namenjenih za obrambne izdatke, bo treba za nadaljnji razvoj SV opraviti razmislek o prihodnjem obsegu in strukturi SV, ki mora temeljiti na stabilnem proračunskem financiranju, kar naj bo podlaga za srednjeročno in dolgoročno načrtovanje razvoja vojaških zmogljivosti. Zaradi vse večjih razlik med zahtevami, navedenimi v razvojnosmerjevalnih dokumentih, in dejansko zagotovljeno višino proračunskih virov za realizacijo bo v prihodnosti treba zagotoviti medsebojno usklajenost. Danes se pomanjkanje finančnih virov kaže predvsem pri določeni opremlitvi in oborožitvi, ki je potrebna za realizacijo ciljev zmogljivosti, pri vzdrževanju vojaške infrastrukture itn. Temeljni izziv za prihodnost SV mora kot cilj biti izgradnja načrtovanih zmogljivosti za zavezništvo in nacionalne potrebe.

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NORMATIVNA VLOGA ZAVEZNIŠTVA PRI NEKONVENCIONALNIH VARNOSTNIH GROŽNJAH – KIBERNETIČNA OBRAMBA ČLANIC

THE NORMATIVE ROLE OF THE ALLIANCE IN NON-CONVENTIONAL SECURITY THREATS – CYBER DEFENCE OF MEMBER STATES

Povzetek Vloga mednarodnih varnostnih organizacij je oblikovanje konsenza o vrednotah, normah in pravilih, ki se nanašajo na kibernetično bojevanje. Nato proizvaja kibernetične politike, skrbi za izobraževanje in izmenjavo informacij, tudi s publicistično dejavnostjo, nekoliko manj pa je razvil operativne zmogljivosti za skupno kibernetično obrambo in kibernetično bojevanje.

V Natu lahko pričakujemo pobude za tesno sodelovanje pri kibernetični obrambi in gradnji skupnih kibernetičnih zmogljivosti, kar je racionalen odgovor na nekonvencionalne grožnje. Pridobitve članic, ki bodo izšle iz sodelovanja na področju kibernetičnega bojevanja, se bodo med seboj razlikovale. Največ pridobitev avtorica pripisuje ZDA, ker je njihova ekonomija najbolj odvisna od informacijsko-komunikacijskih tehnologij, najbolj globalizirana in domnevno najpogostejša tarča kibernetičnih napadov.

Ključne besede *Kibernetična obramba, mednarodne varnostne organizacije, mednarodno pravo.*

Abstract The role of international security organizations is to create a consensus on values, norms and rules relating to cyber warfare. NATO produces cyber policy and provides for education and the exchange of information also through publicistic activity. To a lesser extent it has also developed operational capabilities for joint cyber defence and cyber warfare.

NATO can expect initiatives for close cooperation in cyber defence and the establishment of common cyber capabilities, which are all rational responses to unconventional threats. The benefits stemming from such cooperation differ by state. The author is nonetheless convinced that the United States will benefit the most from the said cooperation as their economy is the most dependent on information and communication technology, the most globalised and allegedly the most frequent target of cyber attacks.

Key words *Cyber defence, international security organizations, international law.*

Uvod Ob povečanem številu kibernetičnih napadov smo priča vedno pogostejšim razmišljanjem o kibernetičnih konfliktih in najprimernejši nacionalni organizaciji za njihovo preprečevanje in obvladovanje. Slovenija se na pojav kibernetičnih konfliktov odziva, vendar ni proaktivna, a je zaslediti aktivno prilagajanje zunanjim izzivom. V tem prispevku bomo pozornost namenili temu, kakšno vlogo imajo mednarodne varnostne organizacije pri uravnavanju vedenja članic v kibernetičnih konfliktih, nasproti pa postavili nacionalne varnostne potrebe. Na abstraktni ravni bomo govorili o vlogi mednarodnih organizacij pri oblikovanju konsenza o vrednotah, normah in pravilih, ki se nanašajo na kibernetično bojevanje, ali o normativizaciji in odnosu struktura – enota. Na konkretni ravni bomo obravnavali odnos med Natom in Slovenijo.

Soglasje se v mednarodnih organizacijah gradi okrog legitimnosti institucije za sodelovanje na področju nekonvencionalnih groženj in za sodelovanje držav članic na področju oblikovanja politik (policy programming). To doseganje soglasja spada v output mednarodnih varnostnih organizacij, ki ga sicer lahko razčlenimo v oblikovanje politik, informacijske dejavnosti in operacije (Rittberger & Zangl, 2006). Informacijske dejavnosti mednarodnih varnostnih organizacij so tudi kategorizacija dejanj, ki jih bodo države članice razumele kot aktivnosti, ki vodijo v kibernetične konflikte, ter razširjanje informacij, vključno z analizo primerov in dobrih praks.

