

# B i l t e n

## SLOVENSKE

### vojske



Z N A N J E Z M A G U J E



REPUBLIKA SLOVENIJA  
MINISTRSTVO ZA OBRAMBO  
GENERALŠTAB SLOVENSKE VOJSKE

ISSN 1580-1993

September 2008 – 10/Št. 3

VOJAŠKOSTROKOVNA PUBLIKACIJA SLOVENSKE VOJSKE

# Bilten

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**ISSN 1580-1993**  
**UDK 355.5 (479.4) (055)**

**September 2008 – 10/Št. 3**

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**IZDAJATELJ/PUBLISHER:**

*Generalštab Slovenske vojske/General Staff of the Slovenian Armed Forces*  
*www.mors.si/index.php?id=213*

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*Šola za tuje jezike, PDRIU, SV*

**OBLIKOVANJE/DESIGN & GRAPHICS:**

*Roman Kuhar, Gorenjski tisk, d. d.*

**TISK/PRINT:**

*Tiskarna Oman*

**NAKLADA/EDITION:**

*500 izvodov/Copies*

*Prispevki, objavljeni v Biltenu Slovenske vojske, niso uradno stališče Slovenske vojske niti organov, iz katerih so avtorji prispevkov.*

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**IZZIVI ZOPERSTAVLJANJA TERORIZMU V  
JUGOVZHODNI EVROPI**

**COUNTERTERRORISM CHALLENGES IN  
SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE**

*»Po dolgem premisleku spregovori ali deluj – kajti nimaš možnosti spremeniti svojih izgovorjenih besed niti narejenih dejanj.«*

*Pitagora*

*“Consult and deliberate before you act, that you may not commit thoughtless actions.”*

*Pythagoras*



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# IZZIVI ZOPERSTAVLJANJA TERORIZMU V JUGOVZHODNI EVROPI – NAMESTO UVODA

.....

Republika Slovenija na področju mednarodnih odnosov namenja veliko pozornosti varnosti in stabilnosti v Jugovzhodni Evropi. V skrbi za varnost v regiji zavzemajo posebno mesto prizadevanja, namenjena zoperstavljanju terorizmu. Za prispevek h krepitvi sodelovanja in aktivnosti za zoperstavljanje terorizmu v Jugovzhodni Evropi sta Ministrstvo za obrambo in Generalštab Slovenske vojske v sodelovanju s Centrom za civilno-vojaška razmerja (Center for Civil Military Relations iz ZDA) organizirala mednarodno regionalno konferenco z naslovom »Izzivi zoperstavljanja terorizmu v regiji Jugovzhodne Evrope«, ki je bila od 8. do 12. septembra 2008 v Izobraževalnem centru Uprave Republike Slovenije za zaščito in reševanje na Igu pri Ljubljani. Cilj regionalne konference je bil povezati znanstvene in strokovne poglede predstavnikov državnih organov Republike Slovenije ter držav Jugovzhodne Evrope in članic Evropske unije ter zveze Nato na zoperstavljanje terorizmu in tako prispevati k boljšemu razumevanju, izmenjavi primerov dobrih praks ter krepitvi spoznanj o nujnosti sodelovanja in povezav na tem področju. Namen konference, ki sta jo financirala Slovenska vojska in Ministrstvo za obrambo ZDA v okviru programa »Counterterrorism Fellowship Program«, je bil, da se med njenimi udeleženci vzpostavijo stiki, ki bodo omogočili oblikovanje novih povezav oziroma okrepi sedanje sodelovanje med posameznimi ustanovami, za katere je zagotavljanje nacionalne varnosti temeljna naloga, ter tako omogočili in/ali izboljšali izmenjavo dobrih praks s področja zoperstavljanja terorizmu v teoretičnem in praktičnem smislu.

Predstavniki različnih državnih organov iz Republike Slovenije in držav Jugovzhodne Evrope ter članic Evropske unije, zveze Nato in drugih gostujočih držav so bili povabljeni, naj na konferenci predstavijo aktualne teme s svojega področja dela v povezavi z zoperstavljanjem terorizmu

kot obliki ogrožanja nacionalne in nadnacionalne varnosti. Nekateri so se odločili, da svoje teme predstavijo na konferenci, drugi jih bodo predstavili in objavili v posebni tematski številki Biltena Slovenske vojske. Neodvisno od različnih umestitev posameznih držav, ki se pojavljajo kot del Jugovzhodne Evrope, je v razpravah o tem delu Evrope pomembno upoštevati, da gre za širok spekter raznolikosti, ki izhajajo iz geografskih, zgodovinskih, verskih, socioloških, politoloških, pravnih, varnostnih in drugih razlogov, ki vplivajo na njeno dinamičnost in pestrost. Navedeno lahko med drugim pomeni tudi povečano varnostno tveganje.

Poleg tega je treba spomniti tudi na še vedno prisotno terminološko zagato v pojmovanju terorizma, ki je bila očitna tudi na konferenci. Beseda terorizem izvira iz francoščine, označevala pa je metodo ene izmed faz revolucije med jakobinsko diktaturo (med letoma 1794 in 1796). V francoskem in nekaterih drugih jeziki je beseda *terreur* ali *terror* ohranila prvotni pomen močnega in skrajnega strahu. Beseda ima sicer koren v latinščini (*terror, terroris* – močan strah), izvira pa iz indoevropskega pojma *tras*, ki je označeval drhtenje in stanje strahu. Ta beseda je tudi v korenu naše besede *tresti* (Ozebek 2005). Enotna definicija oziroma pojmovanje terorizma je bilo kar dolgo vprašljivo. Pomembno je omeniti Resolucijo Združenih narodov 1373, sprejeta 28. septembra 2001, ki je postavila izhodišča za skupno razumevanje delovanja, organizacije in financiranja terorizma, vendar definicije terorizma ni postavila. Enotno definicijo smo dobili šele z Resolucijo združenih narodov 1456 iz leta 2003, ki pravi, da Varnostni svet razume pod pojmom terorizem<sup>1</sup> »kriminalno dejanje, naperjeno tudi proti civilistom, ki ima namen povzročiti smrt ali resne telesne poškodbe, zajetje talcev z namenom ustrahovanja javnosti ali skupine ljudi ali določenih oseb, prestrašiti najširšo populacijo ali prisiliti vlado ali mednarodno organizacijo, da stori ali opusti kakršnokoli dejanje«. Definicij terorizma je več, še posebej zato, ker se ta kot oblika ogrožanja varnosti pojavlja v najrazličnejših oblikah in okoliščinah, pri čemer ima pomembno vlogo vzrok oziroma povod za tako teroristično in posledično kaznivo dejanje. Po padcu berlinskega zidu se je veliko držav v Vzhodni Evropi osamosvojilo in stopilo na pot demokratizacije, odpiranja in povezovanja ter sodelovanja, med

<sup>1</sup> "Criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act."

njimi tudi Slovenija. Pot do osamosvojitve je bila za nekatere države veliko težja, saj so šle tudi skozi vojno v pravem pomenu besede. Ali so v vojnih in kriznih obdobjih nekateri posamezniki z naprednimi idejami ali izrazitim domoljubjem »teroristi« ali kot se pogosto sami imenujejo narodni prebuditelji in osamosvojitelji, velikokrat odloča le končni izid. Če takšna dejavnost uspe in je ne zatrejo politične ali vojaške sile, so osamosvojitelji junaki, v nasprotnem primeru pa so lahko storilci kaznivih dejanj, nasprotniki vlad ali režimov, politični zaporniki ali teroristi. Navedeno zveni zelo preprosto, vendar je praksa pokazala, da so povsod tam, kjer obstajajo nacionalni, politični, etnični, verski ali drugi konflikti, pogledi in stališča na to, kdo je na pravi strani in kdo uporablja legalna in legitimna sredstva ter kakšne so resnične razmere, zelo različni, še posebej, če gre za vprašanja, ki segajo prek državnih meja. Različnost je tako temeljni vzrok, iz katerega izhaja potreba oziroma nuja po medsebojni izmenjavi mnenj in izkušenj na področju zagotavljanja nacionalne varnosti in s tem zoperstavljanja terorizmu.

Nesporno dejstvo je, da se je treba proti terorizmu »boriti«. Za kakšen »boj« v resnici gre, je odvisno predvsem od posamezne države, njene zgodovine, geografske in geopolitične lege, izkušenj s terorizmom in drugih okoliščin. *Vojna proti terorizmu* je izraz<sup>2</sup>, ki ga ZDA uporabljajo po 11. septembru 2001 in predstavlja eno glavnih groženj nacionalni varnosti, kar pomeni, da se država z njim sooča z vsemi sredstvi, vključno z vojsko. Temu pojmovanju so sledile številne evropske in druge države. Na splošno pa so bile evropske države skeptične do tega termina. Tudi v Sloveniji smo do njega zadržali »kritično distanco« in ga pojmujejo kot varnostno grožnjo oziroma kaznivo dejanje, ki ga je treba primerno sankcionirati. Tudi Velika Britanija se je leta 2007 odločila, da ne bo več uporabljala fraze vojna proti terorizmu (Črnčec 2008). V Sloveniji namesto pojma »vojna« ali »boj proti terorizmu« uporabljamo izraz zoperstavljanje terorizmu.

V Republiki Sloveniji razumemo pojem terorizem kot eno izmed potencialnih oblik ogrožanja nacionalne varnosti. Demokratična družba je podlaga za razvoj in uresničevanje številnih interesov posameznikov in skupin. Obstaja veliko legalnih poti in načinov za doseganje širokega spektra ciljev, vendar nasilje, kriminalna dejanja, ki lahko povzročijo smrt ali resne telesne poškodbe,

<sup>2</sup> Anžič meni, da se zdi, da pri tem, ko govorijo o vojni, mislijo predvsem na odločenost v ukrepih zoper terorizem, in ne na to, da bi spopad s terorizmom razlagali s sociološkimi, antropološkimi ali pa polemološkimi definicijami vojne (Anžič 2001: 464).

jemanje talcev, ustrahovanje javnosti ali skupine ljudi ali določenih oseb, izsiljevanje vlade in podobno, v Republiki Sloveniji pomenijo kaznivo dejanje, ki se preganja po uradni dolžnosti. Slovenija namenja veliko pozornosti načrtnemu preventivnemu delovanju svojih ustanov, ki so povezane v sistem zagotavljanja nacionalne varnosti in hkrati sodelujejo z drugimi takimi sistemi v svetu.

»Na uspešnost oboroženih sil pri izvajanju aktivnosti zoperstavljanja terorizmu vpliva več dejavnikov, kot so kompleksnost sodobnega varnostnega okolja, sistemska urejenost sodobnih nacionalnovarnostnih sistemov za zoperstavljanje terorizmu, vloga oboroženih sil v sistemu zoperstavljanja terorizmu, pogostost izražanja različnih interesov, ki so povezani z vlogo oboroženih sil na raziskovanem področju, ter civilno-vojaško sodelovanje v okviru civilno-vojaških razmerij v demokratični družbi.« (Čaleta 2007: 589) Večplastnost fenomena zoperstavljanja terorizmu je bila prisotna, njeno razlaganje in razumevanje pa želeno tudi na konferenci in v prispevkih ter nastopih avtorjev. Uredniški odbor Biltena Slovenske vojske je izbral trinajst prispevkov 15 avtorjev, ki jih predstavljamo v tej številki.

Pogled na varnost v Jugovzhodni Evropi v povezavi s pojavom terorizma je predstavil dr. Thomas R. Mockaitis, odzive držav in njihove sistemske odgovore nanj pa Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei. Oba avtorja sta predavatelja v Centru za civilno-vojaška razmerja v Montereyu v ZDA.

Regionalni pobudi SEDM (angl. South Eastern European Defense Ministerial) kot primeru pristopa k sodelovanju in zoperstavljanju terorizmu se je posvetil dr. Iztok Prezelj, docent in raziskovalec na Fakulteti za družbene vede Univerze v Ljubljani. Raziskovalno in pedagoško se ukvarja z varnostjo, kriznim menedžmentom in terorizmom.

O vlogi interneta in oblikah njegove uporabe na področju terorizma je pisal asistent dr. Uroš Svete, predavatelj na Fakulteti za družbene vede Univerze v Ljubljani. Uporaba interneta, ki povezuje najširše množice po svetu, ima svoje prednosti in slabosti. Za posameznike in skupine s terorističnimi ambicijami predstavlja prednost.

Albert Černigoj z Ministrstva za notranje zadeve Republike Slovenije je predstavil izkušnje iz slovenskega predsedovanja Svetu Evropske unije, povezane z dobrimi praksami pri zoperstavljanju terorizmu.

O izzivih in perspektivah na področju zoperstavljanja terorizmu v Republiki Makedoniji je poročal Zoran Ivanov. Njegov prispevek ponuja vpogled

v raznovrstnost varnostnih tveganj v njegovi domovini in širše v regiji Jugovzhodne Evrope.

Major Artan Duraku in Edward Anderson sta v svojem prispevku opisala stanje in dileme, predvsem pa soočanje Republike Kosovo z različnimi oblikami zagotavljanja in ogrožanja varnosti, pri čemer je terorizem le ena izmed mnogih.

Dr. Denis Čaleta iz Slovenske vojske nas je seznanil s stališči pripadnikov Slovenske vojske do vloge, ki jo ima Slovenska vojska pri preprečevanju terorizma v mednarodnem okolju, in sicer s sodelovanjem v operacijah kriznega odzivanja.

Novi Zakon o preprečevanju pranja denarja in financiranja terorizma in delo Urada Republike Slovenije za preprečevanje pranja denarja je predstavil Leo Pongračič. Sodobna tehnologija in globalizacija ustvarjata razmere za širjenje terorizma. Pri njegovem preprečevanju je nujno nenehno posodabljanje pristopov in odzivov. Sodobna zakonodaja in delovna oprema ter redno usposabljanje pomenijo ustrezno preventivo.

Gorazd Rednak z Ministrstva za obrambo se je spraševal, ali je Republika Slovenija pripravljena na umazano vojno, in sicer na različnih področjih. Ali smo kot sistem nacionalne varnosti resnično dobro organizirani in kaj navedeno pomeni v praksi? Naravne katastrofe v obliki poplav in neurij prinašajo nekatere izkušnje in predstavljajo nove naloge.

Dr. Polona Selič in Andrej Juratovec z inštituta Pares v Ljubljani sta opozorila, da kriminalistika pojmuje terorizem kot obliko organiziranega kriminala. Pri preiskovanju kaznivih dejanj se uporabljata metodi profiliranja in psihofiziološkega preiskovanja verodostojnosti izjav s poligrafom. Obe sta uporabni tudi pri preprečevanju in preiskovanju terorističnih kaznivih dejanj.

Podpolkovnik Žarko Henigman in stotnik Dragomir Čevriz iz Slovenske vojske sta nas seznanila z definicijami pojmov atentatorjev in samomorilcev ter oblikovanjem ustreznih strategij za njihovo prepoznavanje oziroma preprečevanje njihovih dejavnosti. Eno ključnih vlog pri tem imajo obveščevalne službe.

Mag. Aminiullah Lashkari iz Sveta za nacionalno varnost v Islamski republiki Afganistan je opisal delovanje in vlogo verskih šol (medres), ki so po mnenju nekaterih centri za usposabljanje in promocijo terorističnih aktivnosti. Ali je res tako?

Uredniški odbor Biltena Slovenske vojske se je odločil, da s posebno tematsko številko podpre organizacijo konference. Pri recenziji prispevkov so sodelovali

redni profesor dr. Andrej Anžič, dr. Denis Čaleta, dr. Damir Črnčec, asistent dr. Uroš Svete in redni profesor dr. Anton Žabkar. Prispevki so odraz osebnih pogledov avtorjev in večinoma ne predstavljajo uradnih stališč držav ali posameznih ustanov, prav tako pa ne uradnega stališča Ministrstva za obrambo.

*Mag. Liliana Brožič  
Slovenska vojska  
Ministrstvo za obrambo*

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# COUNTERTERRORISM CHALLENGES IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE INSTEAD OF INTRODUCTION

.....

In the area of international relations, the Republic of Slovenia is giving a lot of attention to security and stability issues in South Eastern Europe. In endeavours to maintain security in the region, counterterrorism efforts are of extreme importance. In order to contribute to enhancing cooperation and activities in the area of counterterrorism in South Eastern Europe, the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff of the Slovenian Armed Forces, in concert with the Center for Military Relations from the United States of America, organized an international regional conference 'Counterterrorism Challenges in Region of South Eastern Europe', held from 8 to 12 September 2008 in The Training Centre for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief of the Republic of Slovenia in Ig near Ljubljana.

The goal of the regional conference was to connect the scientific and expert views of representatives of the state bodies of the Republic of Slovenia, South Eastern countries, EU members states and NATO on counterterrorism, and thus contribute to a better understanding and exchange of cases of best practices as well as to increase awareness of the importance of the need for cooperation and relations in this area. The purpose of the conference, sponsored by the Slovenian Armed Forces and the United States Department of Defence in the framework of 'Counterterrorism Fellowship Program', was to establish relations among the participants. This would enable new ties and enhance the current cooperation among individual institutions whose priority is to ensure national security. Thus, the exchange of best counterterrorism practices, in theory and practice, would be facilitated and/or improved. Representatives of different state bodies of the Republic of Slovenia, South Eastern countries, EU member states, NATO and other guest countries were invited to present current issues from their field of work in connection with



counterterrorism as a form of threat to national and transnational security. Some of the guests decided to present their topics both, in an article for a special issue of the Bulletin of the Slovenian Armed Forces and through a presentation at the conference, while others decided only for a presentation at the conference.

