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
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GENERALŠTAB SLOVENSKE VOJSKE

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Varnost in regionalno sodelovanje – od Zahodnega Balkana do črnomske regije

*»Z zaupanjem in sodelovanjem
skupnim izzivom soodvisnega sveta naproti«*

Dr. Damir Črnčec

Security and regional cooperation – from the Western Balkans to the Black Sea Region

*»With trust and cooperation towards
common challenges of the interdependent world«*

Damir Črnčec, PhD

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UVODNIK

V sodobnem, soodvisnem, globaliziranem in z informacijsko tehnologijo povezanem svetu, kjer so varnostna tveganja in izzivi ter grožnje transnacionalnega in transregionalnega značaja nekaj samoumevnega, je ustrezno spoprijemanje z njimi še posebno pomembno; ne samostojno, z vidika ene same države, temveč holistično in ob upoštevanju vsaj regionalnih interesov in implikacij. Sodelovanje v regionalnih okvirih je pomembno, še pomembnejše pa postaja medregionalno sodelovanje, katerega namen ni samo izmenjava izkušenj, mnenj in stališč, temveč tudi ali predvsem vzpostavljanje medsebojnega zaupanja med državami z različnimi zgodovinskimi izkušnjami, različnimi cilji in željami za prihodnost, pa vendar s skupnim imenovalcem, željo in potrebo po varnosti v času, ko sodobne varnostne grožnje niso več usmerjene samo proti eni državi ali voditelju, temveč proti skupnim vrednotam, svoboščinam in pravicam.

Izkušnje, tako pozitivne kot negativne iz Jugovzhodne Evrope oziroma ožje, z Zahodnega Balkana, so lahko dobra podlaga za krepitev prenosa znanja in opomnik slabih praks, ki naj se ne bi ponovile na območju črnomske regije. Devetdeseta leta prejšnjega stoletja bodo v evropskem spominu namreč ostala zapisana kot najbolj krvava leta po koncu druge svetovne vojne. Razpad nekdanje Jugoslavije je povzročil številne oborožene spopade, vojne, katerih posledice se čutijo še globoko v 21. stoletje. Zaradi tega je območje Jugovzhodne Evrope oziroma Zahodnega Balkana postalo sinonim za krvave, dolgotrajne konflikte, ki temeljijo na nacionalizmu, kjer tudi genocid ni neznanca. S širitvijo zveze Nato in Evropske unije na vzhod in jugovzhod Evrope je območje Zahodnega Balkana postalo obdano tako s članicami Evropske unije kot tudi zveze Nato. Proces članstva je vedno potekal po istem načelu »*Najprej Nato, nato EU*«, v nekaterih primerih, tudi Slovenije, pa je bilo članstvo skoraj istočasno. Iz črnomske regije sta temu načelu sledili dve državi, ki sta bili še pred dobrima dvema desetletjema članici Varšavskega pakta, Bolgarija in Romunija. Državi, ki ju niso pretresali oboroženi konflikti, spreminjanje

meja ali nastajanje novih držav znotraj njunega ozemlja, soočata pa se s številnimi drugimi izzivi. Dogajanje na svoji zahodni meji sta pozorno in z zaskrbljenostjo zanesljivo spremljali, kakor vsaj s kančkom očesa tudi dogodke v črnomorski regiji, katere del sta tudi sami.

Črnomska regija kot specifično območje morda res nima tako dolge regionalne zgodovine kot območje Zahodnega Balkana, pa vendar je vedno v zgodovini ločevalo Evropo in Azijo ter tako predstavljalo ne samo geografski, temveč tudi geopolitični most oziroma križišče. V zadnjih dvajsetih letih je ta vloga postala bolj vidna pri transportu energetskih virov s Kaspijskega morja v Evropo. Z zgodovinskega vidika je bila ta regija vedno jabolko spora predvsem med Rusijo in Turčijo. Med obdobjem hladne vojne je Črno morje služilo kot ločnica med Natom, katerega članici na tistem območju sta bili Turčija in Grčija, in Varšavskim paktom s Sovjetsko zvezo, Bolgarijo in Romunijo. Po razpadu Sovjetske zveze je na območju Črnega morja nastalo veliko novih neodvisnih držav, ta proces pa je sprožil tudi številne vojaške konflikte in odcepitvena gibanja, znana kot »zamrznjeni konflikti«.

Oči in pozornost Zahoda v devetdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja so bile bolj uprte v dogodke na Zahodnem Balkanu, območje Črnega morja pa je bilo z evropskega vidika nedvomno potisnjeno na politično obrobje. Po 11. septembru 2001 je regija za Združene države Amerike nenadoma postala zelo pomembna za projiciranje sil v povezavi z Irakom in Afganistanom. Evropa je Črno morje počasneje prepoznala kot regijo, vse dokler članici Nata in Evropske unije nista postali Bolgarija in Romunija. In prav ti dve državi tvorita most med Zahodnim Balkanom in črnomorsko regijo, hkrati pa vsem državam z Nato in EU ambicijami služita kot primer, kako postati članici teh dveh organizacij. Pa vendar za članstvo v zvezi Nato in EU ne zadostujejo samo lastna želja, vabilo ali izpolnjevanje kriterijev, temveč tudi širše »soglasje« pomembnih regionalnih in/ali globalnih akterjev.

Na eni strani smo torej lahko priča želji posamezne države v smeri evroatlanskih integracij, na drugi strani pa je prisoten strah pomembnih sil po izgubljanju vpliva v njihovi soseščini. Želja Gruzije ali Ukrajine, četudi bi doma uživala soglasje, ni nujno uresničljiva, ne zaradi (ne)izpolnjevanja kriterijev, temveč zaradi širše geopolitične konstelacije sil in trenj na mejah geopolitičnih sfer. Izgubljena vojna z Rusijo leta 2008 Gruzije zanesljivo ni približala k članstvu v Natu, prav tako smo videli, kako je Rusija leta 2010 z novim dogovorom o črnomorski floti in podpisom vrste sporazumov o povezovanju najpomembnejše ukrajinske in ruske industrije nekdanj pro-Zahodno Ukrajino pahnila (nazaj) v rusko orbito.

Poleg nastanka novih držav po razpadu Jugoslavije in Sovjetske zveze regiji Zahodnega Balkana in Črnega morja povezuje veliko število drugih dejavnikov in podobnosti. Države iz obeh regij so sestavni del jugovzhodnega vojskotališča, predstavljajo most in vrata med Zahodom in Vzhodom, tesno so (bodo) povezane z energetskimi projekti, v njih pa se vsakodnevno postavljajo vprašanja kakovosti

institucij, dobrega vladanja ter neenakomernega gospodarskega in političnega razvoja. Poleg nastanka novih držav, ki so širše mednarodno priznane, se postavlja vprašanje legalnosti in legitimnosti nastanka novih držav iz sedanjih, kot kažejo primeri Kosova, Južne Osetije in Abhazije. V obeh regijah so države, ki nameravajo postati članice Nata in Evropske unije ter pri tem upoštevati tako mnenje Rusije kot ZDA. Razumljivo je, da so balkanske države bolj napredovale v smislu regionalnega sodelovanja – nekatere izmed pobud so podrobneje predstavljene v nadaljevanju, medtem ko v primeru črnomske regije – kljub obstoju številnih regijskih organizacij, kot so Organizacija črnomskega gospodarskega sodelovanja (BSEC), Delovna skupina za črnomoško pomorsko sodelovanje (BLACKSEAFOR) in Črnomorski forum, ni nobenega znaka o trdnejši integraciji. V tem kontekstu bodo/so izkušnje z Zahodnega Balkana zelo dobrodošle. In predvsem temu je namenjena ta številka, ki proučuje varnost in regionalno sodelovanje – od Zahodnega Balkana do črnomske regije, tako skozi slovensko perspektivo, to je skozi perspektivo države, ki zase pravi, da je srednjeevropska, južnoevropska in jadransko-sredozemska ter je bila več kot osem desetletij članica nekdanje Jugoslavije, kakor tudi skozi perspektivo posameznikov iz različnih držav črnomske regije, nekdanjih članic Sovjetske zveze ali Varšavskega pakta.

Lada L. Roslycky v svojem prispevku analizira odnos med geopolitiko, suverenostjo in samoopredelitvijo. S tem, ko samoopredelitev predstavi kot instrument ekspanzionistične zunanje politike, pozornost namenja vlogi, ki jo organiziran kriminal igra pri spodbujanju separatizma, predvsem v državah nekdanje Sovjetske zveze v črnomorski regiji. Poudarja, da mora mednarodna skupnost obravnavati in kaznovati uporabo organiziranega kriminala držav, ki v pehanju po geopolitični moči spodbujajo separatizem na tujem.

Damir Črnčec skozi položaj Slovenije v geopolitičnem in geostrateškem okolju 21. stoletja poleg slovenskih analizira tudi širše geopolitične spremembe po koncu hladne vojne in po terorističnih napadih 11. septembra 2001. Posebno pozornost namenja tudi geoekonomiki kot posebni in vedno bolj pomembni veji geopolitike. Rdeča nit, ki narekuje ravnanje Slovenije po osamosvojitvi leta 1991, je zavezanost evroatlantskim integracijam ter skrb za varnost in mir na območju Jugovzhodne Evrope in Zahodnega Balkana. Slovenija je postala država s sodobnimi izzivi in dilemami, ki je tudi s predsedovanjem Svetu Evropske unije v prvi polovici leta 2008 dokazala, da so se manjše države sposobne uspešno udeleževati na globalni ravni. Izkušnje, ki si jih je Slovenija pridobila v zelo kratkem času dveh desetletij, so tisto, kar lahko enakopravno in od *spodaj gor* ponudi državam tako Zahodnega Balkana kot tudi črnomske regije.

Ugotovitve, ki jih v članku predstavlja avtor Hrigoriy Perepelitsya, vodijo do sklepa, da se je v zadnjih dvajsetih letih namesto Velike Evrope na evropskih tleh začel oblikovati bipolarni varnostni sistem na regionalni ravni. Ta sistem predstavljajo Nato in Evropska unija na eni strani ter Organizacija sporazuma kolektivne varnosti (CSTO) in Skupnost neodvisnih držav (CIS) pod vodstvom Rusije na drugi strani.

Nestabilnost in kratkoročna narava tega sistema bosta pogojeni z dinamiko razvoja ključnih sestavnih elementov, privedli pa bosta do spremembe v ravnovesju moči. Regionalni bipolarni sistem moramo torej obravnavati kot prehodni sistem, ki vodi do homogenega ali heterogenega sistema.

Milan Jazbec v svojem prispevku izpostavlja pomembnost izjemnih večstranskih izkušenj Slovenije, še posebej v okviru njenih odnosov z Zahodnim Balkanom, črnomorsko regijo in obravnavanimi državami. Pri tem se osredotoči na multilateralne dejavnosti, ki jih spremljajo komentarji o bilateralnih dejavnostih, obravnava pa tudi že pridobljene izkušnje in prihodnje izzive slovenske zunanje politike. Posebej je treba izpostaviti, da avtor zagovarja in dokazuje tezo, da multilateralizem deluje kot naravni zaveznik majhnih držav. Ustrezna kombinacija bilateralnih in multilateralnih pristopov ter načinov izvajanja zunanje politike in diplomacije je zanesljivo recept, po katerem v primeru majhnih držav uspeh ne more izostati.

Kot pravi Alojz Šteiner, je preoblikovanje slovenske vojaške organiziranosti potekalo vzporedno s procesom osamosvojitve ter vojaškimi aktivnostmi za zavarovanje demokratične in samostojne države. Slovenska vojska je prehodila dolgo pot od tranzicije do transformacije. Transformacija je izziv, ki prinaša velika pričakovanja, pa tudi dileme, ne le v zavezništvu, tudi v nacionalnih okoljih. Tranzicijske spremembe so težile k prilagajanju, ne pa k radikalnemu spreminjanju obrambno-vojaških struktur. Hkrati je potekal tudi kompleksen proces integracije v zavezništvo, z vrsto postopkov in aktivnosti, ki omogočajo, da se nova članica lahko uspešno vklopi in sodeluje v zavezniških mehanizmih soodločanja in izpolnjevanja svojih obveznosti ter je deležna prednosti. Slovenija je v zvezi Nato primer članice, ki je uspešno opravila s preizkušnjami in izzivi tranzicijskega obdobja. Kot taka je lahko dober primer za vključitev malih držav in kandidatk, zlasti v njeni neposredni soseščini.

Radu Dudau obravnava zapleteno naravo energetskih varnostnih politik, ki Rusijo povezujejo z Evropsko unijo. V zadnjih 15 letih je zaradi rezerv ogljikovega vodika v Kaspijski kotlini prišlo do tekmovanja glede pridobivanja in transporta te surovine na evropske trge. Avtor raziskuje gospodarska in politična tveganja pri glavnih plinovodnih projektih, ki naj bi Evropo povezali s kaspijsko regijo (*Nabucco in Južni tok*) in severozahodno Rusijo (*Severni tok*). Pravi, da: (1) naj bi bil plinovod Severni tok, ki so ga začeli graditi spomladi 2010, pravočasno dokončan, čeprav projekt še ni popolnoma pripravljen za izvedbo druge faze; (2) so kaspijski obeti glede plinovoda Nabucco še vedno nejasni zaradi politične in finančne negotovosti; (3) je plinovod Južni tok le »papirnati tiger«, zasnovan, da bi spodkopal Nabucco; (4) nedavno začeti projekti glede utekočinjenega zemeljskega plina poleg obetajočih rezultatov razvoja »nekonvencionalnega zemeljskega plina« kažejo, da evropska varnost dobave še ni izčrpana zaradi plinovodnih igric.

Andrej Rahten v svojem prispevku predstavi kritičen pogled na pomen vloge Slovenije na Zahodnem Balkanu. Meni namreč, da zgodovinske izkušnje in jezikovna bližina niso zadostna podlaga, da se v okviru EU Slovenija razvije v enega najpomembnejših

igralcev na Zahodnem Balkanu. Dejstvo je, da je uresničitev takšnih ambicij odvisna od več akterjev. Uspešen razvoj Zahodnega Balkana ni le odgovornost ene ali dveh držav v regiji oziroma ene ali dveh držav EU. Samo skupno delovanje bo koristilo regiji (npr. »proces Brdo«), izboljšalo pogoje za nadaljevanje širitvenega procesa in okrepilo globalno vlogo EU.

Azer Khudiyev se osredotoča na varnostno regijo Črnega morja in varnostno vizijo Azerbajdžana v okviru Evropske unije. Poudarja, da bi Azerbajdžan lahko kakovostno sodeloval pri oblikovanju evropskega varnostnega sistema. Slovenija in Azerbajdžan si prizadevata za krepitev dobrih midsosedskih odnosov, varnosti, sodelovanja in medsebojnega spoštovanja med državami črnomske regije in kaspijske kotline ter balkanskimi državami. Avtor izpostavlja potrebo po dialogu, še posebno med Natom in Organizacijo sporazuma kolektivne varnosti (CSTO), saj diplomacija na podlagi dialoga v tem procesu pomeni civiliziran in demokratičen način komunikacije. To vprašanje je zelo zapleteno, zato bi morale vse vpletene strani za njegovo rešitev pokazati visoko raven odgovornosti, medsebojnega spoštovanja, pravičnosti in profesionalnosti.

V študiji primera pobude Clearinghouse za Jugovzhodno Evropo (SEEC) Aljoša Selan predstavlja regionalno pobudo, ki so jo podale ZDA in Slovenija (kot sopobudnici in stalni sopredsedujoči) ter države regije Zahodnega Balkana. Namen pobude je zagotovitev dodane vrednosti na področju sodelovanja pri obrambnih reformah. Pobuda SEEC je postavila platformo in orodja, ki pomenijo veliko priložnost za uveljavitev sprememb konceptov regionalnega sodelovanja pri obrambnih reformah na Zahodnem Balkanu. To je torej povsem novo poglavje regionalnega sodelovanja z vidika regije, dobre izkušnje pa je mogoče uporabiti tudi v drugih regionalnih okvirih, kot je npr. črnomska regija.

Simon Saradzhyan analizira grožnjo pomorskega terorizma za Rusijo. Določi akterje, ki bi bili zmožni in motivirani napasti pomorske tarče v Rusiji in prouči morebitne pomanjkljivosti v sistemu države. Storilci terorističnih dejanj katastrofalnih razsežnosti bi se lahko začeli bolj zanimati za pomorske tarče, saj se varnost izboljšuje na kopenskih objektih, pravi Saradzhyan, ki grožnjo konvencionalnega in jedrskega terorizma raziskuje že več let. Poleg tega razvoj medijskih tehnologij pomeni, da pomorske tarče niso več nedostopne splošni javnosti, ki jo teroristi skušajo ustrašiti. Avtor zaključuje, da se grožnja pomorskega terorizma v Rusiji ne bo zmanjšala in predlaga več načinov, kako jo močno omiliti.

Vsebine in prispevki iz te posebne tematske številke so rezultat sodelovanja Ministrstva za obrambo Republike Slovenije v Harvardskem programu črnomske varnosti. Prav prek sodelovanja v tem programu se je tudi razvila zamisel o izvedbi tega programa v Sloveniji leta 2010, kakor tudi o njegovi nadgradnji skozi to posebno obliko. In še ob rob dilemi, ki se nam je porajala, zakaj konferenca o črnomorski varnosti sploh v Sloveniji? Dejstvo je, da Slovenija s svojim geopolitičnim in geostrateškim položajem predstavlja naraven most med državami članicami Nata

in EU, ki ležijo bodisi ob Jadranskem bodisi ob Črnem morju. To vodilo sva zasledovala v sourednikovanju¹ in z razumevanjem, kako pomembno je biti kamenček v mozaiku (med)regionalnega sodelovanja in skupnega spoprijemanja z varnostnimi tveganji, grožnjami in izzivi.

¹ *Kot domači gostujoči sourednik bi želel izraziti svoje zadovoljstvo in tudi zahvalo za trud, predanost ter sodelovanje tujemu gostujočemu souredniku dr. Sergeiju Konoplyovu, direktorju Programa ZDA - Ruske varnosti in Programa črnomske varnosti ter generalu Tadu Oelstromu, direktorju Programa nacionalne varnosti na Fakulteti Johna F. Kennedyja harvardske univerze.*

INTRODUCTION

In a contemporary inter-dependant and globalized world characterized by information technology where security risks and challenges as well as transnational and trans-regional threats are taken for granted, an appropriate way of dealing with them is so much more important; not independently, from the standpoint of only one country, but through a holistic approach, considering at least regional interests and implications. Cooperation in regional frameworks is important; however, even more significant is becoming interregional cooperation, whose purpose is not only the exchange of experience, opinions and views, but also or mainly the establishment of mutual trust among countries with various historical experience, different goals and wishes for the future, but sharing the same wish and need for security in the times when contemporary security threats are not aimed only against one country or leader, but against common values, freedoms and rights.

Positive and negative experience from Southeast Europe and, more specifically, from the Western Balkans can serve as a good basis for transposition of knowledge and as a reminder of bad practices which should not repeat in the Black Sea Region. In the European memory the 1990s will be remembered as the bloodiest period after World War II. Disintegration of the former Yugoslavia caused numerous armed conflicts and wars whose consequences can be felt also in the 21st century. The area of Southeast Europe or the Western Balkans thus became a synonym for bloody, long-lasting and on nationalism-founded conflicts with elements of genocide. With NATO and EU's expansion to Eastern and Southeastern Europe the area of the Western Balkans has become surrounded by both, EU and NATO member states. The membership process has always followed the same principle: »*NATO first, EU second*«. In some cases, including Slovenia, the entry into both organizations was almost simultaneous. This principle was followed also by two Black Sea countries who just two decades ago were still members of the Warsaw Pact, namely Bulgaria and Romania. These are countries not shaken by armed conflicts, border changes or emergence of

new countries within their territory; however, they are dealing with numerous other challenges. They have probably carefully and worriedly followed the developments along their western border and dedicated at least some of their attention also to the events in the Black Sea Region to which they belong.

The Black Sea Region as a specific area may not have such a long regional history as the area of Western Balkans; however, it has always been a natural border between Europe and Asia, representing not only a geographical, but also a geopolitical bridge and crossroads. In the past twenty years this role has become more visible in transporting energy resources from the Caspian Sea to Europe. Historically it has always been the bone of contention mainly between Russia and Turkey. During the Cold War the Black Sea served as a division line between NATO, whose members in this area were Turkey and Greece, and the Warsaw Pact with the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Romania. Upon the demise of the Soviet empire many new independent states appeared around the Black Sea; however, this process triggered also several military conflicts and secessionist movements known as »frozen conflicts«.

In the 1990s the eyes and attention of the West were focused on the events in the Western Balkans, leaving the Black Sea Region in political periphery, from the European point of view. After 11 September 2001 the region suddenly became very important for the United States in the context of force projection with regard to Iraq and Afghanistan. Europe was slower in recognizing the Black Sea as a region until Bulgaria and Romania became members of NATO and the European Union. And it is exactly these two countries that form the bridge between the Western Balkans and the Black Sea Region and at the same time set an example to all countries with NATO and EU ambitions showing how to succeed in entering these two organizations. Nevertheless, for the NATO and EU membership the wish alone, invitation or satisfaction of criteria is not enough. What is required is also a wider »consensus« given by important regional or global actors.

On the one side we can witness the wish of individual countries to join Euro-Atlantic integrations, and on the other the fear of important actors to lose the influence in their neighborhood. The wish of Georgia or Ukraine, although supported at home, might not be necessarily realizable, and not due to the (non)fulfillment of criteria, but due to a wider geopolitical constellation of forces and tensions along the borders of geopolitical spheres. The war with Russia in 2008 Georgia lost did not contribute to its approaching to NATO membership. Also, the new deal with Ukraine on the Russian Black Sea fleet and a series of agreements to link major Ukrainian and Russian industries concluded in 2010 put once pro-Western Ukraine (back) into the Russian orbit. The Western Balkans and the Black Sea are similar in many aspects besides the emergence of new states following the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Countries from both regions form an integral part of the South-Eastern Theatre of War. They represent a bridge and gateway between the West and East and are (will be) closely connected with energy projects. Countries of both regions are also characterized by institutions and governance of questionable quality, as well as

by uneven economic and political development. Besides the new internationally recognized countries, the legality and legitimacy of newly emerged countries within the existing ones is being discussed, such as Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In both regions there are countries wishing to become NATO and EU members. In this process they are ready to take into account the opinion of both, Russia and the USA. It is understandable that Balkans countries have made better progress in the area of regional cooperation – some initiatives are thoroughly presented in the article. As to the Black Sea – despite the existence of numerous regional organizations such as the Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the Black Sea Naval Co-operation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR) or the Black Sea Forum – there is no sign of deep integration. In this context the Western Balkan lessons will be more than welcome. This is also the topic of this issue which addresses security and regional cooperation – from the Western Balkans to the Black Sea Region both, through Slovenian perspective, the perspective of the state which for over eighty years formed an integral part of the former Yugoslavia and now claims to be Central European, Southern European and Adriatic-Mediterranean country, and through a perspective of individuals from various Black Sea countries, former members of the Soviet Union or Warsaw Pact.

In her article Lada L. Roslycky analyses the relationship between geopolitics, sovereignty and self-determination. Presenting self-determination as an instrument of expansionist foreign policy, she calls attention to the role played by organized crime in spurring separatism particularly in the Post-Soviet states of the Black Sea Region. She points out the need for the international community to address and penalize the use of organized crime by states that promote separatism abroad in their pursuit of geopolitical power.

Damir Črnčec, through Slovenian position in the geopolitical and geostrategic environment of the 21st century, besides Slovenian changes analyses also wider geopolitical changes the world has witnessed since the end of the Cold War and terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. Special attention is given to geo-economics as a special and increasingly important branch of geopolitics. The red thread characterizing Slovenian policy after the declaration of independence in 1991 was the commitment to Euro-Atlantic integrations and care for peace and security in the area of Southeast Europe and the Western Balkans. Slovenia has become a country with contemporary challenges and dilemmas. By assuming the EU Council Presidency in the first half of 2008 it proved that also small countries could successfully participate on a global level. The experience gained by Slovenia in a short period of two decades is what Slovenes can, on an equal basis and from *bottom up*, offer to the countries of the Balkans and Black Sea Region.

Observations made by Hrigoriy Perepelitsya in this article lead him to the conclusion that over the past twenty years instead of the Great Europe a regional level bipolar security system has started to take shape in the European continent. This system is represented by NATO and the EU on the one side and the Collective Security Treaty

Organization (CSTO) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) led by Russia on the other. Instability and short-term nature of this system will be predetermined by the development dynamics of its key constituent elements and resulting in the change in the balance of powers. Therefore, this regional bipolar system should be considered as a transitional system leading to the homogeneous or heterogeneous system.

In his article Milan Jazbec stresses the importance of unique Slovenian multilateral experience, especially in the framework of Slovenia's relations to the Western Balkans, the Black Sea Region and the countries addressed. The article is focused on multilateral activities accompanied by comments on bilateral activities. The author addresses also lessons learned and future challenges within the Slovenian foreign policy. It must specifically be pointed out that the author advocates and proves the thesis that multilateralism serves as a natural ally of small countries. An appropriate combination of bilateral and multilateral approaches as well as the methods of implementation of foreign policy and diplomacy is undoubtedly a recipe where, in the case of small countries, the success can be taken for granted.

As said by Alojz Šteiner, the transformation of Slovenian military organization took place in parallel with the independence process and military activities to protect the democratic and independent country. The Slovenian Armed Forces travelled a long way leading from the transition to transformation. The latter is a challenge bringing high expectations and also dilemmas, not only within the Alliance but also within national environments. Transition changes favoured adjustments rather than radical changes in defence-military structures. At the same time, a complex integration process into the Alliance took place. It included a series of procedures and activities enabling a new member state to successfully integrate and participate in NATO mechanisms within which Slovenia can take part in decision-making processes, comply with its commitments and enjoy priority consideration. Slovenia is a NATO member state which successfully passed the tests and challenges of the transition period. As such it can set an example to other small states and candidate countries, especially in its direct neighbourhood, to integrate into NATO.

Radu Dudau discusses the intricate nature of the energy security policies that link Russia to the European Union. Over the past 15 years, the hydrocarbon reserves of the Caspian Basin have launched a competitive game regarding the extraction and transport of those resources to the European markets. The author explores the economic and political stakes in the major gas pipeline projects intended to connect Europe to the Caspian Region (*Nabucco* and *South Stream*) and to northwestern Russia (*Nord Stream*). He argues that (1) the Nord Stream pipeline, whose construction started in the spring 2010, is likely to be finalized in time – though the project is still not completely ready for its second phase; (2) Nabucco's Caspian prospects are still uncertain due to political and financial uncertainties; (3) South Stream is probably a mere "paper tiger," conceived to undermine Nabucco; (4) the recently started liquefied natural gas projects, along with the promising results of

“unconventional gas” developments, show that Europe’s security of supply is not exhausted by the pipelines game.

In his article Andrej Rahten critically addresses the importance of Slovenian role in the Western Balkans. He believes that historical experience and similar language are not a sufficient basis for Slovenia to, under the auspices of the EU, become one of the key players in the Western Balkans since ambitions of this kind depend on several actors. Successful development of the Western Balkans is not the responsibility of one or two countries in the region, or of one or two EU member states. Only joint cooperation will prove useful for the region (e.g. Brdo Process), improve conditions for the continuation of the expansion process and enhance a global role of the EU.

Azer Khudiyev addresses the security region of the Black Sea and the security vision of Azerbaijan. He points out that Azerbaijan could successfully participate in the construction of European Security System. Slovenia and Azerbaijan endeavour to enhance good neighbouring relations, security, cooperation and mutual respect among countries of the Black Sea Region-Caspian Basin and the Balkan countries. The author stresses the need for a dialogue, especially between NATO and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), since diplomacy based on dialogue represents a civilized and democratic way of communication in this process. This problem is very complex; its successful solution therefore requires a high level of responsibility, mutual respect, justice and professionalism of all parties involved.

In his case study of the Southeast Europe Clearinghouse (SEEC) initiative Aljoša Selan presents a regional initiative launched by the USA and Slovenia as co-initiators and permanent co-chairs, as well as by Western Balkan countries. The purpose of the initiative is to ensure added value within the participation in defence reforms. The SEEC initiative established a platform and tools representing an important opportunity to enforce changes in concepts of regional cooperation in the area of defence reforms in the Western Balkans. This is a new chapter in the area of regional cooperation, from the standpoint of the region itself, while best practices can be used also in other regional frameworks, such as the Black Sea Region.

Simon Saradzhyan analyzes the threat of maritime terrorism for Russia. He identifies actors that could be capable and motivated to attack maritime targets in Russia and reviews potential vulnerabilities in the country’s system. Perpetrators of acts of catastrophic terrorism may develop stronger interest in maritime targets as security improves at land facilities, argues Saradzhyan who has researched the threat of conventional and nuclear terrorism for years. Moreover, development of media technologies means that maritime targets are no longer out of sight of general public that terrorists seek to intimidate. The author concludes that the menace of maritime terrorism will not decrease in Russia and offers a number of recommendations on how to minimize this threat.

The articles published in this special thematic edition are a result of the participation of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia in the Harvard Black Sea Security Programme. The participation in this programme also generated the idea to implement this programme in Slovenia in 2010 and to upgrade it in this special way. Why should a conference on Black Sea Security be held in Slovenia? The fact is that Slovenia with its geopolitical and geostrategic position represents a natural bridge between NATO and EU member states situated both, along the Adriatic and the Black Sea. This guidance led us in our role of co-editors¹ and made us reflect on how important it is to be a stone in the mosaic, a mosaic of (inter)regional cooperation and joint activities with regard to security risks, threats and challenges.

¹ *As Slovenian guest editor I would like to use this opportunity to express my satisfaction, as well as my gratitude for their commitment, effort and dedication to foreign guest editor Dr Sergei Konoplyov, Director of the US - Russia Security Programme and Harvard Black Sea Security Program, and to General Tad Oelstrom, Director of the National Security Programme at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.*

GEOPOLITIKA MANIPULIRA Z NAČELOM SAMOODLOČBE

GEOPOLITICS MANIPULATING SELF-DETERMINATION

Short scientific article

V politiki je organizirana manjšina politična večina.

J. Jackson

In politics, an organized minority is a political majority.

J. Jackson

Povzetek Avtorica obravnava medsebojni vpliv geostrategije ter načel samoodločbe in suverenosti. V tem članku prikazuje načelo samoodločbe kot instrument, s katerim vplivne države v težnji po moči opravičujejo spodbujanje separatizma. Čeprav razlikuje med separatizmom, ki ga podpirajo demokratične sile, in separatizmom, ki ga spodbujajo bolj represivne sile, pa opozori na skupno značilnost, ki jo predstavlja odnos med državami in transnacionalnim organiziranim kriminalom v zvezi s tem vprašanjem. Avtorica se sprašuje, ali igra separatizem v postsovjetskih državah črnomske regije ključno vlogo pri preprečevanju širjenja demokracije.

Ključne besede *Separatizem, geopolitika, samoodločba, organiziran kriminal, obveščevalna dejavnost, Kosovo, črnomska regija, Rusija, strategija.*

Abstract This article examines the interplay between geostrategy, self-determination and sovereignty. The author presents the principle of self-determination as an instrument used to justify the promotion of separatism in the pursuit of power by powerful states. Although a distinction is made between separatism that is backed by democratic forces and that which is backed by more repressive ones the relationship between states and transnational organized crime in this regard is presented as a commonality. The author asks if separatism in the Post-Soviet states in the Black Sea Region has played an instrumental role in preventing the spread of democracy.

Key words *Separatism, geopolitics, self-determination, organized crime, intelligence, Kosovo, Black Sea Region, Russia, strategy.*

Introduction There appears to be a hushed trend in which the ancient strategy of *divide et impera* continues to provide strong states with more geopolitical power at the expense of sovereignty and peace. The balance between sovereignty, geopolitics and self-determination is delicate and can be manipulated by the foreign policies of powerful states. Unfortunately, self-determination is the noble principle, which has reared its head as the driving force of such separatist strategies. The geopolitical tactics associated with this principle appears to be less than above-board. Could it be that the strategic use of informal tactics to financially support separatists enables intervening states to extend their authority into foreign territories? Some tactics used to create new “states” appear to be illegal, and transnational organized crime also plays a role; albeit in the promotion democratic power (i.e. Kosovo) of the projection of repressive power (i.e. Post-Soviet states). In the Black Sea Region separatism and frozen conflicts are not unique phenomena. Furthermore, it appears to have stunted the democratic development of the sovereign Post-Soviet states. It is therefore worthy to consider the interplay between sovereignty, geopolitics and self-determination in this regard and the role played by organized crime.

The violation of state sovereignty occurs often without repercussion – enter international anarchy (Buzan et al. 1997:150). This anarchic reality born of the lacuna that exists between international politics and international law allows states - via individual actors - to act on both sides of the moral spectrum. The exercise of hard and soft power by players trapped in a globalizing but state-centric matrix tends to revert to the pursuit of geopolitical power. Does this mean that soft power tactics such as corruption and other forms of transnational organized crime play a role in state making and geopolitics?

To achieve state-based, civilized globalization, it is important to ask if organized crimes committed in one state have their origins in the intrusive foreign policy of another. In the field of international relations, separate levels of analysis facilitate the study of international security by demarcating the actors whose behavior within the anarchic structure will be analyzed (Buzan et al. 1997:5). They also facilitate distinguishing between the way international security threats are perceived when they are posed by states on the one hand, and terrorists or transnationally organized criminals on the other. Although distinct, the levels are not mutually exclusive; rather, they are coexistent and interdependent.

In this study, we shall endeavor to discover a place in international anarchy where, in their geopolitical pursuits, states cooperate with transnational organized crime. To assume such a place does not exist is to deny that injustice and iniquity are the fundamentals of human society - as are their counterparts, justice and righteousness.

1 SELF-DETERMINATION, SOVEREIGNTY AND GEOPOLITICS

In the 19th century, renowned military theorist and strategist Carl von Clausewitz identified an approach for states to obtain control over foreign territory using the

military, but *without* resorting to combat (Howard M. & Peter P. (eds.) 1976: 93). He asserted that by combining its presence with soft power tactics that increase the enemy's expenditure effort or simply cause damage, the military could serve as an anchor to win a war without defeating the enemy's forces (Howard M. & Peter P. (eds.) 1976: 93). Could Carl von Clausewitz also have had organized crime and corruption in mind?

It is foreseeable that economic, historic and ethnic strife within one state's territory can be used to deteriorate its power potential by combining albeit "peaceful" foreign military presence with organized criminal activity. The combination of a foreign military presence and organized crime could severely harm a state's power potential, particularly if the military power is situated in territories that are simultaneously the host state's 'weak spots' and of strategic importance to the intervening state. It thereby gives effect to the strategic principle of bringing superior force to bear on a point where, due to historic, economic or ethnic strife the enemy is both weaker and liable to crippling damage (Shy & Jomini, 1986: 168).

In 1945, the international community of states entered self-endangering and paradoxical obligations through the ratification of the Charter of the United Nations. The sovereign states declared their pursuit of universal peace and respect for the principle of self-determination (UN Charter 1945, Art. 2). This declaration reveals the dichotomous nature of globalization in which the more universal interests become; the more localized or 'tribal' the focus¹. Within this "global paradox", universalism is balanced by 'tribalism' and vice versa (Naisbitt 1994:18-19). However, by balancing "universalism" with 'tribalism', it is foreseeable that great powers will continue to use 'tribal' tactics to divide and conquer weaker states in their pursuit of international power.


The intricacies of this universal-tribal paradox are perhaps best depicted by the relationship between self-determination, sovereignty, and geopolitics. Sovereignty and self-determination are both based on territorial claims and the right to rule over a people. Both lay claims to power and, both are the founding principles of international law and relations. However, whereas sovereignty is an established institution (with about 200 sovereign states in the global arena); self-determination is not.

State sovereignty is a ruling principle and fundament of the material structure of international relations and law. It designates a specified territory and the exclusive right to govern over its population to a sovereign. Importantly, state sovereignty is legitimized by the immaterial will of the people. The principle of self-determination encapsulates the will of the people. It recognizes the right of "peoples" to determine their political status including their economic, social and cultural development (*Article 1 (2) United Nations Charter, Article 1 (1) International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 1966 and Article 1 (1) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1976*). The precariousness surrounding the


¹ The term tribalism refers to a lower level of analysis, which would fall between the unit and subunit level as established by Buzan Weaver and De Wilde .

right to self-determination notwithstanding, it is also codified, moral obligation of sovereign states to uphold it (*Article 1 (2) The Charter of the United Nations 1945, Article 1 (1) International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 1966, Article 1 (1) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1976*).

However, the relationship between self-determination, sovereignty and geopolitics is an interactive one. Normally, intervention violates state sovereignty and, without due cause and procedure, is prohibited by international law. However, if a minority or nation has a legitimate claim and is unduly oppressed and/or suppressed by the sovereign state in which it is found, external state powers may choose to intervene (Supreme Court of Canada 20 August, 1998). Ideally, self-determination, sovereignty and geopolitics should balance each other to uphold peace.



However, moral principles and ideals do not seem to balance themselves perfectly in this world. Rather, they often come into play only when it is convenient or necessary. This is reflected by the reality that great powers do not advocate moral principles of international law uniformly. Differences in historical, cultural, political and religious perceptions open avenues for foreign states to intervene. Therefore, based on their own geopolitical interests, great power states may *choose* to participate in regional dynamics to which they are not geographically bound. (Buzan & Wæver: 2007). This ability to transform self-determination into an instrument of foreign policy shows how the relationship between state sovereignty, self-determination, and geopolitics can be pernicious.



Geopolitical self-interest appears to have the ability to transform self-determination (and separatism, its ‘evil’ offspring) into an instrument of expansionist foreign policy. Conflicts may be ‘frozen’ because “neighboring states, kin-states, and/or patrons abroad have a political or economic interest in starting or stoking ‘ethnic’ conflicts” (Kemp 2004: 49).

By orchestrating separatism abroad, great powers violate the sovereignty of states to satisfy their own geopolitical interests. The notion of “sovereignty” has been used to suppress claims to self-determination. The relationship between Turkey and the Kurds, and, Spain and the Basque separatists exemplify the struggle sovereign states face in maintaining their territorial integrity. On the international level, a good example of this is found in the United States policy toward Ukrainian and Azerbaijani freedom movements. During the Cold War, the United States, aware of the people’s violent suppression and oppression, recognized Russia’s hegemony and *de facto* sovereignty over the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Fearing that Russian retribution would outweigh the potential benefit, the United States Department of State (1953) opted to overlook communist atrocities suffered there and not support the right to self-determination of these nations. Conversely, whereas the notion of sovereignty has justified the containment of self-determination, self-determination can break state sovereignty down through secession.

The (failed) attempts of the Quebecois to secede from Canada are indicative that the democratic maturity of the state in question plays a pivotal role. Ruling against Quebecois secession in 1998, the Canadian Supreme Court clarified international law regarding self-determination. The court asserted, the right to secession under the principle of self-determination of people arises only where ‘a people’ is governed as part of a colonial empire; is subject to alien subjugation, domination or exploitation; and possibly is denied any meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination within the state of which it forms a part. International law entitles states to maintain territorial integrity and to have other states recognize it when: a) the government in question represents the whole of the people or “peoples” resident within its territory; b) the said representation is based on equality, without discrimination and; it respects the principles of self-determination in its internal arrangements. Canada meets these criteria and therefore, under considerations of international law, is entitled to territorial integrity and its recognition by foreign states.

However, what would have happened to Canada’s sovereignty had it not met these conditions? Kosovo and Serbia provide a case and point of how the violation of these conditions can lead to international intervention, the violation of state sovereignty and secession. The policies of Serbian leader Milosevic were aimed at reestablishing the Serbian position in Kosovo. Notwithstanding the *de jure* Serbian authority over Kosovo and historical causes for the Serbian minority status there, his repressive policies violated internationally recognized human rights and principles. His policies spurred the self-determination of the Kosovo-Albanians and the Western powers took the opportunity to intervene.

Self-determination and secession movements require both internal and external support. The West’s geopolitical interests of expanding its sphere of influence through the spread of democracy coincided with the self-determination of Kosovo-Albanians. It has been reported that the British Special Armed Services, the German Secret Service (BND), the US Central Intelligence Agency and, at later stages NATO, cooperated to

train and equip the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) (Kuentzel 2000, Bisset 2001). However, the reasons for (and level of), Western involvement remain moot.

Testifying at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, former Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Bisset, testified: “The U.S. led attack on Yugoslavia was designed to improve President Clinton’s public image and restore credibility to NATO, whose existence since the end of the cold war was in jeopardy.” The legality of these actions is unclear. What is clear, however, is that because the KLA was armed and trained, it was able to partake in a war that led to Kosovo’s declaration of independence on 17 February 2008. To date, 65 states including the majority EU and NATO states have recognized Kosovo as an independent state.

In selecting areas of strategic value, the intervening powers and/or states are able to increase their geopolitical power by weakening the host state. In such a case, state organized/supported self-determination becomes *strategic separatism*.

2 IDEOLOGICAL FERVOR AND ORGANIZED CRIME

Self-determining “peoples” usually rely on networks that include politicians and senior military, police, and intelligence officials, executives as well as the supply networks of neighboring states, Diaspora, as well as criminal elements for external support to operate *against* the state (Kemp 2004: 51). However, the role played by organized crime and corruption in the state making and state breaking processes must not be ignored. Armed groupings and/or criminals who are able to profit from such self-determination seek cooperation with willing hosts or allies, which also need support (including force) to realize their aims (Kemp 2004: 45). In fact, ideological fervor is increasingly evident in ethnic conflicts where “would-be commandos feel completely justified” in participating in organized crime in their “profitable quest to realize their territorial ambitions” (Kemp 2004:18).

Unfortunately, because the profit potential of instability attracts the criminal element to the state-building process, eradicating it is a more complicated matter (Kemp 2004:45). In 2008, the United Nations estimated that between 15-20% of Kosovo’s economy was derived from organized crime (Rosenthal 2008). Crime and corruption is endemic in Kosovo and it holds a dominant position in the European drug trade and human trafficking. German media have accused former Prime Minister Ramush Haradinj, former KLA commander, of being a key figure in the nexus between politics and organized crime. Disappointingly, the U.N. administration in Kosovo has also been accused of complacency toward, if not outright collusion with the criminal networks (Rrahmani & Zogiani 2007, Rosenthal 2008).

Democratic powers and institutions play an important role in state making and institution building. Having dangerous, corrupt neighbors is after all, a security threat. Ironically, even if so-called state making contains elements of brute force, organized crime and corruption the long-term perspective of the territories concerned is

promoted as positive when it is done in the name of democracy by democratic forces. It cannot be denied that ‘new democracies’ are expected to integrate, give effect to the rule of law and eventually absorb the living standards of the “democratic West” and the spread of democracy through Euro-Atlantic integration and European Union enlargement continues to be perceived by many in the West and East as a privilege.

However, if it is true that “Democracy greatly magnifies and multiplies the assertiveness of tribes and repression does the reverse”, what does it mean when *repressive* states support self-determination and separatism beyond their legitimate borders? (Naisbitt 1994: 18-19). Could they be countering the proliferation of democracy into their perceived spheres of influence or simply playing quid pro quo?

3 THE BLACK SEA REGION

The use of the principle of self-determination to promote separatism appears part of Russia’s foreign policy of countering the spread of democracy and western influence in states it continues to perceive as belonging to its exclusive sphere of influence. In fact, on 30 January 2006, in reaction to developments in Kosovo, the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin forewarned a positive decision on the legality of Kosovo’s independence would set a precedent for the rest of the post-Soviet territory (Bisset). Curiously, the Russian Federation, while relying on sovereignty to suppress self-determination within its own borders (Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Tatarstan, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria), vehemently promotes “self-determination” in the Post-Soviet States in the Black Sea Region.

Democracy has encroached on the Black Sea Region in an unprecedented manner. Former Warsaw Pact states Romania and Bulgaria are now NATO and EU members. Turkey is a longstanding and valuable NATO member and takes pride in being a democratic secular state. Following suit, the Post-Soviet states in the Black Sea Region (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, henceforth, NISBSR) have expressed their intentions to democratize and develop ever-closer ties with the West and its institutions. This combined with the Russian Federation’s anti-democratic sentiment places these states in a precarious position. Their proximity to the “democratic West” and the “undemocratic East” makes the interplay between geopolitics, self-determination, sovereignty and organized crime particularly pertinent in the Black Sea Region.

Has Russia participated in master-minding the self-determination and separatism in states of its former empire to counter the spread of democracy in states it perceives belonging to its sphere of influence? Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, Transdnistria in Moldova, South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia and Crimea in Ukraine are all territories with “self-determining peoples” supported by the Russian Federation. Whereas the legitimacy of the self-determination of these groups is questionable, it is clear that the support they receive from the Russian Federation threatens the territorial sovereignty of the Post-Soviet states and security of the entire Black Sea Region.

To varying degrees, the aforementioned breakaway territories exercise internal sovereignty *without external legitimation*.² Lacking external legitimation, “it stands to reason that their form of government will be considered illegitimate and their sources of revenue illegal”. All are notorious for their links to organized crime, some of which are referred to as “black holes of organized crime”. However, there, ‘the territorial separatists of the early 1990s have become the state builders of the early 2000s, creating *de facto* countries whose ability to field armed forces, control their own territory, educate their children, and maintain local economies is about as well developed as that of the recognized states of which they are still notionally a part’ (Kemp 2004:46).

All of the disputed territories are strategically important to the Russian Federation and, for economic, historic and ethnic reasons they are the host states’ ‘weak spots’. Importantly, they have all been, in one way or another, converted into Russian protectorates hosting Russian military power albeit rented bases, air bases, naval bases, ‘peacekeeping’ or training missions. This gives Russia access to the Black Sea and territories in which it lost the legitimacy of its presence with the end of the Cold War. It also limits the role and presence of democratic powers.

Conclusion Self-determination and sovereignty are the foundations of international relations and international law. However, in their geopolitical relations, both are debased by states pursuing power through the promotion of separatism. The facilitating role played by “peaceful” military presences, intelligence agencies and organized crime in this regard deserves attention from academia and security analysts. In the Black Sea Region, this interface appears to promote separatism in order to prevent the democratization of Post-Soviet states.

Criminal law is an ancient corner stone of human civilization and predates biblical times. National criminal law regulates the public. However, in our globalized times, the regulation of criminal state behavior and the rule of international public law are in natal phases. Therefore, “To confront those who resort to criminal activity and violence, one needs to identify and expose their illegal sources of income and interdict their support networks.”³ In so doing, targeted sanctioning and/or the cutting off sources of external finance would be facilitated and the victimized states and humans protected. The manner in which the international community addresses separatism there will inevitably impact not only the millions of people living in the region, but the safety and security of states far beyond.

² *On the one end of the spectrum lies South Ossetia on the other Crimea – through Sevastopol.*

³ *Kemp. W. A., The Business of Ethnic Conflict, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Vienna, Austria Security Dialogue vol. 35, no. 1, March 2004. p 55.*

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SLOVENIJA V GEOPOLITIČNEM IN GEOSTRATEŠKEM OKOLJU 21. STOLETJA

SLOVENIA IN GEOPOLITICAL AND GEOSTRATEGIC ENVIROMENT OF THE 21ST CENTURY

Original Scientific article

Povzetek Republika Slovenija je kontinentalna in pomorska država. Leži na prostoru, kjer se stikajo slovanska, germanska in romanska kultura. V zgodovinskem in kulturnem pogledu pripada Srednji Evropi, vojaško pa je del južnoevropskega vojskovališča. Geostrateški položaj Republike Slovenije v evropskem prostoru je pomemben zato, ker je na njenem ozemlju stičišče treh geostrateških in geopolitičnih prostorov, in sicer srednjeevropskega, južnoevropskega in jadransko-sredozemskega. Zavezanost evroatlantskim integracijam, skrb za varnost in mir na območju Jugovzhodne Evrope ter Zahodnega Balkana sta rdeči niti, ki opredeljujeta slovensko geopolitično in geostrateško ravnanje slovenskih političnih elit v preteklih dveh desetletjih. Prav tako bo to ostalo pomembno tudi v njihovem prihodnjem delovanju, saj bo varnost Slovenije še naprej odvisna od varnostnih razmer v regiji in od sposobnosti slovenskih političnih elit, da uspešno rešujejo s sodobne varnostne izzive v Natu in Evropski uniji v globaliziranem, multipolarnem, geopolitično nestabilnem svetu, polnem različnih tveganj ter priložnosti. Slovenija je po osamosvojitvi leta 1991 postala sodobna država s temu primernimi izzivi in vprašanji, ki je tudi s predsedovanjem Svetu Evropske unije v prvi polovici leta 2008 dokazala, da so se manjše države sposobne uspešno udeleževati na globalni ravni.

Ključne besede *Geoekonomika, geopolitika, geostrategija, Jugovzhodna Evropa, Evropska unija, Slovenija, Zahodni Balkan, Nato.*

Abstract The Republic of Slovenia is a continental and maritime country. It is situated in a place where Slavic, Germanic and Roman cultures meet. Historically and culturally speaking, it belongs to Central Europe; however, from the military point of view, it forms a part of the Southern Theatre of War. The geostrategic position of the Republic of Slovenia is extremely important in European area because its territory represents a crossroads of three geostrategic and geopolitical spaces: Central European, Southern European and Adriatic-Mediterranean. The commitment to Euro-Atlantic

integrations, as well as the interest in security and peace in Southeast Europe and Western Balkans are a red thread which has characterized the activities of Slovenian political elites in the past two decades. This will also be the core of their future engagement, since also in the future the security of Slovenia will depend on the security situation in the region and on the capacity of Slovenian political elites to successfully address contemporary NATO and EU security challenges in a globalized, multipolar and geopolitically instable world, full of various risks and opportunities. Following its independence in 1991, Slovenia became a modern country with corresponding challenges and dilemmas. By presiding the EU Council in the first half of the year 2008 it proved that small countries could successfully participate on a global level.

Key words *Geo-economics, geopolitics, geostrategy, Southeast Europe, European Union, Slovenia, Western Balkans, NATO.*

Introduction Slovenia, its territory and population were many times in the history used as a pawn on a chessboard in important geopolitical and geostrategic games. Used as territorial and demographic 'strategic crumbs' it had no influence on what would happen with its territory as a result of mutual promises made by those taking important decisions which was best proved by geopolitical dynamics of Slovenian space in the 20th century. If the 20th century was characterized by numerous wars, armed conflicts, border changes and migration of population in Slovenian space, at the beginning of the 21st century our future seemed relatively less pessimistic. The membership in NATO and EU, as well the assessment that Slovenia is not under a direct military threat instill optimism not only in the country, but also in the wider region where the absence of potential war is still not completely guaranteed. More than ever before in the history, the development and future of Slovenes depend on our capacity to use opportunities offered by membership in important international organizations. Relations with international environment are of crucial importance for Slovenia, as well as for its present and future development, since they highly depend on import, export and future globalization trends. So, a global economic crisis means also a local crisis for Slovenia.

The realization of Slovenia' wish to become independent was a long process, but historically speaking, relatively short. Even shorter was the way leading from its independence in 1991 to NATO and EU membership in 2004, as well as to the EU Council Presidency in 2008 as the first country from behind the iron curtain¹. The path towards these enviable achievements was paved with a wider national consensus: where, how and when. In December 1993, two years after the triumphant war, the Slovenian Parliament adopted a Resolution on the Starting Points for the Concept of National Security of the Republic of Slovenia, and in January 1994 its amendment

¹ *The iron curtain, which fell on Europe and stretched from the Baltic Region to the Gulf of Trieste, was a term used by Winston Churchill in 1946 to denote a division between democratic Europe with free and democratic elections, and Europe of socialist countries unfamiliar with elections of this kind. This was the time before the appearance of official blocks in Europe; however, during the time of NATO/Warsaw Pact division, the former Yugoslavia skillfully maneuvered between the two.*

which defined wishes and the path of the young nation towards Euro-Atlantic integrations. »In the integration process into European and other international economic and political integrations the Republic of Slovenia at the same time assumes rights and responsibilities required by these integrations in the defence area, except from the provision of a peace-keeping force in the area of former Yugoslavia until the settlement of the current crisis. That even more, because the Republic of Slovenia is vitally interested in the establishment of an efficient collective security system in its neighbourhood, Europe and in the world. Its important goal is to integrate into NATO or Western European Union as a European NATO pillar« (Chapter 1, Article 12)². On the basis of this guideline given by the National Assembly, Slovenia joined the Partnership for Peace as soon as in March 1994. The disappointment felt when Slovenia was rejected membership in NATO during its expansion in 1999 did not prevent Slovenia from further focusing on Euro-Atlantic integrations. Slovenia confirmed its strategic orientation towards membership in the European Union and NATO in numerous strategic, development and normative documents. As the key strategic goal this was written also in the Resolution on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia (ReSNV) adopted in 2001³. The introduction of ReSNV highlights that »the Republic of Slovenia wishes to guarantee its basic security interest also within its membership in the European Union and NATO«. From the point of view of regional security situation, it was generally assessed in 2001 that »in Southeast Europe a certain level of security threat still exists for the Republic of Slovenia. Security of the Republic of Slovenia indirectly depends on the situation in the Region«.

Although Slovenia has been a member of EU and NATO for as long as six years, the revised and updated basic strategic national security document was adopted by the National Assembly only on 26 March 2010. The Resolution on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia (ReSNV-1)⁴ stresses that »important comparative advantages of the Republic of Slovenia as a member of EU and NATO will also in the future result from its historical, political, economic, social, ethnic, cultural and other relations with Southeastern Europe.« From the standpoint of the international security environment it is generally assessed that »in Euro-Atlantic area the possibility of international armed conflict has dramatically decreased; however, what has increased at the same time in this area is vulnerability of the countries to asymmetric threats and risks, usually posed by non-state subjects, whose effects have distinctive transnational dimensions.« The Resolution states that »the security in Euro-Atlantic area will also in the future be most influenced by political-security and other events in the Western Balkans⁵, East Europe, South Caucasus, Middle and Far East, North and Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.« (Article 3.2, ReSNV-1).

² *Resolution on the Starting Points for the Concept of National Security of the Republic of Slovenia and its amendment, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 71/93 and No. 2/1994.*

³ *Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 56/01.*

⁴ *Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 27/10.*

⁵ *The area of the Western Balkans includes Albania and former Yugoslavia without Slovenia. Southeastern Europe is a wider geographic term and, of course, includes also the area of the Western Balkans.*

Examination of complex geopolitical and geostrategic topics requires an interdisciplinary approach using a wide spectrum of scientific methods. To this end, the author uses a method of strategic analysis which takes into account the balance of force, as well as the time and place which witnessed radical changes in the strategic environment and in Slovenia itself. A special emphasis was given to the usage of statistical data of all kinds, their comparison, appropriate processing and interpretation. Within his critical analysis the author uses the advantage of being not only a careful observer, researcher and examiner of the topics addressed, but also an actor in certain important events. In this way he can upgrade theoretical and empirical topics with the method of direct observation using the appropriate information gained from practice. Geopolitical and geostrategic tectonics of Slovenian space as well as its placement in wider contemporary environment are thus presented in a comprehensive and original scientific way. In doing this and also when analyzing contemporary global trends and changes in security environment, he accepts the challenge of indicating and not predicting future trends.


But of course not only in Slovenia, but also wider, regionally and globally, since the Resolution specifically stresses the need to continue with enlargement processes⁶ because »stability and security of Euro-Atlantic area highly depend on further EU and NATO enlargement (ibid.)«, where benefits and burdens are shared and where, as very picturesquely described by Slovenian Defence Minister, »you can not be a free-rider of security. You must invest something in the common security framework (Jelušič, 2010).« The commitment to Euro-Atlantic integrations and the interest in security and peace in Southeast Europe and Western Balkans⁷ undoubtedly present a gravitation force which unites all strategic documents adopted in almost two decades. Slovenia's security will also in the future depend on the security situation in the region and its capacity to deal with contemporary NATO and EU security challenges in a globalized, multipolar, geopolitically unstable world full of various challenges

⁶ *EU and NATO wish and are (on principle) ready to continue with further enlargement processes despite the enlargement tiredness. The goal of both organizations is to conclude the enlargement process with Balkan countries. Four countries are actively engaged in becoming EU members, three with a status of candidate countries; Croatia is relatively successful in negotiations, Iceland applied for EU membership in July 2009, Macedonia is being hampered by Greece due to the conflict on the name Macedonia, (the same is true for its membership in NATO), while Turkey became associate member of EU in 1963 and officially applied for membership in 1987. The path towards EU is being announced also by Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Serbia. During the Bucharest Summit in 2008 NATO promised the invitation to the Alliance to Macedonia, Georgia and Ukraine. This path is followed also by Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. Relevant questions which at the moment have no appropriate answer are: what is happening with Moldavia, Ukraine or even Georgia with regard to their EU membership and what are realistic chances of countries with international peacekeeping forces in their territory (BiH, Kosovo, etc) to become EU members, since EU membership depends also on the will of individual countries which can change on the basis of election results (e.g. Ukraine).*

⁷ *Slovenian West Balkan Coordinator and future Slovenian Ambassador to Croatia Vojko Volk divides Slovenian approach to the Western Balkans into two periods. The first period was characterized by Slovenian diplomacy's escape from the Balkans. Slovenia disgustedly claimed to be a non-Balkan country. We were a Central European country. This period lasted until Slovenia became an associate member of the EU in 1996. Our trump card was the idea that »we are not the Balkans and do not want to deal with it« Whatever initiative was launched in the Balkans, we had reservations whether to even go there. When the first salvation came – confirmation of the associate membership in EU in Florence in June 1996, Slovenian diplomacy could breathe with full lungs again. It was then that we returned to the Balkans. Slovenian diplomacy did not only return to the Balkans, it was also successful. (The Balkans starts in Trieste, an interview with Vojko Volk published in a daily Dnevnik on 21 December 2009).*

and opportunities. In a world which is, as said by Thomas Friedman (2005, 2006), transformed and made smaller – **flattened** by the information revolution and globalization of economy. Through numerous examples Friedman highlights geo-economic aspects of globalization thus enabling a simpler understanding of the change from a bipolar understanding of geopolitics, based on security and defence questions, to a more geo-economic-relevant world where an important role is played by various old and new global and regional organizations based mainly on economic interests, and new economic superpowers such as India and China. And, finally, how has the last economic crisis in such a short time become an opportunity for newly emerged economies and a cruel reality for the West?! (Graph 1).

Graph 1:
Strong rebound
of industrial
production in
newly emerged
economies.



Source: EU Interim Forecast February 2010 Report.

1 GEOPOLITICS FROM TRADITIONALISM TO POSTMODERNISM

The concept of geopolitics is closely related to the concept of political geography⁸: the difference between the two was in a very simple way tried to be explained by Haushofer. In his opinion political geography views the state from the standpoint of space, while geopolitics views space from the standpoint of the state, making it a distinctively applicable discipline (Haushofer v Bufon, 2007:21). Ratzel is a pioneer of modern studying of political geography, while his student, Rudolf Kjellen from

⁸ Morgenthau (1995: 264) is very critical towards the concept of geopolitics. It calls it pseudoscience which raises the geography factor to the level of absolute, seemingly defining the power and, consequently, the fate of individual countries. For Morgenthau geography is, besides natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character; national morale and quality of government only one of the eight elements of national power (ibid., 207-254).

Sweden, is considered to be a founder of geopolitics as a theory which conceptualizes a state as a geographic organism or space phenomenon (Bufon, 2007:21).

In *The Geographical Pivot of History*⁹ Mackinder develops a retrograde thesis¹⁰ (Figure 1) that world history is actually a constant conflict between land and sea peoples. The centre of Eurasian mainland – the area of Eastern Europe is, in his opinion, the Heartland: who rules the Heartland will command unless he is stopped. The Rimland consists of two concentric circles; the inner circle was the home of great historical civilizations of Europe, Middle East, India and China, while the outer circle includes both Americas, Sub-Saharan Africa and Australasia. Mackinder put all this in a today anachronistically sounded triptych:

Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland;

Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island;

Who rules the World Island commands the World (Parker, 1997: 77-93).

Figure 1:
Mackinder's
Heartland
concept.



Source: *The Geographical Pivot of History*, *Geographical Journal* 23, no. 4 (April 1904): 435 and in Parker, 1997:80.

At the turn of the 20th century, Mackinder's concept was very arguably rejected by his contemporary Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan who developed a mercantilist thesis on the dominating influence of a fleet on the »World Island« - Eurasia. Considering the fact that the power of countries depends on their successful trade¹¹, he developed

⁹ Mackinder, H. J., *The Geographical Pivot of History*, *Geographical Journal* 23 (1904).

¹⁰ His thesis was generalized on the basis of the then balance of forces in Eurasia and constant clashes in Great Britain and Tsarist Russia in the 18th and 19th century.

¹¹ Based on the analysis of the development of the British Empire where the sun never sets. After World War II that meant in practice that »nuclearized« US naval forces dominated land forces, the Soviet Union and China.

a thesis that the development and future of the world will be significantly influenced by the naval power which will dominate sea routes with its fleet and project its power from the sea to the land.

After World War I the study of geopolitics was, mainly due to German experts, very popular and geopolitical schools were gradually established in the entire West. After World War II the old »geopolitics was forbidden (sic!) as a way of thinking, a science or a political recipe. It was reproached for inspiring racist theories of Nazi Germany and territorial expansion of the Axis powers. It shyly started to appear in the 1960s, while the boom of interest came in the 1990s« (Simoniti, 1997: 10-11).

The affirmation on the ban of geopolitics and the shyness of its appearance is extremely exaggerated and does not sustain a serious judgment. It is worth mentioning that at the beginning of the 1940s, Spykman, on the basis of Mackinder, justified the American need for having its bases in Rimland and an appropriate naval power, since the balance of powers in Eurasia directly influences the security in the USA (Spykman, 2007). Spykman is most often called the godfather of containment between the blocks where from Iceland to Japan an important role is played by regional organizations and forms of cooperation, such as NATO (1949-), CENTO (1955-1979), SEATO (1954-1977), ANZUS (1951-), ANZUK (1971-1974), FPDA (1971-), etc¹². Former socialist countries established the Warsaw Pact (1955-1991), while Marxists also implemented their geopolitics: from the intervention of the Soviet Union with its fleet in Cuba (Missile Crisis in 1962) to the export of revolutions to the Third World (Che Guevara, 1965-1967)¹³.

By the 1970s the majority of geopolitics had implicitly accepted the hegemonic position of the West. This determinant is also included in the idea that the world is a concluded and ultimate whole. Interpretations of constants of geopolitical theories with various shades can be united in six main schools: binary, marginal, zonal, pluralist, centre-periphery and idealistic (more in Parker, 1997: 239-248). Contemporary understanding of geopolitics has thus travelled a long way: from studying who will rule the Heartland to a more complex understanding of space which is not only physical, but also imaginary or even virtual. It can be divided into five fields or action spaces, namely: physical, natural space; demographic, demo-political space; interstate or more generally speaking diplomatic-military field; socio-economic field dealing with globalization and symbolic space, idealistic and cultural – e.g. Western Ideology (Dussouy, 2010: 143-148).

¹² Regional organizations or forms of cooperation are: North Atlantic Treaty Organization – NATO; Central Treaty Organization - CENTO or Middle East Treaty Organization - METO, also known as Baghdad Pact; Southeast Asia Treaty Organization – SEATO; Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty – ANZUS; a tripartite force formed by Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom – ANZUK and defence cooperation between Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand and Great Britain - Five Power Defence Agreement - FPDA.

¹³ Also as a response to the Informbiro Resolution, in 1953 the former Yugoslavia signed the Balkan Pact: Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation with NATO members Greece and Turkey, thus revoking the Soviet Union's access to the »warm sea«, which in turn built a huge submarine base on the island of Sazan. As an alternative to both blocks, a gray zone where proxy wars were fought, in 1961 Nehru, Nasser and Tito established the Non-Aligned Movement which outlived both blocks; in 2009 it had 118 members states and 17 observer countries.

A branch of geopolitics which more thoroughly than former Mahan's mercantilism stresses the importance of economic aspects for geopolitics was in the 1990s named **geo-economics**. According to Luttwak's definition, a geo-economic discussion, defined by **geo-economics**, is »the mixture of the logic of conflict with the methods of commerce...., where countries act geo-economically simply because they are what they are, space-defined entities intended to win one another at the global scene« (Luttwak, 1990). The conflict thus continues in another, economically conditioned way, with national interventions, or, as said by Luttwak, »geo-politics is a new version of ancient rivalry among countries«. The rivalry where the battle for markets is fought with economic resources. The enforcement of customs and favouring of national economies is, of course, in conflict with the principle of free movement of goods and services (e.g. EU), as well as with various international agreements, such as GATT¹⁴. »Geo-economics analyzes economic strategies -- notably commercial --, decided upon by states in a political setting aiming to protect their own economies or certain well-identified sectors of it,... where it represents an element of power and influence to the state or "national enterprise" and helps to reinforce its economic and social potential« (Lorot, 1999)¹⁵. Geo-economists put the transition of developed or pivotal countries into a position where economic priorities prevail over security and military priorities which dominated during the Cold War (Aligica, 2002). From the economic point of view, in the period of globalization on global and regional level, a special role is played by international organizations¹⁶ which act as companions or a type of heirs to the post-block arrangement.

The grand strategy, the greatest of all is **Astropolitik** or geopolitics, based on the presumption that the key factor for control over the development of the Earth is supremacy in the space from where the force can be projected on selected targets. The neoclassical formulation explains the Astropolitik thought with a saying which continues Mackinder and Spykman's examples: who controls low-Earth, controls

¹⁴ *The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - GATT was concluded in 1947 under the auspices of UN. The original GATT wording was valid until 1994. Since 1995 it has been implemented within the World Trade Organization - WTO with 153 member states. The organization was established with an aim to exercise control and liberalization of the world trade.*

¹⁵ *The founders of this relatively young branch of geopolitics are American military strategist and historian Edward Luttwak and French economist and politologist Pascal Lorot.*

¹⁶ *If we mention only a few well-known organizations: during the period of both blocks, in 1952, the European Union, which today has 27 member states, was established in Europe for purely economic purposes. In the area of Southeast Asia, a geopolitical and economic organization the Association of Southeast Asian Nations - ASEAN was established in 1967 which today has ten member states: the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. In 1989 the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation - APEC was established, a forum of 21 Pacific Rim countries. The aim of APEC is to increase economic growth and prosperity in the region and to enhance Asian-Pacific community. APEC member states include approximately 40% of world population, 54% of global BDP and 44% of world trade (member states are e.g. Australia, Japan, China, Russia, the USA, etc). In 1994 Canada, Mexico and the USA established the North American Free Trade Agreement - NAFTA, a trilateral trade block in the area of North America. Following the example of the European Union, a similar organization with ambitious plans is being established in the area of South America, the Union of South American Nations (SP Unión de Naciones Suramericanas - UNASUR) which has 12 member states and two observer countries and whose beginnings go back to the year 2004. In May 2008 the UNASUR Constitutive Treaty was signed by member states in Brazil; however, by April 2010 it had been ratified by four member states; Brazil, Ecuador, Venezuela and Guyana, while the validity of the Treaty requires the ratification of at least nine member states.*

near-Earth; who controls near-Earth, dominates Terra; who dominates Terra, determines the destiny of humankind (Dolman, 2002). Space is still interesting from various points of view; therefore, countries are developing their capabilities to conquer it. Since the launching of the first artificial satellite Sputnik 1 in 1957 approximately 50 countries have sent thousands of satellites into space. In the context of Terra-related geopolitical thoughts, influential countries can not avoid Astropolitik or questions related to controlling or discovering the space.

Chinese and Russian perception of the world contributes an important stone to the mosaic of discussions on geopolitics. A completely different, non-West reflection of Mao Zedong from February 1974 on the existence of **three worlds**¹⁷ is of key importance for Chinese strategic thought of the past four decades. The first world consists of the USA and Soviet Union, while the second or in-between world includes Japan, Europe and Canada. The third world is densely populated. With the exception of Japan, it comprises Asia, the entire Africa and Latin America¹⁸. Deng Xiaoping explained and upgraded Mao's strategic reasoning and stressed the commitment of Chinese support to the third world countries. Chinese contemporary geopolitical policy is obvious also from the Chinese navy's extrovert orientation towards the wide spaciousness, which implies a significant change from, as said by Qi Xu (2004), »deliberate absence« to »the navy's strategic choice oriented toward the world's oceans and formulated with a perspective of the grand strategic space« (ibid.). From the Chinese presence in the so called third world can be concluded that the strategy is successful in practice and that it will be followed by, we can say that for the first time in the history, Chinese navy¹⁹.

The most stable geopolitical school in Russia²⁰ is **Eurasian School** founded by brothers George and Evgeny Trubetskoi at the beginning of the 20th century. Its basic idea is that Russia is neither Europe nor Asia, but Eurasia. Contemporary leader of this school is Aleksander Dugin²¹. Contemporary geopolitical schools in

¹⁷ Triple A: South Asia, Africa and Latin America.

¹⁸ See Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs' website: <http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18008.htm>.

¹⁹ It is known from the history that Chinese »ocean« navy used to be a diplomat/military instrument with strategic reach. At the beginning of the 15th century Admiral Zheng He carried out a series of trade expeditions to the shores of Africa, Asia, India, etc., with an impressive force of over one hundred ships and a few ten thousands of men. Following his death in 1435 Chinese emperors no longer decided to cover a huge strategic space with Chinese navy.

²⁰ Geopolitical strategies of Prometheism and Intermarium developed in Poland at the beginning of the 20th century as a counterweight to Russian political aspirations. Polish Marshal Pilsudski is the father of strategies whose roots go back to the battles of numerous nations subjugated to the Russian Empire in the 19th century. With the establishment of independent states the countries of the Baltic, Black and Caspian Sea regions would be defended from Russian expansionism. Prometheism is a relatively unknown school in Slovenia. Rather unknown is also the fact that before and during World War II Slovenian intellectuals cherished the idea of joining the Intermarium, a federation of Baltic, Central and Eastern European space. The Polish and Slovenes nourished the idea of a new political arrangement in East Europe, a type of a loose association of 16 nation-states sharing the external defence and internal market (Arnež, 2002: 354). If a state or association of this kind had been developed, it would have certainly been a better and upgraded form of cordon sanitaire from the period between both world wars.

²¹ Dugin is famous for his non-moderate views. He is an author of a 600-page book *The Foundations of Geopolitics: The Geopolitical Future of Russia, 1997*, allegedly written with the help of high officers of Russian Army.

Russia are rather unpopular. Russian geopolitics traditionally deals with internal affairs of Russia and its position in the world, rather than with global issues. From the standpoint of the future, a large debate is being run between two schools, the so-called *Westerners* and *Slavophiles*²². While the former recognize the universality of western values, the latter advocate the development of Russia towards a genuine direction since western values are not universal (Okunov, 2009). The School of »Westerners« is undoubtedly also stable in Russia; however, numerous examples reject the affirmation on the orientation towards internal Russian affairs. Russia is, among other things, active regionally and globally also in the following areas: active participation in Asian space, SCO, engagement in the near neighbourhood of the former Soviet Union, BRIC and the initiative on strategic partnership among the USA, Russia and Europe²³.

The Internet has shrunk geographic borders, while the digital division between North America, Europe and East Asia on one side and Sub-Saharan Africa and Middle East on the other remains huge despite the spreading of Internet access. The access of this kind enables the flourishing of various activities, positive and negative, including the global terrorist network Al Kaida (Dodds, 2007: 166-167). In post-modern geopolitics the space can first be imagined and only then widely represented in national and also non-national frameworks (Luke, 1993; Ó Tuathail in Dalby, 1998). Ó Tuathail (1998, 27-28) suggests that geopolitics-related problems of the key countries in the contemporary world should be addressed in a different way, through the following questions:

1. How is global space imagined and represented?
2. How is global space divided into essential blocs or zones of identity and difference?
3. How is global power conceptualized?
4. How are global threats spatialized and strategies of response conceptualized?
5. How are the major actors shaping geopolitics identified and conceptualized?

Post-modern geopolitics is accompanied also by the so called *popular geopolitics*. Popular geopolitics is a way of distribution of pictures and images of global political geographies within national political cultures and above them; therefore, a relation between political life and mass media, and also the way in which various media, a part of global politics, produce and distribute their messages on the television,

²² *During the Tsar period they were Orthodox Slavophiles, today they are Eurasians who, the same as Žirinovski, can not see Russian perspective in its orientation to impoverished Western Slavs, but through Iran and India to South Asia. Materialization of this doctrine is presented by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization – SCO, established in 2001 as a successor of the Shanghai Five which in 1996 was founded by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, China, Russia and Tajikistan. SCO was co-founded also by Uzbekistan. Observer countries today are also India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan. Belarus and Sri Lanka have a dialogue partner status, while guest attendances are Afghanistan, ASEAN and the Community of Independent States.*

²³ *The initiative on the new pan-European security architecture was suggested to Europe by Russian President Medvedjev in Berlin 2008, while at the Council of Europe session in April 2010 Foreign Minister Lavrov suggested dealing with common global challenges and forming a strategic triangle USA-Europe-Russia, Worth mentioning as a symbolic gesture is the fact that in May 2010, for the first time in history, members of NATO member states, namely France, Poland, Great Britain and the USA, participated in a military parade on the occasion of the 65th anniversary of victory in World War II at the Red Square in Moscow.*

radio and/or Internet. (Dodds, 2007: 17). Following 11 September 2001²⁴ the area of geopolitics saw the establishment of new reality, balance of forces and response strategies. Asymmetry of global security threats and reality of popular geopolitics shook the foundations of the traditional understanding of geopolitics. We can find causative consequences between an attack of a small group of terrorist on a symbol of economic power in the USA and two wars within the so called Global War on Terror in Afghanistan and Iraq. The importance of asymmetric actors for geopolitical issues is greater than ever before.

Non-state asymmetric actors are an integral part of anti-geopolitics that represents constant independence from a state, regardless of who is in power, and articulates two interconnected forms of anti-hegemonic fight. Firstly, it challenges the *material* (economic and military) geopolitical power of countries and global institutions, and secondly, it challenges their *image* in the world, forced by political and economic elites. (Routledge, 2003, 2008: 236-237). Anti-geopolitics has in practice a local character, which, however, definitely changes in line with the globalization process. In a codependent world, terrorists with global reach can be considered also as actors of geopolitics, since their goals and ambitions significantly exceed the ideas and environment of their origin. And not only terrorists as individuals, but also as members of a certain group or idea, such as Al Kaida which for some is a loose movement oriented against the West, and for others a very well connected and led terrorist network.

And what role do small countries play in this changed, post-modern and complex understanding of geopolitics? Since the size of territory, number of population, length of borders and geographic position are not of such key and exclusive importance as in the past, this is also a chance and opportunity for small actors. Only sixteen years following its declaration of independence and as the first former communist country Slovenia presided over a 27 member state community comprising half a billion population, the Council of the European Union²⁵. Therefore it is important to see and understand how, on the basis of development of its own statehood, Slovenia achieved this historic moment for all Slovenes in the year 2008.

²⁴ *Just like the fall of bipolar world caused numerous geopolitical changes. The period following the end of the Cold War was characterized by the movement from the periphery to the center and from focusing on military power to focusing on economic power. It was the non-interest in problems, conflicts and difficulties in the periphery that turned the traditional border areas in battlefields, which happened in the former Yugoslavia. (Tunander, 1997: 6-7).*

²⁵ *Despite a significant amount of praise Slovenia received for successful presiding over EU Council, it would have been illusionary to expect that Slovenia could have made radical changes in this bureaucratic mastodon, especially from the standpoint of Slovenian economy; EU Commission employs approximately 25 000 people, Secretariat 3 300 and Military Staff 200 (sic!).*

2 GEOSTRATEGIC CHARACTERISTICS OF SLOVENIAN SPACE

2.1 Short historical review

A historical review of Slovenian territory shows that from approximately 70 000 km² of Slovenian land in its largest size in the first half of the 9th century, 10 000 km² soon became a part of Hungarian space. By the end of the 15th century, three fifths of the remaining territory – 36 000 km² had become a part of Bavarian-German space following several hundreds of years of development, while two thirds – 24 000 km² remained the foundation of Slovenian national development after the 15th century (Grafenauer, 1994: 8). Contemporary Slovenian state is thus based on almost 29% of historical territory from one thousand years ago, or on 83% of territory which has formed the basis of development for the past few centuries²⁶. Through the entire history Slovenian territory and Slovenes have been, as the northernmost southern Slavic nation, in the middle and at the crossroads of Germanic, Roman and Hungarian interests clearly expressed also in both world wars²⁷.

The Republic of Slovenia is a continental and maritime country. It is situated in the European space to which Slavic nations managed to penetrate on their way to the West and in the area where Slavic, Germanic and Roman cultures meet. Historically and culturally speaking it belongs to Central Europe²⁸. The Republic of Slovenia's geostrategic position²⁹ in European space is unique³⁰ since it represents the crossroads of three geostrategic and geopolitical spaces, namely, Central European, Southern European and Adriatic-Mediterranean³¹. The shortest land routes run through its

²⁶ This percentage would be considerably lower if General Maister after the end of World War I, in the fights for the northern border, had not succeeded in winning almost one third of today's Slovenian territory in the east, including Maribor, and if Slovenia after World War II had not been given back a large portion of the national territory in the west it lost after World War I.

²⁷ For a detailed presentation and comprehensive analyses of historic perspective of the strategic importance of Slovenian theatre of war and geopolitical dynamics of Slovenian space see Žabkar, 1996 and 1997. Prof. Dr. Anton Žabkar is a pioneer of Slovenian, not only military science, but also of geopolitical and strategic thought. Special author's thanks goes to the fact that the article is significantly enriched by lucid, meticulous and critical remarks and comments made by Prof. Žabkar.

²⁸ According to NATO and Jane's Sentinel's classification, Slovenia forms a part of the Southern Theatre of War.

²⁹ Geostrategy as a social science discipline, sub-area of geopolitics and a type of foreign politics guided by geographic factors. In this context, technological, military, political, economic and cultural aspects of a country are taken into account. Besides the above mentioned theorists of geopolitics, famous geostrategists are Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, Nicholas J. Spykman, George F. Kennan, etc.

³⁰ Every country believes its space is unique. Whether this is true from the global or regional geostrategic and geopolitical point of view is another question. For example, Slovenia connected the northern part of the South Wing of NATO, Italy and Hungary, and later this connection expanded also to Croatia.

³¹ Slovenia is active in numerous forms of regional cooperation which include all three types of space. The most well-known are the following: The Central European Initiative, whose beginnings go back to the year 1989, brings together 18 member states from Central and Southeast Europe. It includes the highest number of member states of all regional initiatives. The Adriatic-Ionian Initiative includes eight countries situated along the Adriatic and Ionian Sea. The Alpe-Adrian Working Group brings together 13 provinces and regions, while Croatia and Slovenia cooperate at the state level. Other forms of regional cooperation are also: The Danube Cooperation Process, the Southeast Europe Clearinghouse Initiative (SEEC), the Southeastern Europe Defence Ministerial Initiative (SEDM), etc. (see <http://www.mors.si> in <http://www.mzz.gov.si>). Slovenia and other 43 member states from Europe, North Africa and Middle East participate in Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean which was initiated by French EU Council Presidency in July 2008. It is co-chaired by French and Egyptian President and based in Barcelona in Spain.

territory connecting Western Europe and the central part of Southern Europe with the Danube Region and Balkans, and through them with Eastern Europe and Anatolia. Slovenian territory also offers the shortest and most favourable connections leading from continental Central European countries to the coast of the Adriatic Sea and Apennine Peninsula (Chapter 3.2. ReSNV, 2001).

The total length of the Slovenian state border is 1370 km. The land border – 67.2% - is 920 km long, the river border – 29.3% - is 402 km long, while the maritime border³² – 3.5% - is 48 km long. Slovenia has open issues regarding the state border with Croatia. In this context, the maritime border is of vital importance for Slovenia. The current and future position and (non)-concession of Croatia³³ regarding the border in the Gulf of Piran will most probably be influenced by the situation along its southern maritime border with BiH and Montenegro. Any potential unilateral Croatian concession during negotiations on the border in the Gulf of Piran would aggravate Croatian negotiations on the maritime border with Montenegro and BiH; these two countries could probably refer to the potential Croatian concession regarding its northern maritime border to negotiate the most favorable course of the border at the sea (Žabkar, 1997).

The in-between geostrategic position of Slovenia has – considering the fact that various actors determined borders between the Western Balkans and Europe in different way, in the 20th century Slovenia formed a part of multinational countries (Austro-Hungarian Empire and Yugoslavia) whose geostrategic centres were in Central Europe and in the Balkans – contributed to the fact that international analyses, as well as geopolitical and strategic classification sometimes consider Slovenia as a Central European country (Figure 2) and sometimes as a Balkans area or country. Since Slovenia was internationally recognized, it has generally been assessed as Central European and Southern European country; Slovenes should therefore be Central European Southerners³⁴. Slovenes mainly identify themselves as belonging to Western Europe and consider Slovenia similar to Alpine countries and regions,

³² See http://www.stat.si/doc/pub/slo_figures_09.pdf.

³³ Croatia had in the past already withdrawn from the signed agreement on solving Slovenia-Croatia border dispute. In September 2002 Croatia sent a letter to Slovenia saying it could not accept the Treaty on the Common State Border (the so called Drnovešk-Račan Agreement) initialed by Slovenian and Croatian Prime Ministers on 20 July 2001. Eight years later, on 4 November 2009 in Stockholm, Slovenian Prime Minister Borut Pahor and Croatian Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor, in the presence of Swedish Prime Minister and a co-signatory of the Agreement Fredrik Reinfeldt, the then President of the EU Council, signed the Arbitration Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Slovenia and the Government of the Republic of Croatia. The Arbitration Agreement establishes the Arbitral Tribunal which must determine: (a) the course of the maritime and land boundary between the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Croatia, (b) Slovenia's junction to the High Sea and (c) the regime for the use of the relevant maritime areas (Article 4 of the Agreement). The Agreement was ratified by Slovenian and Croatian Parliament. The Arbitration Agreement caused numerous polemics in Slovenia, namely what could Slovenia gain or lose with the Agreement. The key question which divided the opinion of supporters and opponents of the Agreement was whether Slovenia, once the arbitration procedure was concluded, would keep the junction to the international waters. On the basis of the joint-decision made by the ruling coalition and opposition, a legislative subsequent referendum was called for 6 June 2010 to decide on the final adoption of the Act Ratifying the Arbitration Agreement. The referendum was attended by 42.3% of the country's voters, of whom 51.5% supported the ratification of the Arbitration Agreement.