Do zdaj mednarodna skupnost ni dosegla enoznačne interpretacije sedanjih načel in pravil mednarodnega prava za kibernetične konflikte in kibernetično bojevanje. Vendar pa je mogoče izluščiti nekaj področij mednarodnega prava, ki so še posebno pomembna za razvoj mednarodnih norm v kibernetičnem prostoru – *jus ad bellum*, *jus in bello*, ter nevtralnost države. Narava kibernetičnega prostora posebno otežuje uveljavitev načel nujnosti, proporcionalnosti, razlikovanja in nevtralnosti v kibernetičnem bojevanju. Pravni diskurz v mednarodni skupnosti pa ni iskanje neke objektivne resnice, ki bi čakala, da jo odkrijemo (Johnstone, 2003), ampak je diskurz o izvršenih dejanjih in praksah, nastalih na podlagi skupnega razumevanja in skupnih prepričanj, ki so v ozadju kibernetičnih konfliktov in kibernetičnega bojevanja. Razlikovati je treba med zakonodajno ali normativno vlogo na nacionalni ravni in normativizacijo, to je celotnim procesom od uveljavljanja načel mednarodnega prava do nastanka mednarodnih pravil in mednarodnih pogodb na mednarodni ravni. Razpravi o nacionalni zakonodajni vlogi in nacionalnem razvoju obrambnega podsistema nista predmet tega prispevka.

Kljub temu poskusimo opredeliti strateško-usmerjevalno-razvojno-doktrinarno vlogo vojske, pri čemer je ta opredelitev bolj predmet obramboslovne stroke kot mednarodne politologije. Strateška vloga vojske na nacionalni ravni je sestavljena iz razvoja nacionalne strategije kibernetične varnosti in obrambe. Nanaša se

na posodobitev zakonodaje o informacijski družbi in obrambi, da je v podporo nacionalnemu ukrepanju ter odraža stopnjo nacionalne odvisnosti od informacijsko-komunikacijskih tehnologij. Razvojna vloga vojaškega podsistema je zagotoviti mesto in vlogo Slovenske vojske pri zagotavljanju učinkovitega odziva na kibernetične grožnje ter organizacijsko umestiti in uskladiti vse zmožljivosti za upravljanje incidentov in zagotavljanje kibernetične varnosti. Usmerjevalno vlogo opredeljujejo oblikovanje ciljev in oblike civilno-vojaškega sodelovanja ter opredeljevanje in določanje ciljev pri upravljanju kibernetičnih incidentov. Doktrinarna vloga vključuje razvoj optimalnih tehnik, taktik in postopkov za zagotavljanje nacionalne varnosti.

Ta prispevek izhaja iz konstruktivistične teorije mednarodnih odnosov (Onuf, Kratochwil) ter poststrukturalizma (Der Derian), v katerih je uporaba statističnih podatkov bolj izjema kot pravilo. Med slovenskim prispevkom k znanosti posebno poudarimo Svetetovo pojmovanje informacijsko-komunikacijskih tehnologij kot družbeno-tehničnih omrežij, prav tako utemeljeno v konstruktivizmu (Svete, 2005). Uporabljeni sta deskriptivna in primerjalna metoda, osredotočili se bomo na raziskovalni vprašanji:

(1) So velike države v mednarodnih varnostnih organizacijah vodilne pri normativizaciji nekonvencionalnih varnostnih groženj?

(2) Postavljajo spremenjeni izzivi iz okolja pred mednarodno varnostno organizacijo nove varnostne potrebe njenih članic?

1 NASTANEK PRAVIL KIBERNETIČNEGA BOJEVANJA

Pridobitve članic, ki izhajajo iz sodelovanja v mednarodnih varnostnih organizacijah, se med seboj razlikujejo. Pri upravljanju kibernetičnih konfliktov največ pridobijo ZDA, ker je njihova ekonomija najbolj odvisna od informacijsko-komunikacijske tehnologije (IKT), najbolj globalizirana in domnevno najpogostejša tarča kibernetičnih napadov. Zato si za sodelovanje najbolj prizadevajo in so zainteresirane za takšno konverzijo nacionalnih potreb v mednarodni areni, po kateri bo rezultat zanje čim ugodnejši. Med standardnimi potmi konverzije potreb držav članic v rezultat delovanja mednarodne organizacije, ki povečuje nacionalno in mednarodno varnost, so za ZDA najbolj učinkovita medvladna pogajanja. Na voljo imajo namreč vire za učinkovito mobilizacijo znotraj Nata. Za popolno sliko navedimo le še preostale poti za konverzijo potreb: glasovanje, uporaba standardiziranih postopkov in pravil, politika upravljanja ter racionalna izbira (Rittberger & Zangl, 2006).