Regardless of the different classifications of the countries which are said to belong to South Eastern Europe, when discussing this part of Europe, one must bear in mind that this area comprises a wide spectrum of diversity, deriving from geographical, historical, religious, politological, legal, security and other reasons which influence the dynamics and variety. This diversity, among other things, can also pose an increased security risk.

It should also be noted that the terminological problem of the concept of terrorism, which was obvious also at the conference, has not been solved yet. The word terrorism is French in origin, and characterizes the method of one of the phases of the revolution during the Jacobin dictatorship (1794 — 1796). In French and some other languages the word *terreur* or *terror* has retained its original meaning, strong and extreme fear. The root of the word is Latin (terror, terroris - strong fear), however, the word is derived from an Indo-European term *tras*, denoting shivering and a state of fear. This word can also be found in the root of a Slovenian word *tresti* (to shake) (Ozebek, 2005). A unified definition and a concept of terrorism were questionable for a rather long time. In this context, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, adopted on 28 September 2001, should be mentioned. This Resolution set the starting point for a common understanding of operation, organization and funding of terrorism, however, it did not give a definition of terrorism. The unified definition of terrorism came only in 2003 with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1456, declaring that the Security Council considers the term terrorism as 'criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.' There are several definitions of terrorism, mainly since terrorism, as a form of a threat to security, appears in various forms and circumstances. In this context, a cause or a reason for such terrorist acts, and consequently, criminal offences, is of extreme importance.

After the fall of Berlin Wall many countries in Eastern Europe, including Slovenia, gained independence and started their way towards democratization, liberalization and the establishment of relations and cooperation. For some of these countries independence was an extremely difficult goal to attain since they experienced war in the literal meaning of the word. During wars and crises, are individuals with progressive ideas or highly patriotic persons ‘terrorists’, or are they, self-proclaimed, elevators of national pride or liberators? The decision often depends on the final outcome alone. If they succeed in their intentions and are not suppressed by political or military forces, liberators are heroes. If they fail, they can be considered as perpetrators of crime, government and regime enemies, political prisoners or terrorists. All this sounds very simple. However, practice has shown that in the presence of national, political, ethnic, religious or other conflicts, the views and opinions on who is on the right side, who uses legal and legitimate sources and what the real situation is, are very different, especially if transnational issues are in question. Diversity is thus a key reason for the need or necessity for mutual exchange of views and experiences in the area of ensuring national security and, thus, counterterrorism.

Terrorism must be fought - this is an unquestionable fact. What kind of ‘fight’ this really is, depends mainly on an individual country, its history, geographical and geopolitical position, experience with terrorism as well as other circumstances. ‘*War on terrorism*’ is a term<sup>1</sup> used by the United States of America after 11 September 2001. It represents one of the main threats to national security, meaning that the country is fighting it with all its resources, including the armed forces. This concept was followed by several European and other countries. In general, European countries were rather sceptical about the term *war on terrorism*. Slovenia as well has held a ‘critical distance’ and considers it as a security threat and a criminal offence which should be punished accordingly. In 2007 Great Britain decided not to use the term *war on terrorism* anymore (Črnčec 2008). Instead of terms ‘war’ or ‘fight on terrorism’ Slovenia uses the term counterterrorism.

The Republic of Slovenia considers terrorism as a potential form of threat to national security. A democratic society is a basis for development and

<sup>1</sup> According to Anžič, when discussing war, the United States of America seem to have in mind mainly decisive measures against terrorism rather than explaining the war on terrorism through sociological, anthropological or polemological definitions of war (Anžič, 2001: 464).

implementation of various interests of individuals and groups. There are many legal ways and methods for attaining a wide spectrum of goals. However, violence, criminal acts which can cause death or serious bodily injury, taking of hostages, intimidation of the general public or particular persons, compelling a government to do or to abstain from doing any act, etc. are, in the Republic of Slovenia, criminal offences which are prosecuted *ex officio*.

Slovenia is giving a lot of attention to the systematic preventive work of its institutions which are connected into a system of ensuring national security and which simultaneously cooperate with similar systems abroad.

“Success of the armed forces in conducting counterterrorism activities depends on various factors, such as complexity of the modern security environment, systemic regularity of modern national security systems for countering terrorism, the role of the armed forces in the counterterrorism system, frequency of expressing different interests related to the role of the armed forces in the researched field, and civil-military cooperation within civil-military relations in a democratic society.” (Čaleta 2007: 589)

The conference showed the diversity of the counterterrorism phenomenon, the interpretation and understanding of which were also desired in the contributions and presentations of the authors. The editorial board of the Bulletin of the Slovenian Armed Forces chose thirteen contributions by 15 authors, presented in this issue.

The view on security in South Eastern Europe in regard to terrorism occurrence was presented by Thomas R. Mockaitis, Ph.D., while the countries' reactions and their systemic responses to terrorism were presented by Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei. Both authors lecture at the Center for Civil-Military Relations in Monterey, USA.

Dr. Iztok Prezelj, Assistant Professor and researcher at the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Ljubljana, addressed the SEDM regional initiative (South Eastern European Defense Ministerial) as an example of an approach to cooperation and counterterrorism. He researches and lectures on security, crisis management and terrorism.

Assistant Professor, Dr. Uroš Svete, lecturer at the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Ljubljana, wrote about the role of the internet and its forms of use in terrorism. The use of the internet which connects multitudes of people around the world has its advantages and disadvantages. It gives advantage to individuals and groups with terrorist ambitions.

Albert Černigoj from the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Slovenia presented lessons learned from Slovenia's presidency of the European Union Council, related to good practice in the area of counterterrorism.

Zoran Ivanov reported on the challenges and perspectives in fighting terrorism in the Republic of Macedonia. His contribution offers insight into the diversification of security risks in his country and in the broader region of South Eastern Europe.

In their contribution, Artan Duraku and Edward Anderson described the situation and dilemmas in the Republic of Kosovo, focusing on the different forms of security provisions and threats, terrorism being merely one of them. Dr. Denis Čaleta from the Slovenian Armed Forces presented the position of SAF members in regard to the Slovenian Armed Forces' role in terrorism prevention within the international environment through cooperation in crisis response operations.

Leo Pongračič presented the new Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Act, together with the work of the Office of the Republic of Slovenia for the Prevention of Money Laundering. Modern technology and globalisation create conditions for spreading terrorism. Constant updating of approaches and responses is crucial for its prevention. Appropriate prevention encompasses modern legislation, equipment and regular training.

Gorazd Rednak from the Ministry of Defence posed the question of whether or not the Republic of Slovenia is prepared for a 'dirty war', considering different facets. Is Slovenia, as a system of national security, truly well organised and what does this mean in practice? Natural disasters, such as floods and thunderstorms, bring some experience and constitute new tasks.

Dr. Polona Selič and Andrej Juratovec from the Pares Institute in Ljubljana drew attention to the fact that criminal investigation sees terrorism as a form of organised crime. The methods used in investigating criminal offences are profiling and psychophysiological examination of the authenticity of declarations with the use of a polygraph. Both are also useful in preventing and investigating terrorist criminal offences.

Ltc Žarko Henigman and cpt Dragomir Čevriz from the Slovenian Armed Forces defined the terms 'assassin' and 'suicide', and presented appropriate strategies for their identification as well as prevention of their activities. Intelligence services play one of the key roles in this process.

Aminiullah Lashkari from the National Security Council in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan described the operation and the role of religious schools (medrese), which some people consider to be centres for the training and promotion of terrorist activities. Is this truly the case?

The editorial board of the Bulletin of the Slovenian Armed Forces decided to support the organisation of the conference by issuing a special thematic edition. Participants in the review of the contributions were Professor Dr. Andrej Anžič, Dr. Denis Čaleta, Dr. Damir Črnčec, Assistant Professor Dr. Uroš Svete and Professor Dr. Anton Žabkar. Contributions reflect personal views of the authors and not the official views of countries or individual institutions, also not the official view of the Ministry of Defence.

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# VARNOST JUGOVZHODNE EVROPE: TERORIZEM V KONTEKSTU

## SOUTH EASTERN EUROPEAN SECURITY: TERRORISM IN CONTEXT

### POVZETEK

*Medtem ko so bile ZDA vse od napadov 11. septembra preobremenjene s terorizmom, so se nanj osredinile tudi nekatere druge države. Večina držav, med njimi so tudi nekatere največje zaveznice Amerike, terorizem vidijo le kot eno od groženj na dolgem seznamu varnostnih izzivov. Nekatere ga umeščajo na sam vrh spiska. Terorizem nikakor ni prva skrb jugovzhodnoevropskih držav oziroma celotne regije. Pri odpravljanju posledic hladne vojne in razpada Jugoslavije so vsakdanje grožnje zamenjale nevsakdanje, med katerimi je nadvladal terorizem najhujša. V Jugovzhodni Evropi so pomembne prehodne poti za trgovino z mamili ali ljudmi, tihotapstvo in domačo kriminalno dejavnost. Kljub temu pa je grožnja mednarodnega terorizma v regiji treba jemati resno, saj teroristi pogosto delujejo po enakih linijah kot kriminalne združbe. Teroristi lahko oblikujejo začasna zavezništva s kriminalnimi združbami ali uporabljajo tihotapske poti, da bi prišli do tarč v Zahodni Evropi. Opozoriti je treba tudi na manjšo prisotnost terorizma v nekaterih državah in na razmere, ki gojijo terorizem v drugih. Ta članek grožnjo terorizma za Jugovzhodno Evropo postavlja v širši regijski varnostni kontekst.*

<sup>1</sup> The Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR). Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.

**KLJUČNE BESEDE**

*Upor, protiupor, etnični spopadi, organizirani kriminal, trgovina z ljudmi, trgovina z orožjem, trgovina z mamili, tihotapljenje, Balkan.*

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**ABSTRACT**

*While the U.S. has been preoccupied with terrorism since the 9/11 attacks, few other nations have focused on it so intently. Most states, including some of America's closest allies, consider international terrorism as only one threat on a long list of security challenges. Few place it at the top of the list. Terrorism certainly does not rank first among the concerns of South Eastern European states or the region as a whole. In the aftermath of the Cold War and the breakup of Yugoslavia, unconventional threats have replaced conventional ones, with transnational crime as the most serious. South Eastern Europe contains major transit routes for narcotics, human-trafficking and contraband, as well as domestic criminal activity. However, since terrorists often operate in the same shadows frequented by criminal enterprises, the threat of international terrorism in the region must be taken seriously. Terrorists may form temporary alliances with criminal groups or use trafficking routes to gain access to targets in Western Europe. A small terrorist presence in some countries and the conditions that breed terrorism in others must also be addressed. This paper sets South Eastern Europe's terrorist threat in a larger regional security context.*

**KEY WORDS**

*Insurgency, counterinsurgency, ethnic conflict, organized crime, human trafficking, arms trafficking, narcotics trafficking, smuggling, Balkans.*

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**INTRODUCTION**

The Global War on Terrorism is now entering its eighth year, with no end in sight. Americans preoccupied with this struggle and its ancillary conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have often failed to appreciate that relatively few

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countries rank terrorism high on their list of security threats. Differing defense priorities have produced considerable tension between the United States and some of its closest allies, exacerbated by the provocative statement: “You are either with us, or you are with the terrorists.”<sup>2</sup> Every nation must, of course, set its own security priorities and has the right to resist pressure to rearrange those priorities to suite American interests. On the other hand, Washington rightly reminds its friends and allies to take the threat of terrorism, however small, seriously. Tragic experience teaches that terrorism can escalate from a remote possibility to a serious threat very rapidly. Few states have appreciated this reality before suffering a serious or even catastrophic attack. Even states that rank terrorism low on their list of concerns must devote at least some resources to combating it. The key to security in the twenty-first century lies in a comprehensive risk assessment that situates terrorism in the context of a broad range of security threats and a regional/international security strategy.

South Eastern Europe epitomizes the complex security environment of the contemporary world. The region consists of ancient civilizations encompassed in newly independent states, rich in human capital but relatively poor in other resources. It lies at a strategic crossroads between Europe and Asia. Its numerous small states, many of which emerged from the ethnic conflicts of the 1990s, have been easy prey to organized criminal elements, aided by corruption surviving from the Communist era and encouraged by the low pay of police and civil servants. While renewed ethnic strife seems unlikely, residual animosities impede regional cooperation and facilitate criminal enterprises, which have no problem collaborating across ethnic divides. Although transnational crime remains the pre-eminent threat, a strong potential for terrorism also exists since both nefarious elements operate in the same shadowy realm. Only by understanding the nature of each threat and how they all interact can the countries of South Eastern Europe develop a truly effective strategy for combating them.

The ambiguity surrounding the terms “South Eastern Europe” and “the Balkans”, requires clarification. For the purposes of this essay, the terms will be applied to the newly independent and/or newly democratic nations of the old Communist bloc, excluding Hungary and Romania. Discussion will focus primarily on the states of the Western Balkans, specifically Albania, Bosnia-

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<sup>2</sup> George W. Bush, 2002 State of the Union Address.



Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia, along with Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia. Whether one considers Kosovo an independent state or a breakaway province does not fundamentally alter my conclusions. However, separating these countries from their neighbors is useful but not wholly satisfactory. Human trafficking in the region cannot be examined without consideration of organized crime in Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia and Turkey. Examination of opium smuggling necessitates some consideration of crime in Iran, Turkey and Bulgaria. Nonetheless, the group of nations selected for discussion here has enough in common to make security threat analysis meaningful.

**Nature of contemporary threats**

Security threats fall into two broad categories: conventional and unconventional. Conventional threats are those posed by the armed forces of one state or alliance system against another. Unconventional threats include a broad array of activities that can weaken or destroy a state. Insurgency and terrorism have traditionally been understood as the pre-eminent unconventional threats, but analysts increasingly place organized crime in this category because of its growing propensity for violence and increasing ability to carry it out. Unlike conventional ones, unconventional threats come primarily from non-state actors, although these may have tacit or overt support from states. A third category of threat, which is receiving growing attention from scholars, may be described as “structural”. Some analysts consider items in this category as root causes of conventional and unconventional conflicts rather than threats themselves. Structural threats include poverty, lack of vital resources such as water and fossil fuels, corruption, and racial, ethnic and/or religious discrimination.

Three specific unconventional threats dominate today’s security environment: insurgency, organized crime and terrorism. The looseness with which most politicians and even some analysts use these terms requires that they be more precisely defined. “Terror” is not a movement or an organization but a weapon designed to spread fear, targeting those who watch even more than those who are killed or maimed. States, insurgent groups and terrorist organizations can use terror, but each does so in a different way. Insurgency is an organized movement to take control of a state from within through a combination of

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subversion, terror and guerrilla warfare. For the sake of clarity, “terrorism” and “terrorist” should be reserved for extremist organizations driven by a religious or other ideology that seeks to transform the world. Unlike states or insurgent groups, terrorist organizations embrace goals that transcend control of countries or regions. Those motivated by ideology have been willing to use terror with far less discrimination than organizations with more focused goals (Mockaitis 2007, 7).<sup>3</sup>

Organized criminal groups also use terror, but they do so in a highly focused way. They maim and murder not merely to punish but to send a message to anyone even considering opposing them. These nefarious elements have learned that they operate beneath a threshold of public tolerance. As long as they confine themselves to killing one another, most citizens will not become overly concerned about their activities. However, when they escalate to killing police, judges or innocent bystanders, they cross a line that forces government to concentrate more resources on combating them. Because too much violence is bad for business, most criminal organizations keep their violent activity to an acceptable level (Mockaitis 2007). However, as recent events in Mexico make abundantly clear, contemporary criminal organizations have the ability to take on police and other security forces, and will do so if the stakes are high enough. The predilection for political leaders to label organizations and groups they do not like as “terrorists” adds to the confusion surrounding unconventional threats and impedes accurate risk assessment and threat analysis. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) offers an instructive case in point. Its critics dubbed it a terrorist organization and/or a criminal enterprise, while its supporters consider it a legitimate insurgency. The organization was an insurgency during the late 1990s when it fought for independence. It used terror to achieve this goal, particularly as a means to provoke massive reprisals by Serbian security forces, which led to international intervention. It engaged in smuggling to support the insurgency, and elements of it continue to pursue criminal activities today.

The hybrid nature of the KLA highlights another important truth about unconventional threats in the contemporary world. They rarely fall neatly into categories. Insurgents engage in criminality to fund their activities as do terrorist organizations. Criminals will sometimes control territory just as

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<sup>3</sup> See pp. 3-6 for definitions and a fuller discussion of actors using terror as a weapon.

insurgents do. Terrorists and insurgents will sometimes work together as they are doing in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Both will contract for services such as document forging from known criminal elements. Contrary to the conclusions of some analysts, however, such cooperation does not mean that criminals and terrorists are natural allies. They may form temporary marriages of convenience, but differing goals can just as easily put them at odds.<sup>4</sup> Criminals will use violence to keep subordinates in line, remove rivals and intimidate law enforcement, but this very limited use of terror serves their purpose of making money. They avoid the publicity produced by over-reliance on violence, which may create moral outrage among citizens, who will then demand stronger measures against them. Terrorists, on the other hand, kill and maim to publicize their cause. They seek the very media attention criminals avoid. However, where organized crime goes, terrorism may follow, not because the two are linked, but because both operate in the same shadows. The same weak sovereignty, corruption, porous borders and bad governance that attract criminals provide an excellent environment in which terrorists can operate. Addressing the underlying causes of one problem often helps to alleviate the other as well.