³⁴ Since the beginning of the 20th century Slovenia has favoured a common European idea in various versions and modalities, from the »United Danube Countries« to »Federal Europe« (Rahten, 2009: 23-31).

Figure 2:
Changing of
borders and
establishment of
new countries
after World
War I.



Source: On <http://media.photobucket.com/image/map%20ww1/SerbianCulture/Europe20Map20Before20After20WW2008.jpg>.

such as Austria, Switzerland, Northern Italy and Bavaria. From the standpoint of the military-geographic classification, there is no doubt that Slovenian space has always been an integral part of the Southern Theatre of War. In the 20th century Slovenia for more than a quarter of the century presented the edge of an unstable Balkans »black hole« in the heart of Europe. In and near Slovenian space four wars were fought (World War I, Northern Border War, World War II and Independence War in 1991) in the total duration of ten years. In this context we must also mention six crisis years in the period between both world wars (TIGR³⁵, Fiume³⁶), nine crisis years after World War I caused by Trieste and the Free Territory of Trieste³⁷, as well as a five-year war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1991 to 1995. In 1999 Slovenia granted NATO use of its airspace for the purposes of the intervention in the Balkans. (ibid.). Since Slovenia's entry into NATO and EU, military threat has no longer been a question. The current issue enjoying an increasing share of interest is Slovenia's participation in international operations and missions which are

³⁵ TIGR is an abbreviation for the names of three towns (Trieste, Gorizia and Rijeka) and a peninsula Istria. It was an organization active in the period between both world wars. TIGR was an underground organization oriented against Italian fascism. The organization was, like General Rudolf Maister, unjustifiably kept in secret for almost five decades after World War II; today, however, the historic role of both is recognized.

³⁶ Fiume is Italian and Austrian name for the town Rijeka which is now in Croatia. Between 1918 and 1924, following the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the town was a bone of contention between Italy and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later the Kingdom of Yugoslavia). In line with the Treaty of Rome, signed on 27 January 1924, the town Rijeka/Fiume was assigned to the Kingdom and Italy.

³⁷ The Free Territory of Trieste was a free city-state (1947-1954) established in line with the Peace Treaty signed by Italy and Allied Forces. The territory was divided into Zone A and Zone B with Italian and Slovene as official languages. Following the London Agreement of 1954, Zone A was assigned to Italy and Zone B to Yugoslavia.

not only of peacekeeping or humanitarian nature. (Iraq, Afghanistan)³⁸. From the military perspective, Slovenia was in 2009 and 2010 characterized by similar public debate on Afghanistan as in 2006 when its participation in Iraq was discussed. The Slovenian Armed Forces participated in NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) with four instructors at the beginning of their mission and then with two instructors until the withdraw from Iraq at the beginning of 2009. The discussion whether Slovenia is in war in Afghanistan, what Slovenian soldiers are doing there, what will be the quality transformation of the Slovenian Armed Forces Contingent within ISAF, etc., continues also in 2010³⁹ due to the expected take-over of Slovenian Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) in autumn this year.

2.2 Short contemporary review

Independent Slovenia covers an area of 20 255 km². According to the 2002 Census, the population in Slovenia was 1 964 036, which meant a 2.6% increase in comparison to the 1991 Census. In 2005, the number of population for the second time in history exceeded two million, whereas in March 2010, according to the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, the number of population was approximately 2 055 000. In the 2002 Census, 83.06% of population declared themselves as Slovenes, 0.11% and 0.32% of population belonged to Italian and Hungarian autochthonous minority respectively, while 8.9% of population did not wish to declare their nationality or they did not wish to answer the question on national affiliation. Other large nationalities living in Slovenia are Serbs with 1.98%, Croats with 1.81%, Bosniaks with 1.1%, Muslims with 0.53%, Bosnians with 0.41% and Albanians with 0.31%⁴⁰ of population.

In terms of size, Slovenia qualifies to the upper third of the group of the fifteen smallest European countries⁴¹ (smaller than Slovenia are the Holy See, Monaco, San Marino, Liechtenstein, Malta, Andorra, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Kosovo and Montenegro, while Macedonia, Albania, Belgium and Moldavia are bigger for 25%, 40%, 50% and 67% respectively). From the standpoint of the number of population, Slovenia also belongs to the upper third of the group of the fifteen smallest European countries whose population is up to 2 310 000 (besides the above mentioned countries, Estonia also has less population, whereas Macedonia, Latvia and Lithuania have more po-


³⁸ For a detailed insight into Slovenian participation in international operations and missions see »Participation of the Republic of Slovenia in international operations and missions«, (Ed. Bric, R.), Ministry of Defence, Ljubljana, http://www.mors.si/fileadmin/mors/pdf/publikacije/zbornik_f.pdf.

³⁹ On 6 May 2010 the Slovenian Armed Forces participated in international operations and missions with 468 servicemembers; with 350 within KFOR in Kosovo, 67 within ISAF in Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the Western Balkans, Lebanon and Syria, <http://www.slovenskavojska.si/mednarodno-sodelovanje/mednarodne-operacije-in-misije/>.

⁴⁰ See <http://www.stat.si/>. In the third quarter of the 20th century citizens of other republics of the former Yugoslavia started migrating to Slovenia as economic migrants.

⁴¹ Thirteen out of fifteen countries are members of the United Nations Organization with 192 member states, see <http://www.un.org/>). The Holy See has the UN observer status, while Kosovo is not a UN member. Kosovo declared its independence on 17 February 2008. By 1 June 2010 Kosovo had been recognized by 69 UN members. Slovenia recognized Kosovo's independence on 5 March 2008, <http://www.kosovothankyou.com/>.

Figure 3:
European Union
and Schengen
Area 2010.



Source: Available on <http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/97/Schengenzone.svg/1000px-Schengenzone.svg.png> <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/focuson/film/images/activities/cold-war/europe-cold-war.png>.

population⁴²). Within the European Union and its 27 member states, Slovenia ranks on the fifth place from the bottom from the standpoint of the number of population; only Malta, Luxembourg, Cyprus and Estonia have less population, and among

⁴² For statistical data see <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>, the number of population is based on the 2009 assessment.

the last four countries in terms of size; Estonia is 125% bigger. Within NATO and its 28 member states, Slovenia ranks on the fourth place from the bottom from the standpoint of the number of population; only Iceland, Luxembourg and Estonia have less population. Smaller than Slovenia is only Luxembourg since Iceland is five times bigger. Slovenia is also one of the 14 new European countries formed after the Cold War (upon the disintegration of socialist federations) and recognized by the international community between 1989 and 1993. It is one of the seven countries established after the fall of the Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; the last three were Montenegro and Serbia in 2006 and Kosovo in 2008.

Slovenia realized its pre-set Euro-Atlantic ambitions with the entry into NATO on 29 March 2004 and into the European Union on 1 May 2004⁴³. On 1 January 2007 Slovenia adopted a common European currency Euro. On 22 December 2007⁴⁴ it joined the Schengen Area when it abolished border checks at common EU land and sea borders. On 30 March 2008 it did the same at air borders (Figure 3). The key tool enabling the implementation of the Schengen Agreement is the Schengen Information System (SIS) – a common electronic database on individuals and objects which includes data on persons who have been banned entry to the Schengen area, persons who are wanted for arrest, missing persons, as well as on stolen vehicles and documents, money, weapons, marked banknotes deriving from criminal offences, etc.⁴⁵.

Today Slovenia is a modern information society; in 2008 one mobile phone was registered per capita, 58% of population used the Internet and 65% of population used personal computer, while these shares are increasing from year to year⁴⁶. This is extremely important because »the time we live in is the period of information and information society, in short, the information age. Everyday life of Slovenes, citizens of the Republic of Slovenia, Europeans and the whole global world is characterized by the use of mobile phones and the Internet (Črnčec, 2009: 12).« The need to study, among other things, also a geo-economical aspect of the geostrategic position of Slovenia is related also, or mainly to the information society, globalization and changed security environment.

⁴³ *The referendum on Slovenia's entry into NATO and EU was attended by over 60% of the country's voters. NATO membership was confirmed by 66% of voters, and EU membership by almost 90% of voters.*

⁴⁴ *The main idea of the Schengen Area, created by the Schengen Agreement signed by five EU members (Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Germany and the Netherlands) in a Luxembourg village in 1985, is the provision of free movement across internal borders. Tighter border controls are thus concentrated at external Schengen borders, mainly to stop illegal migration, drugs smuggling, trade in human beings and other illegal activities. When Slovenia and six other countries joined the Schengen area, the total number of member states increased to 22.*

⁴⁵ *Slovenia – Schengen Newcomer, Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Slovenia, Ljubljana, December 2007.*

⁴⁶ *The Internet is the fastest growing telecommunication medium of all times. In 1998 it was used by 140 million people in the world, in 2001 by 700 million, in the middle of 2007 by 1.173 billion or 17.8% of world's population and on 31 December 2009 by 1.802 billion or 26.6% of world's population. In February 2008 the number of Chinese users of the Internet for the first time exceeded the number of American users (220 million versus 216 million). At the end of 2009 this ratio increased to 384 million users in China versus 234 million users in the USA (<http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm>).*

3 SLOVENIA THROUGH GEOPOLITICAL – GEO-ECONOMIC PRISM

In 2005 Slovenia adopted the *Slovenia's Development Strategy* (SDS)⁴⁷ setting out the vision and objectives of Slovenia's development. SDS determines four basic development objectives: (i) economic development objective – to reach the average level of the EU economic development in the period of ten years; (ii) social development objective – to improve the quality of living and the welfare of all individuals; (iii) cross-generational and sustainable development objective – to enforce the sustainability principle in all areas of development, including the sustainable renewal of population; (iv) Slovenia's development objective in the international environment – to become a recognizable and distinguished country in the world. Development goals were some more and other less successfully realized during the period of economic growth. The sudden change caused by economic crisis is now so much more painful.

Numerous public polemics and discussions, as well as statistical data show that Slovenia has been more affected by economic crisis than the majority of its EU partners. This fact was confirmed also by Slovenian Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development (IMAD) in its 2010 Development Report which says that »the economic crisis in 2009 disrupted the implementation of SDS goals in the area of economic and social development. The crisis has, so to speak, annulled the progress in the area of economic and social development made on the basis of high economic end employment growth in the past cyclically favourable years«⁴⁸.

Cooperation with international environment is of vital importance for Slovenia and its present and future development since it highly depends on imports. Until the year 1991 two thirds of Slovenian exports were intended for the former Yugoslavia. Following Slovenia's independence, its economy reoriented to western markets. The majority of Slovenian international trade is with EU members (in 2008 69% of export and 77.9% of import). Slovenian direct investments abroad are oriented mainly to the area of Western Balkans, while the main investors in Slovenia are EU countries with 85% share (Chart 1). The biggest investors are Austria with 48% share, France with 7%, the Netherlands with 6.5%, Italy with 5.7%, Germany with 5% share, as well as other EU countries. Slovenia dedicates 76.8% of all direct investments to non-EU countries, mainly to the Western Balkans. Slovenia's direct investments to Serbia amount to 28.5%, to Croatia 19.7% and to Bosnia and Herzegovina 12.4%. Austria, the biggest investor in Slovenia, enjoys only 2.5% of all Slovenian direct investments.

⁴⁷ It was adopted during the 30th Government session on 23 June 2005, http://www.svez.gov.si/fileadmin/svez.gov.si/pageuploads/docs/katal_inf_javn_znac/02_StrategijarazvojaSlovenije.pdf.


⁴⁸ The 2010 Development Report was published on 3 May 2010, highlighting numerous structural weaknesses, especially the fact that the so far economic growth has over-relied on technologically not enough demanding industrial activities and traditional services, limiting the competitiveness of Slovenian economy; therefore, the economy recovery and improvement of welfare are demanding challenges, especially because the economic crisis has exacerbated public finances and accessibility to financial sources, and decreased the level of potential gross domestic product. (http://www.umar.gov.si/fileadmin/user_upload/publikacije/pr/2010/POR_2010.pdf).

Chart 1:
International
investments
by individual
countries or
groups of
countries (in
million euros) on
31 December
2009.

Countries or groups of countries	Assets							Liabilities				
	Total	Direct investments abroad	Investments in foreign securities	Financial derivatives	Other investments	International reserves	Total	Direct investments in Slovenia	Foreign investments in securities	Financial derivatives	Other investments	
	2= 3+4+5+6+7	3	4	5	6	7	8= 9+10+11+12	9	10	11	12	
World	-12,128	34,915	6,010	11,249	81	16,827	749	10,788	9,355	191	26,709	
European Union, of that	-18,774	20,880	1,072	9,311	70	10,292	135	9,134	5,526	169	24,825	
Austria	-11,759	2,342	151	633	27	1,513	0	14,083	5,171	485	8,303	
Belgium	443	982	-4	609	6	371	0	539	396	1	83	
France	94	2,089	24	1,628	6	431	0	1,995	773	3	1,213	
Ireland	-971	314	1	233	1	78	0	1,285	1	4	1,280	
Italy	-530	1,235	25	611	4	595	0	1,765	612	23	1,125	
Germany	-2,002	3,319	220	2,125	8	966	0	5,321	531	173	4,615	
The Netherlands	388	1,373	182	838	1	352	0	985	706	19	259	
Great Britain	-2,967	834	9	479	12	257	77	3,801	94	2,269	1,424	
EU institutions	-913	4,639	0	66	0	4,554	19	5,552	0	0	5,552	
EFTA	-881	692	56	108	2	483	44	1,573	1,183	52	337	
Other European countries, of that	8,016	9,313	4,616	351	8	4,338	0	1,297	260	113	906	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1,302	1,475	746	57	2	670	0	173	22	3	145	
Croatia	2,129	2,794	1,187	79	0	1,528	0	665	296	51	313	
Serbia	2,645	2,886	1,715	66	2	1,103	0	241	2	51	184	
Montenegro	440	491	163	8	2	318	0	51	0	5	44	
Macedonia	520	581	384	44	1	152	0	62	2	3	55	
USA	920	1,250	21	979	1	123	126	330	86	131	112	
Other countries	912	1,570	245	500	0	459	366	658	125	25	507	
Unclassified	-2,321	1,210	0	0	0	1,131	78	3,530	0	3,508	22	

Source: Bank of Slovenia.

Graph 2: Direct Investments (DI) and Slovenia (in million euros)



Source: Bank of Slovenia.

The trend of increasing of both indexes has slightly decelerated, and in the event of investments to Slovenia in 2009 even decreased by 2% (Graph 2). All this results from the global economic crisis which has badly affected also Slovenia.

The only Slovenian port, the Port of Koper⁴⁹, is of key importance for Slovenian international trade. The total cargo throughput in 2008 amounted to a record 16.05 millions of tons and decreased by 18% in 2009 to 13.14 millions of tons⁵⁰. Therefore it is of vital importance for Slovenia to be granted an appropriately regulated access to the High Sea and epicontinental shelf. Today the access is not important only for the free movement of vessels (vessels sailing towards Slovenian coast can freely sail through Croatian and Italian waters, in line with provisions of the so called Innocent Passage), but also, and even more importantly, for the exploitation of marine resources. The neighbouring Italy is, for example, already pumping natural gas from the bottom of the North Adriatic Sea. A very pressing issue at the moment is the construction of the Regasification Terminal for Liquefied Natural Gas in Žavljje in the

⁴⁹ There are two other important ports in the North Adriatic Region, Trieste in Italy and Rijeka in Croatia, which can both serve as an entry into Central and East Europe.

⁵⁰ Statistical data on cargo throughput as of the year 2006 are available on <http://www.luka-kp.si/slo/terminali-in-tovor>. The largest decrease was registered in the amount of loaded and unloaded vehicles, from 816,192 tons in 2008 to 444,621 tons in 2009, and in the amount of loaded and unloaded dry bulk cargo, from 7,900,610 tons to 5,575,403 tons. In the year 2010 the trends have re-started to increase; in January 2010 the cargo throughput in the Port of Koper amounted to 1,506,878 tons and in February 2010 to 1,224,876 tons, which is 15.8% more than in February 2009.

Port of Trieste⁵¹. The fact is that on the bottom of the Exclusive Economic Zone of the North Adriatic Sea huge amounts of natural gas have been found. In 2006 Italy⁵² pumped approximately 10.7 billion cubic metres of natural gas, approximately half of it in the North Adriatic Sea, and Croatia approximately two billions. If Slovenia was granted an access to epicontinental shelf, it could also pump natural gas.

Slovenian gross domestic product and gross domestic product per capita have gradually increased in the past decade. In the years 2006, 2007 and 2008, Slovenian gross product increased by 5.8%, 6.8% and 3.5% respectively, to decrease dramatically in the year 2009 by 7.8%. In comparison with EU, Slovenia has been worse affected by the global economic crisis, making its pace of approaching towards the EU level decelerate. If Slovenia before was gaining upon the average level of EU⁵³ development, it has now started to **lag behind** which is proved also by the increase and decrease of GDP in EU. In EU 27, the GDP growth in 2008 amounted to 0.6% and to 0.7% in the Euro Zone. In 2009 GDP in EU 27 decreased by 4.2% in EU and by 4.1% in the Euro Zone. Slovenian gross domestic product thus decreased from 37.135 billion in 2008 to 34.894 billion in 2009, while GDP per capita decreased from 18.366 billion in 2008 to 17.092 billion in 2009. Only in 2009 the national budget debt increased from 8.389 billion euros to 12.519 billion euros, which meant an increase by 13.3%, from 22.6% to 35.9% GDP. In comparison with EU this were still favourable statistical data since the EU 27 public debt in the year 2009 amounted to 73.6% and in the Euro Zone to 78.8%⁵⁴. At the end of 2009 the national budget debt amounted to 1.915 billion (5.5% GDP), while at the end of 2007 there was still an eight million surplus. The number of unemployed increased from less than 60 000

⁵¹ *Italy's intent to build a Regasification Terminal for Liquefied Natural Gas in the Port of Trieste has caused heated reactions, not only by Slovenian and Italian environmental organizations, but also by official Slovenian politics. The Government has considered the opinion made by the interministerial group of experts and decided that the construction of the terminal is not acceptable. It also demands from Italy the official documentation, while speculations have appeared in the media that the documents used in the consensus-gaining process were false. The abstract of the study on the influence the Regasification Terminal for Liquefied Natural Gas in Žavljje would have on the environment is available on http://www.mop.gov.si/fileadmin/mop.gov.si/pageuploads/podrocja/okolje/pdf/cpvo/terminal_zavljje.pdf.*

⁵² *In 2009 intensive cross-border cooperation between Italian company Eni and Croatian company Ina started. Annamaria A and Annamaria B are the first gas platforms situated on both sides of the border between Italy and Croatia, Eni Starts Up Annamaria A Platform in Adriatic Sea, http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=82569; First gas at Annamaria; <http://www.oilonline.com/News/News.Articles/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/31590/First-gas-at-Annamaria.aspx>.*

⁵³ *Slovenian GDP, expressed in purchasing power parity in % of EU average, in 2008 amounted to 90.9%, ranking Slovenia to the 16th place among 27 EU members. Slovenia was thus at the bottom of the second third of EU members, lagging behind the bottom of the first third of EU members for 25% percentage points. According to Slovenian IMAD, in 2009 Slovenia returned to the 89% of EU development level which meant a decrease by 2% to the level from the year 2007 and also the first decrease since the independence, http://www.umar.gov.si/fileadmin/user_upload/publikacije/pr/2010/POR_2010.pdf.*

⁵⁴ *Available on <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu>. Over-borrowing and lack of control can push a country to the edge of bankruptcy, which happened to Greece in 2010. The EU and IMF are forced to lend it 110 billion euros in order to save the Euro Zone. As an EU member, Slovenia will participate in this three-year restoration of financial situation in Greece with 387 million euros, although economists have been warning that the solution of this problem will not be possible without the cancellation of debts. The Greek problem will thus be solved by workers in Slovenia and Slovakia whose average gross wages amount to 1203 and 529 euros respectively, while the average Greek gross wage amounts to 1651 euros (sic!). (Data for the year 2006 in Labour market statistics, <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu>).*

unemployed persons in September 2008 to almost 100 000 in January 2010⁵⁵. From statistical point of view, Slovenian unemployment rate of 6.2% is still well under the EU 27⁵⁶ rate which amounts to 9.6%.

In 2008 the energy independence of Slovenia amounted to 55.3%. In the same year the import of vehicles amounted to 2.856 billion euros, oil and oil derivatives to 2.231 billion euros, iron and steel to 1.357 billion euros, electrical machinery and appliances to 1.264 billion euros and industrial machinery for general use to 1.040 billion euros. From the entire value of import, which in 2008 amounted to 23.046 billion euros or 62% of GDP, the import to export ratio was 86%.

Regardless of the above mentioned statistical data, which from Slovenian point of view are not encouraging but compared to the EU still favourable, in May 2010 Slovenia completed the accession process for OECD⁵⁷ membership, the club of the most developed countries. Slovenia started the accession process for membership in this distinguished international economic organization based in Paris in 2007⁵⁸. Slovenia must look for its opportunities in development, knowledge, knowledge-based society, as well as in research and development. In this area Slovenia and the entire EU are far from realizing the Lisbon Strategy which predicts 3% of GDP for research and development. The new strategy Europe 2020 suggests that 3% of GDP should be spent on research and development, 1% of public and 2% of private resources. According to Eurostat, Slovenian share of public resources in 2008 amounted to 0.55% of GDP, while the EU average was 0.72% of GDP. As said by the competent Minister, in 2009 this share should increase to 0.74% of GDP and in 2010 to 0.85%. In 2007, Slovenia spent 1.45% of GDP on research and development, lagging behind the target 3% of GDP by more than 100%. In 2007, the 3% target was in EU exceeded only by Sweden and Finland with 3.6% and 3.47% respectively. The EU average in 2007 thus amounted only to 1.85% of GDP which was far from the target Lisbon commitments, as well as from the statistics of EU partners/competitors; only Chinese share amounting to 1.44% of GDP was smaller, while the shares of the USA, South Korea (in 2006) and Japan (in 2006) were 2.67%, 3.0% and 3.4% respectively.

⁵⁵ *Slovenia in numbers 2009, Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia and www.stat.si.*

⁵⁶ *According to Eurostat from January 2010.*

⁵⁷ *Estonia, Israel and Slovenia received invitation to join OECD on 10 May 2010. OECD accepted three new members, the total number of members is now (will be) 34, at the ceremony during the Ministerial Council Meeting on 27 May 2010 in Paris. Slovenia signed the Accession Agreement on 1 June in Ljubljana, (www.sta.si).*

⁵⁸ *Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development brings together 31 (20 founding) countries characterized by democratic pluralism and open economy. The organization was established in 1948 as Organisation for European Economic Co-operation – OEEC. In December 1960 it was renamed into the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – OECD. OECD collects information, follows and analyzes trends, predicts economic development, researches social changes and develops models in various areas, such as trade, environment, etc. For over forty years it has been the strongest and most reliable source of comparable statistical data, as well as economic and social data.*

4 GEOPOLITICAL CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY

Geo-economical factors are becoming increasingly important; nevertheless, we should not neglect the significance of the traditional understanding of the space, since in the future an appropriate amount of attention will have to be given both, to geo-economical factors and to the space as it was understood by some classicists. The discussion on future geopolitical challenges always presents a unique challenge of indicating extremely complex and interwoven trends on global, regional or national levels. In Slovenia the beginning of the 21st century was characterized by the implementation of key (geo)strategic goals, as well as by the entry into NATO and EU (Figure 4). Slovenian transition from the most developed republic of the former Yugoslavia towards the average EU development level was relatively smooth. It reached its peak in successful presiding over the Council of the EU, »the EU whose interwoven institutional structure provides small countries with an attractive framework where they can control their smallness in the international environment – on one side it offers them an opportunity to co-decide on matters which they would only hardly control if they were not EU members, and on the other side it provides them with an opportunity of being supported by the power of other member states in pursuing their goals« (Zupančič, 2004: 183). The size does matter, it offers advantages and disadvantages. In the environment of a higher number of small countries, what the EU undoubtedly is, we must look mainly for opportunities, since also »for the economic theory the importance of a country's size for its economic efficiency is not as relevant as it was a few decades ago. In today's relatively free world trade any country can be efficient regardless of its size, which depends on its efficiency to use natural, capital and human resources, as well as on its international trade openness« (Damijan, 1996: 190). A higher emphasis on education, especially technical⁵⁹, as well as on research and development was given to this purpose; however, the wish to qualify for the middle or even the upper third of EU development encountered the economic crisis, when Slovenian GDP decreased by almost twice as much as on average in the EU. But the goal must remain and remains a knowledge-based society in a knowledge economy. »The exact definition of knowledge economy is hard to determine. It generally refers to the economy in which ideas, information and forms of knowledge support innovations and economic growth«. This is also the environment of contemporary organizations and corporations which, in order to be competitive in global environments, have adjusted accordingly and become more flexible and less hierarchic (Giddens, 2001).

⁵⁹ *The percentage of population with college or university education gradually increased: from 3.3% in 1971 to 6% in 1981, to 8.9% in 1991 and to 13% in 2002 (www.stat.si); however, we should shorten the duration of the study, improve its quality and change the ratio between social sciences, natural sciences and technical graduates to the benefit of the latter. In 2004, the ratio in the EU was 25:1.5 and in Slovenia 2.5 to the benefit of social sciences graduates, in Lithuania and Hungary even 4.2 and 3.9 respectively. We should look up to Sweden with the ratio 0.8 or Germany with 0.9. With regard to the ratio between social and natural sciences graduates Slovenia ranked on the last place with the ratio 12.6, while Greece's ratio was only 1.9 to the benefit of social sciences graduates. Resolution on National Programme of Higher Education of the Republic of Slovenia 2007-2010 (ReNPVS), Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 94/07.*

At the global level, the contemporary security environment is under influence of the changed security circumstances and globalization – interdependence and unprecedented development of information technology. Popular and post-modern geopolitics have additionally been characterized by global terrorism threat and *Global War on Terror*⁶⁰. This term was first used by the USA after 11 September 2001 and was later adopted by numerous countries, including Great Britain. European countries were in general very sceptical towards this term, also Slovenia which reasonably held a »critical distance«. Terrorism is a security threat, a criminal offence which should be, from the point of view of criminal justice, punished accordingly. In the USA it represents a threat to national security; therefore, the USA fights it with all resources, including the army. Great Britain decided in 2007 not to use the term Global War on Terror any longer. At the beginning of 2009 the term silently said goodbye also in the USA; however, the terrorist threat⁶¹ has remained.

A terrorist threat is only one of the numerous sources of threats and risks on various levels, from individuals to transnational organizations and global environment. When facing various threats, an appropriate level of attention should also be given to soft power which is primarily based on three sources: culture (the way in which you attract others), political values (that we live at home and abroad) and foreign politics (which is perceived as legitimate and moral). Hard and soft powers sometimes enhance and sometimes oppose each other. The ability to share believable information is becoming a strong source of attraction and power. Soft power is more of a social and economic by-product than only a result of deliberate government policy. With the use of soft power non-profit organizations can exacerbate or hinder government attempts, just like popular culture actors (films, singers, media, etc.) can facilitate or aggravate government efforts in this context (Nye 2004)⁶². An upgraded concept of combined and balanced use of hard and soft power is a smart use of power (Nye, 2008). In a contemporary security environment *smart power* is an important tool of individual countries and organizations facing challenges and risks at the global level.

4.1 Global sources of threats and risks

With Slovenia's entry into NATO and EU Slovenian opportunities and obligations became also common Alliance threats and risks on one side, and mutual help and burden sharing on the other. NATO, EU and individual member states are trying to identify the sources of threats and risks. The adoption of documents which define them, the process of dealing with them, the measurement of effectiveness and implementation of documents is a never ending story for NATO, EU or Slovenia.

⁶⁰ *Global War on Terror – GWOT.*

⁶¹ *According to the annual threat assessment given by Director of National Intelligence in front of the competent organ in the Senate, in 2008 terrorism was still the major threat for US security. In 2009 the major threat was the global economic crisis and in 2010 the far-reaching impact of the cyber threat (see <http://www.dni.gov/>).*

⁶² *A popular saying which actually depicts what is written above, is: To win hearts and minds. The war in Iraq was a glorious military victory using military power which was not sufficiently supported by the use of soft power. In the continuation of the war the hearts and minds were not won and now a favourable result is trying to be achieved with the use of military power supported by soft power.*

NATO Strategic Concept⁶³ clearly explains that in line with the Washington Treaty, the basic and permanent purpose of NATO is to protect freedom and security of all member states with political and military resources. Since the very beginning NATO has been striving and will continue to strive to protect just and permanent peace in Europe founded on common democratic values, human rights and rule of law. This purpose could be threatened by crises and conflicts which influence the security in Euro-Atlantic Region (Article 6). »The fundamental guiding principle by which the Alliance works is that of common commitment and mutual co-operation among sovereign states in support of the indivisibility of security of all its members« (Article 8). Since the document is more than ten years old and was adopted by the Alliance with 19 member states, at Strasbourg/Kehl NATO Summit in 2009 heads of states and governments of NATO members tasked NATO Secretary General with the preparation of a new NATO strategic concept⁶⁴ by the end of 2010.

The New Strategic Concept will be adopted by 28 member states. The document must take into account not only the changed security challenges with the emphasis on proliferation, failed countries, energy storage, terrorism and climate changes, but also how NATO has transformed and adjusted in the past decade to better cope with these challenges⁶⁵.

The EU is facing similar security challenges as NATO. The EU challenges, written in the EU Security Strategy – »A Safe Europe in a Better World«, were adopted in 2003. In practice, within EU structures in the framework of the so called »second pillar« dealing with the provision of common European security and defence policy, this area was a responsibility of Secretary General /High Representative⁶⁶. In 2009 the European Parliament, in order to upgrade European Security Strategy and numerous other documents, adopted the Resolution on European Security Strategy and European Security and Defence Policy. In Article 23 the European Parliament ascertains that the 2003 European Security Strategy identified the main threats for the European Union (terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failed countries and organized criminal), and defined strategic objectives which served as a basis for sub-strategies. Article 24 addresses the receipt of reports on numerous security threats, such as: cyber security, reliable energy supply, including European energy supply, unsolved regional conflicts in EU neighbourhood, challenges in Africa, consequences of climate changes,

⁶³ *The Strategic Concept, first published in 1991, revised and adopted on 23 and 24 April 1999.*

⁶⁴ *He entrusted the work to a group of experts chaired by former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright.*

⁶⁵ *All on the New Strategic Concept and the Group of Experts chaired by former U.S. Secretary of State Ms. Madeleine K. Albright is available on <http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/what-is-strategic-concept.html>. On 17 May 2010 the group of 12 experts concluded its work with a report/analysis entitled NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement.*

⁶⁶ *Javier Solana performed this function as EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and as Secretary-General of the Council of the EU and WEU from October 1999 to December 2009. In line with the Treaty of Lisbon, Catherine Ashton has become de facto Foreign Minister of EU. Since 1 December 2009 she has officially been EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy and since February 2010 also Vice-President of the European Commission.*

competition for natural resources, projects aimed to enhance civilian and military capabilities, the importance of space for common security and maritime security.

At the beginning of 2010, on 25 February, EU interior ministers adopted the Internal Security Strategy for the European Union: Towards a European Security Model⁶⁷ which identifies common threats and risks due to which it is becoming increasingly important for EU members and institutions to jointly engage in the fight against new challenges which surpass our national, bilateral or regional capabilities. The Strategy defines the European security model with common instruments and commitments to a complementing relation among security, freedom and security. It particularly stresses the importance of connection between internal and external security. Common threats and the main challenges for internal security of the EU are the following: terrorism in all forms, serious criminal offences, organized, cyber and cross-border crime, violence, natural disasters and disasters caused by man. EU and NATO challenges are relatively successfully dealt with also by Slovenia in its new National Security Strategy.

Slovenian ReSNV (Chapter 4) determines that the sources of threats and risks for the national security of the Republic of Slovenia, from the standpoint of their origin, appear at global, transnational and national levels. *Global sources* of threats and risks are, besides their global origin and universal-local consequences of their operation, characterized also by the multiplicative nature which influences the appearance of other security threats and risks and at the same time increases their effects and consequences. These sources include climate changes, financial, economic and social risks and crisis areas. *Transnational sources* of threats and risks are characterized by transnational origin and cross-border dimensions. They include terrorism, illegal activities in the area of conventional weapons, weapons of mass destruction and nuclear technology, organized crime, illegal migrations, cyber threats, abuse of information technologies and systems, activities of foreign intelligence services and military threats. *National sources* of threats and risks are, in terms of their origin, related to events and phenomena in national environment. They include threats to public safety, natural and other disasters, restriction of natural resources, degradation of living environment, health-epidemiologic threats and some factors of uncertainty.

A successful fight against threats and risks requires an appropriate provision of financial resources to institutions which cope with them. The defence system is only one of the national security subsystems under fire, since Slovenia has under-

⁶⁷ *Development of European security model is available on <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/sl/10/st05/st05842-re02.sl110.pdf>.*

taken to NATO to guarantee 2% of defence expenditure for its own needs⁶⁸. The fact is that this political commitment is far from being realized⁶⁹ and in this context Slovenia is no exception. In the time of economic crisis numerous countries find it the easiest to give up a share of their defence costs. Of course we can not speak of demilitarization in Europe; however, more than appropriate is Kagan's⁷⁰ metaphor from the second Iraqi war that Europeans come from Venus and Americans come from Mars, especially in the light of the events in Afghanistan where NATO is participating in combat operations. Only few member states enable their armed forces to participate in operations without the so called national caveats and in this context Slovenia is no exception.

4.2 Slovenian challenges in globalization era

In the first decade of the 21st century Slovenia became a full EU and NATO member. A symbolic moment was undoubtedly Slovenian EU Council Presidency. 2720 Slovenian civil servants, 133 outside experts and 245 students took part in this important task performed by the Republic of Slovenia in the first half of 2008. During Slovenian presidency over 8000 events were carried out: 283 in Slovenia, 3285 in Brussels and 4242 elsewhere in the world⁷¹. It is worth mentioning that these events were attended by numerous important world leaders. Slovenia was thus also *de facto* for the first time in its history put on the stage of the world's history. For a small, young country with a short democratic tradition this was its moment in the history.

Slovenes have always understood that membership, besides benefits, brings also obligations. Within NATO, Slovenia is one of the member states contributing the highest share of their servicemembers to international operations and missions. Since 1997 members of the Slovenian Armed Forces have participated in 18 NATO, UN, EU and OSCE-led operations and missions. Participation of the Slovenian Armed Forces in crisis response operations is their permanent task with a 12-year long tradition. So far the Slovenian Armed Forces have took part in 18 operations and missions in 15 countries on three continents. According to 2008 data, the majority or 86% of Slovenian servicemembers participated in NATO-led operations. Geographically speaking, the majority or 66% took part in operations in the area of Balkans (Furlan, 2009). In a certain moment, due to the engagement

⁶⁸ In the year 2008, when the defence expenditure should have for the first time been 2% of GDP, it amounted to 1.52% and in 2009 to 1.63%. On the basis of financial movements defined by the Spring Announcement 2010 the adopted proposal on defence expenditure suggests 1.65% for the year 2010 and 1.61% for the year 2011. (<http://www.mors.si/fileadmin/mors/pdf/dokumenti/SPOR2009.pdf>). However, considering the general economic situation in Slovenia and the announced revised budget, the defence expenditure for the year 2010 is expected to be approximately 1.5% of GDP.

⁶⁹ The Ministry of Defence's budget covers also the subsystem for civil protection and disaster relief. In the year 2009 the related costs amounted to 38 million euros which are not considered as defence expenditure. However, the defence expenditure does include the costs of (military) pensions, approximately 59 million euros, and the subsystem of civil defence.

⁷⁰ Kagan, R., 2003, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*; New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

⁷¹ See http://www.eu2008.si/si/News_and_Documents/Press_Releases/June/0630UKOMstevilkePEU.html.

of their battalion in KFOR in Kosovo, the Slovenian Armed Forces participated abroad with more than 7% of their active component which is undoubtedly an impressive number.

At the beginning of the 1990s Slovenia still had a conscript army which, including the reserve force, amounted to 60000 members. In the process of transformation of the Slovenian Armed Forces towards a fully professional army, they now comprise 9212 members, 82% of active component and 18% of reserve component⁷². In line with strategic documents, the goal is to have 14000 members, 8500 members of the active component and 5500 members of the reserve force⁷³. The Slovenian Armed Forces remain committed to the conduct of tasks within national defence, although a large share of their responsibilities includes the conduct of tasks in the system of collective defence. Slovenia still forms a part of the Southern Theatre of War connecting Italy with Hungary and Croatia and through Romania and Ukraine with the Black Sea Region; however, the military dimension of space is perhaps not as important (sic?!) as it used to be.

From the standpoint of transport and energy it must be noted that Slovenian space is a transit crossroads of European corridors V and X⁷⁴ and Adriatic-Ionian corridor. Slovenia represents a gateway – a logistic starting point for Central and Southeast Europe, while it is expected to participate also in the energy project South Stream⁷⁵ through Slovenian territory towards Italy. Due to enhanced relations with Asia and its importance for Europe it would be wise to strengthen cooperation between the key Adriatic ports (Koper, Trieste and Rijeka) and Asia in the area of trade. The time will tell if this is realistic, since the past experience stirs serious doubt with regard to this possibility. What do Slovenian, North Adriatic and the entire Adriatic Region mean for Slovenia and Europe in the period of EU integration now and within a

⁷² Data for March 2010, <http://www.slovenskavojska.si/o-slovenski-vojski/>.

⁷³ Article 6.2. of the Resolution on the general long-term programme of the development and equipment of the Slovene Army (ReDPROSV), Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 89/04. The document is relatively obsolete; therefore we can expect its revision in the near future. The future size of the Slovenian Armed Forces is more likely to be similar to the present size than to the one defined by ReDPROSV.

⁷⁴ Ten Pan-European corridors were defined at the second Pan-European Transport Conference in Crete in March 1994. Routes leading to Central and East Europe are being defined which in the following ten to fifteen years will require large investments. Corridor V is 1600 km long (994 mi) and includes three shorter branches (see www.corridor5.org). It goes from west to east, from Italy to Ukraine, in the following direction: Venice - Trieste/ Koper - Ljubljana - Maribor - Budapest - Uzhhorod - Lviv - Kiev. Corridor X goes from north to south, from Austria to Greece in the following direction: Salzburg - Ljubljana - Zagreb - Belgrade - Niš - Skopje - Veles – Thessaloniki and comprises four shorter branches (<http://www.unece.org/trans/main/ter/Countries/PanEuCorridors.html>).

⁷⁵ Slovenian and Russian economy ministers, Matej Lahovnik and Sergej Šmatko, in the presence of prime ministers of both countries, Borut Pahor and Vladimir Putin, in Moscow on 14 November 2009 signed a cooperation agreement on the construction and use of the South Stream Pipeline in Slovenia. Putin on this occasion stressed that Russia had signed the South Stream Pipeline Agreement with all European partners required for the project. The South Stream pipeline is expected to become functional in 2015 when the gas will be distributed also to Slovenian consumers. The last country to join the project was Austria in April 2010. All required documents are now signed between Russia on one side and Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Croatia, Italy, Slovenia, Serbia and Hungary on the other. The end of the line of a partly competitive project Nabucco which will connect Central Asia, Caucasus Region and Turkey with the EU, is predicted for Austria, while the line itself will run through the countries (south)east of Slovenia.

reasonable time period of 20-30 years from the standpoint of maritime and sea-related economy (e.g. Port of Koper, maritime transport, tourism, fishing industry, water sports, education of personnel in maritime area, etc) is a question which in the future will require an appropriate level of attention.

The future challenges Slovenia will have to deal with and still have no answer are the following: how to decrease the high level of unemployment, increasing borrowings of the country and population, health and pension system which, in the long-term period, will not be possible to maintain and poor demographic growth: 1.3 child per mother is one of the lowest rates in Europe. Demographic projections show that by the year 2060 Slovenian population will have decreased to 1.8 million, while the share of people over 65 will have doubled and will amount to over 30%. Public opinion polls show that the majority of Slovenes feel safe. This is the opinion expressed by 82% of respondents who assess that the national security is mostly threatened by drugs, traffic accidents, unemployment, crime, etc. It is interesting that the research »National and International Security 2003⁷⁶« was conducted after the terrorist attacks in the USA; however, Slovenes did not mention them as a threat to their security. In Slovenia important geopolitical and geostrategic issues are not areas Slovenian citizens would deal with; nevertheless, our attention should be given also to global aspects which Slovenia as an open society and economy can not avoid.

5 POSSIBLE GEOSTRATEGIC SCENARIOS BY THE YEAR 2020–2025


Scientists and experts do not entirely agree on who is losing the status of great power and who is gaining the status of this kind. In Dussouy's world system between unipolarity and disorder (Figure 4), the new world axis is extremely »cruel« to the EU since it excludes it from this axis. It mentions a long-lasting marginalization of Europe and continues to exclude Africa from the world game. The new world axis is formed by: USA-China-India-(Russia) (Dussouy, 2010:148-149). A bit as a joke and a bit seriously we could say that the axis consists of only two countries. The neologism *Chimerica*, created at the end of 2006 by historian Niall Ferguson and economist Moritz Schularick, stresses the interpenetration⁷⁷ of both economies and huge Chinese reserve of dollars⁷⁸, and tries to assign a part of the blame for global economic crisis also to this relation.

⁷⁶ On <http://nato.gov.si/slo/javno-mnenje/nacionalna-varnost.pdf>. The level of safety feeling among Slovenian population remains high, since 81% of people feel very safe. This is obvious from the public opinion poll in which citizens of the Republic of Slovenia evaluated the work of Slovenian Police for the year 2008. The poll was carried out by the School of Advanced Social Studies from Nova Gorica, <http://www.mnz.gov.si/nc/si/splonso/cns/novica/article/12027/6240/>.

⁷⁷ The relation described by Ferguson as the partnership between the big saver and the big spender (on <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/16/AR2008111601736.html>).

⁷⁸ In 2009 China had over 2 trillion US dollars reserves which could increase to 4 trillion US dollars in the next five to ten years. As said by Rogoff (2009), if this happens, China will not want to encounter the dollar crisis with 4 trillion US dollars in the sack.

Figure 4:
The configuration of the contemporary world system (between unipolarity and disorder).



Source: Dussouy, 2010: 149.


Cohen is more lenient when saying that since the end of World War II, which was followed by a two-block period and its fall, five great powers have been established: the USA, the EU, Russia, China and Japan (Figure 5). In the first quarter of the 21st century this relation additionally dispersed since the five existing actors were joined by Brazil and India. Areas of internal conflicts moved from East Europe and the former Soviet Union to Indonesia and Central Asia. The roles and areas of the *Shatter Belt*, *Compression Zone* and *Gateway Region*⁷⁹ have also changed (Cohen, 2010: 157-164). Upon this a question arises whether the key global organization which brings together all countries and continents, the United Nations Organizations, is a reflection of this new reality. Despite numerous efforts the structure of the Security Council has not adjusted to a new reality; India, as the second biggest country in the world, South America and Japan thus remain without a seat. The fact that no one seriously considers an African member confirms the thesis that Africa remains outside the global game.

⁷⁹ For the most part, geopolitical structures are organized along the following hierarchically ordered spatial levels:

- The geostrategic realm – the most extensive level, or macrolevel;
- The geopolitical region – a subdivision of the realm that represents the middle level, or mesolevel;
- National states, quasi-states and territorial subdivisions within and across states at the lowest level, or microlevel.

Outside of this ordering of structures are regions or clusters of states that are not located within the realm of regional frameworks. These include regions such as Shatterbelts, whose internal fragmentation is intensified by pressures of major powers from competing realms; Compression Zones, which are torn apart by internal divisions and the interference of neighbouring states within the region; and Gateways, which serve as bridges between realms, bridges and states (Cohen, 2003: 33).

Figure 5:
World
geopolitical
map in the first
quarter of the
21st century.



Source: Cohen, 2010: 163.

On the other hand, numerous thoughts and arguments flourish favouring the idea of the 21st century as the Asian century, the century of the rise of the East and the fall of the West. We are therefore talking of an increasing role of one sphere and a decreasing role of the other, and in this context, of the effects at mesolevel and microlevel. The arguments are based on certain explicit empirical indicators which, aided by good interpretation, sound very convincing. Mahubani (2088) says that by the year 2050 three out of four biggest economies in the world will be Asian⁸⁰: China, India and Japan. The number of population in the West is decreasing, while in Asia it is increasing, the number of Asian students at technical faculties is increasing, while in the West the number of students is decreasing, etc. Asia wishes to copy, not rule the West. However, the West will start to share the power with Asia in the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, G-7⁸¹ and the UN Security Council. Mahubani depicts the 21st century development through three scenarios named the Asian March to Modernity, Retreat into the Fortress and Triumph of the West. The latter is considered to be the least likely, while the first scenario seems to present the best chance and opportunity for mutual cooperation between Asia and the West, as

⁸⁰ In the first century AD, Asian GDP amounted to 76.3% of global GDP and European to 10.8%. In the year 1000 European share fell to 8.7% and Asian to 70.3%. During the industrial revolution period European share started to increase, while Asian share started to decrease. In 1820 the Western European share amounted to 23.6% of global GDP, Asian share decreased to 59.2%, while the total share of the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand amounted to 1.9%. In 1998 their share amounted to more than 25% of global GDP, Western European share to 20.6% and Asian share only to 37.2% (Mahubani, 2008: 51). In the future this ratio will undoubtedly turn (it is turning) again to the benefit of Asia, as shown by the following indicator: during the global world crisis in 2009 the EU's GDP decreased by 4.2%, the USA's GDP by 2.4% and Japanese GDP by 5.2%, while Chinese GDP increased by 8.7% and Indian GDP by 6.7%. With the 9% economic growth in 2008, China contributed 20% of global economic growth.

⁸¹ In 2009, the G-20 was more in the spotlight than the G-7 (G-8). The global economic crisis was the main topic of leaders of 20 biggest economies from all continents (19 countries and the EU) which together create 85% of GDP, 80% of trade and include two thirds of the world's population.

well as for their co-management of the world founded on equal basis. If the 1990s were characterized by the victory of the West and the end of history as defined by Fukujama, the future will belong to Asia. Will the future be characterized by the Rise of the Rest, meaning mainly Asia with its three billion population where in the past we have witnessed economic miracles? The influence within the key international organizations must change, the key organizations must change or break (Overholt, 2009: 15-18). A demand for changes within the UN Security Council, International Monetary Fund and World Bank, as well as for a »new world order« was again very clearly expressed by the four emerging superpowers, named BRIC⁸², at their second summit in Brazil in April 2010.

The largest »regional« security organization with global reach is also dealing with its future role. In order to enhance our understanding of future threats for the Alliance, NATO, through the exact analysis of future security challenges, carried out the Multiple Futures Project – MFP⁸³ which was not meant as a contemporary oracle from Delphi (Mattis, 2009). Prophecies can easily be mistaken for predictions of future trends, challenges and threats, especially if they are made for two decades in advance. Intelligence experts will also avoid giving intelligence assessments or projections so far into the future because of too many unknown factors, since special capacities are necessary to make predictions so far in advance. MFP identified 40 risk factors, from failed countries and ethnic conflicts to the »challenges of values and world views«. In this context it is therefore difficult to speak of exact science; nevertheless, the efforts of this kind are of extreme importance in the terms of adopting long-term strategic decisions which in the West represent decisions lasting over one mandate. On the basis of current trends we can of course quite successfully predict future also in the defence area, while the new Strategic Concept will try to adjust, qualify and prepare NATO for a wide spectrum of regional and transregional security challenges.

From the Eurocentrist or geo-European point of view, scenario theories offer arguments for at least three geostrategic scenarios by the year 2025⁸⁴. In a very short and general explanation, according to the *optimistic scenario* globalization processes continue in the following way: the EU keeps its current positions, a relatively balanced levelling of the world continues, while the consequences of the economic crisis are quite evenly spread out. According to the *moderate scenario*

⁸² BRIC, Brasil, Russia, India and China include almost a half of the world's population and a quarter of the territory. Their first summit took place in Russia in 2009, while the second is predicted to be held in China.

⁸³ A kind of a predecessor of this project is a 2007 study "Future Security Environment".

⁸⁴ As said by Secretary-General of the reflection group on the long-term future of Europe, chaired by former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales, and former Slovenian Minister of Development Dr Žiga Turk, **changes and adjustments** (underlined by Damir Črnčec) in Europe are the »only way for Europe to preserve its economic and social model, continue the quality of life and enforce its priorities, firstly, by being strong inside and undertaking radical reforms in economic and political areas, and secondly, by speaking with one voice beyond Europe and directing the world order towards regulated multilateralism« (Žiga Turk for STA: Europe will maintain its influence in the world only with radical changes (interview), 9 May 2010, <http://www.sta.si/vest.php?s=s&id=1510788>).

the European development setback starts or continues, conflicts with Russia⁸⁵ arise due to the expansion to the East and fluctuations between cooperation and conflicts occur. The rise of China and its central role are in the forefront, NATO is involved in war conflicts in Asia and Africa⁸⁶, while the increasing rivalry between the USA and China is present. According to the *pessimistic scenario*, the period of instability is characterized by the worsening of general crisis, expansion of nationalism and xenophobia, competition for raw materials, appearance of new nuclear forces, expansion of »new wars« and terrorism with weapons of mass destruction, rivalry between the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and NATO, new cold war with the centre in Asia and internal problems in China⁸⁷. All scenarios should include the responsibility for the following common concerns: ***water and energy resources, climate changes, migrations, cyber threats and security of nuclear weapons***. This latter was also the main topic of the Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010, hosted by US President Obama⁸⁸.

It should also be mentioned that the globalization has become so powerful that the world today is facing the inevitable conflict between the globalization and self-determination. The latter expresses the ambition of people in real or imagined communities to keep their own ambitions and values, to pursue happiness in their own ways, and to feel in control of their own destinies (May, Zelikow 2008: 21). The future challenge we will have to deal with lies on the axis of globalization and self-determination in the framework of an open, civilized world founded on five key principles:

- Respect for the identity of others,
- Cooperating welfare: commitment to openness and international economic cooperation,
- Mutual security: we jeopardize our own security if we jeopardize other countries,
- Taking care of the planet, food, water, earth, air, fossil fuels and ocean resources⁸⁹,

⁸⁵ *Worth mentioning is a special collective security organization relatively unknown in Europe, namely the Collective Security Treaty Organisation – CSTO, (Russ. Организация Договора о Коллективной Безопасности). The founding treaty was signed by presidents of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan in Tashkent in October 2002. In June 2006, CSTO was joined also by Uzbekistan. CSTO is a successor of the Collective Security Treaty – CST signed by the Commonwealth of Independent States in 1992. Former members of CST who did not join CSTO are Azerbaijan and Georgia.*

⁸⁶ *See Joseph E. Stiglitz: Globalization and Its Discontents in Zbigniew Brzezinski: The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives.*

⁸⁷ *See Naomi Klein: The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, London : Allen Lane, 2007 in Alvin in Heidi Toffler: War and anti-war, Boston [etc.] : Little Brown and Company, 1993.*

⁸⁸ *The summit attended by representatives of 47 countries, including 38 Heads of States or Governments, was the biggest diplomatic event hosted by any U.S President after 1945.*

⁸⁹ *This care is never-ending; however, the first half of 2010 was characterized by two events, a natural disaster and an ecological disaster caused by man. Both events alarmed environmentalists and entailed global economic-security consequences. Dust and ashes from Iceland volcano Eyjafjallajökull caused numerous problems in Europe; air traffic, for example, was seriously disrupted for six days in the entire Europe during which 95 000 flights were cancelled, including overseas flights. The damage suffered only by airline companies exceeded 1 billion euros. On 20 April 2010 the worst ecological disaster, oil spill, in the US history happened in the Gulf of Mexico. The oil rig accident claimed 11 lives. Experts reveal that between 12 000 and 19 000 barrels of oil gush into the sea on daily basis. By 1 June 2010 all attempts made to fill the bore hole and block the passage of oil to the sea had been unsuccessful. So far, these attempts, lasting over forty days now, have cost the company British Petroleum (BP) almost 1 billion US dollars, while the disaster will have long-term consequences for life in the sea and on the coast.*

- Limitation of governments by the rule of law, democratic responsibility, division of power among the branches of power and on regional levels (May, Zelikow: 2008).

When considering various future scenarios and predictions, from less to more positive, it is appropriate that in the 21st century we try to learn from mistakes made in the 20th century when two world wars, as well as numerous regional wars and conflicts were fought, and find a better future for predicted 8 billion people.

6 INSTEAD OF THE CONCLUSION

Central and Southeast Europe represent the area where both world wars started and where after World War II we witnessed the largest slaughter and the longest military engagements. The Western Balkans Region is also an area where a significant size of international police/military force is still present. Although their size tends to decrease, it is difficult to predict when they will completely withdraw from this area. Therefore it is a huge success that at the beginning of the 21st century we can say that from geopolitical and geostrategic point of view the position of Slovenia is more solid than ever before. April 2010 marks the 20th anniversary of the first democratic elections after World War II, while the geopolitical balance of the past two decades is undoubtedly more than satisfactory. Membership in Euro-Atlantic integrations is based on equality, the principle Slovenes could not enjoy in any previous state formation. What is more, Slovenia is a modern country which exports peace and stability. In the international environment its words are undoubtedly much more appreciated than the size of its territory. With its geopolitical and geostrategic position Slovenia also represents a natural bridge between NATO and EU members situated both, along the Adriatic and Black Sea.

Slovenian EU Council Presidency proves that small countries can also participate on a global level and in this context, the then Slovenian Prime Minister and President of EU Council presented global challenges of EU to the European Parliament. It does not suffice to address the global changes facing the European Union only in terms of “competitiveness” and “combating terrorism”; at the global level, the European Union must address also the following four challenges: the UN reform and the establishment of a new order, combating poverty, combating climate changes and intercultural dialog. Only if the European Union deals with these challenges, it will be able to play a more important role in the global world, ensure peace and security for its citizens as well as sustainable and safe energy supply, and control migration pressures. (Janša 2008: 8) These are huge ambitious and words, especially if said by Prime Minister of a two-million nation on behalf of a half a billion people. In other words, Slovenia for a short time followed this saying: think globally, act globally. From the traditional geopolitical point of view this is almost impossible, since the size matters; however, with globalization and expansion of information technology in all corners of the world the traditional geopolitics has had to adjust to contemporary times and their challenges, while the current and future challenge remains: think globally, act locally and, especially, regionally. From this point of view we

must also assess the efforts made by Slovenian Prime Minister Borut Pahor in 2010 to organize a conference »Together for the European Union: Contribution of the Western Balkans to European Future«. Although the conference was not attended by all heads of governments and states of the Western Balkans, the beginning of the »Brdo Process« was a difficult, yet necessary step into the right direction⁹⁰.

Although Slovenia can justly be self-confident, in the future we will have to devote our energy to increasing the competitiveness, development and knowledge-based society in knowledge economy. Economic indicators of the past period are not very encouraging; these challenges therefore require an appropriate treatment in Slovenia and in EU. Greece is a very good example that Europe is not a land flowing with milk and honey. The future will be characterized by numerous challenges EU members and the entire EU will have to deal with. This, however, requires ideas, changes and adjustments, visions and measurable goals, while the path has to be paved with short and long-term measures. We have to ensure a sufficient number of jobs with a high added value, an appropriate level of investments in research and development, improve the education structure to the benefit of scientific and technical areas and identify clear methods of the implementation of results. And in this area much more can still be done. Failure is a risk and threat, both, for an individual country or for a community of countries. The analysis of results of the Slovenian Development Strategy is not very encouraging; therefore, additional attention should be given to the heavy, measurable geo-economics: to increase the trade beyond EU framework or southern neighbourhood to China, India and Russia by using not only the Port of Koper, but Slovenia as a logistic bridge for the EU and Central Europe, a bridge with excellent infrastructure; following the independence the motorway network was constructed, which is, however, not true for the next required precondition – the second railway track from the Port of Koper to Slovenian inland areas. Open questions remain the construction of the third pier in the Port of Koper, the larger use and extension of the runway at Portorož Airport, the construction and upgrade of pipelines, the use of gas terminals, etc. All these development questions are related to large financial investments and ecological risks and it seems that this represents the highest obstacle; therefore, we will have to reach the national consensus on whether we want the development, what it will be like, how much it will cost and if we are ready to expose ourselves to environmental risks and threats with which it seems we easily identify ourselves.

On the other hand, »conventional« sources of risks and threats of one nation or region became transnational or transregional long ago. They are guided by asymmetry where

⁹⁰ *In cooperation with the EU, the conference was on 20 March 2010 organized by Slovenian Prime Minister Borut Pahor and Croatian Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor. Besides Slovenian Prime Minister, Heads of Governments of five countries in the region (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo and Macedonia) attended the conference which started an informal form of cooperation named »the Brdo Process«. According to Prime Minister Pahor, the Brdo Process is open also for those who were not present on that day. Serbian President Tadić did not attend the conference because Kosovo Prime Minister was one of the participants, <http://www.kpv.gov.si/nc/si/splosno/cns/novica/article/1914/4489/>. We can expect that in the future the Brdo Process will have positive multiplicative regional effects in numerous areas, from economy to questions related to (national) security.*

individuals or groups have a greater power than ever before. With the use – abuse of benefits of information revolution they carried out the biggest terrorist attack on the center of world power and shook the foundations of the world order still dominated by the West. Empirical data of economic, financial, demographic or scientific nature show that Asia or the rest of the world is on the rise – and the basic question remains whether we will be able to live with each other or fall in conflicts. Equal co-existence based on universal ethnic and cultural principles is a way in which we can satisfy the wishes and needs of all those who feel deprived or discriminated. The task of all responsible, chosen and selected leaders is to find an appropriate *modus vivendi* with which the highest possible number of people will be able to identify. Therefore it is in the interest of the Republic of Slovenia to, in cooperation with all well-intentioned actors, contribute to the stability not only in Southeast Europe or in the Western Balkans as it is often said; our obligation is also to look wider, also to the areas where our friends and allies are fighting challenges which directly or indirectly influence the security situation in Slovenia. Slovenia, as a small country non-preoccupied with geopolitical ambitions, can offer its non-preoccupation, experience and advice to all who care for our future and for the future of our successors since it is our obligation and responsibility to leave them a well-preserved planet.

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PARADIGMA NOVEGA EVROPSKEGA VARNOSTNEGA SISTEMA

PARADIGM OF THE NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM

Professional article

Povzetek V prispevku je predstavljena nova varnostna paradigma v Evropi. Avtor izhaja iz predpostavke, da se je namesto Velike Evrope v zadnjih dvajsetih letih v Evropi vzpostavil regionalni bipolarni varnostni sistem. Sistem predstavljajo na eni strani Nato in Evropska unija ter na drugi strani, pod vodstvom Rusije, CSTO in SND. Takšen regionalni bipolarni sistem ne bo obstal dolgoročno, temveč ga je razumeti kot prehod v homogen ali heterogen sistem. V takšnem bipolarnem varnostnem okolju ima Ukrajina majhne možnosti, da ohrani svojo neodvisnost in suverenost.

Ključne besede *CSTO, Evropski varnostni sistem, širitev EU in Nata, širša Evropa, regionalna varnost, varnostni vakuum, Rusija, Ukrajina.*

Abstract The paper presents the new paradigm in Europe. The author's view is based on the assumption that in the last twenty years, instead of Wider Europe on the European continent the bipolar system of European security on the regional level was formed. This system is represented by NATO and the EU, on the one side, and CSTO and CIS led by Russia, on the other side. Such regional bipolar system will not remain in the long term, therefore it should be considered as transitional towards a homogeneous or heterogeneous system. Under such regional bipolar system Ukraine will have feeble chances to preserve its independence and state sovereignty.

Key words *CSTO, European Security System, EU and NATO enlargement, Wider Europe, regional security, security vacuum, Russia, Ukraine.*

Introduction The end of the Cold War was a historical chance for the European nations to create a secure and united continent. The idea of a "Wider Europe" in the 1990s seemed close to reality. The Helsinki process, which started in the 1970s, laid the foundation for such a Europe, grounded in common values, European identity, indivisibility

of security, inviolability of borders and territorial integrity, absence of dividing lines and spheres of influence. In order to build such a foundation for a “Wider Europe”, a special institution, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), was established, which afterwards grew into the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

The OSCE successfully managed to overcome the confrontation between East and West, which eventually resulted in the end of the Cold War. The OSCE proved to be effective in establishing trust between two ideologically hostile parts of Europe—democratic West and communist East. Mainly, due to the OSCE initiative the military machine with enormous weapon potential – a material basis of the Cold War was successfully dismantled. The OSCE managed to introduce the methods of military trust between countries from the opposing politico–military blocks. After the end of the Cold War the OSCE faced huge new tasks namely: the development of common European security system and Wider Europe which were grounded in shared democratic values.

Thus, the Paris Charter for Europe adopted at the summit in Paris served as the main plan for development of this system. It included the set of shared values which European countries should adhere to in their relations, while there was no confrontation and divisions of spheres of influence between the blocks. This system had to be based on the principle of ‘indivisibility of security’ and dependence of one country’s security from the safety of others. Thus, the OBSE/CBSE managed quite successfully the consequences of the Cold War and prepared the ground for the building of new Europe.

However, the implementation of the “Wider Europe” project appeared to be very different from the initial plan.

1 INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF “WIDER EUROPE” SECURITY PROJECT FIASCO

As it turned out building of this new Europe, both on the West and East edges of large European continent was impossible. The introduction of democratic values in post–Soviet and post–communist countries was stifled by authoritarian consciousness, deep social stratification and the dominant post–communist elites.

As a result of such economic and political transformations the states in this region sank in deep economic downturn and social chaos. Profound disintegrating processes and ethnic conflicts broke out in some of these countries. Post–communist countries found themselves in a security vacuum. Russia suffered from particularly destructive processes in this period. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty was perceived by it as a huge geopolitical defeat. Russians developed a complex of ‘loss of country greatness’ which reached the edge of

breakdown under the influence of these deep-rooted and radical transformational processes. This complex is, in fact, a complex of 'state status' loss, which turned out to be the main value for the Russians, unlike the Western Europe with the democracy as its fundamental value. On the background of a great sense of 'status loss' the Russians started perceiving democracy as alien and hostile to their values. Thus, Russian society felt the need to restore 'country greatness' and authoritarianism. Russia and Europe were once again divided. Fundamental European values of democracy, which had to serve as a foundation for Wider Europe, have not taken root in Russia and in the majority of former Soviet countries. Thus, the project to develop a "Wider Europe" failed.

These circumstances, building a united Europe started through dissemination of Western European values in Central and Eastern Europe in the form of NATO and the EU enlargement, as well as through involving of post-communist countries in joint programs in security, humanitarian and economic development. With regard to the security, a NATO programme "Partnership for Peace" (PfP) appeared to be the most successful. Through this program, the North Atlantic alliance has managed to build a system of partnerships between European countries in the field of security. In addition, the program has prepared an appropriate ground for Central and Eastern European countries to join NATO. Therefore, NATO acted as the main integrator of the efforts to build a common security system in Europe in the '90s and 2000. NATO enlargement to the East has formed the necessary security and political framework for EU enlargement. The latter served as a model of political and economic integration for Western and Central-Eastern Europe.

So, after the last twenty years of post-bipolar period a new united Europe with shared values, common economic, political and security space came into existence. The other Eastern part of this continent stayed outside this united Europe.

Thus a security vacuum was formed in Europe, which revealed itself as internal instability of the countries located in this part of the continent, through the threats, instability and conflicts. On the other hand, Russia got a chance to establish its dominance in East Europe and to claim it to be its 'zone of privilege interests' due to such a division of the European continent into the areas of security and uncertainties, stability and instability. This perspective allowed Moscow to take revenge and to restore its statehood on the former Soviet Union territory and to include it into Eurasia (Russian) civilizational space with authoritarian values.

Therefore, instead of Wider Europe on the European continent the bipolar system of European security on the regional level was formed, being incarnated on the one hand by NATO and the EU, on the other – SCSO and the CIS under the Russian leadership. This trend has intensified while the American leadership got weaker and international relations have undergone transformations from unipolar into multi-polar system.

2 EUROPEAN BIPOLAR SYSTEM OF REGIONAL SECURITY IN TERMS OF MULTI-POLARITY

Ebbing of U.S. role in the world is the main characteristic of such transformation. More and more the U.S. experience a lack of its foreign policy resources in order to implement their global geopolitical interests. The U.S. is losing their allies in the international arena. The Iraq war did not bring the desired success for the United States. Moreover, it destroys international image of this country as a world leader and sole superpower, eroding its economic, military and socio-political potential. In this sense, the war in Iraq destroys U.S. leadership the same way the war in Afghanistan destroyed the Soviet Union as a superpower.

On the other hand, through the easing of U.S. global leadership one can observe the emerging of new centres of power such as China, Russia and the EU. The development of these powers has been accompanied by an increase in their geopolitical ambitions, leading to increased regional confrontation between them. The emergence of these regional centres of power is also a challenge to U.S. global dominance and their unipolar world order. As a result, such global tendency is accompanied by deterioration of the international security climate. Weakening of transatlantic ties and increasing geopolitical ambitions of the EU is a serious challenge for European security in general and the national security of Ukraine in particular. Weakening of transatlantic ties leads to disability of the North Atlantic Alliance to provide the highest level of security and defence in Europe. This will also undermine the EU security as it has no defence structure and needed resources, and therefore is unable to protect its members. Thus, due to the development of such negative trends in relations between the U.S. and EU, Ukraine will lose the chance join both the EU and NATO.

The emergence of new centres of power will certainly lead to a dramatic struggle between them for spheres of influence, as well as the renewal of old conflicts. This struggle will end with the distribution of spheres of influence in Europe.

Following such international developments, the regional security will undergo great destruction. Threats and challenges to international security in a multipolar world will shift from global to regional level. In fact, the security climate in Europe formed in the post-bipolar period after the Cold War has already suffered from a very substantial erosion.

Military or severe threats will become again the most relevant issue in regional security. This will lead to the restoration of military rivalry and an arms race on the regional level.

Thus, the tendency to multi-polarity causes formation of bipolar regional security system in Europe. What role can European security institutions play in such a bipolar system and what kind of relations can develop between its two parts?

NATO and the EU will belong to European part of it. The existence of NATO allows the U.S. to maintain a presence in Europe. And therefore, U.S. possesses considerable resources and strategic advantages over the Eastern, the Eurasian part of the system presented by Russia with its satellites combined in such structures as the CSTO and the CIS.

Russia is interested in such a bipolar system because it allows it to restore itself on this territory outside the united Europe as a great power and one of the world power-centre. Obviously, Russia will seek to renew such a bipolar system of European regional security. What is important for Russia in development of such a system?

First of all, to keep a status quo as one of the two main power-centres in Europe.

Secondly, to hold the right to exclusive possession of the part of Europe not covered by NATO and the EU. In its turn, Russia is ready to recognise relatively similar rights of NATO and the EU in regards to their members, and not to interfere in the processes occurring inside these organisations in the area of their geo-strategic responsibility.

Thirdly, to achieve a certain balance of power in relations with the opposite part of the system, which would be characterised by strategic parity in order to shift the relations with the West from the asymmetric into symmetric relations plane. The vast majority of Russian President D. Medvedev's points regarding the signing the Treaty on European security was actually dedicated to achieving these goals. In addition to reciting the principles of international security enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, D. Medvedev emphasized the following principles of the future treaty: "not to ensure own security at the expense of others; not to allow actions within military unions that will weaken the unity of shared security space; focus should be placed on military-political issues, because the so-called "hard security" plays a crucial role today; common "rules of the game" for all multilateral institutions, including the European Union, NATO, OSCE, CSTO, CIS; an effective interaction between Russia, NATO and the United States could become the main structure of political unity in Euro-Atlantics"¹

In fact, it is all about the establishment of common rules of the game for Russia, CIS and the Collective Security Treaty Organization on the one side, and the United States, NATO and the EU on the other side. Besides, these rules should be enshrined by a legally binding document. According to the above-quoted abstract this means that countries can not join, for example, the North Atlantic Alliance without Russia's consent, because such accession could be regarded as a threat to its national security. This means that NATO can not expand, because such an extension may weaken the unity of a common security space. Besides, key issues of European security regarding many European countries are now suggested to be addressed on the level of triumvirate NATO/Russia/United States. This proposal disguises Russia's attempts to raise

¹ *D. Medvedev's speech at Helsinki University, and answers to questions from audience on 20.04.2009. / <http://www.ruvek.ru/?page=news&grpID=13&newsID=847>.*

its international status and to have a decisive influence on all the security processes in Europe as well as to play a key role in problem–solving of European security.

Another intention seen in D. Medvedev's initiative is an effort to put the CSTO and NATO on one level in new the European security system of and to establish equal partnership between them. Thus, through the realisation of this intention Russia gains the opportunity, on the one hand, to balance relations with the West and to achieve institutional parity and, on the other hand, to deeper integrate and mobilise post–Soviet countries around itself. In this case, Russia is entitled to form its part of the bipolar system according to symmetric conditions uniting former Soviet states in the Russian camp, grounded not in the European democratic but Eurasian authoritarian values. Countries which happen to join this camp are denied any opportunity to integrate into the European community.

Moreover, in reaching the rules, which would include non–intervention of NATO and the EU in conflicts with third countries other than their members, Russia gets *carte blanche* to resolve military conflicts in the post soviet countries, which conduct policy that diverges with Russian interests. In this case, for example, democratic regimes in Georgia and Ukraine would immediately be confronted with the threat of Russian military occupation as happened with Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968).

Another important question: `what kind of relations would develop between the two parts in the conditions of such regional bipolarity? No doubt that neither the West nor Russia is willing to restore military confrontation. However, the West wants to build relations with Russia grounded in shared values, while Russia wants to build equal relations with the West based on their interests. Obviously, the consensus between the two sides of the bipolarity will depend on whether Europe, especially the EU, is ready to exchange values for the interests of certain leading EU countries, as well as on what is Russia's ultimate goal of its policy in Europe: European security or sphere of influence. It is obvious that today the EU is not ready to barter away democratic values for the selfish interests of some EU countries, and Russia is not ready to change its 'spheres of influence' thinking. In such a situation, reproduction of 'Helsinki+' process, which is also a part of President of Russia D. Medvedev's initiatives, can only be viewed with a high level of conditionality.

What will Russia seek to gain from the 'Helsinki+' process?

1. Respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders in the light of new subjects of international law, including Kosovo as well as Abkhazia and North Ossetia.
2. Adherence to fundamental principles of arms control that would enable NATO and the CSTO to achieve military parity, confidence, moderation and reasonable sufficiency in military development².

² *Medvedev presented to Europe a project proposal on Collective Security Treaty. 08.10.2008 17:55 /http://www.grani.ru/Politics/Russia/m.142433.html.*

3. Setting common “rules” in a legally binding document to ensure common security guarantees. Provide the OSCE with decision legally binding status³.

What is the West interested in regards to ‘Helsinki+’ process?

1. Implementation of Helsinki ‘third basket’—shaping new Europe based on democratic values.
2. The principle of openness, partnership, cooperation and free competitiveness among systems, organizations and countries.

Zbigniew Brzezinski in “Foreign Affairs” magazine has written about forming bipolarity in Europe on such principles, suggesting to sign ‘an official pact’ between NATO and the CSTO. According to his estimation, Moscow has recently shown interest in achieving such an agreement, however NATO, by contrast, showed no inclination to such ‘an official pact’ as it would mean “military and political symmetry between the two organizations”. Brzezinski justifies the importance of signing this Covenant provided there is a provision in it giving the right for non-member countries of either NATO or CSTO to join in any of these organisations⁴.

Of course, due to the implementation of these principles the West would have multiple strategic superiority over Russia, that would result in the European Community and Euro–Atlantic system of shared security to be joined by Western Independent States, and in Russia’s loss of sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union. Thus, Russia may end up as the USSR did as a result the Helsinki process. History might repeat itself. It is no mere chance that the official representative of Russia to NATO Rogozin D. hastened to call Brzezinski’s proposal ‘nicely wrapped candy’ used to remove Russia’s objections against the involvement of new NATO members⁵.

Obviously, with such different priorities and principles regarding development of new European security, a compromise between the two sides is unlikely. However, it is clear that the only type of relations between the two sides can be built on the principle of relations of peaceful coexistence of two systems with different political structures and different ideological values.

Signing the **Treaty between NATO and CSTO on non-aggression and renunciation of the information and propaganda war** aimed at discrediting the parties would be an important step in strengthening the stability of relations between the two sides of bipolar system and European security in overall. In this respect, Z.Brzezinski’s idea of “Official pact” is grounded in rational thinking. Another important set of questions in regards to the development of such regional bipolarity in Europe is about the future role of NATO, EU, OSCE and the future awaiting for Ukraine in such a European security system.

³ The same source of info.

⁴ Zbigniew Brzezinski. *An Agenda for NATO: Toward a Global Security Web*. *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2009. /<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65240/zbigniew-brzezinski/an-agenda-for-nato>.

⁵ Artur Blinov. *OSTO into NATO// Independent newsletter*. – 2009. – September, 3rd.

NATO. It is obvious that with the predominance of hard threats and regional bipolarity, NATO will remain, as in the Cold War, the main pillar of European collective security and defence. In comparison with the unipolar world, when NATO had to respond to global threats, and thus, to assume the functions of the global security structure. In a multipolar world it will be forced to return to the traditional regional responsibility enabling NATO to respond to specific global challenges. However, despite returning to the traditional functions and objectives in such a system of regional bipolarity, NATO will face a new challenge. Tentatively it can be called - *a dilemma between global strategy of cooperative security and regional strategy of holding Russia back*. Without the implementation of such functions bipolar system of European security will be fragile, unstable and inefficient. Obviously, to fulfil such functions, NATO will be forced to limit their missions, particularly in Afghanistan and to direct its resources into the key and most promising areas.

EU. EU will serve as the second pillar in given system and play the role of second riddle in ensuring security to the European Community. The EU will focus their efforts in the security area on neutralizing the soft threats to European security in close correlation with NATO and cooperation with Russia. Such distribution of duties will enable the EU to save on military expenditure and concentrate its resources on the economic and political modernisation within European community.

OSCE. The role of this organization will be reduced to a mediator between the two sides of bipolar security system and a common regime of arms control.

Ukraine. In a bipolar system of regional security, Ukraine will remain in the grey or “buffer zone”, which is characterized by internal and external instability, an adverse and sometimes dangerous foreign environment. Unable to integrate into the European system, and not wishing to join the Russian bloc, Ukraine will formally remain non-aligned country with a large deficit of its own national security. The perspective of neutrality for the countries in the grey zone, foreseen by D. Medvedev’s initiatives, seems unlikely for Ukraine. With the lack of its adequate defense resource base, Russian military presence, powerful external influences and the split of Ukrainian society and political elites, such guarantees of neutrality may be fictitious and only seen as obstacles to NATO.

However, such a fictitious neutrality or non-membership status will not save Ukraine from external interference by Russia into internal affairs in order to re-structure the political system of the country into the Russian system. Thus, in such regional bipolar system, Ukraine has very little chances to maintain its independence and state sovereignty. However, such bipolar regional security system in Europe would not last long.

3 SCENARIOS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT

If even during the Cold War bipolar system lasted for nearly 40 years, it is clear that regional bipolar system will last less than half. Instability and transience of the system will be stipulated by the dynamics of its basic components and by the change of power balance between them. That is why it would be appropriate to regard this regional bipolar system as a transition to homogeneous or heterogeneous system. Depending on the change of the balance of power, one can expect two possible scenarios.

The first scenario, where Russia succeeds in developing its geopolitical offensive in Europe and achieves its geopolitical interests for establishing dominance on the European continent. This script can be called a “*scenario of the European concert*”. This phenomenon was typical for European policy in the 18th, 19th and first half of the 20th century, when the development of international relations in Europe was determined by five major powers, including Russia. Other European and non-European states were looked on as policy objects of those leading European countries. Commonality of interests of these states was stipulated by external threats to European security.

However, within Europe the relations between those leading countries were built on the principle of maintaining the balance. Responsibility for maintaining internal European balance relied on large countries, which concluded various interim military–political alliances between themselves. Due to its participation in maintaining a balance, Russia played a key role in solving many problems of European security. Russia is longing to re-gain this role today. Medvedev’s initiatives include stories about multi-polarity, multi-ateralism, the mechanism of between Russia/NATO/EU interaction – a key element of security etc⁶.

The security system built on the principles of “European concert” would be the most acceptable for the geopolitical ambitions of Russia and for its transformation into truly influential world power.

The main terms and conditions of Russian in order to build such a European security system are:

1. Removal of U.S. from Europe.
2. Liquidation of NATO as a military and political organization.
3. Split of European Union.
4. Forming geopolitical axis Paris/Moscow/Berlin.

Russia started building such a system in Europe when Vladimir Putin came to power. The reduction of U.S. influence due to Russia’ efforts was supported by such EU countries as Germany and France through their resistance to U.S. policy, stirring up widespread anti-American hysteria both in Russia and abroad; intentions to unite anti-American alliance with countries like China, Iran, as well as India;

⁶ *Constructive Agenda for the European security. June, 4th 2009/ <http://www.kremlin.ru/articles/217262.shtml>*

displacement of the U.S. economic, political and military presence in Central Asia and the former Soviet Union territory. The most successful of Russia's strikes related to U.S. interests can be considered Russia's victory in the war with Georgia, its severe approach to relations with the countries seeking to develop close ties with the United States, Kyrgyzstan's decision under Russian pressure to close U.S. military base in Manas, Russia signing an agreement with Tajikistan on the RF Ministry of Defence military taking control over Hyssar airport including the space observation station.

By displacing the U.S. presence in the former Soviet Union and decreasing Washington's influence in Europe, Russia is trying to build an equal relationship with the U.S. based on a power balance as equals in geopolitical power. Putin believes that terms and conditions for such parity relations with the U.S. would be as follows: the U.S. dispense with deployment in Europe, Ukraine's refusal to join NATO, the acceptance by the U.S. and EU of their mistake supporting 'colors' revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia⁷.

Obviously, for Ukraine such Russian claim in relations to the United States means to give up on the idea of NATO membership, as well as strategic partnership relations between Ukraine and the United States. As for Ukraine in this context of relations with the U.S., Russia's policy is aimed at isolating Ukraine and convincing the U.S. to stop supporting the sovereignty of Ukraine and its democratic development.

The second Russia's strategic offensive towards the West was directed against NATO. Supported by Germany and France, Russia managed to block granting Membership Action Plan to Ukraine and Georgia at the Bucharest summit in April and at the summit of NATO Foreign Ministers in December 2008. Having restored their control over the Caucasus after the Russian-Georgian war, creating a military base in Tajikistan and the CSTO military group in Central Asia, Russia has put at risk the logistical support corridor for NATO's mission in Afghanistan. Thus, Russia has got an opportunity to push against the Alliance's weakest point bringing it to the edge of defeat in the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan. According to the representative of the Russian Federation to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, in the context of the current official position (Moscow – author) U.S. presence in Afghanistan only contributes to instability in the region⁸.

Russia's third geo-strategic offensive was launched towards the EU. Russia's growing geopolitical ambitions, energy resources, demonstration of military force, occupation of Georgia during the war there in 2008 as well as the intention to deploy missiles in Kaliningrad region against Europe was its main striking force while attacking the European Union. Russian President D. Medvedev has repeatedly de-

⁷ *Putin is happy that Obama is in no mood for Ukraine.* // TCH. ua. 2009, January, 26th, 12:37.

⁸ *Ioshua Kucera. Kyrgyzstan shows US the door* // *Guardian*, 2009, 5 February // [www.guardian.co.uk/2009/ Feb. 10h. 15:00](http://www.guardian.co.uk/2009/Feb.10h.15:00).

monstrated the willingness to restore Cold War relations with Europe⁹. However, major European powers, especially Germany, France and Italy are not interested in confrontation with Russia. Neither are they interested in military confrontation between Russia and the United States, which could destroy the entire security of Europe (the foundation for the European Union). Therefore, the EU fears renewal of Cold War relations even more than Russia.

On the other hand, the integration concept used by the EU to integrate Russia into Wider Europe has totally collapse. Therefore, the EU no longer requires democratic values from Russia and is ready to recognize Russia's right to determine the fate of post-Soviet countries. Russia's strategy aimed at splitting the European Union has succeeded. Following this strategy Russia prefers bilateral relations with the leading EU countries such as Italy, Germany and France ignoring the interests of other EU countries. Thus, Russian policy towards the EU causes inconsistency of the European countries' policy towards Russia.

Lack of common consolidated position towards Russia makes the EU weak and unable to resist the Russian geopolitical offensive. The manifestation of inconsistencies and uncertainties of EU policy toward Russia is seen through two fundamentally different approaches. According to one of them, Russia is a threat that must be gently restrained. Mainly countries of Central - Eastern European - new EU members - stick to this approach. Meantime the old EU members – Western European countries – regard Russia as a potential partner, willing to integrate it in the European system. Some are developing strategic partnerships with Russia, while others are trying to openly oppose its geopolitical offensive in Europe.

However, Russia has lacked adequate resources and international influence in order to implement such a plan of the European security system development. Russia's war against Georgia, the impact of the global financial crisis and the gas conflict, which involved the EU as well as the election of Barack Obama as New U.S. president have consolidated Europe to some extent and made it share the United States attitude. President Dmitry Medvedev could already sense such changes of the West' position during the meeting in Evian in 2008, when French President Nicolas Sarkozy said that "any agreement on security from "Vancouver to Vladivostok" should be based primarily on NATO and invited the Russian President for closer cooperation with already existing institutions and mechanisms such as the Council of Russia-NATO, European Security and Defence Policy of the EU¹⁰.

So, Medvedev's first initiatives aimed to exclude NATO from a new European security system, the new version, as he noted in his interview for the program "News

⁹ *Dmitry Medvedev: Russia does not fear the Cold War. /PEK, 2August, 27th 2008, 10:15AM. http://www.e1.ru/news/print/news_id-292043.html.*

¹⁰ *Medvedev and a new European security architecture. Commentary by Bobo Lo, the head of Russian-Chinese programmes of the Centre for European Reform. September, 3rd 2009./<http://www.polit.ru/institutes/2009/09/03/bezopasnost.html>.*

on Saturday,” on May 15th, 2009: “New agreement on security in Europe, which Russia has an intention to sign, should not be directed against NATO¹¹.”

Thus, now new version of Medvedev’s initiative actually seeks to build regional bipolar security system in Europe. However, Russia is again facing the problem of balancing geopolitical ambitions and interests with available resources. Asymmetry of the latter in comparison with the West remains impressive.