Male države z nizko stopnjo vpetosti v mednarodne gospodarske tokove, z ekonomijo, ki bolj malo temelji na IKT, in z miroljubno zunanjo politiko spadajo med manj ogrožene in imajo zato manjši interes za sodelovanje na področju kibernetične varnosti. Dodatno se njihova motivacija za sodelovanja zmanjšuje zaradi varnostne dileme, kar negativno vpliva na sodelovanje. V kibernetični varnostni dilemi so nekatere dimenzije poudarjene, saj je relativizacija stopnje ogroženosti še večja,

kot pri konvencionalnih grožnjah, tajnost in nepreglednost uporabe kibernetičnega orožja sta veliki, prinašata celo odločilno prednost nacionalnemu varnostnemu sistemu (Axelrod & Iliev, 2014). V nasprotju s konvencionalnimi grožnjami pa obstaja zmožnost obnovitve informacijske infrastrukture. Kibernetična varnostna dilema seveda zmanjšuje verjetnost sodelovanja med državami.

Nato proizvaja kibernetične politike (Nato, 2011), skrbi za izobraževanje in izmenjavo informacij v centru odličnosti in za publicistično dejavnost, nekaj manj pa je vplival na razvoj operativnih zmogljivosti članic za skupno kibernetično obrambo in kibernetično bojevanje. Na področju operacij (computer network operations – CNO) je leta 1999 dokumentirano podprl dejavnosti ZDA v okviru operacije Allied Force (Lambeth, 2002), in sicer z ofenzivnimi metodami, medtem ko se po drugi strani ni odzval na estonske klice na pomoč leta 2007 (Meyer & Ummelas, 2007, May 17). Leta 2014 pa ZDA izražajo dvom, ali se je ob kibernetičnem napadu mogoče sklicevati na 5. člen Severnoatlantske pogodbe. Po ukrajinski krizi in zaostrenem varnostnem položaju vzhodnoevropskih članic se v ameriški eliti pojavlja mnenje, da ima 5. člen v sebi klico propada, saj bi lahko neposreden poziv k solidarnosti temeljito pretresel temelje Nata, kakor je zatrdil nekdanji direktor ameriške obveščevalne službe CIA John McLaughlin (Calabressi, 2014).

Pomembno za razumevanje načina bojevanja in uvajanje organizacijskih sprememb je razumevanje kibernetičnega prostora v povezavi z novimi nalogami oboroženih sil. Pojmi s področja kibernetične varnosti pripomorejo k opredeljevanju pojavnosti, pri premagovanju konceptualnih težav v kibernetični obrambi in kibernetičnem bojevanju, pri proučevanju novih konceptov, kot je kibernetična odpornost, in celo nakažejo nove možnosti za obravnavanje kibernetičnih groženj (Rantapelkonen, 2014). Narava kibernetične obrambe je usmerjena navznoter, kot je navedeno v primerjalni študiji Inštituta za demokratični nadzor oboroženih sil (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces – DCAF) pa oborožene sile nekonvencionalne nove interne naloge izvajajo neoborožene (Schnabel & Hristov, 2010). Tudi ofenzivno kibernetično orožje ni klasična oborožitev, gre za računalniški program, žargonsko poimenovan weaponized code. Številna podjetja razvijajo kode za napad na ranljivost v ciljnih operacijskih sistemih in aplikacijah, vojaške in obveščevalne organizacije pa kupujejo programsko opremo na prostem trgu, pri čemer so po vrednosti in zahtevnosti nakupa v ospredju ZDA (Menn, 2013).

Kako naj torej vojska uresničuje svojo novo nalogo, ki je nekje med računalniško forenziko in načrtnim sodelovanjem z vrhunskimi matematiki in računalniškimi strokovnjaki ter nakupovanjem ustrezne ofenzivne kode na prostem trgu? Ponovno se nam ponuja ameriški vzorec, ki pa ne ustreza zmogljivostim in potrebam majhne države z omejenimi viri, kot je Slovenija. Navznoter Slovenska vojska potrebuje organizacijske rešitve, ki omogočajo intenzivno sodelovanje z drugimi pristojnimi organi v javni upravi, z novimi partnerji med telekomunikacijskimi podjetji in podjetji za informacijsko varnost, ter sistemski pristop k zagotavljanju človeških virov.