### **South Eastern Europe**

Torn by conflict just a decade ago, South Eastern Europe today faces no real prospect of conventional war. Ethnic tensions remain, but they seem unlikely to flare into open conflict anytime in the foreseeable future. Former belligerents Croatia and Serbia have nothing to gain from renewed hostility. Bosnia remains ethnically divided within a loose federation, but all parties to the 1990s conflict agree that four years of fratricide ultimately benefited no one. Serbia understandably rejects Kosovo's independence but will not try to reverse the situation by force of arms so long as even a small NATO contingent remains there, which seems likely for the foreseeable future. With Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece and Slovenia members of NATO and the EU and the other states in the region on track to join both organizations, a conventional war between any of them seems very unlikely.

Secure for the time being from interstate conflict, South Eastern Europe faces serious unconventional threats. The region provides ideal conditions for such threats to appear and develop. Most of its numerous small states have

<sup>4</sup> Phil Williams, conversations with the author.

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emerged as democracies during the past decade and a half. Large areas of their economies are black or grey, generating little or no tax revenue. As a result, governments can devote few resources to controlling long, porous borders. Low pay for police and civil servants invites corruption, which facilitates illicit activity.

*Organized Crime:* Transnational organized crime poses the greatest threat to the security and stability of individual states and the region of South Eastern Europe as a whole. The region's location at the crossroads between Asia and Europe and the weak governance factors already identified make it an ideal smuggling route. Organized along ethnic/kinship lines, crime syndicates nonetheless have achieved a degree of cooperation beyond anything achieved by states. Criminals move contraband cigarettes, gasoline and compact discs throughout the Balkans and into Western Europe. However, the most pernicious activities are trafficking in narcotics, human beings and weapons. Opium (and the morphine and heroine derived from it) constitutes the bulk and the most profitable of narcotics trafficked through the Balkans. Removal of Afghanistan's Taliban regime, which had suppressed poppy cultivation, and the continued instability of the country have caused production to skyrocket. In 2006, Afghanistan accounted for 92% of the world's opium production, most of it bound for Western Europe (World Drug Report 2007, 10). The drugs move west along three main routes: directly to the United Kingdom via Pakistan, northwestward through Central Asia and Eastern Europe, and westward through Iran, Turkey and the Balkans with the Balkan route carrying the greatest load (World Drug Report 2007, 45). Within that region Kosovo has emerged as a staging area, where opiates arriving from Albania and Macedonia can be stored and repackaged for shipment into Western Europe via Montenegro and Serbia (Anastasijevic 2006, 4).

This distribution route gives a competitive advantage to Albanian criminal groups, whose ethnic community has large populations in Kosovo and Macedonia, as well as Albania proper and large diaspora communities in Turkey, Austria, Germany and Switzerland (Anastasijevic 2006, 4). Albanian drug lords cooperate closely with their Serbian, Macedonian and Bulgarian counterparts. They typically ship heroin into Kosovo from Macedonia, storing it in towns along the eastern border with Serbia. They then repackage the narcotic and smuggle it across the loosely controlled border to the Serbian town of Presvo, just fifteen kilometers from the international

highway linking Athens and Skopje to Belgrade and points west (Anastasijevic 2006, 4). From there, the narcotics complete their journey to the streets of Western European cities.

Although Balkan narcotics traffickers may have no direct links to terrorist organizations, their activities contribute greatly to the problem of terrorism. Money spent on Afghan opiates funds the activities of both the Taliban and al-Qaeda. It may also be used to support terrorist activities in Europe.

*Human Trafficking:* Human trafficking refers to the movement of people for forced labor or sexual slavery. Movement may occur across international borders or from rural to urban areas. Eighty percent of those trafficked transnationally are women and girls and half are minors (Trafficking in Persons Report 2004). The U.S. Department of State has developed a three-tiered ranking system for countries based on their compliance with the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000. Tier 1 countries fully comply with the act's minimum requirements to combat trafficking, Tier 2 countries are making progress towards meeting those requirements, and Tier 3 countries are making little or no effort to comply. Tier 2 countries needing the most improvement are placed on a watch list (Trafficking in Persons Report 2004). Analysts also divide the human trafficking world into origin, transit and destination countries.

While most South Eastern European countries fall into all three categories, the region as a whole plays the greatest role in transiting victims to lucrative markets in Western Europe and farther abroad. All countries in the region fall into Tier 2, except Slovenia, which has advanced to Tier 1. The region also borders two major countries of origin: Ukraine and Moldova. Recruiters typically approach young women in impoverished rural areas of these countries, promising them well-paying jobs as maids, waitresses or hotel staff in the West. Recruiters provide their victims with a passport and transportation. When they arrive at their destination (often a country other than the one they had been promised), the young women face a harsh choice: become a prostitute or repay the pimp who bought them an impossibly large sum of money to recoup his costs. They may also be raped or assaulted before being put to work. Legitimate and quasi-legitimate enterprises offering passage to real jobs abroad make the trafficker's job much easier. So does the cooperation of friends and family members, who often assist recruiters for a commission. In some cases women who were themselves trafficked into prostitution agree

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to recruit someone from their own community as a replacement so that they themselves can be freed. Trafficking has become highly stratified with, for example, Moldovans recruiting victims and then selling them to organized crime syndicates of various ethnicities. The pattern of trafficking has also changed over time. During the instability and conflict of the 1990s, the region became an attractive destination for trafficked women and girls, especially to Kosovo and Bosnia with their large UN and NATO missions, which provided many of the customers. Today, Turkey, Russia, Israel and other Middle Eastern countries have joined Western Europe as major destination countries (Finnegan 2008).

Increasing international pressure, better laws and more effective law enforcement may be reducing human trafficking in the Balkans. Optimists point to promising data from anti-trafficking units and NGOs that reveal significant declines in the number of victims. Skeptics counter that the data illustrate little more than the growing sophistication of traffickers, who have moved the trade deeper underground. This change in trafficking tactics and the rise of new, more lucrative destination countries account for the apparent decline in Balkan trafficking (UNICEF 2004, 49).<sup>5</sup>

*Arms:* Arms trafficking is a doubly pernicious criminal activity. It represents a serious security threat to the country of origin as well as to the country of destination. The region was awash in weapons even before the turbulence of the 1990s. Following the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, Tito became increasingly paranoid about a similar attack on Yugoslavia. His concept of national defense included stockpiling arms throughout the country and maintaining a decentralized, self-sufficient arms industry. The armed forces did not destroy or even sell most of its obsolete weapons, preferring to store them. The wars of Yugoslav succession brought even more guns into the region, as did the 1997 collapse of the Albanian government. During the Cold War, Bulgaria provided arms to Eastern bloc allies and friendly organizations. Small arms from the region continue to be sold to criminals in Western Europe and farther abroad. According to a UN report, as recently as 2001 it was possible to buy handguns, assault rifles, heavy machine guns, explosives and anti-tank weapons. An AK-47 cost as little as \$300, and a 9 mm Makarov, semi-automatic pistol went for \$100-200 (UN 2008, 82-83).<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> See *Trafficking in Human Beings in Southeastern Europe* (New York: UNICEF, 2004).

<sup>6</sup> *Crime and its Impact on the Balkans* (New York: UN, 2008).

**Terrorism**

Political rhetoric aside, the countries of South Eastern Europe do not face an imminent threat of attack from either domestic or foreign terrorists. However, some countries within the region must consider the potential, however slight, for outside agitators to radicalize elements of their population. The immediate concern to the international community comes from terrorist organizations taking advantage of weak governance to set up support cells in the region and/or using it as a transit route to enter Western Europe and conduct attacks there.

With the exception of Greece, Balkan nations have never faced a serious threat from domestic terrorist groups. All parties to the ethnic conflicts of the 1990s made extensive use of terror, but they did so to achieve political objectives. Ethnic cleansing entailed the use of rape, murder and destruction of property to drive members of one group out of areas claimed by the other. During the Kosovo conflict, Serbian authorities dubbed the Kosovo Liberation Army a terrorist group and conducted reprisals that the international community considered state terror. However horrific these acts were, none of them conforms to the pattern of violence practiced by al-Qaeda and its affiliates - indiscriminate attacks on civilians in pursuit of religiously motivated ideology.

During the Bosnian conflict (1992-95) several thousand *Mujahideen* (holy warriors) entered the country to support Bosnian Muslims hard-pressed by superior Bosnian Serb forces. Iran also provided assistance to the Bosniacs (Woehrel 2005). Many of these foreign fighters came out of a genuine desire to help their co-religionists, but others saw in the conflict an opportunity to radicalize local people in the service of the Islamist jihadist cause. Some even married Bosnian women, thus earning the right to citizenship. Following the Bosnian war and the conflict in Kosovo, Muslim charities rebuilt mosques in a further effort to win influence. These mosques provided a pulpit from which radical imams (foreign and domestic) could preach hatred of the United States (Woehrel 2005).

Despite these efforts, South Eastern Europe has been a disappointment to radical Islamists. The large indigenous Muslim populations of Bosnia, Albania and Kosovo have proven unreceptive to radicalization. They see themselves as European first and Muslim second, have lived in secular societies for most of the twentieth century, and have little in common with co-religionists from the Middle East. Bosniacs and Kosovars understand the wars of the 1990s as ethnic rather than religious conflicts, and see a close alliance with the United States

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and its European allies as the best protection against renewed aggression by their Catholic or Orthodox neighbors. Following 9/11, the U.S. and its allies in cooperation with the Bosnian Federation government have made a concerted and largely successful effort to track down and remove the remaining foreign radicals. Albanians took great offense when President Bush characterized their country as a “moderate Muslim state fighting extremism”. While Muslims make up the majority of the population, they do not come into conflict with their Orthodox and Catholic countrymen on religious grounds and do not view their state as having any religious character.

The failure of al-Qaeda and its affiliates to make much headway in radicalizing Balkan Muslims does not mean that the possibility of such radicalization can be ignored. Poverty, unemployment and marginalization may yet make the region’s angry young men receptive to the jihadist message. The potential for mosques to serve as places to mobilize and focus anger has been a source of some concern. Following the collapse of Communism in Albania, for example, the government returned property to all three religious groups. The Orthodox churches received financial support from their Greek partners, and the Catholics got help from Rome. Mosques had no where to turn for assistance in educating their imams and funding their operations. Saudi charities stepped in to the breach, inviting clerical students to study in Saudi Arabia and providing them subsidies when they returned. Not surprisingly, the young imams came back dressed in Wahabi fashion with their wives and daughters wearing hijab. Providing Qur'anic schools within South Eastern Europe as an alternative to study abroad should be a top priority.

The greatest terrorist threat within the Balkans comes from its potential use as a staging area for attacks in Western Europe. Ease of movement facilitated by smuggling and widespread corruption make the region an ideal location for terrorist support sells. The migration (legal and illegal) of large numbers of laborers from the region into European Union countries makes it relatively easy for terrorists to travel the same routes. The abundant supply of arms and explosives from criminal organizations may also facilitate terrorist operations. U.S. bases in Bosnia received terrorist threats following 9/11, and in-country terrorist cells have been destroyed. These past experiences indicate what could occur in the future.

Since many states within the region have troop contingents in Afghanistan and/or Iraq, they face a real threat of being targeted. The example of Spain



suggests that a catastrophic attack may encourage a state to leave an American-led coalition. Alliance with the West in and of itself increases a country's profile as a possible terrorist target.

**Corruption**

Most analysts do not consider corruption a threat to national or regional security, although none deny its deleterious effect on economic development. However, when it becomes so widespread that it deprives poor states of vital funds with which to govern and encourages criminality, corruption rises from a political problem to a security concern. Such is the case with most countries in South Eastern Europe.

Long before the collapse of Communism and the rise of al-Qaeda, corruption plagued most Balkan states. The inability of government officials to live on their modest salaries encouraged them to take bribes, which came to be seen as fees for services. People often sought offices for the access to bribes that those offices provided. Cash-strapped governments ignored such behavior because it relieved them of the need to pay higher wages. Shortages of various commodities led people to buy them on the black market. Today, as much as 60% of some South Eastern European economies are black or gray. Cash-and-carry businesses save buyers and sellers the high value added taxes on goods purchased legally. However, this benefit comes at a price. Off-the-books transactions deprive the government of badly needed revenue. Without such revenue, states cannot raise the salaries of police and other civil servants to a level that would discourage them from taking bribes.

Besides depriving the state of needed revenues, corruption exacerbates other security threats. Underpaid customs and borders officials may receive generous bribes for not inspecting shipments in and out of their countries. If the illicit cargo is cartons of cigarettes, little harm will be done. If it is arms and explosives, the consequences may be catastrophic. Allowing laborers to cross borders illegally seems harmless until governments recognize that terrorists may take advantage of the same lax immigration enforcement. The deadly 2004 attack on a school in Beslan, South Ossetia, was made possible by corrupt border officials allowing the terrorists to bribe their way across borders and through security cordons.

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**Responding to security threats**

Identifying threats is a prerequisite to countering them. Developing a comprehensive strategy and then implementing it must follow threat assessment. Each step in this process is harder than the one before. Strategies must be developed at national and regional levels and should consist of short- and long-term plans. Short-term plans target immediate problems, while long-term plans address the root causes of these problems. National strategies will probably agree on broad goals but may differ on specific details. A regional strategy will focus on problems endemic to all partner states.

Since organized crime and corruption pose the greatest threat to security and stability within the states of South Eastern Europe and in the region as a whole, combating them must be the first priority of any national strategy.

The long-term solution to these problems is economic development. Well paying jobs, low unemployment and a rising standard of living do not provide an environment conducive to criminality on the scale that now exists in the Balkans. Reducing the scope of black and gray markets puts more money in government coffers. This revenue enables governments to raise the salaries of police and civil servants, reducing their incentive to take bribes. Economic development is, however, much easier to describe than to accomplish.

Attracting foreign investment is crucial, but foreign investors are reluctant to put money into countries with endemic corruption and criminality. The need for investment dollars should provide a powerful incentive for more aggressive anti-crime programs and serious penalties for corruption. However, limited resources will force states to choose which criminal enterprises to target. In the short run, most will choose to attack those posing the greatest threat. Governments may, for example, need to ignore cigarette smuggling in order to focus on the far more serious problems of narcotics, arms and human trafficking.

While foreign and domestic terrorism currently pose no serious threat to Balkan states or the region as a whole, the potential for such threats must be taken seriously. The same economic conditions that push people into criminal activity can also make them vulnerable to terrorist recruitment. Fortunately, the same economic development that reduces the reality of crime and corruption also reduces the potential for terrorism. Those countries with large Muslim populations should consider funding Qur'anic schools so that clerics do not need

to be trained and educated abroad in institutions over which the state has no control.

Since organized criminality and terrorism transcend borders, neither can be effectively countered with exclusively national strategies. Despite the participation of southeastern states in anti-crime/anti-trafficking conventions, regional cooperation has been minimal. While criminals have transcended ethnic differences, states have not. The wars of Yugoslav succession have left lasting scars and persistent resentments that will take a very long time to dissipate. Serbia remains unreconciled to the loss of Kosovo. The Bosnian Federation is a country in name only. While none of its three ethnic groups wishes to return to the violence of the 1990s, neither do they accept the authority of Sarajevo. Bosnian Serbs in the semi-autonomous Republika Srpska look to Belgrade for leadership and would join Serbia proper if given the chance. The Croats of western Herzegovina continue to fly Croat flags and would join Croatia if allowed to do so. Some Kosovars may desire a greater Albania, but most Albanians do not. Macedonia contains a Slav majority and an Albanian minority uneasily coexisting. Despite these impediments, there are powerful incentives to cooperation. Virtually all nations in the region have either joined NATO and the EU or strongly desire to do so. Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria are members of both organizations. Croatia, Macedonia and Albania are on track to join. Serbia remains divided between those seeking EU membership and closer ties with the West, and those desiring closer ties with Moscow. However, the extradition of Radovan Karadzic to The Hague strongly suggests that the Europhiles are winning that debate. Both NATO and the EU have strict guidelines for membership, including adherence to human rights (which includes combating human trafficking) and improved border security. With membership comes greater resources in both the economic and security sectors. The U.S. and its allies have already poured millions of dollars into the region, much of it security sector assistance.

**CONCLUSION**

South Eastern Europe is a region in rapid transition. Its newly created states face a broad range of challenges. As the threat of conventional war has receded, unconventional threats have increased. Meeting these threats requires accurate threat assessment, good strategic thinking and effective implementation. Regional and international cooperation are critical. Criminals and terrorists

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have learned to cooperate across vast distances and broad ethnic divides. States must do the same.