The second scenario of the system of European security will be realistic in the case of a substantial reduction of Russia’s positions and a change in the balance of power in favor of the West. In this case, the formation of homogeneity of European security will continue. This will be manifested through continuing NATO and the EU enlargement to the East and joining of independent states into the Western system; through erosion of an authoritarian regime in Russia and other former Soviet states. According to this scenario, Russia will be forced to

integrate into the European security system based on the principles of cooperative security, convergence of economic and political system of Russia and the European Community.

Obviously, that such a scenario of building of the European security system is possible on the base of **convergence of functions of NATO and the EU**. The arrangements in the joint document of the EU and NATO “Berlin Plus” became the first feature of this trend. They enabled the European Union with NATO to start building security system in Europe. The convincing factors that reinforce this trend are: consensus by Member States of the EU and NATO concerning coordination of activity in the security and defense sphere; new dynamics of development of NATO, which has been reflected in the new Alliance strategic concept; the development of the operational capacity of the EU. It is also necessary to take into account the fact that the states which are members of both the EU and NATO will take part in this system.

An important feature of formation of the European security system is strengthening of the institutional and operational cooperation between the EU and NATO. Since early 2001 NATO and the EU have been conducting multilevel regular meetings, particularly at the level of Foreign Ministers and Heads of Staffs. On March 14, 2003 NATO-EU agreement on security of information exchange was signed in Athens.

Today the challenging trend for the EU and NATO is the coordination of authority by functional principle. Particularly, NATO members are eligible to participate in any EU operation, which involves the Alliance means and may be invited to missions which use only means of the EU. NATO members – non-members of the EU, contributing considerably to the operations, take part in the work of key bodies

¹¹ *Medvedev: Agreement on security in Europe should not be directed against NATO.* <http://www.rosbalt.ru/2009/05/15/640726.ht>.

of Common European Security and Defense Policy on a level with the EU Member States, although the decision about start using force to be made only by the European Union.

With reference to the mentioned trends it may be concluded that today the formation of the European security on a common basis of the EU and NATO would be the most acceptable option. Despite some contradictions and differences between two organizations, there is much in common, that unites the EU and NATO in efforts to create a reliable security outpost within the territory of Europe.

In view of the weakness of the European Union in formation of the security area, which shows itself in the insufficient resource, technical, technological and even conceptual bases, today it will not be able to create by itself a reliable and powerful security system in Europe. Just these flaws of the EU can be compensated by the potential of the North Atlantic Alliance. Russia may join this tandem through participation in the implementation of those functions of NATO and the EU, which are of great interest for its.

Conclusions Observations of the author presented in this publication lead him to the conclusion that over the last twenty years instead of the Great Europe a regional level bipolar security system has started to take shape in the European continent. This system is represented by NATO and the EU, on the one side, and CSTO and CIS led by Russia, on the other side. This trend significantly strengthened in light of weakening American leadership and transformation of international relations system from unipolarity towards multipolarity. As a result, this global trend is leads to **worsening of international security climate**.

The existence of such bipolar system corresponds to strategic interests of Russia, since it enables Russia to restore itself (in the space outside the boundaries of unified Europe) as super power and one of the world centers of power. What is important for Russia during the formation of such system? First, to reserve for itself status quo as one of the two major centers of power in the European continent. Second, to reserve for itself an exclusive right to dominate over the part of Europe, which is not covered by NATO and the EU. In its turn, Russia is ready to recognize similar rights for NATO and the EU with regard to their members and not interfere with the processes that take place within these organizations and within the zone of their geo-strategic responsibility. Third, to achieve certain balance of powers in relations with the opposite part of this system, which would be characterized by strategic parity in order to modify its relations with the West from asymmetric to symmetric relations. Most of points in the initiative of the President of Russia, D. Medvedev, on signing the Treaty on European Security are aimed specifically at achieving these objectives. Actually it is about establishing common rules of the game between Russia, CSTO and CIS on the one hand, and USA, NATO, and the EU, on the other hand. Moreover, these rules of the game must be stipulated in a legally binding form.

Under such regional bipolar system Ukraine will have feeble chances to preserve its independence and state sovereignty. Moreover, such bipolar regional security system in Europe is unlikely to be long-lasting. Instability and short term nature of this system will be predetermined by the development dynamics of its key constituent elements and resulting change in the balance of powers. Therefore, this regional bipolar system should be considered as transitional towards homogeneous or heterogeneous system.

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SLOVENIJA IN PRIZADEVANJA NJENE ZUNANJE POLITIKE V ČRNOMORSKI REGIJI: IZBRANE TEME, VIDIKI IN MODALITETE

SLOVENIA AND ITS FOREIGN POLICY OUTREACH IN THE BLACK SEA REGION: SELECTED AREAS, ASPECTS AND MODALITIES

Short scientific article

Povzetek Prispevek predstavlja pomen izstopajoče multilateralne slovenske izkušnje v odnosu do črnomske regije ter do Zahodnega Balkana, vključno s tamkajšnjimi državami. Izhajamo iz dejstva, da je Slovenija nova in mala država, nastala po koncu hladne vojne, k čemur dodajamo dejstvo, da je multilateralizem naravni zaveznik malih držav. Ob tem upoštevamo tudi spremembe v delovanju diplomacije ter v percepciji varnosti, ki so se zgodile v navedenem obdobju in kar dodaja k povečanemu pomenu multilateralne diplomatske prakse.

Zagovarjamo stališče, da multilateralizem spodbuja, pogloblja in včasih tudi delno nadomešča bilateralizem. Navedeno utemeljujemo z analizo slovenskih odnosov do obeh omenjenih regij in njihovih držav. S pomočjo intenzivne slovenske, in sicer redke multilateralne izkušnje, so bili odnosi z državami črnomske regije razviti in dodatno spodbujeni ter tudi poglobljeni, obogateni in okrepljeni.

Na podlagi navedenega sklepamo, da je bilo prav zaradi multilateralnega zunanjepolitičnega pristopa mogoče razviti strukturno raznovrstne in celovite odnose z državami črnomske regije na praktično vseh področjih aktualne mednarodne politike. Ko razpravljamo o zunanjepolitični in diplomatski praksi malih držav, ki imajo omejene resurse, ugotavljamo, da bo multilateralizem pri tem najverjetneje še naprej igral ključno vlogo ter tudi omogočal učinkovito izvajanje bilateralnih odnosov.

V prispevku v metodološkem smislu posplošujemo trende in ugotovitve.

Ključne besede *Slovenija, diplomacija, multilateralizem, male države, integracijski proces, črnomska regija.*

Abstract The article focuses on the importance of significant multilateral Slovenian experiences related to the Black Sea region and the Western Balkans, including the countries of both regions. We derive from the fact that Slovenia is a new and small country created after the end of the Cold War, and the fact that multilateralism is a natural ally of small countries. In addition, changes to diplomatic activity and security perceptions taking place and increasing the importance of multilateral diplomacy practice in the period concerned are taken into account.

We defend the position that multilateralism enhances, strengthens and sometimes also replaces bilateralism. This opinion relies on the analysis of Slovenia's relations with both regions and their countries. With help of intensive Slovenian and otherwise scarce multilateral experiences, the relations with the countries of the Black Sea region are being developed and advanced as well as deepened, enriched and strengthened.

On this basis it can be concluded that the approach of multilateral foreign policy has enabled structurally diverse and extensive relations with the countries of the Black Sea region in practically all areas of the current international policy. Our discussions about the foreign policy and diplomatic practice of small countries with limited resources bring us to the conclusion that multilateralism will most likely continue to play a major role and facilitate efficient bilateral relations.

In terms of methodology, the article provides a generalization of trends and findings.

Key words *Slovenia, diplomacy, multilateralism, small countries, integration process, Black Sea region.*

Introduction During its less than two decades of existence, Slovenia has established and developed its foreign policy outreach in various scopes. This has been, on the one hand, the result of the political programme and, on the other, the policy outcome of various multilateral activities exercised by Slovenian diplomacy. Both determinants complement and produce the current policy output and present the way ahead.

We will focus our attention in this paper on three regions, namely South East Europe, in particular the Western Balkans, and the Black Sea region with most of our research and interest centering on the latter. Bearing in mind experiences already gained and the challenges of the future, this will be presented through the multilateral type activities that have already been undertaken and accompanied by comments on bilateral relations. Since we would like to highlight the basic foreign policy behaviour of a new, small state emerging from the aftermath of the Cold War, our main methodological approach lies in generalizing trends and not dwelling too much on details.¹ Although we do not deal with them, the various differences between the Western

¹ *The author also draws significantly on the method of observing with one's own participation (Gilli, 1974), being a long year diplomat – practitioner as well as theoretician.*

Balkan countries (in particular the successors of the former Yugoslavia) and those of the Black Sea region, which have been determined either by differing national histories (like statehood tradition, and institution building etc.) or by different levels of Soviet influence during the Cold War, should be kept in mind (Isaacs and Downing, 2008). Finally, we will follow the proposition that, as a generalization, it could be used by other such states as Slovenia and in varying environments.

After a brief historical overview, our field of research focuses on contemplating and generalizing the Slovenian experience as well as drawing on lessons learned. The broader framework of this paper is marked by huge changes in the international arena, as well as by parallel changes in the way foreign policy and diplomacy is composed and implemented (Comp. A More Secure World, 2004, Barston, 2006, Buzan et al, 1998, Jazbec, 2009, Reiter, 2003).

1 A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Slovenia was established during the process of change initiated by the events of the tectonic shift at the end of the 1980s and the May Declaration of 1988. This declaration, stating Slovenia's ambition to become part of the European family of nations marked a fundamental foreign policy shift in the emerging state (Hribar, 2006). Indeed, this statement was the initial phase of integration for the new state that soon became its long-term foreign policy goal. Furthermore, it seems that it paved the way for the later move towards a multilateral policy, which began during the first half of the 1990s whilst still under the shadow of bilaterally orientated policies. The fact that Slovenia is a small state naturally contributed to its objectives for international organizations are, by definition, an ally of small states (Comp. Amstrup, 1976, Braveboy-Wagner, 2008, Christmas-Møller, 1983, Jazbec, 2001, Thorhallsson, 2006, Väyryen, 1983 etc.). In the mid-1990s the ambition for membership of the EU, as well as of NATO, was already Slovenia's official foreign policy objective and this, decisively, became the hallmark of the following decade. Indeed, one could point out that – due to its dynamics, scope and efficiency – it most probably presented the multilateral backbone for all the activities which followed (Jazbec, 2010).

From a bilateral point of view, two sets of activities marked Slovenia's foreign policy approach during the 1990s. At first, shortly after international recognition had been achieved, the endeavour to establish and develop cooperation with Europe and most other important countries followed. Then, particularly after the conclusion of the war in Bosnia, the direction of foreign policy was focused on the other newly established countries in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and not only on Croatia.² Within the framework of developing strong cooperation with the whole of South East Europe, the Western Balkan countries were gaining in importance.³ Contrary to

² *Slovenia and Croatia coordinated the majority of activities which paved the way for independence of both countries.*

³ *Relations with all successor states of the former Yugoslavia were upgraded after Tudjman's death and the imprisonment of Milošević at the beginning of the new millennium.*

Table 1:
Intensity
of Bilateral
Contacts

Country	Intensity	Indicator of scale: ow - ○, medium - ●, high - ◼.
Bulgaria	●	
Georgia	○	
Romania	●	
The Russian Federation	◼	
Turkey	●	
The Ukraine	●	
Armenia	○	
Azerbaijan	○	
Moldova	○	

this, yet during the same period, bilateral contacts with the countries of the Black Sea region were developing differently, varying from high to low intensity, depending on the country in question as well as on several other factors (namely history, culture, economic cooperation and tradition etc).

Since we are generalizing trends and findings in this paper, it is possible to present the stage of bilateral contacts with the countries of the Black Sea region during the 1990s in the following manner.⁴

The first observation points out the fact that two of the countries compared (Bulgaria and Romania) find themselves in two distinct groups (regions), namely the South East European and Black Sea regions. Also, from the same methodological point of view, the three Caucasus countries – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia – are either part of, or closely connected with, the Black Sea region. Moreover, Moldova, which is located between Romania and the Ukraine and is not a coastal country, could too be treated as part of the region discussed. This all extends our need for a broader geographical generalization that perhaps could be reached by having in mind such regional tools of cooperation as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Council (BSEC).

Furthermore, one can detect huge differences among the countries concerned in various aspects (territory, population, membership of international organizations and other forums, influence, power and foreign policy orientation etc.). Additionally, all of the Western Balkans countries, the three Caucasus and Moldova could be categorized as small countries (Comp. Amstrup, 1976, Jazbec, 2001, pp 36-76, Šabič and Bukowski, 2002, Väyrynen, 1983). This brings us to a certain degree of reservation where the process of generalization (which still remains our main principle and indicator) is concerned and hence, our conclusion, that bilateral relations with the countries concerned did not, on average, exceed medium intensity (although those with the Russian Federation were high all the time).

⁴ The estimation of intensity is made by the author. It has been generalized upon the criteria, which Small and Singer (1973) point out as an indicator of intensity of bilateral relations between two countries.

However, it became obvious rather soon, partially by design and partially by chance, that the multilateral frame also offered many opportunities for developing bilateral activities. This holds in particular for those countries with which not much was achieved earlier, for several reasons and not only due to previously set agendas. The EU accession process and the advancement of the ambition for NATO membership presented an assortment of opportunities for strengthening cooperation with a variety of countries.⁵ Still, relations and cooperation with all of the countries of the Black Sea region were not a full part of the daily business until the early years of the new decade. Because of this, at the moment Slovenia began to engage intensively in different multilateral topics and processes, the pursuit of bilateral relations emerged in a new and enriched form.

2 SELECTED AREAS, ASPECTS AND MODALITIES

After Slovenia became intensively engaged in the EU and NATO membership activities of the mid 1990s, the idea to opt for the UN Security Council's nonpermanent membership for the period of 1998–1999 soon developed.⁶ The goal was fulfilled at the 52nd session of the General Assembly in the autumn of 1997, when Slovenia was elected. That event launched Slovenia's diplomacy onto a global platform as well as offered her the opportunity to touch base on various topics with countries with which she had hitherto shared little or even no experience or contact (Jazbec, 2001, pp 66-72). It also meant that Slovenian diplomacy became more broadly acquainted as well as familiar with policy topics and issues related to the Black Sea region and previous bilateral contacts were strengthened and deepened along with the referred know how being accumulated.

This experience was intensified during the next decade (1999–2009), which was marked by a series of outstanding multilateral projects which Slovenia headed or played a central role. We are speaking about the following projects: the nonpermanent membership of the UN SC 1998/99, EU and NATO membership (obtained in 2004), the OSCE Chairmanship in 2005, the Chairmanship of the Human Security Network (HSN) in 2005/06 and the Presidency of the Board of Governors of the IAEA in 2006/07 as well as the Presidency of the Council of the EU in the first half of 2008 and the Presidency of the Council of Ministers of the Council of Europe (CoE) in 2009.⁷ This all means that the previous shortage of bilateral contacts with some countries of the Black Sea region and with the region as a whole was, *via facti*, dealt with and that the multilateral projects had been the *de facto* instruments of this intensification of relations. However, the bilateral aspect of these multilateral projects still remained behind as, when carrying a multilateral project, countries generally refrain from linking them directly to bilateral relations. Despite this, however, the

⁵ For example, cooperation with the three Baltic States also increased a lot for multilateral reasons.

⁶ During 1996, the author was a member of regular daily senior diplomats' board meetings of the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the late summer of that year the idea was discussed and the decision taken to forward the proposal to the Government.

⁷ For a more detailed policy overview, see Jazbec (2010).

Table 2:
Slovenian
multilateral
projects and the
intensity of their
relation to the
three regions

No	Year	Project	SEE	WB	BSR	Topics
1.	1998/99	UN SC	○	●	○	Collective Security
2.	1994/2004	NATO	○	●	○	Collective Defense
3.	1994/2004	EU	○	●	○	Crisis Management
4.	2005	OSCE	○	■	■	Cooperative Security
5.	2005/06	HSN	○	●	○	Soft Security
6.	2006/07	IAEA	○	○	●	Nuclear Security
7.	2008	EU	○	■	●	Crisis Management
8.	2009	CoE	○	●	●	Human Rights

high multilateral dynamics in which Slovenia was engaged did deepen the concrete knowledge of the countries concerned and pave the way for a bilateral upgrade later on. At the same time, Slovenia's foreign policy outlook was heavily enriched with various topics and issues which were composed of a multilateral agenda, spanning from global peace and security issues to those of purely regional questions and specific issues (stockpiles, military leftovers and mélange ammunition, etc.). This series of multilateral projects, including their main topics and the intensity of their relations to the three regions, is presented in the following Table.

The mentioned period and the engagement in the above-presented activities has brought Slovenia a rich experience in policy making on a combination of highly various topics that span from hard to soft security issues, with many policy options and approaches in between (from collective and cooperative security to collective defense and crisis management), to the nuclear security of the global community and human rights (Comp. Axworthy, 2001, Hillison, 2009, Nye, 2004). All these would have been unexplored territories had it not been for the multilateral policy and diplomatic approach. Moreover, what is striking is that, despite just eighteen years of Slovenia's existence as a sovereign independent state, eight outstanding multilateral projects have been carried out in barely twelve years. This seems to be a unique case in modern history. Simply put, a highly enriched foreign policy and the diplomatic dynamics of the new state brought around a rare experience and proved again, in practice, that multilateralism works in favour of small countries (Comp. Prasad, 2009). As a result, the trend was enabled due to a changed international environment that carried with it beneficial circumstances on the one hand, and because of an open ear and policy sensibility on the other.

Through these projects Slovenia managed to develop varying and structurally complex contacts and relations with the countries of the Black Sea region on practically all the important aspects of contemporary international politics. In some cases these have been a combination of the already intensive bilateral relations enriched

Table 3:
Types of
Slovenia's
experience
and its
relation to
countries

No	Type	Project	Countries
1.	Bilateral Cooperation	All	All
2.	Integration Process (primarily)	EU + NATO	Majority
3.	Policy and Political Management	All	Majority
4.	Exchange	All	All

by multilateral activities while, in other cases, bilateral activities were stimulated by multilateral contacts and engagement in various forums.

Due to the dynamics of multilateral diplomacy this has been a two-way process in which Slovenia has gained a lot. Its multilateral experiences can be grouped into four main fields. Firstly, bilateral cooperation as a diplomatic and foreign policy fundament; secondly, integration process activities, which encompass a variety of processes, aspects and areas; thirdly, policy and political management, which helped not just to carve out Slovenia's policy approach but to constantly transform it and, fourthly, an overall process of exchanging experiences, ideas, and knowledge as well as enhancing cooperation. A policy overview of this matrix is presented in the following Table.

The overview offers an outlook of the various types of Slovenian experience referring to the countries from all three regions and projects through which these activities have primarily been executed. The first and the fourth type of experience (bilateral cooperation and exchange) refer to all of the countries and were carried out through all projects. This presents the most encompassing experience and general approach; perhaps, it is also the most fundamental approach in each case. The second one (integration process experience) concerns the majority of the countries discussed but primarily the post Cold War endeavours of the EU and NATO (Comp. Bebler, 2009.b, Marc, 2008). The third one (policy and political management) is also related to the majority of the countries involved and has been carried out through all of the projects.

Generally speaking, the matrix demonstrates what dynamic relations with a country look like when carried out through various approaches and within a multilateral framework.⁸ Additionally, one can speculate that in regard to all of the countries, bilateral relations were stimulated, upgraded, and, sometimes, also partially compensated through the multilateral projects discussed here. It also illustrates how strong, efficient and complementary bilateral and multilateral diplomatic and foreign policy approaches can be in the management of contemporary world affairs. Multilateralism serves here as an element of support for upgrading bilateralism as well as serving its

⁸ *Based on our method of generalization, one would hardly exclude any country from all four types. But still, to obtain a clear view of the process, we have done this to show the structural dynamics and various possibilities of different practical cases.*

Table 4:
Intensity of
Slovenian
experience
and challenges
related to the
three regions

	Experiences		Future Challenges	
	Bilateral	Multilateral	Bilateral	Multilateral
South East Europe	☑	☑	○	●
Western Balkans	☑	●	●	☑
Black Sea Region	○	○	○	●

own purposes.⁹ Relations among countries in such cases are much better, closer and fuller in scope and, at the same time, act in a more interlinked manner that enriches their cooperation. At the end of the day, however, it is still bilateralism which serves as the starting point for all these activities.

The last focus in this part of the paper refers to the three regions and the intensity of both the Slovenian experience and the future challenges in relation to them (inside they incorporate a separate look at the bilateral and multilateral aspects). We give a generalized view of the intensity of the experiences which Slovenia gained in its contacts with these regions and of the future challenges they pose over the coming period.¹⁰ A generalized overview is presented in the following Table.

It looks as if the intensity of Slovenia's relations with these regions has, to date, depended upon Slovenian integration ambitions. During the pre-membership period in NATO and the EU, for example, Slovenia was mostly occupied with carrying out activities which would lead it to membership status and the relations with the regions in question and the various countries within them were determined by these facts. Later, after membership (actually, during the final stages of the process), relations were enriched with the transfer of the integration experiences to these countries and regions.¹¹ However, other multilateral projects also determined the scope and intensity of the relations discussed. Perhaps one can point out here that it was the Slovenian OSCE Chairmanship of 2005 that, in various ways brought together Slovenia and the Black Sea region in particular. It could also be stressed that the multilateral approach has been crucial for the upgraded activities with these regions over the past period albeit with the exemption of the Western Balkans (although relations with the Black Sea region remain behind the other two.).

Speculating about the future challenges in these relations, one could say that it is the multilateral approach that will dominate the management of these relations. Most

⁹ Form more on this compare, for example, Simoniti (1994).

¹⁰ As far as the agenda is concerned, we presuppose that it will be composed primarily of the topics determined by various multilateral forums and their activities. This would mean that participation of countries from these regions in various integration processes form or determine their policy agenda. Compare Brzezinski (2009), Glenn (2009) and Kennedy (1993).

¹¹ This primarily applies to the Western Balkans and some countries of the Black Sea region, while the majority of South East Europe was included in the integration process more or less at the same time as Slovenia.

probably the Western Balkans region will stand out more, which is to be expected given the rich political, historical, security, economic, cultural, and other aspects involved. Since the majority of South East Europe is already firmly ensconced in the notion of integration, one could further speculate that the intensity of the challenges is unlikely to exceed that of the gained experiences. Hence, the Black Sea region is gradually spreading and increasing the variety of its contacts and participation in those multilateral endeavours where Slovenia is also heavily engaged, a policy which could upgrade the existing intensity.¹²

Conclusion The main ambition of this paper was to present the importance of Slovenia's outstanding multilateral experience with regards to its relations with the relevant countries, but particularly with the Western Balkans and the Black Sea region. We focused on multilateral activities accompanied by comments on bilateral activities, as well as taking into consideration the experiences already gained and the future challenges that Slovenian foreign policy is likely to face.

The broader framework of our discussion was established by the fact that Slovenia is a small (as well as the majority of countries discussed) newly independent state, which emerged from the tectonic changes that came about as a result of the end of the Cold War. This enhances the proposition that multilateralism works as a natural ally of small states. Additionally, as a consequence of the changes in 1989, several shifts of policy have also occurred in the directions of diplomacy as well as in the perceptions of security. The reordering of world affairs has coincided with the necessity to observe, detect and cope with the outburst of the globalization process, which has, at the same time, deepened the importance and the efficiency of multilateralism in diplomatic practice.

Perhaps the most important observation in this paper would be that multilateralism stimulates, enhances and sometimes partially also compensates for bilateral relations. This fully illustrates the current structural dynamics between the two aspects of diplomatic practice. We have showed this in the case of Slovenia and its relations primarily with the countries of the Black Sea region, supported with similar, but less intensive findings about the Western Balkans where bilateralism still plays a highly important, if not crucial role. On a general level though, whilst multilateralism serves as a policy approach it also appears, in practice, to be a diplomatic tool and a methodological framework for bilateralism.¹³ Due to Slovenia's rare and intensive multilateral experience, relations with the countries of the Black Sea region have not only been improved and stimulated, but also upgraded, enriched and strengthened. There are, of course, differences as far as the various countries are concerned, but the general observation is relevant.

¹² Again we point out the diversity of this engagement in the Black Sea region (referring to some of the countries like Russia and Turkey) and the necessity of generalization in the paper.

¹³ The intention of the paper is not to support all these with several empirical examples, but at least to present the author's personal, diplomatic view that there are many such issues in Slovenian diplomatic practices across various areas.

It has been its multilateral policy orientation that has enabled Slovenia to develop structurally diverse and complex contacts and relations with the countries of the Black Sea region on practically all the important aspects of contemporary international politics. There are cases where this has been a combination of the already intensive bilateral relations in place being enriched by multilateral activities, and there are cases where bilateral activities have been stimulated by multilateral contacts and engagement in various forums and on other such platforms. As a consequence, since we hail from the foreign policy and diplomatic practice of a small country with limited resources, multilateralism will most probably continue to play a dominant role and continue to shape and enable the efficient implementation of our bilateral relations.

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MED TRANZICIJO IN TRANSFORMACIJO

BETWEEN TRANSITION AND TRANSFORMATION

Review article

Povzetek Po šestih letih sodelovanja Republike Slovenije in Slovenske vojske v Natu in strukturah Evropske unije številni pokazatelji navajajo na sklep, da sta politična in obrambno-varnostna tranzicija uspešno končani, prav tako vojaška tranzicija, pri čemer je izpolnjen tudi petletni načrt vključevanja v zavezništvo. Kljub prepričanju, da zavezništvo predvsem stane, pa je dejstvo, da so obrambni izdatki, obrambna struktura in obrambne sile bistveno manjši, kot če bi še vedno gradili samozadosten sistem. Republika Slovenija verodostojno sodeluje v obrambno-vojaških strukturah in skupnih aktivnostih tako v Natu kot v EU. Pri tem mislim zlasti na aktivnosti skupnega obrambnega načrtovanja, sodelovanje v skupnih poveljstvih in njihovih aktivnostih, povezovanje v zavezniško strukturo sil ter zagotavljanje prispevka v njenih odzivnih silah, sodelovanje v mednarodnih operacijah in na misijah ter graditev nacionalnih zmogljivosti, ki so prek doktrin in standardov povezljive z drugimi v zavezništvu. Obenem je Slovenija deležna skupne zaščite in kontrole zračnega prostora ter Natovega investiranja v letališke zmogljivosti v Sloveniji. Integracija v zavezništvo je ustvarila pogoje za spreminjanje strategije nacionalne varnosti in posledično vojaške doktrine. V zavezništvu in posameznih državah ter njihovih oboroženih silah pa se srečujemo s pojavi transformacijske narave, pri čemer se postavljajo vprašanja o izginjanju nacionalnih vojaških identitet in nacionalnih vojaških sposobnosti. V članku predstavljamo značilnosti slovenskega tranzicijskega obdobja in izzive transformacije na obrambno-vojaškem področju ter navajamo slovenske vojaške izkušnje iz procesa integracije.

Ključne besede *Tranzicija, integracija, izkušnje iz delovanja v zavezništvu, transformacija.*

Abstract After six years of cooperation of the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovenian Armed Forces in NATO and the European Union structures, numerous indicators point to the conclusion that the political as well as the defence and security transition have been

successfully completed. Also completed are the military transition and the five-year action plan for the integration into the Alliance. Despite the conviction that the Alliance is above all costly, it is a fact that defence expenditures, defence structure and defence forces are significantly smaller than in the case of building a self-sustaining system. The Republic of Slovenia participates, as a credible partner, in defence and military structures as well as in joint activities within NATO and the EU. This refers to the activities of joint defence planning, participation in NATO commands and their activities, integration in the NATO Force Structure and contribution to its Response Forces, participation in multinational operations and missions, as well as the building of national capabilities, implementation of the doctrines and standards through which forces and commands are interoperable with others in the Alliance. At the same time, Slovenia is enjoying air policing and NATO's security investment in military airport facilities in the country. Integration in the Alliance has created conditions for changing the national security strategy and, consequently, the military doctrine. In addition, the Alliance and individual countries, along with their armed forces, are facing a transformation phenomenon, which brings questions regarding the loss of national military identity and national military capabilities. The article discusses the characteristics of the Slovenian transition period, transformation challenges in the area of defence and military, as well as Slovenian military experiences from the process of integration.

Key words *Transition, integration, integration process lessons learned, transformation.*

Introduction In 2009, at the 60th anniversary of NATO, activities began for the preparation of the new NATO Strategic Concept (NSC), which is to respond to the current and, above all, future challenges of the Alliance. The work on designing the new NSC was completed in May 2009 by a special expert group. At the beginning of 2010, the Slovenian Armed Forces fulfilled its tasks arising from the integration plan and thus became comparable and interoperable with other armed forces in the Alliance.

It took Slovenia ten years of preparation in the context of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme to join the Alliance, while the political and military conditions for membership were fulfilled in the second accession cycle of the Membership Action Plan (MAP). Legitimacy was assured by the 2003 referendum, when 66 percent of citizens voted for the membership of the Republic of Slovenia in NATO. One of the main conditions for Slovenia's membership was reforms carried out in numerous areas, including the restructuring of the Slovenian Armed Forces, as well as its structural and functional professionalisation. Slovenia's achievement of NATO membership was followed by a very intense five-year period of integration activities. One may claim that after five years of membership, the Slovenian path to transition and its integration in the Alliance have been successfully completed.

1 SLOVENIAN PATH TO TRANSITION

In Europe, the end of the Cold War and bipolar division have led to major social transition processes. These processes were most intense in the European countries of the former socialist regime, while they also took place in the West European countries. Consideration of conceptual, structural and functional changes made during the transition in the defence and military field in Slovenia indicates a number of characteristics also found in other European countries after the end of the Cold War. At the same time, there are several particularities which, on the one hand, apply only to Slovenia as a newly established state and, on the other hand, exceed the period of transition and represent the characteristics of transformation changes.

The central common feature of transition processes was the **adaptation** of the defence and military organisation to the new circumstances in the period of social as well as defence and security transition. In the area of defence, efforts regarding the functionality were directed towards the provision of national defence during the intense structural changes, and towards the accession to military and political alliances, which led to cooperation in conflict solving in crisis areas abroad. Efforts in the social area were focused on the establishment of institutions for democratic control of armed forces, which Cottey, Edmunds and Forster (2002, pp. 31–56) consider the first and the second generation of problems in the civil-military relations¹.

Since 1992, Slovenia, as an independent state with international recognition, has participated in the processes of political, economic, national, as well as defence and security transition. It has established a multiparty political system of parliamentary democracy, introduced market economy, built its own state, along with the defence and security components, as well as prepared for and entered such liaisons as the UNO, OSCE, NATO and the EU. Slovenia spent part of the process of the defence and security transition developing and reforming the national security system.

The transformation of Slovenian military organisation ran in parallel with the process of independence and with military activities for securing the establishment of a democratic and sovereign state in 1991². These activities were conducted on the basis of total defence and mass army concepts, founded on a large mobilised reserve structure of the Territorial Defence. The period after July 1991, after the end of the War for Independence, saw the demobilisation of enlisted reservists and final establishment of the Territorial Defence Learning Centres³ which trained Slovenian military recruits on the basis of general compulsory military service. At the same time, a regular army and a large military reserve were also established. The process in Slovenia was conducted simultaneously with the processes of reducing mass

¹ See also Donnelly (1997), Ikenberry (2002) and Moskos (2000).

² In reality, however, it began immediately after the first democratic elections and the assumption of power in May 1990.

³ The first two Slovenian Territorial Defence learning centres were established in May 1991, while altogether eight learning centres were established by June 1992.

armies and abolishing military service in some industrialised countries of the former Europe, for example in Belgium and the Netherlands. Considering the fact that Slovenia emerged from the war in 1991 and was, until 1995, under a military threat from war activities in its immediate vicinity in the former Yugoslavia, Slovenian deviation from the then processes in developed European countries can be better understood.

In the process of establishing a regular Slovenian army, several specific features emerged, which could not be eliminated in subsequent periods, as all transition changes were aimed at adaptation rather than radical changing of the defence and military structures (Šteiner 2009, pp. 126-129). Thus, from the initial establishment of the military organisation, through the period of transition, to entering the transformation period, there have been characteristics present, which have impeded further changes in the Slovenian Armed Forces and thus its transformation. Establishment of compulsory service with the system of manning the regular and reserve structures has left an officer structure that is too vast and inappropriate, having a conscript army mentality; infrastructure that, on the one hand, is adapted to military service of the male population and, on the other hand, is spread throughout the country; as well as a wide branched civil and administrative recruitment network. All of the above-mentioned has been reorganized several times during the military transition. However, it has not been abolished or overcome in accordance with the new tasks and missions of the Slovenian Armed Forces. The numerous reorganization processes of the command structure and scope of the army, as well as gradual changes are thus essential companions in the period of transition, as can also be observed in other countries.

Through extensive support of countries with which the Republic of Slovenia has entered in cooperation in the military area (the USA, Canada, Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Israel, and others), it gradually became clear that it is necessary to abandon the outlived military organisation models and the past operational patterns. Accession of the Republic of Slovenia to the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme in January 1994 signified, on the one hand, moving away from old models, while, on the other hand, it has led to the pluralism of following foreign examples. Following examples may sometimes signify the adoption of everything that has been offered and evaluated as good, regardless of the efficiency of the examples when they are placed in concrete situations and the defence and military system. Uncritical and unselective following of foreign examples is characteristic of all countries in transition, as described by Haltiner and Klein (2002, pp. 7-22).

Realisation of the necessity of abandoning the old model of military organisation and consequently of military structure and scope of the army has become one of the most important transition challenges. It was not easy to comprehend, let alone implement, as ideas of restoring old models are still present. A particular challenge was the necessity to open up and cooperate in the area of defence and military,

which arose with the accession to the PfP. The tools and activities in the PfP thus not only appear as mechanisms of defence and military transition, but also of political transition. For this reason, there are many changes and new processes conducted in the field of defence planning and, consequently, political decision-making with regard to defence issues⁴. Slovenia has been learning about and adapting to collective defence planning since 1994, through the Planning and Review Process (PARP) and the Individual Partnership Programme (IPP), also followed by the Membership Action Plan (MAP) in 1999. Until the time of the accession to NATO and during very intensive preparations of Slovenia, which followed the five-year membership action plan, these tools provided effective interagency cooperation.

When, in 1997 in Madrid, the Republic of Slovenia did not receive a membership invitation, the initial disappointment resulted in the knowledge that the transition process will have to be brought to the point where it is evident that Slovenia takes reforms seriously and will successfully implement them. The Madrid “no” thus helped, rather than inhibited, Slovenia on its path to transition and enhanced the political aspects of the defence reform⁵. Without the Madrid experience, Slovenia would have certainly delayed the professionalisation of its army, and the establishment of modern and deployable armed forces.

The transition period until 2002 was characterised by gradual and relatively slow changes. When the Slovenian government and the parliament decided to abolish military service as a component of general compulsory military service, and the NATO Summit in Prague in November 2002 resulted in Slovenia’s invitation to become a full member of NATO, this signified the continuation of even more intense changes in the military organisation. After the accession in 2004, the Slovenian Armed Forces prepared the Accession and Integration Plan (AAI)⁶ which was to be fulfilled by the end of 2010, but was already implemented by the end of 2009. One may claim that the essence of activities in the period of PfP, MAP and AAI lies in their orientation towards transition in the broadest sense of the word.

Based on conclusions made during the period of Slovenia’s transition, two general characteristics can be defined. First, preparations for membership take several years and include the implementation of membership plans, which brings many changes to the military organisation and the defence system. Second, integration in the processes of joint decision-making and defence planning brings modifications and adaptations of national approaches in the functioning of the government, the diplomatic field, the provision of conditions for the protection of classified information and, ultimately, the public. It often appears that such changes are determined by the defence and military structure, especially with regard to participation in multinational operations and missions, when this structure needs to meet the

⁴ *More on this Šavc 2009, pp. 52-55.*

⁵ *This includes the operation of the government, creation of a positive public attitude to membership in the Alliance, and changes in the external activities. More on this Grizold (2005) and Bebler (2009).*

⁶ *Implementation of the plan was monitored and supported by JFC Naples, Italy.*

conditions of interoperability and integrating in joint operations. In the context of NATO, Slovenia is an example of a member that has successfully overcome the tests and challenges of the transition period. As such, it can be a good example for the integration of other small countries and candidate countries, particularly the ones in its immediate vicinity.

2 INTEGRATION PROCESS – LESSONS LEARNED

The integration into the Alliance is a comprehensive process including several procedures and activities that allow new members to be effectively integrated and to participate in the Alliance's mechanisms of decision making and fulfilment of its commitments and is, hence, given priority⁷. In discussing Slovenian lessons learned from the integration process, it should be stressed that the accession to the Alliance is only the beginning of intensive activities. The achievement of full membership is followed by a demanding period of association and integration as well as affiliation⁸ of declared forces to NATO Force Structure. In the case of Slovenia, this integration process spanned over five years. When these processes came to an end, it became evident that it would be followed by further transformation processes of the military organisation, standardisation procedures and processes of integrated multinational force structures as well as capability building for the needs of national and collective defence.

There is no uniform definition of what is part of integration processes. In Slovenia, **the integration process** has been divided into: (1) integration into the allied processes of political decision-making and defence planning, (2) introduction of NATO doctrines and standards, (3) integration in NATO Command Structure, (4) affiliation of declared forces into NATO Force Structure (corps), (5) military capability building in accordance with the adopted allied force goals, (6) provision and maintenance of interoperability of commands and units, including NATINADS⁹ and Air Policing, (7) participation in planning, preparing and conducting multinational operations and missions, (8) preparation and contribution in NATO Response Forces (NRF), (9) financing joint projects through the NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP)¹⁰. Integration areas are also shown in Figure 1.


⁷ *Humar states that (Humar and others, 2009, p. 71) the NATO structure allows the respect of joint values and interests within the Alliance and, in particular, provides a frame, based on which member states may determine and implement common goals. In the NATO context, member states are the main decision-making players. As owners of the forces, they make decisions by consensus. Forces and capabilities which are provided by the member states for carrying out NATO activities are under NATO control and are, at the same time, part of the national chain of commands and control at all levels.*

⁸ *Affiliation refers to the integration of forces based on international agreements.*

⁹ *NATO Integrated Air Defence System is an integrated and interlinked system of the allied air defence. Air Policing is the surveillance of the air space, including its capabilities for such operational use.*

¹⁰ *NATO Security Investment Programme is the financial tool and programme for a joint investment into allied capabilities.*

Diagram 1:
Integration
areas



Source: Presentation by the SAF General Staff, 18 February 2010.

Slovenia was successfully integrated into the **allied political decision-making process and defence planning**. Defence planning encompasses seven different planning disciplines: force planning, resources planning, planning of defence investments, logistical planning, C3 planning, nuclear planning and civil emergency planning (Šavc 2009, p. 45). National defence planning as a whole is part of the sphere of defence policy and thus a matter of particular agencies and organisational units of defence ministries. Based on defence planning starting points, force planning is part of the domain of national as well as allied military staffs. In order to meet the purposes of military operation and operation within multinational operations and missions, operational planning for individual NATO operations is applied. All NATO planning categories are described in particular allied publications respectively instructions, which serve as bases for preparing national regulations and instructions. In 2006, the defence budget structure in Slovenia was harmonised with the NATO method based on which reporting on defence planning is carried out within the Alliance. Furthermore, it should be mentioned that Slovenia is successfully participating in activities and operation procedures of most allied committees and working bodies. Slovenia did not use the basic principle in the decision process, that is to say consensus, for hampering the operation of the Alliance.

Furthermore, the area of **introducing NATO doctrines and standards** presents a particular organisational and intellectual challenge. The Ministry of Defence and the Slovenian Armed Forces adopted and introduced most of the standards that are necessary for achieving the interoperability of armed forces or defence measures and

military procedures. As much as half of them were adopted in the original language with only the first page translated. These are used in the original language, whereas others were translated into the Slovenian language. Consequently, providing the capability of managing and employing standards in the English language is a speciality and ability, which is coupled with the fulfilment of English language standards. The Slovenian Armed Forces adapted and developed its Military Doctrine and the Military Logistics Doctrine, bringing them in line with allied documents. In addition, it has ambitious plans for continuing the preparations of doctrines in other areas.

Slovenia's integration into the **NATO Command Structure** is achieved in line with plans, taking into account changes that occur in its peace-time structure. The integration into the peace-establishment command structure¹¹ refers to national military personnel contributions to NATO commands and bodies as well as participation in its operational processes. The Slovenian Armed Forces is linked to the NATO Command Structure through military representations which, in 2009, were transformed into a peace-time structure of the Slovenian Armed Forces abroad. The Military Representative (MilRep) in Brussels can be considered as part of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Slovenia to NATO and the EU. SHAPE near Mons, Belgium, includes the National Military Representation – (NMR) at the Allied Command Operations (ACO). In Norfolk, USA, the ACT includes the National Liaison Representation (NLR). Interaction with NATO's command structure does not only exist at the strategic level. Significant connections and cooperation are carried out through the Slovenian Armed Forces' Force Command, which cooperates with the JFC in Naples, Italy. Of a total of 80 military representatives abroad, this is as much as 1 percent of the peacetime national military structure. Around 30 representatives are assigned to NATO commands and their bodies as well centres of excellence, and approximately 10 representatives are part of unit commands, into which the Republic of Slovenia can affiliate its capabilities.

In 2010, Slovenia completed the second rotation of personnel which represented the Republic of Slovenia in NATO and the EU. In this context, national representations played an important role in performing integration activities and achieving interoperability by implementing set tasks, in particular in understanding the Alliance, the political decision-making process as well as the preparation of military advice and its implementation. Efficient cooperation in working bodies and committees requires great efforts as well as learning. Often, this involves learning from doing or learning from those who have gained experience within the Alliance. The Alliance considers Slovenia to be a positive surprise, as it is well integrated into NATO bodies, successfully communicates at the level of allied bodies and national decision-makers as well as processes. Furthermore, the positive experience of a balanced representation of national interests in relation to joint allied interests and goals should be emphasised.

¹¹ *NATO uses the term NATO Command Structure – NCS. More about this in Humar and others, 2009: Integration Slovenian Armed Forces in NATO, The Bulletin of the Slovenian Armed Forces, No. 11-3/2009 pp. 71-79.*

The Republic of Slovenia and the Slovenian Armed Forces have carried out initial activities for **affiliation declared forces into the NATO force structure**. Affiliation into corps as multinational allied structures is considered as the integration of national capabilities into tactical and operational structures or commands¹². One of the tasks of corps commands in peace is to increase the interoperability within NATO through training and preparing commands and units for possible combined joint operation. I have stated the fact that initial activities have been carried out in order to point out that comprehensive activities and changes that have to be carried out in the following years should be concerned.

Building military capacities in accordance with the adopted allied force goals is an area which reflects in particular the modernisation and transformation of armed forces and their capabilities. It is defined through national defence planning and force planning as well as harmonised with allied planning and based on the force goals. The force goals reflect the adopted political commitments to capability building that meet national requirements, as well as joint allied capabilities. This presents a special feature, as Capability Based Planning is carried out on the basis of capability requirements. During the Cold War, on the other hand, Threat Based Planning was prevalent with threats being easier to recognise and, hence, required capabilities being easily determined.

Capability building in states that are in transition or have just completed it, has certain particular features, as most of the jointly agreed capabilities usually have to be established from the very beginning. Therefore, it is necessary to provide required resources, such as financial, personnel, material and infrastructural resources. Capability building is based on the fact that it is expected to invest 20 percent of funds for modernisation and equipment. As the building of deployable capabilities is generally a priority task, there are not enough resources for other capabilities. Under such conditions, within the new member states and small states, it may occur that only joint or even foreign capabilities are invested in.

Modernisation of armed forces and the building of military capabilities present a special challenge during the economic crisis and recession. In this context, the countries are reducing expenses for defence and military purposes and (are) therefore, reducing investments, in particular in the defence sector. This results in an impaired capability building or even its end. Thus, we can speak of a crisis of implementing plans of military capability planning and confidence into national promises. Modern capability building is not only the purchase of military equipment and its modernisation, but also demanding relations with personnel, training and readiness for operating together with other allied forces in a complex environment. Furthermore, we should consider the introduction of doctrines and standards which contribute to interoperability.

¹² *It is about the affiliation of light battalion battle groups into the NATO Rapid Deployable Corp in Italy and the CBRN battalion into the Multinational Corp North-East in Poland.*

Provision and maintenance of interoperability of commands and units is an important area of integration which allows the Alliance's joint operation and is achieved through training, joint exercises and participation in operations. In addition to standardisation procedures, it is increasingly contributing to the transformation of the defence system and the achievement of comparability and interoperability. Interoperability should not be considered as a unification or cloning, but (particularly) reflects the ability to achieve shared points in procedures, equipment, qualified personnel and decision-making as well as participation in operations.

Interoperability is most clearly reflected in the areas of NATINADS and Air Policing. The Slovenian Air Space Operational Centre is integrated into the Alliance's system and closely cooperates with the NATO Combined Air Operations Centre in Poggio Renatico, Italy. Air Policing in Slovenia is performed jointly by NATO air forces and Slovenian air controllers. Similarly, the Maritime Operational Centre is linked to the Allied Naval Centre at the Maritime Component Command (CC MAR) in Naples. This reflects the achievements of the Republic of Slovenia's membership in the Alliance, since it does not have nor has it developed certain capabilities.

Participation in planning, preparing and conducting multinational operations and missions is an area which was very exposed during the preparations for membership and even later on. The contribution to NATO Crisis Response Operations outside Article 5 reflects the credibility of a country that is aware of the necessity of contributing to international peace¹³. The Republic of Slovenia has contributed little more than 0.6 percent of international peace-time forces in the past four years¹⁴.

Slovenia's military contribution to multinational operations and missions is directly linked to the remodelling of the military, its transition from a conscript to professional armed forces as well the development of deployable capabilities (Šteiner and Geder 2009, pp. 183-210). The Slovenian Armed Forces have been participating in multinational operations and missions for thirteen years, since 1997. So far, it has participated in nineteen multinational operations and missions and in three Continents. By the end of May 2010, a total of 6096 military persons and 15 civilian experts have been deployed. The Slovenian contribution has increased from its initial dispersion and participation of individuals and groups to the participation of smaller tactical units. In 2007, a battalion was engaged for the first time. This proves the connection of a structural change of the Slovenian Armed Forces and

¹³ *National contributions include operations that are under the auspices of the UN as well as those that are performed under the auspices of NATO and the EU. United Nations Peace Keeping Operations include: conflict prevention peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace enforcement and peace building. Non-Article 5 NATO crisis response operations are classified as peace support operations, which include (a) conflict prevention, (b) building, (c) exercise, (d) conservation and (e) the construction of peace and humanitarian operations. In addition, there are other NATO Non-Article 5 Operations and Crisis Response tasks, such as (a) humanitarian assistance operation, and (b) disaster relief, (c) search and rescue, (d) support in the evacuation of civilian personnel and (e) military support for civil authorities (AJP-3.4 2008: 4-1, 4-11; Šteiner and Geder, 2009 p. 185).*

¹⁴ *See also Jelušič 2009, pp 39-46).*

its endeavours for an increased and more active participation in ensuring stability as well as solving global crisis situations. In addition, multinational operations and missions have a significant impact on international activities, the provision of interoperability and joint actions on the international scene.

Lessons learned from various multinational operations and missions are a significant factor in building military capabilities. When multinational operations and missions are considered as a transformational tool at the national and international level, it can be established that lessons learned and good practice provide answers to various strategic, operational and tactical questions on the employment of armed forces and military capabilities. Operations provide an opportunity to test new equipment and resources as well as to confirm some experiments in the use of new capabilities or tactics, as well as to develop a combined and multinational interoperability and joint operation.

The thirteen years of participation of the Slovenian Armed Forces in multinational operations and missions can be divided in three periods: the first between 1997 and 2002, the second between 2003 and 2006 and the third after 2007 (Šteiner and Geder, 2009). The first period is characterised by the involvement of smaller and less-demanding modules up to platoon-level. During the second period, a progress in terms of quantity and quality can be observed, although dispersion is most noticeable in this period. The third period is characterised by the fact that challenges of a comprehensive approach in multinational operations and missions have been taken over. This enabled the integration of Slovenian companies in multinational structures as well as the formation of national structures in the form of battalion groups that also include modules of other countries. If the first period is characterised by the fact that Slovenian troops appear in the international environment and gain experience, one can say that the second can be referred to as a period of search and maturation within multinational operations and missions. Yet, the third period should be considered as a time when the Slovenian Armed Forces were given the opportunity to promote itself in the international crisis response environment. In all of these three periods, the Slovenian contingents were, from a certain point of view, dependent on partner or lead countries, in particular as a result of limitations in the strategic air lift and reduced capability to supply forces in remote areas.

By preparing and providing of **NATO Response Forces (NRF)**, joint and combined allied forces are designated that are ready for rapid deployment and use for rapid interventions in the entire spectrum of NATO's military engagement. The forces support the Allies based on rotations that is for a certain period of time. Most of these forces are part of NATO Force Structure (NFS). Through forming the NRF, NATO as a whole and member states transform their capabilities in order to achieve greater effectiveness and responsiveness. The Slovenian contribution has developed gradually. The Slovenian Armed Forces began with the contribution of platoon modules, later companies and ended with the contribution of battalion modules, as for example the CBRN battalion.

In order to finance **joint projects through the NSIP**, the Republic of Slovenia contributes financial resources and also receives recourses through it. In this context, Slovenia is a net beneficiary, in particular regarding NATO's contribution in arranging the multipurpose military airport in Cerklje. Furthermore, Slovenia has, through co-financing, been included in initiatives that enable access to knowledge and capabilities that otherwise would be hardly achievable (Strategic Air Lift and Air Ground Surveillance as well as AWACS).

In order to describe international areas and lessons learned, one can refer to the assessment that the Republic of Slovenia respectively the Slovenian Armed Forces in the last six years of NATO and EU membership has successfully completed processes of interoperability, deployability and also sustainability within multinational operations and missions. Slovenia is a good example, in particular due to its objectivity in what it offers and what it has managed to achieve. But also in what the Alliance gives back in the form of increased security or support through capabilities which the country cannot provide or will not provide by itself, such as air defence capabilities and airspace security. It would be advisable that all political elites be aware of success and the special features of the Alliance. Of course, certain joint plans and commitments in the capability development in the future depend on the further development of the economic situation and recession. In this context, it will be necessary to be realistic in order not to halt the development and modernisation of the Slovenian defence system or impact it to such a degree that it could stagnate, as this might result in long-term negative consequences.

3 TRANSFORMATION PARADIGM AND CHALLENGES

While Slovenia was preparing for participation in the Alliance and began functioning as a full member of NATO, a demanding transformation process took place within NATO, enabled by the 1999 concept. A period of transformation began, based on the knowledge of changes necessary for the future. NATO has been engaged in transformation challenges and processes for the entire decade¹⁵. The greatest challenge is its transformation and proper understanding as well as response to changes in the security environment, due also to the fact that there are more frequent questions on energy security and environmental issues, as well as questions on asymmetric threats which have long not only been in the form of traditional military threats. Transformation within NATO is a proactive and innovative process of development and integration of new concepts, doctrines and capabilities for the improvement of efficiency and interoperability within the Alliance and with its partners.

¹⁵ *This was intensified through searching for answers to new terrorist and asymmetric threats after the attacks on the World Trade Centre twin towers on 11 September 2001 in New York and the railway station in Madrid on 11 March 2004. The beginning of the transformation period was politically endorsed at the NATO Summit in Prague in 2002 (NATO Handbook, 2006, p. 20). Later, the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) was also established.*

Some see transformation changes as a **transformation paradigm** (Binnendijk and Kugler, 2006). In this regard, it is about a new approach and new understanding of changes, not only in narrow defence and military terms, but also in broader security and political terms. Transformation in its narrow sense of the word includes the area of remodelling and transfiguration within the defence and military system, which is extended to and connected with the social environment. Transformation is a global and transnational process. On the other hand, it puts an entirely new light on some national defence and security issues, particularly with regard to the provision of a stable and secure environment for the operation of governmental, economic and civil institutions. Transformation paradigm is actually a shift from the armed forces of the industrial age to the armed forces of the information age. Transformation in the defence and military field is therefore seen as a reasonable alternative to the social transformation in the use of military force, thus becoming a new theory of the changing of military organisation.

A special feature of transformation is its focus on the deliberate and voluntary, or non-revolutionary changes¹⁶, which, however, does not exclude the depth of changes. Revolutionary and radical changes in the defence and military sphere result in too many risks and negative consequences particularly due to the fact that the old is demolished while the new cannot be immediately established and simply replace the operation of the previous system. Transformation thus signifies abandonment of revolutionary approaches to change in military affairs, making it sometimes difficult to distinguish from changes and adjustments in the period of transition.

Transformation objectives are aimed at achieving new levels of quality and changes which correspond to modern requirements in key areas of the organisation and operation of military forces and the defence sector, namely in personnel, material, technological, information and political areas. In a practical manner, transformation is reflected in the changes of organisational structures, doctrines and operations, and in the focus on capabilities, especially the areas of research and development, experimentation and learning from experience. Perhaps the most important element of transformation is the intellectual element: knowledge, learning and understanding (Knott 2004). Education and training, research and development, experimentation and learning from experience, and consequently the profile of military professionals are becoming key areas of the transformation process.

For countries dealing with change from military transition to transformation, this signifies moving away from adjustments and focusing on renovation¹⁷. If military transition is characterised by the adaptation of military structures, organisation and operation with regard to the emerging situations, transformation is an attempt

¹⁶ The following text has a very meaningful title: *No Revolutions Please, We're British*. It was written by Potts and Thackray (2005, 29-42) and compares models of changes of military capabilities, and gives reasons for abandoning the so-called revolutionary models.

¹⁷ More on this Šteiner 2009 117-134 in *It is Time for Transformation*.

to create advantages not only in structure, organisation and operation, but also in the monitoring and anticipation of what is possible, bringing a decisive advantage over new situations.

The Republic of Slovenia, or its defence system and armed forces, has also found itself in the middle of these processes. Given the scope of current changes, the speed and relative success of transition from the model of mass territorial army to the model of deployable and non-deployable forces, as well as change in the manning system, one could argue that Slovenia has overcome the main transition changes. It is, however, aware of transformation challenges and is gradually realising them, conscious of the fact that continual transitional adaptation of the structure, tasks, organisation and operation of the army can no longer achieve the objectives for the future.

4 INTEGRATION ALSO MEANS UNDERSTANDING NATO

A particular challenge of integration is maintaining and expanding the understanding of NATO and characteristics of the Alliance. This is neither easy nor unambiguous, especially in the period of economic crisis and recession, or in situations when there is no immediate threat. In the first place, NATO membership requires proper understanding of joint military operations in accordance with Article 5 of the Treaty of Alliance¹⁸ as well as outside the scope of this Article. In the first case, it is about the understanding of collective defence which is, in the period of moving away from the bipolar division of the world and the threat this presents, changing its priorities. In the public and among the political elite, this may cast doubt on the necessity of the Alliance.

Through the participation in Non-Article 5 Operations, more commonly referred to as NATO Crisis Response Operations¹⁹, countries face challenges regarding the mission of the Alliance and its interests. This is particularly the case when it comes to the engagement of military forces in crisis areas, making it more difficult to identify common interests and the impact on the threat to national security and the Alliance²⁰. Hence it follows that national force structures must be adapted to both requirements, that is to the provision of joint forces for the needs of collective defence, as well as the provision of forces for participation in multinational operations and missions in crisis areas. Such willingness must be real and not merely in the form of promises. At the NATO Summit in Bucharest in 2008, members undertook to have half their forces as Deployable Forces, while ten percent of these would be in readiness or engaged in operations. This commitment is often

¹⁸ *Washington Treaty of 1949.*

¹⁹ *In the Strategy of Cooperation of the Republic of Slovenia in Multinational Operations and Missions, the term Multinational Operations and Missions (MOM) is adopted as common for all types of international operations.*

²⁰ *On account of this, the Republic of Slovenia offers its military contribution to NATO and other multinational operations and missions which have a UN mandate and are covered by relevant Security Council resolutions.*

decisive in planning the development of forces and their equipping, as well as in achieving interoperability.

Another important finding is related to the consensus and responsibility, which are the cornerstones of the Alliance. An important contribution to the achievement of consensus is also the harmonisation of efforts of individual members. Despite the multitude of interests and wishes, this harmonisation must be balanced, realistic, targeted, and based on the implementation of commitments undertaken by members (Šavc 2009, 54-55). Commitments to the Alliance are made through the processes of association, integration, and joint defence planning, and must be considered and treated responsibly. Should there be objections or even breaches of commitments, other countries and everything that connects the Alliance become faced with questions and challenges.

Slovenia is a member of two large international organisations, NATO and the EU, which brings some particularities and challenges, especially in the provision of capabilities. The Slovenian Armed Forces provides the same capabilities for both organisations, following the principle of the Single Set of Forces. In doing so, it supports better cooperation and efforts for the improvement of cooperation of both organisations in the military field.

There is another feature with which the Alliance members are faced. Frequently, the requirement to become an Alliance member is emphasised, the reason being the reduction of defence and military spending. However, the real issue is another aspect related to a more rational and efficient use of budgetary resources, which is seen in the investment in real defence needs and military capabilities. In the national environment, this is often seen as a limiting factor which prevents the use of defence resources for the purposes and needs that are not necessary or essential to defence capabilities. There are examples when defence budgets are trying to show expenses which have little in common with real defence matters in order to seemingly show an increase in expenditure. In cases when the issue is promoting the transparency of the defence and military budget, the sense of limitation on account of the Alliance is understandable. However, the real issue is promoting the quality aspect of use, which is the fundamental multiplier of joint military power and capabilities of the Alliance.

An important question is whether Slovenia has learned enough in the process of transition and is able to change its actions. Can this provide a basis for realistic national plans which will meet NATO's expectations? There is also the issue of how NATO planners understand force goals for particular countries and how they define expectations for the joint capability building, and particularly their deficiencies. Then, there is the question of what is of primary and what of secondary importance in case the resources are limited. Is it the national defence capabilities or those which, in addition to being used for national purposes, may also contribute to the overall Allied deployable capabilities? And finally, after joining the Alliance,

countries must be aware of the reasons which have led them along the path of integration and achievement of objectives which they wish to attain through membership. Such awareness is important because transition periods and changes cannot be taken back or become undone.

Conclusion The article tries to address some special features of the Slovenian path to transition in the defence and military field. Some of these features will be evident in the transformation process in which Slovenia is included as a NATO member. The article lists several experiences from the period of preparation for the accession to NATO, from the process of Membership Action Plan, and from the five-year period of integration, following the accession to the Alliance. The common denominator of all knowledge is reality as the foundation of credibility. The path to the Alliance should not be strewn with promises which cannot be fulfilled or are unrealistic and beyond national capabilities.

Transformation is a challenge which brings great expectations but also doubts, not only within the Alliance, but also in national environments. In the period of transformation, countries set themselves the goal of establishing an army which is small, but effective, highly professional, modern equipped, deployable and interoperable, and can, together with NATO, successfully implement national and allied tasks and missions.

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EVRAZIJSKA ENERGETSKA VARNOST: NAJNOVEJŠI TRENDI V EVROPSKI IGRI PROJEKTOV ZEMELJSKEGA PLINA

EURASIAN ENERGY SECURITY: RECENT TRENDS IN THE EUROPEAN GAME OF NATURAL GAS PROJECTS

Review article

Povzetek Članek obravnava razvojne možnosti obsežnih projektov za plinovode, ki naj bi skladno z načrti na eni strani povezovali Evropo s Kaspijsko regijo (plinovoda Nabucco in Južni tok), na drugi strani pa s severozahodno Sibirijo in Barentsovimi morjem (Severni tok). Analiza kaže, da se bo prva faza gradnje plinovoda Severni tok verjetno začela pozno spomladi leta 2010, čeprav projekt še nima plinskega polja, ki bi zagotovilo zadostno oskrbo za drugo fazo. Usoda plinovoda Nabucco je še vedno negotova, čeprav je bilo nedavno doseženo nekaj političnega napredka. Projekt Južni tok je zgolj »papirnati tiger«, katerega namen je predvsem spodkopati projekt Nabucco. Nekateri tudi trdijo, da je odprtje plinovoda med Srednjo Azijo in Kitajsko, ki Turkmenistanu omogoča dostop do še enega velikega izvoznega trga poleg Rusije, odločilna poteza v igri s plinovodi. Sploh pa naj bi razvoj nove infrastrukture za utekočinjeni zemeljski plin in obetavni rezultati razvojnih dosežkov v zvezi z »nekonvencionalnim plinom« na Madžarskem kazali na to, da igra s plinovodi ne ogroža varnosti evropske dobave.

Ključne besede *Energetska varnost, južni koridor, Nabucco, Južni tok, Severni tok, Beli tok.*

Abstract The paper discusses the development prospects of the major gas pipeline projects planned to link Europe to the Caspian region (Nabucco and South Stream), on the one hand, and to northwestern Siberia and the Barents Sea (Nord Stream), on the other hand. The analysis indicates the following: the construction work of Nord Stream's first phase will likely start in the late spring of 2010, though the project has no developed supply field for its second phase; Nabucco's fate is still uncertain, in spite of some recent political progress; and the South Stream project is a mere "paper tiger," working mainly to undermine Nabucco. Besides, it is argued that the opening of the Central Asia-China pipeline, which gives Turkmenistan a major export outlet other than Russia, is a true "game changer," and that along with the development of

new liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure, the promising results of “unconventional gas” developments in Hungary show that Europe’s security of supply is not exhausted by the pipelines game.

Key words *Energy security, Southern Corridor, Nabucco, South Stream, Nord Stream, White Stream.*

Introduction The EU-Russia energy interdependence

The EU currently imports more than 40% of its natural gas from Russia, a figure which is expected to rise to 60% by 2030. The level of dependence is considerably higher for a number of European states which rely on Russian imports for virtually their entire gas needs.¹ The situation did become a public concern during the Russo-Ukrainian “gas war” of January 2009, which left parts of South-East Europe in the cold for two weeks in the middle of the winter. Gazprom, the monopolist exporter owned 51% by the Russian state, which produces around 19.4% of the world’s total output of natural gas, sells two thirds of its gas to the EU countries. In 2006, for instance, Gazprom’s gas sales to Europe reached 161.5 billion cubic meters (bcm), exports to the CIS and the Baltic States amounted to 101 bcm, while the Russian domestic market received 316 bcm, or about 54.6% (Mitrova, 2008: 2). The Russian market price is considerably lower than what EU countries pay on average. Since about two thirds of Russia’s export earnings come from oil and gas, Europe is by far the largest and most profitable market for Russian energy sales.

Apparently, the equation of energy interdependence between Europe and Russia is simple: the world’s biggest gas market meets the world’s largest gas producer, and each of them has what the other one needs. Yet the real picture is much more complicated. In fact, the situation is structurally dissatisfying for both parts.

On the one hand, the EU member-states – despite important differences among them in their dependence on Russian gas and the warmth of their relations with Moscow – have grown concerned about Gazprom’s capacity to produce sufficient natural gas for the domestic market and its export obligations. These worries typically draw on the following kind of considerations: “Russia’s energy production remains imperiled by inefficiency, underinvestment, politicization, high taxes, and falling prices – not to mention the increasingly urgent search for ways of moving beyond a carbon-based economy” (Mankoff, 2009: 8). Besides, the new members of the European Union have obvious apprehensions about the possible Russian misuse of energy as a means of political coercion. Again, the January 2009 gas crisis galvanized the European determination to reduce that level of dependence, though this has not really translated into anything of a common, broad and coherent EU-level approach to energy security. Rather, a loose consensus has in practice (re-)emerged among the European

¹ According to Gazprom, while Finland, Slovakia, Serbia and Bulgaria all import over 90% of their gas from Russia, states like Italy, France, Romania, the Netherlands and Belgium all depend for less than 25% on Gazprom.

institutional and business actors of the energy scene regarding the diversification of the sources of supply and delivery routes for imported hydrocarbons, and about the development of renewable energy sources.

The conceptual pillars of this consensus were articulated in November 2008, as the European Commission published its Second Strategic Energy Review, titled “An EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan”². Importantly, the document proposes a five-point “energy security and solidarity action plan” for the EU, focusing on the development of the energy infrastructure and diversification of energy supplies, on stocks of hydrocarbons and crisis response mechanisms, and on energy efficiency. Of course, these policies were circumscribed to EU’s commitment to the so-called “20-20-20” initiative: “reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 20%, increasing the share of renewables in the energy consumption to 20% compared to 8.5% today and improving energy efficiency by 20%, all by 2020”³.

Regarding the promotion of infrastructure, the following six points were promoted as priorities of the Commission: (1) connecting the energy markets in Europe; (2) creating a Southern Gas Corridor “for the supply of gas from Caspian and Middle Eastern sources”; (3) developing sufficient liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities and storage capacities; (4) completing a Mediterranean “energy ring,” “linking Europe with the Southern Mediterranean through electricity and gas interconnections”; (5) developing North-South gas and electricity interconnections with Central and South-East Europe, “building notably on the [Hungarian] New European Transmission System (NETS) initiative to create a common gas transmission system operator;” and (6) preparing a blueprint for a North Sea offshore grid, in order to “interconnect national electricity grids in North-West Europe and plug-in the numerous planned offshore wind projects.”⁴

In relation to EU’s external suppliers of hydrocarbons, the Second Strategic Review advocates the development of a “new generation of ‘energy interdependence’ provisions” based on the principles of the Energy Charter Treaty, aiming at a “balance between security of demand and security of supply.”⁵

In practice, however, these precepts have been typically trumped by the particular interests and priorities of individual member-states. Also, Moscow has little interest in ratifying the Energy Charter Treaty, whose provisions would contribute to leveling the field of its energy deals with Europe.

Concerning natural gas, the security of supply injunction is to achieve at least a moderate level of geographical diversification away from the Russian sources and pipelines. Yet, as will be seen below, perceptions of competing interests among

² http://ec.europa.eu/energy/strategies/2008/2008_11_ser2_en.htm

³ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0781:FIN:EN:PDF>, p. 2

⁴ *Idem*, pp. 4-5

⁵ *Idem*, p. 8

individual EU states and influent non-state actors – i.e., big European energy companies with lucrative contracts with Gazprom⁶ – result in slow progress toward an effective European energy policy, with hesitant, suboptimal and sometimes mutually undermining actions.

Then, apart from diversification, the EU's energy security is indeed significantly enhanced by a gradual integration of its gas energy markets. The interconnectivity of the national networks would offer the means for other EU states to help in times of crisis. Besides, larger regional markets are more efficient in attracting investment and in bargaining with external suppliers. The New European Transmission System (NETS), a 2007 Hungarian initiative by MOL company of setting up a regional network in South East Europe, is a remarkable example. Also important is the creation of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), hosted by Ljubljana, as an instrument of extending a common regulatory framework which would allow coordination at the EU level. Undoubtedly, ACER's efficiency will depend on its ability to overrule national regulators on issues connected with security of supply and the operation of cross-border transmission systems (Mankoff, 2000: 28).

On the other hand, if the EU countries strive to diversify away from Russia, no wonder that Gazprom also looks for ways of diversifying away from Europe. Gazprom prioritizes the development of its East Siberian and Far-Eastern hydrocarbon fields in order to expand its presence in the Asian market and to supply its own Far East provinces. Since 2009, Russia has become a player on the global LNG market, with the opening of an LNG terminal on Sakhalin Island, from which Russia has started exporting to Japan and South Korea. Nonetheless, Europe is and will likely remain Russia's key market for a long time to come.

Moscow has resented the capacity of some transit states – notably Ukraine and Belarus – to block its East-West transport of gas. Consequently, it aims both at taking over the control of these countries' pipeline systems,⁷ and at building circumventing pipelines – be it in excess capacities – that would provide alternative routes. But the sheer size and directness of the Ukrainian pipelines, plus the huge storage capacities that accompany them, make it probable that most of the Russian gas will keep flowing westwards through Ukraine. Moreover, after the recent win of Viktor Yanukovich in the Ukrainian presidential elections, Kiev has repeatedly advanced the concept of offering Gazprom a substantive share in Ukraine's gas transit system in the guise of a Ukrainian-Russian-European consortium, in return for a sizeable price cut of its massive imports (Socor, 2010a; 2010d).

⁶ *Although openly embracing free-market norms and practices, some major European energy companies have in fact been pressing for their own preferential long-term deals and been constantly expecting the geopolitical backing of their national governments (Youngs, 2009: 5)*

⁷ *The Belarussian gas crisis of 2007 ended with Gazprom taking a controlling stake in BelTransGaz, the Belarussian pipeline monopoly.*

Both the EU countries and Russia support the construction of new pipelines, yet that support is unevenly allocated to different projects. Some of the EU member-states see themselves threatened by the Russian political leverage in the energy trade and seek to avoid the entrapping of a monopolistic pricing system; hence they favor a non-Russian project. Others would just take in as much gas as possible regardless of how it reaches them, and therefore subscribe to all pipeline projects that are economically viable – Russian or non-Russian. Besides, apart from security of supply considerations, some West European powers also benefit from the deep involvement of their giant energy corporations in these pipeline projects.

The Western-backed project that would bring Caspian gas to Europe through non-Russian territory bears the name of Nabucco. As we shall see in section 3, Nabucco has been integrated in the above mentioned EU's concept of the Southern Gas Corridor of hydrocarbons transport from the Caspian region to Central Europe. In its turn, Russia wants access to the European market through a multitude of channels, so as to avoid reliance on any individual transit state. A strategy of “excess capacities” of delivery offers Moscow political influence over the transit states just because it could choose an alternative transit route. Indeed, the Russian “grand design” includes a multitude of projects, adding to the current Soviet-times capacities: Nord Stream, on the bottom of the Baltic Sea, from Russia to Germany, meant to avoid the Baltics and Poland; South Stream, on the bottom of the Black Sea, from Russia to Bulgaria, meant to avoid Ukraine and Turkey. There has also been talk – even though less and less convincing – about the westwards extension of the Blue Stream pipeline, which currently links Russia to Turkey, underneath the Black Sea. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the rationales and the evolution prospects of these projects, among others.

In particular, I argue that two important “game-changers” have emerged in the economy of the East-West gas flows:

(1) The December 2009 opening of the Central Asia-China pipeline, which provides Turkmenistan with a very significant export outlet other than Russia, added to the more modest, though also important, quantities sold to Iran (see section 2). Against the background of a stagnant Russian production of natural gas, it will be shown that this raises serious problems for Russia's ability to acquire sufficient gas for re-export in Ukraine, and to fill mammoth projects such as South Stream, which is planned to tap into Caspian gas. Indirectly, Nord Stream's second phase is likely to be affected too, as Moscow will find it difficult to free up volumes from the domestic market that are otherwise supplanted by Turkmen imports.

(2) The promising results that alternative technologies of gas production – so-called “unconventional gas”, obtained through hydraulic fracturing of shale rocks – have in Europe. These results point to an immense potential. Therefore, there is more to Europe's energy security than the gas pipelines game.

1 TURKMENISTAN'S NEW OUTLETS

On December 14, 2009, the Presidents Ju Jintao of China, Gurbanguly Berdimukhammedov of Turkmenistan, Nursultan Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan, and Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan celebrated at Samandep, in eastern Turkmenistan, the valve-opening ceremony of the new Central Asia-China gas pipeline. The line has a planned total capacity of 40 bcm/year (consisting of 30 bcm from Turkmenistan and 10 bcm from Kazakhstan) and is more than 1,800 kilometers long. It starts from Turkmenistan's Bagtyarlik gas field, near the Uzbek border, on the right side of the Amu Darya river, and it goes 188 km on Turkmen territory, then runs about 550 km through Uzbekistan and 1,300 km via Kazakhstan and before entering China in the Xinjiang region (Socor 2009a).

The framework agreement on the pipeline construction and gas supplies was signed in April 2006 between China and Turkmenistan. The project developed at an improbable speed, with the signing in 2007 of the agreement on exploration and production of the Bagtyarlik field by China's National Petroleum Company, and also of the agreement between Kazakhstan and China on the construction of the Kazakh segment of the line. The latter incorporates segments of the preexisting pipeline from Uzbekistan to Almaty. The maximum planned volume of gas will flow after the completion of a second, parallel line in Kazakhstan, starting in 2010.

The strategic consequences of this achievement are very important. For one thing, Russia's monopsony on Turkmen natural gas has been broken. Until recently, Moscow bought almost entirely the quantities of Central Asian gas that were up for sale, amounting even to 80 bcm/year. Of this, Russia re-exported one part to Ukraine and Europe, at increased prices, and used the rest on the domestic market, thus freeing up quantities of West Siberian gas for exports to Europe. To these quantities of gas, Turkmenistan contributed with almost two thirds, for which Gazprom had paid until the end of 2008 the cheapest price of all its Central Asian suppliers: a bit over one third of the average European netback price. Thus, given the stagnation of Russia's own gas production, the Turkmen gas has constituted an essential part of Gazprom's business model.

On January 1, 2009, Gazprom began paying European-level rates for the Turkmen gas, and honored its commitments despite the major drop in European demand. In the spring of 2009, however, after the visit to Moscow of President Berdimukhammedov, the relations between Moscow and Ashkhabad started to degrade, since Turkmenistan refused to assure the leadership of Gazprom about giving up its drive toward diversification of market outlets (Renaud, 2009, 3). Consequently, the signing of an agreement on the construction of a gas pipeline from the gas fields in Eastern Turkmenistan to the Caspian shores was deferred. Back in Ashkhabad, Berdimukhammedov announced the launch of an international bid for the construction of that pipeline, whereupon Gazprom reacted by announcing a progressive reduction in the volumes of gas bought from Turkmenistan. Because of

poor communication between Gazprom and Turkmen gas, an explosion took place on April 8 near the Uzbek border, due to the build-up of an excess of pressure in the pipeline. Although Gazprom authorities behaved thereafter as if nothing extraordinary had happened, Turkmenistan reaffirmed its policy of diversifying gas exports.

And indeed, the Central Asia-China pipeline begins by transporting 5 bcm in 2010 and is due to rise to 30 bcm/year by 2013. An additional quantity of 10 bcm/year will be delivered to China after the completion of the second stage, in 2011. China's State Development Bank opened a \$4 billion line of credit to Turkmen gas for exploration and production in the South Yolotan and Osman gas fields. Hence, all in all, China's intake of Turkmen gas is likely to surpass the purchases by Russia in the near future (Socor, 2009i).

The inauguration of yet another pipeline is due to take place soon in Turkmenistan: from the Dauletabad field (known until 1991 as Sovietabad and dedicated until now to exports to Russia) to Salyp Yar in Iran. The initial capacity of this pipeline is 6 bcm/year, scheduled to increase to 12 bcm in the second phase. The new pipeline to Iran will add to the existing one, Korpeje-Kordkuy, commissioned in 1997, with a capacity of 8 bcm/year. Overall, the Turkmen exports to Iran will add up to 20 bcm/year (Socor, 2009j).

As already pointed out, the importance of these changes can hardly be overestimated. Turkmenistan now certainly has more power in negotiating with Russia on the sale of future gas volumes. But the impact is more direct on Russia's ability to bring to an end its diversification projects for the European market: Nord Stream and South Stream. South Stream, whose sources of Caspian gas remains unspecified, will almost certainly not be fed with Turkmen gas. For Nord Stream's second phase, again, the lack of Turkmen imports will block the volumes of West Siberian gas earmarked for export to Germany – we shall discuss these projects in more detail in the next section. Then, China will also have a stronger hand in the negotiations with Russia over the purchase of gas from eastern Siberia, because from now on China does not depend on a monopolistic provider any longer (Socor, 2009k). Finally, Azerbaijan itself has contemplated the possibility of exporting eastward, to China and other East Asian markets, out of frustration with the slow progress of the Nabucco project and with the dispute with Turkey over transit terms and revenues for the Azerbaijani gas transiting Anatolia (Petersen, 2009a). But this remains a rather rhetorical threat, as shall also be argued in the next section.

Meanwhile, however, Russia keeps significant leverage upon Turkmenistan's foreign policy. The prospect for Ashkhabad to directly access the European gas market is fatally limited by Moscow's – along with Iran's – vehement opposition against the construction of a Trans-Caspian pipeline, which would run on the Caspian seabed from Turkmenbashi to Baku. Moreover, Moscow is adept at linking energy security with other issue areas – including military security. On December 22, 2009, President Dmitri Medvedev visited Turkmenistan. The agenda of the

meeting between Medvedev and Berdimukhammedov included the signing of an agreement on the resumption of gas deliveries from Turkmenistan to Russia early next year (Stratfor, 2009c). Yet the emphasis of the visit was on Russia's endeavor to keep Uzbekistan in check – Turkmenistan's northern neighbor, which Ashkhabad regards as a threat, as it dominates the population core in the Fergana Valley and can thus project influence via its ethnic majority not only in Turkmenistan, but also in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

2 NABUCCO AND SOUTH STREAM

Nabucco is the main Western-backed gas pipeline project meant to reduce the European energy dependence on Russia. The line would continue the extant Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, cross Anatolia east to west and then climb north-westwards through Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria till the terminus hub, Baumgarten an der March, near Vienna. The total length of the projected pipeline is 3,300 km. The construction work is due to start in 2010 – according to 2008 estimates (Torello, 2008), though it is likely that even this date will be pushed back – and is scheduled to be completed in 2014. The estimated cost climbed in 2008 to €7.9 billion, due to the increased price of steel, up from the initial estimate of €4.6 billion (Gutleederer, 2008), but is now likely to be revised downward again, after the global economic crisis.

Although the protocol of intention on the construction of the pipeline was signed in 2002 by OMV (Austria), MOL (Hungary), Bulgargas (Bulgaria), Transgas (Romania) and Botas (Turkey), progress has been slow and mined with setbacks. The feasibility study of the project was financed 50% by the European Commission. The joint venture agreement was signed by the five consortium members in June 2005. Thereafter, no noticeable progress had been registered until February 2008, when the German public utility RWE joined the consortium.⁸

Undoubtedly, it was the Russo-Ukrainian gas spat of January 2009 that triggered a new wave of political interest in the fate of Nabucco. On January 27, 2009, a Nabucco Summit took place in Budapest, at which the heads of the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) pledged to offer financial support for the project (Deutsche Welle, 2009). The next day the European Commission announced the allocation of €250 million through EIB, to jumpstart construction (Harrison, 2009).

Another major step was the Southern Corridor Prague Summit of May 8, 2009, which brought together representatives of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, together with representatives of EU institutions. The summit

⁸ *The current shareholders of the Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH are, according to the official website of the consortium, the following: Botas AS, Bulgarian Energy Holding EAD, MOL Plc, OMV Gas & Power GmbH, RWE AG, and Transgas SA, each holding an equal share of 16.67% (www.nabucco-pipeline.com, March 25, 2010).*

operationalized the concept of Southern Corridor, as delineated in the above quoted Second Strategic Review (EurActiv, 2009). In the Joint Declaration, the “Southern Corridor” countries committed explicitly to complete the Trans-Caspian link for hydrocarbons, to sign by the end of 2009 an intergovernmental agreement for the Turkey-Greece-Italy Interconnector (ITGI), and to sign memoranda of understanding with Iraq and Egypt, respectively, regarding their inclusion in the Southern Corridor.

Then, in July of 2009, Ankara hosted the signing ceremony of the intergovernmental agreement (IGA) of the five transit states of Nabucco. Conspicuously, though, the producer states were not present. The ratification process of the IGA ended on March 4, 2010, when the Turkish parliament ratified it. The next stage will consist in the negotiation of separate project support agreements between the Nabucco consortium and each of the transit states (Kardas, 2010). Nonetheless, for several reasons, the advancement of the Southern Corridor is still beset with obstacles and uncertainties, due both to lackluster EU political and economic involvement and to the deterring effect of the competing Russian project, South Stream.

South Stream AG is a joint venture of Gazprom and the Italian company Eni SpA (each holding 50% of the shares, cf. www.southstream.ch) planning to lay down 900 km of pipeline on the Black Sea’s seabed, from Beregovaya (Russia) to Varna (Bulgaria). According to South Stream’s official website, two possible routes are under consideration regarding the pipeline’s onshore route from Varna (cf. www.south-stream.info): a northwestwards-going branch, to Serbia, Hungary, Slovenia and Austria, and a southwestwards-going branch, to Greece and southern Italy, via a marine interconnector. The project was publicly announced in June 2007 and since then it has made several important steps toward inhibiting its archrival, Nabucco. On January 25, 2008, both Serbia and Hungary ratified the intergovernmental agreements with Russia to build the respective sections of the pipeline, plus a large gas storage center near Banatski Dvor, in Serbia. The Bulgarian Parliament ratified the agreement in July 2008, while Greece and Russia signed one in April of 2008. On November 14, 2009, Slovenia joined the South Stream project, thus providing it with the missing link for the northern branch.

On November 11 in Moscow, in a joint statement, the Austrian Chancellor Werner Faymann and the Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin emphasized the need for Austria to join South Stream (upi.com, 2009). Also, on November 27, 2009, during Prime Minister Putin’s visit to France, Electricité de France (EDF) joined the South Stream consortium. EDF’s participation is expected to border on 10% (Vidalon, 2009). Also significant was that immediately after the signing of Nabucco’s intergovernmental agreement in Ankara, Turkey accepted that Russia lays down the South Stream line on the Turkish seabed – thus avoiding the Ukrainian economic zone – in return for the planned construction of an oil transport system linking Novorossiysk to the Black Sea port of Samsun and centering around a new oil pipeline across Anatolia, from Samsun to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan – as part of Ankara’s strategy of turning Ceyhan in the world’s biggest energy hub (Socor, 2009b).

Finally, after meeting with Vladimir Putin in Moscow, Croatia's Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor announced her country would join the South Stream project (Stratfor, 2010). As shall be shown in section 5, Croatia's location on the coast of the Adriatic Sea is of strategic importance to Russia, particularly in light of Zagreb's plan to build an LNG regasification terminal on the Krk Island.

Other than its obvious diplomatic and formal success, South Stream is a hugely difficult enterprise. The debit of the offshore section of the line was boosted from initially 31 bcm/year to no less than 61 bcm/year (*dpa*, 2009), at a prohibiting cost of about €24 billion, according to Gazprom's own estimate; this would make it the world's most expensive pipeline (Socor, 2009a). It is unlikely that this kind of investment will take place, given Gazprom's excessive delivery commitments – all the more now, after the commissioning of the Central Asia-China pipeline, which left Gazprom with limited sources of Caspian gas.