Preglednica 1:
Povprečno
število prizadetih
uporabnikov
glede na sektor
leta 2013
Vir:
Symantec,
stran 41
(Symantec,
2014).

| Sektor | Povprečno število identitet na incident |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| računovodstvo | 673.916 |
| administracija in človeški viri | 150.650 |
| kmetijstvo | 37.000 |
| civilna družba in neprofitni sektor | 34.614 |
| računalniška strojna oprema | 100.000 |
| računalniška programska oprema | 12.761.182 |
| izobraževanje | 100.267 |
| finančni sektor | 11.884.222 |
| vladni sektor | 99.893 |
| zdravstvo | 67.519 |
| turizem | 2.034.232 |
| informacijska tehnologija | 4.500.230 |
| zavarovanje | 114.775 |
| policija | 1119 |
| vojska | 26.500 |
| trgovina na drobno | 8.692.318 |
| socialna omrežja | 16.083.333 |
| telekom | 3.029.286 |
| prevoznništvo | 243.390 |
| gradbeništvo | 20.000 |

Preglednica 2:
Statistika
obravnanih
incidentov v
Sloveniji
Vir:
SI-CERT,
stran 10
(SI-CERT, 2014).

| VRSTA INCIDENTA | 2012 | 2013 |
|-------------------------------------|------------|------------|
| skeniranje in poskušanje | 51 | 43 |
| botnet | 12 | 16 |
| napad onemogočanja (DDoS) | 47 | 76 |
| škodljiva koda | 258 | 417 |
| zloraba storitve | 9 | 8 |
| vdor v sistem | 76 | 61 |
| zloraba uporabniškega računa | 9 | 37 |
| razobličanje | 125 | 80 |
| napadi na aplikacijo | 17 | 22 |
| Tehnični napadi skupaj: | 604 | 760 |
| kraja identitete | 67 | 56 |
| goljufija | 161 | 210 |
| spam | 74 | 50 |
| phishing | 139 | 209 |
| dialer | 1 | 0 |
| Goljufije in prevare skupaj: | 442 | 525 |

Napadi na vojaška omrežja, kot jih je zabeležil Symantec leta 2013, številčno niso bili razširjeni (Internet Security Threat Report (ISTR), 2014). Kot sledi iz podatkov v preglednici 1, je večina kibernetičnih napadov označenih kot kriminalna dejanja. Sektor, v katerem je okuženih največ uporabnikov in kjer se okužbe najbolj širijo, so

družabna omrežja. Države o napadih na kritično infrastrukturo poročajo zelo redko, saj je prijava napada Evropski agenciji za omrežno varnost (European Network and Information Security Agency – ENISA) trenutno prostovoljna, čeprav Evropska unija to zakonodajo postopoma zaostruje.

Po podatkih SI-CERT v preglednici 2 so leta 2013 v Sloveniji obravnavali skupaj 1513 incidentov, kar je 21-odstotna rast v primerjavi z letom 2012, ko so zabeležili 1250 obravn. Izstopa predvsem porast škodljive kode, kar 50-odstotno povečanje phishinga, povečuje pa se tudi število spletnih goljufij in prevar (SI-CERT, 2014).

V mednarodnem smislu izhajamo iz vprašanja, kako naj se države v kibernetnem prostoru vedejo druga do druge, pri čemer zaznavamo značilnosti slabe kibernetne sosesčine, naraščajoče nezaupanje v spletne storitve zaradi kibernetičnega kriminala, odpor do množičnega nadzora in druge transnacionalne pojave. Vrednote v ozadju mednarodnih razprav so partikularne, mednarodno pravo kibernetičnih konfliktov pa ni neka objektivna realnost, ki čaka, da jo odkrijemo, temveč je proizvod običajev, norm in iz njih izhajajočih pravil. Na nastanek mednarodnega prava bodo tako najverjetneje vplivala tudi pravila kibernetičnega bojevanja, zbrana in predstavljena v Natovem priročniku Talinn.

Nastajajoča pravila kibernetičnega bojevanja obravnavajo vprašanja, o katerih je šele treba doseči soglasje v stroki, v institucijah vojske in države ter politiki in mednarodnih organizacijah. Avtorica meni, da so za Slovenijo pomembni etična in normativna vprašanja ter njihova rezultanta, ki je optimalna struktura za zagotavljanje nacionalne kibernetične varnosti. V odnosu do kibernetične varnosti je vojska šele na drugem mestu pri zagotavljanju varnosti, primarna varnost se nanaša na informacijsko varnost, katere nosilci so podjetja, posamezniki in policija. Tudi v kibernetični obrambi (computer network defense – CND) imajo pomembno vlogo nevojaški akterji, pri ofenzivnih operacijah pa že nastopijo aktivnosti, ki jih uravnava mednarodno pravo in za katere bi iskali odgovore v priročniku Talinn. To so: način bojevanja, dovoljena raba kibernetičnega orožja, prepovedi, opredelitev vmesnega področja obveščevalnih dejavnosti, ki so predmet dela civilnih in vojaških obveščevalnih agencij ter zaščita posamičnih skupin, kot so novinarji, humanitarni in zdravstveni delavci, otroci in drugi.

Mednarodne organizacije klasificirajo kategorije problemov in jim določajo prednostni vrstni red ter identificirajo akterje (Sil & Katzenstein, 2010). Nato s svojo kibernetno politiko sledi tej logiki klasificiranja problemov in lahko bi celo trdili, da oblikuje priporočila za obravnavanje akterjev, to je članic zavezništva. Kot primer konkretnih priporočil, ki še niso izdana kljub jasni potrebi v okolju, avtorica posebej imenuje priporočili za omejevanje nakupa na črnem trgu in izvoza tehnologij za množični nadzor v avtoritarne države.