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# SPOPADANJE S TERORIZMOM IN ORGANIZIRANIM KRIMINALOM: SKUPNI PRISTOP JUGOVZHODNE EVROPE

## COMBATING TERRORISM AND ORGANIZED CRIME: SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE COLLECTIVE APPROACHES

### **P O V Z E T E K**

*Konec hladne vojne je sprožil velik razcvet demokracije in svobode ter nevarno varnostno okolje. Po hladni vojni varnostni izzivi in grožnje ne prihajajo več od organiziranih, hierarhičnih državnih dejavnikov, ampak od nedržavnih, prilagodljivih mrežnih skupin in organizacij (kot so teroristične skupine, skupine organiziranega kriminala – angl. organized crime, skupine za pranje denarja in trgovino z ljudmi), ki jim je postopoma uspelo spremeniti tradicionalne geografske ovire med državami ter med domačimi in tujimi grožnjami. Propad Jugoslavije v zgodnjih devetdesetih letih in teroristični napadi na ZDA (2001), Turčijo (2003) in Španijo (2004) so jasno pokazali, kako lahko nestabilnost in vojna, ki vključujeta propad države na eni strani ali pa specifične ideologije ter verska prepričanja manjše skupine ljudi (ki je vseeno dobro pripravljena in organizirana) na drugi, vplivata na mir in varnost vse regije ali kontinenta.*

*Ta razvoj je vlade in narode spodbudil k raziskovanju dinamike medsebojnega sprejemanja odločitev in prevzemu vedenja teh*

<sup>1</sup> The Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR), Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.

*skupin, da bi terorizem bolje razumeli ter se lažje spoprijeli z njim in mrežami organiziranega kriminala (glej opombo 1). Poleg tega so narodi z ustanovitvijo orodij in mehanizmov za »medagencijsko sodelovanje«, z oblikovanjem in utrjevanjem »partnerstev« ter priključitvijo k različnim organizacijam ali zavezništvom za »kolektivno varnost in sodelovanje na področju varnosti« poglobili sodelovanje z državami, ki imajo skupne varnostne cilje.*

*Za Jugovzhodno Evropo grožnje in izzivi terorizma ter organiziranega kriminala niso več neznanka. Skupaj z revščino, politično nestabilnostjo, korupcijo, izolacijo manjšin, pandemičnimi, naravnimi in drugimi boleznimi oblikujejo te grožnje spekter varnostnih groženj za Jugovzhodno Evropo. Narodi so med iskanjem učinkovitih odgovorov postopoma razvili množico dvostranskih, podregijskih in regijskih sodelovalnih mehanizmov in/ali so se pridružili sedanjim sodelujočim mednarodnim organizacijam ali zavezništvom. Še vedno ostaja vprašanje, ali se je Jugovzhodna Evropa z vsemi orodji na pravem mestu iz »evropskega sodčka smodnika« spremenila v stabilno regijo brez terorizma in organiziranega kriminala. Ta članek preiskuje razvoj Jugovzhodne Evrope na področju sodelovanja v boju proti terorizmu in organiziranemu kriminalu.*

## **K L J U Č N E B E S E D E**

*Boj proti terorizmu, boj proti organiziranemu kriminalu, sodelovanje Jugovzhodne Evrope, boj Jugovzhodne Evrope proti terorizmu, boj Jugovzhodne Evrope proti organiziranemu kriminalu, varnostno sodelovanje Jugovzhodne Evrope*

## **A B S T R A C T**

*The end of the Cold War triggered an inexorable bloom of democracy and freedom in a multifarious and perilous security environment. Post-Cold War security challenges and threats no longer come from organized, hierarchical state actors, but rather from non-state, easily adaptable, network-centric groups and organizations (such*

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*as terrorist, organized crime (OC), money laundering and human trafficking groups), which have progressively succeeded in altering the traditional geographical borders between countries, as well as between domestic and foreign threats. The breakdown of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s and the terrorist attacks in the US (2001), Turkey (2003) and Spain (2004), etc. have clearly illustrated how instability and war involving failing states, on the one hand, or specific ideologies and religious convictions of small groups of people (yet very well prepared and organized), on the other hand, can impact the peace and security of an entire region or continent. These developments have prompted governments and nations to investigate the dynamics of networked decision-making and adopt a more network-like behavior in order to better understand and tackle terrorism and organized crime networks.<sup>2</sup> In addition, nations have deepened cooperation with countries with common and shared security goals by establishing “interagency cooperation” tools and mechanisms, developing and consolidating “partnerships” and joining various “collective/cooperative security” organizations and alliances.*

*South Eastern Europe is no stranger to terrorism and organized crime threats and challenges. These menaces, along with poverty, political instability, corruption, isolation of minorities, pandemic disease, natural disasters and others, shape the spectrum of security threats to the South Eastern European region. In their search for effective responses, nations have gradually developed an array of bilateral, subregional and regional cooperation mechanisms and/or joined existing international cooperative organizations and alliances. One question remains: with all these instruments in place, has SEE shifted from the “Powder Keg of Europe” to a stable, terrorism- and organized crime-free region? This paper investigates South Eastern Europe’s developments with regard to combating terrorism and organized crime cooperation.*

<sup>2</sup> From the perspective that there is a need for “fighting networks with networks”. Anthony Glees, “The British Search for a New Intelligence System”, in Steve Tsang ed., *Intelligence and Human Rights in the Era of Global Terrorism*, (Westport: Praeger Security International 2007), p. 152. Yet, governments’ becoming very effective network centric organizations is challenged by bureaucratic challenges and parochial perspectives. It is difficult to “flatten” their decision-making processes to develop the speed and agility necessary to get inside the decision cycles of their terrorist adversaries. See “Interagency Coordination: The Other Side of CIMIC” by Paul Shemella, Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) (Draft Paper).



**KEY WORDS**

*Combating terrorism, combating organized crime, South Eastern Europe cooperation, South Eastern Europe combating terrorism, South Eastern Europe combating organized crime, South Eastern Europe security cooperation.*

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**INTRODUCTION**

The end of the Cold War triggered an inexorable bloom of democracy and freedom in a multifarious and perilous security environment. Post-Cold War security challenges and threats no longer come from organized, hierarchical state actors, but rather from non-state, easily adaptable, network-centric groups and organizations (such as terrorist, organized crime (OC), money laundering and human trafficking groups), which have progressively succeeded in altering the traditional geographic borders between countries, as well as between domestic and foreign threats. The breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s and the terrorist attacks in the US (2001), Turkey (2003), Spain (2004) and London (2005), etc. have clearly illustrated how instability and war involving failing states, on the one hand, or specific ideologies and religious convictions of small groups of people (yet very well prepared and organized), on the other hand, can impact the peace and security of an entire region or continent.

These developments have prompted governments and nations to investigate the dynamics of networked decision-making and adopt a more network-like behavior in order to better understand and tackle terrorism and organized crime networks<sup>3</sup> (Tsang 2007). In addition, nations have deepened cooperation with countries with common and shared security goals by establishing “interagency cooperation” tools and mechanisms, developing and consolidating “partnerships”, and joining various “collective/cooperative security” organizations and alliances.

South Eastern Europe (SEE) is no stranger to terrorism and organized crime. These menaces, along with poverty, political instability, corruption, isolation of minorities, pandemic disease, natural disasters and others, shape the spectrum

<sup>3</sup> Yet, governments’ becoming very effective network centric organizations is challenged by bureaucratic issues and parochial perspectives. It is difficult to “flatten” their decision-making processes to develop the speed and agility necessary to penetrate their terrorist adversaries. See Paul SHEMELLA: Interagency Coordination: The Other Side of CIMIC (Draft Paper).

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of security threats to the South Eastern European region. In their search for effective responses, nations have gradually developed an array of bilateral, subregional and regional cooperation mechanisms and/or joined existing international cooperative organizations and alliances. One question remains: with all these instruments in place, has SEE shifted from the “Powder Keg of Europe” to a stable, terrorism- and organized crime-free region? This paper investigates South Eastern Europe’s developments with regard to combating terrorism and organized crime cooperation.

**COLLECTIVE APPROACHES TO COMBATING TERRORISM AND ORGANIZED CRIME COOPERATION IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE**

**The need for cooperation: terrorism and organized crime in the region**

South Eastern Europe is not a major haven for terrorism, as compared to other regions. On the one hand, there are a relatively small number of Muslim immigrants, and the Muslim minorities are integrated in SEE states (e.g. in Romania and Bulgaria). On the other hand, support for terrorism of the largest indigenous Muslim groups in the Balkans is lukewarm, due to these groups’ more secular philosophy as compared to Muslims elsewhere; they consider themselves Europeans and fear that terrorism would stain their name in Europe, ban them from traveling there and hinder their countries’ efforts toward EU and/or NATO membership. Moreover, the crackdown on Islamic militants by the main Middle East sources of terrorists (i.e. Saudi Arabia) has also reduced the threat of terrorism in the Balkans (Woehrel 2008, Bruwell and others 2006, Alic 2006).

Nevertheless, since 1989, SEE has been fertile ground for organized crime and, to a certain extent, terrorism. There are several reasons for this. First is the communist breakdown (and regime change) in the region, which has placed SEE countries on different economic, political and societal levels. Precarious and dysfunctional state institutions, weak law enforcement organizations, political instability, corruption and poverty have fueled terrorist and organized crime groups’ activities (Innes 2005, Moustakis 2004). In addition, a merger between organized crime and terrorism has been noticed lately due to diminished state sponsorship from the Soviet Union and its satellites, coupled with the post-9/11 decreased terrorism backing by various Arab-world states. These changes have constrained terrorist groups to find financial and

material support from other sources, including organized crime. In SEE, it has been reported that the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was involved in heroin trafficking as a way to raise money for its operations conducted during the Kosovo conflict (Hutchinson, O'malley 2007). Globalization has also contributed to expanded terrorist and criminal opportunities, as well as to a convergence between organized crime and terrorist activities (Chepesiuk, 2007). Second is the prolonged conflict in some countries of the former Yugoslavia and/or Soviet Union. This has allowed a proliferation of mafia-like politically motivated structures in the region (Fluri, Gustenau, Pantev, 2005). Third is the extensive military activity in the Black Sea region during the Cold War, which increased opportunities for illegal arms trafficking, which then led to the creation of private armies and paramilitary forces by various secessionist movements in the region (Maior, M. Matei 2005). Fourth is the Muslim presence in SEE: Muslims and/or Arabs who studied in some SEE countries during communist times (as was the case of Romania) and remained in Europe after the fall of communism, and/or Islamic warriors and representatives of different humanitarian relief organizations who arrived from Arab countries (e.g. Saudi Arabia, Syria and Algeria) during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s (Alic, 2006). All of the above factors provided opportunities for Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups to infiltrate SEE (especially the Western Balkans), even though, as previously mentioned, Osama Bin Laden's call for jihad does not appeal to all Muslims in the region<sup>4</sup> (Woehrel 2008, Matei F 2007). Furthermore, various terrorist groups and organizations attempted to recruit so-called "white Muslims" from the Balkans (which potentially generated a "white al-Qaeda" network, operating from Western to South Eastern Europe), as their physical appearance "fits" better in Europe than the look of Middle Easterners<sup>5</sup> (Woehrel 2008, Alic 2006). Fifth is the United States military presence in some SEE countries (i.e. Romania and Bulgaria), which could become indirect terrorist targets. Last, an envisaged relocation (Woehrel 2008) of terrorists currently concentrated in Iraq to the

<sup>4</sup> Islamic non-governmental organizations (some of them fronts for Al Qaeda) have operated in Albania since 1991 and opened terrorist training camps in Serbia. Of these, the Active Islamic Youth was linked to attacks on ethnic Croats in Central Bosnia. Al Qaeda has operated in the Balkans since the Bosnian war.

<sup>5</sup> Bosnian authorities have provided mixed analyses: it is either a great danger or a potential threat due to insubstantial evidence. In 2006 three young men were detained in Bosnia (now pending trial) for an alleged plot of terrorist attacks on Western targets in Sarajevo. Authorities believed they were "White Muslims" recruited by Al Qaeda.

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Balkan region and *vice versa* could entail a crescendo of terrorism and organized crime activities in the region.

### **Cooperative initiatives and mechanisms**

These developments have stimulated cooperation and coordination among the countries in SEE to strengthen freedom, democracy and security in the region. Fighting the region' security threats in general, and terrorism and organized crime in particular, has encompassed strengthened diplomatic, political and military relations between SEE countries, improved intelligence sharing, and intensive cross-border police and judicial cooperation. Cooperation ranges from meetings of political and military leaders in the region to common education and training with regard to combating and preventing terrorism and organized crime, and concerted actions of regional public prosecutors, intelligence and law enforcement officials aimed at securing their borders, arresting or expelling terrorist and/or organized crime suspects, eliminating organizations linked with terrorism and organized crime, freezing or confiscating the assets of people and groups suspected of terrorist financing, and the like. Cooperation has also included SEE countries fighting the war on terrorism together with their allies and partners.

The prospect of NATO and EU membership (a status desired by the majority of former communist countries in Europe as a proof of their democratic maturity and advanced security capabilities), coupled with the two organizations' membership requirements and incentives, have accelerated SEE regional cooperation endeavors. After 1989, both NATO and the EU focused on expanding Europe's zone of peace and stability, by opening their doors to new members and assisting both aspirant and non-candidate countries to consolidate their democracies and increase their security capabilities through various programs, partnerships and/or membership requirements aimed at post-conflict reconstruction and development, reform of security and defense institutions, and bringing SEE countries closer to the West (Burwell, Gompert, Lebl, Lodal, Slocombe 2006). Through these programs, the two organizations have forced the hands of candidate countries to strengthen bilateral and trilateral relations, consolidate relations with their neighbors and participate in a series of regional and subregional cooperative security organizations. In other words, regional and subregional cooperation has been a prerequisite for integration in the two organizations.

**Bilateral and trilateral cooperation**

SEE nations have signed a series of bilateral treaties and established various trilateral cooperation initiatives, each with specific objectives based on shared interests and security preoccupations (ranging from agriculture, education and transportation to customs, defense, extradition, and countering terrorism and organized crime). The bilateral non-aggression and non-territorial claims treaties<sup>6</sup> between Romania and Hungary (1997) and Bulgaria and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1999) were signed as a desire on both sides to halt past misunderstandings and mistrust, and speed up bilateral cooperation, yet the countries also hoped to get extra credit for NATO and EU membership. The trilateral Romania-Bulgaria-Turkey treaty has focused on combating organized crime but was reinforced by the common incentive of European integration of all its members, as well as by Bulgaria and Romania’s common pursuit of NATO membership. Likewise, the trilateral Romania-Bulgaria-Greece treaty has not only been a mechanism of cooperation among the three countries on fighting organized crime, but it also provided an opportunity for Romania and Bulgaria to enjoy Greece’s support for their candidacy in NATO (Ram, 2001).

**Regional Cooperation**

*NATO*

Nine SEE countries are members or partners of (and two others got the invitation letter in April 2008 to join) the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which, since the end of the Cold War (and in particular after the attacks of 11 September 2001) has strived to enhance its collective counter-terrorism capabilities. NATO has been approaching terrorism as an international security problem, which requires a more comprehensive approach and response to include collective political, economic and law enforcement measures, as well as military engagement. In other words, terrorism has become an enduring mission of the Alliance. In 2001, within 24 hours of the terrorist attack in the US, NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time ever. In 2002, NATO adopted several measures and initiatives on combating terrorism: a Civil-Emergency-Planning Action Plan (to assist national authorities strengthen their civil preparedness), enhanced intelligence sharing, better crisis-response

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.nato-pa.int/archivedpub/special/tr-borovetz99.asp> (28 June 2008).

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measures and increased cooperation with its Partners (within the framework of the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism). It has a military concept for defense against terrorism, which sets out four categories of possible military activity by NATO (anti-terrorism, consequence management, counter-terrorism and military cooperation). In all, 26 NATO countries have contributed to the war on terror by their involvement in Afghanistan (Bennett 2003, Burwell, Gompert, Lebl, Lodal, Slocombe, 2006).

*European Union (EU)*

Eight SEE states are members of the European Union, which has also channeled its efforts to develop collective counter-terrorism and organized crime tools. With regard to terrorism, in 2001 the EU adopted an anti-terrorism plan aimed at strengthening international consensus and efforts to combat terrorism (to include terrorism financing and recruiting), augmenting EU anti-terrorism capabilities, protecting international transport and enhancing border security, as well as encouraging third countries' counter-terrorism efforts. Later, the EU approved a regulation on freezing funds and banning terrorism funding and support, followed by a framework decision on the definition and penalty for terrorism in 2002. All these counter-terrorism measures are applicable to the EU fight against organized crime as well (e.g. the discussion about the harmonization of criminal sanctions and the freezing of assets could also be extended to OC) (Bruggeman, 2002). In addition, the EU Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (2000) and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) are aimed at enhancing cooperation on countering organized crime<sup>7</sup> (Zimmermann 2006, Bruggeman, 2002).

Among other efforts, the most relevant EU cooperative endeavors include the EAW, EUROPOL, EUROJUST, JITs and the Office of the Counter-terrorism Coordinator. The European Arrest Warrant (EAW) was adopted in 2002 to deepen cooperation of EU members' judiciary systems by facilitating extradition throughout the EU states (Zimmermann 2006, Bruggeman, 2002). The European Union Law Enforcement Organisation, known as the European Police Office (EUROPOL), was established in 1992 to increase the effectiveness of EU law enforcement organizations' cooperation in preventing and countering terrorism

<sup>7</sup> Fighting Terrorism at European level, 2003. [http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/aussenpolitik/vn/itb/itb\\_eu\\_html](http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/aussenpolitik/vn/itb/itb_eu_html) (24 May 2008).

and international organized crime (i.e. through information and intelligence sharing, support for operations, strategic reports (e.g. threat assessments) and crime analyses, and harmonization of investigative techniques within EU Member States. The Counter Terrorism Unit has recently been reactivated within EUROPOL (Zimmermann 2006). The Network of National Experts on Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) was established in 2005 to ensure cooperation of EU countries' investigation teams with regard to terrorism and organized crime (Zimmermann 2006). The European Union Judicial Cooperation (EUROJUST) is the first-ever permanent network of judicial authorities, established in 2002 to deepen cooperation on criminal justice cases throughout the EU (Zimmermann 2006). The Office of the Counter-terrorism Coordinator in the Council of the European Union was established in 2004 to provide a more integrated approach to the fight against terrorism and better coordination between various EU policies (Zimmermann 2006).