In 2007, at the inception date of South Stream, the large inflows of money to Russia due to the high price of oil and gas, along with Moscow's monopsony position regarding the gas extracted in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan may have justified Gazprom's and Eni's robust belief that their joint venture would materialize. Yet if this has ever been the case, the current economic context has fundamentally decoupled the flurry of political and business negotiations surrounding South Stream from its material substance. It is now actually very probable that South Stream is a mere "paper tiger," whose true rationale is to undermine trust and discourage investments in the Nabucco project, as well as to bring into submission "rebellious" transit states, such as Ukraine.

It is actually revealing that ENI's CEO, Paolo Scaroni, has recently suggested a partial merger of the South Stream and Nabucco pipeline routes, on the Bulgaria-Austria segment – although Nabucco's route is already well defined, and different from South Stream's tentative northern branch. "Should all partners decide to merge the two pipelines for part of the route, we would reduce investments, operational costs and increase overall returns," said Scaroni, quoted by Bloomberg.com (Martinez and Resnick-Ault, 2010). Yet it is probable that Scaroni's statement connotes his skepticism that investments and gas quantities of the scale needed by South Stream will ever be in place. Taking an unwavering stance, Moscow promptly dismissed Scaroni's call through the Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko, who declared that South Stream was "more competitive" than Nabucco (Shiryayevskaya, 2010).

By cunningly promising all the participant countries the status of an energy hub, Gazprom relied on a strategy of *divide et impera*, to the success of which also contributed EU's half-hearted support of Nabucco. Indeed, a recent setback of the Nabucco project was the announcement of the delay to the fourth quarter of 2010 of its European allocation of financial support, initially anticipated to be arranged in January of 2010 (Renauld, 2009: 7). Yet by far the most pressing obstacle for Nabucco at the moment is the dispute between Azerbaijan and Turkey regarding transit revenues and gas pricing for Azerbaijani gas transiting Turkey to fill the

Turkey-Greece-Italy Interconnector. This adds to Ankara's insistence on having a reserved quota of up to 15% of the Nabucco transit at deeply discounted prices.

President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan made public his country's dissatisfaction with Ankara's tactics on October 21, 2009, while chairing an expanded session of the government. According to Aliyev, Ankara has been paying merely one third of the average European price for Azerbaijani gas in recent years (Socor, 2009d). Under a bilateral agreement signed in 2002, Turkey bought gas from Azerbaijan at \$120 per one thousand cubic meters (tcm). That agreement expired in April 2007, along with any justification for the low price, but Ankara has stonewalled the negotiations on a new price, just continuing to pay the same and bargaining for slight increments. For the approximately 7 bmc/year that it imports from Azerbaijan, Turkey pays less than 50% of what it offers for the Russian gas coming through the Blue Stream pipeline (Socor, 2009c). Also according to Aliyev, Ankara insists on charging transit fees that are 70% higher than those charged by other transit states on the Nabucco route. These facts inhibit the development of the Azerbaijani Shah Deniz gas field, earmarked to feed into Nabucco. The start of its commercial production has already been delayed by two years, being now scheduled for 2015.

In the face of it, Azerbaijan was compelled to contemplate other export options. On November 20, State Oil Company of Azerbaijan's (SOCAR) President Rovnag Abdullayev declared that his country was seriously considering exports to China (Petersen, 2009a). This, on the one hand, was prompted by the approaching opening of the Central Asia-China pipeline, which has been agreed upon and constructed in a much more expedient and uncomplicated manner. On the other hand, it has certainly been a message pointed at the Nabucco consortium and at the European governments involved that they coordinate with Turkey and come out with a clear offer to the Caspian producers.

However, the possibility that Azerbaijan drastically reorients its exports strategy – to the East instead of the West – is remote. The reasons are aptly enumerated by Petersen (2009a): first, because of the inherent technical difficulties related to a supplementary extension of the China pipeline, already set to be the longest in the world; second, because that would require Turkmenistan's cooperation, which is difficult to obtain against the background of the ongoing dispute between the two states about the Serdar/Kyapaz gas field in the Caspian Sea; third – and most important – because such a reorientation would have Azerbaijan give up its geostrategic position as a gateway to the westward flows of Caspian hydrocarbons. That key advantage would be completely lost if Baku stood last in the queue, looking toward Beijing.

It is much easier for Azerbaijan to increase its exports on the north-south axis – that is, to Russia and Iran, respectively. Gazprom has long offered to buy up the entire gas production of Azerbaijan, for its North Caucasus market and for further exports to the EU, an offer which Baku has so far resisted. In October of 2009, however, an agreement was signed by which starting January 1, 2010, Azerbaijan exports 500

million cubic meter/year of gas to Russia. Interestingly, the price seems to be similar to the European netback and re-export is precluded by a specific clause. While this is a small quantity, the agreement includes an increase option. For the moment, though, the agreement is primarily a wake-up call to the Nabucco consortium.

The gas supply agreement corroborates with a more general growth of political influence of Moscow over Baku, going as far as Azerbaijan's consideration of membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) (Stratfor, 2009a). Two reasons stand out for such a move: (i) Baku's effort to obtain Moscow's parity of treatment with Armenia (an old military ally of Russia) in relation to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; (ii) Baku's disillusionment with the "normalization" negotiations between Armenia and Turkey, which Azerbaijan perceives as a betrayal by its *aga bey*, Turkey.

Importantly, for its north and south gas export options, Azerbaijan does not depend on other transit countries and does not need new pipelines. Soviet-era pipeline connections to both Russia and Iran are in place and only need modernization, adding up to 10 bcm/year – enough to accommodate Azerbaijan's surpluses for the next years, in case Nabucco falters.

Finally, during the October 16, 2009 session of the government, President Aliyev alluded to the proposition of a new pipeline project as an alternative export option: White Stream, which is supposed to deliver gas from Azerbaijan via Georgia and the Black Sea seabed to Romania – unlike the previous version of the project, which would have run to Crimea (Socor, 2009d). White Stream thus fits into the Southern Corridor concept. A bit more precisely, White Stream is currently thought of as branching off from the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) pipeline towards the port of Supsa and as continuing from there on the Black Sea seabed 1,100 kilometers to Constanta, where it would connect to the Romanian transmission system. The total planned capacity is 32 bcm/year. According to the general manager of the White Stream consortium, Roberto Pirani, the company hopes to sign a project agreement in 2010, to complete the design work by 2011, to obtain an investment decision by 2012, to start construction by 2013 and to see the first gas flowing by 2016 (Socor, 2009e).

Aliyev discussed the new White Stream proposal with the Romanian President Traian Băsescu during his visit to Bucharest in late September of 2009, where the two leaders signed a strategic partnership agreement. They also considered the possibility of developing an LNG system as a possible alternative solution for the export of Azerbaijani gas via the Black Sea, which would involve liquefaction in a Georgian port and regasification in Constanta. But of course, whether at the end of the day the delays in the Nabucco project would push Azerbaijan toward a non-Turkish option, the choice between White Stream and LNG – or other alternatives altogether – would have to be grounded in a comparative cost-benefit analysis.

Following the July 2009 signing ceremony of Nabucco's IGA, the Iraqi prime-minister Nouri al-Maliki stated in Istanbul his country's willingness and capacity

to contribute up to 15 bcm/y of gas to the Europe-bound pipeline (Kardas, 2009). Moreover, two companies of the Nabucco consortium – OMV and MOL – have recently invested in gas production in Iraq’s Kurdistan. Thus, given the tensions between Baku and Ankara, it is not unlikely that Nabucco’s first phase will be fueled from the Middle East, rather than the Caspian region. As pointed out by Petersen (2009a), “[w]hile the plan is still to link Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz II gas into Nabucco’s first phase (to fill about half of the pipeline’s eventual capacity), more supplies may well be available from gas-rich northern Iraq in five years’ time, and the possibility that Egyptian gas could be linked to Nabucco is increasingly gaining credence after it was first mentioned publically by Cairo in July.”

3 NORD STREAM

Nord Stream is the name of the Russo-German project of a Baltic offshore gas pipeline planned to link Vyborg with Greifswald. The pipeline would run for 1,200 kilometers and would consist of two twin lines, each of a capacity of 27.5 bmc/year.

Picture 1:
Projected Routes
of Nord Stream,
Nabucco and
South Stream
Pipelines



Source: http://www.energy.eu/images/pipelines_nabucco_nord_south_stream.gif

Construction work is due to start in the late spring of 2010, so as to finish the first line by late 2011. The second line would be built from 2012 to 2014. Thus, the full throughput capacity of 55 bcm/year ought to be reached by 2015. The costs are estimated at €7.5 billion (Flauger, 2009). The shareholders of the Nord Stream AG consortium are Gazprom with 51%, BASF (through its gas-trading subsidiary, Wintershall) with 20%, E.ON Ruhrgas with 20%, and Netherlands' Gasunie with 9%. Following an agreement reached in March 2010 by Presidents Medvedev and Sarkozy in Paris, Gaz de France is also expected to join the consortium, receiving a 9% stake of the shares through corresponding reductions in the stakes of the German partners, so as to leave Gazprom with the control majority of 51% (Socor, 2010c).

The agreement on the construction of Nord Stream was signed on September 8, 2005, during the final days in office of Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, who thereafter became head of the shareholders' committee. His successor, Chancellor Angela Merkel, lobbied for the inclusion of Nord Stream among EU's projects of interest, lumping it together with Nabucco and South Stream for "collectively contributing" to Europe's security of supply (upstreamonline.com, 2009).

This very proposition is telling of a deep-going difference in the way Germany understands its energy security needs and the way other EU member states, particularly from Eastern Europe, conceive of them. After all, Nord Stream has from its inception been surrounded by political controversy. In Warsaw, the project is nicknamed "The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pipeline," after the 1939 Soviet-Nazi deal for the partition of Poland (Petersen, 2009c). The Baltic countries have the same feeling and cannot understand the plan of laying down such an expensive offshore construction when it would have been much cheaper to build it onshore through Eastern Europe, other than as a deliberate exclusion by Moscow of countries that it still considers as part of its sphere of influence. Moscow thus shows the willingness to incur huge economic costs out of mistrust in its former socialist brethren, while the latter fear that once Gazprom has secured direct access to its "golden hen" – the German market – their own energy security would be at risk, for reasons both economic and political.

The German rationale for this deal seems to stem from worries that the Russian gas reserves will not suffice to cover the growing European demand of the coming years; thence the willingness to secure as much of the available Russian reserves of gas, even at the risk of a dangerous dependence – at almost 40% of the annual consumption, with a similar percentage for oil. The German conception of solidarity in the European energy policy has prioritized the need to interconnect the pipeline networks of the EU states. This will indeed be an important step and will certainly be helped by the creation of the new Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulator (ACER) of the EU (Goldirova, 2009). Nevertheless, the bilateral energy deals closed by a few powerful European states with Russia are profoundly detrimental to any sense of a common European energy policy. Along with Germany, Italy is supposed to provide government guarantees for Nord Stream, in return for massive business contracts given to Italian firms designated to participate in the construction of the

line and in the manufacturing of the steel pipes. It is important that we notice the difference in type and motivation among the actors involved in the European energy game. The situation is well described by Socor (2009g):

Italy's involvement with Nord Stream underscores the emergence of a tripartite, Russo-German-Italian pipeline alliance to outflank Europe through the Nord Stream and South Stream projects. In this grouping, Russia alone operates as a state actor with integrated economic and political strategies. The German actors are interest groups driven by compartmentalized business strategies, though capable of influencing the government; while the Italian participants are companies linked with Moscow-friendly Silvio Berlusconi's government.

Be it as it may, four years after the signing of the construction agreement, the Nord Stream project received the Scandinavian countries' "green light," i.e. environmental permissions to the consortium to lay the pipeline through their respective economic zones of the Baltic seabed. Denmark had given it in late October, followed by the Finnish and Swedish governments on November 5, 2009. The Russian environment authority, Rosprirodnadzor, gave its approval on December 18, followed on December 28 by the permission of the German Federal Maritime and Hydrographic Agency. Still pending is a second Finnish permission, to be granted by an independent environment agency (Stratmann, 2009; Rettman, 2009). Thus, all seems to be set for the first pipeline segments to be laid on the Baltic seabed starting in the late spring of 2010. The logistical preparations have been underway for years now, since the plan has it that by the start of the construction work no less than one third of the steel pipeline should be ready, covered in concrete (Runner, 2009; Russland-Aktuell, 2009).

Nord Stream's dedicated gas field has been right from the start Yuzhno-Russkoye, located in the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Area, up north above the Arctic Circle – thus making the name Yuzhno ("south" in Russian) a misnomer. According to the consortium's own data, the proven reserves of the field exceed 700 bmc, with a yearly yield of about 25 bcm (nord-stream.com, 2009). As this yearly debit barely suffices to fill in even the first line of Nord Stream, Gazprom mentions as a supplementary source the Shtokman supergiant gas field, offshore in the Barents Sea.

The Shtokman field has estimated reserves of 3.2 trillion cubic meters (Tcm) (offshore technology.com, 2009). It lies 550 kilometers off from land, at a depth of 350 meters. More technical detail is telling of the exceedingly difficult conditions of exploitation: "The field covers an area of 1,400m² and lies inside the arctic. It is subject to icebergs of up to 1 million tons drifting at up to 0.25m/s, and 1.2m drift ice moving at up to 1m/s" (offshore-technology.com, 2009). Accordingly, the estimated development costs are huge: anywhere between \$10 and \$25 billion. Such hostile conditions require advanced technological know-how and financial power, which only the global players of the energy business can bring. To this purpose, Gazprom has invited Norway's StatoilHydro and France's Total as partners to develop Shtokman,

but uncertainties regarding the transfer of technologies to Russia have so far hindered the conclusion of an agreement. Thus, it is improbable that Shtokman will enter commercial production before 2020 (Socor, 2009g), which is late for Nord Stream. Besides, Shtokman has also been earmarked for LNG production, especially for the North American market.

The website of the Nord Stream consortium also mentions “additional gas fields from the Yamal Peninsula” (nord-stream.com), but the extremely rough conditions and the special technologies needed for constructions on permafrost make development difficult and very expensive. And, although Yamal’s deposits are immense, potential top investors are rather hesitant to accept Gazprom’s terms for partnership.

Indeed, at the meeting of Vladimir Putin with the top managers of the world’s largest energy companies in Salekhard on September 24, 2009, aiming at developing Yamal’s deposits for the LNG market, they responded with reticence to Putin’s terms about technology transfers to Russia, in exchange for their being allowed to “access” those gas resources (Vedomosti, 2009). Apart from the onerous terms of this particular offer, the reluctance of Western companies has also to do with Royal Dutch Shell’s experience in Sakhalin, where it developed the Sakhalin II field – currently Russia’s single LNG project on stream – only to be forced by the Russian state to sell part of its majority stake along with its operation rights to Gazprom, in 2006-2007, at a heavily underestimated price. The risk is adamantly depicted by Mikhail Korchemkin, head of the East European Gas Analysis consultancy: “When Russia needs money and technology, it invites foreign partners. But when the project is ready to yield money, investors may be forced into such unbearable conditions that they will be happy to sell their stakes” (Vedomosti, 2009).

4 LNG AND UNCONVENTIONAL GAS DEVELOPMENTS

The European market of natural gas certainly does not reduce to pipelines, and the Caspian gas is certainly not the unique stake of the game. Investments in other technologies are likely to seriously alter the landscape of natural gas economics in Europe.

LNG, for instance, which reached a peak in global demand in 2008 and has since seen a relative recession, continues to unfold in Europe. The Gate Terminal in Rotterdam, currently in construction, will have a capacity of 12 bcm/year (offshore-technology.com, 2009). LNG currently represents approximately 8% of the world’s total natural gas trade (Stratfor, 2009b). Since 2004 there has been an investment boom in LNG shipping capacity. The number of LNG tankers increased from about 150 at the end of 2003 to more than 300 today (offshore-technology.com, 30. Apr. 2009). Russia has just started to play in this league with the opening of its terminal on the Sakhalin Island, but fathoms the ambition of becoming world leader through the development of the mentioned northern fields of Shtokman and Yamal.

Picture 2:
White Stream
Route options
Option 1:
Georgia/Crimea/
Romania,
Option 2:
Georgia to
Romania Direct.



Source: <http://www.rense.com/general87/image003%2012.jpg>

An important European project is the regasification terminal of the Adria LNG consortium in Omisalj, on Croatia's Krk Island, intended to receive Middle Eastern LNG. The terminal will have an initial capacity of 10 bcm/year, which will increase to 15 bcm/year. Construction work is due to begin in 2010 and the project is due to be functional in 2014, at a cost of about €800 million – without pipeline connections (OilVoice, 2008). The Croatian public opinion had been rather reticent about this project, mainly due to safety and environmental concerns, but again, the Russo-Ukrainian gas spat did obviously spurt public support for the Adria LNG project. The Krk terminal will provide natural gas not only to Croatia (which has a total demand of 3.2 bcm/year), but also to Italy, Austria, Hungary, Romania and Slovenia (Ilic, 2009a). To this purpose, Plinacro, the Croatian natural gas transmission operator, signed on March 3, 2009 an agreement with MOL's subsidiary, FGSZ Zrt, for the construction of a 294 kilometer long gas interconnector between Croatia and Hungary, with a capacity of 6.5 bcm/year (Ilic, 2009b).

Russia has recently made a couple of major business propositions to Croatia in the energy sector, on the occasion of President Stjepan Mesic's visit to Moscow, on December 13-14 (Socor, 2009). In the oil sector, Lukoil and GazpromNeft intend to acquire stakes in the Adriatic Oil Pipeline (JANAF), which runs from Omisalj to northern Hungary. The Russian government has long sought to reverse the pipeline's

direction, so as to use it for Russian oil exports over the Adriatic Sea. In the gas sector, Moscow proposes to build an extension of the South Stream pipeline through Croatia. Gazprom has asked to use the existing in-country transmission pipelines in the context of South Stream, including the above mentioned Plinacro interconnector toward Hungary. This would prevent the use of the interconnector for EU-backed projects, such as the New European Transmission System (NETS) – proposed by MOL and conceived to create a common gas transmission system operator in Central and South Eastern Europe – or Nabucco; but it would also cut off an important prospective link of Adria LNG. In effect, should Gazprom enter Croatia through South Stream, it would likely press for halting the Krk Island LNG project altogether (Socor, 2009I), since the Qatari LNG thus shipped in would stand in direct competition with the South Stream gas.

Unconventional natural gas development has the potential to be a game-changer in the European gas business. Typically, unconventional gas refers to pockets of natural gas “trapped” in shale rocks, from which it can be “freed” using a new drilling technology, called hydraulic fracturing, also known as “fracing.” The high energy prices of the years up to 2008 led to sustained investment in companies tapping into sources otherwise considered too expensive or inaccessible to develop. The biggest player in this new field is the giant energy company ExxonMobil, which has been drilling for “tight gas” on hundreds of thousands of acres in North America, in Colorado and British Columbia. In Europe, ExxonMobil entered in April 2008 a joint venture with a little known company American company, Falcon Oil and Gas Ltd., which had a production license from the Hungarian government for more than 245,000 acres of the Mako Trough gas reservoirs, in South-Eastern Hungary, near the Romanian border.

Those reserves are very hard to access – 7,000 meters deep and at high temperature – but immense. According to Falcon, “its license area alone contains a resource of some 44 trillion cubic feet of gas. That is three times as large as Britain’s proven gas reserves” (WSJ, 2008). It does indeed cost billions to produce gas from fields of this sort, but the gains can be huge. So much so that ExxonMobil, the world’s largest energy company, completely ignored the Eurasian pipeline game (Petersen, 2009a).

Conclusion The discussed projects of gas pipelines play a defining role in shaping the strategic environment of the energy security relationship between Russia, Europe, and the countries in between. Energy politics is a key factor in Moscow’s foreign policy. It is not only about securing demand for Russia’s most valuable exports – hydrocarbons – but also about the political and economic control of a number of strategically important states in its vicinity.

The development of oil and gas fields in the Caspian basin in the 1990s and the construction of the BTE and BTC pipelines from Azerbaijan to Turkey in the 2000s – with substantive political and economic American involvement – sparked off a

competitive geopolitical game in the Black Sea and Caspian region for the control and transport of those resources. Turkey, in particular, situated at the crossroads of all routes of natural gas from southern Russia, the Caspian region and the Middle East toward Europe, turned into a true – potentially giant – energy hub. Using the existing South Caucasian transit corridor that goes from Azerbaijan to Turkey via Georgia, the Nabucco gas pipeline project is the Western attempt to achieve a degree (albeit modest) of independence of supply from Russia. The concept is to continue the current Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) pipeline all the way to Vienna via Turkey and Eastern Europe. Moscow's response has been South Stream, an excessively costly enterprise with uncertain sources of gas, whose apparent role has been to undermine Nabucco and to discourage Ukraine, as a key transit state, from leveraging its geographic advantage in negotiations with Russia.

Accordingly, Russia adopted a strategy of building pipelines in “surplus capacity,” in order to avoid dependence on any particular transit country. Nord Stream is also a case in point: conceived to transfer gas directly from Russia to Germany underneath the Baltic Sea, the project of this pipeline is deeply resented by Poland and the Baltic countries.

Indeed, despite the strategic principles of energy security laid down in Brussels to increase EU's overall energy security, the different interests, situations and perceptions of the European states regarding the “pipelines game” have led to an aggregate dissociated energy policy – basically a result of a natural economic nationalism enhanced by Moscow's crafty divide and impera policies.

I have argued that alternative technologies for extracting natural gas – the so-called “fracing” of shale rocks – already introduced in Europe, as well as the significant investments in LNG facilities (which are themselves a bone of contention with Gazprom, such as in Croatia) have the potential to change the structure of the natural gas market within the EU. Considering also the difficulties of sustaining massive investments in the current economic context, the entire “new pipelines game” may well fall behind the curve in the next years.

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SLOVENIJA IN POLITIKA EVROPSKE UNIJE NA ZAHODNEM BALKANU – POGLED ZGODOVINARJA

SLOVENIA AND EU POLICY IN THE WESTERN BALKANS – A HISTORIAN'S PERSPECTIVE

Review article

Povzetek V prispevku je predstavljeno slovensko dojemanje pomena Balkana v smislu spreminjanja mednarodne ureditve od versajskega sistema do padca berlinskega zidu in širitve Evropske unije na Vzhod. V zadnjih dveh desetletjih se je uveljavila teza, da ima Slovenija zaradi posebne zgodovinske izkušnje in jezikovne bližine velike možnosti, da se pod okriljem Evropske unije razvije v enega pomembnih »igralcev« na Zahodnem Balkanu. Vendar uresničitev takih ambicij ni odvisna le od Slovenije. Vzrok ni le v njenih demografskih in gospodarsko-finančnih **omejitvah, temveč tudi v vse večji podjetnosti drugih akterjev.**

Ključne besede *Slovenija, Balkan, versajski sistem, Jugoslavija, Evropska unija.*

Abstract The paper introduces Slovenian perception of the Balkans' significance in the senses of changing international regime from the Versailles system until the fall of the Berlin wall and the enlargement of the European Union towards the East. In the last two decades, a thesis prevailed that due to its specific historic experience and language similarities, Slovenia has a large potential to develop into an important »actor« in the Western Balkans under the auspices of the EU. However, the realisation of such ambitions does not depend only on Slovenia. The reason does not lie only in its demographic, and economic and financial restrictions, but in an increasing enterprise of other actors.

Key words *Slovenia, Balkans, Versailles system, Yugoslavia, European Union.*

Introduction

„History is the preoccupation of those who lack ideas for the future.“ These words have been used recently by one of Slovenian experts on Western Balkans from Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He used them to conclude his interview about the role of Slovenia in the Western Balkans. (Volk, 2010). At the same time, one of the historians, who study Yugoslav past of the Slovenians, wrote: “To expect that we will automatically be privileged just because of our common history and proximity is therefore wrong.“ (Repe, 2010) Both statements were made on the eve of the conference, which was organised on 20 March 2010 at Brdo near Kranj to the initiative of Slovenian President of the Government Borut Pahor and his Croatian colleague Jadranka Kosor. The title of the conference also implied a message for the future: *Together for the European Union: Contribution of the Western Balkans to the European future*. However, the absence of Serbian president Boris Tadić once again proved that a more optimistic attitude towards the European future of the Balkans will not be possible, if certain partitions from the past are not surmounted.

Last year’s 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin wall was a good opportunity to evaluate the achievements of the most successful political peace project in the history of Europe. Nevertheless, another anniversary passed a lot less noticed: ninety years ago at the Paris peace conference, the superpowers drafted a peace plan which soon proved to be nothing but a “twenty-year cease fire” between the two world wars, as a French Marshal Ferdinand Foch said (Kissinger, 1995).

Due to the collapse of the four empires – Russian, Austro-Hungarian, German and Ottoman, the Paris peace conference, which set foundation for the Versailles regime, had to design a new plan of the international regime in the Central and South-Eastern Europe. The principle of self-determination that the US president Thomas Woodrow Wilson tried to enforce also had impact on the disintegration process of two several-hundred-year-old empires: the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires. Despite the sincere wishes that the acknowledgement of the demands of nations, which had been “serfs” to the aforementioned dynasties until then, would bring new stability to Europe, this was not the case. Quite the opposite: several new nation countries did appear on the map of Central and South Eastern Europe; however, each of them also took a number of minorities under their wing. Due to the processes of planned ethnical homogenisation, this led to national disputes. Of course, Wilson cannot be blamed for that. As Philip Stephens wrote, Wilson’s “14 points” did not provoke conflicts leading to the Second World War. This was more of a consequence of the fact that superpowers were unprepared to use these points to come to a more favourable European regime for small nations (Stephens, 2008).

Also from the viewpoint of emancipation movements, Wilson was at first a hero. However, the 1919 Paris peace conference did not manage to find a formula that would at least roughly leave all Balkan nations with the same amount of (dis)satisfaction. The latter ones also immediately split into a revisionist camp which looked

for a new opportunity to “repay the debts”, and into a group which within the “little entente” helped France to defend the Versailles system. This made the creators of peace in Paris fail a similar exam in case of the Balkans as the governing elite did in the Habsburg Empire. In 1914, not only Austria-Hungary failed an exam, but the entire “Concert of Europe”, which did not know or was not able to find a solution for a peaceful settlement of the tensions which occurred after the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo. The Archduke’s death became an introduction into the biggest slaughter thus far. Gavrilo Princip with his achievement became a part of the myth about the forming of a new Yugoslav country and assumed a privileged position in the Yugoslav historiography (Dedijer, 1966). He remained a role model for numerous Serbian nationalists. Upon the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the former leader of Bosnian Serbs, Radovan Karadžić devoted him a pathetic poem, which includes the following verse: “Oh, Soul, shoot at the emperor, sharpen the supreme sprit! Shoot at the strong knee of the era. May the time kneel, may the empires jumble their themes, may Vienna grow dumb, may the sky grow dumb!” (Kolšek, 2008)

The story about the motives for the murder of the Habsburg Archduke is also a story about the plans to transform Austria-Hungary. It is also a search of an answer to the question how to face the increasingly confident appearance of South Slavic elites which began to rock the foundation of the international regime in the Balkans, in force until then. Had the liquidation of the chief protagonist of the idea of Big Austria not happened, Serbian “Piedmont” would not have been able to implement its mission to join South Slavic (for the representatives of Big Serbia – “Serbian”) countries and undertake an important role in the Versailles system.

After the First World War, Serbia remained in possession of the territories it had usurped (according to the then Serbian terminology: returned) during the Balkan Wars in 1912-1913. Kosovo remained under its authority. Despite its predominant Albanian population, its name was changed to Old Serbia. At the same time, the Serbs continued to rule Macedonia, which became South Serbia. The descriptions of the two adhered provinces which entered the 20th century as part of the Ottoman Empire, speak about the administrative regime enforced by Serbia (Rajović, 1985; Bebler, 2008). As established by a Serbian socialist Dimitrije Tucović, who opposed the adherence of new territories, Serbia during the Balkan wars not only doubled its territory. It also doubled the number of enemies (Repe, 2008).

At the Paris peace conference, the fact that during the First World War Serbia heroically resisted the armies of Central Powers, increased the sympathies of the winning superpowers’ diplomats towards the »Yugoslav Piedmont«. South Slavic political elites from the ruined Habsburg monarchy led by a Slovenian, Dr Anton Korošec, decided to connect with Serbia and choose the Karadorđević family as their new dynasty. This additionally reinforced Serbian political influence in the entire South Eastern Europe. After that, Yugoslavia was for almost two decades the key ally of France in the Balkans. This provided Belgrade ruling circles with a »free hand« in

the regulation of internal political problems, which were quite numerous. This was not due to the national, religious and cultural diversity, but because, within it, two different concepts of national regime had clashed: centralism and federalism. The dogma of “one nation of three tribes” also reflected in the official name Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Kingdom SHS). The dogma was created by the founding fathers of Yugoslavia. However, the rule was not asserted successfully in the multinational formation which emerged. In 1929, King Aleksandar was forced to opt for dictatorship in order to use an authoritarian policy to prevent further national tensions in the country.

Conflicts between the former Habsburg (before that mainly Western Roman) and Ottoman (before that Byzantine) part of the country which was now common, were a tough task for the governing elites which reached a temporary solution as late as on the eve of the Second World War. This solution provided Croats with a great deal of autonomy. However, Hitler’s devastating attack in 1941 proved that this was only a fragile truce between Serbian and Croatian political elites, which had not been able to reach uniformity, not even regarding the way how to effectively protect the territorial integrity of the country. Despite the formal fall of the Versailles system, which did not have the power to prevent the spreading of totalitarian regimes in 1930s, some of its borders preserved until the 21st century. They were disbanded by the “big enlargement” of the European Union to Central and Eastern Europe.

1 SLOVENIA AS PART OF THE BIG EU ENLARGEMENT

Following the fall of the Habsburg monarchy, the breaking of Slovenian national entity occurred. Despite the fact that, at the Paris peace conference, Slovenians together with the Croats formed a part of the delegation of the winning Serbia, it was soon clear that they trusted Wilson’s principles too much. Great Britain and France depended on the 1915 *London Pact*, which assigned a big part of the ethnic Slovenian and Croatian territories to Italy. This mostly affected Slovenians in the coastal region and Croats in Istria. Together with South Tyrolese, they were the first in Europe to be exposed to the terror of Mussolini’s fascist regime. After the Second World War, the victories of Tito’s army enabled the accession of all Croatian ethnic territories to the communist Yugoslavia. However, Trieste and Gorizia remained under Italian authority. Despite the decision of superpowers to leave Carinthia under Austria after the Second World War, the majority of Slovenians were united within the communist Yugoslavia.

After the Second World War, Yugoslavia remained on the eastern side of the iron curtain. This also left Slovenia outside the integration process which had started in the Western Europe. Tito, however, skilfully exploited the fame he acquired during the war as a rebel against Hitler. For this reason, he was almost always a welcomed guest of western politicians. Nevertheless, the system introduced in the new Yugoslavia did not have anything in common with the tradition of western liberal democracies, although in 1948, it parted from the Soviet leader Stalin. Quite the opposite: after

the dispute with the Communist Information Bureau, Yugoslavia was struck by a new wave of collectivisation and nationalisation of the assets. By this, Tito probably wanted to prove that he was a better communist than his former role model. This was certainly not a good omen for the future. However, at least in one area, Tito's charm contributed to a bigger consolidation of the country than his predecessors, the Karađorđević dynasty, managed to achieve: a federation. For quite some decades, the communist ideology prevailed over former national conflicts and it seemed as though Tito's concept of brotherhood and unity was going to neutralise even the old Croatian-Serbian conflicts. Tito's death shattered this illusion as well.

In 1980s, with the rise of Slobodan Milošević, who openly flirted with traditional territorial plans of Big Serbia while defending a communist posture, the perception of Slovenian democratic intellectuals prevailed that it was necessary to find a way out of the Balkans. In the eyes of Slovenian democrats, the perspective of joining the European integration process meant a possibility to maintain Slovenian national uniqueness and democratic values. The first to publically draw attention to this fact was France Bučar, PhD, who in early 1988 at the European Parliament invited all European politicians to stop supporting the communist Yugoslavia. Slovenian communists therefore declared Bučar a "national traitor". Despite the threats of armed Yugoslav generals, the Pan-European idea and democratic processes in Slovenia could no longer be stopped. In the summer of 1991, following the ten-day war against the Yugoslav Army, Slovenia returned to Central Europe and confidently stepped on its path to the European Union.

Obviously, the Slovenians made a good use of the historic opportunity which appeared in the late 1980s upon the break of real socialist systems and the end of the Cold War. They became a nation state. On 15 January 1992, the then twelve European member countries recognised Slovenia as an independent and sovereign country. In the core of Slovenian endeavours to establish an independent country, it was clearly recognised that Slovenia had to join Euro-Atlantic structures as soon as possible.

Slovenia was not a problematic candidate, so that it was often highlighted as an "exceptionally good student". It demanded only a short transition period and very few exceptions, i.e. only in the areas where they were necessary (agriculture, environment, fiscal and social policy, free movement of goods, services and capital, energy and regional policy). It should be kept in mind that in comparison to the former European fifteen member countries, the role of Slovenia was small and mainly that the EU was not joining Slovenia, but quite the opposite. The EU had a positive attitude towards Slovenia's intentions. Nevertheless, Slovenia had to adhere to the rules and standards valid for the EU, if it wanted to join the EU. Considering the deep roots of the Slovenian nation in the European history and tradition, it is not surprising that, in the referendum of 23 March 1990, almost 90 per cent of voters voted in favour of Slovenia's accession to the EU (Kodelja, 2004).

Ever since the first steps towards the EU's enlargement towards Central and South Europe, a viewpoint prevailed in member countries as well as in member candidates that the enlargement will have a positive impact on all. In candidate countries, versatile preparations to enter the EU have substantially accelerated and deepened democratisation and economic modernisation processes. Above all, an enlargement would enable these countries to return to the political, economic and security community they had always belonged to and from which they were forcibly torn after the Second World War. On the other hand, the enlargement was a great opportunity especially for companies from old EU member countries looking for new markets to sell their products and services, as well as investments. In addition, an opinion prevailed that enlargement also provided an enhancement of the EU as a global actor.

2 GLOBAL ROLE OF THE EU AND THE ENLARGEMENT PROCESS

The Maastricht Treaty enables each European country complying with the listed standards to apply for membership. Upon its establishment, fifty years ago, the European structure had six members and it joined 200 million people. Since the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, the EU has had as many as 27 members and its population has reached the number of half of billion. According to the *deepening and widening* principle, the EU successfully underwent all enlargements. At the same time, each enlargement also meant a step ahead towards its internal homogenisation: following the enlargement towards the south in 1980s, a joint market was established, and following the accession of Nordic countries and Austria in 1990s, the Common Foreign and Security Policy was reinforced. After the "big enlargement", important measures were adopted in the field of justice and internal affairs. The very fact that the number of countries interested in accessing to the EU increased, constantly increased the influence of the EU worldwide.

Following the constitutional crisis, which ended with the Irish referendum last November, conditions were created for further enhancement of the EU. Of course, the EU was not the only one striving for a bigger influence on the developments in the world. There are many doubts in this case as well. Just before his death, the constitutional father of the Pan-European movement, Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote: "The entire European history shows that the Europeans are one of the most capable and hard-working branch of mankind and a unified Europe will someday become one of cultural and economic leading parts of our planet." As he wrote this, the Europe was still divided by the iron curtain which was according to Coudenhove-Kalergi one of the key obstacles towards the reinforcement of Europe's role in the world: "Until millions of Europeans rest under the communist rule on the other side of the iron curtain, it seems that Europe will have a hard time defending itself from the hostile world." (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 2006 p. 456).

The first condition set by Coudenhove-Kalergi has been fulfilled for two decades. However, after the break of the bipolar world regime, another important transformation

occurred in the international environment. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the world received one single superpower, which seemed as though it was going to keep its advantage for a long time. The West began to enlarge towards the former East and new members joined the North Atlantic Alliance. It seemed as though the model of liberal-democratic rule was going to prevail in most of the countries. American philosopher Francis Fukuyama even wrote about the end of the history. His thesis was first refuted by the wars in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

But if the Balkan wars affirmed the great military power of the USA, which was in the end demonstrated through the bombing of Belgrade, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown that competition to the superpower again occurred. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall until today, when America is led by the first black president in the history, its position has changed significantly in comparison to other global actors. In the Far East, another superpower developed which represents a serious threat to the advantage of the USA in the world, and is also a rival to the EU. We are talking about China, which came out a winner of the global financial crisis. The economic development of China in the last decades has been impressive. This homeland of the “authoritarian regime” is just on the verge of replacing Japan in the place of world’s second largest economy. The influence of China is also increasingly evident in the international policy. Africa is a very instructive case. Instead of the EU exploiting its geographic proximity and historical experiences to its own advantage, the China is becoming the key actor in the black continent. Of course, it is not only China which strives for a larger role in the international politics.

With the crisis following the unsuccessful referendums on the Constitutional Treaty, it seemed for a few years as though the Europeans were losing hope into the success of the European integration project, as it was envisaged. On the other hand, we can see that others too have followed the European integration model. As early as during the pre-election campaign, the present Japanese president Jukio Hatoyama referred to the ideas of Coudenhove-Kalergi, who is related to Asia through his “Japanese mother”. Following the model of Coudenhove-Kalergi in the Far East, Hatoyama would like to create something more than just a tendency towards the removal of customs obstacles and introduction of a common currency. What he considers as crucial in the integration process, is to nourish solidarity among Asian nations and to enforce the concept of “brotherhood” (Dickie, 2009).

Today, we witness an intensive discussion about people and means which the European Union will use to implement the provisions of the *Lisbon Treaty* in the foreign policy area. However, we should not be so much interested in the discussion about who had been chosen as EU President and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and how diplomatic teams in the *European External Relations Service* will be manned. We should be more interested in what will be the concept of the EU’s foreign policy performance. Future attempts regarding enlargement towards the Western Balkans can play a crucial role in this.

3 SLOVENIA'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE WESTERN BALKANS AND EU POLICY

During the EU accession period, Slovenian political elite exercised restraint regarding initiatives of international partners to assume a more active role in the developments in former Yugoslavia. However, upon joining the EU, its perception of the region changed. Of course, in the period of Yugoslavia, the majority of Slovenian export was oriented towards Serbia, Croatia and other former republics. The secession with Milošević and bloody interethnic conflicts which followed destabilised the entire region and also cut former trade links. Numerous Slovenian companies were faced with new game rules which had a negative impact on their financial situation. On the other hand, for a long time, Slovenia had been a part of different "Balkan packages" which tried to reinforce its bond with the region, yet they strongly pushed it away from the possibility to join the EU.

When it became clear that Slovenia was going to join the EU in 2004 together with other Central European countries, it assumed a more relaxed attitude towards the former common country. As early as in 2002, the first official programme document underlining the need for a more active role of Slovenia in the Western Balkans was drafted under the authority of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Dimitrij Rupel. It had a characteristic title: *Primerna zunanja politika (Appropriate Foreign Policy)* (Rupel, 2004). The satisfaction over the fact that Slovenia made a part of the most prestigious European club, did not refrain Slovenian politicians from supporting the accession to the EU of Albania and other former Yugoslav countries. Their EU interest for South Eastern Europe was growing stronger even when the state of mind in Brussels offices and halls did not promise any radical moves regarding further EU enlargement.

After 2004, there were quite a few men of influence in EU political circles, who were so "tired" from the past enlargement that they wanted to close EU doors right after the accession of Romania and Bulgaria (some even before that). However, there were also quite a few who were less "tired" and supported in principle the open-door policy. However, in practice they acted in favour of a delayed enlargement. The latter were more favourable to the integration of all Balkan countries in a package, since they believed that such integration would be slower than the integration of separate countries.

Personally, I do not belong among those who claim that Slovenia has a great potential to develop under the EU umbrella into one of key actors in the Western Balkans, due to its special historical experience and language similarities. It is a fact that the realisation of such ambitions does not depend only on Slovenia. The reasons for this can be found not only in its demographic and economical and financial restraints, but also in the increasing enterprise of other actors (Vidmajer, 2010). This does not include only largest European countries, which have been traditionally present in the region. From the Slovenian perspective, attention must also be drawn to the fact

that, following the disintegration of Yugoslavia, many a smaller Central European country increased their influence in the region substantially: Austria and Slovakia are two typical examples.

An important role here is attributed to the fact that none of the aforementioned countries had unsettled debts with Croatia. On the other hand, conflicts between Slovenia and Croatia do not have any long historical background and have exclusively been provoked by unsettled legal relations upon the disintegration of the former common county. However, from a realistic point of view, this very conflict has from the beginning prevented Slovenia from enforcing itself more confidently as a benevolent mediator between Brussels and the Western Balkans. In the future, Croatia would like to assume this role and assert itself as a credible partner after the waning of Belgrade as a regional centre.

Slovenia's attempts to use stricter policy when assessing Croatia's fulfilment of conditions for the accession to the EU have forced its south neighbour to assume a more compromise attitude regarding the border dispute. However, these attempts continuously collide against the general wish of the majority of EU countries to accept Croatia to the European family as the next in the "Yugoslav package". This has put Slovenia into an unenviable position. On one hand, it in principle supports EU enlargement towards the Western Balkans, but, on the other hand, this attitude prevents it from assuming a more determined approach to Croatia as far as accession criteria are concerned. Not to even mention the fact, that after gaining independence, Slovenia itself soon found out how accession mechanisms could be used for the settlement of bilateral issues.

In the first half of 2008, Slovenia assumed EU Council Presidency with the heritage of dispute with Croatia and, in addition, it still had to settle the unfinished business with Kosovo. The latter was not its primary responsibility, but a consequence of hesitation of the international community to cut the last major Balkan knot. In this complicated case, Slovenia played a double role. On one hand, it was responsible, as presiding country, to endeavour for unification of positions of all EU countries. On the other hand, however, it could not avoid the fact that due to historical circumstance, its position differed from the positions of other countries. This was well demonstrated when a group of Serbian protesters also chose Slovenian embassy to demonstrate its protest against Slovenia's recognition of Kosovo. The solutions that Slovenian diplomacy managed to enforce in Kosovo as common European, aimed at finding the lowest common denominator. Such approach demands more reconciliation and more time. However, at the moment, due to EU members' interests, this is the only way which enables a gradual continuation of the enlargement process.

At this point, Slovenia's manoeuvre space does not differ a great deal from the Austrian, Slovakian and those of smaller countries who have lately increased their influence in the Western Balkans. On the formal level, their influence too depends mostly on the decisions in Brussels, but mainly on diplomatic actions of Paris,

Berlin, London and some others. The decision-making process at this level was described in detail in the last book by former Slovenian foreign minister Rupel, when he presented the dilemmas of the international community regarding the recognition of Kosovo during Slovenia's EU Presidency (Rupel, 2009).

Is thus the fact that Slovenia constitutes a part of the region an advantage or a disadvantage? Slovenian diplomats believe both. This can be concluded on the basis of statements by Vojko Volk in the introduction of the already quoted coordinator for the Western Balkans at the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "Our advantage is the fact that we speak common language, we are thoroughly acquainted with the circumstances. The infrastructure of Western Balkan countries was mainly constructed by the same Slovenian companies: the secrets of electrical connections are known to Iskra, the secrets of all hydroelectric power stations in the Balkans are known to Litostroj. We were not able to dissipate these advantages in the years when we fled from the Balkans, therefore they remained. However, in the European Union, this is not always an advantage. In particular, when decisions are made regarding EU representatives in the Balkans, such as special EU representatives to individual countries (EUSR) or in peace operations, such as Eulex. We have been contaminated." (Volk, 2010)

4 EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

I borrowed the title of the last chapter from the name of a centre established by the Slovenian government five years ago to be able to more actively support the European perspectives of Western Balkan countries. And what are those perspectives? Recently, in his very interesting book, an American strategic analyst George Friedman wrote about what the world is going to be like in 100 years. He also evaluated power ratio in the Balkans. He established that, in 2045, the "Polish bloc" will prevail, also searching its bases by the Adriatic Sea. In order to fulfil this ambition, it will expand its control to Rijeka, thereby including Slovenia and Croatia. According to Friedman, Slovenia and Croatia themselves would ask Poland to intervene in order to protect them from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, Poland will not want to include Serbia into its bloc, since it could include them into Serbian political conflicts. Friedman also forecasted that the chief competition to Poland for the rule in the Adriatic and Mediterranean area will not be Serbia, but Turkey. Turkey would be interested in renewing the influence of the former Ottoman Empire (Friedman, 2009). Of course, the scenario goes beyond the imagination of an average observer of the situation in the region. However, it serves as a warning of the biggest constant defining the relations in the Balkans: many actors and diversity of interests.

If we now take a look at the short-term estimations, we must first establish that, in the last two years, despite the complications regarding the status of Kosovo (or because of that), Serbia has made several important steps as far as its way to EU integration is concerned. This is also proven by last year's report on the progress and the EU's

“Christmas gift” regarding cancellation of visas. The constructive role of Serbia in the stabilisation of situation in the Western Balkans will enable a more effective operation of the EU in joint projects with countries in the region.

Also due to the emphasised Serbian reactions, supported by its traditional ally, Russia, the Kosovo knot, which loosened up during Slovenian EU Presidency, for a while completely outshined other problems in the region. I do not refer so much to Greek demands regarding the name of its northern neighbour, but to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the end of EU Presidency, when Slovenian diplomacy focused mainly on the Kosovo problem, the then Slovenian President of the Government Janez Janša warned that the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina should not be underestimated. This is also proven by the recent complications regarding the repeatedly announced referendum in Republika Srpska as well as some precipitated words about the intervention of troops of one of the neighbouring countries. The hardly obtained stability in the ethnically and religiously mixed country, which was during the times of Tito's Yugoslavia the role model of those defending “brotherhood and unity” and later a scene of most horrifying crimes in Europe after the Second World War, is not something that goes without saying.

We are only a few years away from the 100th anniversary of the Sarajevo assassination, which in 1914 provoked the ultimate explosion of the Balkan powder keg and pushed the world into the biggest world conflict thus far. The year 2014 should serve as a warning and encouragement that stability in the region is directly connected to its progress within the EU. Also in the future, the establishment will prevail that a successful development of the Western Balkans is not solely the responsibility of one or two countries in the region, nor one or two countries in the EU. Only joint efforts will be of use to the region. They will improve the conditions for the continuation of the enlargement process and reinforce the EU's global role.

It seems as though Pahor's government has perceived the reinforcement of Slovenian role in the Western Balkans as the most important inner political priority. The “personal trilateral” meeting Pahor-Kosor-Tadić in Ptuj on 5 March 2010, when the three politicians smiled at the public at a press conference organised in the Ptuj Castle in front of the internationally renowned collection of Turkish art, portraits from the Ottoman Empire, demonstrated big ambitions of the Slovenian government. For a moment, it seemed as though the old formula of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SHS) could repeat itself within the common European perspective of all three countries. However, this time, the order would be quite the opposite of the one characteristic of the one-month country of south Slaves from the Habsburg Monarchy back in 1918. The abbreviation SHS back then put the Slovenians and not the Serbs in the first place. The new Slovenian confidence is the result of the fact that Slovenia is already an EU member; Croatia will join in the near future, while the Serbs are only just waiting for a so-called EU-questionnaire from Brussels, which will take a few years to settle. The first step has been made with the conference at Brdo near Kranj. Whether a “Brdo Process” will develop from this, which will

ultimately provide a relatively quick EU accession for the entire region, will not only depend on Slovenia, but on those who sat at the same table on 20 March 2010. It will also and mainly depend on those who were not present at Brdo.

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AZERBAJDŽAN IN NOVI SISTEM EVROPSKE VARNOSTI

AZERBAIJAN AND A NEW SYSTEM OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

Professional article

Povzetek Članek obravnava črnomoško varnostno območje in varnostno vizijo Azerbajdžana v okviru Evropske unije.

Črnomoško varnostno območje s številnih vidikov vpliva na različna področja, zato obstaja tudi mnogo okoliščin, ki lahko vplivajo na varnost.

Avtor meni, da ima Azerbajdžan dobre možnosti, da prispeva k večji varnosti. V tem članku primerja Slovenijo in Azerbajdžan z vidika varnostnih vprašanj, in sicer v smislu primerov dobre prakse ter načina, kako se lahko majhna država uveljavi in skupaj z drugimi prispeva svoj delež k varnosti Evropske unije.

Ključne besede *Azerbajdžan, črnomoško varnostno območje, Evropska unija, varnost, Slovenija.*

Abstract Article focuses on Black sea security region and Azerbaijan's security vision in the frame of European Union.

Black sea security region presents an area with broad spectrum of influences on many different fields thus the circumstances having impact on security are also many.

According by the author Azerbaijan has good issues to achieve some benefit in security aspects. The author made the comparison between Slovenia and Azerbaijan since both are an example of good practices and way of small country can find and contribute with others in case of European Union.

Key words *Azerbaijan, Black Sea Security region, European Union, security, Slovenia.*

Introduction Azerbaijan's participation in this process is due to several factors which are of crucial geopolitical, geo-economic, geo-cultural, geo-environmental and military importance. The issue can be considered in two different aspects. The first aspect is the role of Azerbaijan and its contribution as an independent and self-sufficient country

to the creation of the new architecture of European security. The second aspect is Azerbaijan's role as a member of regional geopolitical, geo-economic, geo-cultural, politico-military and other structures. One cannot say that at the present stage of world development, there are absolutely independent countries – they are all interconnected with each other “to such an extent that humanity is perceived as a complex, open and non-linear system”. The components of these systems are interconnected, and the existence of one depends on the existence of others. These “others” can be geographically located in the neighborhood or at a distance of thousands of kilometers. Figuratively speaking, our world has become very “sensitive” in all aspects of life, both at the level of society and humanity. For these reasons, it would be more constructive and effective to analyze the role of Azerbaijan in the creation of new European security architecture in the context of regional integration. By “region” we mean the Black Sea-Caspian basin. Both Western and Russian politicians and analysts see the Black Sea and Caspian basins as a single whole – all models of security focus on a single system of the Black Sea-Caspian basin. Such an approach is due to several factors, above all, energy factors and general characteristics of the globalization process. We are not going to focus on description of these factors – sufficient information could be found in many researches¹ (Adiyev, Ryabtsev).

Let's make two preliminary comments of methodological nature. Firstly, by security system we understand a regulatory mechanism, within the framework of which all conditions leading to emergence of differences, disputes and conflicts between the states would be brought to minimum. Thus, security system – is a dynamic condition of interactions among the states in given geographical area.

It is clear that system of monitoring must be in place for providing security. Essentially this system is a formation of a network of “measurement points” of the situation in all countries of the region with single organizational and conceptual “not”. According to international practice, direct way of achieving this is application of trust-building measures and initiation of multifaceted cooperation between the states. Secondly, in contrast to the approach taken by some experts who see the Black Sea-Caspian region as a buffer zone between Russia and the West, for Azerbaijan the operational definition of the term “Black Sea-Caspian region” is as follows: a region that unites the East and the West. In this regard, it would be appropriate to consider, first of all, Azerbaijan's role in creating the new architecture of European security through a prism of trans-national energy projects. Almost all Russian and Western experts, including experts from NATO, consider the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum projects as the main factors influencing the formation of a new security system in the Black Sea-Caspian basin that unites the east and west of the region. Moreover, almost all leading Western politicians and statesmen are talking about the special role of Azerbaijan in the Nabucco project precisely in the context of ensuring the energy security of Europe. This point is also considered in the context of regional cooperation which covers the entire Black

¹ See more *Black Sea Forum supports the dialogue and cooperation. Monday, Weekly edition of South-Caucasian Institute of regional security. 2006, № 21, (June). P.3-4.*

Sea-Caspian basin. Thus, on 7 August 2008, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said while making a joint statement on the results of his bilateral meeting with Romanian President Traian Basescu in Baku: “Our energy policy is aimed at strengthening peace, stability and security in the region. Azerbaijan will continue its efforts towards ensuring the energy security of Europe.” The Azerbaijani president also stressed the need for joint steps aimed at strengthening cooperation between the states of the Caspian and Black Sea basins. During a meeting with Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov on 10 November 2008 (ahead of the Baku Economic Forum), the EU Commissioner for Energy Andris Piebalgs said that “Azerbaijan plays an important role in ensuring Europe’s energy security.”² He called his visit to Ankara, Baku and Ashgabat a “Nabucco journey”. The EU commissioner clearly stated that “my intent is to confirm to the senior leadership of these countries the political commitment of the European Union to the Nabucco project”³. He also spoke about the new EU document “Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan”. This once again proves that the energy factor plays a significant role in ensuring Europe’s security. It is precisely this moment that takes centre stage in Azerbaijan’s role in establishing a new European security system. But the role of our country does not end here. The situation in the region is very complicated and differs by the presence of some contradictions of a geopolitical nature. NATO experts (who?) are talking about this specifically. Assessing the situation, they come to the conclusion that it is impossible to clearly determine the vector of the development of the situation in the Black Sea-Caspian basin today. According to the experts (who?), although there are significant integration factors that contribute to the unification of the regional countries, we should not forget about the unique characteristics of region. Due to the complexity of the situation, it is a tool in the geopolitical game. Therefore, it requires personal attention to its problems. In other words, the Black Sea-Caspian basin is a site of the conflict of interests of various security systems.

1 AZERBAIJAN AND ITS FOREIGN POLICY

Azerbaijan considers this to be a significant point in its foreign policy. The strategy of Azerbaijan’s participation in the creation of a new security system includes the principle of the balance of geopolitical forces. Today, NATO and the EU have no well-established strategy for the Black Sea-Caspian basin. Moreover, they emphasize that access to the Black Sea is a strategic priority for Russia. On the other hand, the West considers the expansion of relations between regional countries and Euro-Atlantic organizations as promising. Azerbaijan, meanwhile, is pursuing a policy of strengthening and expanding mutually beneficial cooperation between producing countries, transit countries and consumers of energy resources and of creating the necessary enabling environment for the implementation of regional projects. To this end, Baku reinforces its policy of diversifying oil and gas supply routes from the Caspian basin to world and European markets via the Black Sea basin. In this

² See more at <http://kavkaz-uzel>, 11.11.2008.

³ See more at <http://energyland.info>, 09.11.2008.

context, one can mention Azerbaijan's real steps to build the Odessa-Brody pipeline in the Euro-Asian oil transportation corridor for oil supplies to Europe, to establish a new institutional structure for the Sarmatia international pipeline company in order to implement the Odessa-Brody-Plock-Gdansk oil pipeline project and its efforts to implement joint projects on gas transit to Europe via Georgia and Turkey, including the Turkey-Greece-Italy interconnector, Nabucco, etc. At the same time, Azerbaijan is actively involved in programmes such as Partnership for Peace, Stability Pact and Black Sea Initiative, focusing in particular on specific programmes and initiatives. Azerbaijan actively supports initiatives to establish a Caspian-Black Sea-Baltic energy transit area for joint efforts to ensure reliable and safe transportation of energy resources. Admittedly, this is a serious contribution to the creation of a new European security system. Azerbaijan's commitment to this policy is most clearly seen against the background of the many years of struggle between the various security systems of the Black Sea-Caspian basin. It is known that on the initiative of Romania, the debate resumed on security and cooperation in the Black Sea basin in the spring of 2006. This issue was considered in the context of the programme "European Neighborhood Policy." As part of this approach, an international conference on interregional cooperation in the Black Sea was held on 30 March 2006 in the Romanian city of Constanta. On 5 June 2006, the summit "The Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership" was held in Bucharest. The summit was attended by Black Sea heads of state, foreign ministers of EU member states, representatives of the United States, Israel, several international and regional organizations, businesses and experts⁴. The organizers of the event made no secret that the security problem of the Black Sea-Caspian basin is considered "in the context of processes of Euro-Atlantic integration". However, this action was not continued. Perhaps, apart from Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), no other international Black Sea organization functioned effectively. Azerbaijan actively participates in the work of this organization which was initiated by Turkey. One could also note the work of the Danube Commission and the International Black Sea Club, but unlike BSEC, they have not been remembered for their performance. Caucasus as part of Europe In terms of creating a system of regional security in the Caucasus, more has been offered. Several options for establishing a security system have been initiated here. In early June 1996, Russia proposed a Big Caucasus model. But then, things were limited to a purely declaratory document "For interethnic accord, peace, economic and cultural cooperation in the Caucasus". Further events continued according to a different scenario. From 1999, several projects appeared at once: "Troika" (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan), "Ten" (Russia, the three Transcaucasian states, two trans-Caspian states – Iran and Turkey, the EU and US), Caucasus Cooperation Forum (US project), the OSCE project (1999, Istanbul) and the Stability Pact for the Caucasus (2000, Turkey). Ankara resumed the latter after the August 2008 events between Georgia and Russia. The authors of all these projects gave Azerbaijan a central role in the creation of a Caucasus security system. Baku itself has always taken a balanced position in regard to these projects and in parallel, has carried out specific policies

⁴ See more at *Black Sea Forum supports the dialogue and cooperation // Monday, Weekly edition of South-Caucasian Institute of regional security. 2006, № 21, (June). P.3-4.*

for regional integration with a strategy of integration into the Euro-Atlantic area. Finally, Iran made two proposals to establish a security system, but none of them was crowned with success. Attempts were made by Russia and the United States. They are all still valid. But Azerbaijan continues to react to these initiatives with restraint (Ryabtsev, 2003; Zaslavskiy, 2005; Matveyev).

2 AZERBAIJAN AND SLOVENIA AS AN EXAMPLE FOR EUROPEAN UNION AND BLACK SEA REGION

Thus, despite rivalry between different security models in the Black Sea-Caspian basin, Azerbaijan has consistently maintained its policy of participation in the creation of a new European security system. Of course, Baku does not neglect proposals by its closest neighbors - for example, the same project by Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev to establish a new model of the European security system, of which the West is wary, and Turkey's Caucasus Stability Pact. But Baku considers them in the context of more meaningful participation in the new architecture of the European security system. In the new concept of its security, the West prefers multi-polar world models, which implies closer cooperation between all major geopolitical forces of the planet, including joint action by major military blocs - NATO and the CSTO. In this approach, the Black Sea-Caspian basin is seen as a geopolitical area that unites the West and the East. The most acute problem in this way is, perhaps, the unresolved conflicts. The "frozen conflicts" seriously hinder the process of establishing a security system in Europe. As a country that has suffered from such a problem, Azerbaijan is extremely interested in their prompt resolution. In this context, we can say that Azerbaijan's role will become more meaningful and productive after the settlement of the Nagorny Karabakh problem.

Successful creation of the Black Sea/Caspian Region Security System is impossible without considering geopolitical and military factors of neighboring regions. From this aspect the Balkan Peninsula is of primary importance by two reasons. First, this region was a field of fierce political and military struggle between the West and Russia until recently. Secondly, today the Balkan Peninsula states have different levels of economic, political and military development. But at the same time they are members of NATO and EC: Greece, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria are the members of the European Union and Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia are the members of NATO. The Balkan Peninsula is washed by the Mediterranean Sea, Adriatic Sea, Ionian Sea, Aegean Sea and Black Sea in the southwest, south and south-east. Thus, the Black Sea/Caspian Basin security is ultimately interconnected with the whole European security. And some countries of the Balkan Peninsula are in fact interlinks in this process.

Certain parallels can be drawn and comparative analysis of prospects of creation of the Black Sea/Caspian basin security system can be made by the example of Slovenia. We could also conduct comparative analysis of the role of Slovenia and Azerbaijan in creation of security system, bearing in mind that these two small

countries have common history of gaining independent statehood and commonality of geopolitical interests.

Owing to its membership in NATO for example Slovenia carries out one of the most important objectives of foreign policy it has set after declaration of independence. These objectives were determined at an intersection of three factors: adherence to NATO values, adherence to strategic interests in the field of security of Slovenia and action within national interests of Slovenia. Development of the policy of collective defense, military transformation and strategic partnership relations focuses on adherence to these three factors. This also determines common spirit of foreign policy of Slovenia in the field of security and partnership relations with other states. By example of this country it is possible to find out the dynamics of development of cooperation of the European countries with the countries of the Black Sea-Caspian basin in the field of safety. Dynamics of development of cooperation of Slovenia and Azerbaijan on this side draws attention of experts. Azerbaijan stresses the close cooperation with Slovenia both on a bilateral basis, and within the international and regional organizations, including the European Union, OSCE and NATO. Slovenia was one of the first European countries recognized the independence of Azerbaijan. Histories of independence of Slovenia and Azerbaijan also are similar. Both countries over a long period of time were the parts of other countries and achieved the state independence almost simultaneously.

The efforts of Azerbaijan and Slovenia in a direction of maintenance of energy assurance of Europe influence the dynamics of development of inter-regional integration. During the first visit to Azerbaijan, the president of Slovenia Danilo Turk has some times paid attention to this question. In the light of development of cooperation of the European Union with Azerbaijan Slovenia looks at the prospects of development of cooperation with Azerbaijan. Slovenia and Azerbaijan make every endeavor for strengthening of good neighborhood communications, safety, cooperation and mutual respect between the countries of the Black Sea-Caspian basin and Balkan States. In this aspect stable and successful Azerbaijan playing a key role in the region, has exclusive value for Europe and all world. By means of creative and open dialogue, Azerbaijan and Slovenia with the same persistence which they showed till now will continue to bring the contribution to creation of new system of the European security.

Ivo H. Daalder, US Ambassador to NATO, giving a speech titled "NATO's Partnership" in Vilnius on January 15, 2010 said: "History has taught the United States that security risks in the Western Balkans, the Caucasus – even Central Asia – cannot be ignored by America or NATO, and that the security of all of Europe is integral to the national security of both the United States and NATO." Further, the Ambassador noted the following: "NATO partnerships have never been a threat to Russia, which should understand that it can benefit from democracy, stability, and prosperity in its neighborhood." From this aspect the USA – Europe (including the Western Balkans) – Black Sea Basin – Caucasus – Central Asia is integral parts of

a uniform system of global security. All this indicates that at the present historical stage the security issue has global character and here dialogue diplomacy must play a key role in order that all countries of the world could take advantages of democracy, stability and prosperity in their neighborhood.

The initiative of the European Union “East partnership” offers new challenges for our cooperation. The efforts of Azerbaijan in a direction of maintenance of energy assurance of Europe influence the dynamics of development of inter-regional integration. The European Union tend to more active cooperation with the neighbors on Caucasus. To that end we should make active encouragement of this cooperation which will provide the steady peace, stability, safety and well-being on our continent. Azerbaijan makes every endeavor for strengthening of good neighborhood communications, safety, cooperation and mutual respect between the countries of the Black Sea-Caspian basin. In this aspect stable and successful Azerbaijan playing a key role in the region, has exclusive value for Europe and all world. By means of creative and open dialogue, Azerbaijan with the same persistence which they showed till now will continue to bring the contribution to creation of new system of the European security.

Conclusion Thus, the question of formation of architecture of the European safety is very difficult, and assumes to consider set of factors. In this context, actual mechanisms of a combination of systems of safety of the Black Sea-Caspian basin and the countries of the Central and Southeast Europe are represented (Balkan Peninsula). Geographical countries of the Central and Southeast Europe are connecting link between EU and the Black Sea-Caspian region. Collective defense, military transformation and development of strategic partnership – are highlights of this integration. Harmonization and realization of these purposes in many respects depends on dialogue diplomacy being effective. It is an essential moment. Mutual understanding of military blocs directly depends on this factor. Also, skilled diplomats, analysts, politicians (for example, Z.Bzejnsky) and experts during last times often speak about necessity of dialogue between the NATO and CSTO. Dialogue diplomacy in this process is unique civilized and democratic way of dialogue. This problem has difficult structure of itself and in its solution all parties should show a high sense of responsibility, mutual respect, justice and professionalism. Doubtless the Management of public diplomacy created in the structure of NATO, will play a key role in the formation of the general mechanism of dialogue diplomacy in the process of creation of new system of the European safety. We are firmly convinced that Azerbaijan’s role in creation of a European security system will largely depend on prospects of dialog diplomacy.

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TRANSFORMACIJA REGIONALNEGA SODELOVANJA NA PODROČJU OBRAMBNIH REFORM – ŠTUDIJA PRIMERA CLEARINGHOUSE ZA JUGOVZHODNO EVROPO

TRANSFORMATION OF REGIONAL COOPERATION IN DEFENCE REFORMS – A CASE STUDY OF SOUTHEAST EUROPE CLEARINGHOUSE

Professional article

Povzetek Regionalno obrambno sodelovanje na območju Jugovzhodne Evrope je razvejano in raznovrstno. Tudi Republika Slovenija ima bogato tradicijo sodelovanja v regionalnih pobudah. Z vidika praktičnih oblik sodelovanja na Zahodnem Balkanu ima posebno vlogo pobuda Clearinghouse za Jugovzhodno Evropo (JVE), v kateri ima strateško vodilno vlogo, skupaj z ZDA, prav Slovenija. Dejstvo, da je bistveni člen regionalne povezave, pa predstavlja vrsto izzivov in priložnosti. Pobuda je presegla prvotno zastavljene cilje, saj je odprla nove možnosti regionalnega sodelovanja, nova konkretna in dolgoročna orodja za krepitev regionalne stabilnosti in integriranega sodelovanja, močno pa je okrepila tudi prepoznavnost, ugled in zaznavanje profesionalnosti slovenskih predstavnikov in države kot celote.

Pobuda se je zaradi neformalne narave in izjemne prilagodljivosti pokazala kot pospeševalnik različnih oblik in vsebin regionalnega sodelovanja sploh. Slovenija, razen z vidika svoje vodilne vloge, ni znala dovolj izkoristiti možnosti sodelovanja v pobudi, delno tudi zaradi slabe odzivnosti in nezadostne ravni ambicij obrambnega resorja. Predvideni sprejem nacionalnih strateških dokumentov za delovanje na Zahodnem Balkanu bo najbrž ena zadnjih priložnosti za bolj usmerjen, prepoznaven, prožen, integriran in učinkovit pristop države k obrambnemu sodelovanju v regiji.

Ključne besede *Zahodni Balkan, regionalno sodelovanje, obrambne reforme, Clearinghouse za Jugovzhodno Evropo, regionalni projekti, regionalni centri, izmenjava primerljivih izkušenj, pragmatični pristop.*

Abstract Regional defence cooperation in Southeast Europe is diverse. Slovenia has a rich tradition of cooperation in regional initiatives. From perspective of practical cooperation in the Western Balkans the Southeast Europe Clearinghouse initiative, where United States and Slovenia play a strategic leadership role, has a special place. This fact presents many challenges and opportunities.

The initiative has outgrown initial expectations and goals, since it opened up new perspectives for regional cooperation, while introducing new specific and long-term tools for strengthening regional cooperation. It also strengthened the visibility, recognition and the perception of professionalism of Slovenian representatives and the country as a whole. The informal character and extreme adaptability helped make the initiative a facilitator of various forms and topics of regional cooperation. Slovenia, beside having a clear lead role, failed to fully use the opportunities within the initiative, partly because of slow recognition and low level of ambition within the defence system. The anticipated adoption of national strategic documents on priority cooperation in the Western Balkans may present one of the last opportunities for a more focused, recognizable, flexible, integrated and effective approach towards cooperation in the field of defence reforms in the region.

Key words *Western Balkans, regional cooperation, defence reforms, Southeast Europe Clearinghouse, regional projects, regional centres, exchange of comparable experiences, pragmatic approach.*

Introduction Contemporary international security environment is characterized by the presence of transnational sources of threats that increase inter-dependence of the international community entities¹. Countries develop similar threat perceptions which may also lead to connecting national interests and common efforts towards common goals (Murray and Viotti, 1994, p. 10, Plano and Olton, 1988, p. 10–11). With the end of the Cold War and the changed nature of conflicts, regional security cooperation has been gaining in importance² (Anastasakis and Bojicic-Dzelilovic, 2002, p. 1) and has become a permanent element of contemporary international relations (Svetlozar, 2009, p. 85).

In accordance with the United Nations Charter, regional cooperation is a major tool for addressing political and economic issues, before they develop into challenges requiring global response. Moreover, cooperation among countries belongs to one of the ten principles of the Decalogue of the Helsinki Final Act of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) which govern relations among countries. The countries have undertaken the commitment to promote mutual understanding, good neighbouring relations and international peace, security and justice, and to improve the living conditions for the population. To this end, regions³ have

¹ See also the Resolution on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia adopted on 26 March 2010, RS Official Gazette, nr. 27/2010 dated 2. 4. 2010.

² More on the regional security theory at: Buzan, Barry, 1991. *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post Cold War Era*. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Lake, David in Morgan, Patrick, 1997. *The New Regionalism in Security affairs*. In: Lake, David in Morgan, Patrick, ed. *Regional Orders*. The Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania.

³ There are various definitions of the term region acc. to Morgan (1997, p. 25–26). However, there are individual key elements indicating its existence, i.e. specific awareness level of its members and the environment about the existence of the region, geographical vicinity and interaction, inter-dependence of its members, a certain level of autonomy in relation to the global system and a high level of political, economic and cultural similarity. Regional cooperation is, after all, the reflection of external, international factors and internal dynamics (Anastasakis and Bojicic-Dzelilovic, 2002, p. 2).

developed appropriate institutional structures and cooperation regimes, in particular intra-regional initiatives, which advance greater coherence of the region and establish common values and the feeling of loyalty. The more successful they are in this process, the greater the chance that cooperation will be successful (Šabič and Bojinović, 2007, p. 317–318, and Svetlozar, 2009, p. 88).

Initially, it is necessary to stress the limited ambitions of this article, the purpose of which is not to provide a comprehensive overview of various initiatives in the region, although this issue would deserve a special debate, but rather to deal with a special case of the Republic of Slovenia, which through its Ministry of Defence (MO) identified and found its regional opportunity, and in a successful, innovative and practical example partly justified the occasionally empty slogan of Slovenia being a regional expert or leader. The focus of the author is on regional cooperation in the area of defence.⁴

The article derives from the author's experiences as an active participant in all development stages of the regional Southeast Europe Clearinghouse Initiative (SEEC), ranging from the design of its conceptual framework in 2004 up to the present time. Moreover, during the past few years the author has acted as a permanent co-chair of SEEC. This role provided an excellent opportunity for applying the method of observation through participation and regular discussions with participants. The article provides an analysis of the basic documents adopted within SEEC and its mechanisms (e.g. databases). It also includes an analysis of secondary sources, which allows a better understanding of the development of regional cooperation in Southeast Europe and the Western Balkans.

Based on the classical theoretical assumptions about the role of regional cooperation in international relations (developed by the authors such as Ernst Haas, Robert Keohane and Philippe Schmitter) or recent research on regionalism (Martin Dangerfield and Charles King), regional forms of cooperation can be analysed in terms of their type (given the initiative for their launching – externally or by the countries from the region⁵), membership, institutions and priority policies (Svetlozar, 2009, p. 90–91). In addition, the analysis covers the development aspect of the regional initiative in question, which enables a more comprehensive understanding of the otherwise complex subject matter.

⁴ *If we focus on the current international security cooperation projects in the region and the relevant role of the Republic of Slovenia, we can use the typology as defined in the target research project »Science for security and peace 2004–2010« from 2007, where the division is used between defence cooperation, including military and crisis management cooperation, cooperation in search and rescue, research and development, with a focus on security, and cooperation in defence industry.*

⁵ *Often an initiative is launched from the outside and is then moving to an increasingly big regional ownership; a tendency that has also been actively supported within SEEC.*

Following the turbulent period of the 1990s, on the turning point of the new millennium, the Western Balkans⁶ witnessed a revival of defence cooperation.⁷ Confidence and security building were on the rise among the countries in the region. At the same time, a security regime had to be introduced in the conflict-prone and a deeply divided area (Anastasakis and Bojicic-Dzelilovic, 2002, p. 5). Particularly in the aftermath of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, several regional cooperation initiatives were generated that nowadays combine a number of processes and projects in various security areas and with various actors (state and non-state). Today we speak about a multi-layered and a multi-level process of regional cooperation which involves both top-level political dialogue and individual practical, project-based cooperation, as well as bilateral cooperation based on regular cooperation programmes among the countries, and more formal regional forms of cooperation (Dangerfield, 2004, p. 205).

The region has been largely influenced by the US, European Union and NATO.⁸ According to Karel Deutsch (1957), Europe has sought to build stability and implement the concept of security community in the region of Western Balkans following the example of the Western, Central and partly Eastern Europe. Reaching reconciliation through regional cooperation that would lead to political understanding and economic and social flourishing has become a requirement for the EU membership.⁹ At the same time, the European future and the perspective of the EU and NATO membership have become major tools of conflict prevention and a mechanism for the transformation of defence systems or the driving force of promoting regional cooperation (CRP, 2007, p. 103–111).¹⁰

⁶ *Individual authors often question the existence of the Western Balkans region. Historically speaking, this area was mainly divided among various power poles, except for Yugoslavia, which resulted in a weak regional identity. The Balkans is a geographical name for the territories in Southeast Europe, situated south of the Sava and the Donava Rivers. The countries often refused the name »Balkans« because of its negative connotation and connection with conflicts and tensions attributed to this area by the international community. This has led to the use of terms, such as Southeast Europe or the Western Balkans. However, our premise derives from a region that has been significantly shaped by external factors, among them the stabilisation and accession process in the European Union as the major ones. The region has connected the countries with a membership perspective that were left as part of an unresolved story of European stabilisation and integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures (Delević, 2007, p. 11–16).*

⁷ *For the history on regional integration in the Balkans see also: Kut, Sule and Sirin, N. Asli, 2002. The Bright Side of Balkan Politics: Cooperation in the Balkans. Journal of Southeast Europe and Black Sea Studies, January 2002, 2(1), p. 10–23.*

⁸ *According to Olli Rehn, a former European commissioner for enlargement, the development of regional cooperation is in the best interest of all West European countries. It is a key factor of political stability, security and economic development. From this viewpoint, regional cooperation forms the basis of the EU relationship with the region and the stabilisation and accession process leading to the EU membership. The former Secretary General of NATO regarded cooperation in the Western Balkans as necessary, taking into account more than 50 years of European experiences of the integration as facilitator of trust, stability and development (Seroka, 2008, p. 15).*

⁹ *The reason is simple. The countries should overcome differences and disputes with their immediate neighbours so as to prevent the spreading of conflicts to the NATO and EU level (Seroka, 2008, p. 15–17). Moreover, the countries making contributions to regional goals are willing to assume commitments deriving from the EU membership (Dangerfield, 2004, p. 204).*

¹⁰ *Without external input it would be unreal to expect that the countries from the region managed to generate sufficient political will for cooperation with former adversaries. Weak economies, mistrust, weak democratic institutions and wartime experiences are the factors more likely to have hindered than encouraged cooperation (Seroka, 2008, p. 17–18).*

Regional initiatives¹¹ often entail an important political component, especially during the time when individual countries of Central and Southeast Europe were paving their way towards the integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures. Moreover, the form of meetings themselves is important, therefore these initiatives often involve regular meetings at the ministerial level. The two examples, among the others, are the Southeastern Europe Defence Ministerial (SEDM) and the Adriatic Charter (A-3/A-5)¹². These initiatives are appropriately formalized and structured, and may, among other things, also include organizing committees, different working bodies and political declarations. Another significant effect or goal of such initiatives can also be a regular exchange of information, declarations of regional solidarity, joint statements of intent, cooperation plans, special projects, and the similar. In line with the increased participation of countries in multinational operations and missions, tendencies have occurred towards more pragmatic and target-oriented regional cooperation in defence reforms as well as multinational operations and missions. With reference to cooperation of the A-3 group in multinational operations and missions, including participation of its countries with a trilateral medical unit in Afghanistan, Multinational Land Force (MLF)¹³ should also be mentioned as a formal initiative with specific and limited goals, and membership.

The major forms of regional and multilateral cooperation in defence and security area which involve an active engagement of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia include the Southeastern Europe Defence Ministerial¹⁴, the Regional

¹¹ See CRP, 2007, p. 114–238, and Delević, 2007, p. 17–29.

¹² *The Adriatic Charter is an initiative, whose members seek, individually and collectively, to intensify reform-related and other efforts towards strengthening security, stability and welfare of the entire Western Balkans. It is a forum intended to assist the countries from the region in their accession to the Euro-Atlantic structures. The initiative was created after the model of the Baltic Charter from 1998. The idea about its creation appeared first at the Prague NATO Summit in 2002, among top-level representatives of the US, Albania, Croatia and Macedonia. On 2 May 2003, the foreign ministers of these countries signed a charter on strategic partnership on the way to the Euro-Atlantic structures, i.e. the Adriatic Charter (A-3) in Skopje, thereby officially marking the launching of the initiative. In September 2008, A-3 members decided to invite Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro that became full members in December of the same year with the signing of appendix to the charter (A-5) during the OSCE ministerial in Helsinki.*

¹³ *The MLF of Italy, Hungary and Slovenia was established in 1998 based on a special agreement. It represents a very successful form of international military cooperation in the region. Its achievements include joint training and participation in multinational operations and missions, as well as the building and integration into the concept and practice of European battle groups (EUBG).*

¹⁴ *The Southeastern Europe Defence Ministerial (SEDM) initiative was created in 1998 with the aim of strengthening peace, security and stability, and consolidating trust among the countries of Southeastern Europe. Cooperation of the member countries follows the spirit of NATO Partnership for Peace Programme and has the function of a mechanism transferring the experiences of NATO and EU member countries participating in SEDM to candidate countries through participation in working groups. Members are also Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Italy, Greece, Macedonia, Rumania, Turkey, USA, Slovenia, Ukraine, and Montenegro and Serbia.*

Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre¹⁵ (RACVIAC) and the Southeast Europe Clearinghouse¹⁶. A detailed analysis would reveal that they are primarily targeted at providing assistance to countries in the process of joining Euro-Atlantic integrations. In addition to cooperation within SEDM, contacts have also been established at the operational level. In case of SEEC, in particular, the activities have mainly developed according to the »bottom up« principle, i.e. from the expert level upward. Over years, this successful cooperation has strengthened and become more specialized. It can even be claimed that we have witnessed a major transformation of the initiative and change of some fundamental principles of regional cooperation in general. The SEEC initiative has laid the foundation and offered the tools facilitating the introduction of conceptual changes to regional cooperation in defence reforms of the Western Balkans. This is an entirely new chapter in regional cooperation, both from the perspective of the region and the role played by the Republic of Slovenia.

1 SOUTHEAST EUROPE CLEARINGHOUSE INITIATIVE

The Southeast Europe Clearinghouse initiative was launched in 2004 by the US¹⁷ and the Republic of Slovenia¹⁸ as the initiators and permanent co-chairing countries and by the countries of the Western Balkans – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro. Based on the past experiences with the official forms of cooperation, the founders intended to introduce an informal initiative sufficiently flexible and capable of pragmatic project-based approach.¹⁹ Additional fundamental principles were also voluntary participation and cooperation.

¹⁵ *The Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre (RACVIAC) is an international, independent and non-profit regional academic organization founded in October 2000. Its purpose or goal is to encourage Southeast European countries to efficiently implement arms control agreements and strengthen trust and cooperation in the region. Following its 2008 transformation to the Centre for Security Cooperation (RACVIAC – CSC), the organization focused its efforts on the further stabilisation of the region and provided additional support to relevant efforts of the international community. Priority tasks of the centre therefore became the organization of programmes in support of reforms, connected with the democratic control of the armed forces, improvement of civil-military cooperation standards and other issues connected with defence sector reforms, and provisions of »soft security«. Among its members there are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Greece, Moldova, Montenegro, Rumania, Serbia, Turkey, Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and others.*

¹⁶ *In 2004, Slovenia and the US, together with the countries of the Western Balkans, launched an informal Southeast Europe Clearinghouse (SEEC) initiative. In addition to the countries from the region, it includes approx. 30 other countries and several international organizations. The primary purpose of the initiative is the exchange of information on defence systems and cooperation in key areas of defence reforms. Another interesting initiative is the Stability Pact which was transformed into the Regional Cooperation Council in February 2008. As a regionally managed, target oriented and efficient framework of regional cooperation it is designed to support the countries in their integration into Euro-Atlantic establishments.*

¹⁷ *Initially, the American side participated with the representatives of the United States European Command (US EUCOM), and since 2008 with the representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defence (OSD).*

¹⁸ *Slovenia is represented with the MoD Defence Policy Directorate personnel.*

¹⁹ *Informality and voluntarism, in addition to concrete projects, are two major advantages of this initiative. See: Joint Statement of the Southeast Europe Clearinghouse, 30 November – 1 December 2004, Ljubljana, Slovenia, http://www.seecdb.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=5&Itemid=6.*

The launching of the SEEC initiative was based on the aspirations of all participants, especially countries from the region, to eliminate any duplication and dispersion of cooperation in defence reforms resulting from the distribution of various forms of the existing cooperation. The intention was hence to provide an added value to cooperation in defence reforms and to the efforts at rationalizing the management of the available resources. Of crucial importance was also the assistance offered to the candidates for NATO and Partnership for Peace membership and the creation of the information exchange forum.

The first conference of the Clearinghouse initiative held on 1 December 2004 in Ljubljana was attended by more than 30 countries²⁰ and 5 organizations. Conference participants drafted a special joint statement²¹ which, among other things, aimed at »avoiding duplication of effort in the region, optimizing limited resources and synchronizing activities, while achieving shared goals«. They also noted that the three candidates for NATO membership (Albania, Croatia and the Republic of Macedonia) and the two countries aspiring for the Partnership for Peace membership (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro) should clearly define their requirements concerning defence reforms, so that other participating countries and organizations could provide help and support, and identify areas of cooperation for the benefit of all concerned. The joint statement stressed very clearly that the SEEC initiative was not to replace any of the existing forms of cooperation, but rather to introduce new quality and transparency, and to avoid duplication.

1.1 Phase one of SEEC development – the supply and demand concept

With reference to the basic goals declared in the joint statement, the participants decided to create a database which would provide a clear overview of requirements of the countries from the region in various areas of defence reforms. It should be pointed out that this alone was a significant achievement. Since SEEC is an informal initiative and hence without personnel of its own, this task was entrusted to the MoD Defence Policy Directorate that created the database in cooperation with the ministry's CIS experts. The operation of the database had to be simple and most of all useful. A connection tool was also put in place for the information exchange and communication purposes. After a few years, the management of the base was delegated to the Montenegro's Defence Ministry, also in the spirit of bigger regional ownership. The database offers a lot of important information. Special mention should be made to the list of SEEC's points of contact that is regularly updated. The list includes officially appointed contact representatives of individual countries and organizations functioning within the initiative, and provides regular information about the key activities.