1.1 Oboroženi napad

Nadaljujmo od oblikovanja pravil za mednarodne kibernetične konflikte v bolj podrobno opredelitev postopkov in pravil Nata. Priročnik ne opredeljuje Natovih pravil za ofenzivno delovanje, uporabo 5. člena Severnoatlantske pogodbe pa pogojuje z izpolnjevanjem meril za oboroženi napad.

1.1.1 Merila za oboroženi napad: učinek, potek

Ali se kibernetični napad lahko kvalificira kot oboroženi napad, je odvisno od obsega in učinka, o čemer bi se lahko objektivno prepričali šele po napadu. Vendar se je skupina sodelujočih strokovnjakov strinjala, da pri presoji, ali ukrep izpolnjuje pogoje za oboroženi napad, zadošča ocena razumno predvidljivih posledic takega napada. Če nedvoumno povzamemo, ali gre pri kibernetičnem napadu za oboroženi napad, je stvar presoje posledic. Schmitt (Schmitt, 2014) trdi, da je odgovor s silo, kinetično ali nekinetično, upravičen le, če kibernetične operacije predstavljajo oboroženi napad. Odgovor s silo je predmet mednarodnega humanitarnega prava, vseh pravnih odgovorov o posledicah kibernetičnih operacij pa trenutno še nimamo.

Dodatna merila za oboroženi napad se nanašajo na značilnosti poteka kibernetičnega napada, to je na delovanje računalniškega programa *weaponized code*. Te ocene so v priročniku navedene, gre za nujnost in sorazmernost (pravilo 14), neizbežnost in neposrednost (pravilo 15), vendar je treba analizirati vsako posamično ofenzivno kibernetično aktivnost, preden bi jo lahko država ali države članice Nata opredelile kot oborožen napad. Forenzična sposobnost opredelitve oboroženega napada in ustrezna mednarodnopravna argumentacija ter diplomatska akcija so pomembne pri sklicevanju na 5. člen Severnoatlantske pogodbe.

Za aktivacijo člena sta formalno nujna tudi vabilo napadene države in dogovor članic o tem, ali napad izpolnjuje Natova merila. Pri utemeljevanju je napadeni državi v pomoč nekaj vodilnih vprašanj (Schmitt, 2013):

- kolikšna škoda je nastala in koliko žrtev je bilo zaradi napada;
- kako hitro je zlonamerna koda povzročila učinek;
- je kibernetični napad neposredno povzročil učinek ali so učinek povečali kakšni drugi vzroki;
- kako invazivna je bila aktivnost, ali je bila usmerjena na posebno varovano omrežje;
- kako merljiv je učinek, ali je izračun učinka zanesljiv;¹
- ali je imela aktivnost vojaški značaj;
- ali je šlo za uporabo sile po mednarodnem pravu;
- ali gre za posredno ali neposredno vpletenost države.

Pri takšnem večdisciplinarnem utemeljevanju je nujno sodelovanje strokovnjakov različnih strok. Predvsem pri določanju invazivnosti morajo sodelovati strokovnjaki za informacijsko varnost, ki tako ali tako ocenjujejo in analizirajo vsakokratni

¹ *Slaba obramba krepi učinek.*

napad po izbranih merilih.² Pogosto prihajajo iz zasebnega sektorja, uživajo velik mednarodni ugled in svetujejo različnim vladam, ki jih zaprosijo za pomoč.

V ta namen bomo poskusili sistematizirati potrebe malih in velikih držav pri zagotavljanju nacionalne kibernetične varnosti, pri čemer pa raziskovalci odnosa med državami in omrežji že vedo, da sta varnost in sekurizacija postali vodilni pri upravljanju interneta (Mueller, 2010). S taksonomijo upravljanja kibernetičnega prostora bomo razvrstili ključne dejavnosti državnih akterjev za zagotavljanje nacionalne varnosti. Enote uvrščamo v dve skupini, to je v skupino velikih in malih držav, pri čemer so v skupini velikih držav članice Nata Francija, Kanada, Nemčija, Velika Britanija in ZDA, vse druge članice pa so v skupini malih.