*OSCE*

Created in 1975, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is the world's largest regional security organization, with 56 participating countries from Europe, Central Asia and America. It represents both a political cooperation forum (for issues ranging from early warning and conflict prevention, to crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction) and an operative mechanism (through its unique network of field missions). Interagency cooperation on combating terrorism and organized crime has been a high priority of the OSCE; to this end, the OSCE has organized numerous meetings, conferences and roundtables aimed at enhancing cooperation between police, prosecutors and judges in organized crime investigations, as well as harmonization of legislation among its member states. It has also been a supporter and contributor to global anti-terrorism efforts<sup>8</sup>.

**Subregional organizations**

*The Central European Initiative (CEI)*

The Central European Initiative (CEI) is an intergovernmental cooperation forum established in 1989 to assist its Central European member countries in fulfilling EU membership requirements. After the inclusion of South Eastern

<sup>8</sup> <http://www.osce.org> (28 June 2008).<http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/2002EU-OSCE.htm> (28 June 2008).

and Eastern European countries in the late 1990s, the CEI agenda changed to include cross-border cooperation in combating terrorism and organized crime. Currently, the CEI comprises 18 countries from Central and Eastern Europe (Albania, Austria, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine). The CEI's activities have involved regular meetings aimed at exchanging and sharing information and experience, assessing lessons learned from past experiences and providing comparative surveys on regional security threats<sup>9</sup>.

*Brdo Process*

The Brdo Process is a CT and OC cooperation forum initiated in 2001 at Brdo pri Kranju, Slovenia, by a number of countries from Central and Eastern Europe (Austria, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYROM, Greece, Hungary, Romania, Serbia-Montenegro, Slovenia and Turkey). Representatives of the institutions with attributions in the field of combating terrorism from Brdo member countries have convened yearly to address current security challenges to the region and find common ways to tackle them<sup>10</sup>.

*South East European Cooperation Process (SEECP)*

The South East European Cooperation Process was created in 1996 to strengthen subregional security cooperation (i.e. cooperation in justice and home affairs, trans-border cooperation, as well as cooperation in combating organized crime, illicit traffic in drugs and guns, and terrorism). It comprises Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, FYROM, Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, Turkey, and Bosnia and Herzegovina (February 2001), with Croatia and Moldova as observers<sup>11</sup>. In 2004, the SEECP set up a Consultation Group for Combating Organized Crime and Corruption (Costea, 2004).

*Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe*

The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (also known as the Marshall Plan of SEE) is a forum of cooperation of over 40 countries and organizations from SEE, created in 1999 on the initiative of the EU, more or less as a regional

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<sup>9</sup> <http://www.ceinet.org/home.php> (22 June 2008).

<sup>10</sup> <http://www.ceinet.org/home.php> (22 June 2008).

<sup>11</sup> <http://www.ceinet.org/home.php> (22 June 2008).



cooperation “prerequisite” for every candidate country to the EU. Security cooperation is ensured by Working Table III (with two Sub-Tables: Security and Defense, and Justice and Home Affairs). The Working Table’s achievements in fighting organized crime include the Stability Pact’s Initiative against Organized Crime (SPOC) and the Police Forum (PF) (Delevic, 2007). The Pact has been criticized for its slow pace and inadequate funding, especially because it lacked its own funding, but its value in fostering regional cooperation cannot be denied (Moustakis, 2004). In 2007 the Stability Pact became the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), a regionally owned cooperative organization<sup>12</sup>.

*Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI)*

The Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) was established in 1995 to strengthen Euro-Atlantic cooperation among its 13 participant states (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Turkey and Montenegro)<sup>13</sup>. Within the SECI, a Regional Center for Combating Trans-Border Criminality was created in 2000 in Bucharest, Romania, to strengthen law enforcement and counter cross-border crime cooperation (i.e. fighting drugs, arms, human trafficking and illegal immigration). Besides the 13 member states, the SECI Center has 15 observer states (Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Canada, France Georgia, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States of America) and 2 permanent advisors (ICPO-Interpol and the World Customs Organization). The Center has seven working groups, focusing on human trafficking, illegal migration, illicit drugs, stolen vehicles, smuggling, customs crimes, financial crime and cybercrime, as well as on ensuring the safety of sea containers<sup>14</sup>. The SECI Center conducts, organizes and participates in joint education and training activities and regular meetings to strengthen combating organized crime and terrorism cooperation<sup>15</sup> (Ram 2001, Woehrel 2008). Among the most recent exercises, it is worth mentioning the 2007 Black Sea Regional Weapons of

<sup>12</sup> Strategic Outlook at the Priority Areas of Cooperation in South East Europe. [http://rcc.int/download.php?tip=docs&doc=RCCStrategicOutlook\\_200508.pdf&doc\\_url=1654e047b919225f06cc5b6e1cb12a91](http://rcc.int/download.php?tip=docs&doc=RCCStrategicOutlook_200508.pdf&doc_url=1654e047b919225f06cc5b6e1cb12a91) (23 June 2008).

<sup>13</sup> [http://www.secicenter.org/m106/About\\_SECI](http://www.secicenter.org/m106/About_SECI) (28 May 2008).

<sup>14</sup> [http://www.secicenter.org/m106/About\\_SECI](http://www.secicenter.org/m106/About_SECI) (28 May 2008).

<sup>15</sup> [http://www.secicenter.org/m106/About\\_SECI](http://www.secicenter.org/m106/About_SECI) (28 May 2008). <http://ue.mae.ro/index.php?lang=en&id=31&s=6181&arhiva=true> (28 May 2008).

Mass Destruction (WMD) Counterproliferation Exercise, organized by the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency and FBI, with participants from Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Romania and the SECI Center. The simulation exercise increased cooperation among participants as concerns testing, command and control, communication, intelligence sharing as well as operational capabilities with regard to weapons of mass destruction counter-proliferation<sup>16</sup>. In addition, every six months the Center's experts provide decision makers with specific strategic analyses and reports on drug trafficking, cigarette smuggling, human trafficking and illegal immigration in South Eastern Europe<sup>17</sup> (Ram 2001, Woehrel 2008). But the SECI's activity goes far beyond meetings and exercises. The SECI is a real operational center of cooperation, which has been very effective and successful in its anti-crime efforts during its eight years of existence, working closely with INTERPOL, WCO and other organizations. Successful SECI operations include the following: in 2002, Operation "Mirage", carried out with the participation of both SECI and non-SECI member states<sup>18</sup> (e.g. Ukraine, Serbia and Montenegro), which resulted in the identification and elimination of a huge number of transnational human trafficking networks<sup>19</sup>, in 2003, the SECI played a significant role in the arrest in Montenegro of the Macedonian sex-trade king, Leka<sup>20</sup>; in 2006, Operation "Torino", conducted by Italian and Romanian authorities and supported by the SECI, which resulted in the arrest of 32 Albanian and Romanian human traffickers in both Italy and Romania<sup>21</sup>; in 2006, the SECI's joint investigation with Romania and Serbia and Montenegro, targeting cigarette smuggling between the two countries, which resulted in 11 arrests in Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, as well as the seizure of considerable quantities of cigarettes and other goods<sup>22</sup>; in 2007, Operation "Ring", a drug trafficking operation conducted by a Turkish OC network (operating both in Romania and Turkey, with The Netherlands as destination country for drug sale), which resulted in the apprehension of 14 persons simultaneously in Romania and Turkey<sup>23</sup>;

<sup>16</sup> <http://www.mai.gov.ro/englez/Documente/Arhiva%20comunicat/2007/BI%20web%2024-30.09.en.pdf> (16 June 2008).

<sup>17</sup> [http://www.secicenter.org/m106/About\\_SECI](http://www.secicenter.org/m106/About_SECI) (28 May 2008). <http://ue.mae.ro/index.php?lang=en&id=31&s=6181&arhiva=true> (28 May 2008).

<sup>18</sup> <http://www.ceinet.org/home.php> (22 June 2008).

<sup>19</sup> Ioan RUS. Interview by Victor IONESCU, *Balkanii si Europa*, No. 33.

<sup>20</sup> Balkan Countries Step Up the Fight against Organized Crime. <http://www.sectv-exchanges.com/code/navigate.php?Id=184> (23 June 2008).

<sup>21</sup> [http://www.secicenter.org/p182/20th\\_of\\_June\\_2006](http://www.secicenter.org/p182/20th_of_June_2006) (24 June 2008).

<sup>22</sup> [http://www.secicenter.org/p182/20th\\_of\\_June\\_2006](http://www.secicenter.org/p182/20th_of_June_2006) (24 June 2008).

and, in 2008, Operation “Pigeon”, which resulted in the apprehension of 24 smugglers who were part of two networks operating on the Moldova - Ukraine - Romania - Hungary - Italy route<sup>24</sup>.

*Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)*

Established in 1992, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) was the first full-fledged regional cooperation organization in the Black Sea region, comprising all six Black Sea riparian states (Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine), as well as five neighboring countries (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece and Moldova). In regards to organized crime and terrorism, the BSEC countries signed an agreement on Cooperation in Combating Crime (including organized crime) in 1998 and an additional protocol in 2004<sup>25</sup>.

*Black Sea Naval Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR)*

The Black Sea Naval Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR) is a multinational naval force comprising the six Black Sea countries (Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and Georgia) aimed at reducing illicit activity on the Black Sea through international cooperation. It has been activated for maritime emergencies (e.g. search and rescue operations, humanitarian needs, counter maritime terrorism, clearing sea mines, etc). (Ram 2001, Babaoglu 2005, Öztürk 2007).

*Border Defense Initiative (BDI)*

The Border Defense Initiative (BDI), also known as the “Black Sea Border Security Initiative”, is a cooperative endeavor of the Black Sea riparian countries (Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine), launched in 2004. Under the auspices of the BDI, member countries are conducting various simulation exercises to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), strengthen border control and share intelligence on illicit WMD-related activities in the region<sup>26</sup> (Istrate 2006).

<sup>23</sup> [http://www.secicenter.org/p286/20\\_December\\_2007](http://www.secicenter.org/p286/20_December_2007) (26 December 2007).

<sup>24</sup> <http://www.secicenter.org/p411/23+April+2008> (24 June 2008).

<sup>25</sup> <http://www.bsec-organization.org/temp/cooperation.htm> (29 November 2007). [http://www.bsec-organization.org/areas\\_of\\_cooperation.aspx?ID=Cooperation\\_in\\_Combating\\_Crime](http://www.bsec-organization.org/areas_of_cooperation.aspx?ID=Cooperation_in_Combating_Crime) (28 May 2008).

<sup>26</sup> [http://www.roembus.org/presidency\\_agenda/2005/visit\\_march\\_2005/10cfr/speech.htm](http://www.roembus.org/presidency_agenda/2005/visit_march_2005/10cfr/speech.htm) (30 June 2008).

**Analysis of Cooperation**

Admittedly, the existence of such a great number of cooperation instruments is proof of the SEE countries’ common security concerns and willingness to work together to tackle them. However, this may also be a challenge to effective cooperation. Not only are some cooperation initiatives redundant, but they ultimately seem to become more symbolic than real (in that they either lack the appropriate management and/or support to be effective, or hold meetings only for the sake of more meetings) (Ordesman, Burke 2006). For example, there are three cooperation initiatives involving the Black Sea countries, all of them concerned with combating terrorism and/or organized crime. The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was more symbolic than effective due to “inadequate authority, confused priority setting and less than spectacular management” (Moustakis 2004, Karajkov, 2007). The SEECP, although considered for a long time the only regionally led and owned initiative, did not go beyond conducting frequent meetings of heads of state and government, and releasing declarations that had no close follow-up; this brought into question the effectiveness of the Process, especially considering that influential organized crime groups are still operating in the region (Moustakis 2004). In addition, many regional initiatives have pursued immediate problem solving or quick-fix solutions to various security issues, rather than long-term security goals for the region, which made regional cooperation a “good intention” with no substantial results<sup>27</sup>. Moreover, SEE has more diplomatic versus operative collective tools; even if diplomatic efforts are valuable in strengthening regional relations they may not be as effective in CT and CO as specific regional centers of CT and/or CO experts. The SECI and EUROPOL may be effective with regard to OC but not necessarily CT.

While, in general, all SEE countries have acknowledged the need for a concerted response to terrorism and organized crime, national interests and security concerns have prevailed over cooperation. As a consequence, cooperation in the realm of intelligence, home affairs and justice has been challenging: countries have been reticent to share national information with regard to countering organized crime and terrorism, hesitant to create an integrated regional database on organized crime (which is highly desirable

<sup>27</sup> Has Regional Cooperation Led to the Establishment of Balkania: Europe’s Southeastern Dimension?, Analytica 2007. <http://www.analyticamk.org/files/ReportNo7.pdf> (30 November 2007).

in order to facilitate access to records for all law enforcement agencies), and unable to establish robust cooperation capabilities among investigative magistrates<sup>28</sup>. On the other hand, the SEE countries have had different tempos of development, institution-building, and European and Euro-Atlantic integration, thus a different pace of reform and transformation of security and judiciary institutions. They did not have compatible counter-terrorism and organized crime legislation, resources, capabilities, methods and equipment, of which organized crime networks have taken advantage, which has had a negative impact on the effectiveness of cooperation (Antill, 2002). The frequent meetings of regional and subregional organizations, experience sharing, education and training, and most importantly simulation exercises with regard to combating terrorism and organized crime, will ultimately deepen cooperation in the region. The SECI Center has proved promising as well. By bringing together law enforcement experts from various government branches of its members and observers, the SECI Center has successfully built effective regional enforcement networks, thus overcoming discrepancies and distrust between countries and/or between the same country's law enforcement agencies (i.e. between police and customs, a problem predominant in SEE)<sup>29</sup>. On the other hand, as concerns legal and judiciary cooperation, the Stability Pact's 2003 Sarajevo Declaration aligned the judiciaries of SEE countries to the UN Convention against Organized Crime, whereby countries agreed to cooperate to: ensure the early and full implementation of the UN Convention and its three protocols; create the appropriate institutional setting and provide the required infrastructure for the enforcement of the required legislation by the UN Convention; establish bilateral agreements on extradition and mutual legal assistance; encourage interregional cooperation, especially among the respective judicial authorities and police forces; ensure that police, customs, judges and prosecutors are adequately trained to investigate, prosecute and sentence organized crime members; develop national and regional strategies to prevent organized crime; and other issues<sup>30</sup>. This Declaration was very important considering that a lack of compatible criminal legislation has been a

<sup>28</sup> A Regional Security Strategy for the Western Balkans, *Journal of Foreign Policy of Moldova*, Issue 1, 2006, 2-20.

<sup>29</sup> [http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=events.event\\_summary&event\\_id=15910](http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=events.event_summary&event_id=15910) (29 June 2008).

<sup>30</sup> Balkan Countries Step Up the Fight against Organized Crime. <http://www.sectv-exchanges.com/code/navigate.php?Id=184> (23 June 2008). <http://www.stabilitypact.org/org-crime/031028-sarajevo.asp>, (27 June 2008).

serious drawback to cooperation. For example, although the SECI's intelligence sharing and joint police actions were crucial in the arrest in Montenegro of the Macedonian sex-trade king, Leka, his trial in Macedonia would not have been possible without a specific extradition agreement between Macedonia and Montenegro<sup>31</sup>. In addition, the South East European Prosecutors' Advisory Group (SEEPAG) was created in 2003 to facilitate judicial cooperation among Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Greece, Croatia, Moldova, Romania, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia and Turkey, through swift information and evidence sharing in trans-border investigations, and assisting lawmakers in the region on various justice and law enforcement issues (Delevic 2007). Larger organizations such as the European Union have also had problems cooperating, especially in the field of combating terrorism. Some EU countries do not see terrorism as a global threat, but rather a "bygone era of political violence agitation indigenous to Europe in the 1970s" (Zimmermann 2006). And, even if they viewed the Madrid terrorist attacks as the European version of 9/11, Spain's terrorist attacks did not change some EU countries' inertia toward a common counterterrorism strategy (including using military force to fight international terrorism) (Zimmermann 2006). This is one of the reasons why the European Union lacks a strong autonomous law-enforcement, intelligence and operational counter-terrorism authority (Zimmermann 2006). EUROPOL for example may be the EU's main law-enforcement mechanism, but it lacks an effective mandate for combating terrorism, as the EU Member States still hesitate to grant EUROPOL a serious counter-terrorism role (Zimmermann 2006). On the other hand, according to researchers, the EU's anti-terrorism plan lacks coherence with regard to countering terrorist financing and consequence management (Zimmermann 2006). Most likely, cross-organization interaction will make regional and subregional cooperation more effective. It is worth mentioning the incremental progress of cooperation and mutual assistance among the Stability Pact's Initiative to Fight Organized Crime (SPOC), the Police Forum (PF), the SEECF, SEEPAG, the SE Police Chief Association (SEPCHA)<sup>32</sup> and the SECI Center (Delevic 2007, Ram 2001). NATO and the EU have also established security agreements

<sup>31</sup> Balkan Countries Step Up the Fight against Organized Crime. <http://www.sectv-exchanges.com/code/navigate.php?Id=184> (23 June 2008).