²⁰ Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, Estonia, Finland, France, Macedonia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Rumania, Serbia, Montenegro, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom, DCAF, RACVIAC, NATO.

²¹ Joint Statement of the Southeast Europe Clearinghouse, 30 November – 1 December 2004, Ljubljana, Slovenia, http://www.seecdb.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=5&Itemid=6.

The contents of the database were designed according to the demand principle in the form of clearly expressed project-related requirements of countries in the region, different categories of defence reforms and the relevant cooperation offers of other parties. In substantive determination of individual defence reform areas, the database derives from NATO categorization, whose main sections also include various policies and organization, human resource management, training, capabilities, communication, real estate, multinational operations and missions, arms control, non-proliferation and other. After two years of operation, the base has been populated with data on requirements and offers, which allows comprehensive analyses and situation assessments. The initial assumptions about the duplication of effort in the region have been confirmed in the analysis of the database, indicating the risk of duplication in some key areas.

Table 1:
Part of data
derived from
the supply
and demand
analysis of
the SEEC
database

AREA	NEEDS	OFFERS
Human resource management		
General	Croatia (4 + 4/SPECTRA), BiH (2)	Denmark, UK, USA, Czech Rep., Poland, additional options possible - RACVIAC, NATO
Downsizing of personnel and retirement	Croatia (2), Albania (1), Serbia (3 ²²), Bosnia and Herzegovina(2)	
Recruitment and candidate selection	Bosnia and Herzegovina (1), Serbia (1)	
Military infrastructure – Simulations Centre	Albania, Serbia, Macedonia	Latvia, Slovenia, Poland
Command and control	Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia	Denmark, Slovenia, USA
Public relations	Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia	UK, Netherlands, RACVIAC, Latvia, Poland, Slovenia, Estonia
Legal requirements	Serbia, Albania	Estonia, Poland, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, Rumania
CIMIC	Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia	seminars (Slovenia, Denmark), Poland, NATO

The analysis (Table 1) has indicated duplication both on the part of supply and demand. Countries and organizations populated the base with very similar requirements and offers. It was therefore decided that the most economic method of addressing defence reforms in the relevant areas would be the regional approach, both in terms of a more integrated approach towards similar subject-matter issues and from the viewpoint of exchanging comparable experiences among the countries in the region facing similar challenges and tasks. This eventually marked the conclusion

²² Number of requirements broken down by projects.

of phase one of the SEEC initiative, that is the »demand and supply« phase, and the focus of activities has been transferred to phase two with attention directed at various aspects of the regional approach.

1.2 Phase two of SEEC development – regional approach

The key areas of defence reforms identified as important for several countries on the basis of the database analysis included training for multinational operations and missions, training for the media, personnel management, defence planning, disarmament, medical support and others. A detailed needs' description of individual countries indicated several similarities, but also opportunities for a more rational approach to avoiding duplication of activity and the collective added value. Here we owe some clarifications from the aspect of organization and contents of the regional dynamics of SEEC activities. Looking at the evolution of the SEEC initiative through the eyes of modern time, it can be established that the regional approach developed in two directions. The first was the strengthening of regional cooperation in the key areas as identified in the database through direct connections among individual countries from the region. Such cases were, for instance, identified in personnel management, medical support training²³ and dog training. Also based on the analysis of database and key areas, some countries dedicated a lot of effort to the practice of regular regional expert meetings, conferences and workshops on various individual professional topics.

In order to deal comprehensively with the critical reform issues of the region, Slovenia organized a 3-day regional conference on defence planning in July 2007. The meeting format provided the opportunity for a concept-based move to a higher quality level. A number of statements reconfirmed the value of significant and useful exchange of experiences, information and good practice among the countries of the region facing similar challenges. The new quality was hence the exchange of comparable and similar experiences and their immediate use. The conference was also attended by Slovenian experts in NATO and EU defence planning. This regional event uncovered another conceptual point of interest, that is the possibility for cooperation of different countries and organizations in the events with diverse regional participation that facilitated not only condensed, quality and comprehensive transfer of information and knowledge, but also a more rational approach towards the events

²³ *A cooperation agreement between the countries of complementary capabilities in a similar area, i.e. with Serbia and its traditional Medical Academy capabilities, and the Republic of Macedonia providing quality training as part of preparation for participation in multinational operations and missions. The path to reaching the agreement led from the period of both countries fearing that the existence of a similar capability indicated a threat, through mutual expert-level relations, to an agreement on cooperation options based on the principle of mutual complementation. These patterns have also been evident in several other cases, where the progress was based on continued dialogue significantly strengthening mutual trust, on expert talks, transfer of decision making to defence policy directors, and the renewed expert-level dialogue. All this of course required a lot of time.*

in terms of finance, organization and contents as opposed to dispersed and non-representative activity.²⁴

Another direction of the regional approach was mainly marked by the talks among the countries from the region about the setting up of regional education and training centres in the fields arousing interest in the majority of countries. As this involves very important, politically sensitive and potentially long-term issues, the discussions clearly indicated the need for the launch of a new forum that would facilitate important and constructive talks at the relevant decision-making levels. The need for a regular exchange of information on defence reforms, multinational operations and missions, and intensive debates about the strengthened regional cooperation, including the establishment of regional centres, have led to the creation of a new forum of regular meetings of national armaments directors.²⁵

These forms of meetings that have become a major mechanism of the second, regional development stage of SEEC were unknown to the region before. As already mentioned, these requirements within the initiative appeared as pretty natural in the moment when special issues occurred about potentially structured and long-term forms of regional cooperation following some good examples of the current structural forms of cooperation in the Baltic areas, for instance the Nordic Initiative and the Baltic Defence Academy. A significant shift in the second stage of SEEC development was the third meeting of defence policy directors in June 2008 at Zgornji Brnik, where participants, according to the order of priority, identified the establishment of regional centres as their common interest. The first group included the Centre for Peace Support Operations' Training in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Centre for Media Training in the Republic of Macedonia and the CBRN-Centre in Serbia. The second position was earmarked for dog training and education and training in military medicine. A decision was taken to make arrangements for bilateral cooperation in dog training between Croatia and Serbia and to consider the options for closer cooperation at the bilateral level between Serbia and the Republic of Macedonia. The directors also decided to nominate working groups for individual centres, while the dynamics of their creation were entrusted to host countries. Naturally, the issue of potential establishment of multinational regional centres in the region of the Western Balkans was strategically important and complex, and could bring about long-lasting effects in the concepts of regional cooperation, closer links among the countries from the region, greater inter-dependence and, indirectly, greater security and stability in the region.

²⁴ *As part of the planned survey among the participants that was carried out by the representatives of the MoD Defence Policy Directorate, the assessment of a Serbian participant, head of J-5 in the General Staff of the Serbian Armed Forces, is particularly indicative. He pointed out that in his entire life he had never learned so much as in one day only, especially from his counterparts and planning experts from various countries of the region, who were faced with similar and comparable professional challenges. This is a clear statement of the opportunities provided through the regional approach. Following this example, the Republic of Slovenia organized the conferences on CIS and defence standardization in the year 2008, and the Republic of Macedonia conducted a workshop on planning documents.*

²⁵ *The level of defence policy directors involves regular meetings of the EU and NATO member countries. Four formal meetings and one informal meeting have taken place so far.*

1.3 Dispersion of organisation


One of the consequences of the evolution of activity development concerning the Southeast Europe Clearinghouse initiative is its organizational diversity. A thorough analysis indicates an entirely understandable phenomenon, as the initiative has been eventually the hatchery of various forms of cooperation that also go beyond its framework. This fact can best be described with the introduction of the new mechanism of regular meetings of defence policy directors of the Western Balkans, following the model of NATO and the EU. These meetings were spurred by complex and difficult issues within the SEEC initiative, the treatment of which went beyond the framework of conferences and working groups from the perspective of the required decision-making level. The introduction of regular meetings of regional defence policy directors can be regarded as a major achievement of this initiative. In some cases, the dispersion of organization often made the overview and management of various activities difficult. The initial mechanisms in the functioning of the initiative at first included regular semi-annual regional conferences on topical events in the field of defence reforms in the region, and the working groups established in individual countries of the region to address open issues regarding defence reforms. Initially, conferences were frequently preceded by the meetings of the organizing committee that was primarily tasked with conference preparations. A number of issues of conceptual and strategic nature were, especially during the establishment phase, also addressed at regular working meetings and in contacts among the representatives of the permanent co-chairing countries, the US and the Republic of Slovenia.

2 EVALUATION OF THE SOUTHEAST EUROPE CLEARINGHOUSE INITIATIVE

Up to date, nine conferences, five meetings of defence policy directors and one defence ministerial meeting of the Western Balkans have taken place as part of the SEEC initiative. In addition, numerous meetings of working groups and seminars on specific areas of defence reforms have been organized. Particular attention should be given to the increased dynamics of the Peace Support Operations Training Centre (PSOTC) in Sarajevo and the CBRN-Centre in Kruševac whose working groups consider the possibilities for greater regional ownership. One of the ambitions of the countries from the region is also to establish a catalogue of all regional capabilities for English language training and various forms of training for multinational operations and missions.

It can be concluded that the SEEC initiative has proved to be an important challenge, a linking tool, an added value to the present forms of cooperation in the region, as well as an impulse and driving force in the search of new forms of cooperation. It has also become obvious that it would be difficult to follow the development of all sub-segments and initiative effects because of the great organizational diversity. It has been found out that a large quantity of information from the database, informal contacts within various SEEC formats, multilateral agreements and other, have contributed to the strengthening of bi- and multilateral forms of cooperation. SEEC,

Table 2:
Evolution of
SEEC process



however, has not received any feedback. From this point of view it could even be claimed that certain mechanisms and activities within the initiative functioned as an important catalyst for various forms of cooperation beyond the initiative. The best indicators of this are the introduction of meetings of defence policy directors, arrangements concerning the establishment of regional training centres and, last but not least, a formal document ensuring political guidance and commitment towards the implementation of arrangements and the upgrading of the success achieved in the form of a joint statement of all defence ministers from the region, signed on 18 November 2009 in Sarajevo.

SEEC should be looked at as an example of *sui generis* also from the perspective of the role of the Republic of Slovenia in the initiative. The Ministry of Defence recognized without hesitation in 2004 the value and significance of deliberations of J-5 of the US European Command about the potential introduction of an informal regional initiative for cooperation in defence reforms and its search for support and advice of the country often regarded as a role model for other countries from the region. The Strategic Planning Sector and Policies to the USEUCOM and the Defence Policy Directorate determined in a series of working meetings and discussions the basic parameters and areas of the future initiative. The US and the Republic of Slovenia used much of the first two years to stimulate dynamics, convince the participants about the usefulness of such cooperation and to develop concepts and tools (working group

concept, database etc.). This was followed by the period of intensive dynamics in the first stage of SEEC development that involved intensive work of the working groups, conferences and the exchange of defence reform information.

One of the major challenges in ensuring continuity of the initiative was of personnel character, which became evident in significant fluctuation of participants, also on the part of the co-chairing US side whose focus on SEEC processes was changeable due to the system of officer rotations. The responsibility of the Slovenian side was hence even greater, as it was necessary to provide a permanent team ensuring contribution through regular monitoring and promotion of development to support uninterrupted progress which would otherwise be extremely difficult given the personnel fluctuations. The Slovenian side took care of the historical memory and target orientation, although it often appeared that the initiative was at a standstill or sometimes even in regression.

Strategically speaking, the SEEC initiative contributed considerably to the strengthening of regional cooperation and long-term mutual trust at all levels. It improved the awareness about the rationality of approach, both from the viewpoint of organization, personnel, contents, as well as from the finance perspective. SEEC activities confirmed the conceptual importance of exchanging comparable experiences among the countries of the region. An important achievement of the initiative is the introduction of communications tool and database serving as a good information basis. Great success was the continuity of decision makers' meetings, political commitment on the level of defence ministers, and cooperation in multinational operations and missions. Given these great achievements it is easy to be self-critical. The SEEC initiative has revealed that in the absence of the regular flow of information it has been a real challenge to manage numerous forms of cooperation and trace the effects of various activities. Quite often the progress was very slow and tedious, mainly due to the lack of historical memory about the development, purpose and achievements of the initiative, periodic mistrust deriving from excessive protection of individual interests and the precedence level of approach innovation within the initiative. A key factor likely to exert significant influence on the further success of practical regional cooperation is enhanced regional ownership of all processes.

3 PERSPECTIVES OF REGIONAL COOPERATION IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

The vision of future regional cooperation was co-shaped by the relevant ministers of defence who signed a letter of intent concerning the strengthening of regional cooperation on 18 November 2009 in Sarajevo and also with support of the regional centres in the Western Balkans. The implementation of principles and elements of the joint statement was entrusted to defence policy directors. The joint statement²⁶ clearly summarizes the achievements brought about by the Clearinghouse process

²⁶ *The initiative to sign a joint statement came from Slovenia. The document was drafted by the Defence Policy Directorate and then harmonized with all countries from the region. The joint statement can be accessed at: http://www.seecdb.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=42&Itemid=38*

and provides political guidance for further work. Among other things, the ministers pledged their commitment to the strengthening of regional cooperation as an important factor of building mutual trust. The ministers also undertook the commitment for the regular exchange of information on defence reforms, including the sharing of lessons learned and good practice. In addition, they welcomed practical forms of cooperation in the area of comparable reform-related challenges that had strengthened in the past years, stressed a new independent regional forum of regular meetings of defence policy directors, and expressed their support for the regular organization of defence ministerials. They found out that the directors' meetings, regular conferences and expert working groups ensure a solid foundation for enhanced, comprehensive and transparent defence and security dialogue. The joint statement stresses the importance of regional approach in addressing joint challenges also in the area of multinational operations and missions. The regional approach is highlighted as a rational and practical cooperation method, mostly from the viewpoint of the synchronization of limited personnel and financial resources.

A clear support was expressed for the introduction of regional centres that attract most attention in the region. These are the following three centres recognized by defence policy directors on the basis of expert recommendations: Peace Support Operations Training Centre in Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Media Training Centre in Skopje (Macedonia) and the Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence in Kruševac (Serbia). At the establishment of these regional centres, the signatories of the statement provided a guidance to consider the opportunities for common funding, management, use, planning and execution of education and training. This also clearly marked the conceptual division among the three institutions already functioning as national centres and their potentially modified regional role in the future. Moreover, there are additional possibilities for other forms of such cooperation. The ministers expressed their support for a wider promotion of regional centres, especially following the operational principle of professionalism and top standards of excellence. This is of course a demanding goal that needs to take into account the already existing centres of excellence within the wider context of the Euro-Atlantic integration.

The anticipated adoption of the Republic of Slovenia's national strategic documents on the activity in the Western Balkans will probably be one of the last opportunities for a more targeted, recognizable, flexible, integrated and efficient approach of the country towards regional defence cooperation. New mechanisms provide an excellent basis for a lasting cooperation in the region that will not be conditioned upon the integration into the Euro-Atlantic establishments but upon a sincere wish for long-term stability and cooperation for the benefit of the region as a whole. Most of all, it would be necessary to establish efficient mechanisms to prevent duplication and to ensure integrated operation, measurability of progress and process management. Such form of comprehensive and institutionalized cooperation would mean a huge step forward and the realization of an unprecedented vision of the region's progress never seen before. It would allow for strengthened mutual trust on the path

towards peace and progress in the region, and consequently the implementation of the basic national interests of the Republic of Slovenia. This would also indicate the implementation of basic goals and interests of the region and the wider international community, and an important model of cooperation that could be tested in other regions as well.

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DINAMIKA POMORSKEGA TERORIZMA, KI OGROŽA RUSIJO, IN ODZIV VLADE

DYNAMICS OF MARITIME TERRORIST THREATS TO RUSSIA AND THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE

Review article

Povzetek Na začetku članka so predstavljeni teroristi, ki so dovolj sposobni in motivirani za pomorske teroristične napade proti Rusiji. Nato so obravnavani ruska pomorska in sladkovodna infrastruktura ter dejavnosti in opisani izbrani scenariji terorističnih dejanj, s katerimi bi bilo mogoče izkoristiti šibke točke te infrastrukture in objektov. Sledi pregled odzivov ruske vlade na terorizem in tudi napak v njihovem odzivu. Na koncu avtor ugotavlja, da je pomorski terorizem, vključno s terorizmom katastrofalnih razsežnosti, še naprej resna grožnja, navedena pa so tudi izbrana priporočila za zmanjšanje verjetnosti takšnih napadov.

Ključne besede *Al Kaida, Čečenija, Rusija, jedrski napad, pomorski terorizem.*

Abstract This paper begins by identifying those actors that have the capacity and motivation to commit acts of maritime terrorism against Russia. The article then reviews Russia's maritime and freshwater infrastructure and activities before outlining selected scenarios of terrorist acts that could take advantage of vulnerabilities in this infrastructure and facilities. It then offers an overview of the Russian government's response to terrorism, including the flaws that have existed in this response. The paper concludes that the threat of maritime terrorism, including catastrophic terrorism, remains serious, and offers selected recommendations on how to minimize the likelihood of such attacks.

Key words *Al Qaeda, Chechnya, Russia, maritime terrorism, nuclear attack.*

Introduction Russia has been the victim of a number of horrendous terrorist attacks at the hands of endemic actors, such as networks of radical separatists and terrorists based in the North Caucasus. These networks have bombed a Coast Guard residential complex

and a parade at a Caspian Sea town, killing dozens; they have plotted to hijack one atomic submarine and claimed responsibility for sinking another; and their supporters seized a vessel with Russian passengers on board and threatened to blow it up. Some groups within these networks have already crossed the moral threshold between conventional and catastrophic terrorism by staging such horrendous attacks as the hostage taking in Beslan, in which 331 people, half of them children, were killed in 2004. The hostage-taking raids on the Beslan School and on Moscow's Dubrovka Theatre in 2002 demonstrated the formidable capabilities of these networks in planning and executing complex attacks, which involved profound knowledge of the practical flaws and organizational deficiencies of Russia's counter-terrorism and law-enforcement system. Attackers in both cases included individuals willing to die in the course of the attacks.

The Russian authorities have dealt these networks a number of serious blows thanks to the strengthening of the Russian state and its security and law-enforcement apparatus, as well as to the increased involvement of local populations, including former rebels, in counter-insurgency and policing efforts. They have also significantly improved the security of critical facilities of land-based infrastructure, such as nuclear power plants and nuclear weapons facilities. Nevertheless, the security at some Russian facilities, including maritime facilities, remains insufficient to withstand an assault by a well-organized terrorist group similar to those that attacked the Beslan school and Dubrovka Theatre, especially if it was assisted by insiders. These networks remain not only willing, but also capable of executing terrorist attacks in Russia with high impact and dramatic visibility.¹

These trends suggest that the likelihood of a high-impact maritime terrorist attack in Russia is significant enough to require that policymakers in the sphere of counter-terrorism divert some of their attention from land to seas and rivers.

1 AGENTS OF TERROR

1.1 Networks of Radical Separatists Based in the North Caucasus

Of all the agents plotting and executing acts of terror in Russia, terrorist networks based in the North Caucasus have the strongest motivation and greatest capabilities for acts of maritime terrorism, possibly of catastrophic proportions. As demonstra-

¹ *The nature and motivation of conventional guerilla and terrorist networks operating in the North Caucasus varies greatly. These include groups and individuals who fight for the establishment of an Islamic state in parts of the entire North Caucasus and groups and individuals who fight for a secular independent state of Chechnya or larger parts of the North Caucasus. For purposes of clarity, I refer to these groups as radical separatists. The line between these networks is often blurred, and some members switch from one to another. There are other groups that use violence against authority and enter into alliances with radical separatists but do not fit the criteria of radical separatists, such as organized crime syndicates and groups of avengers, who seek revenge for abuses by law enforcement and other government agencies.*

ted by some of their previous attacks, these networks are prepared to inflict massive, indiscriminate casualties, making no distinction between state or civilian targets.²

Until several years ago, the Chechnya-based factions of these terror networks had been the most active, even displaying interest in acts of WMD terrorism. They acquired radioactive materials,³ threatened to attack Russia's nuclear facilities,⁴ and attempted to put pressure on the Russian leadership by planting a container with radioactive materials in Moscow and threatening to detonate it.⁵ They also planted explosives in chemical storage tanks and scouted Russian military nuclear facilities.⁶

But their most stunning plot relates to maritime terrorism. This plan was uncovered in January 2002, when federal troops found the personal archive of the Chechen separatists' late president Dzhokhar Dudaev. The archive, which was found in the Chechen village of Starye Atagi on 4 January 2002, contained a detailed plan to hijack a Russian atomic submarine. The commander of the Russian troops in Chechnya, Vladimir Moltenskoï, told reporters on 2 February 2002 that the plan provided for seven Slavic-looking fighters to seize a submarine from the Russian Navy's Pacific Fleet sometime in 1995–96, and to blackmail Moscow into withdrawing troops from Chechnya and recognizing the republic as an independent state. Moltenskoï said detailed military maps of Primorskiï Krai, where the Pacific Fleet has bases, were found along with the plan. According to an April 2002 Russian television report, the plan specifically provided for taking a nuclear warhead from the hijacked submarine to Chechnya.⁷ A Chechnya-based correspondent of Russian State Television quoted what he described as the "last item" in the plan as saying "together with the hostage(s) . . . and the nuclear warhead they will leave for Chechnya in a plane."⁸ It was a former officer in the Soviet Navy, Islam Khasukhanov, who allegedly developed the plan back in 1995; according to Moltenskoï, the then-chief

² This article defines a terrorist act as an act of political violence that inflicts harm on non-combatants, but that is designed to intimidate broader audiences, including state authorities, and is an instrument used to achieve certain political or other goals. This article defines an act of catastrophic terrorism as a terrorist attack involving the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear materials or weapons of mass destruction, or conventional techniques to kill a significant number of people (1000 or more).

³ Chechen rebels removed several containers of radioactive materials from the Grozny branch of Russia's Radon nuclear waste collection site prior to the seizure of the facility by federal troops in January 2000, according to a Russian magazine's sources in the Russian Ministry of Defense. Yury Gladkevich, "Poshel v Gory," *Profil* (20 March 2000), quoted in "Radwaste Reported Removed from Radon Facility in Grozny," NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies Nuclear Threat Initiative.

⁴ Then-Chechen president Dzhokhar Dudayev warned that his fighters might attack nuclear plants in Russia in 1992 to discourage Moscow from trying to counter his republic's independence bid. He issued a similar threat again in 1995 when the military campaign was already underway in the republic. "Dudayev Grozit Perenesti Voïnu v Glub' Rossii," *Vecherny Chelyabinsk* (1 February 1995).

⁵ Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev tried to blackmail the Russian leadership with a crude radiological device. Grigorii Sanin and Aleksandr Zakharov, "Konteyner Iz Izmailovskogo Parka Blagopoluchno Evakuïrovan," *Segodnya* (25 November 1995).

⁶ "FSB Says Major Terror Attacks Foiled," *Moscow Times* (6 May 2005).

⁷ The Pacific Fleet operates no nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), but it still has a number of nuclear powered submarines, including those that can carry nuclear torpedoes.

⁸ Russian State Television, 26 April 2002, transcribed by BBC Monitoring on 26 April 2002. No other media reported this information, however.

of the Chechen General Staff Aslan Maskhadov personally reviewed the plan and wrote notes on it. Federal troops seized Khasukhanov during a raid in the Chechen town of Shali on 21 April 2002. Khasukhanov had served on Russian submarines before leaving the Pacific Fleet with the rank of naval commander to become chief of the operational department of the Chechen separatists' general staff.⁹

In 2002, the command of the Pacific Fleet responded to reports of this plan to hijack a submarine by claiming that security at Russian military nuclear facilities was adequate and that the planned hijacking would have failed in 1995. "This could happen only in a foreign fantasy-action movie. In reality, it is a doomed plan," a spokesman for the fleet said.¹⁰ Yet, two years after Khasukhanov's plan was supposed to have been implemented, a single sailor managed to take hostages and lock himself up in a Russian nuclear submarine in the most dangerous case of attempted maritime terrorism in Russia, which will be discussed in greater depth below. Dudayev's archive also contained plans to blow up installations at nuclear power stations, military airfields, and oil refineries.¹¹

Outside Chechnya, Dagestan-based terrorist groups have been very active in the North Caucasus. These groups staged two horrendous attacks in the Caspian Sea town of Kaspiisk targeting servicemen of the local unit of the Border Guard Service's coast guard branch and general military personnel in another. In 1996 they bombed a residential complex in Kaspiisk, destroying an entire section of the complex, which housed mostly servicemen of the local Coast Guard unit and their families. The blast killed sixty-seven people, including twenty-one children. The same Caspian Sea town saw these Dagestani-based networks bomb a military parade in May 2002, killing 43 and injuring 170, many of the victims being spectators and their children.

Factions of these networks in North Caucasian republics of Ingushetia, Karachayevo-Cherkessia, and Kabardino-Balkaria have also displayed the capability to plan and execute complex attacks, such as seizures of urban areas accompanied by killing of military and law-enforcement personnel, with assistance of corrupted or ideologically converted police officers. The Ingushetia-based faction has been so successful in such attacks that the Chechen warlord Dokku Umarov, who is the current leader of the terrorist and insurgency networks in the North Caucasus, has appointed Magomed Yevloyev, leader of the Ingush terrorists and insurgents, to the post of the "Commander of the Caucasian Front" of the forces fighting to establish a caliphate in the Northern Caucasus and other parts of Russia with sizeable Muslim populations.

⁹ "Nachalnik Operativnogo Shtaba Maskhadova Gotovil Plan Zakhvata Rossiiskoi Atomnoi Podlodki (Chief of Maskhadov's Operational Staff Was Preparing a Plan to Hijack Russian Atomic Submarine)," *RIA-Novosti* (25 April 2002).

¹⁰ "Komandovanie TOF: Chechenskim Boevikam Ne Pod Silu Zakhvatit Podlodku (Command of the Pacific Fleet: Chechen Rebels Are Incapable of Hijacking a Submarine)," *RIA-Novosti* (5 February 2002); available at <http://www.lenta.ru/vojna/2002/02/05/submarine/>.

¹¹ "V Chechne Nashli Plan Zakhvata Rossiiskoi Lodki (Plan to Hijack a Russian Submarine Found in Chechnya)," *Lenta.ru* (4 February 2002). Also reported in "Nachalnik Operativnogo Shtaba Maskhadova Gotovil Plan Zakhvata Rossiiskoi Atomnoi Podlodki (Chief of Maskhadov's Operational Staff Was Preparing a Plan to Hijack Russian Atomic Submarine)," *RIA-Novosti* (25 April 2002).

1.2 Accomplices and Allies of North Caucasus-based Networks

International Terrorist Organizations and Groups of Militants that Support Secession from Russia. The North Caucasus-based terrorist networks—and the Chechen faction in particular—have been in close contact with foreign militant Islamists, including those groups that resort to terrorism. The best-known successful act of what Russian authorities have described as maritime terrorism—the seizure of a ferry with Russian passengers on board off the Turkish coast—was carried out in the name of Chechnya's separatist cause. Muhammad Tokcan, a Turkish citizen of Chechen origin and his armed supporters (who included Turkish citizens of Abkhaz origin as well as ethnic Chechens) hijacked the Avrasya ferry on the Black Sea and took more than two hundred hostages in 1996. Tokcan threatened to blow up the ferry, which was not far from away from the Bosphorus Strait, which is only half a mile wide at its narrowest point, demanding an end to Russian military efforts to end Chechnya's separatist bid. The hijackers eventually surrendered after a four-day standoff and were subsequently imprisoned, but two of them, including Tokcan, later escaped while others were released under an amnesty law.¹²

Apart from maintaining ties with militant representatives of North Caucasian Diasporas abroad, the Chechnya-based terrorist and insurgent networks have also maintained links with Al Qaeda, which has expertise in the field of maritime terrorism. Osama bin Laden has been actively involved in the terrorist insurgency in Chechnya since 1995, sending Al Qaeda agents to the North Caucasus and sponsoring Chechen rebels.¹³

More recently, Russian security services and law-enforcement agencies announced in October 2008 that they had foiled plans by the chief of the North Caucasus-based terrorist networks and Al Qaeda's lieutenant in the region to organize terrorist attacks in the area where Russia is to host the 2014 Olympic Games. Umarov and a certain Moganned, Al Qaeda's "emissary" in the region, have plotted terrorist attacks in the Black Sea resorts of Sochi and Anapa, according to FSB.¹⁴

North Caucasus-based terrorist networks can count on Al Qaeda to share expertise with them if they decide to plan and execute an act of maritime terrorism, since Al Qaeda has successfully carried out acts of maritime terrorism in the past. Operatives and/or allies of Al Qaeda have been responsible for the bombings of the U.S. Navy ship Cole and France's Limburg tanker. The network has also designed attacks on a wide range of Western maritime targets, including military vessels, oil tankers, and

¹² Interestingly, Tokcan then led another group of hostage-takers who seized 120 tourists and staff in a Turkish hotel in 2002, this time to protest against Russia's second military campaign in Chechnya. He was subsequently sentenced to twelve years in prison.

¹³ The document was released by Judicial Watch, a U.S. public corruption watchdog, in 2004.

¹⁴ In the past, North Caucasus-based terrorist groups have enjoyed the cooperation of their compatriots when plotting attacks in Moscow.

cruise ships, according to information from Abd Al Rahman al Nashiki, the alleged organizer of both attacks and an Al Qaeda member.¹⁵

In addition to developing maritime and land-based conventional terrorism capabilities, Al Qaeda has sought to acquire expertise in nuclear weaponry. Al Qaeda has tried to acquire a ready-to-use nuclear bomb or to develop one, and has considered striking a deal with members of Russian organized criminal groups.¹⁶ North Caucasus-based terrorists hope that Al Qaeda will supply them with nuclear weapons for the “jihad against the infidels” if it manages, for instance, to topple the government of Pakistan, given the close ties between Al Qaeda and the North Caucasus-based networks and the convergence of their goals in building a caliphate.

Organized Crime. The North Caucasus-based networks have established tactical alliances with organized crime groups, primarily those that have been formed by natives of the North Caucasus across Russia.¹⁷ Such ethnically-oriented organized crime groups operate in many major Russian cities, including ports. In some instances, natives of Chechnya and other North Caucasian republics involved in ethnic crime rings outside the North Caucasus have returned to their homeland to fight on the separatists’ side or vice versa. Such gangsters can potentially take advantage of established criminal channels to help the North Caucasus-based groups to organize terrorist acts.

An authoritative RAND study suggests that, while terrorists and organized crime figures are collaborating on land, there is little evidence that terrorists and piracy syndicates are collaborating.¹⁸ According to the study, their interests may conflict, and thus hinder collaboration, since pirates depend on steady commercial activities in the waters where they operate, while terrorists often seek to cause maximum damage and disruption. However, one could argue that pirates can still be contracted for hijacking by terrorists who may keep the pirates in the dark about their real attentions. Also, some terrorist and militant groups, such as the Sri Lankan LTTE, have been involved in classical organized crime activities (such as illicit trafficking) to finance their activities (until its forces were effectively destroyed by Sri Lankan government troops in the spring of 2009, the LTTE had a fleet of ten ocean-going

¹⁵ Ali M Koknar, “Maritime Terrorism: A New Challenge for NATO,” *Energy Security, Institute for the Analysis of Global Security* (24 January 2005).

¹⁶ “We also believe that (Al Qaeda leader Osama) bin Laden was seeking to acquire or develop a nuclear device,” George Tenet, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, told hearings at the U.S. Congress in February 2002. Al Qaeda tried to acquire nuclear weapons and weapons-grade materials in Russia through local organized crime gangs, the *Washington Times* reported on 8 October 2002, citing a source in the U.S. defense community. Bill Herz, “U.S. says Al Qaeda exploring Russian market for weapons,” *The Washington Times* (8 October 2002).

¹⁷ In October 2004, Russian media reported that Ruslan Elmurzayev, an ethnic Chechen and an employee of a Moscow bank, was one of the main organizers of the Dubrovka theater attack, and that it was financed through loans from his bank. Carl Schreck, “Prima Bank Linked to Dubrovka Attack,” *Moscow Times* (27 October 2004).

¹⁸ Michael D. Greenberg, Peter Chalk, Henry H. Willis, Ivan Khilko, David S. Ortiz, “Maritime Terrorism, Risk and Liability,” *The RAND Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy*, 2006.

freighters).¹⁹ And Al Qaeda itself has owned and/or controlled somewhere between fifteen to twenty-three freighters sailing in the Mediterranean, Indian, and Pacific Oceans, according to estimates of the U.S. and Norwegian intelligence agencies.²⁰ According to the Russian Navy's assessment, the "line between piracy and maritime terrorism has already become blurred," and the challenges of fighting piracy with that of fighting terrorism should be bundled together.²¹

Unsuspecting 'Helpers' and Insiders. Investigations of the 2002 Dubrovka Theatre hostage-taking and other suicide attacks revealed that members of these North Caucasus-based terrorist groups do not hesitate to solicit logistical and other assistance from rogue or unsuspecting natives of their home regions living outside the North Caucasus. Every large Russian city has a sizeable diaspora of natives from this region. The vast majority these Caucasian expatriates would never knowingly assist terrorists, but that does not mean that they cannot be unwittingly manipulated, particularly through their willingness to offer aid to their exploited relatives and compatriots. In one instance, Chechnya-based terrorists even claimed to have inserted a shakhid (suicide bomber) on a Russian atomic submarine. Soon after the sinking of the Kursk submarine in August 2000, the separatists claimed that the submarine was sunk by a Dagestani shakhid, but produced no proof. Law enforcement officials have denied that either of the two ethnic Dagestanis on board the Kursk could have done anything deliberate to sink it.²² The official investigation into the deadly accident revealed no traces of sabotage.

Clearly, those working at naval and other maritime facilities have the best opportunity to hijack vessels. Such crimes are more difficult to prevent, as insiders have the most thorough knowledge of the facilities' vulnerabilities and can take advantage of the trust that they enjoy among their colleagues. The most serious type of insider threat is posed when an insider conspires with outsiders.

While there have been no publicly known cases of subversion or sabotage at Russian naval and maritime facilities, there have been several instances when servicemen have been led to commit a crime for profit. Some officers and defense industry workers have already chosen to try to "earn" thousands of dollars from one single theft. This conforms to the findings of British nuclear security expert Gavin Cameron that the overwhelming motivation for most insider crimes committed by servicemen was a desire for individual financial gain.²³

¹⁹ Ali M. Koknar, "Maritime Terrorism: A New Challenge for NATO," *IAGS Energy Security*, published by the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, (24 January 2005).

²⁰ "What Al Qaeda Can Do with A Terror Navy," *World Net Daily* (October 2003), cited in Koknar, *ibid*.

²¹ From a 29 March 2008 statement issued to the author by the Russian Navy in response to his written questions on Russia's response to maritime piracy and terrorism for a newspaper article.

²² Anna Badkhen and Simon Saradzhyan, "Investigation Opened Into Sinking of Kursk," *The Moscow Times* (25 August 2000).

²³ Gavin Cameron, "Nuclear Terrorism: Reactors & Radiological Attacks After September 11," paper presented at the Symposium on International Safeguards: Verification and Nuclear Material Security, Vienna, Austria, 29 October–2 November 2001.

In the 1990s, when the Chechen rebel Khasukhanov allegedly planned to hijack an atomic submarine with nuclear weapons onboard, security at even some of the nuclear facilities of the Russian Navy was so lax that stealing uranium was easier than taking potatoes in Russia at one point, according to a Russian military investigator. This investigator probed the theft of four kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) by the Russian Navy officer Alexei Tikhomirov in November 1993.²⁴ Another theft of weapons-usable nuclear material occurred at a Russian naval facility in 1993. In July of that year, 1.8 kilograms of 36 percent-enriched HEU was stolen by two naval servicemen from the Andreeva Guba naval base near Russia's Norwegian border.²⁵

Such nefarious insiders will most likely refuse to cooperate with terrorists, as their motivation is personal financial gain instead of redress of political grievances. But they could be kept in the dark about the real intentions by the terrorists, who can pose as gangsters with criminal rather than political intentions. In one instance, an opportunistic insider agreed to commit an act for money that investigators and prosecutors classified as terrorism, according to the Federal Security Service (FSB). Igor Senin, the deputy mayor of Zaozyorsk—a closed military town in northern Russia—was arrested by FSB agents in April 2006 and subsequently charged with plotting a terrorist attack off the coast of the Murmansk region, near the Kola Peninsula. The FSB issued a statement to assert that Senin had the planned bombing of an oil tanker in the Kolsky Bay in hopes of causing an environmental catastrophe. The official had planned to use a homemade bomb to blow up the tanker *Teider* in an act that would have caused at least forty metric tons of oil products to spill into the ocean, polluting at least five square kilometers of the sea surface. Senin was in fact a middleman between an unidentified client, who wanted to cause an oil spill for unknown reasons, and those who were to carry out the foiled attack, which prosecutors estimated would have caused some USD 26 million in environmental damage. The client gave Senin USD 100,000 to organize the attack. The official stood trial in 2007 on charges of having attempted to organize a terrorist attack, and was sentenced to over three years in prison by the Murmansk Regional Court.

Rogue Elements within Law Enforcement. The corruption and ideological conversion of law enforcement officers by extremists in the North Caucasus has emerged as a major security threat, as the investigations of many major terrorist attacks have unearthed cases of corrupt or ideologically driven police officers who have assisted the attackers. Neither the boosting of passive defense measures nor increased preventive strikes against militant hideouts will succeed in curbing domestic terrorism if the Russian authorities fail to take serious action to root out the corruption that

²⁴ Oleg Bukharin and William Potter, "Potatoes Were Guarded Better," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (May/June 1995).

²⁵ Matthew Bunn, *The Next Wave: Urgently Needed New Steps to Control Warheads and Fissile Material* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000). The two servicemen were sentenced to five years and four years in prison, respectively, in November 1995. Mikhail Kulik and Vladimir Orlov, "Uranovaya Krazha: Istoriya Guby Andreeva, (Theft of Uranium: History of Guba Andreeva)," *Moskovskiye Novosti* (October 1995).

plagues the country's law enforcement community, and that has already evolved into a major threat to Russia's national security.

There have been a number of cases in which North Caucasian extremists would either change their identities or surrender in order to join pro-Moscow police forces in order to obtain information to feed to their accomplices, or even to participate in attacks staged by the terrorist groups.²⁶ While most cases of police officers joining forces with extremists for either religious or opportunistic reasons have occurred in the North Caucasus region, the corruption of law enforcement officials and employees of other government agencies remains a nationwide phenomenon that has allowed terrorist groups to strike Russian cities hundreds of miles from their bases. A Moscow policeman was sentenced in February 2004 to seven years in prison for registering Luiza Bakueva in Moscow in 2002 in exchange for a bribe. Having registered in Moscow, Bakueva participated in the hostage-taking at Moscow's Dubrovka Theatre in October 2002 (the so-called Nord-Ost attack).²⁷

1.3 Disgruntled Insiders

When it comes to agents of maritime terrorism, it is a disgruntled insider rather than a North Caucasus-based terrorist that has come closest to committing an act of terrorism on board of a nuclear naval vessel belonging to Russia. In 1998, a young Russian sailor, Alexander Kuzminykh, locked himself in one of the fleet's nuclear-powered submarines, threatening to blow it up. Nineteen-year old sailor Kuzminykh crept out of his cabin at night to kill six fellow servicemen before taking two other hostages inside the Akula-class hunter-killer submarine, which was docked at the fleet's Skalisty base near Murmansk. Kuzminykh then locked himself and the two hostages in the submarine. Kuzminykh subsequently shot both hostages dead and repeatedly threatened to start a fire on board in order to detonate torpedoes from the nuclear submarine. FSB commandos remained unable to get to Kuzminykh until he shot himself inside the submarine, separated from the agents by a 10-cm-thick steel hatch.²⁸

Since this incident, Russian authorities have significantly improved the recruitment and monitoring of personnel deployed on naval nuclear vessels and faculties to weed out disgruntled insiders. For one, all of Russian submarine crews—including those boats carrying SLBMs as well as other atomic-powered vessels—are now being manned only with professional sailors, with conscripts having been removed from

²⁶ *A case in point came when several policemen were arrested for helping Russia's most wanted man, rebel warlord Shamil Basayev, slip in and out of the North Caucasus republic of Kabardino-Balkaria last year. Basayev—whom investigators believe to have ordered both the Beslan hostage-taking raid and the June raid on Ingushetia—lived in a private house in the republic's town of Baksan for an entire month. Simon Saradzhyan, "Law Enforcement Turncoats, Russia's Bane," ISN Security Watch (2005).*

²⁷ *Another such case has been heard in a Kislovodsk court. This court sentenced a local traffic policeman, Stanislav Lyubichev, to four years in prison for letting a truckload of explosives—six metric tons of hexogen, to be exact—pass through a checkpoint in 1999 with no questions asked. The explosives were later used to blow up apartment buildings in Moscow, killing hundreds of people in September 1999.*

²⁸ *Simon Saradzhyan, "Sailor Kills Himself After Standoff in Sub," The Moscow Times (15 September 1998); <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/1998/09/15/015.html>.*

service. The screening of candidates for positions as professional sailors needs to be improved, however, as evidenced by the case when a “drunken curious sailor” set off the fire safety system on a Russian nuclear submarine that killed twenty people in 2008.²⁹

1.4 Ultrationalists

The recent conviction of a Russian nuclear industry worker and several ultranationalist skinheads for bombing attacks, which are felt to have been primarily motivated by racial hatred, demonstrate that some violent ultranationalist groups and individuals in Russia are increasingly adopting methods used by terrorist groups. There are anywhere between 20,000 and 60,000 members of skinhead and other ultranationalist groups in Russia. Of those members of these groups who are violent, most stick to street weapons, such as knives, chains, and iron bars. However, some of these groups have begun to expand their arsenal to include more lethal weapons, such as explosives and even mercury. For instance, In 2007, a group of ultranationalists in the Siberian city of Tomsk was convicted of terrorism and inciting ethnic hatred for a series of attacks, including setting up a booby trap under an anti-Semitic poster and spilling mercury in a restaurant owned by a Jewish businessman.

In March 2007, six members of a skinhead group were detained in Russia’s maritime capital of St. Petersburg on suspicion of having been responsible for the bombing of a McDonald’s restaurant out of hatred for Americans as well as in honor of ultranationalist leader Dmitry Borovikov, who was shot dead by police in 2006. Members of Borovikov’s group had been charged with killing several dark-skinned foreigners. They also acquired mercury and planned to spray or spill it to contaminate targeted facilities.³⁰

Also in 2007, the Moscow Regional Court sentenced a former employee of a nuclear scientific research center to eighteen years in prison for the June 2005 bombing of a Moscow-bound passenger train from Chechnya in what the verdict said was an ethnic hate crime.

Of special concern are cases in which ultranationalists who have studied technical sciences in Russian universities use their acquired knowledge to stage lethal hate crimes. A group of young men were convicted in May 2008 by the Moscow City Court of a series of hate crimes, including bombings. Among other attacks, they staged an August 2006 bombing at Moscow’s Cherkizovsky market, which is primarily patronized by Asian customers. The attack killed eleven and injured forty-five. One of the attackers, Oleg Kostyrev, was a fourth-year student at the Dmitry Mendeleev Russian Chemical-Technological University in Moscow. According to police, it was

²⁹ *The Russian daily Zhizn reported on 13 November 2008 that sailor Dmitry Grobov had testified that he had pushed a button to activate the fire-extinguishing system, which puts out fires by releasing deadly Halon gas, because he was curious.*

³⁰ *These figures were given by the Moscow Bureau for Human Rights on 17 April 2005.*

there that he acquired the diagram for the bomb used in the attack on the market, although the defendants insisted they had found the design on the Internet.

In a worrying development, prosecutors revealed during the trial that one of the leaders of the group had written a book to propagate his ideas of xenophobic violence, in which he referred to himself as a “messiah.” As experience with totalitarian sects shows, their leaders’ and members’ rationale for actions is often rooted in religious beliefs that may justify not only violence against individual “aliens” or “non-believers,” but even the pursuit of an Armageddon that can be brought by a terrorist act of catastrophic proportions, as it was the case with the Aum Shinrikyo apocalyptic cult in Japan. The fact that ultranationalist terrorists have so far limited themselves to land attacks does not preclude the possibility that they will stage sea or river operations if they see an opportunity, such as cruise ship in St. Petersburg carrying tourists of the “wrong” ethnic origin or nationality on board.

2 RUSSIA'S MARITIME AND FRESHWATER ACTIVITIES

The safety and security of maritime shipping, which accounts for 60 percent of Russia’s foreign trade,³¹ is of paramount importance to Russia. Russia’s 2001–20 Maritime Doctrine describes “maritime shipments” as being of “vital importance” to the country. Disruption of these shipments by a series of terrorist attacks would come as a tangible blow to the Russian economy. Maritime shipping is also the only transportation method available for some of the far-flung Russian regions, and disruption of maritime channels to these regions would create serious problems for the local population.

Russia’s water frontiers span over 46,000 kilometers, including 39,000 km of seacoast. Given this vast coastline, the volume of maritime and river transportation has steadily increased in Russia. The volume of cargo processing in Russia’s seaports is expected grow by 1.3 times between 2006 and 2010, while some 55 percent of the deadweight controlled by Russian companies will come to fly the Russian flag by 2010.³²

Russian ports processed 407 million tons of cargo in 2005, including 173 million tons of dry cargo and 223.78 million tons of liquid cargo such as oil, compared to 113 million tons in 1993.³³ These volumes have been forecast to increase further, albeit this forecast will probably have to be revised because of the recent global

³¹ *At the same time, vessels carrying Russian flags account only for 4 percent of Russia’s foreign trade shipments, according to the 2006–10 Strategy of Development of Transport of the Russian Federation, endorsed by the government in July 2006. Perhaps this explains the low level of attention given by government agencies to piracy.*

³² *According to the 2006–10 Strategy of Development of Transport of the Russian Federation, endorsed by the government in July 2006*

³³ *According to the then-head of the Federal Agency of Maritime and River Transportation Alexander Davydenko’s 2006 interview, “Uzkie Mesta Graydushchei Navigatsii,” Transport Rossii (December 2006).*

economic crisis. The Russian government has predicted that Russian have should be processing a total 540 million tons of cargo per year once global trade recovers.³⁴

In addition to maritime channels, Russia also has thousands of inland waterways, rivers, and channels. These freshwater shipping lanes total 101,600 km, and facilitate shipments to sixty-eight out of Russia's eighty regions. These lanes annually transport 23 million passengers and 130 million tons of cargo,³⁵ and some of them are choked by heavy traffic. For instance, vessels often spend two or three days passing through a 55-km stretch of a waterway that connects the Gorodetsky dam and Nizhniy Novgorod, rather than the three or four hours that their speed would allow.³⁶ Transportation of passengers by water will also increase by eight to ten times between 2005 and 2010, according to the 2006–10 Strategy of Development of Transport of the Russian Federation.

3 POSSIBLE SCENARIOS OF MARITIME TERRORISM

Russia has a number of large seaports, as well as several major cities located in close proximity to seas or major rivers. Some of these population centers are not located directly on the sea but in deltas of rivers that empty into the ocean—such as St. Petersburg and Astrakhan—while others are seaports with sizeable populations, such as Novorossiysk. Yet other cities are located on the coast, but do not have large ports, such as Sochi. Sochi, where Russia is to host the Winter Olympics in 2014, is located in proximity to Georgia's breakaway province of Abkhazia, which remains volatile, with assassinations and bombings occurring regularly. Russia's own volatile North Caucasian republics are only a few hundred kilometers east of Sochi. There is a possibility that insurgents based in the North Caucasus will try to discredit Russia's assertions that the Southern Federal District, which includes both Sochi and the North Caucasus, is safe and secure and under the firm control of the authorities by staging attacks across the region, including in Sochi itself, before or during the 2014 games.

One of Russia's busiest ports is Astrakhan, which is connected to the Caspian Sea by a 160-km channel, which is crossed by four ferry links.³⁷ This port, where members of the North Caucasus-based networks have retreated to regroup and rest, has also been the site of potential terrorist attacks. In 2004, FSB agents foiled an attempt by terrorists to blow up a gas facility in this city.

A less busy but important still transportation lane is the Neva River, in the delta of which sits St. Petersburg, Russia's former imperial capital. St. Petersburg has seen

³⁴ According to the then head of the Federal Agency of Maritime and River Transportation Alexander Davydenko's 2006 interview, "Na Puti k WTO, Chto Eshche Uspeem," *RZhD-Partner Port* (January 2006).

³⁵ Interview with Alexander Davydenko, "Uzkie Mesta Graydushchei Navigatsii," *Transport Rossii* (December 2006).

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ According to an interview with the then head of the Federal Agency of Maritime and River Transportation Alexander Davydenko, titled "My Naidyom Argumenty i Dlya Ministrov, i Dlya Sudovladeltsev," *Gudok* (8 February 2006).

no attacks by terrorist networks based in North Caucasus, which reflects the fact that it has no landmarks of great appeal to terrorist groups when compared to Moscow. But that is bound to change, as St. Petersburg—the hometown of Russia's two latest presidents—has begun to acquire some of the functions of a capital city. It has already become home to Russia's Constitutional Court, and the Russian leadership is also considering relocating the command of the Russian Navy there.

3.1 Explosion of a Nuclear Weapon in a Port City

According to the worst-case scenario, radical separatists based in the North Caucasus could hijack a submarine with nuclear warheads on board, as they have planned in the past. They could then try to deploy the weapons in the nearest port city and detonate them. But such an operation could be relatively easily foiled, as the hijacking of a submarine would immediately alert the authorities, while the launch of nuclear weapons would require the ability to break lock codes and other special expertise that the hijackers may find very difficult to obtain.

Alternatively, such a terrorist group could steal an atomic bomb and then smuggle it in a shipping container via sea routes to a major port city. Only anywhere between 8 and 30 percent of transit cargo containers are checked by the Russian customs agency, which is responsible for safety and security checks, such as screening for WMD.³⁸ Another way to avoid checks could be to ship the bomb concealed inside a load of scrap metal.³⁹

Casualties from the explosion of a nuclear weapon in a city would vary, depending on location and time, but we can assume that an explosion of a nuclear warhead in a city would immediately kill tens of thousands and would send panic waves across the entire continent. In 2005 the United States government conducted an exercise, involving the smuggling and detonation of a ten-kiloton nuclear device in the port of Charleston, South Carolina, the fourth-largest sea container port in North America. In such a scenario, a potential fatality count would be 10,000, while the number of those severely injured could reach 30,000.⁴⁰ And if terrorists were to smuggle a ten-kiloton bomb and detonate it in New York City's Times Square on a busy afternoon, up to one million would die, according to Graham Allison, one of the leading U.S. experts on nuclear terrorism.⁴¹

³⁸ Interview with Alexander Davydenko, "Na Puti k WTO, Chto Eshche Uspeem," RZHD-Partner Port (January 2006).

³⁹ "For instance, a federal official familiar with New York harbor, pointed to a scrap metal terminal in Jersey City and stated to a reporter: 'If I wanted to bring an atomic bomb into the port, I'd do it through that scrap operation.'" William Finnegan, "Watching the Waterfront," *The New Yorker* (19 June 2006).

⁴⁰ According to U.S. Army General Bruce Davis. "Nightline: Loose Nukes On Main Street," *ABC News Transcripts* (12 October 2005). An explosion of a twenty-five-megaton nuclear warhead over the heart of Detroit or St. Petersburg, for instance, would immediately kill anywhere between 200,000 and 2 million people, according to *The Effects of Nuclear War* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, May 1979).

⁴¹ Graham Allison, *Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe* (New York: Times Books, 2004).

In the hypothetical scenario outlined above regarding the hijacking of a Russian nuclear submarine, after the nuclear weapon was detonated, the terrorist leaders would then try to compel the Kremlin to first pull Russian troops out of parts of the North Caucasus and then enter negotiations on establishment of an independent state in the region by threatening the authorities with another attack. As stated above, terrorists have already tried to subject the Russian leadership to nuclear blackmail. Russia's then most notorious terrorist leader—the Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev—tried to blackmail the Kremlin with a crude radiological device that he planted in Moscow. Fortunately, the scenario involving the seizure and detonation of a Russian Navy nuclear missile is highly improbable, as functioning nuclear weapons are accorded the highest security in Russia and would be extremely difficult to steal.

3.2 Explosion of a Dirty Bomb in a Port City

In another potential terrorist scenario, radical separatists could hire organized criminals to either bribe or coerce personnel at a nuclear facility to steal weapons-grade material or spent nuclear fuel. They could also try to steal nuclear materials during transport, as there have been cases when such material disappeared during transit or in the process of being prepared for shipment. Even though North Caucasus-based separatists are not known to possess the expertise to build an atomic bomb with stolen weapons-grade material, they could still pack the spent fuel with explosives and then deploy it in a shipping container in St. Petersburg, Vladivostok, Sochi, or any other major Russian port. A dirty bomb made with 50 kilograms of spent fuel packed around 45 kilograms of conventional explosives could kill hundreds, if not thousands, although many of the deaths would occur weeks and months later from radiation exposure.⁴²

3.3 Hijacking of an Atomic-Powered Vessel with Subsequent Sabotage of its Reactor

Another scenario could be an attempt to seize an atomic-powered vessel and sabotage its reactor. Radical separatists might place their agents as insiders on the ship's crew; take hostages; plant explosives at the reactor; and then try to coerce the Russian leadership into entering negotiations on secession of parts of the North Caucasus.

If either the terrorists or disgruntled insiders or both had managed to not only seize a nuclear-powered vessel and sabotage its reactor, but also to blow it up in the harbor of a major Russian port city, the consequences would have been disastrous. In addition to the immediate casualties, an explosion of a nuclear reactor would have long-term effects on the health of thousands, if not tens of thousands of people if it occurred in a major Russian coastal city.⁴³ It would also have a psychological impact as great—if not greater—than that caused by a dirty bomb attack.

⁴² James Kitfield, "Threat Assessment: Could Terrorism Go Nuclear?" *National Journal* (19 December 2001).

⁴³ This assessment is according to Vladimir Kuznetsov, a former inspector at Gosatomnadzor, a nuclear security watchdog, and author of *Yadernaya Opasnost (Nuclear Danger)* (2003).

It is important to bear in mind that sabotaging modern nuclear reactors, which feature many redundant safety functions, would require profound know-how, including knowledge of which equipment would need to be destroyed to cause a reactor meltdown and where it is located.

3.4 Bombing of an Oil Tanker or an Oil Terminal

As noted above, a corrupt Russian municipal official has already plotted to blow up an oil tanker off the coast of Russia's Murmansk region. Apart from this plot, there has been no publicly known attempt to cause a massive oil spill in Russia's territorial waters. However, we can discern from this incident that terrorist groups could in theory seize an oil tanker—for instance, at Russia's busy Black Sea port of Novorossiysk—and blow it up. The damage of such an attack would be mostly economic and environmental. Prosecutors have estimated that the aforementioned potential spill of the oil tanker in the Kolsky Bay would have caused at least 40 metric tons of petroleum to be released into the sea, causing millions of dollars worth of environmental damage.

We could also extrapolate the economic costs from the bombing of the Limburg tanker in October 2002. The bombing contributed to a short-term collapse of the international shipping business in the Gulf of Aden and nearby waters, and caused rates among Yemeni shippers to soar by 300 percent, and reduced Yemeni port shipping volumes by 50 percent.⁴⁴ Obviously, the spilling of 90,000 barrels of oil into the Gulf of Aden also caused serious ecological damage.

We can also only guess what damage the destruction of an oil terminal could cause in Russia's oil shipment hub, the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. For instance, the 2004 attack against the oil terminal in Basra, Iraq, was carried out by suicide bombers in three inflatable boats. The attack killed two U.S. Navy servicemen and shut down the terminal for two days, causing almost USD 40 million in damage.⁴⁵

3.5 Disrupting the Shipping Operations of a Major Port

Some of Russia's waterways are so clogged that the sinking of a vessel could paralyze traffic in them for protracted periods of time. As was mentioned above, the high level of congestion in the waterway connecting the Gorodetsky dam and the city of Nizhniy Novgorod makes this shipping lane exceptionally vulnerable to such a disruption, whether due to the intentional scuttling of a ship or to the destruction of a bridge. Russian government agencies and research organizations have done no publicly available studies on what economic damage the long-term disruption of shipping on internal waterways could cause.

⁴⁴ Paul W. Parformak and Jonn Fritelli, *Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities* (Washington, D.C.: Report prepared for the Congressional Research Service, 9 January 2007).

⁴⁵ Ali Koknar, "Maritime Terrorism: A New Challenge for NATO."

3.6 Bombing of an Explosives Warehouse in Port

Facilities such as fertilizer plants and industrial refrigeration warehouses could under certain conditions be turned into “weapons of mass destruction,” according to a study released in Russia in 2002.⁴⁶ An explosion at a refrigeration warehouse would lead to an enormous fire, which would release tons of ammonia into the air, possibly poisoning thousands of people over an area of several square kilometers, the study warned. In fact, Russia has already seen one attempt to execute such an attack. FSB agents foiled a 2004 attempt by two members of an extremist group based in the North Caucasus to blow up a gas facility in Russia’s port of Astrakhan, which is located in the delta of the Volga River that flows into the Caspian Sea.⁴⁷

3.7 Seizure of a Passenger Vessel and Publicized Mass Execution of Those on Board

As stated above, the hijacking of a passenger ship is the only act of maritime terrorism that has thus far been committed by groups seeking the secession of parts of the North Caucasus from Russia. That attack—the hijacking of a passenger ferry bound for Russia from Turkey by Chechen separatists in January 1996—ended peacefully, although it could have become a highly public bloodbath in the vicinity of the heavily traveled Bosphorus Strait had the hostage-takers decided to implement their threats against the ship’s defenseless passengers. Having seen that hostage taking alone failed to have any impact on the Russian government’s decision making, terrorist groups contemplating the seizure of passenger ships may opt for escalation and execute their hostages instead, for maximum media exposure and public shock.

As a U.S. Coast Guard analyst noted, “in terms of the probability of something happening, the likelihood of it succeeding, and the consequences of it occurring, ferries come out at the very high end.”⁴⁸ According to an authoritative RAND study, onboard bombings present the greatest combination of threat and vulnerability among all forms of assault on ferries and other passenger vessels.⁴⁹

3.8 Bombing of a Dike

Some of Russia’s major dikes, which are connected to rivers, are located upstream from sizeable cities, making them potential targets for terrorist attacks. The then-head of the Federal Agency of Maritime and River Transportation Alexander Davydenko noted in a 2006 interview that there was a particularly serious “terrorist threat” to the

⁴⁶ Alexander Fyodorov, ed., *Terrorism in the Metropolis: Assessing Threats and Protecting Critical Infrastructure* (Moscow: PIR Center, 2002).

⁴⁷ The FSB press service announced that its agents managed to prevent two men from blowing up a gas distribution facility on 14 November 2004.

⁴⁸ Eric Lipton, “Trying to Keep the Nation’s Ferries Safe From Terrorists,” *The New York Times* (19 March 2005), as cited in Parformak and Fritelli, *Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities*.

⁴⁹ Michael D. Greenberg, Peter Chalk, Henry H. Willis, Ivan Khilko, and David S. Ortiz, *Maritime Terrorism, Risk and Liability* (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy, 2006).

vulnerable Khimki water reservoir, which is located close to Moscow, and where the surface of the water is 40 meters higher than the altitude of Red Square.⁵⁰

In the same year, the then-head of the Federal Security Service Nikolai Patrushev told a session of the National Counter-Terrorism Committee, which he chaired, that groups of Chechnya-based terrorists had planned to stage a series of explosions at hydro-technical facilities in Russia. He said the threat was most serious in the south of Russia, at such locations as the dikes of the Volgograd and Tsimlyanski water reservoirs, as well as at facilities in the Saratov region and the North Caucasian republic of Dagestan. Patrushev said an inspection of these dikes and reservoirs has revealed that they were not sufficiently protected. "A sabotage or terrorist attack on one of these (facilities) can cause catastrophic consequences, including big human casualties and serious economic losses," Patrushev said. "This threat is very real."⁵¹

There are some other potential scenarios for acts of maritime terrorism that should be kept in mind, and that must be taken into account in any comprehensive strategy to address maritime terrorist attacks, including:

- Ramming tankers and other ships or offshore oil and gas platforms with high-speed boats
- Bombing ships in port or underwater pipelines with underwater explosives⁵²
- Mining of a port harbor
- Use of a small, high-speed boat to attack an oil tanker or offshore energy platform
- An attack on a port or a major coastal city with biological or chemical agents

4 THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO THREAT OF TERRORISM, INCLUDING MARITIME TERRORISM⁵³

Russia's organizational and legal response to terrorism has undergone major changes in the wake of a number of horrendous terrorist attacks, including the dramatic hostage situations at Moscow's Dubrovka Theatre in 2002 and at the Beslan school in 2004.

A number of laws have been passed to improve the government's response to terrorism.

Among the measures that have been introduced is the use of the armed forces and security services to fight terrorists abroad. If diplomatic methods of resolving a hostage crisis that involves Russian citizens abroad do not do not succeed, the President of the Russian Federation has the power to issue an executive order to have

⁵⁰ "My Naidyom Arguymenty i Dlya Ministrov, i Dlya Sudovladeltsev," *Gudok* (8 February 2006).

⁵¹ "Khorosho Zabytaya Trevoga," *Vremya* (8 November 2006).

⁵² According to a study by RAND, suspected members of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) are known to have enrolled in scuba diving courses in the Southern Philippines. See Greenberg, et al., *Maritime Terrorism, Risk and Liability*.

⁵³ This section is partially based on the chapter "Russia's System to Combat Terrorism and Its Application in Chechnya" in Simon Saradzhyan, *National Counter-Terrorism Strategies* (Brussels: NATO, December 2006).

Russian troops conduct an anti-terrorist operation outside the borders and territorial waters of the Russian Federation. Such operations are conducted in accordance with the international treaties to which the Russian Federation is a signatory, and with the Russian Federal Law on “Countering Terrorism.”⁵⁴

This 2006 law introduced the use of the armed forces and other units to fight terrorism away from Russian soil. The law also empowers the president to decide whether and where to use armed forces against terrorists abroad.

Among other things, this landmark law has given the authorities the right to sink and shoot down hijacked vessels and aircraft, even if the latter have hostages on board.

In another significant development, the law also gave the lead role in fighting terrorism to the Federal Security Service (FSB) in a clear effort to centralize command over counter-terrorism activities. In coordination with this counter-terrorism law, the Russian president also signed a decree establishing a National Counter-Terrorism Committee (NCC) in February 2006. The president put the FSB in charge of this permanent body to coordinate the federal agencies’ response to terrorism.

A number of other federal bills have been introduced to ban authorities from conducting political negotiations with terrorists, as well as to permit the confiscation of property of terrorists and outlaw handing over the bodies of slain terrorists to their relatives.

Most recently, Russia adopted the Concept of Countering Terrorism in the Russian Federation. The concept, which was approved by President Dmitry Medvedev in October 2009, notes WMD aspirations of terrorists and admits there are internal root causes for terrorism. It also notes geographic expansion of terrorism, improvement of terrorist groups’ organizational skills, formation of large terrorist organizations with developed infrastructure and increasing nexus of terrorism and organized crime. However, the document contains no references to maritime terrorism.

The most recent strategic document to touch upon the Russian state’s response to terrorism is the new Military Doctrine. The doctrine, which President Dmitry Medvedev signed off on after a number of delays in February 2010, lists international terrorism among major external threats and lists “fighting piracy, ensuring security of maritime shipping” and “ensuring security of the economic activities of the Russian Federation in the World Ocean” among the armed forces’ peacetime missions.⁵⁵

Interestingly, Russia’s 2001–20 Maritime Doctrine does not list terrorism among the maritime challenges that Russia faces.

⁵⁴ From a 3 April 2008 statement issued to the author by the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation in response to his written questions on Russia’s response to maritime piracy and terrorism for a newspaper article.

⁵⁵ “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” February 5, 2010. Official web site of the Russian president.

4.1 Key Agencies' Evolving Organizational Response to Maritime Terrorism

The Federal Security Service (FSB). As was noted above, the FSB has been given the lead role in fighting terrorism in Russia. FSB officers chair the NCC and sit on this committee's regional counterparts to oversee routine counter-terrorism policy making. They are also tasked with leading the aforementioned counter-terrorism Federal Operational Staff and regional Operational Staffs in cases of terrorist attacks.

FSB also has the power to send its commando units abroad to strike terrorist groups and their bases. The FSB also has the Border Guard Service under its command, including its coastal guard forces. These coastal guard units are tasked with the challenge of protecting Russia's 46,000 km of water frontiers, including 39,000 km of seacoast.⁵⁶

The Defense Ministry. Russia's Defense Ministry, as in many other countries, is taking on an increasingly prominent role in anti-terrorism operations. The fact that both the Defense Minister and the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces sit on the National Counter-Terrorism Committee reflects the role that Russia's political leadership would like the military to play in fighting terrorism. Defense Ministry forces play auxiliary roles in CT operations, such as providing air transportation and fire support, including attack planes and gunships for law-enforcement units pursuing groups of insurgents and terrorists. The 2006 law on terrorism makes the military responsible for sinking hijacked ships and shooting down hijacked airliners.

Of course, of all the branches of the armed forces, it is the navy that bears the main responsibility for fighting maritime terrorism and piracy threats. As of 2003, the Russian Navy had 146 combat warships, including 70 ocean-going vessels, compared to the Soviet Navy's total of 703 (including 380 ocean-going vessels) in 1985.⁵⁷ The Russian Navy's operational capabilities on the world's seas have decreased by two-thirds since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, according to Russian naval experts' estimates.

Prosecutor General's Office. The Prosecutor General's Office and its Investigative Committee are tasked with investigating rather than interdicting terrorist incidents. The committee investigates and prosecutes all major terrorist attacks. The General Prosecutor's Office also has special departments responsible for overseeing individual law-enforcement agencies and could help to entice them to shift their focus from response and post-facto investigation to deterrence and prevention.

⁵⁶ *The coast guard vessels inspected 27,000 fishing vessels in 2005, intercepting 500 Russian and foreign poaching ships to confiscate 2,400 tons of fish and seafood, according to Vice Admiral Vyacheslav Serzhanin, commander of the Coast Guard directorate of the Border Guard's Organizational Department.*

⁵⁷ *"Kuda Plyovot VMF Rossii," V.V.Zabros (31 October 2007); available on the web site of the graduates of the Popov Naval Radioelectronics Academy, at http://vvmure1987.ru/index.php?nma=catalog&fla=stat&cat_id=22&page=1&nums=103.*

Interior Ministry. One of the problems exposed by the Beslan tragedy has been the failure of the Interior Ministry and other law enforcement agencies to shift the focus of its operations from responding to terrorist acts to preventing them from taking place. NCC's then Chairman Patrushev made clear at the time that preventing terrorism is one of the key institutional challenges that his committee needs to resolve as soon as possible.⁵⁸

The Interior Ministry also supervises Russia's rough equivalent of the United States' National Guard, known as the Interior Troops, which play an important role in responding to a terrorist attack under way. These Interior Troops also have special units of combat divers that can be called into action should a maritime terrorism scenario materialize.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

That only one act of maritime terrorism, targeting Russian citizens and Russian assets, has been carried out and several more attempted reflects the global trend. Seaborne strikes have constituted only 2 percent of all international terrorism incidents over the last thirty years, according to the RAND Terrorism Database.⁵⁹ The RAND study suggests that acts of maritime terrorism are rare because operating at sea requires specific skills in addition to those specialized competencies needed to operate a ship, such as surface and underwater demolition techniques. It also requires access to appropriate assault and transport vehicles and the ability to mount and sustain operations from a non-land-based environment.⁶⁰

Yet, in spite of these difficulties, maritime terrorism should not be discounted as a negligible threat in Russia for a number of reasons.

The first reason is the improvement of security at land-based military facilities. Government agencies have implemented extensive measures to harden inland targets to such an extent that the targets located on rivers and seas are becoming relatively more attractive as targets for groups who have previously have considered these water targets to require too many resources and special skills to attack.

Second, the increasing frequency and importance of maritime shipments make them easier and higher-impact targets. Maritime shipping already accounts for 60 percent of Russia's foreign trade, and has been forecast to continue to grow, although the current economic crisis will probably slow down or arrest this growth. There are also large areas in Siberia where water is the only possible venue for cargo transportation, with neither roads nor railways connecting these areas to 'mainland' Russia. Also, as Russia's oil output had grown dramatically in the several years prior to

⁵⁸ *Interfax-AVN* (20 March 2006).

⁵⁹ See Greenberg, et al., *Maritime Terrorism, Risk and Liability*.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

eruption of the economic crisis in Russia in the fall of 2008, so have shipments of oil in tankers from Russia, making it easier to plan an attack on such a tanker to cause a massive oil spill that would cause economic and ecological damage to Russia. And, while rebels in Chechnya have largely abstained from attacking the oil infrastructure, perhaps because they have benefited from the oil industry financially, in other parts of Russia terrorist networks have attacked facilities with the aim of inflicting economic damage, including electricity lines in the Moscow region and gas pipelines in Tatarstan.

The third reason that maritime terrorism should not be discounted, despite its rarity, is that maritime violence is no longer out of sight. The rapid development and increasing availability of technologies used to record and transmit visual and other data, ranging from personal mobile phones equipped with cameras to professional cameras mounted on media helicopters, mean that maritime targets are no longer out of sight and, therefore, their value increases in the eyes of terrorists, who always seek to maximize the impact of their actions on their target audiences.

While conventional maritime attacks will be easier to execute in the future, I would argue that endemic agents of terror in Russia are more likely to attempt acts of catastrophic proportions. The terrorist networks based in the North Caucasus should have realized by now from their own experience that nothing short of catastrophic terrorist attack would coerce Russian authorities to negotiate; not even a terrorist act on the scale of the Beslan siege, in which more than one hundred children died, succeeded in forcing the Kremlin to the negotiating table

If these networks' leaders ask themselves what single event can reverse their fortunes in the fight to defeat Russia and establish an independent state in the North Caucasus, what is the single option they should focus their energy and capabilities on, the answer most likely would be a nuclear terrorist attack staged from land or water. An alliance of North Caucasus-based terrorist groups, corrupt law enforcement officials, and venal insiders would be impossible to interdict, especially if the hijackers are well organized and armed and are prepared to die, thinking they are fighting a holy war, in which they have already dehumanized the enemy and its infidel civilians and in which the reward for their "martyrdom" is paradise.

Russia needs to continue to strengthen lines of defense against catastrophic terrorism. However, no matter how many lines of defense are built around Russia's facilities, borders, and key terminals, these efforts will prove futile unless the nation's security culture improves and nefarious insiders are winnowed out. Russian law enforcement agencies must also be cleansed of corrupt or disloyal officials who may provide safe passage to terrorists for material gain or ideological reasons.

These agencies and security services should acknowledge the emerging terrorist threat posed by ultranationalists armed with technical knowledge and access to hazardous materials. And these agencies should continue to keep groups on the

run—no matter their political or ideological orientation—that might be interested in both nuclear and conventional maritime terrorism. The authorities should also address root causes and contributing factors behind the indigenous terrorism, including poverty, unemployment, abuses of the population in the North Caucasus, spread of religious extremism and ethnic intolerance, lack of education opportunities and others.

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Slikovno gradivo

Pictures

Slika 1
Photo 1



Udeleženci konference med uvodnim nagovorom dr. Damirja Črnčca, generalnega direktorja Obveščevalno varnostne službe, ki mu je sledil nagovor dr. Ljubice Jelušič, ministrice za obrambo. Za glavnim omizjem sedijo nosilci vsebinskih prispevkov tega sklopa, genmaj. mag. Alojz Šteiner, načelnik Generalštaba Slovenske vojske, g. Primož Šavc, generalni direktor Direktorata za obrambno politiko, veleposlanik g. Matjaž Šinkovec, Ministrstvo za zunanje zadeve, in dr. Milan Jazbec, Ministrstvo za zunanje zadeve.

Participants of the conference during an introductory address by Director General of Intelligence and Security Service, MoD Dr Damir Črnčec, followed by an address by Dr Ljubica Jelušič, Minister of Defence. At the main table Maj-Gen Alojz Šteiner, Chief of the General Staff, Slovenian Armed Forces, Mr Primož Šavc, Director General of Defence Policy Directorate, MoD, H.E. Mr Matjaž Šinkovec, MFA and Dr Milan Jazbec, MFA.

Slika 2
Photo 2



Skupinska fotografija udeležencev konference in nosilcev vsebinskih prispevkov.
Group photo of participants and authors of papers.

Slika 3
Photo 3



Ministrica za obrambo dr. Ljubica Jelušič se je ob robu konference srečala tudi z direktorjem Programa ZDA-ruske varnosti in Programa črnomske varnosti, dr. Sergeijem Konoplyovom.
In the margins of the conference, Minister of Defence Dr Ljubica Jelušič also met with Director of the US-Russia Security Program and Black Sea Security Program Dr Sergei Konoplyov.

Slika 4
Photo 4



Udeležence konference je v Vili Podrožnik sprejel in nagovoril veleposlanik g. Andrej Benedejčič, generalni direktor Direktorata za globalne zadeve in politično multilateralo Ministrstva za zunanje zadeve RS.
Participants of the conference were hosted and addressed in Vila Podrožnik by H.E. Mr Andrej Benedejčič, Director General for Global Issues and Multilateral Political Relations, MFA.

Avtorji

Authors



Lada L. Roslycky

Lada L. Roslycky je neodvisna svetovalka in doktorska kandidatka na Univerzi v Groningenu na Nizozemskem. V letih 2008–2009 je bila članica harvardskega Programa črnomske varnosti in si je močno prizadevala glede podpore evroatlantski integraciji in demokratičnemu razvoju v Ukrajini. Lada Roslycky je avtorica več objav na temo politike črnomske regije, politično-kriminalne povezave, mehke moči in varnosti.


Lada L. Roslycky LL.M. *is an independent consultant and PhD Candidate at the University of Groningen in The Netherlands. In 2008-2009 she participated in the Harvard Black Sea Security Program and made significant effort to support Euro-Atlantic Integration and democratic development in Ukraine. Ms. Roslycky is the author of several publications on the Black Sea Region policy, political criminal nexus, soft power and security.*



Dr. Damir Črnčec

Dr. Damir Črnčec je diplomirani politolog – obramboslovec ter magister in doktor politoloških znanosti. Končal je usposabljanje s področja mednarodnih in varnostnih zadev v Evropskem centru za varnostne študije George C. Marshall ter usposabljanje o nacionalni in mednarodni varnosti na univerzi Harvard. Je (so)avtor številnih strokovnih in znanstvenih člankov ter dveh znanstvenih monografij. Po različnih operativnih, analitičnih in vodstvenih nalogah v Obveščevalno varnostni službi Ministrstva za obrambo je od decembra 2005 njen generalni direktor. Od leta 2010 je docent za obrambni in varnostni sistem.

Damir Črnčec, PhD, *graduated in political sciences – defence studies, and received his master’s degree and PhD in political sciences. He completed training in the area of international and security affairs at the George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, as well as in the area of national and international security studies at the Harvard University. He is the (co)author of numerous expert and scientific articles and two scientific monographs. After carrying out several operational, analytical and leadership assignments at the Intelligence and Security Service of the Ministry of Defence, he was assigned to his present post as Director-General in December 2005. In 2010 he was appointed as Assistant Professor of defence and security studies.*



Hrygoriy Perepelytsia

Hrygoriy Perepelytsia je direktor Raziskovalnega inštituta za zunanjo politiko na diplomatski akademiji ukrajinskega ministrstva za zunanje zadeve. Je doktor in profesor političnih znanosti. V svoji karieri je bil vodja analitične skupine v Centru za strateške študije na generalštabu ukrajinske vojske, vodja oddelka za vojaško politiko na Nacionalnem inštitutu za strateške študije, namestnik direktorja Nacionalnega inštituta za strateške študije, direktor Raziskovalnega inštituta za zunanjo politiko in profesor na Inštitutu za mednarodne odnose Nacionalne univerze v Kijevu.

Hrygoriy Perepelytsia is Director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the Diplomatic Academy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. He is Doctor and Professor of Political Sciences. He has been Chief of the Analytical Group at the Center for Strategic Studies of the General Staff of Armed Forces of Ukraine, Head of Military Policy Department at the National Institute for Strategic Studies, Deputy Director of the National Institute for Strategic Studies, Director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and Professor at the Institute of International Relations at the Kiev National University.



Dr. Milan Jazbec

Dr. Milan Jazbec je vodja Sektorja za načrtovanje politik in raziskave na Ministrstvu za zunanje zadeve Republike Slovenije. Od decembra 2000 do novembra 2004 je bil državni sekretar za obrambno politiko in mednarodno sodelovanje na Ministrstvu za obrambo. Je avtor osmih knjig o diplomaciji ter tudi številnih člankov in študij o diplomaciji ter mednarodnih varnostnih in obrambnih temah. Od maja 2009 je izredni profesor diplomacije, njegovi osrednji raziskovalni temi pa sta postmoderna diplomacija in sociologija diplomacije.

Milan Jazbec, PhD, is the Head of the Policy Planning and Research Division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia. From December 2000 to November 2004 he was State Secretary for Defence Policy and International Affairs at the Slovenian Ministry of Defence. He is the author of eight books on diplomacy, as well as of numerous articles and studies on diplomacy, international security and defence. Since May 2009 he has been Associate Professor of Diplomatic Studies. His research is primarily focused on postmodern diplomacy and sociology of diplomacy.



Generalmajor mag.
Alojz Šteiner

Generalmajor mag. Alojz Šteiner je magister obramboslovja, naziv magistra pa je pridobil tudi na šolanju na visoki šoli *Industrial College of Armed Forces*, ki spada pod univerzo *National Defence University* v ZDA. Je generalmajor SV in od maja 2009 načelnik Generalštaba. Med pomembnejšimi dolžnostmi, ki jih je opravljal v preteklosti, so dolžnosti poveljnika 7. pokrajinskega štaba Teritorialne obrambe v Mariboru, namestnika poveljnika 3. operativnega poveljstva SV in namestnika poveljnika sil SV, na Generalštabu pa dolžnosti v J-3, J-4 in J-5. Bil je svetovalec trem načelnikom, direktor štaba in namestnik načelnika. Napisal je več člankov o preoblikovanju Slovenske vojske.

Major General Alojz Šteiner received his master's degree in defence studies, as well as from the *Industrial College of Armed Forces at the National Defence University in the USA*. He is Major General of the Slovenian Armed Forces. In May 2009 he was appointed as Chief of General Staff. His most significant duties in his past career include Commander of the 7th Regional Territorial Defence Staff in Maribor, Deputy Commander of the 3rd Operational Command of the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF), Deputy Commander of the SAF, as well posts at the General Staff (J-3, J-4 and J-5). He was also advisor to three chiefs of the SAF General Staff, Director of Staff and Deputy Chief of the SAF General Staff. He has written several articles on transformation of the Slovenian Armed Forces.



Radu Dudău

Radu Dudău je izredni profesor na oddelku za filozofijo univerze v Bukarešti. Poučuje teorijo mednarodnih odnosov, etiko mednarodnih odnosov in analizo mednarodnih konfliktov. Je tudi vodja oddelka za raziskave romunskega diplomatskega inštituta. Njegove raziskave na področju politike so usmerjene v evrazijsko energetska varnost, geopolitiko širše črnomorske regije in transatlantske odnose.

Radu Dudău is Associate Professor in the Philosophy Department at the Bucharest University. He teaches *International Relations Theory, Ethics of International Relations and Analysis of International Conflicts*. He is also the Head of the Research Department at the Romanian Diplomatic Institute. His politics-related research is focused on *Eurasian energy security, geopolitics of the wider Black Sea Region and Trans-Atlantic relations*.



Doc. dr. Andrej Rahten

Doc. dr. Andrej Rahten je zaposlen na Inštitutu za kulturno zgodovino ZRC SAZU in na Filozofski fakulteti Univerze v Mariboru, kot predavatelj mednarodnih odnosov pa deluje tudi na drugih slovenskih fakultetah. V letih 2000–2009 je bil podpredsednik Slovenskega panevropskega gibanja, od leta 2004 pa je član predsedstva Mednarodne panevropske unije. V letih 2004–2008 je bil svetovalec predsednika vlade za zunanjo politiko. V letih 2008–2009 je bil predsednik Upravnega odbora Evro-sredozemske univerze. Je eden izmed pobudnikov in član uredništva zbirke *Studia diplomatica Slovenica*. Do zdaj je objavil sedem monografij s področja slovenske diplomatske in politične zgodovine.

Assistant Professor Andrej Rahten, PhD, is employed at the Institute for Cultural History at the ZRC SAZU (Scientific and Research Centre of the Slovenian Academy of Science and Art) and at the Faculty of Arts of the University of Maribor, and teaches International Relations also at other Slovenian faculties. From 2000 to 2009 he was Vice-President of Slovenian Pan-European Movement. Since 2004 he has been Member of the Presidency of the International Pan-European Union. From 2004 to 2008 he was Foreign Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister of the Republic of Slovenia. In 2008 and 2009 he was President of the Euro-Mediterranean University Management Board. He is one of the initiators and member of the Editorial Board of the book series *Studia Diplomatica Slovenica*. He has published seven monographs on Slovenian diplomatic and political history.



Azer Khudiyev

Azer Khudiyev je vodja oddelka za analize na Centru za sinergetske raziskave v Bakuju. Na diplomatski akademiji v Ukrajini bo zagovarjal doktorsko disertacijo na temo Vloga Azerbajdzana pri zagotavljanju varnosti v črnomoški in kaspjski regiji. Vodi raziskovalno delo na tem področju, o navedenem vprašanju pa je napisal tudi več člankov.

Azer Khudiyev is the Head of the Analytical Department of the Synergetic Centre in Baku. He will defend his doctoral dissertation entitled “Role of Azerbaijan in Ensuring the Security of the Black Sea and Caspian Region” at the Diplomatic Academy in Ukraine. He leads research work in this area and has written several articles related to the above-mentioned issue.



Mag. Aljoša Selan

Mag. Aljoša Selan je univerzitetni diplomirani politolog in magister komunikologije. Diplomiral je s področja vojaškega vodenja in končal Šolo za častnike vojnih enot. V okviru doktorskega študija proučuje procese odločanja. Udeležil se je izobraževanj na univerzah Cranfield v Veliki Britaniji, Carleton v Kanadi in Harvard v ZDA. Opravljal je različne naloge na področju mednarodnega sodelovanja in obrambne politike v okviru Direktorata za obrambno politiko Ministrstva za obrambo. Trenutno je vodja Sektorja za evroatlantske integracije in sopredsedujoči pobudi Clearinghouse za Jugovzhodno Evropo.