Preglednica 3:
Taksonomija
upravljanja
kibernetičnega
prostora za
nacionalno
varnost

| | Strateški cilj | Jurisdikcija | Nadzor nad upravljanjem |
|------------------------|--|--|---|
| Velike države | prevlada v kibernetičnem prostoru | prizadevajo si za ekstrateritorialnost nacionalne zakonodaje, enostranski globalizem | visok, formalen, hierarhičen |
| Male države | izbira med proaktivno adaptacijo in akomodacijo nastajajočemu režimu | erodira | temelji na zaupanju, vzajemnosti, delitvi virov |
| Neodvisno od velikosti | digitalne človekove pravice (zasebnost, množični nadzor, varovanje podatkov), programiranje skupnih sredstev za upravljanje omrežij (TRIPS, IP, DPI, mednarodne ustanove, kot so WIPO, ICANN, WTO, IGF), regulacija vsebine, odziv na globalizacijo varnosti (neprekinjeno sodelovanje mednarodne skupnosti, deljene vrednote, norme in načela, stabilnost in odpornost omrežij) | | |

Iz taksonomije upravljanja kibernetičnega prostora za potrebe nacionalne varnosti v preglednici 3 sledi, da je kibernetični prostor pred države postavil nove varnostne zahteve, ki jih v obdobju pred vitalno odvisnostjo nacionalnih ekonomij od kibernetičnega prostora države niso poznale. V preglednici 3 so razvrščene ključne dejavnosti držav pri upravljanju kibernetičnega prostora z vidika zagotavljanja varnosti omrežij. Opozoriti velja, da so upoštevani izključno državni akterji, ne pa

² Značilne informacije za vzorce napada, ki jih zbira forenzika, so: klasifikacija napada, opis delovanja kode, ranljivosti tarče, metoda napada, napadalčev cilj, viri, veščine in znanje za izvedbo napada, rešitve za zaustavitev delovanja škodljive kode, opis okoliščin in reference.

tudi nevladne organizacije, med prednostnimi nalogami upravljanja pa je predvsem skrb za nacionalno varnost, ne pa tudi reševanje tehnično-operaterskih težav.

Varnost omrežij je varnostna potreba držav, ki jo te zadovoljujejo v mednarodni areni. Predstavlja tako velik izziv, da ga je Nato formalno prepoznal kot novo varnostno potrebo članic v okviru politike *Defending the Networks* (Nato, 2011). Nova varnostna potreba držav je stabilnost in odpornost omrežij, kar je Nato poimenoval kot standardizacijo procesov, ki vodijo v povečanje odpornosti nacionalnih omrežij in kritične infrastrukture, kar je tudi namen kibernetične obrambe. Vse obrambne politike, aktivnosti in ukrepi so namenjeni povečanju odpornosti, pri čemer odpornost razumemo kot sposobnost, da predvidimo naravne nesreče ali nesreče, ki jih povzročijo ljudje, se jim izognemo, se jim upremo, jih minimiziramo in si opomoremo od njih (O'Neil, 2009).

Potrebo po varnosti države torej uresničujejo s konverzijo svojih potreb, in sicer tako, da posegajo v upravljanje omrežij in svetovnega spleta, regulacijo vsebin in dodeljevanje domen ter z nadzorom drugih sredstev upravljanja. Kot trdi Mueller, obstaja možnost nastanka regulatorne koalicije med regulatorji vsebin, zagovorniki intelektualne lastnine in zagovorniki varnosti za hierarhični nadzor nad internetom, osnovanem na nacionalnem načelu (Mueller, 2010).

1.2 Uporaba sile

Kibernetični napad se razume kot uporaba sile ne glede na uporabljeno orožje, ki je v našem primeru računalniški program, imenovan tudi *weaponized code*. Uporaba sile je v mednarodnem pravu prepovedana, skladno z odločitvijo Stalnega mednarodnega sodišča (Permanent Court of International Justice) pa so v splošnem dovoljene vse aktivnosti, ki z mednarodnim pravom niso izrecno prepovedane (*The Case of the S.S. Lotus, France v. Turkey*). Pomembno je torej vedeti, katere slovenske kibernetične aktivnosti bi pred Stalnim mednarodnim sodiščem šteje kot uporaba sile, saj bi jih kot take upoštevala tudi OZN in Nato. Na kibernetični napad, ki velja kot uporaba sile, je dovoljen odziv skladno z 51. členom Ustanovne listine OZN. Uporaba sile pa sicer še ni izenačena z oboroženim napadom, zaradi katerega bi lahko podpisnica Severnoatlantske pogodbe pozvala h kolektivni obrambi na temelju 5. člena.