<sup>32</sup> Which was created in 2002 to fight organized crime (among other issues), and which actually took the responsibility for the Police Forum activities in 2007. <http://www.sepca-bg.org/about/?a=3> (23 June 2008).

(especially between NATO and EU Member States that are not Alliance members) to facilitate mutual intelligence and information sharing (Burwell, Gompert, Lebl, Lodal, Slocombe 2006). EUROPOL cooperates with a number of third countries and organizations, including the following SEE countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey<sup>33</sup> (Zimmermann 2006).

The penetration of organized crime into security institutions throughout the SEE region has been a grave setback to effective operative regional and subregional CT and CO cooperation<sup>34</sup>. A telling example is the involvement of the Serbian Unit for Special Operations (also known as the Red Berets) in criminal gang activities, whose deputy commander, Zvezdan Jovanovic, assassinated Zoran Djindjic, Serbia's prime minister between 2001-2003 in 2003<sup>35</sup>. After the assassination, the Serbian authorities started a comprehensive reform of the country's security institutions, began a hunt for organized crime groups (and their connection to government collaborators) and strengthened cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which led to the apprehension of 4500 people and elimination of Serbia's largest organized crime associations, including the criminal group behind Djindjic's murder<sup>36</sup>. Corruption at all government levels is a common problem in SEE, and, when involving border and/or customs police, it becomes a regional security threat, as it fuels illegal trafficking in goods, persons and terrorist materials at border crossings. A successful cooperative attempt to address this challenge was, among other efforts, the SECI Trade and Transportation Program's Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), signed by nine of its member states, to foster trade and reduce corruption and smuggling at border crossings<sup>37</sup>. Bilateral cooperation has also been effective with regard to countering organized crime.

<sup>33</sup> Europe - succeeding together, Presidency Programme, 1 January to 30 June 2007. [http://www.eu2007.de/includes/Downloads/Praesidentschaftsprogramm/EU\\_Presidency\\_Programme\\_final.pdf](http://www.eu2007.de/includes/Downloads/Praesidentschaftsprogramm/EU_Presidency_Programme_final.pdf) (23 March 2008).

<sup>34</sup> A detailed study on the penetration of the security sector in SEE by the organized crime was published by the Center for Study of the Democracy in 2004: Partners in Crime. The Risk of Symbiosis between the Security Sector and Organized Crime in Southeast Europe. <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNPAN017117.pdf> (23 June 2008).

<sup>35</sup> Balkan countries step up the fight against organized crime. <http://www.sectv-exchanges.com/code/navigate.php?Id=184>, (23 June 2008).

<sup>36</sup> Balkan countries step up the fight against organized crime. <http://www.sectv-exchanges.com/code/navigate.php?Id=184>, (23 June 2008).

<sup>37</sup> [http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=events.event\\_summary&event\\_id=15910](http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=events.event_summary&event_id=15910) (28 June 2008).

**CONCLUSION**

Whether an act of free will or a condition imposed by NATO/EU membership requirements, the SEE countries are currently well connected through profuse cooperative mechanisms, ranging from bilateral agreements to regional organizations and alliances and subregional arrangements. One could argue that SEE has moved from the “Powder Keg of Europe” to a more stable and peaceful region. In a poll developed by the *Financial Times* in 2008 on the world’s most peaceful countries in 2007, some SEE countries ranked high (Slovenia 16, Hungary 18, Romania 24, Bulgaria 57, Croatia 60, out of a total of 140 countries). The ranking took into account the countries’ foreign policy and internal conduct, including the probability of terrorist acts and organized crime, internal conflict and political violence, good neighborly relations, participation in international military and peace operations, etc.<sup>38</sup>. Undoubtedly, some countries ranked high due to, among other reasons, regional cooperation. But SEE is not a terrorism- and organized crime-free region. First, in the same poll, other SEE countries occupied low positions (Albania 79, Moldova 83, Serbia 85, Macedonia 87) (Ardelean, 2008). In addition, a very recent threat assessment done by the United States warned of the relocation of Europeans trained in Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan to a number of European countries, including Romania<sup>39</sup>. And, no matter how alert and keen to cooperate the SEE countries are, terrorist and organized crime networks seem to be a step ahead of any regional joint efforts; according to a regional study, “despite the numerous efforts made to counter it, the international cooperation of law enforcement authorities could not keep up with the international cooperation of criminals, which was always a step ahead of the law” (Delevic 2007). Therefore, while SEE countries’ cooperative endeavors are praiseworthy, they need to continue to work together relentlessly and more effectively (especially at the operative level) to eradicate both terrorism and organized crime (and, in parallel, to speed up their security institutions’ reform and transformation, and to remove OC infiltration from government). To date, the SECI Center for Combating Trans-border Crime has been very successful in combating terrorism and organized crime collectively and has even served as a model for other regions (e.g. GUAM Law Enforcement Center, the Central Asian Regional Information and

<sup>38</sup> <http://www.visionofhumanity.org/gpi/results/rankings.php> (29 June 2008). [http://www.antena3.ro/Financial-Times-Romania-pe-locul-24-in-topul-celor-mai-pasnice-state-din-lume\\_ext\\_49511\\_ext.html](http://www.antena3.ro/Financial-Times-Romania-pe-locul-24-in-topul-celor-mai-pasnice-state-din-lume_ext_49511_ext.html) (22 May 2008).

<sup>39</sup> ABC / NBC news, 23 June 2008.



Coordination Center located in Kazakhstan (CARICC), the Gulf Cooperation Council and a similar center in Colombia), or resulted in requests by other countries to join the organization (e.g. Belarus and Israel) (Ram 2001, Woehrel, 2008). As Deputy Attorney General of the United States of America, Mark Filip, appreciated<sup>40</sup>: “The SECI Center is a unique institution in Europe, and it is doing a better job than any institution in the region”. Nevertheless, it needs to strengthen its cooperation with other law enforcement and judicial cooperation mechanisms, such as EUROPOL, SEPICA, SEEPAG, etc. This will hopefully be achieved by the newly-established RCC, whose key objective is to augment the role of the SECI Center and make it “the” international law enforcement agency for South Eastern Europe and strengthen the SECI’s collaboration with its counterparts<sup>41</sup>.

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<sup>40</sup> <http://www.secicenter.org/p416/20+May+2008> (24 June 2008).

<sup>41</sup> Strategic Outlook at the Priority Areas of Cooperation in South East Europe. [http://rcc.int/download.php?tip=docs&doc=RCCStrategicOutlook\\_200508.pdf&doc\\_url=1654e047b919225f06cc5b6e1cb12a91](http://rcc.int/download.php?tip=docs&doc=RCCStrategicOutlook_200508.pdf&doc_url=1654e047b919225f06cc5b6e1cb12a91) (23 June 2008).

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# PROTITERORISTIČNO SODELOVANJE V JUGOVZHODNI EVROPI: ANALIZA PRIMERA REGIONALNE POBUDE SEDM<sup>2</sup>

## COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE: ANALYSIS OF AN EXAMPLE OF SEDM REGIONAL INITIATIVE

### POVZETEK

*Analiza primera vloge SEDM (South Eastern Europe Defense Ministerial) na področju protiterorističnega (so)delovanja v Jugovzhodni Evropi je pokazala, da je pomembno oblikovati sistemske mehanizme za sodelovanje med obrambnimi ministrstvi držav v varnostno najbolj rizični regiji Evrope proti varnostno najbolj nepredvidljivi grožnji – terorizmu. Pobuda SEDM je v svojem razvoju preoblikovala vsebino in strukturo (so)delovanja tudi v smeri zoperstavljanja mednarodnemu terorizmu. To je odraz povečane vloge obrambnih sistemov tudi na področju tega boja. Članek izpostavlja in analizira tri precej uspešne protiteroristične mehanizme, ki so nastali v okviru SEDM:*

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The author expresses his gratitude to the Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Slovenian Armed Forces, Major General Alojz Šteiner, M.A., for useful advice in forming and writing the article.

*CBSC (Defence/Military Support to WMD Counterproliferation, Border Security, and Counter-Terrorism), SEESIM (South-Eastern Europe Simulation Network) in MCEP (Military Civil Emergency Planning). Analiza mehanizmov je pokazala, da je SEDM v preteklih letih dosegel velik napredek pri izvajanju regionalnih protiterorističnih simulacij, v boju proti širjenju orožja za množično uničevanje, vojaški pomoči pri nadzoru meja in oblikovanju regionalnih standardov pri odzivanju na teroristične incidente. V članku so predstavljeni tudi ključni izzivi in priložnosti za dopolnitev ter okrepitev protiteroristične vloge SEDM.*

**K L J U Č N E B E S E D E**

*Terorizem, protiteroristično delovanje, Jugovzhodna Evropa, Zahodni Balkan, SEDM, SEESIM.*

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**A B S T R A C T**

*Analysis of the SEDM role in counter-terrorist (co)operation in South Eastern Europe has shown the importance of forming system mechanisms for the cooperation between Defence Ministries of the countries in the security-wise most challenging region in Europe, against the most unpredictable threat - terrorism. The SEDM initiative has, during the time of its development, also transformed the content and structure of (co)operation in fighting international terrorism. This is a reflection of the increased role of defence systems in fighting international terrorism. The article highlights and analyses three relatively successful counter-terrorist mechanisms, created within SEDM: CBSC, SEESIM and MCEP. The mechanisms analysis has shown a great progress made by SEDM in the previous years at conducting regional counter-terrorist simulations, fighting against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, military assistance at border control and formation of regional standards at responding to terrorist incidents. The article also presents key challenges and opportunities for complementing and reinforcing the counter-terrorist role of SEDM.*

**KEY WORDS**

*Terrorism, counter-terrorism, South Eastern Europe, Western Balkans, SEDM, SEESIM.*

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**INTRODUCTION**

South Eastern Europe is not immune to terrorist threats. The security situation has changed significantly after the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo, and after the riots in Macedonia. A military threat is unlikely; however, there is a more realistic possibility of increasing a large spectrum of other security threats, which could have a significant impact on the security of the region itself and also on the European security. Terrorism within the region reveals itself in specific ways: local radicalized groups are establishing relations with the more or less subtle nationalist movements or with the global idea of Jihad against the West and the USA. The purpose of this article is not to analyze terrorist threats in the region but rather to expose a specific view of counter-terrorist cooperation - cooperation between the Defence Ministries within SEDM. Cooperation between Defence Ministries in fighting terrorism presents a narrower segment of counter-terrorism since there are various authorities within each country that operate against terrorism. These are the Ministry of the Interior (the police), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, intelligence services, administrations or agencies for civil protection and disaster relief, etc.

There are many initiatives in the region, which bring the countries closer in the area of security. Among them there are those which mainly provide political cooperation as well as those which mainly provide operational cooperation. Only some of them address terrorism or counter-terrorism in addition to other goals. Thus, there are no fully specialized initiatives for regional counter-terrorist cooperation.

The oldest initiative is CEI, which was formed in 1989 as a political cooperation forum, first for the Central European countries and later also for the South Eastern and Eastern European countries. In 1996, that is after Dayton, SEECF (South-East Europe Cooperation Process), SECI (South-East European Cooperative Initiative) and SEDM were also initiated. The latter two have been established on the initiative of the USA but all of them share a regional approach. It is evident that these initiatives did not succeed in preventing the

war in Kosovo, which is why some of them have become more comprehensive after this war. Among them are Stability Pact, SEEI (South Eastern Europe Initiative), SEEGROUP and SAP (Stabilisation and Association Process).<sup>3</sup> Besides the abovementioned regional initiatives, the ones that are relevant are also SEEC, SEESAC, Center for Security Cooperation - RACVIAC, American-Adriatic Charter, DPPI, SECI Center, Adriatic-Ionian Initiative, MARRI Center, the Ohrid Process, the Brdo Process, etc. In addition to this, the Stability Pact developed into the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) in the beginning of 2008.

Most of the aforementioned initiatives play a specific, more or less important role in the regional fight against terrorism. Their security (and in this context also counter-terrorist) role has been studied in the research project 'Security and Cooperation in Central and South Eastern Europe'. The main purpose of this article, however, is to present the counter-terrorist view of SEDM (Southeast Europe Defense Ministerial) operation, which is the basic form of regional cooperation in the area of defence. This manner of studying focuses on ensuring security in the most problematic security dimension (terrorism), in the security-wise most challenging area in Europe (South Eastern Europe) and in a very specific area of counter-terrorism (defence). The article presents and analyzes the SEDM institutional framework, the key counter-terrorist activities and related challenges.

### **The SEDM institutional framework as the basis of cooperation in fighting terrorism**

SEDM is a regional initiative for cooperation of the Defence Ministries of the South Eastern European countries. The initiative was launched in 1996 in Tirana, at the meeting of Defence Ministers, based on a proposal by the United States of America. After the initial consensus, the Defence Ministers adopted

<sup>3</sup> The year 1999 saw the establishment of the Stability Pact which reflected the founders' endeavours to achieve long-term stability, and not mere solving of current conflicts. That same year the EU initiated SAP, deriving from conviction that the region needed stable democratic institutions, the rule of law and market economy to establish peace and stability. During its intervention in Kosovo in 1999, NATO established SEEI at the Washington Summit. SEEI was a mechanism for enhancing cooperative programmes and initiatives to achieve long-term stability in the Balkans. In this regard, it continued cooperation between NATO and the countries in the region within the PfP framework. This mechanism also allowed NATO to establish relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Croatia. NATO thus cooperated with all the countries in the region, except Yugoslavia. This initiative was characterized by the fact that NATO merely offered political and expert assistance for the implementation of programmes carried out by regional actors.

a joint declaration and a document featuring further measures and activities for the performance of the process of mutual cooperation in which every country was assigned relevant tasks. The declaration and the document were adopted in Sofia in 1997.

The general goal of the initiative is enhancement of peace, security and stability, as well as building of trust among the countries in South Eastern Europe, while the priority goals of SEDM are the following:

- Promotion of understanding, trust and cooperation among member states;<sup>4</sup>
- Promotion of contribution to regional and world security and stability;
- Realization and development of SEDM projects;
- Increase of interoperability and deployment of SEEBRIG;
- Promotion of SEEBRIG cooperation in peace support operations;
- Promotion of member states' integration into the Euro-Atlantic establishments;
- Expanding the SEDM process on new members; and
- Cooperation with international organizations (Miladinovski 2007: 3).

This cooperation is conducted in the spirit of the Partnership for Peace programme and has the function of promoting the integration of countries in the region into transnational connections, focusing on joining NATO. New NATO members from South Eastern Europe will enhance the South Eastern European dimension of the organization and undoubtedly also peace and stability in the region. SEDM thus operates in the spirit of helping non-members become members. This fact is also confirmed by the interview with the SEDM Secretariat representatives in Skopje. In their opinion, SEDM is first of all a process of promoting cooperation. Countries need promotion in the time of their integration into the Euro-Atlantic establishments. "The main reason for the cooperation of countries within SEDM is integration into the Euro-Atlantic establishments. Everything derives from this" (interview with Gareva, Contev and Miladinovski 2007).

Today, the initiative has 12 members and 4 observers. Members of the initiative are: Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Greece, Croatia, Italy,

<sup>4</sup> It needs to be noted that member states have undertaken to build good relations with the neighbouring countries, both in the area of defence and security. The international community thus took an important step towards regional stability.



Macedonia, Romania, Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine and the USA (director and mentor of the initiative). Observing states are Moldova, Montenegro, Georgia and Serbia. Members of the initiative have stated, on several occasions, that they support and maintain the open-door policy, allowing other countries to join. Representatives of certain countries (e.g. Serbia) have already expressed their interest to join the initiative.

Admission of Ukraine, for instance, has been presented as a new dimension of the regional cooperation process (see Joint Statement SEDM Ministers of Defense 2005). Ukraine's contribution in terms of strategic transport for SEEBRIG has been particularly important. The USA have, for the initiative, examined the options for contributing to security in the Black Sea area as well. Turkey has supported such potential expansion, since it has much interest in the stability of the region. It is a prerequisite that SEDM does not duplicate existing mechanisms in the Black Sea region (see **Approved Minutes of the 14th SEDM CC Meeting 2006**). All this points to the fact that SEDM is also expanding beyond South Eastern Europe.

It must also be noted that decisions within SEDM are adopted by consensus and by a so called silent procedure (similar as in NATO).

Cooperation mechanisms within SEDM are the following:

1. Ministerial meetings of Defence and Foreign Ministers (annually);
2. SEDM-CC meetings (Coordination Committee) (twice a year - in the autumn and spring);
3. PMSC meetings (Political Military Steering Committee) (twice a year - in the autumn and spring);
4. Meetings of Deputy Chiefs of Staff of the member states' armed forces (annually);
5. Specific initiatives or projects.

SEDM-CC is a Coordination Committee whose task is coordinating activities within SEDM (except PMSC). This body prepares decision authorities' meetings, provides political-military advice, monitors the work of working groups, etc.