Aljoša Selan is Bachelor of Political Sciences and holds a Master's degree in Communication Studies. He graduated in the area of military leadership and completed the Reserve Officer Training School. Within his doctoral study programme he researches decision-making processes. He has attended education programmes at Cranfield University in Great Britain, Carleton University in Canada and Harvard University in the USA. He performed various tasks in the area of international cooperation and defence policy within the Defence Policy Directorate of the Ministry of Defence. At the moment he is the Head of the Sector of Euro-Atlantic Integrations and Co-Chair of the Southeast Europe Clearinghouse Initiative.



Simon Saradzhyan

Simon Saradzhyan je raziskovalec v Centru Belfer vladne šole John F. Kennedy na harvardski univerzi in avtor člankov o terorizmu, varnosti in nadzoru nad oboroževanjem. Njegovi raziskovalni interesi obsegajo nadzor nad oboroževanjem, jedrski in konvencionalni terorizem ter obrambne, varnostne in vesoljske zadeve v Rusiji in drugih državah, ki so pred kratkim postale neodvisne. Preden je začel delati za center Belfer, je bil namestnik urednika časopisa The Moscow Times in svetovalec Urada Združenih narodov za koordinacijo humanitarnih zadev.

Simon Saradzhyan is a researcher at the Belfer Center at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and author of several articles on terrorism, security and arms control. His research interests include arms control, nuclear and conventional terrorism, defence, security and space affairs in Russia and other newly-independent states. Before joining the Belfer Center, he worked as deputy editor of The Moscow Times and as a consultant for the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

Navodila avtorjem
za oblikovanje prispevkov

Instructions for the authors
of papers

NAVODILA AVTORJEM ZA OBLIKOVANJE PRISPEVKOV ZA BILTEN SLOVENSKE VOJSKE IN VOJAŠKOŠOLSKI ZBORNIK

Vsebinska navodila

Splošno **Bilten Slovenske vojske** je interdisciplinarna znanstveno-strokovna publikacija, v kateri se objavljajo prispevki o aktualnih temah, raziskavah, znanstvenih in strokovnih razpravah, tehničnih ali družboslovnih analizah z varnostnega, obrambnega in vojaškega področja.

Vojaškošolski zbornik je vojaškostrokovna in informativna publikacija, namenjena izobraževanju in obveščanju o dosežkih ter izkušnjah na področju vojaškega izobraževanja, usposabljanja in izpopolnjevanja.

Kaj objavljamo?

Objavljamo prispevke v slovenskem jeziku s povzetki, prevedenimi v angleški jezik, in po odločitvi uredniškega odbora prispevke v angleškem jeziku s povzetki, prevedenimi v slovenski jezik.

Objavljamo prispevke, ki še niso bili objavljeni ali poslani v objavo drugi reviji. Pisec je odgovoren za vse morebitne kršitve avtorskih pravic. Če je bil prispevek že natisnjen drugje, poslan v objavo ali predstavljen na strokovni konferenci, mora to avtor sporočiti uredniku in pridobiti soglasje založnika (če je treba) ter navesti razloge za ponovno objavo.

Tehnična navodila

Omejitve dolžine prispevkov Prispevki naj obsegajo 16 strani oziroma 30.000 znakov s presledki (avtorska pola), izjemoma najmanj 8 strani oziroma 15.000 znakov ali največ 24 strani oziroma 45.000 znakov.

Recenzije Prispevki se recenzirajo. Recenzija je anonimna. Glede na oceno recenzentov uredniški odbor ali urednik prispevek sprejme, če je treba, zahteva popravke ali ga zavrne. Pripombe recenzentov avtor vnese v prispevek.

Zaradi anonimnega recenzentskega postopka je treba prvo stran in vsebino oblikovati tako, da identiteta avtorja ni prepoznavna.

Avtor ob naslovu prispevka napiše, v katero kategorijo po njegovem mnenju in glede na klasifikacijo v COBISS njegov prispevek spada. Klasifikacija je dostopna na spletni strani revije in pri odgovornem uredniku. Končno klasifikacijo določi uredniški odbor.

Lektoriranje Lektoriranje besedil zagotavlja OE, pristojna za založništvo. Lektorirana besedila se avtorizirajo.

- Prevajanje** Prevajanje besedil ali povzetkov zagotavlja OE, pristojna za prevajanje.
- Navajanje avtorjev prispevka** Navajanje avtorjev je skrajno zgoraj, levo poravnano.
Primer:
 Ime 1 Priimek 1,
 Ime 2 Priimek 2
 V opombi pod črto se za slovenske avtorje navede, iz katere ustanove prihajajo. Pri tujih avtorjih je treba navesti tudi ime države.
- Naslov prispevka** Navedbi avtorjev sledi naslov prispevka. Črke v naslovu so velike 16 pik, natisnjene krepko, besedilo naslova pa je sredinsko poravnano.
- Povzetek** Prispevku mora biti dodan povzetek, ki obsega največ 1200 znakov (20 vrstic). Povzetek naj na kratko opredeli temo prispevka, predvsem naj povzame rezultate in ugotovitve. Splošne ugotovitve in misli ne spadajo v povzetek, temveč v uvod.
- Povzetek v angleščini** Avtorji morajo oddati tudi prevod povzetka v angleščino. Tudi za prevod povzetka velja omejitev do 1200 znakov (20 vrstic).
- Ključne besede** Ključne besede (od 3 do 5, tudi v angleškem jeziku) naj bodo natisnjene krepko in z obojestransko poravnavo besedila.
- Besedilo** Avtorji naj oddajo svoje prispevke na papirju formata A4, s presledkom med vrsticami 1,5 in velikostjo črk 12 pik Arial. Na zgornjem in spodnjem robu naj bo do besedila približno 3 cm, levi rob naj bo širok 2 cm, desni pa 4 cm. Na vsaki strani je tako približno 30 vrstic s približno 62 znaki. Besedilo naj bo obojestransko poravnano, brez umikov na začetku odstavka.
- Kratka predstavitev avtorjev** Avtorji morajo pripraviti kratko predstavitev svojega strokovnega oziroma znanstvenega dela. Predstavitev naj ne presega 600 znakov (10 vrstic). Če je avtorjev več, se predstavi vsak posebej, čim bolj zgoščeno. Avtorji naj besedilo umestijo na konec prispevka po navedeni literaturi.
- Strukturiranje besedila** Posamezna poglavja v besedilu naj bodo ločena s samostojnimi podnaslovi in ustrezno oštevilčena (členitev največ na 4 ravni).
Primer:
 1 Uvod
 2 Naslov poglavja (1. raven)
 2.1 Podnaslov (2. raven)
 2.1.1 Podnaslov (3. raven)
 2.1.1.1 Podnaslov (4. raven)

**Oblikovanje
seznama
literature**

V seznamu literature je treba po abecednem redu navesti le avtorje, na katere se sklicujete v prispevku, celotna oznaka vira pa mora biti skladna s harvardskim načinom navajanja. Če je avtorjev več, navedite vse, kot so navedeni na izvirnem delu.

Primeri:

a) knjiga:

Priimek, ime (začetnica imena), letnica. *Naslov dela*. Kraj: Založba.

Na primer: Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

b) zbornik:

Samson, C., 1970. Problems of information studies in history. V S. Stone, ur. *Humanities information research*. Sheffield: CRUS, 1980, str. 44–68. Pri posameznih člankih v zbornikih na koncu posameznega vira navedemo strani, na katerih je članek, na primer:

c) članek v reviji

Kolega, N., 2006. Slovenian coast sea flood risk. *Acta geographica Slovenica*. 46-2, str. 143–167.

Navajanje virov z interneta

Vse reference se začenjajo enako kot pri natisnjenih virih, le da običajnemu delu sledi še podatek o tem, kje na internetu ste dokument našli in kdaj. Podatek o tem, kdaj ste dokument dobili, je pomemben zaradi pogostega spreminjanja spletnega okolja.

Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, str. 45–100. <http://www.mors.si/index.php?id=213>, 17. 10. 2008.

Pri navajanju zanimivih internetnih naslovov v besedilu (ne gre za navajanje posebnega dokumenta) zadošča navedba naslova (<http://www.vpvs.uni-lj.si>). Posebna referenca na koncu besedila v tem primeru ni potrebna.

**Sklicevanje
na vire**

Pri sklicevanju na vire med besedilom navedite le priimek prvega avtorja in letnico izdaje. *Primer: ... (Smith, 1997) ...*

Če dobesedno navajate del besedila, ga ustrezno označite z narekovaji, v oklepaju pa poleg avtorja in letnice navedite stran besedila, iz katerega ste navajali.

Primer: ... (Smith, 1997, str. 15) ...


Pri povzemanju drugega avtorja napišite besedilo brez narekovajev, v oklepaju pa napišite, da gre za povzeto besedilo. *Primer: (po Smith, 1997, str. 15)*. Če avtorja navajate v besedilu, v oklepaju navedite samo letnico izida in stran (1997, str. 15).

**Slike,
diagrami
in tabele**

Slike, diagrami in tabele naj bodo v posebej pripravljenih datotekah, ki omogočajo lektorske popravke. V besedilu mora biti jasno označeno mesto, kamor je treba vnesti sliko. Skupna dolžina prispevka ne sme preseči dane omejitve.

Če avtor iz tehničnih razlogov grafičnih dodatkov ne more oddati v elektronski obliki, je izjemoma sprejemljivo, da slike priloži besedilu. Avtor mora v tem primeru na zadnjo stran slike napisati zaporedno številko in naslov, v besedilu pa pustiti dovolj prostora zanjo. Prav tako mora biti besedilo opremljeno z naslovom in številčenjem slike. Diagrami se štejejo kot slike. Vse slike in tabele se številčijo. Številčenje poteka enotno in ni povezano s številčenjem poglavij. Naslov slike je naveden pod sliko, naslov tabele pa nad tabelo. Navadno je v besedilu navedeno vsaj eno sklicevanje na sliko ali tabelo. Sklic na sliko ali tabelo je: ... (slika 5) ... (tabela 2) ...


Primer slike:



Slika 5: Naslov slike

Primer tabele:

Tabela 2: Naslov tabele



**Opombe
pod črto**

Številčenje opomb pod črto je neodvisno od strukture besedila in se v vsakem prispevku začne s številko 1. Posebej opozarjamo avtorje, da so opombe pod črto namenjene pojasnjevanju misli, zapisanih v besedilu, in ne navajanju literature.

Kratice

Kratice naj bodo dodane v oklepaju, ko se okrajšana beseda prvič uporabi, zato posebnih seznamov kratic ne dodajamo. Za kratico ali izraz v angleškem jeziku napišemo najprej slovensko ustreznico, v oklepaju pa angleški izvirnik in morebitno angleško kratico.

**Format
zapisa
prispevka**

Uredniški odbor sprejema prispevke, napisane z urejevalnikom besedil MS Word, izjemoma tudi v besedilnem zapisu (samo besedilo).

**Naslov
avtorja**

Prispevkom naj bosta dodana avtorjeva naslov in internetni naslov ali telefonska številka, na katerih bo dosegljiv uredniškemu odboru.

**Kako poslati
prispevek**

Na naslov uredništva ali članov uredniškega odbora je treba poslati tiskano in elektronsko različico prispevka.

**Potrjevanje
sprejetja
prispevka**

Uredniški odbor avtorju pisno potrdi prejetje prispevka. Avtorjem, ki sporočijo tudi naslov svoje elektronske pošte, se potrditev pošlje po tej poti.

Korekture

Avtor opravi korekture svojega prispevka v treh dneh.

**Naslov
uredniškega
odbora**

Ministrstvo za obrambo
Generalštab Slovenske vojske
Bilten Slovenske vojske
Uredniški odbor
Vojkova cesta 55
1000 Ljubljana
Slovenija
Elektronski naslov
Odgovorna urednica: liliana.brozic@mors.si

Prispevkov, ki ne bodo urejeni skladno s tem navodilom, uredniški odbor ne bo sprejemal.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE AUTHORS OF PAPERS FOR THE BULLETIN OF THE SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES AND THE MILITARY EDUCATION JOURNAL

Content-related instructions

General **The Bulletin of the Slovenian Armed Forces** is an interdisciplinary scientific expert magazine, which publishes papers on current topics, researches, scientific and expert discussions, technical or social sciences analysis from security, defence and military field.

The Military Education Journal is a military professional and an informative publication intended for education and informing on achievements and experiences in the field of military education, training and improvement.

What do we publish?

We publish papers in Slovenian with abstracts translated into English and, based on the decision of the editorial board, we also publish papers in English with abstracts translated into Slovenian.

We publish papers, which have not been previously published or sent to another magazine for publication. The author is held responsible for all eventual copyright violations. If the paper has already been printed elsewhere, sent for publication or presented at an expert conference, the author must notify the editor, obtain the publisher's consent (if necessary) and indicate the reasons for republishing.

Technical instructions

Limitations regarding the length of the papers

The papers should consist of 16 typewritten double-spaced pages or 30,000 characters, at a minimum they should have 8 pages or 15,000 characters and at a maximum 24 pages or 45,000 characters.

Reviews The papers are reviewed. The review is anonymous. With regard to the reviewers assessment, the editorial board or the editor either accepts the paper, demands modifications if necessary or rejects it. After the receipt of the reviewers' remarks the author uses them in his paper.

Due to an anonymous review process the first page must be designed in the way that the author's identity cannot be revealed.

Next to the title the author indicated the category the paper belongs to according to him and according the classification in the COBISS. The classification is available at the magazine's internet page and at the responsible editor. The editorial board determines the final classification.

- Proof-reading** The organizational unit responsible for publishing provides the proofreading of the papers. The proofread papers have to be approved.
- Translating** The translation of papers or abstracts is provided by the organizational unit competent for translation or the School of Foreign Languages, DDETC.
- Indicating the authors of the paper** The authors' name should be written in the upper left corner with left alignment.
Example:
Name 1 Surname 1,
Name 2 Surname 2,
Slovenian authors should indicate the institution they are coming from in the footnote. Foreign authors should also indicate the name of the state they are coming from.
- Title of the paper** The title of the paper is written below the listed authors. The letters in the title are bold with font size 16. The text of the title is centrally aligned.
- Abstract** The paper should have an abstract of a maximum 1,200 characters (20 lines). It should briefly present the topic of the paper, especially the results and the findings. General findings and reflections do not belong in the abstract, but rather in the introduction.
- Abstract in English** The authors must also submit the translation of the abstract into English. The translation of the abstract is likewise limited to a maximum of 1,200 characters (20 lines).
- Key words** Key words (3-5 also in the English language) should be bold with a justified text alignment.
- Text** The authors should submit their papers on a A4 paper format, with a 1,5 line spacing written in Arial and with font size 12. At the upper and the bottom edge, there should be approx. 3 cm of space, the left margin should be 2 cm wide and the right margin 4 cm wide. Each page should consists of approx. 30 lines with 62 characters. The text should have a justified alignment, without indents at the beginning of the paragraphs.
- A brief presentation of the authors** The authors must prepare a brief presentation of their expert or scientific work. The presentation should not exceed 600 characters (10 lines). If there are several authors, each should be presented individually as short and as concise as possible. These text should be placed at the end of the paper, after the cited bibliography.

Text structuring

Individual chapters should be separated with independent subtitles and adequately numbered.

Example:

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Title of the chapter (1st level)
- 2.1 Subtitle (2nd level)
- 2.1.1 Subtitle (3rd level)
- 2.1.1.1 Subtitle (4th level)

Referencing

In the bibliography only the authors of the references you refer to in the paper have to be listed alphabetically. The entire reference has to be in compliance with the Harvard citing style.

Example:

Surname, name (the initial of the name), year. *Title of the work*. Place. Publishing House.

Example:

Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

At certain papers published in a collection of papers, at the end of each reference a page on which the paper can be found is indicated.

Example:

Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. p. 45–100.

Referencing internet sources

All references start the same way as the references for the printed sources, only that the usual part is followed by the information about the internet page on which the document was found as well as the date on which it was found. The information on the time the document was taken off the internet is important because the WWW environment constantly changes.

Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. p. 45–100. <http://www.mors.si/index.php?id=213>, 17 October 2008.

When referencing interesting WWW pages in the text (not citing an individual document) it is enough to state only the internet address (<http://www.vpvs.uni-lj.si>). A separate reference at the end of the text is therefore not necessary.

More on the Harvard referencing style in the A Guide to the Harvard System of Referencing, 2007; <http://libweb.anglia.ac.uk/referencing/harvard.thm#1.3>, 16 May 2007.

Citing

When citing references in the text, indicate only the surname of the author and the year of publication. *Example:* (Smith, 1997) ...

If you cite the text literary, that part should be adequately marked “text”...after which you state the exact page of the text in which the cited text is written.

Example: ... (Smith, 1997, pp 15) ...

Figures, diagrams, tables

Figures, diagrams and tables in the paper should be prepared in separate files that allow proofreading corrections. The place in the text where the picture should be inserted must be clearly indicated. The total length of the paper must not surpass the given limitation.

If the author cannot submit the graphical supplements in the electronic form due to technical reasons, it is exceptionally acceptable to enclose the figures to the text. In this case the author must write a sequence number and a title on the back of each picture and leave enough space in the text for it. The text must likewise contain the title and the sequence number of the figure. Diagrams are considered figures. All figures and tables are numbered. The numbering is not uniform and not linked with the numbering of the chapters. The title of the figure is listed beneath it and the title of the table is listed above it.

As a rule at least one reference to a figure or a table must be in the paper. Reference to a figure or a table is: (figure 5) (table 2)

Example of a figure:





Figure 5: Title of the figure

Example of a table:

Table 2: Title of the table



Footnotes

Numbering footnotes is individual from the structure of the text and starts with the number 1 in each paper. We want to stress that the footnotes are intended for explaining thoughts written in the text and not for referencing literature.

Abbreviations

When used for the first time, the abbreviations in the text must be explained in parenthesis, for which reason non additional list of abbreviations is needed. If the abbreviations or terms are written in English we have to write the appropriate Slovenian term with the English original and possibly the English abbreviation in the parenthesis.

Format type of the paper

The editorial board accepts only the texts written with a MS Word text editor and only exceptionally texts in the text only format.

Title of the author

Each paper should include the author's address, e-mail or a telephone number, so the editorial board could reach him or her.

Sending the paper

A print or an electronic version of the paper should be sent to the address of the editorial board or to the members of the editorial board.

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Appendix

SLOVENIJA V GEOPOLITIČNEM IN GEOSTRATEŠKEM OKOLJU 21. STOLETJA

SLOVENIA IN GEOPOLITICAL AND GEOSTRATEGIC ENVIROMENT OF THE 21ST CENTURY

Original scientific article

Povzetek Republika Slovenija je kontinentalna in pomorska država. Leži na prostoru, kjer se stikajo slovanska, germanska in romanska kultura. V zgodovinskem in kulturnem pogledu pripada Srednji Evropi, vojaško pa je del južnoevropskega vojskovališča. Geostrateški položaj Republike Slovenije v evropskem prostoru je pomemben zato, ker je na njenem ozemlju stičišče treh geostrateških in geopolitičnih prostorov, in sicer srednjeevropskega, južnoevropskega in jadransko-sredozemskega. Zavezanost evroatlantskim integracijam, skrb za varnost in mir na območju Jugovzhodne Evrope ter Zahodnega Balkana sta rdeči niti, ki opredeljujeta slovensko geopolitično in geostrateško ravnanje slovenskih političnih elit v preteklih dveh desetletjih. Prav tako bo to ostalo pomembno tudi v njihovem prihodnjem delovanju, saj bo varnost Slovenije še naprej odvisna od varnostnih razmer v regiji in od sposobnosti slovenskih političnih elit, da uspešno rešujejo s sodobne varnostne izzive v Natu in Evropski uniji v globaliziranem, multipolarnem, geopolitično nestabilnem svetu, polnem različnih tveganj ter priložnosti. Slovenija je po osamosvojitvi leta 1991 postala sodobna država s temu primernimi izzivi in vprašanji, ki je tudi s predsedovanjem Svetu Evropske unije v prvi polovici leta 2008 dokazala, da so se manjše države sposobne uspešno udeleževati na globalni ravni.

Ključne besede *Geoekonomika, geopolitika, geostrategija, Jugovzhodna Evropa, Evropska unija, Slovenija, Zahodni Balkan, Nato.*

Abstract The Republic of Slovenia is a continental and maritime country. It is situated in a place where Slavic, Germanic and Roman cultures meet. Historically and culturally speaking, it belongs to Central Europe; however, from the military point of view, it forms a part of the Southern Theatre of War. The geostrategic position of the Republic of Slovenia is extremely important in European area because its territory represents a crossroads of three geostrategic and geopolitical spaces: Central European, Southern European and Adriatic-Mediterranean. The commitment to Euro-Atlantic

integrations, as well as the interest in security and peace in Southeast Europe and Western Balkans are a red thread which has characterized the activities of Slovenian political elites in the past two decades. This will also be the core of their future engagement, since also in the future the security of Slovenia will depend on the security situation in the region and on the capacity of Slovenian political elites to successfully address contemporary NATO and EU security challenges in a globalized, multipolar and geopolitically instable world, full of various risks and opportunities. Following its independence in 1991, Slovenia became a modern country with corresponding challenges and dilemmas. By presiding the EU Council in the first half of the year 2008 it proved that small countries could successfully participate on a global level.

Key words *Geo-economics, geopolitics, geostrategy, Southeast Europe, European Union, Slovenia, Western Balkans, NATO.*

Uvod Slovenija, njeno ozemlje in njeni prebivalci so bili v zgodovini večkrat uporabljeni kot kmetje na šahovnici v velikih geopolitičnih ter geostrateških preigravanjih. Uporabljena kot ozemeljske in demografske »strateške drobtinice« ni imela možnosti vplivanja na to, kaj se bo zgodilo z njenim ozemljem na račun medsebojnih obljub tistih, ki so imeli v rokah škarje in platno. Geopolitična dinamika slovenskega prostora v 20. stoletju to najboljše dokazuje. In če je bilo 20. stoletje zaznamovano s številnimi vojnami, oboroženimi spopadi in premikanjem meja ter selitvijo prebivalstva na slovenskem prostoru, je bilo na začetku 21. stoletja mogoče zreti v prihodnost precej manj pesimistično. Članstvo v Natu in Evropski uniji (EU) ter ocena, da Slovenija ni neposredno vojaško ogrožena, vlivata optimizem ne samo državi, temveč tudi širši regiji, v kateri odsotnost morebitne vojne še ni povsem zagotovljena. Bolj kot kadar koli prej v zgodovini sta razvoj in prihodnost Slovencev odvisna od naše sposobnosti uporabiti možnosti in priložnosti, ki jih ponuja članstvo v pomembnih mednarodnih organizacijah. Za Slovenijo in njen sedanji ter prihodnji razvoj je povezanost z mednarodnim okoljem namreč življenjskega pomena, saj je zelo odvisna od uvoza in izvoza ter od nadaljnjih globalizacijskih trendov. In če je ekonomska kriza globalna, to za Slovenijo pomeni tudi lokalno krizo.

Uresničitev želja po samostojnosti in neodvisnosti Slovenije je bil dolg proces, z zgodovinskega vidika pa sorazmerno kratek. Še krajša je bila pot od osamosvojitve leta 1991 do članstva v Natu in EU leta 2004 in uspešnega predsedovanja Svetu Evropske unije leta 2008 kot prva država izza železne zavese¹. Pot k tem zavidljivim uspehom je bila tlakovana s širšim nacionalnim konsenzom: kam, kako in kdaj. Slovenski parlament je že decembra 1993, torej dobri dve leti po zmagoviti vojni, sprejel Resolucijo o izhodiščih zasnove nacionalne varnosti Republike Slovenije, januarja 1994 pa še njen popravek, s katerim je zarisal želje in pot mlade nacije k

¹ *Z železno zaveso, pod katero je padla Evropa in ki je obsegala predele od Baltika do Tržaškega zaliva, je Winston Churchill leta 1946 označil delitev med demokratično Evropo, kjer se izvajajo svobodne, demokratične volitve, in Evropo socialističnih držav, ki ni poznala takih volitev. To je bil čas, ko v Evropi še ni bilo uradnih blokov, pozneje, v času delitve na Nato in Varšavski sporazum, pa je nekdanja Jugoslavija spretno manevrirala med obema.*

evroatlantskim integracijam. »V procesu vključevanja v evropske in druge mednarodne gospodarske in politične povezave Republika Slovenija prevzema hkrati pravice in odgovornosti, ki jih te povezave terjajo na obrambnem področju, razen zagotavljanja mirovnih sil v prostoru nekdanje Jugoslavije do končanja sedanje krize. To še toliko bolj, ker je življenjsko zainteresirana za vzpostavitev učinkovitega sistema kolektivne varnosti v svoji soseščini, Evropi in svetu. Kot pomemben cilj si pri tem postavlja vključitev v Nato oziroma Zahodnoevropsko unijo (*ang. Western European Union*) kot evropski steber Nata« (12. točka 1. poglavja)². Na podlagi te usmeritve slovenskega Državnega zbora se je Slovenija že marca 1994 vključila v Partnerstvo za mir. Razočaranje, ki ga je povzročila zavrnitev vstopa v Nato (ob širitvi leta 1999), Slovenije ni odvrnilo od evroatlantskih usmeritev. Svojo strateško usmeritev za članstvo v Evropski uniji in zvezi Nato je potrdila v številnih strateških, razvojnih in normativnih dokumentih. Kot ključni strateški cilj je to ostalo zapisano tudi v Resoluciji o strategiji nacionalne varnosti Republike Slovenije (ReSNV), sprejeti leta 2001³. Resolucija že v uvodu poudarja, da *Republika Slovenija želi zagotoviti svoj temeljni varnostni interes tudi v okviru članstva v Evropski uniji in Natu*. Glede varnostnih razmer v regiji je leta 2001 prevladovala ocena, da je *v Jugovzhodni Evropi za Republiko Slovenijo še vedno prisotna določena stopnja varnostnega tveganja. Varnost Republike Slovenije je posredno odvisna od stanja v regiji*.

Ne glede na to, da je Slovenija članica EU in Nata že šest let, je bil prenovljen in posodobljen temeljni strateški nacionalnovarnostni dokument v Državnem zboru sprejet šele 26. marca 2010. V Resoluciji o strategiji nacionalne varnosti Republike Slovenije (ReSNV-1)⁴ je poudarjeno, da bodo *pomembne primerjalne prednosti Republike Slovenije kot članice EU in Nata tudi v prihodnje izhajale iz njenih zgodovinskih, političnih, gospodarskih, socialnih, etničnih, kulturnih in drugih povezav z območjem Jugovzhodne Evrope*. Z vidika mednarodnega varnostnega okolja je v posodobljeni Resoluciji zapisano, da se je *v evroatlantskem prostoru verjetnost izbruha oboroženih meddržavnih spopadov močno zmanjšala, hkrati pa se je v tem prostoru povečala ranljivost držav na asimetrične grožnje in tveganja, katerih nosilci so praviloma nedržavni subjekti, njihov učinek pa ima poudarjeno transnacionalno razsežnost*. Iz Resolucije tako izhaja, da bo *na varnost evroatlantskega prostora tudi v prihodnje najbolj vplivalo politično-varnostno in drugo dogajanje na Zahodnem Balkanu⁵, v Vzhodni Evropi, na Južnem Kavkazu, Bližnjem in Srednjem vzhodu, v Severni in Podsaharski Afriki ter Južni Aziji* (točka 3.2, ReSNV-1).

² Resolucija o izhodiščih zasnove nacionalne varnosti Republike Slovenije in njen popravek, Uradni list RS, št. 71/93 in št. 2/1994.

³ Uradni list RS, št. 56/01.

⁴ Uradni list RS, št. 27/10.

⁵ Zahodni Balkan je območje nekdanje Jugoslavije z dodano Albanijo in odvzeto Slovenijo. Območje Jugovzhodne Evrope pa je precej širši geografski pojem, ki seveda vključuje tudi Zahodni Balkan.

Pri proučevanju kompleksne geopolitične in geostrateške tematike je nujen interdisciplinarni pristop z uporabo širokega spektra znanstvenih metod. V ta namen avtor uporablja metodo strateške analize, pri kateri upošteva razmerje sil in prostor ter čas, v katerih je v strateškem okolju in v Sloveniji prihajalo do korenitih sprememb. Posebej so poudarjeni uporaba statističnih podatkov vseh vrst, njihova primerjava in ustrezna obdelava ter interpretacija. Avtor pri svoji kritični analizi izkorišča svojo prednost v vlogi ne le pozornega opazovalca, raziskovalca in proučevalca obravnavanih vsebin, temveč tudi akterja v nekaterih pomembnih dogodkih. Na ta način lahko teoretične in empirične vsebine nadgradi z uporabo metode neposrednega opazovanja, in sicer z uporabo ustreznih informacij, pridobljenih iz prakse. Celovito in na izviren znanstveni način je tako prikazana geopolitična in geostrateška tektonika slovenskega prostora ter njegova umeščenost v sodobno širše okolje. Pri tem, kot tudi pri analizi sodobnih globalnih trendov in sprememb v varnostnem okolju, se drzno loteva tudi izziva nakazovanja in ne napovedovanja prihodnjih trendov.


In seveda ne samo v Sloveniji, temveč tudi širše, regionalno in globalno. Resolucija namreč še posebej izpostavlja potrebo po nadaljevanju širitvenih procesov⁶, saj sta *stabilnost in varnost evroatlantskega prostora močno odvisni tudi od procesa nadaljnje širitve Evropske unije in Nata (ibid.)*, kjer se koristi in bremena delijo in kjer, kot je slikovito opisala slovenska obrambna ministrica, *v varnosti ni zastojkarstva. Nekaj je treba vložiti v skupni varnostni okvir (Jelušič, 2010)*. Zavezanost evroatlanskim integracijam ter skrb za varnost in mir na območjih Jugovzhodne Evrope in Zahodnega Balkana⁷ nedvomno predstavljata gravitacijsko silo, ki povezuje vse strateške dokumente, sprejete v slabih dveh desetletjih. Tudi v prihodnje bo varnost Slovenije odvisna od varnostnih razmer v regiji in njene sposobnosti soočati se s sodobnimi varnostnimi izzivi v Natu in EU v globaliziranem, multipolarnem, geopolitično nestabilnem svetu, polnem različnih izzivov in priložnosti.

⁶ *Tako na strani EU kot Nata ostaja želja in (načelna) pripravljenost na nadaljnjo širitev, čeprav je zaznati razprave o širitveni utrujenosti. Zaokrožitev članstva na Balkanu je cilj obeh organizacij. Za članstvo v Evropski uniji se aktivno potegujejo štiri države, tri s statusom kandidat; Hrvaška se precej uspešno pogaja, Islandija je podala prošnjo za članstvo v EU julija 2009, Makedonijo zaradi spora z imenom blokira Grčija (enako velja za Nato), medtem ko je Turčija pridružena članica EU že od leta 1963 in je uradno prošnjo za pridružitve podala že leta 1987. Svojo pot proti EU najavljajo tudi Albanija, Bosna in Hercegovina, Kosovo in Srbija. Nato je na vrhu v Bukarešti leta 2008 obljubil povabilo v Zavezništvo Makedoniji, Gruziji in Ukrajini. Po tej poti stopata tudi Bosna in Hercegovina ter Črna gora. Umestna vprašanja, ki so trenutno še brez jasnega odgovora, so: kaj je z Moldavijo, Ukrajino ali celo Gruzijo in njihovim članstvom v EU, kakšna je realna možnost za članstvo držav, ki imajo na svojem ozemlju mednarodne mirovne sile (BiH, Kosovo ipd.), saj je članstvo v EU ne nazadnje odvisno tudi od volje posamične države, ki se lahko spremeni na podlagi volilnega izida (npr. Ukrajina).*

⁷ *Slovenski koordinater za Zahodni Balkan in veleposlanik na Hrvaškem Vojko Volk slovenski pristop do Zahodnega Balkana deli v dve obdobji. Prvo je bilo, ko je slovenska diplomacija z Balkana bežala. Z gnusom se je Slovenija razglasila za nebalgarsko državo. Bili smo srednjeevropska država. To obdobje je trajalo do našega pridruženega članstva EU, torej do leta 1996. Naš adut je bila ideja, da mi nismo Balkan in nočemo imeti nič z Balkanom. Kakršna koli pobuda že se je oblikovala na Balkanu, smo imeli neznanske zadržke, da bi tja sploh šli. Ko smo končno dobili prvo odrešitev – potrditev vstopa v pridruženo članstvo v EU, to je bilo v Firencah junija 1996, je prišlo do olajšanja in takrat je slovenska diplomacija spet zadihala s polnimi pljuči. Takrat smo se vrnili na Balkan. In ne samo, da se je slovenska diplomacija tja aktivno vrnila, temveč je bila tudi uspešna. Balkan se začne v Trstu, intervju Vojko Volk, Dnevnik, 21. 2. 2009.*

V svetu, ki ga, kot pravi Thomas Friedman (2005, 2006), informacijska revolucija in globalizacija gospodarstva transformirata in zmanjšujeta – ga *sploščata*. Friedman s številnimi primeri poudarja geoekonomske vidike globalizacije in tako omogoča preprostejše razumevanje zasuka od bipolarnega, na varnostnih in obrambnih vprašanjih temelječega razumevanja geopolitike, na bolj (geo) ekonomsko relevanten svet, v katerem igrajo pomembno vlogo različne stare in nove globalne ali regionalne organizacije, temelječe predvsem na gospodarskih interesih, ter nove gospodarske velesile, kot sta Indija in Kitajska. Ne nazadnje je pomembno tudi vprašanje, kako je zadnja gospodarska kriza v kratkem času za prihajajoče ekonomije postala priložnost, za Zahod pa kruta realnost (graf 1).

Graf 1:
Močan odboj
industrijske
proizvodnje
v prihajajočih
gospodarstvih



Vir: Poročilo EU Interim Forecast February 2010.

1 GEOPOLITIKA OD TRADICIONALIZMA DO POSTMODERNIZMA

Pojem *geopolitike* je tesno prepleten s pojmom politične geografije⁸, pri čemer je razliko najbolj enostavno skušal prikazati Haushofer. Po njegovem mnenju politična geografija proučuje države s prostorskega vidika, medtem ko je geopolitika veda, ki prostor proučuje z državnega vidika, torej je izrazito aplikativna disciplina (Haushofer v Bufon, 2007: 21). Ratzel je oče zarodka sodobnega proučevanja politične geografije, medtem ko njegov učenec Šved Rudolf Kjellen velja za

⁸ Do koncepta geopolitike je zelo kritičen Morgenthau (1995: 264). Imenuje jo psevdoznanost, ki faktor geografije povzdiguje v absolut, ki navidezno določa moč in s tem tudi usodo držav. Za Morgenthaua je geografija, poleg naravnih bogastev, industrijske zmogljivosti, vojaške pripravljenosti, prebivalstva, nacionalnega značaja, nacionalne morale in kakovosti vlade le eden izmed osmih elementov nacionalne moči (ibid., 207–254).

utemeljitelja geopolitike kot teorije, ki državo pojmuje kot geografski organizem ali prostorski fenomen (Bufon, 2007: 21).

Mackinder je v svojem delu *Geografsko osišče zgodovine*⁹ postavil retrogradno tezo¹⁰ (slika 1), da je svetovna zgodovina v bistvu nenehno ponavljajoči se spopad med prebivalci kopnine in pomorskimi ljudstvi. Središče evrazijske kopnine – prostor Vzhodne Evrope je po njegovem mnenju »osišče svetovne politike (angl. *Heartland*); kdor obvladuje osišče, bo prevladal, če se mu to ne prepreči. Obrobne dežele sveta (angl. *Rimland*) so sestavljene iz dveh koncentričnih krajev; notranji ali obrobni krajec je bil prizorišče velikih zgodovinskih civilizacij Evrope, Bližnjega vzhoda, Indije in Kitajske, medtem ko zunanji ali otoški krajec sestavljajo obe Ameriki, podsaharska Afrika in Avstralazija. Vse skupaj je takrat zajel v danes anahronistično zvenečem triptihu:

kdor vlada Vzhodni Evropi, vlada osrčju;

*kdor vlada osrčju, vlada svetovnemu otoku (angl. *World Island*);*

kdor vlada svetovnemu otoku, vlada svetu (Parker, 1997: 77–93).

Slika 1:
Mackinderjev
koncept osišča
svetovne politike



Vir: *The Geographical Pivot of History*, *Geographical Journal* 23, št. 4 (april, 1904): 435 in v Parker, 1997: 80.

Mackinderjevo trditev je na prelomu 19. in 20. stoletja zelo argumentirano zavrgel že njegov sodobnik, admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, ki je razvil merkantilistično tezo o dominantnem vplivu flote na »svetovni otok« – Evrazijo. Izhajajoč iz tega, da je moč držav odvisna od njihovega uspešnega trgovanja¹¹, je postavil tezo, da bo na

⁹ Mackinder, H. J., *The Geographical Pivot of History*, *Geographical Journal* 23 (1904).

¹⁰ Tezo je posplošil na podlagi tedanjega razmerja sil v Evraziji in nenehnih trenj Velike Britanije in carske Rusije v 18. in 19. stoletju.

¹¹ Na podlagi analize razvoja britanskega imperija, v katerem sonce nikoli ne zaide. Po drugi svetovni vojni je to v praksi pomenilo, da imajo prevlado nad kopensko silo, to je Sovjetsko zvezo in Kitajsko, »nuklearizirane« pomorske sile ZDA.

razvoj in prihodnost sveta bistveno vplivala tista pomorska sila, ki bo s svojo floto obvladovala pomorske komunikacije in z morja projicirala svojo moč na kopno.

Proučevanje geopolitike je bilo po prvi svetovni vojni, predvsem po zaslugi nemških strokovnjakov, zelo popularno, geopolitične šole pa so počasi nastajale povsod po zahodnem svetu. Po drugi svetovni vojni je bila tradicionalna *geopolitika prepovedana (sic!) tako kot način razmišljanja kakor tudi kot veda ali politična receptura. Očitali so ji, da je navdihovala rasistične teorije nacistične Nemčije in teritorialno ekspanzijo sil osi. Sramežljivo se začne pojavljati v šestdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja, medtem ko do prave eksplozije zanimanja pride v devetdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja* (Simoniti, 1997: 10–11).

Vendar pa je trditev o prepovedi geopolitike in sramežljivosti njenega pojavljanja močno pretirana in ne vzdrži resne presoje. Velja omeniti, da je Spykman na začetku štiridesetih let prejšnjega stoletja, izhajajoč iz Mackinderja, utemeljil potrebo po tem, da imajo ZDA svoje postojanke, kakor tudi ustrezno pomorsko moč, v *rimlandu*. Ravnotežje moči v Evraziji namreč neposredno vpliva na varnost ZDA (Spykman, 2007). Spykman je največkrat poimenovan kot boter strategije zadrževanja med blokoma, kjer od Islandije do Japonske pomembno vlogo igrajo regionalne organizacije oziroma oblike sodelovanja, kot so Nato (1949–), CENTO (1955–1979), SEATO (1954–1977), ANZUS (1951–), ANZUK (1971–1974), FPDA (1971–) itn.¹² Takratne vzhodnoevropske socialistične države so ustanovile Varšavski pakt (1955–1991), svojo geopolitiko pa so uresničevali tudi marksisti: od posredovanja Sovjetske zveze s floto na Kubi (raketna kriza 1962) do izvoza revolucij v tretji svet (Che Guevara, 1965–67)¹³.

Večina geopolitikov je do sedemdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja implicitno sprejela hegemonski položaj Zahoda. Ta determinanta je zajeta tudi znotraj ideje, da velja svet za zaključeno in končno celoto. Interpretacije stalnic geopolitične teorije z različnimi odtenki in različicami je mogoče združiti v šest glavnih šol: binarno, marginalno, pasovno, pluralistično, idealistično ter šolo jedra in okolice (več v Parker, 1997: 239–248). Sodobno razumevanje geopolitike je torej prehodilo dolgo pot od proučevanja, kdo bo vladal Osrčju, h kompleksnejšemu razumevanju prostora, ki ni samo fizičen, temveč tudi imaginaren ali celo virtualen. Razdeliti ga je mogoče na pet področij ali prostorov dejavnosti: fizični, naravni prostor; demografski, demopolitični prostor; meddržavni prostor ali pogosteje uporabljen izraz diplomatsko-vojaško področje; socioekonomsko področje, ki se ukvarja z globalizacijo, ter simbolični prostor, ideološki in kulturni – na primer zahodna ideologija (Dussouy, 2010: 143–148).

¹² Imena regionalnih organizacij oziroma oblik sodelovanja so: Organizacija severnoatlantskega sporazuma (angl. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation – Nato); Organizacija osrednjega sporazuma (angl. The Central Treaty Organization – CENTO ali Middle East Treaty Organization – METO, znana tudi pod imenom Baghdad Pact); Organizacija jugovzhodnega azijskega sporazuma (angl. Southeast Asia Treaty Organization – SEATO); Varnostni sporazum med Avstralijo, Novo Zelandijo in Združenimi državami Amerike (angl. The Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty – ANZUS); sodelovanje med vojskami Avstralije, Nove Zelandije in Velike Britanije – ANZUK in obrambno sodelovanje med petimi državami: Singapur, Malezija, Avstralija, Novo Zelandijo in Veliko Britanijo (angl. The Five Power Defence Agreement – FPDA).

¹³ Tudi kot odgovor na resolucijo Informbiroja je nekdanja Jugoslavija leta 1953 podpisala Balkanski sporazum o prijateljstvu in sodelovanju z Natovima članicama Grčijo in Turčijo. Jugoslavija je s to potezo zaprla izhod Sovjetski zvezi na »toplo morje«, SZ pa je nato v Albaniji na otoku Sazanu zgradila veliko podmorniško bazo. Kot alternativo obema blokoma, sivo cono, kjer so divjale »proxy« vojne, pa so Nehru, Nasser in Tito leta 1961 ustanovili gibanje neutrščenih. Gibanje je preživel oba bloka, saj je imelo leta 2009 118 držav članic in 17 opazovalk.

Veja geopolitike, ki obširneje od nekdanjega Mahanovega merkantilizma poudarja pomen ekonomskih vidikov za geopolitiko, je v devetdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja dobila ime *geo-ekonomika* ali *geoekonomika* (ang. *geo-economics*). Geoekonomski diskurz, ki ga opredeljuje geo-ekonomika, je po Luttwakovi definiciji *primes logike konflikta s trgovinskimi metodami /.../, kjer države delujejo geo-ekonomsko preprosto zato, ker so, kar so, prostorsko definirane entitete, namenjene prekašanju druga druge na svetovni sceni* (Luttwak, 1990). Konflikt se torej nadaljuje na drug, gospodarsko pogojen način, z državnimi intervencijami, ali kot pravi Luttwak, *geopolitika je nova verzija starodavnih rivalstev med državami*. V teh rivalstvih boj za tržišča in čim večje zasluzke poteka z ekonomskimi sredstvi. Vsiljevanje carin in protežiranje nacionalnih gospodarstev je seveda v nasprotju tako z načelom pretoka blaga ali storitev (npr. EU) kot tudi z različnimi mednarodnimi sporazumi, kot je GATT¹⁴. *Geoekonomika analizira ekonomsko strategijo – predvsem trgovinsko – sprejeto v državah v okviru politik, namenjenih zaščiti nacionalnih gospodarstev, ali na nekaterih natančno določenih področjih, /.../ kjer državi ali »državnemu podjetju« predstavljaja element moči in vpliva ter tako prispeva h gospodarskim in družbenim potencialom* (Lorot, 1999)¹⁵. Geoekonomisti prehod razvitih ali osiščnih držav postavljajo v položaj, v katerem gospodarske prioritete nadvladajo varnostne in vojaške, ki so bile v ospredju med hladno vojno (Aligica, 2002). Z gospodarskega vidika imajo v času globalizacije na globalni in regionalni ravni posebno vlogo mednarodne organizacije¹⁶ kot sopotniki ali neke vrste dediči postblokove ureditve.

Velika strategija (angl. *grand strategy*), največja izmed vseh, je *astropolitika* (angl. *Astropolitik*) oziroma geopolitika, ki izhaja iz predpostavke, da je za nadzor nad razvojem Zemlje ključnega pomena premoč v vesoljskem prostoru, od koder se lahko sila projicira na izbrane cilje. V neoklasični formulaciji je astropolitiko misel mogoče pojasniti z izrekom, ki je nadaljevanje Mackinderjevih in

¹⁴ Splošni sporazum o carinah in trgovini (angl. *General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade – GATT*) je bil sklenjen leta 1947 pod okriljem OZN. Izvorno besedilo GATT je veljalo do leta 1994, od leta 1995 pa se izvaja znotraj Svetovne trgovinske organizacije (angl. *World Trade Organization – WTO*) s 153 državami članicami, ustanovljenimi zaradi nadzora in liberalizacije svetovne trgovine.

¹⁵ Utemeljitelja te razmeroma zelo mlade veje geopolitike sta ameriški vojaški strateg in zgodovinar Edward Luttwak ter francoski ekonomist in politolog Pascal Lorot.

¹⁶ Če izpostavimo samo nekaj zelo dobro poznanih: v času obeh blokov je bila iz povsem gospodarskih vzrokov v Evropi ustanovljena Evropska unija (1952), ki danes šteje 27 držav članic. Na območju Jugovzhodne Azije je bila leta 1967 ustanovljena geopolitična in ekonomska organizacija Združenje jugovzhodnih azijskih držav (angl. *Association of Southeast Asian Nations – ASEAN*), ki danes šteje deset članic: Filipine, Indonezijo, Malezijo, Singapur, Tajsko, Brunej, Burmo (Myanmar), Kambodžo, Laos in Vietnam. Leta 1989 je bila ustanovljena Organizacija za azijsko-pacifiško sodelovanje (angl. *Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation – APEC*), forum 21 držav Pacifiškega roba. Cilj APEC-a je povečanje gospodarske rasti in prosperitete v regiji ter krepitev azijsko-pacifiške skupnosti. Države članice obsegajo približno 40 odstotkov svetovnega prebivalstva, 54 odstotkov svetovnega BDP in 44 odstotkov svetovne trgovine (članice so npr. Avstralija, Japonska, Kitajska, Rusija, ZDA itn.). Kanada, Mehika in ZDA so leta 1994 ustanovile organizacijo Severnoameriški sporazum o svobodni trgovini (angl. *North American Free Trade Agreement – NAFTA*), trilateralni trgovinski blok na območju Severne Amerike. Po zgledu Evropske unije na območju Južne Amerike nastaja podobna organizacija z velikimi ambicijami: Unija južnoameriških držav (šp. *Unión de Naciones Suramericanas – UNASUR*), ki šteje 12 držav članic in dve opazovalki, njeni začetki pa segajo v leto 2004. Ustanovno pogodbo so članice podpisale maja 2008 v Braziliji, do aprila 2010 pa so jo ratificirale štiri države: Bolivija, Ekvador, Venezuela in Gvajana. Za veljavnost pogodbe je potrebna ratifikacija najmanj devetih držav članic.

Spykmanovih primerov: kdor nadzira spodnjo zemeljsko orbito, nadzira bližnji zemeljski prostor. Kdor nadzira bližnji zemeljski prostor, nadzira Zemljo (*lat. Terra*). Kdor prevladuje na Zemlji, odloča o usodi človeštva (Dolman, 2002). Vesolje je še vedno zanimivo z več vidikov, zato posamične države razvijajo svoje zmogljivosti, da bi ga osvojile. Od prvega utirjenega satelita Sputnik 1 leta 1957 je približno 50 držav poslalo v vesolje na tisoče satelitov. Velike države se pri zemeljskih geopolitičnih razmislekih ne morejo izogniti astropolitiki kot tudi ne vprašanjem, povezanim z obvladovanjem ali odkrivanjem vesolja.

Kitajska in ruska percepcija sveta sta pomembna kamna v mozaiku razprav o geopolitiki. Za Kitajsko strateško misel zadnjih štirih desetletij je ključnega pomena popolnoma drugačno, nezahodno razmišljanje Mao Zedonga iz februarja 1974 o obstoju *treh svetov*¹⁷. Prvi svet tvorita ZDA in Sovjetska zveza, drugega oziroma vmesnega pa Japonska, Evropa in Kanada. Tretji svet je zelo naseljen. Z izjemo Japonske spadajo v tretji svet Azija, celotna Afrika in Latinska Amerika¹⁸. Deng Xiaoping je razložil in nadgradil Mao Zedongovo strateško razmišljanje ter poudaril zavezo kitajske podpore državam tretjega sveta. Sodobna kitajska geopolitična usmeritev je razvidna tudi iz usmerjenosti kitajske mornarice navzven, na širna prostranstva, kar pomeni veliko spremembo, kot pravi Qi Xu (2004), iz *premišljene odsotnosti v strateško izbiro mornarice, usmerjeno proti svetovnim oceanom in izraženo na podlagi vidika velikega strateškega prostora* (ibid.). Iz prisotnosti Kitajske v t. i. tretjem svetu je mogoče sklepati, da strategija v praksi uspeva in, lahko rečemo, da ji bo prvič v zgodovini sledila tudi kitajska mornarica¹⁹.

V Rusiji²⁰ je najstabilnejša geopolitična šola evrazijska šola, ki sta jo na začetku 20. stoletja ustanovila brata George in Evgeny Trubetskoj. Temeljna ideja te šole je, da Rusija ni niti Evropa niti Azija, temveč Evrazija. Sodobni vodja te šole je Aleksander Dugin²¹. Sodobne geopolitične šole v Rusiji niso zelo popularne.

¹⁷ Trojni A: južna Azija, Afrika in Latinska Amerika.

¹⁸ Glej spletno stran kitajskega zunanjega ministrstva: <http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18008.htm>.

¹⁹ Iz zgodovine je znano, da je kitajska »oceanska« mornarica nekaj že bila diplomatsko/vojaški instrument s strateškim dosegom. Admiral Zheng He je že na začetku 15. stoletja izvedel vrsto trgovskih ekspedicij na obale Afrike, Azije, Indije in. z impresivno silo več sto ladij in nekaj deset tisoč mož. Po njegovi smrti leta 1435 se kitajski cesarji niso več odločali za pokrivanje velikega strateškega prostora s kitajsko mornarico.

²⁰ Kot protiutež ruskim geopolitičnim aspiracijam se je na Poljskem na začetku 20. stoletja razvila geopolitična strategija prometejizma in medmorja. Poljski maršal Pilsudski je oče strategij, katerih korenine segajo v boje številnih narodov, ki so bili v 19. stoletju podjarmljeni ruskemu imperiju. Države Baltiškega, Črnega in Kaspijskega morja bi z ustanovitvijo neodvisnih držav predstavljale obrambo pred ruskim ekspanzionizmom. Prometejizem je šola, ki je v Sloveniji precej neznana, prav tako kot dejstvo, da so se slovenski razumniki pred in med drugo svetovno vojno ukvarjali z idejo o priključitvi k Medmorju (*lat. Intermarium*), federaciji baltskih, srednje- in vzhodnoevropskih držav. Poljaki so skupaj s Slovenci razvijali ideje o novi politični ureditvi vzhodnoevropskega prostora, o nekakšni ohlapni povezavi 16 narodov/držav s skupno zunanjo obrambo ter skupnim notranjim trgov (Arnež, 2002: 354). Če bi takšna država ali zveza nastala, bi bila zanesljivo boljša in izpopolnjena oblika cordona sanitaire iz obdobja med obema svetovnima vojnoma.

²¹ Dugin je znan po svojih nezmernih stališčih. Je avtor 600 strani dolge knjige *The Foundations of Geopolitics: The Geopolitical Future of Russia, 1997*, pri kateri naj bi mu pomagali visoki častniki ruske vojske.

Ruska geopolitika se tradicionalno ukvarja z notranjimi zadevami Rusije in njenim položajem v svetu, in ne z globalnimi vprašanji. Z vidika prihodnosti poteka velika debata med dvema šolama, t. i. *zahodnjaki* in *slovanofili*²². Medtem ko prvi prepoznavajo univerzalnost zahodnih vrednot, drugi zagovarjajo razvoj Rusije v izvirno smer, kajti zahodne vrednote niso univerzalne (Okunov, 2009). Nedvomno je v Rusiji stabilna tudi šola »zahodnjakov«, vendar številni primeri ovračajo trditev o usmerjenosti k notranjim zadevam Rusije. Rusija je med drugim aktivna tako globalno kot regionalno na področjih, kot so aktivno članstvo v azijskem prostoru, SCO, angažiranje v bližnji soseščini nekdanje Sovjetske zveze, BRIK in pobuda o strateškem partnerstvu med ZDA, Rusijo in Evropo²³.

Geografske meje v zadnjem desetletju zelo krči internet, čeprav digitalna delitev med Severno Ameriko, Evropo in vzhodno Azijo na eni strani ter med podsaharsko Afriko in Bližnjim vzhodom na drugi strani ostaja velika kljub širjenju internetnega dostopa. Dostop te vrste omogoča cvetenje različnih aktivnosti, tako pozitivnih kot negativnih, vključno z globalno teroristično mrežo Al Kaido (Dodds, 2007: 166–167). V postmoderne geopolitiki si je prostor namreč mogoče najprej zamišljati in šele nato na široko predstavljati, tako v državnih kot tudi nedržavnih okvirih (Luke, 1993; Ó Tuathail in Dalby, 1998). Ó Tuathail (1998, 27–28) predlaga, da se problematike geopolitike ključnih držav v sodobnem svetu lahko lotimo tudi drugače, in sicer na podlagi vprašanj:

1. Kako je globalni prostor zamišljen in predstavljen?
2. Kako je globalni prostor razdeljen med ključne identificirane bloke ali območja identitet in razlik?
3. Kako je globalna moč konceptualizirana?
4. Kako so globalne grožnje prostorsko umeščene in strategije odzivanja konceptualizirane?
5. Kako so ključni akterji geopolitike identificirani in konceptualizirani?

Sopotnik postmoderne geopolitike je tudi tako imenovana *poljudna geopolitika* (angl. *popular geopolitics*). Poljudna geopolitika je način kroženja slik in predstav globalnih političnih geografij znotraj nacionalnih političnih kultur in nad njimi, torej povezuje političnega življenja in množičnih medijev, ter tudi kako različni mediji, ki so del globalne politike, proizvajajo in razširjajo svoja sporočila po

²² V času carjev so bili ortodoksni slovanofili, danes so evrazijski, ki – kot Žirinovski – ne vidijo perspektive v usmeritvi Rusije na obubožane zahodne Slované, temveč prek Irana in Indije v južno Azijo. Materializacijo te doktrine predstavlja Šanghajska organizacija za sodelovanje (angl. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation – SCO). Organizacija je nastala leta 2001 kot naslednica skupine Šanghajskih pet (angl. Shanghai Five) ki so jo leta 1996 ustanovili Kazahstan, Kirgizistan, Kitajska, Rusija in Tadžikistan. SCO je soustanovil tudi Uzbekistan, danes pa so opazovalke še Indija, Iran, Mongolija in Pakistan; v dialogu s SCO sta Belorusija in Šrilanka, gostujoče države in organizacije pa so Afganistan, ASEAN in Skupnost neodvisnih držav.

²³ Pobudo o novi evropski (panevropski) varnostni arhitekturi je Evropi ponudil ruski predsednik Medvedjev v Berlinu leta 2008, zunanji minister Lavrov pa je na zasedanju Sveta Evrope aprila 2010 predlagal soočanje s skupnimi globalnimi izzivi ter oblikovanje strateškega trikotnika ZDA-Evropa-Rusija. Kot posebno simbolično gesto velja izpostaviti dejstvo, da so se maja 2010 parade ob 65. obletnici zmage v 2. svetovni vojni na moskovskem Rdečem trgu prvič udeležili pripadniki držav članic Nata, in sicer Francije, Poljske, Velike Britanije in ZDA.

televiziji, radiu oziroma internetu (Dodds, 2007: 17). Tudi v geopolitiki so se po 11. septembru 2001²⁴ vzpostavile nove realnosti, razmerja sil in strategije odzivanja. Asimetričnost globalnih varnostnih groženj in realnost poljudne geopolitike sta zamajali temelje tradicionalnega razumevanja geopolitike. Najti je mogoče vzročne posledice med napadom majhne skupine teroristov na simbol gospodarske moči ZDA in dvema vojnoma v okviru t. i. vojne proti terorizmu v Afganistanu in Iraku. Pomen asimetričnih akterjev za geopolitična vprašanja je večji kot kdaj koli prej.

Nedržavni asimetrični akterji so sestavni del antigeopolitike, ki predstavlja stalno neodvisnost od države, ne glede na to, kdo je na oblasti, in artikulira dve medsebojno povezani obliki protihegemonističnega boja. Prvič, izziva *materialno* (ekonomsko in vojaško) geopolitično moč držav in globalnih institucij, ter drugič, izziva njihove podobe pred svetom, ki so jih vsilile politične in ekonomske elite ... (Routledge, 2003, 2008: 236–237). V praksi je antigeopolitika lokalnega značaja, medtem ko se z globalizacijo zanesljivo tudi spreminja. Teroriste z globalnim dosegom v soodvisnem svetu je mogoče obravnavati tudi kot akterje antigeopolitike, kajti njihovi cilji in ambicije precej presegajo ideje in okolje, iz katerih izhajajo. In ne le teroriste kot posameznike, temveč tudi kot pripadnike neke skupine ali ideje, kot je na primer Al Kaida, ki jo nekateri vidijo kot ohlapno gibanje, usmerjeno proti Zahodu, drugi pa kot zelo dobro povezano in vodeno teroristično mrežo.

In kakšna je vloga majhnih držav v tem spremenjenem, postmodernem kompleksnem razumevanju geopolitike? Ker velikost ozemlja, število prebivalcev, dolžina meja in geografska umeščenost niso tako ključnega in izključnega pomena kot v preteklosti, je to tudi možnost in priložnost za majhne akterje. In ne nazadnje je Slovenija zgolj dobrih šestnajst let po razglasitvi samostojnosti in kot prva nekdanja komunistična država predsedovala polmilijardni skupnosti 27 držav članic, Svetu Evropske unije²⁵. Zato je pomembno videti in vedeti, kako je na podlagi razvoja svoje državnosti dosegla ta, za slovenski narod zgodovinski trenutek leta 2008.

²⁴ Kot je tudi z razpadom bipolarnega sveta prišlo do številnih geopolitičnih sprememb. Za obdobje po koncu hladne vojne sta značilna premik z obrobja na center in močnejše poudarjanje ekonomske kot vojaške moči. In prav nezanimanje za vprašanja, prepire in težave z obrobja je tradicionalna mejna območja spremenilo v bojišča, kot so na primer v nekdanji Jugoslaviji (Tunander, 1997: 6–7).

²⁵ Kljub številnim pohvalnim besedam, ki jih je bila Slovenija deležna za izvedbo predsedovanja, bi bilo iluzorno pričakovati, da bi Slovenija v tem ogromnem birokratskem mastodontu lahko naredila tektonske spremembe, še posebno z vidika našega gospodarstva; v komisiji je zaposlenih približno 25.000 uslužbencev, v sekretariatu 3300 in v Vojaškem štabu EU 200 uslužbencev (sic!).

2 GEOSTRATEŠKE ZNAČILNOSTI SLOVENSKEGA PROSTORA

2.1 Kratek zgodovinski presek

Analiza slovenskega prostora skozi zgodovino pove, da je od okrog 70.000 km² slovenskega ozemlja v njegovem največjem obsegu v prvi polovici 9. stoletja 10.000 km² kmalu prešlo v madžarski prostor. Od preostalega dela so do konca 15. stoletja tri petine – 36.000 km² v večstoletnem razvoju prešle v bavarsko-nemški prostor, dve petini – 24.000 km² pa sta ostali temelj slovenskega narodnega razvoja po 15. stoletju (Graffenauer, 1994: 8). Sodobna slovenska država torej temelji na slabih 29 odstotkih zgodovinskega prostora izpred tisočletja oziroma na 83 odstotkih ozemlja, ki je temelj razvoja zadnjih nekaj stoletij²⁶. Slovensko ozemlje in Slovenci smo kot najsevernejši južnoslovanski narod bili skozi celotno zgodovino na prepihu ter na križišču germanskih, romanskih in madžarskih interesov, ki so se odražali tudi v obeh svetovnih vojnah²⁷.

Republika Slovenija je kontinentalna in pomorska država. Leži na evropskem prostoru, do katerega so najzahodnejše prodrli Slovani in kjer se stikajo ter prepletajo slovanska, germanska in romanska kultura. V zgodovinskem in kulturnem pogledu pripada Srednji Evropi²⁸. Geostrateški položaj²⁹ Republike Slovenije v evropskem prostoru je enkraten³⁰, saj je na njenem ozemlju stičišče treh geostrateških in geopolitičnih prostorov, in sicer srednjeevropskega, južnoevropskega in jadransko-sredozemskega³¹. Čez njeno ozemlje potekajo najkrajše

²⁶ Ta odstotek bi bil še precej nižji, če general Rudolf Maister po koncu prve svetovne vojne v bojih za severno mejo Sloveniji ne bi priboril skoraj tretjine današnjega slovenskega ozemlja na vzhodu in severovzhodu, vključno z Mariborom, ter če Slovenija po drugi svetovni vojni ne bi dobila nazaj velikega dela zahodnega nacionalnega ozemlja, ki ga je izgubila po prvi svetovni vojni.

²⁷ Za podrobno predstavitev in celovito analizo zgodovinskega vidika strateškega pomena slovenskega vojskovališča in geopolitične dinamike v 20. stoletju glej Žabkar 1996 in 1997. Prof. dr. Anton Žabkar je nestor slovenske vojaške znanosti, pa tudi geopolitične in strateške misli. Posebna avtorjeva zahvala gre dejstvu, da je profesor Žabkar s svojimi lucidnimi, pronicljivimi ter kritičnimi pripombami in komentarji pomembno obogatil zapisane vsebine.

²⁸ Po Natovi klasifikaciji kot tudi po klasifikaciji publikacije Jane's Sentinel je Slovenija del južnoevropskega vojskovališča (ang. Southern Theatre of War).

²⁹ Geostrategija kot družboslovna veda, podpodročje geopolitike in vrsta zunanje politike, ki jo vodijo geografski dejavniki. Pri tem se upoštevajo tudi tehnološki, vojaški, politični, gospodarski in kulturni dejavniki države ali nekega območja. Poleg že navedenih teoretikov geopolitike so znani geostrategi še admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, Nicholas J. Spykman, George F. Kennan itn.

³⁰ Vsaka država zase misli, da je njen prostor enkraten in unikaten, ali to drži z globalnega ali regionalnega geostrateškega in geopolitičnega vidika, pa je že drugo vprašanje. Tak je primer Slovenije, ki je povezala severni del južnega krila zveze Nato, Italijo in Madžarsko, pozneje se je ta most razširil še na Hrvaško.

³¹ Slovenija je aktivna v številnih oblikah regionalnega sodelovanja, ki obsegajo vse tri prostore. Med bolj znanimi oblikami so: (1) Srednjeevropska pobuda, ki vključuje osemnajst držav članic iz Srednje in Jugovzhodne Evrope, njeni začetki pa segajo v leto 1989, po številu članic pa je najštevilčnejša regionalna pobuda; (2) Jadransko-jonska pobuda, ki povezuje osem držav vzdolž Jadranskega in Jonskega morja; (3) delovna skupnost Alpe–Jadran, ki danes združuje 13 dežel, županij in regij, Hrvaška in Slovenija pa sodelujeta na državni ravni. Oblike regionalnega sodelovanja so še: Podonavsko sodelovanje, sodelovanje v okviru pobude Clearinghouse za Jugovzhodno Evropo, pobuda obrambnih ministrov Jugovzhodne Evrope itn. (glej <http://www.mors.si> in <http://www.mzz.gov.si>). Slovenija skupaj z drugimi 43 članicami iz Evrope, Severne Afrike in Bližnjega vzhoda sodeluje v pobudi o sodelovanju vseh sredozemskih držav z imenom Sredozemska unija (fr. Union pour la Méditerranée) z uradnim imenom Barcelonski proces: Unija za Sredozemlje. Pobudi, ki jo je francosko predsedstvo Svetu EU podalo julija 2008, sopredsedujeta francoski in egiptovski predsednik, sedež pa ima v Barceloni v Španiji.

kopenske povezave, ki zahodno Evropo in osrednji del južne Evrope povezujejo s Podonavjem in Balkanom ter prek njih z vzhodno Evropo in Malo Azijo, obenem pa čez slovensko ozemlje vodijo najkrajše in najugodnejše povezave iz srednjeevropskih celinskih držav do obale Jadranskega morja in Apeninskega polotoka (3.2. poglavje ReSNV, 2001).

Od skupne dolžine slovenskih mej, ki merijo 1370 km, jih 920 km – 67,2 odstotka poteka po kopnem, 402 km – 29,3 odstotka po rekah in 48 km – 3,5 odstotka po morju³². Slovenija ima glede meje odprta vprašanja s Hrvaško, pri čemer je za Slovenijo vitalnega pomena vprašanje meje na morju. Na sedanja in prihodnja stališča ter (ne)popustljivost Hrvaške³³ glede meje v Piranskem zalivu bo po vsej verjetnosti močno vplival položaj na njeni južni pomorski meji z BiH in Črno goro. Vsako morebitno hrvaško enostransko popuščanje med pogajanja o meji v Piranskem zalivu bi namreč zelo otežilo hrvaška pogajanja o razmejitvi na morju s Črno goro in BiH; ti dve državi bi se namreč prav gotovo lahko sklicevali na morebitno hrvaško popustljivost na severni pomorski meji, da bi si izborili čim ugodnejši potek meje na morju (Žabkar, 1997).

Vmesni geostrateški položaj Slovenije je – zaradi dejstva, da so različni akterji meje med zahodnim Balkanom in srednjo Evropo določali na različne načine, je bila Slovenija v 20. stoletju v sestavi večnacionalnih držav (Avstro-Ogrske in Jugoslavije), ki sta imeli geostrateški težišči v srednji Evropi oziroma na Balkanu – prispeval k temu, da so Slovenijo v mednarodnih analizah in geopolitičnih ter strateških razvrstitvah včasih obravnavali kot srednjeevropsko (slika 2), včasih pa kot balkansko območje oziroma državo. Po mednarodnem priznanju Republike Slovenije so v svetu prevladale ocene, da je Slovenija hkrati srednjein država³⁴. Slovenci naj bi torej bili srednjeevropski južnjaki. V Sloveniji med prebivalstvom prevladuje občutek pripadnosti zahodni Evropi in podobnosti z alpskimi državami in regijami, kot so Avstrija, Švica, severna Italija in Bavarska. Z vidika vojaško-geografske klasifikacije ni sporno, da je bil slovenski prostor

³² Glej http://www.stat.si/doc/pub/slo_figures_09.pdf.

³³ Hrvaška je enkrat že odstopila od podpisanega dogovora o reševanju meje s Slovenijo. Septembra 2002 je Hrvaška poslala Sloveniji pismo, da ne more sprejeti Pogodbe o skupni meji (tako imenovani sporazum Drnovšek-Račan), ki sta jo 20. julija 2001 parafirala predsednika vlad Slovenije in Hrvaške. Več kot osem let pozneje, 4. novembra 2009, sta predsednik slovenske vlade Borut Pahor in predsednica hrvaške vlade Jadranka Kosor v Stockholmu, v navzočnosti in ob soprodpisu švedskega premiera Fredrika Reinfeldta, predsedujočega Svetu EU, podpisala Arbitražni sporazum med Vlado Republike Slovenije in Vlado Republike Hrvaške. Arbitražni sporazum ustanavlja arbitražno sodišče, ki mora določiti: (a) potek meje med RS in RH na kopnem in morju, (b) stik Slovenije z odprtim morjem in (c) režim za uporabo ustreznih morskih območij (4. člen sporazuma). Sporazum sta ratificirala tako hrvaški kot slovenski parlament. V Sloveniji je arbitražni sporazum sprožil številne polemike, kaj Slovenija pridobi oziroma izgubi s sporazumom. Vprašanje, v katerem so se mnenja med nasprotniki in zagovorniki sporazuma najbolj razlikovala, je bilo, ali bo Slovenija tudi po koncu arbitraže ohranila stik oziroma teritorialni dostop do mednarodnih voda. S skupno odločitvijo vladajoče koalicije in opozicije je bil nato za 6. junij 2010 razpisan naknadni zakonodajni referendum, na katerem so volivci v Sloveniji odločali o dokončnem sprejemu Zakona o ratifikaciji Arbitražnega sporazuma. Ob 42,7-odstotni volilni udeležbi je za ratifikacijo arbitražnega sporazuma glasovalo slabih 51,5 odstotka udeležencev referenduma.

³⁴ Vsekakor pa smo bili že od začetka 20. stoletja zapisani skupni evropski zamisli v različnih inačicah in modalitetah, od »Zedinjenih podonavskih držav« do »Združenih držav Evrope« (Rahten, 2009: 23–31).

Slika 2:
Spreminjanje
meja in nastanek
novih držav v
Evropi po koncu
1. svetovne vojne



Vir: Na <http://media.photobucket.com/image/map%20ww1/SerbianCulture/Europe20Map20Before20After20WW2008.jpg>.

vedno sestavni del južноеvropskega vojskovališča. Slovenija je bila v 20. stoletju več kot četrtno stoletja rob nestabilne balkanske »črne luknje« v osrčju Evrope. Na in ob slovenskem prostoru so potekale štiri vojne (prva svetovna vojna, vojna za severno mejo, druga svetovna vojna in vojna za osamosvojitve leta 1991), ki so skupaj trajale deset let, k temu pa je treba dodati še šest kriznih let med obema svetovnjima vojnama (TIGR³⁵, Fiume³⁶), devet kriznih let po drugi svetovni vojni zaradi Trsta in STO³⁷ ter pet let trajajočo vojno na Hrvaškem ter v Bosni in Hercegovini od 1991 do 1995. Leta 1999 je Slovenija omogočala tudi prelete slovenskega zračnega prostora za posredovanje Nata na Balkanu (ibid.). Po vključitvi v Nato in EU vojaška ogroženost Slovenije nedvomno ni na vidiku, zanimivo pa postaja vprašanje sodelovanja Slovenije v mednarodnih

³⁵ TIGR je kratica za imena treh mest (Trst, Gorica in Reka) in enega polotoka (Istra), organizacije, ki je med obema svetovnjima vojnama delovala kot podtalna organizacija, naperjena proti italijanskemu fašizmu. Organizacija je bila podobno kot general Rudolf Maister slabih pet desetletij po drugi svetovni vojni neupravičeno zamolčana, danes pa je njuna velika zgodovinska vloga priznana.

³⁶ Fiume je italijansko in madžarsko ime za mesto Reko, danes na Hrvaškem, ki je bilo med leti 1918 in 1924 po razpadu Avstro-Ogrske predmet spora med Italijo in Kraljevino Srbov, Hrvatov in Slovencev (pozneje Kraljevina Jugoslavija). Mesto Rijeka/Fiume je na podlagi Rimskega sporazuma, podpisanega 27. januarja 1924, pripadlo Kraljevini Italiji.

³⁷ Svobodno tržaško ozemlje – STO, svobodna mestna nevtralna država (1947–1954), ki je nastala na podlagi podpisane mirovne pogodbe med Italijo in zavezniki. Ozemlje je bilo razdeljeno na dve območji, in sicer cona A in B, z uradnima jezicoma slovenščino in italijanščino. Z Londonskim sporazumom iz leta 1954 je Italiji pripadla cona A, Jugoslaviji pa cona B.

operacijah in na misijah (MOM), ki niso samo mirovne ali humanitarne narave (Irak, Afganistan)³⁸. Slovenijo so z vojaškega vidika v letih 2009 in 2010 zaznamovale podobne razprave o Afganistanu kot leta 2006 o udeležbi Slovenije v Iraku, kjer je Slovenska vojska v okviru Natove misije za usposabljanje (NTM-I) na začetku sodelovala s štirimi inštruktorji, nato pa z dvema vse do umika na začetku leta 2009. Razprave, ali je Slovenija v Afganistanu v vojni, kaj tam delajo naši vojaki, kakšno bo kakovostno preoblikovanje kontingenta SV v Isaf itn., se zaradi načrtovanega prevzema svoje t. i. operativne skupine za mentorstvo in povezave (OMLT) jeseni letos nadaljujejo tudi leta 2010³⁹.

2.2 Kratek sodoben pregled

Samostojna Slovenija ima površino 20.255 km² in je ob popisu prebivalstva leta 2002 štela 1.964.036 prebivalcev, kar je pomenilo 2,6-odstotni prirast v primerjavi s popisom leta 1991. Število prebivalstva je leta 2005 drugič v zgodovini preseгло dva milijona, marca 2010 pa so na Statističnem uradu Republike Slovenije prešteli približno 2.055.000 prebivalcev. V popisu leta 2002 se je za Slovence opredelilo 83,06 odstotka prebivalcev, 0,11 odstotka oziroma 0,32 odstotka prebivalcev pripada dvema avtohtonima manjšinama Italijanov oziroma Madžarov, medtem ko se 8,9 odstotka prebivalcev ni opredelilo oziroma niso želeli odgovoriti na vprašanje o nacionalni pripadnosti. Naslednje največje narodnostno opredeljene skupine so še Srbi z 1,98 odstotka, Hrvatje z 1,81 odstotka, Bošnjaki z 1,10 odstotka, Muslimani z 0,53 odstotka, Bosanci z 0,41 odstotka in Albanci z 0,31 odstotka⁴⁰ prebivalstva.

Slovenija po velikosti spada v zgornjo tretjino skupine petnajstih najmanjših evropskih držav⁴¹ (od nje so po velikosti manjši Sveti sedež, Monako, San Marino, Liechtenstein, Malta, Andora, Luksemburg, Ciper, Kosovo in Črna gora, medtem ko so Makedonija, Albanija, Belgija in Moldavija (v tem vrstnem redu večje za 25, 40, 50 in 67 odstotkov). Po številu prebivalstva prav tako spada v zgornjo tretjino petnajstih najmanjših evropskih držav, ki štejejo do 2.310.000 prebivalcev (manj številčna od nje je poleg že prej naštetih desetih držav še Estonija, številčnejše pa so Makedonija, Latvija in Litva⁴²). V okviru Evropske unije se med 27 državami članicami po številu prebivalstva uvršča na peto mesto od zadaj, manj

³⁸ Za celovit vpogled v slovensko sodelovanje v mirovnih operacijah in na misijah glej *Sodelovanje Republike Slovenije v mednarodnih operacijah in misijah*, (ur. Bric, R.), Ministrstvo za obrambo, Ljubljana, http://www.mors.si/fileadmin/mors/pdf/publikacije/zbornik_f.pdf.


³⁹ Slovenska vojska je 6. maja 2010 sodelovala v MOM s 468 pripadniki; s 350 pripadniki v okviru Kforja na Kosovu, s 67 pripadniki v Isafu v Afganistanu ter še drugje na Zahodnem Balkanu, v Libanonu in Siriji, <http://www.slovenskavojska.si/mednarodno-sodelovanje/mednarodne-operacije-in-misije/>.

⁴⁰ Glej <http://www.stat.si/>. V tretji četrtini prejšnjega stoletja so se kot ekonomski migranti začeli v Slovenijo priseljevati prebivalci drugih republik nekdanje Jugoslavije.

⁴¹ Trinajst izmed teh petnajstih držav je članic Organizacije združenih narodov, ki šteje 192 držav članic, glej <http://www.un.org/>. Sveti sedež ima v OZN status opazovalke, Kosovo pa ni članica OZN. Po razglasitvi samostojnosti 17. februarja 2008 je neodvisno Kosovo do 1. junija 2010 priznalo 69 držav članic OZN. Slovenija je Kosovo priznala 5. marca 2008, <http://www.kosovothanksyou.com/>.

⁴² Za statistične podatke glej <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>, število prebivalstva temelji na oceni iz leta 2009.

Slika 3:
Evropska unija
in schengensko
območje 2010



Vir: <http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/97/Schengenzone.svg/1000px-Schengenzone.svg.png>
<http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/focuson/film/images/activities/cold-war/europe-cold-war.png>

številčne članice so Malta, Luksemburg, Ciper in Estonija, ter med zadnje štiri po velikosti ozemlja; Estonija je namreč za 125 odstotkov večja. V Natu se med 28 državami članicami po številu prebivalstva uvršča na četrto mesto od zadaj, manj

številčne države so le Islandija, Luksemburg in Estonija. Manjše ozemlje pa ima le Luksemburg, saj je Islandija petkrat večja od Slovenije. Slovenija se uvršča tudi med 14 novih evropskih držav, nastalih po koncu hladne vojne (ob razpadu socialističnih federacij), ki jih je mednarodna skupnost priznala v obdobju od leta 1989 do 1993. Je ena izmed sedmih držav, ki so nastale po razpadu SFR Jugoslavije; kot zadnje tri so nastale Črna gora in Srbija leta 2006 ter Kosovo leta 2008.

Slovenija je načrtovane evroatlanske ambicije uresničila s članstvom v Natu 29. marca 2004 in v Evropski uniji 1. maja 2004⁴³. S 1. januarjem 2007 je prevzela skupno evropsko valuto evro in 22. decembra 2007⁴⁴ postala država članica *schengenskega območja*, ko je odpravila nadzor na notranjih kopenskih in morskih mejah s članicami EU ter to naredila še 30. marca 2008 na zračnih mejah (slika 3). Ključni pripomoček, ki omogoča izvajanje schengenskega sporazuma, je Schengenski informacijski sistem (SIS) – skupna elektronska baza podatkov za osebe in predmete. Gre za osebe, ki jim je prepovedan vstop v schengensko območje, ki se iščejo zaradi odvzema prostosti ali izročitve, osebe, ki so pogrešane, pa tudi za ukradena vozila in dokumente, denar, orožje, označen denar, ki izvira iz kaznivih dejanj itn.⁴⁵

Danes je Slovenija sodobna informacijska družba; leta 2008 smo prešteli en mobilni telefon na prebivalca, 58 odstotkov prebivalstva je bilo uporabnikov interneta in 65 odstotkov prebivalstva uporabnikov osebnega računalnika, ti deleži pa iz leta v leto naraščajo.⁴⁶ To je še posebno pomembno, kajti *čas, v katerem živimo, je obdobje informacij, informacijske družbe, skratka informacijska doba. Mobilni telefoni in internet zaznamujejo vsakdanjik Slovenk in Slovencev, prebivalcev Slovenije, Evropejcev in vsega globalnega sveta* (Črncec, 2009: 12). Tudi ali predvsem z informacijsko družbo, globalizacijo in spremenjenim varnostnim okoljem je med drugim povezana tudi potreba po proučevanju geoekonomskega vidika geopolitičnega položaja Slovenije.

⁴³ Referenduma o vstopu v Nato in EU se je udeležilo več kot 60 odstotkov volivcev; članstvo v Natu je potrdilo 66 odstotkov volilnih udeležencev, članstvo v EU pa skoraj 90 odstotkov.

⁴⁴ Temeljna zamisel schengenskega območja, ki je nastalo leta 1985 s podpisom sporazuma v luksemburški vasi Schengen med petimi državami članicami EU (Belgija, Francija, Luksemburg, Nemčija in Nizozemska), je zagotavljanje pravice do prostega prehajanja notranjih mej. Protiutež je temeljitejši mejni nadzor na zunanjih schengenskih mejah, predvsem zato, da se ustavijo nezakonito priseljevanje, tihotapljenje drog, trgovina z ljudmi in druge nezakonite dejavnosti. Z vstopom Slovenije in še šestih drugih držav v schengensko območje se je skupno število držav članic povečalo na 22.

⁴⁵ Slovenija – schengenska novinka, MNZ RS, Ljubljana, december 2007.

⁴⁶ Internet se je izkazal za najhitreje rastoče telekomunikacijsko sredstvo vseh časov. Leta 1998 je bilo na svetu 140 milijonov uporabnikov interneta, leta 2001 700 milijonov, sredi leta 2007 1173 milijonov ali 17,8 odstotka svetovnega prebivalstva in 31. decembra 2009 1802 milijona uporabnikov ali 26,6 odstotka svetovnega prebivalstva. Kot posebno zanimivost je treba izpostaviti, da je februarja 2008 število kitajskih uporabnikov interneta prvič preseгло število uporabnikov v ZDA (220 milijonov proti 216 milijonom). To razmerje se je konec leta 2009 povečalo na 384 milijonov uporabnikov na Kitajskem proti 234 milijonom ameriških uporabnikov (<http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm>).

3 SLOVENIJA SKOZI GEOPOLITIČNO IN GEOEKONOMSKO PRIZMO

Slovenija je leta 2005 sprejela *Strategijo razvoja Slovenije* (SRS)⁴⁷, ki opredeljuje Usmeritve SRS: Strategija razvoja Slovenije določa štiri temeljne razvojne cilje: (i) gospodarski razvojni cilj – v desetih letih doseči povprečno raven ekonomske razvitosti Evropske unije; (ii) družbeni razvojni cilj – izboljšati kakovost življenja in blaginjo; (iii) medgeneracijski in sonaravni razvojni cilj – uveljavljati načela trajnosti na vseh področjih razvoja, vključno s trajnim obnavljanjem prebivalstva; (iv) razvojni cilj Slovenije v mednarodnem okolju – postati prepoznavna in ugledna država v svetu. Razvojni cilji so se, nekateri manj, drugi bolj, uspešno uresničevali v obdobju gospodarske rasti. Preobrat, ki je nastal z gospodarsko krizo, pa je še posebno boleč.

Iz številnih javnih polemik in razprav ter statističnih kazalcev je mogoče ugotoviti, da je Slovenijo gospodarska kriza prizadela bolj kot večino naših partnerjev v EU. Temu je ne nazadnje pritrnil tudi vladni Urad za makroekonomske analize in razvoj (UMAR) v svojem *Poročilu o razvoju 2010*. Kot je mogoče ugotoviti iz poročila, je bilo z *gospodarsko krizo v letu 2009 prekinjeno uresničevanje ciljev SRS na področju gospodarskega in socialnega razvoja. Kriza je tako rekoč izničila napredek na področju gospodarskega in socialnega razvoja, doseženega z visoko gospodarsko rastjo in rastjo zaposlenosti v preteklih konjunkturo ugodnih letih*⁴⁸.