Tudi če nacionalna znanost, stroka in politika ne dosežejo soglasja, da kibernetične operacije (CNO) štejejo za uporabo sile, se država pred mednarodnim sodiščem ne more sklicevati na nevednost. Upoštevati mora namreč mednarodno pravo, po katerem napačna zavest ni protektivna zavest. Uporaba sile se tako kaže kot ključni koncept pri vzpostavljanju kibernetične obrambe na nacionalni ravni.³

Vedenje držav v kibernetičnem prostoru temelji v njihovi strateški kulturi, v mednarodnih odnosih pa so nekatere dejavnosti, kot je vohunjenje (*computer*

³ Več o dopustnosti ofenzivnih aktivnosti (*computer network attack–CNA*) znotraj kibernetične obrambe (CND) v Sloveniji je najti v razpravi o razvoju ofenzivnih kibernetičnih zmogljivosti v avtoričinih objavljenih prispevkih (Dvoršak, 2014).

network exploitation – CNE), pričakovane in molče odobrene. Take ostajajo tudi v tistem delu mednarodnega prava, ki se nanaša na kibernetično bojevanje. V nasprotju z mednarodnim pravom pa je preventivni udar na potencialnega napadalca, ki sicer ima na voljo kibernetične zmogljivosti, nima pa namenov oboroženega napada.⁴

Tehnične značilnosti poteka napada, recimo pri ranljivosti 0-Day, otežujejo umeščanje kibernetičnih napadov v časovno in vzročno-posledično dimenzijo. Med uporabo sile in oboroženim napadom je zelo tanka ločnica, še posebno nerazločna v kibernetičnem prostoru. Napačne in pristranske interpretacije imajo za posledico padec zaupanja v mednarodno pravo in sposobnosti mednarodnih varnostnih organizacij, da normativno uravnjavajo vedenje držav.

V kibernetičnem bojevanju je dopustno ravnanje, ki v kinetičnem morda sploh ni mogoče, ga pa lahko pričakujemo v kibernetičnih konfliktih. Kot zanimivost in inspiracijo navedimo nekaj primerov dovoljenih ukan:

- posredovanje napačnih informacij in obveščevalnih podatkov,
- posredovanja lažnih ukazov ali namenov o izdaji ukazov,
- vzpostavitev navideznih omrežij, ki simulirajo neobstoječe sile,
- uporaba lažnih identifikatorjev in računalniških omrežij (npr. Honeypots, ki jih v miru uporablja tudi policija),
- uporaba navideznih kibernetičnih napadov pod pogojem, da ne širijo panike med civilnim prebivalstvom,
- uporaba sovražnikovih oznak, signalov in gesel, vendar pa ne oznak humanitarnih ali zdravstvenih organizacij.

Enote za psihološko bojevanje so v kibernetičnem prostoru pridobile novo pomembno dimenzijo za razvoj veščine zavajanja. Smiselno se je vprašati, koliko lahko majhna država z zavajanjem vpliva na zaznavo o mehki (kibernetični) moči države in noopolitiko obrne sebi v prid. Digitalna diplomacija je dober začetek, sistemski odgovor pa je ponovno v razvoju ustreznih konstruktivističnih teorij in modelov. Pretekle poskuse najdemo v modelih družbeno-tehničnih omrežij (Svete, 2005) in v vojaško-industrijsko-medijsko-zabavnem omrežju (military-industrial-media-entertainment-net – MIME-net) (Der Derian, 2001). Možnosti, kako se bo država odzvala na kibernetične operacije, so omejene z mednarodnim pravom. Tako je jasno, da vohunjenje ne pomeni oboroženega spopada ali oboroženega napada po 51. členu Ustanovne listine OZN, zato niso upravičeni odzivi, ki temeljijo na pravu oboroženih spopadov. Sprejemljivo je vzajemno vohunjenje. Nekoliko manj jasno je, kako je z nakupom opreme in programov ali celotne informacijsko-komunikacijske tehnologije, ki ne ustreza zahtevam po integriteti. Skratka – je odgovornost res samo na strani kupca ali nosijo del odgovornosti tudi vpletene države, ki so od zasebnih proizvajalcev zahtevale, da na novo opremo namestijo zlonamerno kodo. Podobno etično vprašanje je nastopilo, ko so podjetja zahodnoevropskih držav v nedemokratične režime izvozila tehnologijo za nadzor množic.

⁴ Primerjaj utemeljitev napada na Irak leta 2003 in odziv stare Evrope, da samo obstoj orožja za množično uničenje ni *causae belli*.

Najbolj oprijemljiv rezultat Natovih kibernetičnih politik je ohranjanje ali reprodukcija varnosti na nacionalni in regionalni ravni. Varnost v svoji predstavitveni in perceptivni dimenziji za konstruktiviste ni neka merljiva dobrina, temveč občutek varnosti, ki ga imajo subjekti varnosti, to so državljani članic Nata, nacionalne elite ter mednarodna elita. Opazili smo lahko nasprotja med interesi ekonomske in tehnične elite pri izvozu tehnologij za nadzor množic ter interesi državljanov zaradi nedemokratskih potencialov teh tehnologij, ki jih politične elite uporabljajo za nadzor državljanov tako v avtoritarnih kot neavtoritarnih državah.