Political-Military Steering Committee - PMSC is bound by MPFSEE. It is thus the steering and coordinating body of the military part of SEDM. PMSC

develops politics and guidelines, to be confirmed by the Ministers, in the following areas:

- Annual training and exercise plan;
- Coordination of national contributions;
- Proposals for possible stationing of MPFSEE;
- Policy of activation, guidelines for the use of forces and rules of engagement (ROE);
- Logistic support, transportation demands and capabilities;
- General budget;
- Organizational restructuring;
- Cooperation with similar formations within the UN, NATO, OSCE and the EU;
- Public information policy;
- Revision of fundamental documents;
- Interoperability and standardization;
- Personnel policy for MPFSEE;
- Validation of contingency plans (Generic Contingency Operations Plans);
- Plan development review;
- Establishment of standards for unit training;
- Validation of doctrinal documents for MPFSEE;
- Validation of training documents;
- Validation of Information Security Directive (MPFSEE Information Security Directive) (Agreement on the Multinational Peace Force South Eastern Europe 1998; Miladinovski 2007).

PMSC and CC presidency rotates every two years. Greece, Romania, Turkey, Albania (twice) and Macedonia have held the presidency in the past (2007-2009). The presiding country also heads the PMSC and CC Secretariat. SEDM Secretariat has the responsibility of coordinating and harmonizing activities within SEDM as well as between SEDM and other international organizations. The Secretariat is located in the presiding country, meaning that it moves every two years. Since 12 July 2007 it has been in Macedonia where it will remain for the next 2 years - until 2009. A special group of people has separated itself from the Macedonian Ministry of Defence and works for SEDM in the form of a secretariat (13 people), based in one of the military posts on the outskirts of Skopje.

SEDM has, over time, gone through content and structure development and transformation. WTC and Pentagon terrorist attack in 2001 has also left a significant mark on the SEDM content and structure. Upon the establishment of SEDM, nobody thought about a counter-terrorist view of regional cooperation, while this later became one of the basic functions of the initiative. Inclusion of counter-terrorist functions in the initiative has meant enhancing its content and structure. New projects, working groups, military units, etc. were now being formed.

Operation within the SEDM initiative is carried out through various projects, initiatives and working groups, such as the following:

- CBSC (Defence/Military Support to WMD Counterproliferation, Border Security, and Counter-Terrorism);
- SEESIM (South-Eastern Europe Simulation Network);
- MCEP (Military Civil Emergency Planning);
- IMIHO (Interconnection of the Military Hospitals, formerly SIMIHO);<sup>5</sup>
- SEEDIRET (Cooperation on Defence Industries, Research and Technology among SEDM Countries);and
- SEMEC (SEE Military Education Cooperation).

Besides all of the abovementioned projects, SEDM is also developing a MPFSEE military unit (Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe) or a SEEBRIG multinational land brigade (South-Eastern Europe Brigade).

Of all these projects, CBSC, SEESIM and MCEP are the most associated with fighting international terrorism, which is why their role will be further presented in the article. Other projects are associated with terrorism only indirectly and we will not focus on them here.

According to the SEDM Secretariat representatives, CBSC currently has priority over other projects, followed by SEESIM. Other projects might be somewhat less emphasized. SIMIHO has lost its satellite aspect, since some

<sup>5</sup> In the past, SIMIHO was a fairly problematic project. Not all countries participated in it, among them Albania and Croatia. Initially, the USA was part of the project but then decided to withdraw, due to various reasons. Slovenia did not attend many working group meetings, which is also an interesting fact (see SIMHO Status Report 2004; SIMHO 2006). At a certain time Turkey decided to withdraw as well (see Approved Minutes of the 14th SEDM CC Meeting 2006). The problem lay in the technical equipping for the purposes of the regional cooperation because this became an open competition. Besides, Italy strongly refused to approve the MOU for this project. Another problem was the fact that some countries lacked military hospitals and had different satellite links to the hospitals. In regard to this, Romania suggested the project to be named IMIHO instead of SIMIHO.

countries do not even have satellites, let alone the ability to connect military hospitals via satellites. On the other hand, the SEEMEC project has only just begun to operate, since the first working group meeting took place in December 2007 (interview with Gareva, Contev and Miladinovski 2007).

### **Defence and Military Support to Weapons of Mass Destruction Counterproliferation, Border Security, and Counter-Terrorism - CBSC**

The European Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction states that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction presents danger because it increases the possibility of its use (see EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 2003). Its potential users are certain countries and terrorist groups. The latter are especially relevant, knowing that some groups have, in the past, already expressed their intention of acquiring and later using weapons of mass destruction. South Eastern Europe could be the area for smuggling biological, chemical, nuclear or radiological weapons and their components. Each country in this region has certain civil and defence or military bodies which can reveal the abovementioned threat and fight it actively, either with the use of preventive or curative measures.

Border security in the region is no longer a military task, but the armed forces still help with border control in various ways. The Balkan smuggling route presents an established canal for smuggling drugs, people, weapons and other goods. It is known that terrorist groups are establishing increasingly better relations with criminal groups, even to the point where it is impossible to distinguish between the two. It is thus quite likely that part of the smuggling activity in the broader region also operates in support of terrorist activities or groups. National administrations' defence subsystems from the region also have a specific role in detecting such activities.

Trough its transformation, SEDM has found the way to contribute to the security provision in the abovementioned areas. CBSC (Defence/Military Support to WMD Counterproliferation, Border Security and Counter-Terrorism) thus relates to Defence Ministries' cooperation process in weapons of mass destruction counterproliferation, border security and counter-terrorism. The need for cooperation in this area was first exposed in 1998 at the meeting of the SEDM Ministers in Skopje, while the establishment of the initiative took place in December 2001 in Antalya, Turkey, soon after 11 September.

During a seminar in Slovenia in September 2001 a consensus on the establishment of this process as well as on the expansion of SEDM to include the mentioned area was reached. The initiative has therefore been launched in light of the September terrorist attack and the international community awareness of having to form appropriate security mechanisms in the mentioned areas. In this respect the project builds on the need for regional approach, as well as joint plan and strategy development in the mentioned areas. This is also associated with the promotion of cooperation and coordination among various security agencies (Defence/Military Support to WMD Counterproliferation, Border Security, and Counter-Terrorism 2002; Working Group on Defence/Military Support to WMD Counterproliferation, Border Security, and Counter-Terrorism - Terms of Reference 2002).

CBSC presents a framework for comprehensive operation in the abovementioned areas. At the beginning of the initiative operation, the following key goals were set:

- Building upon the relevant provisions of SEECAP, presenting joint assessment of the security environment and related threats,<sup>6</sup>
- Promoting cooperation among Ministries of Defence in facing and responding to threats in the mentioned areas,
- Promoting awareness of the Ministries of Defence in regard to threats in the mentioned areas through the promotion of regional intelligence exchange among members,
- Ensuring synergy with various measures, projects and plans of other international organizations and regional initiatives,
- Updating SEDM countries' joint assessments for the aforementioned areas of cooperation (Defence/Military Support to WMD Counterproliferation, Border Security, and Counter-Terrorism 2002).

A working group has been established in order to plan and achieve these goals. The group reports and makes proposals to superior authorities. The working group may also establish working subgroups. The presidency of the working

<sup>6</sup> SEECAP is a document presenting joint assessment of regional security threats, challenges and opportunities. It was adopted in 2001. SEECAP is the first comprehensive and joint document of the Eastern European countries, which has synchronized the perceptions of security threats, risks, challenges and priorities for the building of a safe, stable and indivisible security environment in the region.

group rotates. Romania presided over the working group from September 2002 to August 2003, Greece from September 2003 to August 2004, and Croatia from September 2004 to January 2007. Bulgaria is currently presiding over it. CBSC has been designed and developed in accordance with other regional initiatives, sponsored by the UN, NATO, the EU and OSCE. The reason for this has been the awareness of the problem of potential duplication of CBSC and other existing initiatives in this area. In this regard, the wish for mutual reinforcement with similar initiatives such as the UN Counterterrorism Committee, SEEGROUP, SEECAP, Stability Pact and initiatives by aforementioned international organizations has been exposed. Avoidance of duplication is thus an important CBSC guideline.

CBSC group operates in accordance with the following priorities:

1. Development of model laws which national parliaments could use to regulate the said areas;
2. Inventory of relevant, current and upcoming legislation for the CBSC area of each SEDM country;
3. Establishment of an information system to allow safe data and information exchange within SEDM;
4. CBSC website development, which will also be available to private companies and institutions, to allow information exchange in regard to novelties in security technology, to expand European standards on border security, etc.;<sup>7</sup>
5. Joint assessment of terrorist security threat coordination;
6. Preparation of courses and seminars (e.g. for members of Parliament, etc.) on the working group (CBSC), which would deal with current regional issues;<sup>8</sup>
7. Appointment of a new parliamentary initiative within the context of CBSC, called “The Dubrovnik Dialogue”, which would address and adopt laws and judiciary rules in the area of WMD;
8. Establishment of the list of each member state's national institutions in the area of CSBM and its constant updating (CBSC, 2008; Defence/Military

<sup>7</sup> An information system within SEDM was established under the authority of Bulgaria, together with a special website (interview with Miladinovski, 2008).

<sup>8</sup> A CBSC seminar was conducted in December 2007 in Turkey. The seminar dealt with the strategy of fighting against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the security aspects of this fight and consequence management of nuclear, chemical and biological terrorism.

Support to WMD Counterproliferation, Border Security, and Counter-Terrorism 2002).

Besides the abovementioned priorities, the initiative has been working on joint exercises and training programmes in the said areas, on reviewing institutions of individual countries which play a specific role in the mentioned areas, on forming common understanding of the WMD threat, and on reviewing ministry and military support of border security and counter-terrorism. Some documents also refer to the working group representatives' endeavours to shed more light on its work, especially in regard to other international organizations and processes.

CBSC area exceeds the Ministries of Defence of participating nations in regard to its content, which is why the working group meetings are also attended by representatives of Ministries of the Interior, border police, customs, national Centers for Arms Control, etc.

**SEESIM as a mechanism for conducting counter-terrorist simulations**

Modern computer technology enables simulations of crisis events in crisis management and training, which is significantly less expensive than the testing of plans in the environment itself. Computer simulation modeling is shown to be one of the most appropriate methods of bridging the planning, implementation and analysis gap in crisis response operations home and abroad. Computer-assisted crisis simulations relate to creating an artificial crisis situation in order to test the operation of existing plans, organizations and people (Turner 1995: 32; T'Hart 1996: 134). The area of terrorism is especially appropriate for using computer-assisted simulations. SEDM has, with the help of the SEESIM initiative, bridged the gap in developing and performing regional computer-assisted simulations in counter-terrorism as well as in other areas.

The SEESIM initiative (South-Eastern Europe Simulation Network) is a simulation network for South Eastern Europe, adopted by SEDM Defence Ministers on 9 October 2000 in Thessaloniki, Greece. It was the USA that initiated the development of this proposal. It is a mechanism for conducting simulation exercises in order to encourage cooperation and integration among various SEDM initiatives analyzed in this article. The group is directed by the Steering Committee headed by the host nation and under the vice-presidency

of the USA. Specific tasks are performed by appointed operational and working groups. NATO and Stability Pact representatives are regularly invited to attend SEESIM meetings and other events (SEESIM 2006). Three larger regional simulation exercises have so far been conducted within SEESIM (CAX - Computer Assisted Exercise): SEESIM 02, SEESIM 04 and SEESIM 06. The latter two exercises have, in accordance with the SEDM role transformation, already included terrorist scenarios and testing of national and regional counter-terrorist responses. These two exercises will therefore be presented in further detail.<sup>9</sup> SEESIM 04 exercise is given more attention due to the increased role of terrorism in the scenario.

SEESIM 04 took place between 3 and 12 November 2004. The exercise was hosted by Greece and the participating nations were Albania, Macedonia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Romania, Slovenia and Turkey. Sweden and the USA participated as supporting countries. International participants present were UN OCHA, EADRCC, Stability Pact - DPPI and RACVIAC. SEESIM 04 was a significantly larger and more complex exercise than SEESIM 02, since it expanded contextually to include border security, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, etc. (CBSC area). This means that it included accidents and crises caused by man (SEESIM 04 2006). The purpose of SEESIM 04 was to contribute to the elimination of regional deficiencies identified within SEESIM 02 (e.g. the lack of standard format messages and standard procedures, the lack of training for state representatives using standard messages and procedures, the lack of reliable resources for communication among states, and the lack of a realistic, current and appropriately demanding scenario (see Dervodel 2004)).

The aim of the exercise was to improve the SEDM countries' procedures for national and regional coordination, cooperation and assistance in regard to responding to terrorist attacks. The purpose was to test standard procedures and document forms for inter-state communication. Specific goals of the exercise were the following: responding to a series of terrorist attacks; training

<sup>9</sup> SEESIM 02 took place in October and December 2002 as the first regional simulation exercise. Greece acted as a host and all the SEDM countries and SEEBRIG participated in it. The scenario included a series of nearly simultaneous major earthquakes in the region. The exercise enabled testing of national procedures and response plans, coordination between military and civil authorities within the countries, regional coordination of assistance, search for missing persons, quick repair of damaged communication means and other critical infrastructure, format adequacy of CMEP messages in the process of interstate exchange, integration of SEEBRIG in the regional processes, regional communication procedures, etc. (SEESIM 2006).



of a national and regional civil-military organization in the region; encouraging the use of existing plans, procedures and coordination processes among the appropriate civil and military bodies; presenting participants with a higher number of complex problems within a shorter amount of time; testing and assessing existing communication and coordination procedures; training for the provision and reception of international assistance; upgrading of regional simulation capabilities; etc. (SEESIM 04 2006).

The exercise scenario included various simultaneous terrorist attacks on critical infrastructure within the states in the region. The participating countries were divided into two groups. The first group included Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Romania, while the second group included Macedonia, Slovenia, Croatia, Turkey and Italy. Each group played the role of both the affected state and the state providing help. There were two waves of terrorist attacks and responsibility for them was claimed by the imaginary terrorist group. According to the scenario the group was supposedly linked to organized crime. The group attacked in all the countries, while the countries themselves defined the targets. Implications of the attacks and the victims demanded civil and military structures to respond and the countries to ask for international assistance (see Dayioglu 2004). The Slovenian scenario included a terrorist attack on the international airport and an aircraft accident within the same installation (see SEESIM 2004 - Slovenia - Scenario 2004). The Croatian scenario included a complex situation related to a tanker carrying terrorists and large amounts of hazardous chemicals (see SEESIM 04 - Basic Scenario - Croatia 2004). The Bulgarian scenario included a terrorist attack on an important dam and the port of Burgas (Scenario for SEESIM 2004). The Macedonian scenario included a terrorist attack on the Matka dam, 15 kilometres from Skopje (see SEESIM 04 2004). The Turkish scenario included a terrorist attack on a dam close to Istanbul, a refinery, an underground railway and a chemical attack on an airport (see Bozkurt 2004). The Romanian scenario included a natural disaster (floods) in combination with a terrorist attack on a large chemical plant, which eventually led to the declaration of a national state of emergency. The Italian scenario included a bomb attack at the Milan train station, etc.

At this point it needs to be mentioned that Turkey protested against the Greek scenario. The SEDM (CC) authorities, however, realized that reaching a compromise among nations, as regards national scenarios designed to fit the

national needs in procedures testing, does not fall within their competence (see Approved Minutes of the 9th SEDM CC Meeting 2003).

It is important to note that each country had various ministries and authorities which participated in the initiative. Participants in the Republic of Slovenia were the Civil Protection, MoD (ACPDR, General Staff, etc.), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of the Interior, Military Police, Ministry of Health, Government Public Relations and Media Office, and Aerodrome Ljubljana. One of the key findings was that communication and cooperation among various response actors needs to be improved in the future.

White Cell meeting reports showed that the exercise was fairly successful because it contributed to the improvement of inter-state procedures within the region. The problems which arose were mostly technical and standardisational but they were quickly eliminated: local time issue (some countries lie in two time zones), repeated sending of some messages, lack of understanding of other sectors in other countries, the need for a return message if an offer is not accepted, delay in receiving help, etc. It was also unclear which standard messages to use in a given situation. It turned out that SEEBRIG had not been used as a stand by mechanism in the region. During the exercise itself SEEBRIG therefore emphasized that it could contribute to the success of the exercise by providing means of transport, clearing ruins, providing temporary shelters for people and animals, repairing and building roads, conducting limited demining and setting up of refugee camps (see White Cell Meeting Reports 2004, 5., 8., 9., 10., 11.11).

SEESIM 06 simulation exercise took place between 8 and 17 November. 2006. General objectives of the exercise were the same as in the previous exercise. Macedonia and Romania hosted the exercise together. The scenario included a combination of natural disasters and terrorist attacks, the management of which requires, among others, international assistance. The natural disasters included great floods in the region, which caused many problems in relation to food, water, medicine supply, etc. Due to SEEBRIG's presence in ISAF, the countries in the region received many terrorist threats, some of which were related to the weapons of mass destruction. Many indicators of increased people smuggling have appeared in connection with this. The participating countries were the same as in the previous exercise, with the addition of Ukraine. Invited observing states were Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Moldova. International participating actors were NATO, OCHA, IFRC, EU-MIC, SECI, WHO and Stability Pact.

The exercise presented an additional opportunity for an increased activation of SEEBRIG in civil crisis management (SEESIM 06 2006; Međunarodna simulacijska vježba SEESIM 06 2006).

Connections which the participating countries are allowed to use during exercises are: e-mail, IP phone, fax, commercial telephone, ECG website, JTLS e-mail, videoteleconference, etc. The exercises have shown that e-mail is the most widely used connection.