Za Slovenijo ter njen sedanji in prihodnji razvoj je življenjskega pomena **povezanost z mednarodnim okoljem**, saj je močno odvisna od uvoza. Do leta 1991 sta bili dve tretjini slovenskega izvoza vezani na nekdanjo Jugoslavijo, po osamosvojitvi pa se je slovensko gospodarstvo preusmerilo na zahodne trge. Velika večina slovenske mednarodne trgovine poteka z državami Evropske unije (leta 2008 69 odstotkov izvoza in 77,9 odstotka uvoza). Slovenske investicije v tujino so usmerjene predvsem na območje Zahodnega Balkana, medtem ko so v Sloveniji največji investitorji države EU s 85-odstotnim deležem (tabela 1). Največji investitor je Avstrija z 48 odstotki, sledi Francija z dobrimi 7 odstotki, Nizozemska s 6,5 odstotka, Italija s 5,7 odstotka in Nemčija s slabimi petimi odstotki ter druge države članice EU. Slovenija pa nameni kar 76,8 odstotka vseh investicij v države, ki niso članice EU, na prvem mestu je seveda Zahodni Balkan. Slovenija namenja za Srbijo 28,5 odstotka vseh investicij, za Hrvaško 19,7 odstotka ter za Bosno in Hercegovino 12,4 odstotka. Investitorju, ki vlaga največ v Slovenijo, Avstriji, je namenjenih le 2,5 odstotka vseh investicij.

⁴⁷ Vlada jo je sprejela na svoji 30. seji 23. junija 2005, http://www.svez.gov.si/fileadmin/svez.gov.si/pageuploads/docs/katal_inf_javn_znac/02_StrategijarazvojaSlovenije.pdf.


⁴⁸ Poročilo o razvoju 2010 je bilo objavljeno 3. maja 2010. Pokazale so se številne strukturne slabosti, predvsem dejstvo, da je dosedanja gospodarska rast preveč temeljila na tehnološko premalo zahtevnih industrijskih dejavnostih in na tradicionalnih storitvenih dejavnostih, kar omejuje konkurenčno sposobnost slovenskega gospodarstva. Zato je hitra povrnitev na pot gospodarskega okrevanja in ponovnega izboljševanja blaginje prebivalstva velik izziv, še posebno, ker sta se z gospodarsko krizo srednjeročno močno poslabšala stanje javnih financ in dostopnost do virov financiranja, znižala se je tudi raven potencialnega bruto domačega proizvoda (http://www.umar.gov.si/fileadmin/user_upload/publikacije/pr/2010/POR_2010.pdf).

Tabela 1:
Stanje
mednarodnih
naložb po
državah oziroma
skupinah držav
(v milijonih EUR)
31. decembra
2009

Država oz. skupine držav	Neto pozicija	Imetja						Obveznosti					
		Skupaj 2= 3+4+5+6+7	3	4	5	6	7	Mednarodne rezerve	Ostale naložbe	Finančni derivativi	Naložbe v tuje vrednostne papirje	Neposredne naložbe v Sloveniji	Tuje naložbe v vrednostne papirje
Svet	1=2-8 -12,128	34,915	6,010	11,249	81	16,827	749	47,043	10,788	9,355	191	26,709	
Evropska unija, od tega	-18,774	20,880	1,072	9,311	70	10,292	135	39,654	9,134	5,526	169	24,825	
Avstrija	-11,759	2,342	151	633	27	1,513	0	14,083	5,171	485	124	8,303	
Belgija	443	982	-4	609	6	371	0	539	396	60	1	83	
Francija	94	2,089	24	1,628	6	431	0	1,995	773	3	6	1,213	
Irska	-971	314	1	233	1	78	0	1,285	1	4	0	1,280	
Italija	-530	1,235	25	611	4	595	0	1,765	612	23	5	1,125	
Nemčija	-2,002	3,319	220	2,125	8	966	0	5,321	531	173	1	4,615	
Nizozemska	388	1,373	182	838	1	352	0	985	706	19	0	259	
Velika Britanija	-2,967	834	9	479	12	257	77	3,801	94	2,269	14	1,424	
EU Institucije	-913	4,639	0	66	0	4,554	19	5,552	0	0	0	5,552	
EFTA	-881	692	56	108	2	483	44	1,573	1,183	52	1	337	
Druge evropske države, od tega	8,016	9,313	4,616	351	8	4,338	0	1,297	260	113	18	906	
Bosna in Hercegovina	1,302	1,475	746	57	2	670	0	173	22	3	3	145	
Hrvaška	2,129	2,794	1,187	79	0	1,528	0	665	296	51	5	313	
Srbija	2,645	2,886	1,715	66	2	1,103	0	241	2	51	4	184	
Črna Gora	440	491	163	8	2	318	0	51	0	5	2	44	
Makedonija	520	581	384	44	1	152	0	62	2	3	2	55	
ZDA	920	1,250	21	979	1	123	126	330	86	131	1	112	
Ostale države	912	1,570	245	500	0	459	366	658	125	25	2	507	
Nerazvrščeno	-2,321	1,210	0	0	0	1,131	78	3,530	0	3,508	0	22	

Vir: Banka Slovenije.

Graf 2:
Pregled naložb



Vir: Banka Slovenije.

Trend naraščanja obeh indeksov se je rahlo upočasnil oziroma v primeru investicij v Slovenijo leta 2009 celo zmanjšal za dva odstotka (graf 2), kar je posledica splošne gospodarske krize, ki je zelo prizadela tudi Slovenijo.

Z vidika mednarodne trgovine je ključnega pomena edino slovensko pristanišče Luka Koper⁴⁹, katerega skupni ladijski pretovor je leta 2008 znašal rekordnih 16,05 milijona ton, leta 2009 pa je upadel za dobrih 18 odstotkov, in sicer na 13,14 milijona ton⁵⁰. Za Slovenijo je zato vitalnega pomena ustrezno urejen dostop do odprtega morja in epikontinentalnega pasu. Dostop danes ni pomemben le zaradi proste plovbe (ladje, ki plujejo k slovenski obali, lahko namreč nemoteno plujejo skozi hrvaške in italijanske zunanje vode, ker zanje veljajo določila t. i. neškodljivega prehoda oziroma mednarodnopravna norma *innocent passage*), temveč vse bolj tudi zaradi izkoriščanja bogastev z morskega dna. Sosednja Italija namreč s severnojadranskega dna že črpa zemeljski plin, zelo aktualno in problematično pa je vprašanje postavitve terminala za sprejem in uplinjanje utekočinjenega

⁴⁹ V severnem Jadranu sta še dve zelo pomembni pristanišči, in sicer Trst v Italiji in Reka na Hrvaškem. Obe lahko služita kot vstopno okno v Srednjo in Vzhodno Evropo.

⁵⁰ Statistika pretovora od leta 1996 je navedena na <http://www.luka-kp.si/slo/terminali-in-tovor>. Najbolj se je zmanjšala količina pretovorjenih vozil, in sicer z 816.192 ton leta 2008 na 444.621 ton leta 2009 ter količina pretovorjenega sipkega in razsutega tovora z 7.900.610 ton na 5.575.403 ton. Na začetku leta 2010 so se trendi spet obrnili navzgor; tako so v Luki Koper januarja 2010 pretovorili 1.506.878 ton ter februarja 2010 1.224.876 ton, kar je 15,8 odstotka več kot februarja 2009.

zemeljskega plina Žavljje v Tržaškem zalivu⁵¹. Dejstvo je, da so na dnu posebne ekonomske cone (*angl. Exclusive Economic Zone*) severnega Jadrana odkrili velike zaloge zemeljskega plina. Italija⁵² je leta 2006 načrpala okoli 10,7 milijarde kubičnih metrov zemeljskega plina, od tega približno polovico na Severnem Jadranu, Hrvaška pa približno dve milijardi. Zemeljski plin bi lahko črpala tudi Slovenija, če bi dobila dostop do epikontinentalnega pasu.

Slovenski bruto družbeni proizvod in bruto družbeni proizvod na prebivalca sta v zadnjem desetletju nenehno naraščala. Slovenski bruto družbeni proizvod je v letih 2006, 2007 in 2008 naraščal za 5,8 odstotka, 6,8 odstotka in 3,5 odstotka ter nato leta 2009 strmoglavil in se zmanjšal za 7,8 odstotka. V primerjavi z EU je Slovenija gospodarsko krizo čutila veliko močneje. S tem se je na glavo postavil tempo približevanja Slovenije povprečju EU. Namesto prejšnjega hitrega dohitevanja povprečja razvitosti EU⁵³ smo zdaj začeli **zaostajati**, kar je razvidno tudi iz rasti in padca BDP v EU. V EU 27 je rast BDP leta 2008 znašala 0,6 odstotka oziroma 0,7 odstotka v evroobmočju. Leta 2009 je bil padec BDP v EU 27 4,2 odstotka in v evroobmočju 4,1 odstotka. Slovenski bruto družbeni proizvod se je tako leta 2009 zmanjšal s 37,135 milijarde leta 2008 na 34,894 milijarde oziroma BDP na prebivalca z 18,366 leta 2008 na 17,092 milijarde evra leta 2009. Dolg državnega proračuna se je samo leta 2009 z 8,389 milijarde evrov povečal na 12,519 milijarde, kar pomeni povečanje za 13,3 odstotka, z 22,6 na 35,9 odstotka BDP. Z vidika EU je to še vedno ugodna statistika, saj je javni dolg v EU 27 leta 2009 znašal 73,6 odstotka in v evroobmočju 78,7 odstotka⁵⁴. Dolg državnega proračuna je konec leta 2009 znašal 1,915 milijarde (5,5 odstotka BDP), medtem ko je bilo še konec leta 2007 osem milijonov presežka. Število brezposelnih se je od septembra 2008, ko jih je bilo manj kot 60.000, do januarja

⁵¹ V Sloveniji namera Italije, da bo v Tržaškem zalivu gradila plinski terminal, sproža burne odzive, ne samo okoljevarstvenih organizacij z obeh strani meje, temveč tudi uradne politike. Vlada je upoštevala mnenje medresorske skupine strokovnjakov in odločila, da gradnja plinskega terminala v Žavljah ni sprejemljiva ter od Italije zahteva uradne podatke, v medijih pa so se pojavile tudi špekulacije, da so bili nekateri dokumenti v procesu pridobivanja soglasij ponarejeni. Povzetek študije vpliva na okolje terminala za sprejem utekočinjenega plina v Žavljah je na voljo na http://www.mop.gov.si/fileadmin/mop.gov.si/pageuploads/podrocja/okolje/pdf/cpvo/terminal_zavljje.pdf.

⁵² Leta 2009 se je začelo intenzivno čezmejno sodelovanje med italijanskim podjetjem Eni in hrvaško Ino. Annamaria A in Annamaria B sta prvi plinski polji, ki sta na obeh straneh meje med Italijo in Hrvaško. *Eni Starts Up Annamaria A Platform in Adriatic Sea*; http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=82569; *First gas at Annamaria*; <http://www.oilonline.com/News/NewsArticles/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/31590/First-gas-at-Annamaria.aspx>.

⁵³ Slovenski BDP, izražen v pariteti kupne moči v odstotkih povprečja EU, je leta 2008 znašal 90,9 odstotka, kar je pomenilo 16. mesto od 27 držav članic EU. Slovenija je bila torej na repu druge tretjine držav EU, od repa prve tretjine pa je zaostajala za 25 odstotnih točk. Slovenski UMAR je objavil, da se je leta 2009 Slovenija vrnila na 89 odstotkov povprečja razvitosti EU, kar je pomenilo padec za dva odstotka na raven iz leta 2007. To je bil tudi prvi padec po osamosvojitvi, http://www.umar.gov.si/fileadmin/user_upload/publikacije/pr/2010/POR__2010.pdf.

⁵⁴ Na <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu>. Preveliko zadolževanje in pomanjkljiv nadzor lahko državo pahmeta na rob bankrota, kot se je to zgodilo Grčiji leta 2010. EU ji je skupaj z IMF prisiljena posoditi 110 milijard evrov, da reši evroobmočje. Slovenija bo kot članica evroobmočja sodelovala pri tej triletni sanaciji grških financ s 387 milijoni evrov, čeprav ekonomisti opozarjajo, da rešitev tega vprašanja ne bo mogoča brez odpisa dolgov. Tako bodo grško vprašanje reševali delavci v Sloveniji in Slovaški s povprečnimi bruto mesečnimi zasluškami 1203 evrov oziroma 529 evrov proti 1651 evrov povprečnega bruto mesečnega zasluška v Grčiji (sic!) (podatki so za leto 2006 v *Labour market statistics*, <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu>).

2010⁵⁵ povečalo na skoraj 100.000. V statističnem pogledu pa je Slovenija s 6,2-odstotno stopnjo nezaposlenosti še vedno krepko pod povprečjem EU 27⁵⁶ z 9,6-odstotno nezaposlenostjo.

Energetska odvisnost Slovenije je bila leta 2008 kar 55,3-odstotna. Leta 2008 je vrednost uvoza cestnih vozil znašala 2,856 milijarde, nafte in naftnih derivatov 2,231 milijarde, železa in jekla 1,357 milijarde, električnih strojev in naprav 1,264 milijarde, industrijskih strojev za splošno rabo pa 1,040 milijarde evrov. Od celotne vrednosti uvoza, ki je leta 2008 dosegla 23,046 milijarde evrov ali 62 odstotkov BDP, je bila pokritost uvoza z izvozom 86-odstotna.

Ne glede na navedeno statistiko, ki s slovenskega vidika ni najbolj spodbudna, v primerjavi z EU pa še povsem vzdržna, je Slovenija maja 2010 uspešno končala pristopni proces za članstvo v OECD⁵⁷, v klub gospodarsko najbolj razvitih držav. Pristopni proces za članstvo v tej prestižni mednarodni gospodarski organizaciji s sedežem v Parizu je začela leta 2007⁵⁸. Slovenija mora začeti iskati svoje priložnosti v razvoju, znanju, družbi znanja in raziskavah ter razvoju. Na tem področju sta tako Slovenija kot tudi celotna EU še zelo daleč od uresničitve lizbonske strategije, ki govori o treh odstotkih sredstev BDP za raziskave in razvoj. Nova strategija Evropa 2020 določa, naj se za raziskave in razvoj namenijo trije odstotki BDP, in sicer odstotek iz javnih sredstev in dva iz zasebnih. Po podatkih Eurostata je bil leta 2008 slovenski delež javnih sredstev 0,55 odstotka BDP, povprečje EU pa 0,72 odstotka. Po besedah pristojnega ministra naj bi se ta delež leta 2009 povečal na 0,74 odstotka, leta 2010 pa na 0,85 odstotka BDP. Leta 2007 je bila Slovenija z deležem 1,45 odstotka porabljenih sredstev za raziskave in razvoj od ciljnih treh odstotkov oddaljena za več kot sto odstotkov. Cilj treh odstotkov sta leta 2007 v EU presegli le Švedska in Finska s 3,6 oziroma 3,47 odstotka. Povprečje celotne EU je leta 2007 znašalo zgolj 1,85 odstotka BDP, kar je bilo še vedno zelo daleč od ciljnih lizbonskih zavez oziroma od statistike partnerjev ali konkurentov. Samo delež Kitajske, ki je znašal 1,44 odstotka BDP, je bil manjši, medtem ko je delež ZDA znašal 2,67 odstotka, Južne Koreje (za 2006) tri odstotke in Japonske (za 2006) 3,4 odstotka.

⁵⁵ Slovenija v številkah 2009, SURS ter www.stat.si.

⁵⁶ Po podatkih Eurostata iz januarja 2010.

⁵⁷ Estonija, Izrael in Slovenija so povabilo za članstvo v OECD prejeli 10. maja 2010. OECD je tri nove članice, zdaj jih je (bo) skupaj 34, sprejel na slovesnosti ob ministrskem zasedanju sveta organizacije 27. maja 2010 v Parizu, Slovenija pa je z OECD sporazum o pristopu podpisala 1. junija v Ljubljani, (www.sta.si).

⁵⁸ Organizacija za gospodarsko sodelovanje in razvoj združuje 31 (20 ustanovnih) držav, ki jih zaznamujeta predvsem demokratični pluralizem in odprto gospodarstvo. Organizacija je bila leta 1948 ustanovljena kot Organizacija za evropsko gospodarsko sodelovanje (ang. Organisation for European Economic Co-operation – OEEC) ter se decembra 1960 preimenovala v Organizacijo za gospodarsko sodelovanje in razvoj (ang. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – OECD). OECD zbira podatke, spremlja trende, jih analizira in pripravlja napovedi gospodarskega razvoja, raziskuje socialne spremembe in razvija modele na različnih področjih, na primer v trgovini, okolju itn. Že več kot 40 let je najmočnejši in najzanesljivejši vir za primerljive statistike ter ekonomske in socialne podatke.

4 GEOPOLITIČNI IZZIVI 21. STOLETJA

Geoekonomski dejavniki postajajo vse pomembnejši. Kljub njihovem pomenu in proučevanju ne gre zanemariti pomena tradicionalnega razumevanja prostora, kajti v prihodnje bo ustrezno pozornost treba nameniti tako geoekonomskim dejavnikom kot tudi prostoru, kot so ga razumeli nekateri klasiki. Razprava o prihodnjih geopolitičnih izzivih pa je vedno svojevrsten izziv nakazovanja prihodnjih zelo kompleksnih in prepletenih teženj na globalni ter regionalni ravni ali ravni posamične države. V Sloveniji je bil začetek 21. stoletja zaznamovan z implementacijo ključnih (geo)strateških ciljev ter vključitvijo v Nato in Evropsko unijo (slika 4). Slovenski prehod iz najbolj razvite nekdanje jugoslovanske republike proti povprečju razvitosti EU je potekal sorazmerno gladko. Pika na i je bilo uspešno predsedovanje Svetu EU, »/.../ EU, ki s svojo prepleteno institucionalno strukturo manjšim državam zagotavlja privlačen okvir za obvladovanje lastne majhnosti v mednarodnem okolju – po eni strani jim ponuja možnost soodločanja o zadevah, ki bi jih brez vključenosti v evropski sistem težko obvladovale, po drugi pa odpira možnosti, da cilje uresničujejo z zaledjem moči ostalih držav« (Zupančič, 2004: 183). Velikost je pomembna, ponuja tako prednosti kot slabosti. V okolju večjega števila manjših držav, kar EU nedvomno je, je treba iskati predvsem priložnosti, kajti tudi »za ekonomsko teorijo je pomen velikosti države za njeno gospodarsko učinkovitost manj aktualno vprašanje kot pred nekaj desetletji. V današnjih razmerah sorazmerno proste svetovne trgovine je lahko vsaka država ne glede na velikost gospodarstva učinkovita, kar je odvisno le od njene učinkovitosti pri izrabi naravnih, kapitalskih in človeških virov ter od njene zunajtrgovinske odprtosti« (Damijan, 1996: 190). Tudi večji poudarek izobraževanju, predvsem tehnični izobrazbi⁵⁹ ter raziskavam in razvoju, je bil namenjen temu, vendar je želja priti v sredino ali celo zgornjo tretjino razvoja EU trčila ob čeri gospodarske krize, ko se je BDP v Sloveniji skrčil skoraj za dvakrat bolj kot povprečno v EU. Vendar cilj mora ostati in ostaja družba znanja v ekonomiji znanja. »Natančno definicijo ekonomije znanja je težko opredeliti, ampak na splošno se nanaša na ekonomijo, v kateri ideje, informacije in oblike znanja podpirajo inovacije in gospodarsko rast. V tem okolju delujejo tudi sodobne organizacije in korporacije, ki so se za konkuriranje v globalnih okoljih ustrezno prilagodile ter postale bolj prilagodljive in manj hierarhične« (Giddens, 2001).

⁵⁹ Odstotek prebivalstva v višjo ali visoko stopnjo izobrazbe se je postopno povečeval, in sicer: s 3,3 % leta 1971 na 6 leta 1981, na 8,9 leta 1991 in na 13 % leta 2002 (www.stat.si); vendar bi bilo treba skrajšati čas študija, izboljšati kakovost ter spremeniti razmerje med družboslovnimi ter naravoslovnimi in tehničnimi diplomanti, seveda v korist slednjih. Leta 2004 je bilo razmerje med enimi in drugimi v EU 25 : 1,5, v Sloveniji pa visoko razmerje 2,5 v korist družboslovcev, v Litvi in na Madžarskem celo 4,2 oz. 3,9. Zgledovati bi se morali po Švedski z razmerjem 0,8 ali Nemčiji z 0,9. V razmerju med družboslovci in naravoslovci pa je bila Slovenija celo najslabša z razmerjem 12,6, medtem ko je imela Grčija razmerje le 1,9 v korist družboslovcev. Resolucija o nacionalnem programu visokega šolstva Republike Slovenije 2007–2010 (ReNPVS), Uradni list RS, št. 94/07.

Na globalni ravni je sodobno varnostno okolje pod vplivom spremenjenih varnostnih okoliščin in globalizacije – soodvisnosti in neslutenege razvoja informacijske tehnologije. Poljudno in postmoderno geopolitiko je dodatno zaznamovalo soočanje z grožnjo globalnega terorizma oziroma z *vojno proti terorizmu*⁶⁰. Ta izraz so ZDA začele uporabljati po 11. septembru 2001, prevzele pa so ga številne države, vključno z Veliko Britanijo. Na splošno so bile evropske države zelo skeptične do tega termina, tudi Slovenija, ki je upravičeno zadržala »kritično distanco«. Terorizem je varnostna grožnja, kaznivo dejanje, ki mora biti ustrezno obravnavano s kazenskega vidika, medtem ko v ZDA predstavlja grožnjo nacionalni varnosti, kar pomeni, da se z njim sooča z vsemi sredstvi, vključno z vojsko. Velika Britanija se je leta 2007 javno odločila, da ne bo več uporabljala izraza vojna proti terorizmu. Izraz je na začetku leta 2009 v tišini odšel v zgodovino tudi v ZDA, seveda pa ne tudi grožnja terorizma⁶¹.

Grožnja terorizma je le eden izmed številnih virov ogrožanja in tveganja na različnih ravneh, od posameznika do nadvladanih organizacij in globalnega okolja. Pri soočanju z različnimi grožnjami je treba ustrezno pozornost nameniti tudi *mehki moči*, moči, ki prvotno temelji na treh virih: kulturi (načinu, kako privlačiš druge), političnih vrednotah (ki jih živiš doma in na tujem) in zunanji politiki (ki je zaznana kot legitimna in moralna). Trdna in mehka moč včasih krepi druga drugo, včasih pa si nasprotujeta. Zmožnost deliti informacije, ki jim je mogoče verjeti, postaja močan vir privlačnosti in moči. Mehka moč (*ang. soft power*) je bolj družbeni in ekonomski stranski produkt kot pa le rezultat načrtnega delovanja vlad. Neprofitne organizacije s takšno mehko močjo lahko otežijo ali ovirajo vladne poskuse, prav tako lahko nosilci popularne kulture (filmi, pevci, mediji ipd.) pomagajo vladnim prizadevanjem v tej smeri ali jih otežijo (Nye, 2004)⁶². Nadgrajeni koncept kombinirane in uravnotežene uporabe trde in mehke moči je modra uporaba moči (Nye, 2008). V sodobnem varnostnem okolju je *modra moč* (*ang. smart power*) pomemben instrument posameznih držav in organizacij, ki se soočajo z izzivi in tveganji na globalni ravni.

4.1 Globalni viri ogrožanja in tveganja

Po vključitvi Slovenije v Nato in EU so slovenske priložnosti in obveznosti postale tudi skupne zavezniške grožnje in tveganja na eni strani ter vzajemna pomoč in delitev bremen na drugi. Tako Nato kot tudi Evropska unija in ne nazadnje vsaka izmed držav članic poskušajo opredeliti vire ogrožanja in tveganja. Proces sprejemanja dokumentov, ki jih opredeljujejo, soočanje z njimi, merjenje uspešnosti in implementacija zapisanega je proces, ki se nikoli ne konča, pa naj to velja za Nato, EU ali Slovenijo.

⁶⁰ *Global War on Terror – GWOT.*

⁶¹ *Še leta 2008 je terorizem v letni oceni ogroženosti, ki jo poda nacionalni obveščevalni direktor (ang. Director of National Intelligence) pred pristojnim telesom v senatu, predstavljal največjo grožnjo ZDA. Največja grožnja so leta 2009 postale globalna ekonomska kriza (ang. Global Economic Crisis) in leta 2010 daljnosežne posledice kibernetične grožnje (ang. far-reaching Impact of the Cyber Threat) (glej <http://www.dni.gov/>).*

⁶² *Prijubljeni izrek, ki resnično prikazuje zgoraj navedeno, je: osvojiti je treba srca in misli (ang. hearts and minds). Vojna v Iraku je bila bleščeča vojaška zmaga z uporabo vojaške moči, ki pa ni bila dovolj podkrepjena z uporabo mehke moči. V nadaljevanju vojne srca in misli niso bili osvojeni in zdaj se spet z vojaško močjo ob podpori mehke moči poskuša doseči ugoden rezultat.*

Nato je v svojem *strateškem konceptu*⁶³ jasno opredelil, da je po washingtonski pogodbi glavni in trajni namen zveze varovanje svobode in varnosti vseh članic s političnimi in z vojaškimi sredstvi. Nato si že od začetka prizadeva in si bo še naprej prizadeval za zavarovanje pravičnega in trajnega miru v Evropi, ki temelji na skupnih demokratičnih vrednotah, človekovih pravicah in pravni državi. Ta cilj bi lahko ogrozili krize in spopadi, ki vplivajo na varnost v evroatlantskem prostoru (tč. 6). »Temeljno načelo, ki vodi zvezo Nato pri delu, je namreč skupna zavezanost in sodelovanje med suverenimi državami v podporo nedeljivosti varnosti vseh njenih članic« (tč. 8). Ker je dokument star več kot desetletje, sprejelo pa ga je zavezništvo z 19 članicami, so predsedniki vlad in držav članic Nata na vrhu Strasbourg/Kehl leta 2009 generalnega sekretarja zadolžili, da do konca leta 2010 pripravi nov strateški koncept⁶⁴ zveze.

Novi koncept bo sprejelo 28 držav članic, dokument pa mora upoštevati ne samo spremenjene varnostne izzive s poudarkom na proliferaciji, propadlih državah, piratstvu, energetskih zalogah, terorizmu in podnebnih spremembah, temveč tudi, kako se je Nato v zadnjem desetletju prilagodil in preoblikoval za boljše soočanje s temi izzivi⁶⁵.

S podobnimi varnostnimi izzivi kot Nato se sooča tudi EU. Izzivi EU, zapisani v varnostni strategiji EU Varna Evropa v boljšem svetu, so bili sprejeti leta 2003. V praksi se je znotraj struktur EU, v okviru tako imenovanega drugega stebra zagotavljanja skupne evropske varnostne in obrambne politike, s tem področjem ukvarjal generalni sekretar oziroma visoki predstavnik⁶⁶. Leta 2009 je Evropski parlament kot nadgradnjo evropske varnostne strategije in številnih drugih dokumentov sprejel Resolucijo o evropski varnostni strategiji ter evropski varnostni in obrambni politiki. Evropski parlament v točki 23 ugotavlja, da je evropska varnostna strategija iz leta 2003 opozorila na osrednje grožnje za Evropsko unijo (terorizem, širjenje orožja za množično uničevanje, regionalni konflikti, propad države in organizirani kriminal) ter opredelila strateške cilje, ki so postali podlaga za podstrategije, v točki 24 pa odobrava prejem poročil o številnih varnostnih izzivih, kot so kibernetika varnost, zanesljiva oskrba z energijo, vključno z oskrbo Evrope, nerešeni regionalni spori v sosesčini EU, izzivi na afriški celine, posledice podnebnih sprememb, tekmovanje za naravne vire, projekti za

⁶³ *Strateški koncept (ang. the Strategic Concept), prvič objavljen leta 1991, dopolnjen in sprejet 23. in 24. aprila 1999.*

⁶⁴ *Delo je poveril skupini strokovnjakov pod vodstvom nekdanje zunanje ministrice ZDA Madeleine K. Albright.*

⁶⁵ *Vse o novem strateškem konceptu in skupini strokovnjakov pod vodstvom nekdanje zunanje ministrice ZDA Madeleine K. Albright na <http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/what-is-strategic-concept.html>. Skupina dvanajstih strokovnjakov je 17. maja 2010 svoje delo zaokrožila s poročilom oziroma analizo z naslovom NATO 2020: zagotovljena varnost; dinamična angažiranost.*

⁶⁶ *Javier Solana je to funkcijo opravljal kot visoki predstavnik za skupno zunanjo in varnostno politiko EU ter kot generalni sekretar Sveta EU in WEU od oktobra 1999 do decembra 2009. Skladno z Lizbonsko pogodbo je Catherine Ashton postala de facto zunanja ministrica EU. Uradno je torej od 1. decembra 2009 visoka predstavnica za zunanje zadeve in varnostno politiko ter od februarja 2010 tudi podpredsednica Evropske komisije.*

krepitev civilnih in vojaških zmogljivosti, pomen vesolja za skupno varnost ter pomorska varnost.

Na začetku leta 2010, 25. februarja, so notranji ministri držav članic EU sprejeli Strategijo notranje varnosti v EU: proti modelu evropske varnosti⁶⁷, ki določa skupne grožnje in izzive, zaradi katerih je vse bolj pomembno, da se države članice in institucije EU skupaj lotijo novih izzivov, ki presegajo nacionalne, dvostranske ali regionalne zmogljivosti. Opredeljen je model evropske varnosti s skupnimi instrumenti in zavezanostjo dopolnjujočemu se odnosu med varnostjo, svobodo in zasebnostjo. Posebej je izpostavljen pomen povezanosti med notranjo in zunanjo varnostjo. Kot skupne grožnje in glavni izzivi za notranjo varnost EU so navedeni terorizem v vseh oblikah, huda kazniva dejanja in organizirani kriminal, kibernetika kriminaliteta, čezmejni kriminal, nasilje ter naravne nesreče in nesreče, ki jih povzroči človek. Z izzivi EU in Nata se je precej uspešno spopadla tudi Slovenija v novi Strategiji nacionalne varnosti.

Slovenija je v ReSNV (poglavje 4) opredelila, da se viri ogrožanja in tveganja nacionalne varnosti Republike Slovenije z vidika porekla pojavljajo na globalni, nadnacionalni in nacionalni ravni. Za *globalne vire* ogrožanja in tveganja je poleg globalnega porekla in univerzalno-lokalnih posledic njihovega delovanja značilno, da zaradi svojega multiplikatorskega značaja vplivajo na nastanek drugih varnostnih groženj in tveganj ter hkrati povečujejo njihove učinke in posledice. Med te vire spadajo zlasti podnebne spremembe, finančna, gospodarska in socialna tveganja ter krizna žarišča. *Nadnacionalni viri* ogrožanja in tveganja nacionalne varnosti imajo transnacionalno poreklo in čezmejne razsežnosti. Med te vire ogrožanja in tveganja spadajo predvsem terorizem, nedovoljene dejavnosti na področju konvencionalnega orožja in orožja za množično uničevanje ter jedrske tehnologije, organizirani kriminal, nezakonite migracije, kibernetike grožnje ter zloraba informacijskih tehnologij in sistemov, dejavnost tujih obveščevalnih služb in vojaške grožnje. *Nacionalni viri* ogrožanja in tveganja nacionalne varnosti so po izvoru povezani z dogajanjem ter pojavi v nacionalnem okolju, mednje pa spadajo predvsem ogrožanje javne varnosti, naravne in druge nesreče, omejenost naravnih virov in degradacija življenjskega okolja, zdravstveno-epidemiološke grožnje ter nekateri dejavniki negotovosti.

Ključnega pomena za soočanje z grožnjami in tveganji je ustrezno financiranje institucij, ki se z njimi spoprijemajo. Obrambni sistem je le eden izmed nacionalnovarnostnih podsistemov, ki so še posebno na udaru. Slovenija se je namreč zavezala Natu, da bo zagotovila dva odstotka obrambnih izdatkov za

⁶⁷ Oblikovanje evropskega modela varnosti na <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/sl/10/st05/st05842-re02.sl10.pdf>.

svoje potrebe⁶⁸. Dejstvo je, da ta politična zaveza še dolgo ne bo uresničena⁶⁹ in Slovenija pri tem ni nobena izjema. Številne države članice se v obdobju gospodarske krize najlažje odpovedo delu obrambnih stroškov. Seveda ni mogoče govoriti o demilitarizaciji v Evropi, vsekakor pa je na mestu Kaganova⁷⁰ prispevka iz obdobja druge iraške vojne, da smo Evropejci z Venere, Američani pa z Marsa, še posebno, če to ocenjujemo v luči dogajanj v Afganistanu, kjer Nato sodeluje v bojnih operacijah. Le malo držav članic omogoča pripadnikom svojih vojsk, da sodelujejo v operacijah brez tako imenovanih nacionalnih omejitev in Slovenija pri tem ni nobena izjema.

4.2 Slovenski izzivi v obdobju globalizacije

Slovenija je v prvem desetletju 21. stoletja s polnimi pljuči zadihala kot članica EU in Nata. Simbolični trenutek nedvomno predstavlja predsedovanje Svetu Evropske unije. Pri tej pomembni nalogi, ki jo je Republika Slovenija opravljala v prvi polovici leta 2008, je sodelovalo 2720 slovenskih javnih uslužbencev, 133 zunanjih strokovnjakov in 245 študentov. Med predsedovanjem je bilo izpeljanih več kot 8000 dogodkov: 283 jih je bilo v Sloveniji, 3285 v Bruslju in 4242 drugod po svetu⁷¹. Ob tej statistiki je treba dodati, da se je teh dogodkov udeležila vrsta najpomembnejših svetovnih voditeljev. Tako je bila Slovenija tudi *de facto* prvič v svoji zgodovini uvrščena na oder svetovne zgodovine. Za majhno, mlado državo, s kratko demokratično tradicijo je bil to njen trenutek v zgodovini.

Slovenci smo vedno dobro razumeli, da članstvo poleg ugodnosti prinaša tudi obveznosti. V Natu je Slovenija namreč ena izmed članic, ki prispevajo najvišji delež pripadnikov svojih oboroženih sil v mednarodnih operacijah in na misijah. Od leta 1997 so pripadniki Slovenske vojske sodelovali v 18 operacijah ali na misijah v okviru Nata, OZN, EU in OVSE. Sodelovanje Slovenske vojske v operacijah kriznega odzivanja je njena stalna naloga in ima 12-letno tradicijo. Slovenska vojska je do zdaj delovala v 18 operacijah in na misijah v 15 državah na treh celinah. Po podatkih iz leta 2008 je večina pripadnikov SV oziroma 86 odstotkov sodelovalo v Natovih operacijah. Geografsko jih je bilo največ oziroma 66 odstotkov na Balkanu (Furlan, 2009). V nekem trenutku je z delovanjem bataljona v Kforju na Kosovu Slovenska vojska v tujini delovala hkrati z več kot sedmimi odstotki celotne stalne sestave, kar je nedvomno impresivno število.

⁶⁸ Obrambni izdatki so leta 2008, ko naj bi prvič znašali 2 % BDP, bili 1,52, % ter leta 2009 1,63 %. Na podlagi finančnih gibanj iz pomladanske napovedi 2010 sprejeti predlog OI za leto 2010 znaša 1,65 % in 1,61 % za leto 2011 (<http://www.mors.si/fileadmin/mors/pdf/dokumenti/SPOR2009.pdf>). Toda z vidika splošnega gospodarskega položaja v Sloveniji in že najavljenih rebalansov proračuna leta 2010 je bilo realno pričakovati, da bo OI znašal približno 1,5 % BDP.

⁶⁹ Ministrstvo za obrambo iz svojega proračuna financira še podsistem zaščite in reševanja z realizacijo leta 2009 v višini dobrih 38 milijonov EUR, ki se ne šteje v obrambne izdatke. Se pa v obrambne izdatke štejejo stroški (vojaških) pokojnin, približno 59 milijonov EUR, in stroški delovanja podsistema civilne obrambe.

⁷⁰ Kagan, R., 2003, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

⁷¹ Glej http://www.eu2008.si/si/News_and_Documents/Press_Releases/June/0630UKOMstevilkePEU.html.

Še na začetku devetdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja je Slovenija imela naborniško vojsko, ki je skupaj z rezervo štela 60.000 pripadnikov. V procesu preoblikovanja Slovenske vojske v smeri polne profesionalizacije ta zdaj šteje 9212 pripadnikov, od tega 82 odstotkov stalne sestave in 18 odstotkov pogodbene rezerve⁷². Skladno s strateškimi dokumenti je ciljno stanje še vedno 14.000 pripadnikov, od tega 8500 pripadnikov stalne in 5500 pripadnikov rezervne sestave⁷³. Slovenska vojska ostaja zavezana opravljanju nalog v okviru nacionalne obrambe, čeprav večji del njenih odgovornosti obsega opravljanje nalog v sistemu kolektivne obrambe. Slovenija je še vedno del južноеvropskega vojskovališča, ki povezuje Italijo z Madžarsko in Hrvaško ter prek Romunije in Ukrajine s Črnim morjem, vendar pa ta vojaška dimenzija prostora mogoče ni več tako (sic!) pomembna, kot je bila v preteklosti.

S prometnega in energetskega vidika je treba poudariti, da je slovenski prostor tranzitno križišče V. in X. evropskega koridorja⁷⁴ ter jadransko-jonske transverzale. Slovenija predstavlja vrata – logistično izhodišče za srednjo in jugovzhodno Evropo, predvideno pa je tudi sodelovanje pri energetskem projektu Južni tok⁷⁵, ki naj bi prek ozemlja Slovenije potekal proti Italiji. Zaradi povečanih stikov z Azijo in njenega pomena za Evropo bi bilo smiselno okrepljeno sodelovanje ključnih jadranskih pristanišč (Koper, Trst in Reka) v trgovini z Azijo. Ali je to tudi realno, bo pokazal čas, kajti izkušnje bolj kot ne vzbujajo resen dvom glede te možnosti. Kaj pomeni slovenski oziroma celotni severni Jadran ter Jadran nasploh v obdobju integracije EU za Slovenijo in Evropo zdaj in v razumnem roku naslednjih 20 do 30 let z vidika pomorskega in z morjem povezanega gospodarstva (na primer delovanja Luke Koper, pomorskega prometa, turizma, ribištva, športov na vodi, šolanja kadrov za pomorstvo itn.), so vprašanja, ki bi jim v prihodnje bilo treba nameniti ustrezno pozornost.

⁷² Podatki za marec 2010, <http://www.slovenskavojska.si/o-slovenski-vojski/>.

⁷³ Točka 6.2. Resolucije o splošnem dolgoročnem programu razvoja in opremljanja Slovenske vojske (ReDPROSV), Uradni list RS, št. 89/04. Dokument je že razmeroma zastarel, zato lahko kmalu pričakujemo njegove spremembe. Pričakovati je, da bo v prihodnje številčno stanje pripadnikov SV bližje današnjemu kot pa številu, navedenemu v ReDPROSV.

⁷⁴ Na drugi panevropski transportni konferenci na Kreti marca 1994 je bilo opredeljenih deset panevropskih prometnih koridorjev. Določajo se poti v srednjo in vzhodno Evropo, ki v prihodnjih desetih do petnajstih letih potrebujejo velike investicije. Koridor V, ki je dolg 1600 km oz. 994 milj ter obsega tri manjše krake (glej, www.corridor5.org), poteka od zahoda proti vzhodu (od Italije do Ukrajine) v glavni smeri Benetke–Trst/Koper–Ljubljana–Maribor–Budimpešta–Uzhgorod–Lvov–Kijev. Koridor X (sever-jug; Avstrija–Grčija) ima glavno smer Salzburg–Ljubljana–Zagreb–Beograd–Niš–Skopje–Veles–Solun ter obsega štiri manjše krake (<http://www.unece.org/trans/main/ter/Countries/PanEuCorridors.html>).

⁷⁵ Gospodarska ministra Slovenije in Rusije, Matej Lahovnik in Sergej Šmatko, sta ob navzočnosti predsednikov vlad obeh držav, Boruta Pahorja in Vladimirja Putina, v Moskvi 14. novembra 2009 podpisala sporazum o sodelovanju pri gradnji in uporabi plinovoda Južni tok v Sloveniji. Ob tem je Putin poudaril, da je Rusija sporazum o plinovodu Južni tok zdaj podpisala z vsemi evropskimi partnerji, ki so potrebni za projekt. Plinovod Južni tok naj bi začel delovati leta 2015, ko naj bi plin dobili tudi slovenski odjemalci. Kot zadnja je k projektu aprila 2010 pristopila Avstrija, tako da so zdaj podpisani vsi zahtevani dokumenti med Rusijo na eni strani ter med Avstrijo, Bolgarijo, Grčijo, Hrvaško, Italijo, Slovenijo, Srbijo in Madžarsko na drugi strani. Konec trase delno konkurenčnega projekta Nabucco, ki bi povezal Srednjo Azijo, Zakavkazje in Turčijo z EU, je predviden v Avstriji, trasa pa bi (bo) potekala po državah (jugo)vzhodno od Slovenije.

Prihodnji izzivi, s katerimi se bo soočila Slovenija in na katere odgovorov še nimamo, so naslednji: kako odpraviti visoko stopnjo brezposelnosti, vse večje zadolževanje države in prebivalstva, zdravstveni in pokojninski sistem, ki ju dolgoročno v sedanji obliki ne bo mogoče vzdrževati, in nizka demografska rast – 1,3 otroka na mater je ena najnižjih stopenj v Evropi. Demografske projekcije kažejo, da bo leta 2060 prebivalstva v Sloveniji le še 1,8 milijona, delež starejših od 65 let se bo do leta 2050 podvojil, torej na več kot 30 odstotkov. Na podlagi javnomnenjskih raziskav se velika večina slovenskega prebivalstva počuti varno, tako meni 82 odstotkov; velika večina anketirancev meni, da nacionalno varnost najbolj ogrožajo mamila, prometne nesreče, nezaposlenost, kriminal itn. Kot zanimivost je treba poudariti, da je raziskava Nacionalna in mednarodna varnost 2003⁷⁶ potekala v času po terorističnih napadih v ZDA, vendar Slovenci tega v anketah niso navedli kot grožnjo svoji varnosti. V Sloveniji velika geopolitična in geostrateška vprašanja niso področja, s katerimi bi se ukvarjali naši državljani, kljub temu pa velja našo pozornost nameniti tudi globalnim vidikom, ki se jim Slovenija kot odprta družba in ekonomija ne more izogniti.

5 MOŽNI GEOSTRATEŠKI SCENARIJI DO OBDOBJA 2020–2025


Znanstveniki in strokovnjaki si niso povsem enotni v tem, kdo izgublja ali je že izgubil status velike sile in kdo pridobiva status te vrste. V Dussouyevem svetovnem sistemu med unipolarnostjo in neredom (slika 4) je nova svetovna os zelo »kruta« do EU, saj jo izloča s te osi. Omenja trajajočo marginalizacijo Evrope, Afriko pa še naprej izključuje iz svetovne igre. Novo svetovno os sestavljajo: ZDA, Kitajska, Indija in Rusija (Dussouy, 2010: 148–149). Malo za šalo in malo zares lahko rečemo, da imamo os samo dveh. Neologizem *Chimerica*, ki sta ga konec leta 2006 skovala zgodovinar Niall Ferguson in ekonomist Moritz Schularick, poudarja prepletenost⁷⁷ obeh gospodarstev in ogromne kitajske rezerve dolarjev⁷⁸ ter išče del krivde za globalno gospodarsko krizo tudi v tem razmerju.

⁷⁶ Na <http://nato.gov.si/slo/javno-mnenje/nacionalna-varnost.pdf>. Stopnja občutka varnosti ostaja med prebivalstvom Slovenije visoka, kajti varno ali zelo varno se počuti 81 odstotkov prebivalcev. To je pokazala javnomnenjska raziskava o ocenah in stališčih prebivalcev RS o delu policije za leto 2008, ki jo je izvedla Fakulteta za uporabne družbene študije v Novi Gorici, <http://www.mnz.gov.si/nc/si/splosno/cns/novica/article/12027/6240/>.

⁷⁷ Razmerje, ki ga Ferguson opiše kot razmerje med velikim varčevalcem in velikim potrošnikom (na <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/16/AR2008111601736.html>).

⁷⁸ Leta 2009 je imela Kitajska za več kot dva trilijona ameriških dolarjev rezerv, z verjetnostjo, da se povečajo na štiri trilijone v naslednjih petih do desetih letih in, kot pravi Rogoff (2009), takrat si Kitajska ne želi pričakati krize dolarja s štirimi trilijoni denarja v vreči.

Slika 4:
Konfiguracija
sodobnega
svetovnega
sistema (med
unipolarnostjo
in neredom)



Vir: Dussouy, 2010: 149.

Cohen je bolj prizanesljiv, ko pravi, da se je v obdobju po drugi svetovni vojni, v času dvoblokovskega sistema in po njegovem razpadu, do danes oblikovalo pet velikih sil: ZDA, EU, Rusija, Kitajska in Japonska (slika 5). To razmerje se je v prvi četrtini 21. stoletja dodatno razporedilo tako, da sta se petim akterjem pridružili še Brazilija in Indija. Območja notranjih konfliktov so se preselila iz Vzhodne Evrope in nekdanje Sovjetske zveze na Indonezijo in Centralno Azijo. Prav tako so se spremenile vloge oziroma območja *pasa razbitin* (ang. *Shatter Belt*), *območja pritiska* (ang. *Compression Zone*) in *vrat* (ang. *Gateway Region*)⁷⁹ (Cohen, 2010: 157–164). V zvezi s tem se samo po sebi postavlja vprašanje, ali je Organizacija združenih narodov kot ključna globalna institucija, ki povezuje vse države in kontinente, odsev te nove realnosti. Kljub številnim naporom se struktura Varnostnega sveta ni prilagodila temu, tako brez sedeža ostajajo Indija, kot druga največja država na svetu, ter Južna Amerika in Japonska. Da pa nihče resno ne razmišlja o članici z afriške celine, samo potrjuje tezo, da Afrika ostaja zunaj globalne igre.

⁷⁹ Geopolitične strukture so večinoma organizirane na podlagi naslednjih hierarhično opredeljenih prostorskih ravneh:


geostrateška sfera – najbolj obsežna raven oz. makroraven;

geopolitična regija – podrazdelitev sfere, ki predstavlja srednjo raven ali mezoraven;

nacionalne države, kvazi države ter teritorialna podrazdelitev znotraj držav in med njimi, ki predstavljajo najnižjo raven ali mikroraven.

⁸⁰ *razdelitev ne vključuje regij ali grozdov držav zunaj sfer ali regionalnih okvirov. V tem primeru pas razbitin pomeni regije, ki jih razjedajo notranji konflikti, njihovo drobljenje pa še dodatno pospešujejo tuja posredovanja in tekmujoče sfere, Območje pritiska se trga zaradi notranjih nasprotij ali vmešavanja sosednjih držav, vrata pa služijo kot mostišča med sferami, regijami in državami (Cohen, 2003: 33).*

Slika 5:
Svetovni
geopolitični
zemljevid v
prvi četrtini 21.
stoletja



Vir: Cohen, 2010: 163.

Po drugi strani cvetijo razmišljanja in argumenti v prid zamislim o 21. stoletju kot azijskem stoletju, stoletju vzpona Vzhoda in zatona Zahoda. Govorimo torej o povečevanju pomena vloge ene sfere in zmanjševanju pomena druge ter v povezavi s tem o učinkih na *mezo* in *mikro* ravni. Argumenti temeljijo na nekaterih eksplicitnih empiričnih kazalnikih, ki ob dobri interpretaciji zvenijo zelo prepričljivo. Mahbubani (2008) pravi, da bodo do leta 2050 tri od štirih največjih svetovnih gospodarstev azijska⁸⁰: Kitajska, Indija in Japonska. Število prebivalcev v zahodnem svetu pada, medtem ko v Aziji narašča, število azijskih študentov na tehničnih fakultetah narašča, medtem ko na Zahodu pada itn. Azija želi Zahod posnemati, ne pa nadvladati, vendar bo Zahod začel deliti oblast z Azijo, bodisi v IMF, Svetovni banki (SB), G-7⁸¹ ali Varnostnem svetu OZN. Mahbubani razvoj v 21. stoletju prikaže skozi tri scenarije, ki jih poimenuje azijski pohod v sodobnost, umik v trdnjavo in zmagoslavje Zahoda. Slednjega označi za najmanj verjetnega, v prvem pa vidi največjo možnost in priložnost za skupno sodelovanje in upravljanje sveta med Azijo ter Zahodom na enakopravni podlagi. Če so bila devetdeseta leta prejšnjega stoletja zaznamovana z zmago Zahoda in koncem zgodovine, kot jo je opredelil Fukujama, bo prihodnost azijska. Ali bo prihodnost

⁸⁰ V prvem stoletju našega štetja je bil obseg azijskega BDP 76,3 % globalnega BDP in evropski 10,8 %, leta 1000 je evropski delež padel na 8,7 % in azijski na 70,3 %. V obdobju industrijske revolucije je začel evropski delež naraščati, azijski pa padati. Leta 1820 je znašal delež Zahodne Evrope 23,6 % globalnega BDP, azijski pa se je zmanjšal na 59,2 %, skupni delež ZDA, Kanade, Avstralije in Nove Zelandije pa je 1,9 %. Njihov delež je leta 1998 znašal več kot 25 % globalnega BDP, delež Zahodne Evrope je bil 20,6 % in Azije zgolj 37,2 % (Mahbubani, 2008: 51). Razmerje se bo v prihodnje nedvomno obrnilo (se obrača) ponovno v korist Azije. Kot primer naj navedem samo en kazalnik: med svetovno gospodarsko krizo se je leta 2009 BDP EU zmanjšal za 4,2 %, ZDA za 2,4 % in Japonske za 5,2 %, BDP Kitajske se je povečal za 8,7 % in Indije za 6,7 %. Z rastjo 9 % leta 2008 je Kitajska prispevala 20 % rasti globalnega gospodarstva.

⁸¹ Leta 2009 se je več kot o G-7 (G-8) govorilo o G-20. Globalna ekonomska kriza je bila glavna tema voditeljev 20 največjih ekonomij z vseh celin (19 držav in EU), ki skupaj ustvarijo 85 % globalnega BDP, 80 % trgovine in obsegajo dve tretjini prebivalstva.

v znamenju »vzpona preostalih« (ang. *the Rise of the Rest*), pri čemer imamo v mislih predvsem Azijo s tremi milijardami prebivalcev, kjer smo bili v preteklosti priče ekonomskemu čudežem? Vpliv v ključnih mednarodnih organizacijah se mora spremeniti, ključne organizacije se morajo spremeniti ali zlomiti (Overholt, 2009: 15–18). Zelo jasno zahtevo po spremembah v VS OZN, IMF in SB ter po »novem svetovnem redu« je ponovno na svojem drugem vrhu v Braziliji aprila 2010 izpostavila četverica vzhajajočih velesil, imenovana BRIK⁸².

S svojo prihodnjo vlogo se ukvarja tudi največja »regionalna« varnostna organizacija z globalnim dosegom. Nato je z namenom krepitev našega razumevanja prihodnjih groženj Zavezništvu s pomočjo natančne analize prihodnjih varnostnih izzivov izvedel *Projekt mnogovrstnih prihodnosti* (ang. *Multiple Futures Project – MFP*)⁸³, ki ni bil predviden kot sodobno preročišče iz Delfov (Mattis, 2009). Prerokovanje se zlahka zamenja z napovedovanjem trendov, izzivov in groženj, še posebno, če je to usmerjeno dve desetletji naprej. Tudi obveščevalni strokovnjaki se bodo namreč izognili podajanju obveščevalnih ocen ali projekcij tako daleč v prihodnost z izgovorom, da je preveč neznank. Potrebne so namreč posebne sposobnosti za predvidevanja tako daleč v prihodnost. Tudi MFP je identificiral 40 dejavnikov tveganja, od propadlih držav do etničnih napetosti ter »izzivov vrednot in svetovnih pogledov«. Torej je v tem kontekstu težko govoriti o natančni znanosti, vsekakor pa so prizadevanja te vrste zelo pomembna v smislu sprejemanja dolgoročnih strateških odločitev, ki v zahodnem svetu pomenijo odločitve, ki sežejo čez en mandat. Z aktualnimi trendi se da seveda precej natančno napovedati prihodnost tudi na varnostnem področju, novi Strateški koncept bo poskusil Nato prilagoditi, usposobiti in pripraviti za pester nabor regionalnih in transregionalnih varnostnih izzivov.

Z evrocentrističnega ali geoevropskega vidika je mogoče v teoriji scenarijev najti argumente za vsaj tri geostrateške scenarije do leta 2025⁸⁴. Zelo na kratko in na splošno se po *optimističnem scenariju* procesi globalizacije nadaljujejo tako, da EU zadrži aktualne položaje, nadaljuje se sorazmerno uravnoteženo izravnavanje sveta, posledice gospodarske krize pa so precej enakomerno porazdeljene. Po *zmernem scenariju* se začne ali nadaljuje razvojno zaostajanje EU, prihaja

⁸² BRIK, Brazilija, Kitajska, Indija in Rusija skupaj štejejo skoraj polovico svetovnega prebivalstva in imajo četrtno ozemlja. Prvi vrh je bil junija 2009 v Rusiji, naslednji pa je predviden na Kitajskem.

⁸³ Neke vrste predhodnica tega projekta je študija iz leta 2007, *Varnostno okolje v prihodnosti*.

⁸⁴ Kot pravita generalni sekretar skupine za razmislek o prihodnosti Evrope, ki jo vodi nekdanji španski premier Felipe Gonzalez, in nekdanji slovenski minister za razvoj dr. Žiga Turk, so **spremembe in prilagoditve** (podčrtal D. Č.) v Evropi nujne ter »edini način, da Evropa ohrani svoj gospodarski in socialni model, še naprej povečuje kakovost življenja in uveljavi svoje prioritete, prvič, da je znotraj močna in se zato loti radikalnih reform tako na gospodarskem kot političnem področju, ter drugič, da zunaj govori z enim glasom in usmerja svetovno ureditev proti urejeni multilateralnosti« (Žiga Turk za STA: Evropa bo vpliv v svetu ohranila le z radikalnimi spremembami (intervju), 9. maj 2010, <http://www.sta.si/vest.php?s=s&id=1510788>).

do trenj z Rusijo⁸⁵ zaradi širitve proti vzhodu ter do nihanj med sodelovanjem in konflikti. Vzpon in težiščna vloga Kitajske sta v ospredju, Nato se vpleta v vojne konflikte v Aziji in Afriki⁸⁶, vse bolj je prisotno rivalstvo med ZDA in Kitajsko. Po *pesimističnem scenariju* je čas nestabilnosti zaznamovan s poglobljanjem splošne krize, razmahom nacionalizma in ksenofobije, bitko za surovine, pojavom novih jedrskih sil, razmahom »novih vojn« in terorizma z orožjem za množično uničevanje, rivalstvom med šanghajsko organizacijo za sodelovanje in Natom, novo hladno vojno s težiščem v Aziji in notranjimi težavami na Kitajskem⁸⁷. Vsem scenarijem mora ostati skupna skrb za vprašanje **vodnih in energetskih virov, podnebnih sprememb, migracij, kibernetičnih groženj in varnosti jedrskega orožja**, in prav slednjemu je bil aprila 2010 namenjen vrh o jedrski varnosti, ki ga je gostil ameriški predsednik Obama⁸⁸.

Opozoriti je treba še na to, da je globalizacija postala že tako mogočna, da je svet danes pred neizogibnimi napetostmi med njo in samoopredelitvijo. To je ambicija ljudi v stvarnih ali navideznih skupnostih, da ohranijo svoje tradicije in vrednote, da so srečni na svoj način ter da imajo občutek, da sami nadzorujejo svojo usodo (May, Zelikow 2008: 21). Izziv prihodnosti, s katerim se bo treba spopasti, je na osi globalizacije in samoopredelitve v okviru *odprtega, civiliziranega sveta*. Ta bo temeljil na petih ključnih načelih:

- spoštovanje identitete drugih;
- sodelujoča blaginja: zaveza k odprtosti in mednarodnemu gospodarskemu sodelovanju;
- vzajemna varnost: svoji varnosti škodiš, če spravljaš v nevarnost druge države;
- skrb za planet, za hrano, vodo, zemljo, zrak, fosilna goriva in bogastva v oceanih⁸⁹;

⁸⁵ Kot posebno kolektivno varnostno organizacijo, o kateri v Evropi ni veliko govora, je treba izpostaviti Organizacijo sporazuma o kolektivni varnosti (ang. *Collective Security Treaty Organisation – CSTO*, rus. *Организация Договора о Коллективной Безопасности*). Dogovor o ustanovitvi so v Taškentu oktobra 2002 podpisali predsedniki Armenije, Belorusije, Kazahstana, Kirgizistana, Rusije in Tadžikistana. CSTO se je junija 2006 pridružil še Uzbekistan. CSTO je naslednica sporazuma o kolektivni varnosti (ang. *Collective Security Treaty – CST*), ki so ga leta 1992 podpisale države Skupnosti neodvisnih držav. V CST sta v preteklosti sodelovala tudi Azerbajdžan in Gruzija.

⁸⁶ Glej Joseph E. Stiglitz: *Globalization and Its Discontents* in Zbigniew Brzezinski: *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostategic Imperatives*.

⁸⁷ Glej Naomi Klein: *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*, London: Allen Lane, 2007 in Alvin in Heidi Toffler: *War and anti-war*, Boston [etc.]: Little Brown and Company, 1993.

⁸⁸ Vrh z udeležbo predstavnikov 47 držav, od tega 38 predsednikov držav ali vlad, je bil največji diplomatski dogodek, ki ga je gostil kateri koli predsednik ZDA po letu 1945.

⁸⁹ Ta skrb se nikoli ne konča, pa vendar sta prvo polovico leta 2010 zaznamovala dva dogodka, naravna nesreča in ekološka katastrofa, ki jo je povzročil človek. Obe nesreči sta močno pretresli ne samo okoljevarstvenike, temveč sta imeli tudi globalni gospodarsko-varnostni odmev. Islandski vulkan Eyjafjallajökull, ki je bruhal pepel in prah, je po Evropi povzročil nemalo težav. Po vsej Evropi je bil aprila 2010 šest dni zelo moten letalski promet; odpovedano je bilo 95.000 letov, seveda tudi čezoceanskih. Že škoda letalskih družb je preseгла milijardo evrov. V Mehiškem zalivu se je 20. aprila 2010 zgodila največja ekološka katastrofa v zgodovini ZDA, razlije nafte. Nesreča na naftni ploščadi je zahtevala 11 smrtnih žrtev. Po strokovnih ocenah steče v ocean na dan od 12.000 do 19.000 sodčkov nafte. Do 1. junija 2010 so bili vsi poskusi mašenja vrtine neuspešni. Stroški več kot štiridesetdnevni poskusov zapiranja vrtine so podjetje British Petroleum (BP) stali že skoraj milijardo ameriških dolarjev; katastrofa pa bo imela dolgoročne posledice za življenje tako v morju kot na obali.

- omejenost vlad z vladavino prava, demokratično odgovornostjo, razmejitvijo oblasti med veje in po regionalnih ravneh (May, Zelikow: 2008).

V preigravanju različnih prihodnjih scenarijev in napovedi, od manj do bolj pozitivnih, je prav, da poskušamo v 21. stoletju izhajati iz napak 20. stoletja, v katerem smo imeli dve svetovni vojni in veliko število regionalnih vojn in spopadov, ter v okviru odprtega in civiliziranega sveta iskati boljšo prihodnost za predvidenih osem milijard ljudi.

6 NAMESTO SKLEPA

Srednja in Jugovzhodna Evropa sta prostor, v katerem sta se začeli obe svetovni vojni, kjer smo imeli po drugi svetovni vojni največjo morijo in najdlje trajajoče oborožene spopade. Zahodni Balkan je tudi prostor, v katerem so še vedno prisotne znatne mednarodne policijsko-vojaške sile. Njihovo število se zmanjšuje, pa vendar je težko napovedati, kdaj bodo v celoti zapustile to območje, zato je velik uspeh, da je mogoče na začetku 21. stoletja trditi, da je z geopolitičnega in geostrateškega vidika položaj Slovenije trdnejši kot kadar koli v preteklosti.

Aprila 2010 je bila dvajseta obletnica prvih demokratičnih volitev po drugi svetovni vojni, geopolitična bilanca dveh desetletij pa je nedvomno zadovoljiva. Članstvo v evroatlantskih integracijah temelji na enakopravni podlagi, kar za Slovence ni veljalo v nobeni izmed prejšnjih državnih tvorb. In ne samo to, Slovenija je sodobna država, ki izvaža mir in stabilnost, njene besede pa imajo v mednarodnem okolju nedvomno večjo težo, kot je površina njenega ozemlja. Slovenija je s svojim geopolitičnim in geostrateškim položajem tudi naraven most med državami članicami Nata in EU ob Jadranskem ali ob Črnem morju.

Predsedovanje Evropski uniji je dokaz tega, da se manjše države lahko udeležujejo na globalni ravni. Tako je tudi tedanji predsednik slovenske vlade in predsedujoči Svetu EU Janez Janša Evropskemu parlamentu predstavil globalne izzive EU. Spopadanje s konkurenčnostjo in vojno proti terorizmu ni dovolj, sprejeti je treba tudi naslednje štiri izzive: vprašanje reforme OZN in oblikovanja novega svetovnega reda, boj proti revščini, boj proti podnebnim spremembam in medkulturni dialog. Le z reševanjem teh štirih izzivov si bo Evropska unija lahko zagotovila večjo vlogo v globalnem svetu, pa tudi mir in varnost za svoje državljanke, trajno in varno oskrbo z energijo ter obvladovanje migracijskih pritiskov (Janša, 2008: 8). To so velike ambicije in besede, še posebno, če jih lahko izreče predsednik vlade dvomilijonskega naroda v imenu pol milijarde ljudi. Povedano drugače, za Slovenijo je kratek čas veljalo: razmišljaj globalno, deluj globalno. S tradicionalnega geopolitičnega vidika bi bilo to skorajda nemogoče, kajti velikost šteje. Z globalizacijo in pronicanjem informacijske tehnologije v vse kotičke sveta pa se je tudi tradicionalna geopolitika morala prilagoditi sodobnemu času in njegovim izzivom, medtem ko sedanji in prihodnji izziv ostaja: razmišljaj globalno, deluj lokalno in predvsem regionalno. S tega vidika je treba oceniti

tudi prizadevanja, ki jih je leta 2010 predsednik slovenske vlade Borut Pahor vložil v organizacijo konference Skupaj za Evropsko unijo: prispevek Zahodnega Balkana k evropski prihodnosti. Čeprav se konference niso udeležili vsi predsedniki vlad ali držav Zahodnega Balkana, pomeni začetek »procesa Brdo« težak, pa vendar nujno potreben korak v pravo smer⁹⁰.

Upravičeni slovenski samozavesti navkljub je v prihodnje treba energijo nameniti povečanju konkurenčnosti, razvoju ter družbi znanja v ekonomiji znanja. Ekonomski kazalniki zadnjega obdobja niso najbolj spodbudni, zato se je s temi izzivi treba pravilno spopasti tako v Sloveniji kot tudi v EU. Grški primer je več kot zgovoren dokaz, da se v EU ne cedita med in mleko, temveč bo prihodnost zaznamovana s številnimi izzivi, s katerimi se bodo morale soočiti tako države članice kot tudi celotna EU. Za to pa so potrebne jasne zamisli, spremembe in prilagoditve, vizija ter nato tudi merljivi cilji, pot pa mora biti tlakovana s kratkoročnimi in dolgoročnimi ukrepi. Zagotoviti je treba zadostno število delovnih mest z visoko dodano vrednostjo, ustrezno raven investicij v raziskave in razvoj, izboljšati izobrazbeno strukturo v prid naravoslovju in tehniki ter opredeliti jasne načine izvajanja rezultatov. In na tem področju je mogoče še marsikaj storiti. Neuspeh pa je tako tveganje kot tudi ogrožanje, bodisi za eno bodisi za skupnost držav. Analiza rezultatov iz Strategije razvoja Slovenije ni najbolj spodbudna, zato je treba dodatno pozornost nameniti težki, merljivi geoekonomiki: povečevanju trgovine zunaj okvira EU ali bližnje južne soseščine v smer Kitajske, Indije in Rusije ob uporabi ne le Luke Koper, temveč Slovenije kot logističnega mostišča za EU in Srednjo Evropo, mostišča z odlično infrastrukturo: avtocestni križ je bil po osamosvojitvi Slovenije sicer zgrajen, kar pa ne velja za naslednji nujni pogoj – drugi železniški tir iz Luke Koper v notranjost Slovenije. Odprto ostaja vprašanje gradnje tretjega pomola v Luki Koper, večje uporabe in podaljšanja steze letališča v Portorožu, gradnje oziroma nadgradnje plinovodov in naftovodov, uporabe plinskih terminalov itn. Vsa ta razvojna vprašanja so povezana z velikimi finančnimi vložki in ekološkimi tveganji. In pri vsem tem se zdi, da je to največja ovira, zato bo treba doseči nacionalno soglasje o tem, ali si želimo razvoj, kakšen bo, koliko bo stal ter ali smo se pripravljene pri tem izpostaviti tudi okoljevarnostnim tveganjem in ogrožanju, za katera se zdi, da se z njimi najlažje identificiramo.

Po drugi strani so konvencionalni viri tveganja oziroma ogrožanja ene nacije ali regije že zdavnaj postali transnacionalni ali transregionalni. Njihovo vodilo je asimetričnost, pri čemer imajo posamezniki ali manjše skupine večjo moč kot kadar koli v zgodovini. Z uporabo – zlorabo koristi informacijske revolucije so

⁹⁰ Konferenco sta ob sodelovanju z EU 20 marca 2010 organizirala predsednik Vlade Republike Slovenije Borut Pahor in predsednica Vlade Republike Hrvaške Jadranka Kosor. Na konferenci, ki so se je poleg slovenskega udeležili še predsedniki vlad petih držav regije (Albanije, Bosne in Hercegovine, Hrvaške, Kosova in Makedonije), so začeli neformalno obliko sodelovanja in jo poimenovali »proces Brdo«. Po besedah premierja Pahorja je odprt tudi za tiste, ki ta dan niso bili prisotni. Srbski predsednik Tadić se konference ni udeležil, ker je na njej sodeloval premier Kosova, <http://www.kpv.gov.si/nc/si/splosno/cns/novica/article/1914/4489/>. Pričakovati je, da bo v prihodnje »proces Brdo« imel številne pozitivne multiplikativne regionalne učinke na številnih področjih, od gospodarstva do vprašanj, povezanih z (nacionalno) varnostjo.

povzročili največji teroristični napad na center svetovne moči in zatresli temelje svetovnega reda, v katerem še vedno prevladuje Zahod. Empirični podatki gospodarske, finančne, demografske ali znanstvene narave kažejo, da je Azija oziroma preostanek sveta v vzponu – in temeljno vprašanje ostaja, ali bo med nami mogoče sobivanje ali bomo zaradi tega prišli v konflikte. Sobivanje na enakopravni podlagi, temelječe na univerzalnih etičnih in kulturnih načelih, je način, kako je mogoče ustreči željam in potrebam vseh, ki se zdaj počutijo prikrajšane in diskriminirane. Naloga vseh odgovornih, poklicanih in izbranih voditeljev je, da najdejo ustrezen *modus vivendi*, s katerim se bo lahko identificiralo kar največ ljudi. Zato je v interesu Republike Slovenije, da v sodelovanju z vsemi dobronamernimi prispeva k stabilnosti, ne le v Jugovzhodni Evropi ali na Zahodnem Balkanu, kot se večkrat ponavlja. Naša dolžnost je namreč, da se ozremo širše, tudi na področja, kjer se naši prijatelji in zavezniki soočajo z izzivi, ki neposredno ali posredno vplivajo na varnostne razmere pri nas.

Slovenija kot majhna in z velikimi geopolitičnimi ambicijami neobremenjena država namreč lahko ponudi svojo neobremenjenost, izkušnje in nasvete vsem, ki jim je mar, kakšna bo naša prihodnost in prihodnost naših zanamcev, ki smo jim dolžni prepustiti planet v ustreznem stanju.

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MED TRANZICIJO IN TRANSFORMACIJO

BETWEEN TRANSITION AND TRANSFORMATION

Review article

Povzetek Po šestih letih sodelovanja Republike Slovenije in Slovenske vojske v Natu in strukturah Evropske unije številni pokazatelji navajajo na sklep, da sta politična in obrambno-varnostna tranzicija uspešno končani, prav tako vojaška tranzicija, pri čemer je izpolnjen tudi petletni načrt vključevanja v zavezništvo. Kljub prepričanju, da zavezništvo predvsem stane, pa je dejstvo, da so obrambni izdatki, obrambna struktura in obrambne sile bistveno manjši, kot če bi še vedno gradili samozadosten sistem. Republika Slovenija verodostojno sodeluje v obrambno-vojaških strukturah in skupnih aktivnostih tako v Natu kot v EU. Pri tem mislim zlasti na aktivnosti skupnega obrambnega načrtovanja, sodelovanje v skupnih poveljstvih in njihovih aktivnostih, povezovanje v zavezniško strukturo sil ter zagotavljanje prispevka v njenih odzivnih silah, sodelovanje v mednarodnih operacijah in na misijah ter graditev nacionalnih zmogljivosti, ki so prek doktrin in standardov povezljive z drugimi v zavezništvu. Obenem je Slovenija deležna skupne zaščite in kontrole zračnega prostora ter Natovega investiranja v letališke zmogljivosti v Sloveniji. Integracija v zavezništvo je ustvarila pogoje za spreminjanje strategije nacionalne varnosti in posledično vojaške doktrine. V zavezništvu in posameznih državah ter njihovih oboroženih silah pa se srečujemo s pojavi transformacijske narave, pri čemer se postavljajo vprašanja o izginjanju nacionalnih vojaških identitet in nacionalnih vojaških sposobnosti. V članku predstavljamo značilnosti slovenskega tranzicijskega obdobja in izzive transformacije na obrambno-vojaškem področju ter navajamo slovenske vojaške izkušnje iz procesa integracije.

Ključne besede *Tranzicija, integracija, izkušnje iz delovanja v zavezništvu, transformacija.*

Abstract After six years of cooperation of the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovenian Armed Forces in NATO and the European Union structures, numerous indicators point to the conclusion that the political as well as the defence and security transition have been

successfully completed. Also completed are the military transition and the five-year action plan for the integration into the Alliance. Despite the conviction that the Alliance is above all costly, it is a fact that defence expenditures, defence structure and defence forces are significantly smaller than in the case of building a self-sustaining system. The Republic of Slovenia participates, as a credible partner, in defence and military structures as well as in joint activities within NATO and the EU. This refers to the activities of joint defence planning, participation in NATO commands and their activities, integration in the NATO Force Structure and contribution to its Response Forces, participation in multinational operations and missions, as well as the building of national capabilities, implementation of the doctrines and standards through which forces and commands are interoperable with others in the Alliance. At the same time, Slovenia is enjoying air policing and NATO's security investment in military airport facilities in the country. Integration in the Alliance has created conditions for changing the national security strategy and, consequently, the military doctrine. In addition, the Alliance and individual countries, along with their armed forces, are facing a transformation phenomenon, which brings questions regarding the loss of national military identity and national military capabilities. The article discusses the characteristics of the Slovenian transition period, transformation challenges in the area of defence and military, as well as Slovenian military experiences from the process of integration.

Key words *Transition, integration, integration process lessons learned, transformation.*

Uvod V Natu so se leta 2009 ob 60-letnici obstoja začele aktivnosti za pripravo novega strateškega koncepta (angl. Nato Strategic Concept – NSC), ki naj odgovori na sedanje in predvsem prihodnje izzive zavezništva. Maja 2009 je posebna izvedenska skupina končala delo pri njegovem oblikovanju. Na začetku leta 2010 je Slovenska vojska izpolnila naloge iz načrta integracije in tako postala primerljiva ter povezljiva z drugimi vojskami zavezništva.

Republika Slovenija se je deset let pripravljala na vstop v zavezništvo v okviru procesov Partnerstva za mir (PzM) in v drugem pristopnem ciklu akcijskega načrta (angl. Membership Action Plan – MAP) izpolnila politične in vojaške pogoje za članstvo. Legitimnost je bila podana z referendumom iz leta 2003, ko je 66 odstotkov udeležencev glasovalo za članstvo Republike Slovenije v Natu. Ena izmed temeljnih podlag za slovensko članstvo so bile opravljene reforme na številnih področjih, vključno s preoblikovanjem Slovenske vojske ter njeno strukturno in funkcionalno profesionalizacijo. Po vstopu v Nato je sledilo zelo intenzivno petletno obdobje integracijskih aktivnosti. Trdim lahko, da sta po petih letih članstva slovenska tranzicijska pot in njena integracija v zavezništvo uspešno končani.

1 SLOVENSKA TRANZICIJSKA POT

V Evropi so se s koncem hladne vojne in bipolarne razdelitve spodbudili procesi obsežne družbene tranzicije. Najbolj intenzivni so bili v evropskih državah nekdanje socialistične ureditve, potekali pa so tudi v zahodnoevropskih. Obravnava konceptualnih, strukturnih in funkcionalnih sprememb med tranzicijo na obrambno-vojaškem področju v Sloveniji kaže na vrsto značilnosti, ki jih najdemo tudi v drugih evropskih državah po koncu hladne vojne. Hkrati opazimo več posebnosti, ki prvič, veljajo le za Slovenijo kot novonastalo državo, in drugič, presegajo obdobje tranzicije in predstavljajo značilnosti transformacijskih sprememb.

Osrednja skupna lastnost tranzicijskih procesov je bila prilagajanje obrambno-vojaškega organiziranja novim okoliščinam v obdobju družbene in obrambno-varnostne tranzicije. Na obrambnem področju so bila prizadevanja glede funkcionalnosti usmerjena v zagotovitev nacionalne obrambe ob intenzivnem strukturnem spreminjanju ter v vstopanje v vojaško-politična zavezištva, kar prinaša sodelovanje pri reševanju konfliktov v kriznih regijah v tujini. Prizadevanja na družbenem področju pa so bila usmerjena v delovanje institucij demokratičnega nadzora nad oboroženimi silami, kar Cottey, Edmunds in Forster (2002, str. 31–56) obravnavajo kot prvo in drugo generacijo problemov civilno-vojaških odnosov¹.

Slovenija je bila kot samostojna država z mednarodnim priznanjem od leta 1992 udeležena v procesih politične, gospodarske, državne in obrambno-varnostne tranzicije. V tem okviru govorimo o vzpostavitvi večstrankarskega političnega sistema parlamentarne demokracije, uvedbi tržnega gospodarstva, graditvi lastne države in njenih obrambno-varnostnih sestavin ter o pripravah in vstopu v povezavo, kot so OZN, OVSE, Nato in EU. Slovenija je del procesa obrambno-varnostne tranzicije preživela hkrati v oblikovanju in preoblikovanju sistema nacionalne varnosti.

Preoblikovanje slovenske vojaške organiziranosti je potekalo hkrati s procesom osamosvojitve ter vojaškimi aktivnostmi za zavarovanje vzpostavitve demokratične in samostojne države leta 1991². Te aktivnosti so potekale na podlagi koncepta totalne obrambe in množične vojske, utemeljene na mobilizirani obsežni rezervni strukturi Teritorialne obrambe. V obdobju po koncu osamosvojitvene vojne, od julija 1991, sta potekala demobilizacija vpoklicanih rezervistov in dokončno vzpostavljanje učnih centrov TO³, v katerih so se usposabljali slovenski vojaški naborniki na podlagi splošne vojaške obveznosti. Ob tem sta se vzpostavljali stalna vojska in obsežna vojaška rezerva. Proces je v Sloveniji potekal hkrati s procesi zmanjševanja množičnih vojsk in ukinjanja služenja vojaškega roka v nekaterih industrijsko razvitih državah takratne Evrope, na primer v Belgiji in

¹ O tem tudi Donnelly (1997), Ikenberry (2002) in Moskos (2000).

² V resnici pa so se začeli že neposredno po prvih demokratičnih volitvah in prevzemu oblasti maja 1990.

³ Prva učna centra Teritorialne obrambe Slovenije sta bila organizirana že maja 1991, do junija 1992 je bilo oblikovanih skupno osem učnih centrov.

na Nizozemskem. Če upoštevamo dejstvo, da je Slovenija izšla iz vojne 1991 in da je bila vse do leta 1995 tudi vojaško ogrožena zaradi vojnih aktivnosti v njeni neposredni sosesčini, v nekdanji Jugoslaviji, je slovensko odstopanje od takratnih procesov v razvitih evropskih državah lažje razumljivo.

V procesu nastajanja stalne vojske slovenske države je prišlo do nekaterih posebnosti, ki jih v nadaljnjih obdobjih ni bilo več mogoče odpraviti, saj so vse tranzicijske spremembe težile k prilagajanju, ne pa k radikalnemu spreminjanju obrambno-vojaških struktur (Šteiner 2009, str. 126–129). Tako se od začetnega oblikovanja vojaške organiziranosti prek obdobja tranzicije do vstopa v obdobje transformacije vlečejo značilnosti, ki so ovire v nadaljnjem spreminjanju Slovenske vojske in s tem tudi njene transformacije. Vzpostavitev obvezniške vojske s sistemom popolnjenja stalne in rezervne strukture je pustila preobsežno in neustrezno častniško sestavo z miselnostjo naborniške vojske, infrastrukturo, ki je bila po eni strani prilagojena služenju vojaškega roka moške populacije, po drugi strani pa razpršena po celotnem prostoru države, ter razvejano obsežno civilno administrativno naborniško mrežo. Navedeno je bilo nekajkrat preoblikovano med vojaško tranzicijo, ni pa bilo odpravljeno ali preseženo skladno z novimi nalogami in poslanstvom Slovenske vojske. Tako so številna preoblikovanja poveljniške strukture in obsega vojske ter postopnost sprememb nujna popotnica tranzicijskega obdobja, kar opazimo tudi v drugih državah.

Ob intenzivni pomoči držav, s katerimi je Republika Slovenija začela sodelovati na vojaškem področju (ZDA, Kanada, Nemčija, Velika Britanija, Francija, Italija, Avstrija, Švica, Izrael in druge), je postopoma prevladalo spoznanje, da je treba opustiti preživete modele vojaške organiziranosti in vzorce delovanja iz preteklosti. Vstop Republike Slovenije v Partnerstvo za mir (angl. Partnership for Peace – PfP) januarja 1994 je po eni strani pomenil oddaljevanje od starih modelov, po drugi strani pa je povzročil pluralizem prevzemanja zgledov iz tujine. Prevzemanje ponekod pomeni sprejemanje vsega, kar je bilo ponujeno in ocenjeno kot dobro, ne glede na to, kakšna je bila učinkovitost uvedenih zgledov, ko so bili postavljeni v konkretne razmere in obrambno-vojaški sistem. Nekritično in premalo selektivno sprejemanje zgledov od drugod je značilnost vseh tranzicijskih držav, o čemer pišeta tudi Haltiner in Klein (2002, str. 7–22).

Spoznanje o nujnosti opuščanja starega modela vojaške organiziranosti in posledično vojaške strukture ter obsega vojske je postalo eden izmed najpomembnejših tranzicijskih izzivov. Ni ga bilo preprosto dojeti, kaj šele uresničiti, saj se zamisli o povrnitvi k starim vzorcem pojavljajo še danes. Poseben izziv je bila nuja po odpiranju in sodelovanju na obrambno-vojaškem področju, ki je nastopila z vstopom v PzM. Tako se orodja in aktivnosti v PzM pojavljajo kot mehanizmi ne le obrambno-vojaške, temveč tudi politične tranzicije, zato na področju obrambnega načrtovanja in posledično političnega odločanja o obrambnih vprašanjih poteka

veliko sprememb in novih procesov⁴. Pri tem se je Slovenija skupnega obrambnega načrtovanja učila in se mu prilagajala od leta 1994 skozi Proces načrtovanja in ocenjevanja (angl. Planning and Review Process – PARP) ter prek Individualnega partnerskega programa (angl. Individual Partnership Program – IPP). Temu je leta 1999 sledil Akcijski načrt za članstvo – ANČ (angl. Membership Action Plan – MAP). S temi orodji je bilo do vključitve v Nato, med zelo intenzivnimi pripravami v Sloveniji prek petletnih akcijskih načrtov, zagotovljeno učinkovito medresorsko sodelovanje.

Ko leta 1997 Republika Slovenija v Madridu ni prejela povabila za članstvo, je po začetnem razočaranju kmalu dozorelo spoznanje, da bo treba tranzicijski proces privesti do točke, ko bo jasno, da z reformami mislimo resno in da bodo uspešno končane. Tako je madridski 'ne' bolj pomagal kot zaviral na tranzicijski poti. Obenem je pospešil tudi politične vidike obrambne reforme⁵. Brez madridske izkušnje bi gotovo odlašali s profesionalizacijo, pa tudi z usmeritvijo v izgradnjo sodobnejših in premestljivih vojaških sil.

Za tranzicijsko obdobje do leta 2002 sta značilni postopnost in precejšnja počasnost sprememb. Ko sta slovenska vlada in parlament sprejela odločitev o ukinitvi služenja vojaškega roka kot sestavine splošne vojaške obveznosti ter je Nato na vrhu v Pragi novembra 2002 sprejel odločitev o povabilu Sloveniji za polnopravno članstvo, je to pomenilo nadaljevanje še intenzivnejših sprememb vojaške organizacije. Po vključitvi leta 2004 je Slovenska vojska pripravila pridružitveni in integracijski načrt – PIN (angl. Accession and Integration Plan – AAI)⁶, ki naj bi ga izpolnila do leta 2010. Načrt je bil uresničen do konca leta 2009. Lahko trdim, da je bistvo aktivnosti iz obdobja PzM, ANČ in PIN v njihovi tranzicijski usmerjenosti v najširšem smislu.

Kot spoznanje iz slovenskega tranzicijskega obdobja navajam dve značilnosti. Prvič, priprave na članstvo potekajo več let in obsegajo uresničevanje načrtov za članstvo, kar povzroča številne spremembe v vojaški organizaciji in obrambnem sistemu. Drugič, z vključevanjem v procese skupnega odločanja in obrambnega načrtovanja se spreminjajo ali prilagajajo nacionalni pristopi pri delovanju vlade, na diplomatskem področju, pri zagotavljanju razmer za varovanje tajnih podatkov in ne nazadnje v javnosti. Ob tem je pogosto videti, kot da obrambno-vojaška struktura take spremembe določa, še posebno takrat, ko gre za sodelovanje v mednarodnih operacijah in na misijah (v nadaljevanju MOM), ko je postavljena v

⁴ Več o tem Šavc 2009, str. 52–55.