1.3 Sabotaža

Oglejmo si primer sabotaže, ki je v literaturi oboroženih spopadov slabo obdelana, še bolj fluidna je situacija pri sabotaži kritičnih infrastrukture in tehnologije za dvojno rabo v miru. Za izhodišče sabotaže vojaških omrežij v vojni vzemimo 5. člen četrte ženevske konvencije, ki navaja, da posameznik izgubi zaščito, ki mu jo konvencije sicer zagotavljajo, če izvaja aktivnosti sovražne varnosti države (Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949).

Aktivnost, ki je sovražna varnosti države, predpostavlja dvoje. Prvič, da je neko dejstvo že nastopilo oziroma, da se je nek dogodek že zgodil, kar je bilo tudi ugotovljeno. Drugič, pridevnik sovražen nakazuje namen ali finalnost tega dogodka, ki je sovražen, to je zlonameren.

Težko je enoznačno opredeliti, kaj točno so izvršena dejstva s sovražnim namenom, verjetno so bile v četrti ženevski konvenciji mišljene vse obveščevalne dejavnosti in sabotaža za sovražno državo. Posredno 5. člen opredeljuje sabotažo kot dejanje, katerega cilj ali učinek je poškodovati ali uničiti materialno lastnino nasprotnikove vojske ali lastnino, ki jo vojska uporablja. V sodobnem jeziku kibernetične obrambe sabotaža prizadene integriteto in dostopnost omrežij, CNE pa zaupnost omrežij in podatkov.

Skladno z interpretacijo v Natovem priročniku Talinn je napadena država upravičena oceniti škodo, preden je ta resnično nastala. Sodeč po Natovem priročniku, ki v vojni izenačuje tehnologijo za dvojno rabo s tehnologijo v izključni uporabi oboroženih sil, so torej protiobveščevalne aktivnosti namenjene tudi odkrivanju sabotaže tehnologije za dvojno rabo, kar je velik del IKT, in tehnologije, na kateri temeljijo kritična infrastruktura in nekatera podjetja v državni lasti. Zaradi navedenega avtorica meni, da razprava o sabotaži zelo zanima države uvoznice, med katere spada tudi Slovenija, in manj izvoznice naprednih tehnologij.

Militarizacija kibernetičnega prostora s sabotažo, o čemer pričajo Snowdenova javna razkritja, je povečala ameriško vojaško dominacijo v kibernetičnem prostoru, kar lahko razumemo kot njihov legitimni cilj. Po drugi strani se je s sabotažo zmanjšala varnost nacionalnih omrežij, o čemer najpogosteje razpravljajo in pišejo strokovnjaki za informacijsko varnost. Vse to tudi neposredno nasprotuje nacionalnim varnostnim interesom držav, ki so izrazite neto uvoznice IKT. Ureditev za zagotavljanje

varnosti tehnologije za dvojno rabo in IKT pravno in institucionalno zaostaja za zmogljivostmi držav izvoznic, da to tehnologijo izrabijo v svoje namene, naj bodo miroljubni ali sovražni. V prihodnosti se bodo povečale naloge in pristojnosti nacionalnih institucij, ki so najbolj odgovorne za kibernetično varnost. Prav tako se bosta spremenila tip medinstitucionalnega sodelovanja in organizacija struktur, ki operativno zagotavljajo kibernetično varnost, za osvežitev v teoretičnem polju pa je že skrajni čas. Načini, kako se velike in male države odzivajo na globalizacijo varnosti, se med seboj že razlikujejo, nedržavni akterji, zasebna podjetja in nevladne organizacije pa bodo verjetno še bolj posegli v reševanje teh interesov.



Sklep Ta prispevek želi osvetliti nekatera razhajanja med priročnikom Talinn in varnostnimi potrebami malih držav. Temeljno nasprotje pri zagotavljanju kolektivne varnosti je konverzija potreb članic v relativni občutek varnosti dveh subjektov, to so nacionalne ekonomske elite in državljani. Drugo nasprotje je v taki strukturi varnostne organizacije, ki bi izključno utrjevala vodilno ameriško vlogo pri zagotavljanju globalne varnosti, ne bi pa zadovoljevala varnostnih potreb preostalih članic.

V Natu lahko pričakujemo dejavnosti za povečanje kibernetičnih zmogljivosti članic in iskanje učinkovitega odgovora na nekonvencionalne grožnje, ne moremo pa pričakovati, da bodo vse pobude enako koristne za vse članice. Članice zavezništva čaka v prihodnosti izziv, da ugotovijo, katerim izmed zahtev iz okolja zavezništvo sploh ustreza in katere cilje želijo doseči z aktivnostmi v zavezništvu. Dogodki v okolju so trda preizkušnja, ali so aktivnosti Nata dovolj usmerjene v varnost državljanov evropskih članic. Na bolj abstraktni ravni je za Slovenijo pomembna ugotovitev, kako odločanje s konsenzom vpliva na interese manjših članic in kako pomembno je, kje je država v organizaciji (agency vs. structure). Za prihodnost zavezništva so to prelomna vprašanja.

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