⁵ To vključuje tudi delovanje vlade, oblikovanje pozitivnega odnosa v javnosti do članstva v zavezništvu in spremembe v zunanjepolitičnem delovanju. Več o tem Grizold (2005) in Bebler (2009).

⁶ Uresničevanje načrta je spremljalo in podpiralo Joint Force Command v Neaplju v Italiji (JFC Neaples, Italy).

položaj, da izpolnjuje pogoje povezljivosti in se vključuje v skupno izvajanje operacij. Slovenija je v Natu primer članice, ki je uspešno opravila s preizkušnjami in izzivi tranzicijskega obdobja. Kot taka je lahko dober primer za vključitev drugih malih držav in kandidatk, zlasti v njeni neposredni sosesčini.

2 IZKUŠNJE IZ INTEGRACIJSKEGA PROCESA

Integracija v zavezništvo je celovita in vključuje več postopkov in aktivnosti, ki omogočajo, da se nova članica lahko uspešno vključi in sodeluje v zavezniških mehanizmih soodločanja in izpolnjevanja svojih obveznosti ter je deležna prednosti⁷. Ko omenjam slovenske izkušnje iz integracijskega procesa, je najprej treba izpostaviti spoznanje, da je vstop v zavezništvo šele začetek intenzivnih aktivnosti. Po sprejetju v polnopravno članstvo namreč sledi zahtevno obdobje pridružitve in integracije ter tudi afilicije⁸ sil v skupne sestave. V slovenskem primeru je ta skrajšano imenovani integracijski proces trajal polnih pet let. Ko se je končal, je bilo jasno, da sledijo nadaljnji procesi prilagoditve vojaške organiziranosti, standardizacijski postopki ter procesi v integriranih večnacionalnih strukturah sil, pa tudi oblikovanje predvidenih zmogljivosti za potrebe nacionalne in kolektivne obrambe.

Enotne opredelitve, kaj vse spada v integracijske procese, ni. V Sloveniji smo **integracijski proces** razdelili na devet področij. To so: (1) vključitev v zavezniški proces političnega odločanja in obrambnega načrtovanja, (2) uvedba Natovih doktrin in standardov, (3) sodelovanje v Natovi poveljniški strukturi, (4) pridružitve deklariranih sil v Natovo strukturo sil (korpuse), (5) vzpostavitev vojaških zmogljivosti, skladno s sprejetimi zavezniškimi cilji sil, (6) zagotavljanje ter vzdrževanje povezljivosti poveljstev in enot, vključno z NATINADS⁹ in Air Policingom, (7) sodelovanje v načrtovanju, pripravah in izvajanju MOM, (8) priprava in zagotavljanje odzivnih sil (NRF) ter (9) financiranje skupnih projektov prek NSIP¹⁰. Integracijska področja kaže tudi shema 1.


⁷ Humar navaja (Humar idr., (2009, str. 71), da struktura Nata zagotavlja spoštovanje skupnih vrednot in interesov zavezništva ter je predvsem okvir, s pomočjo katerega države članice določajo in izvajajo skupne cilje zavezništva. V Natu imajo glavno besedo države članice, ki obenem kot lastnice sil in zmogljivosti odločajo s soglasjem. Sile in zmogljivosti, ki jih države članice prispevajo za izvedbo Natovih aktivnosti, so pod omejenim nadzorom Nata in hkrati ostajajo pod nacionalno linijo poveljevanja ter kontrole na vseh ravneh.

⁸ S terminom afilicija označujemo pridružitve sil na podlagi mednarodnih sporazumov.

⁹ **Nato Integrated Air Defence System** predstavlja integrirani in medsebojno povezan sistem zavezniške zračne obrambe. S terminom **Air Policing** pojasnjujemo nadzor zračnega prostora, vključno z njegovimi zmogljivostmi za tovrstno operativno delovanje.

¹⁰ **Nato Security Investment Program** predstavlja finančno orodje in program za skupno investiranje v zavezniške zmogljivosti.

Shema 1:
Integracijska
področja



Vir: Predstavitev GŠSV, 18. februar 2010.

Slovenija se je uspešno vključila v **zavezniški proces političnega odločanja in obrambnega načrtovanja**. Obrambno načrtovanje v Natu obsega sedem disciplin, in sicer načrtovanje sil, virov, obrambnih investicij, logistike, načrtovanje na C3-področju, jedrsko načrtovanje in civilno-krizno načrtovanje (Šavc 2009, str. 45). Nacionalno obrambno načrtovanje (angl. Defence planning) kot celota je v domeni obrambne politike in s tem posebnih agencij ali organizacijskih enot na obrambnih ministrstvih. Na podlagi izhodišč obrambnega načrtovanja je načrtovanje sil (angl. Force Planning) v domeni vojaških štabov, in sicer tako nacionalnih kot zavezniških. Za potrebe operativnega vojaškega delovanja in delovanja v MOM pa se srečamo še z operativnim načrtovanjem za konkretno Natovo operacijo. Za vse tri kategorije načrtovanja v Natu obstajajo posebne združene publikacije oziroma navodila, ki so bila podlaga za pripravo nacionalnih pravilnikov in navodil. Leta 2006 je bila struktura obrambnega proračuna v Sloveniji usklajena s pristopom, ki se uporablja v Natu in po katerem poteka poročanje o obrambnem načrtovanju v zavezništvu. Dodajam, da v aktivnostih in procesih delovanja v večini zavezniških odborov in delovnih teles uspešno delamo. Slovenija osnovnega načela pri odločanju, torej konsenza, ni izrabljala za oviranje delovanja zavezništva.

Področje **uvajanja Natovih doktrin in standardov** je poseben organizacijski in tudi intelektualni izziv. Na Ministrstvu za obrambo in v Slovenski vojski je prevzeta in uvedena večina standardov, ki so potrebni za doseganje povezljivosti vojaških sil ali obrambnih ukrepov in vojaških postopkov. Dobro polovico smo

jih prevzeli po metodi platnic in se uporabljajo v izvorniku, drugi pa so prevedeni v slovenski jezik. Iz tega izhaja, da je zagotavljanje sposobnosti za obvladovanje in uporabo standardov v angleškem jeziku posebnost, pa tudi sposobnost, ki se izraža v izpolnjevanju jezikovnih standardov. Slovenska vojska je prilagodila ter oblikovala svojo Vojaško doktrino in Doktrino vojaške logistike, ki sledita zavezniškim publikacijam. Poleg tega ima velike načrte tudi za priprave doktrin na drugih področjih.

Slovensko vključevanje v **Natovo poveljniško strukturo** je dosežena skladno z načrti in se prilagaja spremembam, ki nastajajo v njeni mirnodobni strukturi. Z integracijo v Natovo mirnodobno poveljniško strukturo¹¹ razumemo nacionalne obrambne vojaške kadrovske prispevke v večnacionalna poveljstva in organe ter vključevanje v procese njihovega delovanja. Slovenska vojska je povezana s skupno Natovo strukturo z vojaškimi predstavništvi, ki so se ob koncu leta 2009 preoblikovala v mirnodobno strukturo Slovenske vojske v tujini. V tej strukturi v Bruslju deluje vojaško predstavništvo – VOPRE (angl. Military Representative – MilRep), ki v sestavi Stalne misije Republike Slovenije pri Natu predstavlja Slovensko vojsko v Natovem poveljstvu in v EU. V SHAPE v Monsu v Belgiji deluje nacionalno vojaško predstavništvo (National Military Representation – NMR) pri ACO. V Norfolku v ZDA pa deluje nacionalno predstavništvo za povezave (National Liaison Representation – NLR) pri ACT. Povezanost z Natovo poveljniško strukturo pa ni samo na strateški ravni. Pomembne povezave in sodelovanja potekajo prek Poveljstva sil SV, ki sodeluje z JFC v Neaplju v Italiji. Od skupno nekaj več kot 80 vojaških predstavnikov v tujini, kar predstavlja dober odstotek mirnodobne nacionalne vojaške strukture, jih približno trideset deluje v Natovih poveljstvih in njihovih organih ter centrih odličnosti, približno deset pa v poveljstvih enot, kamor Republika Slovenija pridružuje svoje zmogljivosti.

Slovenska vojska leta 2010 končuje drugo rotacijo osebja, ki je zastopalo Republiko Slovenijo v Natu in EU. Pri tem so nacionalna predstavništva z izvedbo postavljenih nalog opravila pomemben del integracijskih aktivnosti in doseganja povezanosti, zlasti v razumevanju zavezništva, procesu političnega odločanja, pa tudi pri procesih obrambnega načrtovanja in pripravi vojaških nasvetov ter njihovem uresničevanju. Učinkovito delovanje v zavezniških delovnih telesih, odborih in komisijah je zahtevalo veliko naporov, pa tudi učenja. Velikokrat je bilo to učenje ob delu ali učenje od tistih, ki so te izkušnje v zavezništvu že imeli. Ob tem smo bili v zavezništvu deležni ocen, da smo pozitivno presenečenje, ker smo se dobro vključili v delovanje Natovih organov, uspešno komunicirali na relaciji med zavezniškimi organi in nacionalnimi nosilci odločanja ter procesi. Kot pozitivno izkušnjo navajam tudi uravnoteženo zastopanje nacionalnih interesov v odnosu na skupne zavezniške interese in cilje.

¹¹ V Natu se uporablja izraz *Nato Command Structure – NCS*. Več o tem Humar idr. 2009: v *Integration Slovenian Armed Forces in Nato*, Bilten SV, št. 11–3/2009 str. 71–79.

Republika Slovenija in Slovenska vojska sta opravili začetne aktivnosti za **pridružitve deklariranih sil v Natovo strukturo sil**. Integracija v korpusne kot večnacionalne zavezniške strukture sil pomeni vključitev nacionalnih zmogljivosti v taktične in operativne sestave ali poveljstva¹². Ena izmed nalog korpusnih poveljstev v miru je, da z usposabljanjem pridruženih enot povečujejo interoperabilnost znotraj Nata in se pripravljajo na morebitno skupno delovanje. Da so opravljene začetne aktivnosti, sem navedel zato, ker gre za celovite aktivnosti in spremembe, ki jih bo treba opraviti v naslednjih letih.

Graditev vojaških zmogljivosti, skladno s sprejetimi zavezniškimi cilji sil, je področje, na katerem se zrcalita predvsem posodobitev in preobrazba vojaških sil in njenih zmogljivosti. Opredeljuje se z nacionalnim obrambnim načrtovanjem in načrtovanjem sil ter usklajuje z zavezniškim in ima podlago v ciljih sil. Cilji sil izražajo politično sprejete zaveze za skupno graditev zmogljivosti, ki naj zadostijo nacionalnim potrebam, ter zahteve po skupnih zavezniških zmogljivostih. Pri tem naletimo še na posebnost, ker načrtovanje zmogljivosti poteka na podlagi potreb zmogljivosti (angl. Capability Based Planning) v odnosu na obdobja iz hladne vojne, ko se je uporabljal pristop na podlagi groženj (angl. Threat Based Planning), ki so bile lažje prepoznavne in zato potrebne zmogljivosti lažje predvidljive.

V državah, ki so v tranziciji ali so jo končale, ima graditev zmogljivosti nekatere posebnosti, saj je večino od skupno dogovorjenih treba postaviti povsem na novo. To pomeni, da je treba zagotoviti potrebne vire, poleg finančnih še kadrovske, materialne in tudi infrastrukturne. Graditev zmogljivosti temelji na domeni, da je treba vanje vložiti predvidoma 20 odstotkov finančnih sredstev za posodobitev in opremljanje. Ker je graditev premestljivih zmogljivosti navadno prednostna naloga, za preostale zmogljivosti ne ostane dovolj virov. V takšnih razmerah se v novih članicah in malih državah ustvarja občutek, da se vlaga zgolj v skupne ali celo tuje zmogljivosti.

Posodobitev oboroženih sil in graditev vojaških zmogljivosti sta v obdobju gospodarske krize in ekonomske recesije poseben izziv. Države namreč izdatke za obrambno-vojaške namene zmanjšujejo na račun zmanjševanja investicij, velikokrat predvsem v obrambnem sektorju, kar povzroči počasnejšo graditev zmogljivosti ali celo njeno zaustavitev. Govorimo lahko o krizi uresničevanja načrtov graditve vojaških zmogljivosti in zaupanja v nacionalne obljube. Graditev zmogljivosti ni le nakup vojaške opreme ali njena posodobitev, temveč zahtevna povezava z osebjem, usposobljenostjo in pripravljenostjo za delovanje skupaj z drugimi zavezniškimi silami v zapletenem okolju. Zato se pri tem srečamo še z uvedbo doktrin in standardov, kar vse prispeva k poveztivosti.

¹² Gre za pridružitve lahke bataljonske bojne skupine v Nato Rapid Deployable Corp v Italiji in bataljona za radiološko, kemično in biološko obrambo v Multinational Corp North-East na Poljskem.

Zagotavljanje in vzdrževanje povezljivosti poveljstev in enot je pomembno področje integracije, ki omogoča skupno delovanje zavezništva, dosega se z usposabljanjem ter skupnimi vajami in operativnim delovanjem. Navedeno skupaj s standardizacijskimi postopki pospešeno prispeva k preobrazbi obrambnega sistema in doseganju primerljivosti ter povezljivosti. Povezljivost ni unificiranje ali kloniranje, temveč predvsem sposobnost za doseganje skupnih povezovalnih točk v postopkih, opremi, usposobljenem osebju in procesih odločanja ter operativnega delovanja.

Najbolj nazorno se povezljivost kaže na področjih NATINADS in Air Policing. Slovenski nacionalni center za nadzor zračnega prostora je povezan v sistem zavezništva in tesno sodeluje z Natovim skupnim centrom za vodenje delovanja v zraku v italijanskem Poggio Renaticu, skupaj z Natovimi zračnimi silami in slovenskimi kontrolorji opravlja nadzor zračnega prostora (air policing) nad Slovenijo. Podobno je s pomorskim operativnim centrom, ki je povezan z zavezniškim mornariškim centrom pri mornariškem komponentnem poveljstvu v Neaplju (angl. Maritime Component Command – CC MAR). V navedenem se kažejo pridobitve, ki jih Republiki Sloveniji prinaša članstvo v zavezništvu, saj sama nima ali ne razvija nekaterih zmogljivosti.

Sodelovanje pri načrtovanju, pripravah in izvajanju MOM je področje, ki je bilo že med pripravami na članstvo in tudi pozneje zelo izpostavljeno. V prispevku k Natovim operacijam kriznega odzivanja zunaj 5. člena se kaže kredibilnost države, ki se zaveda nujnosti prispevanja k mednarodnemu miru¹³. Republika Slovenija je v zadnjih štirih letih prispevala nekaj več kot 0,6 odstotka skupnih mirnodobnih sil¹⁴.

Slovenski vojaški prispevek v MOM je neposredno povezan s preoblikovanjem vojske, njenim prehodom iz naborniške v poklicno ter oblikovanjem preemestljivih zmogljivosti (Šteiner in Geder 2009, str 183–210). Slovenska vojska sodeluje v MOM že trinajst let, saj se je v prvo mednarodno vojaško operacijo vključila leta 1997. Do zdaj je sodelovala v devetnajstih MOM na treh kontinentih. Do konca aprila 2010 pa je bilo vanje skupaj napotenih 6096 vojaških oseb in 15 civilnih funkcionalnih strokovnjakov. Slovenski prispevek je od začetne razpršenosti in sodelovanja posameznikov ter skupin postopno naraščal v sodelovanje nižjih taktičnih enot, leta 2007 pa je bil prvič angažiran bataljon. To kaže na povezanost strukturnega spreminjanja Slovenske vojske in njena prizadevanja

¹³ *Kot nacionalni prispevek štejemo tako v operacije, ki so pod vodstvom OZN, kot tudi tiste, ki potekajo pod vodstvom Nata in EU. OZN v operacije ohranjanja miru (angl. United Nations Peace Keeping Operations) vključuje: preprečevanje konfliktov, ohranjanje, vzpostavljanje, uveljavljanje in gradnjo miru. Natove operacije kriznega odzivanja zunaj 5. člena razvršča v operacije v podporo miru, ki vključujejo (a) preprečevanje konfliktov, (b) vzpostavljanje, (c) uveljavljanje, (d) ohranjanje in (e) gradnjo miru ter humanitarno delovanje. K temu spadajo tudi druge operacije in naloge kriznega odzivanja zunaj 5. člena, kot so (a) podpora humanitarnemu delovanju ter (b) zaščiti in reševanju, (c) iskanje in reševanje, (d) podpora evakuaciji nevojaškega osebja ter (e) vojaška pomoč civilnim oblastem (AJP-3.4 2008: 4–1, 4–11; Šteiner in Geder, 2009 str. 185).*

¹⁴ *O tem tudi Jelušič 2009, str 39–46).*

za vedno številčnejše in aktivnejše vključevanje v zagotavljanje stabilnosti ter reševanje kriznih razmer v svetu. Poleg tega je posebno pomemben vpliv MOM na integracijske dejavnosti, zagotavljanje povezljivosti in skupno nastopanje na mednarodnem prizorišču.

Izkušnje, pridobljene v različnih MOM, so pomemben dejavnik pri graditvi vojaških zmogljivosti. Ko MOM opazujemo kot transformacijsko orodje na nacionalni in tudi mednarodni ravni, ugotovimo, da prinašajo izkušnje in primere dobre prakse, ki dajejo odgovore na številna strateška, operativna ter taktična vprašanja o uporabi vojaških sil in zmogljivosti. V operacijah se preizkušajo nova oprema in sredstva ter potrjujejo nekateri eksperimenti za uporabo novih zmogljivosti ali taktike in za razvijanje združenega ter večnacionalnega povezovanja in skupnega delovanja.

Trinajstletno sodelovanje Slovenske vojske v MOM lahko razdelimo v tri obdobja, prvo od 1997 do 2002, drugo od 2003 do 2006 in tretje po letu 2007 (Šteiner in Geder, 2009). Za prvo obdobje je značilno vključevanje majhnih in nezahtevnih modulov do ravni voda, v drugem opazimo tako količinski kot tudi kakovostni napredek, čeprav je razpršenost v tem obdobju največja. Za tretje obdobje je značilno, da sprejemamo izzive vsestranskega delovanja v MOM, kar omogoča vključevanje slovenskih čet v večnacionalne sestave ter oblikovanje nacionalnih sestavov v obliki bataljonskih skupin, v katere so lahko vključeni tudi moduli drugih držav. Če je za prvo obdobje značilno, da se slovenski vojak pojavi v mednarodnem okolju in pridobiva izkušnje, lahko za drugo trdimo, da je to obdobje iskanja in dozorevanja v MOM, v tretjem pa se Slovenska vojska dokončno uveljavi v mednarodnem okolju. V vseh treh obdobjih so slovenski kontingenti v nekaterih pogledih še vedno odvisni od partnerskih ali vodilnih držav, predvsem zaradi omejitev pri strateškem zračnem transportu in manjše razpoložljivosti svojih zmogljivosti za oskrbo sil na oddaljenih območjih.

S pripravo in zagotavljanjem Natovih odzivnih sil (angl. Nato Response Forces – NRF) se označujejo skupne in združene sile zaveznic, pripravljene za hitro premeščanje in namenjene posredovanju v celotnem spektru Natovega vojaškega delovanja. Sile zagotavljajo zaveznice na podlagi rotiranja, in sicer za določen čas, večina teh sil pa pripada tudi Natovi strukturi sil (angl. Nato Force Structure – NFS). S pristopom k oblikovanju NRF Nato kot celota in države članice preoblikujejo svoje zmogljivosti, da bi tako dosegli večjo učinkovitost in odzivnost. Slovenski prispevek se je razvijal postopno, ko smo prispevali najprej vodne module, zatem četne in končali z bataljonskimi. Tak primer so predvsem enote v slovenskem bataljonu RKBO.

Za financiranje **skupnih projektov prek NSIP** Republika Slovenija prispeva finančne vire ter od njega tudi dobiva sredstva. Tu smo neto prejemniki zaradi Natovega prispevka v urejanje vojaškega večnamenskega letališča Cerklje. Poleg tega smo prek sofinanciranja vključeni v pobude, ki omogočajo dostop do znanja in zmogljivosti, do katerih bi sicer težko prišli (Strategic air lift in Air Ground Surveillance ter AWACS).

Za opis integracijskih področij in izkušenj lahko navedem oceno, da je Republika Slovenija oziroma Slovenska vojska v šestih letih članstva v Natu in EU uspešno sklenila procese povezljivosti, premestljivosti in vzdržljivosti v MOM. Je dober zgled, predvsem zaradi svoje objektivnosti pri tem, kar je ponudila in kar ji je uspelo uresničiti. Pa tudi pri tem, kar ji zavezništvo vrača v obliki večje varnosti ali podpore z zmogljivostmi, ki jih država sama ne more zagotoviti oziroma jih ne bo razvijala, kot to velja za zmogljivosti zračne obrambe in zaščite zračnega prostora. Dobro bi bilo, če bi se uspešnosti in tudi posebnosti zavezništva zavedale vse politične elite. Seveda so nekateri skupni načrti in zaveze o razvoju zmogljivosti v prihodnje zelo odvisni od nadaljnjega razvoja gospodarskih razmer in recesije. Pri tem bo ponovno treba biti predvsem stvaren, da ne bi zaustavili razvoja in modernizacije slovenskega obrambnega sistema ali vplivali nanj, tako da bi nazadoval, kar bi dolgoročno lahko imelo negativne posledice.

3 TRANSFORMACIJSKA PARADIGMA IN IZZVI

Medtem ko se je Slovenija pripravljala na sodelovanje v zavezništvu in začela delovati kot polnopravna članica, je v Natu potekal zahteven proces spreminjanja, ki ga je omogočil koncept iz leta 1999. Začelo se je obdobje transformacije na podlagi spoznanj o spremembah, nujnih za prihodnost. Nato se s transformacijskimi izzivi in procesom ukvarja že celo desetletje¹⁵. Največji izziv so njegovo preoblikovanje in pravilno razumevanje ter odzivanje na spremembe v varnostnem okolju. Tudi zato, ker se vedno pogosteje pojavljajo vprašanja o energijski varnosti, ekološka in seveda vprašanja o asimetričnih grožnjah, ki že dolgo nimajo več klasičnih vojaških oblik. Transformacija v Natu je zastavljena kot proaktiven in inovativen proces razvoja ter vključevanja novih konceptov, doktrin in zmogljivosti, da bi se izboljšali učinkovitost in povezljivost v zavezništvu ter pri partnerjih.

¹⁵ *To je intenzivirano z iskanjem odgovorov na nove teroristične in asimetrične grožnje po napadih na stolpnici Svetovnega trgovinskega centra v New Yorku 11. septembra 2001 in na železniško postajo v Madridu 11. marca 2004. Začetek obdobja transformacije je bil politično potrjen na vrhu Nata v Pragi leta 2002 (Nato Handbook, 2006, str. 20), nato pa je bilo oblikovano tudi Zavezniško poveljstvo za transformacijo (angl. Allied Command Transformation – ACT).*

Transformacijske spremembe nekateri razlagajo tudi kot **transformacijsko paradigmo** (Binnendijk in Kugler, 2006). Pri tem gre za nov pristop in novo razumevanje sprememb, ne le v ozkem obrambno-vojaškem smislu, temveč v širšem varnostno-političnem. Transformacija tako v ožjem smislu vključuje področje preoblikovanja in preobrazbe znotraj obrambnega in vojaškega sistema, ki ga širi na družbeno okolje ter se povezuje z njim. Transformacija je globalna in nadnacionalna. Po drugi strani pa v povsem novo luč postavlja nekatera nacionalna obrambno-varnostna vprašanja, predvsem kako zagotavljati stabilno in varno okolje za delovanje oblastnih, gospodarskih in civilnih institucij. Pri transformacijski paradigmi gre pravzaprav za prehod iz oboroženih sil industrijske dobe v oborožene sile informacijske dobe. Zato se transformacija na obrambno-vojaškem področju kaže kot razumna alternativa družbeni preobrazbi uporabe vojaške sile in tako postane nova teorija spreminjanja vojaške organiziranosti.

Posebnost transformacije je njena usmerjenost v načrtno in prostovoljno, oziroma ne-revolucionarno spreminjanje¹⁶, kar pa ne izključuje temeljitosti sprememb. Revolucionarno in radikalno spreminjanje v obrambno-vojaški sferi prinašata preveč tveganj in negativnih posledic, zlasti zaradi tega, ker se staro poruši, novega pa ni mogoče takoj vzpostaviti in preprosto nadomestiti delovanja prejšnjega sistema. Tako transformacija pomeni zapuščanje revolucionarnih pristopov k spremembam na področju vojaških zadev, zaradi česar jo je ponekod težko ločiti od sprememb in prilagajanj v tranzicijskih oziroma prehodnih obdobjih.

Cilji transformacije so usmerjeni v doseganje nove kakovosti in sprememb, ki ustrezajo sodobnim potrebam na ključnih področjih organiziranja in delovanja vojaških sil ter obrambnega sektorja, in sicer na kadrovske, materialnem, tehnološkem, informacijskem in tudi političnem. Praktično se izraža v spreminjanju organizacijskih struktur, doktrin in delovanja, v usmerjanju na zmogljivosti, še posebej pa na področje razvoja, raziskav, eksperimentiranja in učenja iz izkušenj. Pomemben element transformacije, morda celo najpomembnejši, je intelektualni, to so znanje, učenje in razumevanje (Knott 2004). Tako izobraževanje in usposabljanje, raziskave in razvoj, eksperimentiranje in učenje iz izkušenj ter posledično profil vojaškega profesionalca postajajo osrednja področja, na katerih poteka transformacijski proces.

Za države, pri katerih gre za prehod iz vojaške tranzicije v transformacijo, to pomeni oddaljevanje od prilagajanja in usmeritev v prenavo¹⁷. Če je za vojaško tranzicijo značilno prilagajanje vojaških struktur, njihove organizacije in delovanja glede na pojavljajoče se razmere, se poskušajo s transformacijo ustvariti prednosti ne le v

¹⁶ Pomenljiv naslov ima besedilo: *No Revolutions Please, We're British*, ki sta ga napisala Potts in Thackray (2005, 29–42), v katerem so na primerjavi modelov sprememb vojaških zmogljivosti navedeni razlogi za opuščanje tako imenovanih revolucionarnih modelov.

¹⁷ Več o tem Steiner 2009 117–134 v *It is Time for Transformation*.

strukturi, organizaciji in delovanju, temveč tudi v spremljanju in predvidevanju mogočega, kar prinaša odločilno prednost pred novimi situacijami.

V teh procesih se je znašla tudi Republika Slovenija oziroma njen obrambni sistem in vojska. Glede na obseg dosedanjih sprememb, hitrost in sorazmerno uspešnost prehoda iz modela množične teritorialno organizirane vojske v model premestljivih in nepremestljivih sil ter spremembo sistema popolnjevanja, bi lahko trdili, da so glavne tranzicijske spremembe za nami. Ob tem se transformacijskih izzivov zavedamo in jih postopno uresničujemo. Tudi zato, ker je jasno, da z nadaljevanjem tranzicijskemu prilagajanju strukture, nalog, organiziranja in delovanja vojske ni več mogoče doseči ciljev za prihodnost.

4 INTEGRACIJA JE TUDI RAZUMEVANJE NATA

Poseben integracijski izziv je ohranjanje in širjenje razumevanja Nata ter značilnosti zavezništva. To ni niti lahko niti enoznačno, še zlasti v obdobju gospodarske krize in recesije ali pa v razmerah, ko ni neposredne ogroženosti. Članstvo v Natu prvič zahteva pravilno razumevanje skupnega vojaškega delovanja po 5. členu zavezniške pogodbe¹⁸ in tudi zunaj njega. V prvem primeru govorimo o razumevanju kolektivne obrambe, ki v obdobju oddaljevanja od bipolarne razdelitve sveta in takšne ogroženosti spreminja svoje prioritete. To lahko v javnosti in med politično elito povzroči dvome o potrebnosti zavezništva. Pri sodelovanju v operacijah zunaj 5. člena oziroma najpogosteje imenovanih Natovih operacijah kriznega odzivanja pa se soočamo tudi z izzivi poslanstva zavezništva in njegovih interesov. Še posebno, ko gre za angažiranje vojaških sil na kriznih območjih, pri čemer je težje opredeliti skupne interese ali prepoznati vplive na ogrožanje nacionalne varnosti ali zavezništva¹⁹.

Iz tega izhaja, da je treba nacionalne strukture sil prilagoditi obema zahtevama, tako zagotovitvi skupnih sil za potrebe kolektivne obrambe kot tudi sil za sodelovanje v MOM na kriznih območjih. Takšna pripravljenost mora biti resnična, ne pa le v obliki obljub. Na vrhu Nata v Bukarešti leta 2008 so se članice zavezale, da bo polovica njihovih sil sposobna za premestitve (angl. Deployable Forces), deset odstotkov teh sil pa bo pripravljenih oziroma angažiranih v operacijah. Ta zaveza je nemalokrat odločujoča za načrtovanje razvoja sil in njihovo opremljanje ter doseganje povezljivosti.

¹⁸ Washingtonska pogodba iz leta 1949.

¹⁹ Zaradi tega Republika Slovenija svoje vojaške prispevke Natu pošilja v tiste operacije, ki imajo mandat OZN in so pokrite z ustreznimi resolucijami Varnostnega sveta.

Drugo pomembno spoznanje je povezano s konsenzom in odgovornostjo, ki sta temelja zavezništva. K doseganju konsenza pomembno prispeva tudi harmonizacija prizadevanj posameznih članic, ki mora biti kljub množici interesov in želja uravnotežena, stvarna, ciljno usmerjena, temeljiti pa mora na uresničevanju obveznosti, ki so jih sprejele članice (Šavc 2009, 54–55). V procesih pridruževanja, integracije in skupnega obrambnega načrtovanja se sprejemajo obveze do zavezništva, do katerih se je treba vesti odgovorno. Če pride do nasprotovanj ali celo preloma sprejetih zavez, so pred vprašanji in izzivi tudi drugi in seveda tudi vse, kar zavezništvo povezuje.

Ker je Slovenija članica dveh velikih mednarodnih organizacij, Nata in EU, to prinaša nekatere posebnosti in izzive, predvsem pri zagotavljanju zmogljivosti. Slovenska vojska zagotavlja iste zmogljivosti za obe organizaciji, in sicer po načelu Single Set of Forces. Pri tem pa podpira boljše sodelovanje in prizadevanja za izboljšanje sodelovanja obeh organizaciji na vojaškem področju.

Dodajam še eno značilnost, s katero se srečujejo države v zavezništvu. Večkrat se namreč izpostavlja, da se je treba vključiti v zavezništvo, da bi zmanjšali izdatke za obrambo in vojsko. V resnici pa gre za drug vidik, ki je povezan z racionalnejšo in smotnejšo uporabo proračunskih virov ter se kaže v vlaganju v resnične obrambne potrebe in vojaške zmogljivosti. Navedeno se v nacionalnem okolju velikokrat kaže tudi kot omejevalni dejavnik, ki preprečuje porabo obrambnih virov za namene in potrebe, ki niso nujni ali ključni za obrambne sposobnosti. Opazni so primeri, ko se na obrambne proračune poskušajo obesiti izdatki, ki s stvarnimi obrambnimi zadevami nimajo veliko skupnega, in tako navidezno prikazovati povečevanje izdatkov. V primerih, ko gre za uveljavljanje preglednosti obrambnega in vojaškega proračuna, je občutek omejevanja zaradi zavezništva razumljiv. V resnici pa gre za uveljavljanje kakovostnega vidika porabe, ki je osnovni množitelj skupne vojaške moči in zmogljivosti zavezništva.

Pomembno vprašanje je tudi, ali smo se v procesu tranzicije naučili dovolj in lahko spremenimo naša dejanja. Ali lahko na tej podlagi zagotovimo stvarne nacionalne načrte, ki bodo izpolnili Natova pričakovanja. Vprašanje je tudi, kako Natovi načrtovalci razumejo cilje sil in kako definirajo pričakovanja za skupno graditev zmogljivosti, predvsem njihovih primanjkljajev. Tu je tudi vprašanje, kaj je bistvenega in kaj drugotnega pomena, če so viri omejeni. Ali so to zmogljivosti

za nacionalno obrambo ali tiste, ki poleg tega, da se lahko uporabljajo za nacionalne potrebe, prispevajo tudi k skupnim zavezniškim premestljivim zmogljivostim. In končno, države se morajo po vstopu v zavezništvo zavedati razlogov, ki so jih vodili po poti vključevanja in doseganja ciljev, ki jih želijo doseči s članstvom. Tudi zato, ker se tranzicijskih obdobj in sprememb ne da povrniti.

Sklep Slovenska tranzicijska pot na obrambno-vojaškem področju ima nekaj posebnosti, ki sem jih poskušal predstaviti v članku. Nekaj teh posebnosti se bo pokazalo tudi v transformacijskem procesu, v katerega smo kot članica Nata vključeni. V članku so navedene nekatere izkušnje iz obdobja, ko smo se pripravljali za vstop, iz procesa akcijskega načrta za članstvo in petletnega obdobja integracije po vstopu v zavezništvo. Skupni imenovalec vseh spoznanj je v stvarnosti kot temelju kredibilnosti. Na poti v zavezništvo ni treba obljubljeni stvari, ki jih ni mogoče uresničiti oziroma so nestvarne in presegajo nacionalne zmožnosti.

Transformacija je izziv, ki prinaša velika pričakovanja, pa tudi dvome, ne le v zavezništvu, temveč tudi v nacionalnih okoljih. Države si v obdobju transformacije postavljajo za cilj oblikovanje vojske, ki bo po obsegu majhna, a učinkovita, visoko profesionalna in sodobno opremljena, premestljiva in interoperabilna ter bo skupaj z Natom uspešno uresničevala nacionalne in zavezniške naloge in poslanstvo.

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TRANSFORMACIJA REGIONALNEGA SODELOVANJA NA PODROČJU OBRAMBNIH REFORM – ŠTUDIJA PRIMERA CLEARINGHOUSE ZA JUGOVZHODNO EVROPO

TRANSFORMATION OF REGIONAL COOPERATION IN DEFENCE REFORMS – A CASE STUDY OF SOUTHEAST EUROPE CLEARINGHOUSE

Professional article

Povzetek Regionalno obrambno sodelovanje na območju Jugovzhodne Evrope je razvejano in raznovrstno. Tudi Republika Slovenija ima bogato tradicijo sodelovanja v regionalnih pobudah. Z vidika praktičnih oblik sodelovanja na Zahodnem Balkanu ima posebno vlogo pobuda Clearinghouse za Jugovzhodno Evropo (JVE), v kateri ima strateško vodilno vlogo, skupaj z ZDA, prav Slovenija. Dejstvo, da je bistveni člen regionalne povezave, pa predstavlja vrsto izzivov in priložnosti. Pobuda je presegla prvotno zastavljene cilje, saj je odprla nove možnosti regionalnega sodelovanja, nova konkretna in dolgoročna orodja za krepitev regionalne stabilnosti in integriranega sodelovanja, močno pa je okrepila tudi prepoznavnost, ugled in zaznavanje profesionalnosti slovenskih predstavnikov in države kot celote.

Pobuda se je zaradi neformalne narave in izjemne prilagodljivosti pokazala kot pospeševalnik različnih oblik in vsebin regionalnega sodelovanja sploh. Slovenija, razen z vidika svoje vodilne vloge, ni znala dovolj izkoristiti možnosti sodelovanja v pobudi, delno tudi zaradi slabe odzivnosti in nezadostne ravni ambicij obrambnega resorja. Predvideni sprejem nacionalnih strateških dokumentov za delovanje na Zahodnem Balkanu bo najbrž ena zadnjih priložnosti za bolj usmerjen, prepoznaven, prožen, integriran in učinkovit pristop države k obrambnemu sodelovanju v regiji.

Ključne besede *Zahodni Balkan, regionalno sodelovanje, obrambne reforme, Clearinghouse za Jugovzhodno Evropo, regionalni projekti, regionalni centri, izmenjava primerljivih izkušenj, pragmatični pristop.*

Abstract Regional defence cooperation in Southeast Europe is diverse. Slovenia has a rich tradition of cooperation in regional initiatives. From perspective of practical cooperation in the Western Balkans the Southeast Europe Clearinghouse initiative, where United States and Slovenia play a strategic leadership role, has a special place. This fact presents many challenges and opportunities.

The initiative has outgrown initial expectations and goals, since it opened up new perspectives for regional cooperation, while introducing new specific and long-term tools for strengthening regional cooperation. It also strengthened the visibility, recognition and the perception of professionalism of Slovenian representatives and the country as a whole. The informal character and extreme adaptability helped make the initiative a facilitator of various forms and topics of regional cooperation. Slovenia, beside having a clear lead role, failed to fully use the opportunities within the initiative, partly because of slow recognition and low level of ambition within the defence system. The anticipated adoption of national strategic documents on priority cooperation in the Western Balkans may present one of the last opportunities for a more focused, recognizable, flexible, integrated and effective approach towards cooperation in the field of defence reforms in the region.

Key words *Western Balkans, regional cooperation, defence reforms, Southeast Europe Clearinghouse, regional projects, regional centres, exchange of comparable experiences, pragmatic approach.*

Uvod Sodobno mednarodno varnostno okolje zaznamuje prisotnost transnacionalnih virov ogrožanja, ki večja soodvisnost subjektov mednarodne skupnosti.¹ Države oblikujejo podobne zaznave virov ogrožanja, kar lahko vodi v približevanje nacionalnih interesov in skupno delovanje za doseganje skupnih ciljev (Murray in Viotti, 1994, str. 10, ter Plano in Olton, 1988, str. 10–11). S koncem hladne vojne in spremenjeno naravo konfliktov je pridobilo na pomenu tudi regionalno varnostno sodelovanje² (Anastasakis in Bojicic-Dzelilovic, 2002, str. 1), ki se je razvilo v stalnico sodobnih mednarodnih odnosov (Svetlozar, 2009, str. 85).

Regionalno sodelovanje, skladno z Ustanovno listino Organizacije Združenih narodov, je osrednje sredstvo za obravnavo političnih in ekonomskih vprašanj, preden se razvijejo v izzive, ki zahtevajo globalni odziv. Sodelovanje med državami je tudi eno izmed desetih načel dekaloga Helsinške sklepne listine Organizacije za varnost in sodelovanje v Evropi (OVSE), ki urejajo odnose med državami. Države so se zavezale k spodbujanju medsebojnega razumevanja, dobrih sosedskih odnosov in mednarodnega miru, varnosti in pravičnosti ter k izboljševanju življenjskih razmer prebivalstva. S tem namenom so regije³ razvile ustrezne institucionalne strukture,

¹ Glej tudi Resolucijo o strategiji nacionalne varnosti Republike Slovenije, sprejeto 26. marca 2010, Uradni list RS, št. 27/2010 z dne 2. 4. 2010.

² Več o teoriji regionalne varnosti glej: Buzan, Barry, 1991. *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post Cold War Era*. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Lake, David in Morgan, Patrick, 1997. *The New Regionalism in Security affairs. V: Lake, David in Morgan, Patrick, ur. Regional Orders. The Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania.*

³ Obstajajo sicer različne opredelitve termina regija, tako Morgan (1997, str. 25–26), vendar lahko govorimo o posameznih ključnih elementih, ki govorijo o njenem obstoju, in sicer so to določena raven zavedanja članov in okolja, da regija obstaja, geografska bližina in interaktivnost, tudi soodvisnosti med člani, neka raven avtonomije glede na globalni sistem ter visoka stopnja politične, ekonomske in kulturne podobnosti. Nenazadnje je regionalno sodelovanje tudi odraz zunanjih, mednarodnih dejavnikov in notranje dinamike (Anastasakis in Bojicic-Dzelilovic, 2002, str. 2).

režime sodelovanja, še posebej znotraj regijske pobude, ki spodbujajo večjo koherentnost regije in gradnjo skupnih vrednot in občutka pripadnosti. Bolj kot so pri tem uspešne, večja je možnost, da bo sodelovanje uspešno (Šabič in Bojinović, 2007, str. 317–318, ter Svetlozar, 2009, str. 88).

Že uvodoma je treba poudariti omejene ambicije tega članka, saj njegov namen ni podajanje celovitega pregleda različnih pobud v regiji, čeprav si to vprašanje gotovo zasluži posebno obravnavo. Osvetliti želim predvsem poseben primer, ko je Republika Slovenija prek Ministrstva za obrambo (MO) prepoznala in našla svojo regionalno priložnost ter na uspešnem, inovativnem in praktičnem primeru delno upravičila včasih sicer dokaj votlo krilatico o Sloveniji kot regionalnem ekspertu oziroma voditelju. V članku se omejujem na regionalno sodelovanje na obrambnem področju.⁴

Članek temelji na osebnih izkušnjah, saj sem bil aktivno vključen v vse faze razvoja regionalne pobude Clearinghouse za Jugovzhodno Evropo (Southeast Europe Clearinghouse – SEEC) od snovanja njenih konceptualnih okvirov leta 2004 do danes. V zadnjih letih sem tudi stalni sopredsedujoči SEEC. Ta vloga je bila odlično izhodišče za metodo opazovanja z udeležbo ter redne pogovore s sodelujočimi. Članek obsega analizo temeljnih dokumentov, ki so bili sprejeti v SEEC in njenih mehanizmih (npr. podatkovne baze). Vključena je tudi analiza sekundarnih virov, ki omogoča boljše razumevanje razvoja regionalnega sodelovanja na območju Jugovzhodne Evrope oziroma Zahodnega Balkana.

Na podlagi klasičnih teoretičnih postavk o vlogi regionalnega sodelovanja v mednarodnih odnosih (avtorjev, kot so Ernst Haas, Robert Keohane in Philippe Schmitter) ali novejših raziskav o regionalizmu (Martin Dangerfield in Charles King) lahko analiziramo regionalne oblike sodelovanja glede na tip (glede na pobudo za nastanek – zunanjo ali državn v regiji⁵), članstvo, ustanove in prednostne politike (Svetlozar, 2009, str. 90–91). V analizo je vključen tudi razvojni vidik obravnavane regionalne pobude, kar omogoča celovitejše razumevanje sicer zapletene problematike.

⁴ Če se osredotočimo na sedanje mednarodnovarnostne kooperativne projekte v regiji in vlogo Republike Slovenije v njih, lahko uporabimo tipologijo, opredeljeno v ciljnem raziskovalnem projektu »Znanje za varnost in mir 2004–2010« iz leta 2007, v katerem zasledimo delitev na sodelovanje na obrambnem področju, vključno z vojaškim in sodelovanjem na področju kriznega upravljanja, sodelovanje na področju zaščite in reševanja, razvoja in raziskav, s poudarkom na varnostnem področju, in sodelovanje na področju obrambne industrije.

⁵ Pogosto pride pobuda od zunaj in se pozneje pomika k vedno večjemu regionalnemu lastništvu; težnja, ki smo jo aktivno spodbujali tudi v SEEC.

Po nemirnih devetdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja je na prelomu novega tisočletja na Zahodnem Balkanu⁶ sodelovanje na področju obrambe ponovno oživel.⁷ Začela sta se graditi zaupanje in varnost med državami v regiji, poleg tega je bilo treba uvesti varnostni režim v konfliktnem in močno razdeljenem območju (Anastasakis in Bojicic-Dzelilovic, 2002, str. 5). Predvsem po vojni v BiH in na Kosovu se je razvilo več regionalnih pobud za sodelovanje, ki danes združujejo številne procese in projekte na različnih varnostnih področjih in z različnimi akterji (državnimi in nedržavnimi). Danes govorimo o večplastnem, večinivojskem procesu regionalnega sodelovanja, ki zajema tako politični dialog na najvišji ravni kot posamezne praktične, projektne oblike sodelovanja, tako dvostransko sodelovanje, ki temelji na rednih letnih programih sodelovanja med državami, kot bolj formalne regionalne oblike sodelovanja (Dangerfield, 2004, str. 205).

Na regijo so močno vplivali ZDA, Evropska unija in Nato.⁸ Po besedah Karla Deutscha (1957) je Evropa na območju Zahodnega Balkana z uvajanjem mehanizmov regionalnega sodelovanja poskusila graditi stabilnost oziroma uveljaviti koncept varnostne skupnosti, kot se je pokazal v primeru Zahodne, Srednje in deloma Vzhodne Evrope. Doseganje sprave prek regionalnega sodelovanja, ki naj bi vodilo k političnemu razumevanju in gospodarskemu ter socialnemu razcvetu, je postalo pogoj za članstvo v EU.⁹ Hkrati pa sta tako imenovani evropska prihodnost in perspektiva članstva v EU in Natu postali vodilno orodje za preprečevanja konfliktov ter mehanizem za transformacijo obrambnih sistemov oziroma gonilna sila pospeševanja regionalnega sodelovanja (CRP, 2007, str. 103–111).¹⁰

⁶ Posamezni avtorji pogosto postavljajo pod vprašaj obstoj regije Zahodni Balkan, saj je bilo, zgodovinsko gledano, to območje večinoma razdeljeno med različne pole oblasti, z izjemo Jugoslavije, kar je vodilo do šibke regionalne identitete. Balkan je geografska oznaka za ozemlja v jugovzhodni Evropi, južno od Save in Donave. Države so se oznake »Balkan« pogosto branile zaradi njenega negativnega prizvoka in povezave s konflikti in napetostmi, ki jih je mednarodna skupnost pripisovala temu območju. To je vodilo do uporabe terminov, kot sta Jugovzhodna Evropa ali Zahodni Balkan. Vendar pa izhajamo s stališča, da lahko govorimo o regiji, ki so jo precej oblikovali zunanji dejavniki, od katerih sta med pomembnejšimi stabilizacijski in pridružitveni proces v Evropski uniji. Regija je združila države s perspektivo članstva, ki so ostale del nerešene zgodbe stabilizacije Evrope in integracije v evro-atlantske povezave (Delević, 2007, str. 11–16).

⁷ O zgodovini regionalnega povezovanja na območju Balkana glej tudi Kut, Sule in Sirin, N. Asli, 2002. *The Bright Side of Balkan Politics: Cooperation in the Balkans. Journal of Southeast Europe and Black Sea Studies*, januar 2002, 2(1), str. 10–23.

⁸ Po besedah Ollija Rehna, nekdanjega evropskega komisarja za širitev, je razvoj regionalnega sodelovanja v najboljšem interesu vseh zahodnoevropskih držav. Je ključni dejavnik politične stabilnosti, varnosti in ekonomskega razvoja. S tega vidika je regionalno sodelovanje temelj odnosa EU do regije oziroma stabilizacijskega in pridružitvenega procesa, ki vodi do članstva v EU. Nekdanji generalni sekretar Nata pa je regionalno sodelovanje na Zahodnem Balkanu označil kot nujno na podlagi več kot 50-letnih evropskih izkušenj, da integracija spodbuja zaupanje, stabilnost in razvoj (Seroka, 2008, str. 15).

⁹ Razlog je preprost, države morajo preseči razlike in nesoglasja z neposrednimi sosedami, da se spori ne bodo prenesli na raven Nata oziroma EU (Seroka, 2008, str. 15–17). Poleg tega države, ki prispevajo k regionalnim ciljem, kažejo pripravljenost za prevzem obveznosti, ki izhajajo iz članstva v EU (Dangerfield, 2004, str. 204).

¹⁰ Brez zunanje spodbude bi bilo nerealno pričakovati, da bi države regije uspele v tem času generirati dovolj politične volje za sodelovanje z nekdanjimi nasprotniki. Šibka gospodarstva, nezaupanje, šibke demokratične institucije in vojne izkušnje so dejavniki, ki so prej ovirali kot spodbujali sodelovanje (Seroka, 2008, str. 17–18).

Regionalne pobude¹¹ so imele predvsem v času, ko so nekatere države Srednje in Jugovzhodne Evrope začrtale smer na poti v evro-atlantske integracije, pogosto pomembno politično komponento. Pri tem je lahko pomembna že oblika srečanj, zato v njih na primer pogosto prihaja do rednih srečanj na ministrski ravni. Takšna primera sta med drugim Obrambni ministerial za Jugovzhodno Evropo (SEDM) in Jadranska listina (A-3/A-5)¹². Te povezave so navadno tudi ustrezno formalizirane in strukturirane, med drugim v njih lahko najdemo organizacijske odbore in druga delovna telesa ter politične izjave. Pomembni dosežki ali cilji takšnih povezav pa so lahko tudi redna izmenjava informacij, izrazi regionalne solidarnosti, skupne izjave o nameri, načrti skupnega sodelovanja, posebni projekti in podobno. Hkrati s povečanjem sodelovanja držav v mednarodnih operacijah in na misijah je bilo mogoče zaznati tudi težnjo po bolj pragmatičnem in namensko usmerjenem regionalnem sodelovanju pri obrambnih reformah ter mednarodnih operacijah in misijah. Na področju sodelovanja v mednarodnih operacijah in na misijah lahko na primer poleg skupine A-3, njene države so v Afganistanu sodelovale s tristransko medicinsko enoto, izpostavimo tudi MLF¹³, formalno pobudo s posebnimi in omejenimi cilji ter omejenim članstvom.

Med pomembnejše oblike regionalnega in večstranskega sodelovanja na obrambno-varnostnem področju, v katerih aktivno sodeluje tudi Ministrstvo za obrambo Republike Slovenije, spadajo Pobuda za sodelovanje obrambnih ministrov Jugovzhodne Evrope¹⁴, Regionalni center za pomoč pri verifikaciji in

¹¹ Glej CRP, 2007, str. 114–238, in Delevič, 2007, str. 17–29.

¹² Jadranska listina je pobuda, v okviru katere njene članice poskušajo individualno in skupinsko intenzivirati reformna in druga prizadevanja za krepitev varnosti, stabilnosti in blaginje celotne regije Zahodnega Balkana. Gre za forum za približevanje evro-atlantskim integracijam in zagotovilo za zagotavljanje pomoči ZDA. Pobuda je bila oblikovana po vzoru Baltske listine iz leta 1998. Ideja o ustanovitvi posebne jadranske pobude se je prvič pojavila na vrhu Nata v Pragi leta 2002, in sicer pri najvišjih političnih predstavnikih ZDA, Albanije, Hrvaške in Makedonije. Ministri za zunanje zadeve teh držav so 2. maja 2003 v Skopju podpisali listino o strateškem partnerstvu na poti v evro-atlantske integracije, t. i. Jadransko listino (A-3), ter tako tudi uradno obeležili ustanovitev pobude. Septembra 2008 so se članice A-3 odločile, da k sodelovanju povabijo še Bosno in Hercegovino ter Črno goro, ki sta postali polnopravni članici decembra istega leta, ko je bil ob ministerialu OVSE v Helsinkih podpisan dodatek k listini (A-5).

¹³ Večnacionalne sile kopenske vojske Italije, Madžarske in Slovenije (Multinational Land Force) so bile ustanovljene leta 1998 s podpisom posebnega sporazuma. Predstavljajo zelo uspešno obliko mednarodnega vojaškega sodelovanja v regiji. Med dosežke spadajo uspešna skupna usposabljanja in sodelovanje v mednarodnih operacijah in na misijah ter gradnja ter vključevanje v koncept in prakso evropskih bojnih skupin (EUBG).

¹⁴ Pobuda SEDM (Southeastern Europe Defence Ministerial) je nastala leta 1998 z namenom krepiti mir, varnost in stabilnost ter utrjevati zaupanje med državami Jugovzhodne Evrope. Sodelovanje držav članic poteka v duhu Natovega programa Partnerstva za mir in ima funkcijo mehanizma, ki predvsem prek sodelovanja v delovnih skupinah prenaša izkušnje držav članic Nata in EU, ki sodelujejo v SEDM, državam kandidatkam. Med članicami najdemo tudi Albanijo, Bolgarijo, Bosno in Hercegovino, Hrvaško, Italijo, Grčijo, Makedonijo, Romunijo, Turčijo, ZDA, Slovenijo, Ukrajino ter Črno goro in Srbijo.

implementaciji nadzora oborožitve¹⁵ (RACVIAC) ter Pobuda Clearinghouse za Jugovzhodno Evropo¹⁶. S podrobnejšo analizo je mogoče ugotoviti, da je njihov primarni cilj pomoč državam pri njihovem vključevanju v evro-atlantske integracije. Poleg sodelovanja v SEDM poteka sodelovanje tudi na operativni ravni, še posebej za SEEC pa velja, da so se aktivnosti razvijale predvsem po načelu pristopa »bottom up«, torej z ekspertne ravni navzgor, uspešno sodelovanje pa je z leti postalo bolj razvejano in poglobljeno. Lahko rečemo celo, da je prišlo do pomembne transformacije pobude oziroma spremembe nekaterih temeljnih načel regionalnega sodelovanja nasploh. Pobuda SEEC je postavila temelj in ponudila orodja, ki dajejo možnost za uveljavitev sprememb konceptov regionalnega sodelovanja pri obrambnih reformah na Zahodnem Balkanu. Gre torej za povsem novo poglavje regionalnega sodelovanja, tako z vidika regije kot tudi z vidika vloge, ki jo ima pri tem Republika Slovenija.

1 POBUDA CLEARINGHOUSE ZA JVE

Pobudo Clearinghouse za JVE so leta 2004 ustanovile ZDA¹⁷ in Republika Slovenija¹⁸, kot pobudnici in stalni sopedredujoči, ter države Zahodnega Balkana – Albanija, Bosna in Hercegovina, Hrvaška, Republika Makedonija ter Srbija in Črna gora. Na podlagi preteklih izkušenj s formalnimi oblikami sodelovanja je bila želja ustanoviteljev uvesti neformalno pobudo, ki bi bila ustrezno prilagodljiva in sposobna pragmatičnega projektne pristopa.¹⁹ Pomembni temeljni načeli sta bila tudi pristo-
voljna udeležba in sodelovanje.

¹⁵ RACVIAC (*Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre*) je mednarodna, neodvisna in neprofitna regionalna akademska organizacija, ki je začela delo oktobra 2000. Center je bil ustanovljen z namenom oziroma ciljem spodbujati države Jugovzhodne Evrope k učinkovitemu uresničevanju sporazumov s področja nadzora nad oborožitvijo ter h kreptivi zaupanja in sodelovanja v regiji. Leta 2008 je s preoblikovanjem v Center za varnostno sodelovanje (RACVIAC – CSC) svoje delovanje usmeril v nadaljnjo stabilizacijo regije in dodatno podprl prizadevanja mednarodne skupnosti zanjo. Prednostne naloge centra so zato postali izvajanje programov za spodbujanje reform, povezanih z demokratičnim nadzorom nad oboroženimi silami, dvig standardov civilno-vojaških odnosov ter drugih vprašanj, povezanih z reformo obrambnega sektorja, in zagotavljanje t. i. »mehke varnosti«. Med članicami najdemo Albanijo, Bosno in Hercegovino, Bolgarijo, Hrvaško, Makedonijo, Grčijo, Moldavijo, Črno goro, Romunijo, Srbijo, Turčijo, Avstrijo, Češko, Dansko, Francijo, ZRN, Madžarsko, Italijo, Nizozemsko, Slovenijo, Španijo, Švedsko in druge.

¹⁶ Slovenija in ZDA sta skupaj z državami z območja Zahodnega Balkana leta 2004 ustanovili neformalno pobudo Southeast Europe Clearinghouse (SEEC). V njej poleg držav regije sodeluje še okrog 30 držav in več mednarodnih organizacij. Osnovni namen pobude sta izmenjava informacij o obrambnih sistemih ter sodelovanje na ključnih področjih obrambnih reform. Zanimiva pobuda je tudi Pakt stabilnosti, ki je bil preoblikovan v Svet za regionalno sodelovanje (Regional Cooperation Council), ki deluje od februarja 2008 in naj bi bil regionalno voden, ciljno usmerjen in učinkovit okvir sodelovanja v regiji, namenjen podpori državam pri njihovem vključevanju v evro-atlantske integracije.

¹⁷ Sprva so v pobudi na ameriški strani sodelovali predstavniki US EUCOM (United States European Command), Poveljstva ameriških sil v Evropi, od leta 2008 pa predstavniki OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defence), Urada sekretarja za obrambo.

¹⁸ Slovenijo v pobudi zastopajo predstavniki Direktorata za obrambno politiko Ministrstva za obrambo.

¹⁹ Ravno neformalnost in pristovoljnost, poleg konkretnih projektov, sta glavni prednosti te pobude. Glej: *Joint Statement of the Southeast Europe Clearinghouse*, 30. november–1. december 2004, Ljubljana, Slovenija, http://www.seecdb.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=5&Itemid=6.

Izhodišče za ustanovitev pobude SEEC je bila želja vseh sodelujočih, predvsem pa držav regije, po odpravi podvajanj in razpršenosti pri sodelovanju v obrambnih reformah, do katerih prihaja zaradi razvejanosti različnih oblik sedanjega sodelovanja. Namen je bil torej zagotoviti dodano vrednost sodelovanju pri obrambnih reformah in prizadevanju za gospodarnejše ravnanje z razpoložljivimi viri. Bistvenega pomena sta bila tudi pomoč kandidatkam za članstvo v Natu oziroma Partnerstvu za mir in oblikovanje foruma za izmenjavo informacij.

Na prvi konferenci pobude Clearinghouse v Ljubljani 1. decembra 2004 je bilo udeleženih več kot 30 držav²⁰ in 5 organizacij, udeleženci pa so pripravili tudi posebno skupno izjavo²¹ (joint statement), v kateri so za cilj med drugim opredelili »odpravljanje podvajanja naporov v regiji, optimizacijo omejenih virov, boljše usklajenost aktivnosti, vse v duhu doseganja sorodnih ciljev«. Zapisali so, da bodo tri kandidatke za članstvo v Natu (Albanija, Hrvaška in Republika Makedonija) ter dve državi, ki sta želeli vstopiti v Partnerstvo za mir (BiH ter Srbija in Črna gora), jasno opredelile svoje glavne potrebe na področju obrambnih reform, tako da bodo druge sodelujoče države in organizacije lahko ponudile svojo pomoč in podporo ter da bo mogoče določiti konkretna področja sodelovanja, ki bi prinesla korist vsem udeleženiim. V skupni izjavi je bilo zapisano še, da pobuda SEEC ne želi nadomestiti nobene sedanje oblike sodelovanja, želi pa vnesti novo kakovost in preglednost ter se izogniti podvajanju.

1.1 Prva faza razvoja SEEC – koncept povpraševanja in ponudbe

Na podlagi temeljnih ciljev, izraženih v skupni izjavi, so se sodelujoči odločili za postavitev podatkovne baze, ki bi najprej pravzaprav dala jasen pregled nad potrebami, ki jih imajo države regije na različnih področjih obrambnih reform. Zavedati se moramo, da bi bila že samo to pomembna pridobitev. Ker je pobuda SEEC neformalna in nima svojih kadrov, je to nalogo prevzel Direktor za obrambno politiko MO, ki je bazo razvil v sodelovanju s strokovnjaki za informatiko z ministrstva. Delovanje podatkovne baze je moralo biti dovolj preprosto, predvsem pa uporabno. Uvedeno je bilo povezovalno orodje obveščanja in medsebojnega komuniciranja. Njegovo upravljanje je po nekaj letih, na svojo pobudo in v duhu večjega regionalnega lastništva, prevzelo ministrstvo za obrambo Črne gore. Znotraj podatkovne baze, v kateri je mogoče najti več uporabnih informacij, je pomemben seznam oseb za stike v SEEC, ki se nenehno posodablja, na njem pa so uradno določeni predstavniki za stike posameznih držav in organizacij, ki sodelujejo v pobudi, kar omogoča redno seznanjanje z glavnimi aktivnostmi.

²⁰ Albanija, Avstrija, Belgija, Bosna in Hercegovina, Bolgarija, Kanada, Hrvaška, Češka, Danska, Grčija, Estonija, Finska, Francija, Makedonija, Nemčija, Madžarska, Italija, Latvija, Litva, Nizozemska, Norveška, Poljska, Romunija, Srbija, Črna gora, Slovaška, Slovenija, Švedska, Švica in Velika Britanija, DCAF, RACVIAC, NATO.

²¹ Joint Statement of the Southeast Europe Clearinghouse, 30. november–1. december 2004, Ljubljana, Slovenija, http://www.seecdb.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=5&Itemid=6.

Vsebinski del podatkovne baze je temeljil na konceptu povpraševanja, in sicer v obliki jasnih, projektno izraženih potreb držav v regiji, ter v različnih kategorijah obrambnih reform in z njimi povezanih ponudb za sodelovanje drugih. Pri vsebinski določitvi posameznih področij obrambnih reform smo si sposodili Natovo kategorizacijo, ki v glavne sklope med drugim uvršča področja politik in organizacije, kadrovskega upravljanja, usposabljanja, zmogljivosti, komunikacij, nepremičnin, mednarodnih operacij in misij, nadzora oborožitve, neproliferacije ter drugo. Po dveh letih delovanja smo bazo napolnili s podatki o potrebah in ponudbah, kar nam je omogočilo celovito analizo in oceno stanja. Izhodiščna predvidevanja o podvajanju aktivnosti v regiji so se potrdila z analizo podatkovne baze, ki je pokazala nevarnost podvajanja na nekaterih ključnih področjih.

Tabela 1: Del podatkov iz analize ponudbe in povpraševanja v podatkovni bazi SEEC

POD ROČJE	POTREBE	PONUDBE
Upravljanje kadrov		
Splošno	Hrvaška (4 + 4/SPECTRA), BiH (2)	
Zmanjšanje kadrov in upokojitve	Hrvaška (2), Albanija (1), Srbija (3 ²²), BiH (2)	Danska, VB, ZDA, Češka, Poljska, možnost dodatnih ponudb - RACVIAC, Nato
Rekrutiranje in selekcija kandidatov	BiH (1), Srbija (1)	
Vojaška infrastruktura – Simulacijski Center	Albanija, Srbija, Makedonija	Latvija, Slovenija, Poljska
Poveljevanje in nadzor	Hrvaška, Makedonija, Črna gora, Srbija	Danska, Slovenija, ZDA
Odnosi z javnostmi	Hrvaška, BiH, Srbija	VB, Nizozemska, RACVIAC, Latvija, Poljska, Slovenija, Estonija
Pravne zadeve	Srbija, Albanija	Estonija, Poljska, Slovenija, Litva, Latvija, Romunija
CIMIC	Hrvaška, Makedonija, BiH, Srbija	seminarji (Slovenija, Danska), Poljska, Nato

Analiza (tabela 1) je pokazala na podvajanje tako na strani povpraševanja kot tudi ponudbe. Države in organizacije so bazo napolnile s številnimi zelo podobnimi potrebami in ponudbami, zato smo prišli do ugotovitve, da bi bil na teh področjih obrambnih reform najbolj smotrni regionalni pristop, in sicer tako v smislu bolj integrirane obravnave sorodnih vsebinskih vprašanj kot tudi z vidika izmenjave primerljivih izkušenj med državami regije, ki se soočajo s podobnimi izzivi in nalogami. Lahko ugotovimo, da se je s tem pravzaprav končala prva faza pobude

²² Število različnih projektno razčlenjenih potreb.

SEEC, in sicer faza »povpraševanja in ponudbe«, težišče aktivnosti pa je bilo preneseno v drugo, ki je bila usmerjena predvsem v različne vidike regionalnega pristopa.

1.2 Druga faza razvoja SEEC – regionalni pristop

Ključna področja obrambnih reform, ki smo jih na podlagi analize podatkovne baze zaznali kot pomembna za več držav, so bila usposabljanje za mednarodne operacije in misije, medijsko usposabljanje, kadrovski menedžment, obrambno načrtovanje, razorožitev, zdravstvena oskrba in drugo. Podroben opis potreb posameznih držav je pokazal veliko podobnosti, s tem pa tudi možnost za racionalnejši pristop, ki bo odpravil podvajanje aktivnosti in kolektivno dodane vrednosti. Na tej točki je nujnih nekaj pojasnil z organizacijskega in vsebinskega vidika regionalne dinamike aktivnosti SEEC. Ko z današnjimi očmi gledamo evolucijo pobude SEEC, lahko ugotovimo, da se je regionalni pristop razvijal v dve smeri. Prva je bila krepitev regionalnega sodelovanja na težiščnih področjih, ki jih je identificirala podatkovna baza, in sicer z neposrednim povezovanjem posameznih držav regije. Takšne primere smo na primer zasledili v kadrovskega upravljanju, usposabljanju za medicinsko oskrbo²³ in usposabljanju psov. Prav tako smo na podlagi analize podatkovne baze in ključnih področij nekatere države želele spodbuditi prakso rednega organiziranja regionalnih simpozijev, konferenc in delavnic, namenjenih posameznim strokovnim vprašanjem.

Za celovito obravnavo kritičnih reformnih vprašanj regije smo julija 2007 v Sloveniji organizirali tridnevni regionalni simpozij o obrambnem načrtovanju. Format srečanja je pokazal, da imamo možnost konceptualnega premika na višjo kakovostno raven, saj je bilo večkrat jasno poudarjeno, da je prišlo do zelo pomembne in uporabne izmenjave izkušenj, informacij in dobre prakse med državami regije, ki se soočajo s podobnimi izzivi. Nova kakovost je bila torej izmenjava primerljivih in sorodnih izkušenj, ki jih je bilo mogoče nemudoma uporabiti tudi v praksi. Na simpoziju so sodelovali tudi slovenski strokovnjaki in poznavalci s področja obrambnega načrtovanja iz Nata ter EU. Ta regionalni dogodek nam je pokazal še eno konceptualno zanimivost, in sicer možnost sodelovanja različnih držav in organizacij v dogodkih, v katerih sodelujejo različni poznavalci iz držav v regiji, kar omogoča ne le zgoščen, kakovosten in celovit prenos informacij ter znanja, temveč tudi finančno,

²³ Dogovor o sodelovanju med državama s komplementarnimi zmogljivostmi na sorodnem področju, in sicer Srbijo, ki ima tradicionalne zmogljivosti Medicinske akademije, in Republiko Makedonijo, ki izvaja kakovostno usposabljanje v okviru priprav za sodelovanje v mednarodnih operacijah in na misijah. Pot do dogovora je vodila od obdobja, ko sta se državi bali, da obstoj sorodne zmogljivosti pomeni grožnjo, prek medsebojnega spoznavanja na ekspertni ravni, pa vse do dogovora o možnostih sodelovanja po načelu medsebojnega dopolnjevanja. Takšne vzorce smo zaznali tudi v številnih drugih primerih, napredek pa je temeljil na neprekinjenem dialogu, ki je močno okrepil medsebojno zaupanje, na ekspertnih pogovorih, prenosu odločanja na raven direktorjev za obrambno politiko ter na ponovnem dialogu na ekspertni ravni. Za vse to je bilo seveda treba veliko časa.

organizacijsko in vsebinsko racionalnejši pristop zaokroženih dogodkov, namesto razpršenih in nereprezentativnih.²⁴

Drugo smer regionalnega pristopa pa so zaznamovali predvsem pogovori držav regije o postavitvi regionalnih centrov za izobraževanje in usposabljanje na področjih, ki z vidika potreb najbolj zanimajo večino držav. Gre za tako pomembna, politično občutljiva in potencialno daljnosežna vprašanja, da je med njihovo obravnavo jasno zaznana potreba po uvedbi novega foruma, ki bi sploh omogočil pomembne in konstruktivne pogovore na ustrezni odločevalski ravni. Potreba po redni izmenjavi informacij s področja obrambnih reform, mednarodnih operacij in misij ter poglobljeni pogovori o okrepljenem regionalnem sodelovanju, vključno s postavitvijo regionalnih centrov, so privedli do ustanovitve novega foruma rednih srečanj direktorjev za obrambno politiko.²⁵

Te oblike srečanj, ki je postala glavni mehanizem druge, regionalne faze razvoja SEEC, regija prej ni poznala. Kot rečeno, se je takšna potreba znotraj pobude pokazala kot precej naravna v trenutku, ko so se začela odpirati posebna vprašanja o morebitnih strukturiranih in dolgoročnih oblikah regionalnega sodelovanja, pri katerem dober zgled zagotovo ponujajo že sedanje strukturne oblike sodelovanja v baltskem prostoru, denimo Nordijska pobuda in Baltska obrambna akademija. Pomemben premik v drugi fazi razvoja SEEC je bilo tretje srečanje direktorjev za obrambno politiko na Zgornjem Brniku, junija 2008, na katerem so udeleženci po prednostnem vrstnem redu opredelili skupni interes držav za postavitve regionalnih centrov. V prvo skupino so uvrstili Center za usposabljanje za mirovne operacije v BiH, Center za medijsko usposabljanje v Republiki Makedoniji in RKBO-center v Srbiji. Na drugo mesto so uvrstili usposabljanje psov ter izobraževanje in usposabljanje na področju vojaške medicine. Odločeno je bilo, da se dogovori o možnostih sodelovanja med Hrvaško in Srbijo na področju usposabljanja psov organizirajo na dvostranski ravni ter da bosta Srbija in Republika Makedonija na dvostranski ravni proučili možnosti za tesnejše sodelovanje. Direktorji so se odločili tudi za ustanovitev delovnih skupin za posamezne centre, dinamiko njihovega nastajanja pa naj bi vodile države gostiteljice. Seveda je vprašanje morebitne postavitve večnacionalnih regionalnih centrov na območju Zahodnega Balkana strateško pomembno in zapleteno, saj bi lahko prineslo daljnosežne posledice v konceptih regionalnega sodelovanja, bolj povezano sodelovanje med državami regije, večjo soodvisnost ter posredno tudi večjo varnost in stabilnost v regiji.

²⁴ Med načrtnim zbiranjem vtisov med udeleženci, ki so ga opravili predstavniki Direktorata za obrambno politiko MO, je bila predvsem indikativna ocena srbskega udeleženca, načelnika J-5 v generalštabu srbske vojske, da se v svojem življenju še ni toliko naučil v enem dnevu, predvsem od stanovskih kolegov, profesionalcev s področja načrtovanja iz različnih držav regije, ki se soočajo s podobnimi in primerljivimi strokovnimi vprašanji. Izjava je bila jasna potrditev priložnosti, ki jih ponuja regionalni pristop. Prav zato je Republika Slovenija na primer leta 2008 po tem vzoru organizirala še konferenci s področja informatike in obrambne stadradizacije, Republika Makedonija pa delavnico o planskih dokumentih.

²⁵ Na ravni direktorjev za obrambno politiko se redno srečujejo članice EU in Nata. Doslej so bila organizirana štiri formalna in eno neformalno srečanje.


1.3 Organizacijska razvejanost

Ena izmed posledic evolucije razvoja dejavnosti, povezanih s pobudo Clearinghouse za JVE, je velika organizacijska raznolikost. Ob natančnem pogledu gre sicer za povsem razumljiv pojav, saj je bila pobuda pravzaprav valilnica različnih oblik sodelovanja tudi zunaj nje. To najbolje ponazorimo s primerom uvedbe novega mehanizma rednih srečanj direktorjev za obrambno politiko držav Zahodnega Balkana, in sicer po vzoru podobnega v Natu in EU. Srečanja so nastala na podlagi zapletenih in zahtevnih vprašanj znotraj pobude SEEC, njihova obravnava pa je z vidika potrebne ravni odločanja presejala okvire konferenc in delovnih skupin. Uvedbo rednih srečanj direktorjev za obrambno politiko regije štejemo med pomembnejše dosežke te pobude. V nekaterih primerih pa je organizacijska razvejanost postala tudi težava, predvsem z vidika celovitega pregleda in upravljanja različnih dejavnosti. Prvotni mehanizmi v delovanju pobude so bile najprej redne polletne regionalne konference na temo aktualnega dogajanja na področju obrambnih reform v regiji ter delovne skupine, ki so bile v posameznih državah regije ustanovljene za obravnavo odprtih vprašanj na področju obrambnih reform. V začetnem obdobju pobude se je pred konferencami večkrat sestal tudi organizacijski odbor, njegova naloga pa je bila predvsem priprava konferenc. Številna vprašanja konceptualne in strateške narave so bila predvsem v obdobju ustanavljanja pobude obravnavana tudi med rednimi delovnimi srečanji ter stiki med predstavniki stalnih sopedsedujočih, ZDA in Republike Slovenije.

2 OVREDNOTENJE POBUDE CLEARINGHOUSE ZA JVE

Doslej je bilo znotraj pobude SEEC organiziranih devet konferenc, pet srečanj direktorjev za obrambno politiko in eno srečanje ministrov za obrambo iz držav Zahodnega Balkana. Poleg tega so bila organizirana številna srečanja delovnih skupin in seminarji na temo posebnih področij obrambnih reform. Posebej moramo izpostaviti povečano dinamiko dejavnosti Učnega centra za podporo mirovnim operacijam (Peace Support Operations Training Centre – PSOTC) v Sarajevu in RKBO-centra v Kruševcu, kjer v obeh delovnih skupinah proučujejo možnosti za krepitev regionalnega lastništva. Ena izmed ambicij držav regije je tudi katalogizacija vseh zmogljivosti regije za učenje angleškega jezika in različnih vrst usposabljanja za mednarodne operacije in misije.

Ugotoviti moramo, da se je pobuda SEEC pokazala kot pomemben izziv, povezovalno orodje, dodana vrednost sedanjim oblikam sodelovanja v regiji ter tudi kot spodbuda in gonilo za iskanje novih oblik sodelovanja. Pokazalo se je tudi, da je zaradi velike organizacijske raznolikosti težko slediti razvoju vseh podsegmentov oziroma učinkov pobude. Ugotovili smo namreč, da so številne informacije iz podatkovne baze, neformalni stiki v okviru različnih formatov SEEC, večstranski dogovori ter drugo pripomogli h krepitvi dvo- in večstranskih oblik sodelovanja, o katerih pa SEEC ni dobival povratnih informacij. S tega vidika bi lahko dejali, da so bili mehanizmi in dejavnosti znotraj pobude pomemben katalizator različnih

Tabela 2:
Evolucija
procesa SEEC

oblik sodelovanja zunaj nje. Najboljši kazalniki tega so uvedba srečanj direktorjev za obrambno politiko, dogovori o možnostih postavitve regionalnih centrov za usposabljanje in ne nazadnje tudi formalni dokument, ki zagotavlja politično usmeritev in zavezanost k izpolnjevanju dogovorov ter nadgradnji doseženih uspehov. To je skupna izjava vseh ministrov za obrambo iz regije, podpisana v Sarajevu 18. novembra 2009.

SEEC je treba obravnavati kot primer *sui generis* tudi z vidika vloge Republike Slovenije v njem. Ministrstvo za obrambo je leta 2004 brez obotavljanja prepoznalo vrednost in pomen razmišljanj sektorja J-5 Evropskega poveljstva sil ZDA o morebitni uvedbi neformalne regionalne pobude za sodelovanje na področju obrambnih reform, pri čemer so iskali podporo in nasvet države, ki je pogosto veljala za zgled drugim državam regije. Sektor za strateško planiranje in politike pri USEUCOM ter Direktorat za obrambno politiko sta v nizu delovnih sestankov in pogovorov določila temeljne parametre in sklope prihodnje pobude. ZDA in Republika Slovenija sta večji del prvih dveh let porabili za spodbujanje dinamike, prepričevanje sodelujočih o koristnosti takšnega sodelovanja ter pripravo konceptov in orodij (koncept delovnih skupin, podatkovna baza ipd.). Sledilo je obdobje velike dinamike prve razvojne faze SEEC, ki so ga odlikovali intenzivno delo delovnih skupin, konference ter izmenjava informacij o obrambnih reformah.

Eden večjih izzivov pri zagotavljanju kontinuitete pobude je bil kadrovske narave, kar se je pokazalo pri precejšnji fluktuaciji sodelujočih, ne nazadnje tudi na sopredsedujoči ameriški strani, katere osredotočenost na procese v SEEC je bila zaradi sistema častniških rotacij spremenljiva. Zato je bila odgovornost slovenske strani še večja, saj je bilo treba zagotoviti stalno ekipo, ki je z rednim spremljanjem in spodbujanjem razvoja zagotovila prispevek, ki je omogočil nenehni napredek, ki bi bil sicer prav zaradi številnih kadrovskih nihanj močno otežen. Slovenska stran je zagotovila zgodovinski spomin in ciljno usmerjenost, čeprav se je pogosto zdelo, da pobuda stopica na mestu oziroma občasno celo nazaduje.

Na strateški ravni moramo ugotoviti, da je pobuda SEEC močno prispevala h krepitvi regionalnega sodelovanja in dolgoročnega medsebojnega zaupanja na vseh ravneh. Pobuda je okrepila osveščenost glede racionalnosti pristopa, in sicer tako z organizacijskega, kadrovskega, vsebinskega kot finančnega vidika. Aktivnosti v SEEC so potrdile konceptualno pomembnost izmenjave primerljivih izkušenj med državami regije. Pomemben uspeh je uvedba komunikacijskega orodja oziroma podatkovne baze, ki je pomembna podlaga obveščanju. Velik uspeh pomenijo stalnost srečanj na odločevalski ravni, politična zavezanost na ravni obrambnih ministrov ter sodelovanje v mednarodnih operacijah in na misijah. Ob tako pomembnih uspehih je seveda zlahka biti tudi samokritičen. Pobuda SEEC je pokazala, kako težko je ob pomanjkanju discipline rednega pretoka informacij upravljati številne oblike sodelovanja ter slediti učinkom različnih aktivnosti. Napredek je bil pogosto zelo počasen in naporen. Pomembni vzroki so bili pomanjkanje zgodovinskega spomina o razvoju, namenu in dosežkih pobude, občasno nezaupanje zaradi pretirane skrbi za zaščito posameznih interesov ter precedenčna stopnja inovativnosti pristopov znotraj pobude. Ključni dejavnik, ki lahko precej vpliva na nadaljnje uspehe praktičnega regionalnega sodelovanja, pa je okrepljeno regionalno lastništvo vseh procesov.

3 PERSPEKTIVE REGIONALNEGA SODELOVANJA NA ZAHODNEM BALKANU

Pravzaprav so vizijo prihodnjega sodelovanja v regiji delno oblikovali njeni ministri za obrambo, ki so 18. novembra 2009 v Sarajevu podpisali pismo o nameri za krepitev regionalnega sodelovanja, in sicer tudi s pomočjo regionalnih centrov na Zahodnem Balkanu. Za uresničevanje načel in elementov skupne izjave so zadolžili direktorje za obrambno politiko. Skupna izjava²⁶ jasno povzema dosežke, ki jih je spodbudil proces Clearinghouse, in daje politične usmeritve za nadaljnje delo. V pismu se ministri med drugim zavezujejo h krepitvi regionalnega sodelovanja kot pomembnega dejavnika gradnje medsebojnega zaupanja. Ministri so se zavzeli za redno izmenjavo informacij o obrambnih reformah, vključno z izmenjavo pridobljenih izkušenj in dobrih praks. Pozdravili so tudi praktične oblike sodelovanja na področju primerljivih reformnih izzivov, okrepljene v preteklih letih, izpostavili

²⁶ Pobuda za podpis skupne izjave je prišla s slovenske strani, osnutek dokumenta je bil pripravljen v Direktoratu za obrambno politiko in nato usklajen z vsemi državami regije – skupna izjava je dostopna na: http://www.seecdb.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=42&Itemid=38

nov neodvisni regionalni forum rednih srečanj direktorjev za obrambno politiko ter izrazili podporo rednim srečanjem na ministrski ravni. Ugotovili so, da direktorski sestanki, redne konference in ekspertne delovne skupine zagotavljajo trdno podlago za okrepljen, celovit in pregleden obrambno-varnostni dialog. Skupna izjava poudarja pomen regionalnega pristopa k soočanju s skupnimi izzivi tudi na področju mednarodnih operacij in misij. Regionalni pristop je izpostavljen kot racionalna in praktična metoda sodelovanja, predvsem z vidika sinhronizacije omejenih kadrovskih in finančnih virov.

Jasno je izražena podpora uvedbi regionalnih centrov, za katere je v regiji največje zanimanje, torej tistih treh, ki so jih na podlagi strokovnih priporočil prepoznali že direktorji za obrambno politiko. To so Center za usposabljanje na področju mirovnih operacij v Sarajevu (BiH), Center za medijsko usposabljanje v Skopju (Makedonija) in Center za jedrsko, biološko in kemično obrambo v Kruševcu (Srbija). Podpisniki izjave so podali usmeritev, da je treba ob ustanovitvi teh regionalnih centrov proučiti možnosti za skupno financiranje, upravljanje, uporabo, za načrtovanje ter izvedbo usposabljanja in izobraževanja. S tem je bila jasno postavljena tudi konceptualna ločnica med tremi institucijami, ki sicer že obstajajo kot nacionalni centri, in njihovo morebitno prihodnjo preoblikovano regionalno vlogo. Odprte so tudi možnosti za druge oblike takšnega sodelovanja. Ministri so se zavzeli za širšo promocijo regionalnih centrov, predvsem na podlagi delovanja po načelih profesionalnosti in visokih standardov odličnosti. To je seveda visok cilj, saj je v širšem kontekstu evro-atlantskih integracij treba upoštevati tudi že delujoče centre odličnosti.

Predvideni sprejem nacionalnih strateških dokumentov Republike Slovenije za delovanje na Zahodnem Balkanu bo najbrž ena zadnjih priložnosti za bolj usmerjen, prepoznaven, prožen, integriran in učinkovit pristop države k obrambnemu sodelovanju v regiji. Novi mehanizmi so odlična podlaga za zagotovitev trajnega sodelovanja v regiji, ki ne bo pogojeno z vključevanjem v evro-atlantske integracije, temveč z iskreno željo po dolgoročni stabilnosti in sodelovanju za dobrobit regije kot celote. Pri tem bi bilo predvsem pomembno zagotoviti učinkovite mehanizme, da bi preprečili podvajanja, zagotovili integrirano delovanje, merljivost napredka in upravljanje procesov. Takšna oblika celostnega in institucionaliziranega sodelovanja bi pomenila izjemno velik korak naprej ter uresničitev do pred kratkim še nepredstavljive vizije napredka regije. Zagotovila bi krepitev medsebojnega zaupanja na poti k doseganju miru in napredka v regiji ter s tem tudi uresničitev temeljnih nacionalnih interesov Republike Slovenije. To bi pomenilo tudi uresničevanje temeljnih ciljev in interesov regije oziroma širše mednarodne skupnosti ter pomemben model sodelovanja, ki bi ga bilo mogoče preizkusiti tudi v drugih regijah.

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