It is also important to note that Slovenia did not support the development of regional standard operating procedures (SOP) within SEESIM because these would only duplicate the existing OCHA and EU mechanisms (see Kovač, 2004). Therefore, this problem has not been completely solved, despite SEDM not duplicating other initiatives.

The next SEESIM 08 exercise will take place in October 2008 in Bulgaria.

### **Civil Emergency Planning and Counter-Terrorism**

MCEP (Military Civil Emergency Planning) is a civil and military emergency planning project. The need for an adoption of such a mechanism stems from the fact that the countries in the region are facing great threats of natural and other disasters (floods, earthquakes, fires, landslides, storms, etc.), which call for the organization of international civil and military assistance.<sup>10</sup> MCEP plays an important role in responding to terrorist threats, especially since responding to natural and other disasters is similar to responding to terrorist incidents (clearing of ruins, protection of people, animals and material assets, etc.) The difference in the event of terrorism is that the police and intelligence services play a significantly more important role than in the event of other disasters. In continuation the role of MCEP in responding to disasters, including terrorist incidents will be discussed.

Agreement on the Establishment of the Civil-Military Planning Council has been signed with the purpose of creating a legal basis for immediate and efficient planning and coordination of available resources in disaster relief and intervention within the region. The agreement has been signed on 3 April 2001 in Sofia, Bulgaria, by the directors of the Civil Protection Institutions of Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia. Romania signed the agreement in November 2002 and Turkey in September 2003. The Council's task is

<sup>10</sup> International military assistance could, according to the SEDM concept, include the assistance of SEEBRIG.

the coordination of efforts in all stages of the disaster management cycle: prevention, planning, response and reconstruction. This is also a consultative mechanism between countries as regards methods, practices and manners of promoting regional cooperation in disaster management. The Council is supported by the Secretariat, its presidency rotating. Specific tasks of the Council:

- Processes and resources development for practical regional cooperation in disaster management;
- Improved coordination methods development in all stages of the disaster management cycle;
- Regional risk assessment development;
- Advisable response plan for the greatest risks development;
- Standard operating procedures development;
- Planning, organizing and implementing exercises and trainings (Agreement on the Establishment of the Civil-Military Emergency Planning Council for Southeastern Europe 2001).

The Council has established a so called Disaster Response Process (CMEP SEE Disaster Response Process), which includes standard procedures for notification, assessment, provision and reception of assistance. For all kinds of communication among the countries exist specific forms. The countries have undertaken to immediately inform their neighboring countries of greater disasters (Notification of Disaster Message), which are to be done on the basis of the situation assessment of human and material, damage (Situation Assessment). National decision-making processes should identify the need for international assistance which the country then transfers to other countries within its Request for Assistance. This request specifies the need, location, available resources, etc. The countries which respond to the request have to offer their assistance on a specific form. Only then follows the provision and reception of international assistance. An information network and a regional database have been organized for this purpose and need to be constantly upgraded. Information Management Policy envisages databases on participating countries' PIMS systems (PFP Information Management System). Databases include, among others, operative events, check-ups, situation reports, incidents reports, impact statements, damage assessment reports (daily operational information), performance data (equipment,

personnel, teams, etc.), personnel, organizations, infrastructure, critical facilities, specific needs, hospitals (resources). Ultimately, the database should include a large number of data on various infrastructures, which can be presented by GIS (Geographical Information System).

Several working groups from around the world have been established for the accomplishment of the above tasks. These groups coordinate civil and military organizations in their area. Each working group has its own action programme, meetings, internet site, president, vice-president and mentor. Mentor for all the groups is the USA whose role is giving expert advice. The working group for planning and training develops regional plans for the use of civil and military resources, identifies training programmes, coordinates regional training programmes and plan implementation exercises, etc. The working group for information management deals with the establishment, structure, interoperability and maintenance of regional databases. This includes policy and procedure making as well as related standards. The working group for information technology mainly deals with the information network standards for achieving optimal interoperability between countries. The working group for standards and procedures encourages the discussion of existing cooperation standards and procedures in all stages of the disaster management cycle.

**SEEBRIG as an unused counter-terrorist mechanism**

SEDM has also got a military component which is being developed in the form of a specific initiative. This is MPFSEE (Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe) or SEEBRIG multinational land brigade (South-Eastern Europe Brigade). The MPFSEE agreement was signed by Defence Ministers on 26 September 1998 in Skopje. The main SEEBRIG task is conducting peace support operations under the mandate of the UN, NATO, EU or OSCE. Military forces which operate under the auspices of this unit are based in the participating countries and are mobilized upon call-up (on-call basis). SEEBRIG is an army unit. Permanent members of MPFSEE or SEEBRIG are: Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Romania and Turkey. Observing states are Croatia, The United States of America, Slovenia and Ukraine. The basic SEEBRIG founding contract has been upgraded with additional protocols, due to unit content and system development. Through these protocols, individual SEEBRIG operating provisions have become more

precise, and new bodies and rules have been established. The fourth additional protocol has been approved due to MPFSEE initiative expansion and the need for increased interoperability.

The most important unit operation has been conducted within ISAF, with the unit performing CIMIC tasks, engineer activities, public information services, training programmes, patrols, etc. The decision on participation was made in December 2005 in Washington, when it became clear that the unit was capable of such participation. In February 2006 the unit was deployed to Afghanistan for a six-month period. The interpretative framework of mission participation was the fact that the participating countries thus contributed to NATO and proved their readiness to become its members.

Soon after the identification of the basic functions of SEEBRIG, the unit's planners began thinking about expanding the unit's tasks to the area of humanitarian aid. Such thinking was triggered by the observation that the region was facing threats of natural and other disasters in which military assistance was also desired. For SEEBRIG and other participating countries this was also an opportunity on their accession to NATO. One of the reasons for the unit's establishment was also the fact that such a unit would be relevant both for the participating countries and NATO itself. It was also ascertained that this type of task would be useful to the unit during the long wait for its first mission. Ultimately, it was stated that peace support operations and rescue support operations were mutually complementary. Engineer Task Force has therefore been established first, by the second protocol, having capabilities to offer assistance in humanitarian situations. The countries contributed their own engineer task forces (platoons or companies). Specific tasks of the unit are the following: limited road construction and repair work, limited bridge construction and repair work, limited railway work, provision of land transport services, drainage maintenance, limited demining work, etc. **(Second Additional Protocol to the Agreement on the Multinational Peace Force South Eastern Europe 1999; Employment of SEEBRIG in Disaster Relief Operations 2006)**. Besides the above mentioned tasks, SEEBRIG can also assist in humanitarian aid convoy protection, humanitarian aid transport, aid distribution, provision of security in the affected country, etc.

SEESIM 02 exercise showed that the conception of SEEBRIG at that time did not contribute efficiently to the area of humanitarian aid. SEESIM 04

and SEESIM 06 exercises also showed that the unit was not sufficiently prepared for assistance in the event of a terrorist attack in the region. Moreover, the countries (their representatives in the exercises) did not count on SEEBRIG assistance in the event of major terrorist attacks. Therefore it can be ascertained that the opportunity to use SEEBRIG for the needs of counter-terrorism within the region has so far not been taken advantage of. According to the author's opinion, this is also one of the challenges for the future SEDM development in counter-terrorism.

**CONCLUSION**

Analysis of the SEDM role in counter-terrorist cooperation in South Eastern Europe has shown the importance of forming system mechanisms<sup>11</sup> for the cooperation between Defence Ministries of the countries in the security-wise most challenging region in Europe, against the most unpredictable threat - terrorism. The SEDM initiative has, during the time of its development, transformed the content and structure of (co)operation in fighting international terrorism. This is also a reflection of the increased role of defence systems in fighting international terrorism. The article has highlighted three relatively successful counter-terrorist mechanisms, created within SEDM. The SEDM priority counter-terrorist mechanism is CBSC, the definition of which is extremely broad - so broad that it is in fact questionable as to how to use it fully. The SEESIM initiative or the South-Eastern Europe Simulation Network is probably the most innovative and useful initiative within SEDM. The countries in the region have conducted some quite comprehensive and complex simulations or exercises, which have helped them, define and later complement mutual complementarity. The exercises pointed to numerous similarities and consistencies as well as numerous differences and inconsistencies. Simulations are probably the most important step SEDM has taken towards comprehensive thinking about regional security in South-Eastern Europe. Moreover, performing computer-assisted simulations has contributed to the increase of the policy-making level in the countries. MCEP plays an important role in the establishment of a common standard in joint disaster response in the region, including terrorist

<sup>11</sup> The term 'system mechanism' refers to the organizational, legal or political framework, which enables an effective achievement of goals in the region. Without this type of framework the regional counter-terrorist activities would be conducted unsystematically and uncontrollably or would not be conducted at all.

incidents. In that respect, standard procedures for notification, assessment, provision and reception of assistance in the region have been formed.

The achieved SEDM successes, however, also need to be seen in light of the coming challenges and opportunities. The key challenge of SEDM is to ensure recognizability in the area of counter-terrorism, while at the same time avoid duplication of other existing initiatives. In this context it can be seen that the SEDM initiative has not done enough to ensure its recognizability in the general expert and lay public. Moreover, some past activities duplicated the activities of other initiatives. One of the key challenges also lies in intensifying cooperation between the countries in the area of CSBM. The next challenge is to ensure employability of SEEBRIG in counter-terrorism, among other areas. It would also be wise to think about SEEBRIG developing a specific counter-terrorist capability (not in the sense of special units, etc.). However, the countries in the region would of course need to have the knowledge and the will to use this capability. The question of capabilities is a military operational challenge, while the question of a reason for use is mainly a political challenge. A unique SEDM challenge lies in mutual reinforcement between its mechanisms and projects. CSBM priority area can only develop adequately if other SEDM mechanisms are directed towards supporting CSBM goals. SEESIM exercises have thus mostly been based on terrorist scenarios, while SEMEC will have to contribute to the integration of education and training programmes in the areas of CSBM, etc. The Slovenian viewpoint, expressed during the last Deputy Chiefs of Staff conference, is also similar. Realization of CSBM priorities is possible through the establishment of functional information exchange and provision of conditions for uniformity of education and joint training (Address by Major General Alojz Šteiner, 2008).

The last SEDM Ministers' meeting was in March 2008 in Bulgaria. The joint declaration of the Ministers strongly emphasized the need for coordination between the regional approaches. The need for the development of regional cooperation according to the principle of "network of networks" has been exposed. Additionally, the search for cooperation mechanisms among the key processes in the region has also been exposed, especially among SEDM and SEECP. This type of approach leads to the avoidance of duplication of activities and to an increase in effectiveness. It is hoped that RCC will do much in this area. Besides, support of the new process of Chiefs of General Staff's meetings has been expressed, having been conducted since Thessaloniki 2007. More frequent



meetings at this level would contribute to the transparency and openness in the military sphere (see Joint Statement 2008). The above identified need for better cooperation of SEDM with other initiatives, in the area of counter-terrorism, can only be concretized with a more focused political and operational cooperation of SEDM mechanisms with SECI Center, RCC, SEEC, SEESAC, RACVIAC, SEEI or SEEGROUP, DPPI, the Brdo Process and the Ohrid Process. Some of the mentioned initiatives are interested in deepening relations with SEDM (for example RCC and RACVIAC, which has been expressed at the last SEDM Coordination Committee meeting in Skopje). In the case of open cooperation it would be possible to achieve better transparency in the region, identify specific duplications and consequently optimize regional cooperation.

Let us conclude with the thought that the experiences from SEDM operation in counter-terrorism could be used more efficiently in forming the Slovenian counter-terrorist policy. However, the challenge in this area depends on numerous subjective and objective factors, which will be addressed at some other time. Undoubtedly, the Ministry of Defence should improve and systemize cooperation with countries within the SEDM initiative.

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# NEKATERI VIDIKI VLOGE INTERNETA PRI ŠIRJENJU RADIKALNE (PAN)ISLAMISTIČNE IDEOLOGIJE V JUGOVZHODNI EVROPI

## SOME ASPECTS OF THE ROLE OF THE INTERNET IN SPREADING RADICAL (PAN) ISLAMIC IDEOLOGY IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE

### **P O V Z E T E K**

*Razvoj in uporaba interneta sta doživela nesluten razmah tudi v družbah, ki jih sicer ne moremo šteti za informacijsko razvite. Čeprav se moramo pri uporabi komunikacijskih tehnologij zavedati, da je njihova vloga v družbenih spremembah izrazito dialeksična (na eni strani odražajo spremembe v družbi, na drugi pa te spremembe tudi same ustvarjajo), pa je zlasti internet s svojo (bolj ali manj resnično) zmogljivostjo zagotavljanja anonimnosti uporabnikov povzročil pravo revolucijo tudi na področju novih varnostnih groženj, med katere lahko štejemo ekstremizme vseh vrst, ki so lahko podlaga tudi za teroristične aktivnosti. Empirična analiza nekaterih spletnih virov in analiza sekundarnih virov sta pokazali, da prostor Jugovzhodne Evrope, s posebnim poudarkom na Bosni in Hercegovini, ni v tem okviru nič drugačen.*

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*Tudi tu je mogoče zaznati vse številnejše spletne vire, ki so delno lokalni, delno pa vsekakor del (morda tudi nezaveden) globalne (pan)islamistične in radikalne ideologije. Čeprav se je širjenje take ideologije začelo že v nekdanji Jugoslaviji (spomnimo se samo procesa proti pripadnikom skupine Mladi muslimani), pa je vojna v BiH radikalizirala vse tri vpletene strani. Pojav tujih plačancev iz mnogih islamskih držav, vpletanje tujih obveščevalnih in varnostnih služb ter šolanje muslimanskih verskih dostojanstvenikov na verskih šolah, predvsem v Savdski Arabiji, Jordaniji in drugih arabskih državah, so namreč omogočili, da se je globalni islamizem<sup>2</sup>, ki ga mnogi jemljejo kot ideološki temelj današnjega islamskega terorizma, pojavil tudi v Jugovzhodni Evropi (v BiH in Sandžaku, delno pa tudi na Kosovu). Pri tem je še posebej zanimiva vloga interneta, ki je omogočil komunikacijo radikalnih elementov v diaspori s tistimi, ki so ostali na Balkanu. Čeprav je res, da mnogi temo o globalnem jihu ter vahabitskem gibanju, ki sta dva primera radikalne islamistične ideologije, na žalost razumejo predvsem v okviru političnega diskurza, s katerim se želi diskreditirati islamska skupnost na tem področju in celo ustvariti razmere za dokončno delitev Bosne in Hercegovine, pa je še tako marginalen pojav ideologije, ki zahteva za doseganje ciljev tudi življenja svojih privržencev, vsekakor vreden vse pozornosti in analize.*

## **KLJUČNE BESEDE**

*Jugovzhodna Evropa, globalni islamizem, terorizem, internet, kibernetski prostor.*

## **ABSTRACT**

*The development and use of the internet have experienced an unimagined expansion in societies which cannot otherwise be thought of as information societies. Although we should be aware of the dialectic nature of communication technologies in regard to social changes (on the one hand they merely mirror social*

<sup>2</sup> Oblika strogo konzervativnega in radikalnega islama. Čeprav teoretično konzervativizem in radikalizem nista vedno in povsod skladna, pa gre v tem primeru za težnjo po naglih spremembah.

*changes, while on the other hand they also generate these changes themselves), the internet, with its (more or less real) capacity of ensuring user anonymity, has revolutionized new security threats, including extremism of all kinds, which can also act as a basis for terrorist activities. Empirical analysis of some internet sources and analysis of secondary sources have shown that South Eastern Europe, with a special emphasis on Bosnia and Herzegovina, is no different in this context. We can see a growing number of internet sources in this area, which are to some extent local and to some extent (perhaps unintentionally) part of a global (pan)Islamic and radical<sup>3</sup> ideology. Such ideology began spreading in the former Yugoslavia (let us remember the process against the members of the group called Mladi Muslimani (Young Muslims)) but the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina radicalized all three parties involved. The phenomenon of foreign mercenaries from numerous Islamic countries, involvement of foreign intelligence and security services, and schooling of Muslim religious dignitaries at religious schools in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and other Arab countries have paved the way for global Islamism to appear in South Eastern Europe as well (in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sandžak and partly Kosovo). Many think of global Islamism as the ideological basis for today's Islamic terrorism. Here, the role of the internet is especially interesting because it has enabled the radical elements within the Bosnian Diaspora to communicate with those that have stayed in the Balkans. Although it is true that many people, unfortunately, think of the global Jihad and the Wahhabi movement, the two being examples of radical Islamic ideology, in the context of a political discourse meant to discredit the Islamic community in this area and even create conditions for the final partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, even such marginal examples of ideology, requiring the lives of its adherents in order to achieve its goals, are undoubtedly worth attention and careful analysis.*

<sup>3</sup> A form of strictly conservative and radical Islam. Although conservatism and radicalism are, theoretically, not exactly and always compatible, we are in this case talking about a tendency towards rapid change (radicalism) which is clearly directed towards the current global situation and partly infused with traditional and historical oriented ideas (conservatism).

**KEY WORDS**

*South Eastern Europe, global Islamic ideology, terrorism, internet, cyberspace.*

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**Opening thoughts**

The development and use of information communication technology (ICT) and especially the internet have experienced an expansion of revolutionary proportions in modern societies. The development in telecommunications, satellite links and computer networks has made the entire world interconnected - an information society (Ratray, 2001). Today, this is a generally accepted term in scientific, public, political and security spheres. For a long time now, the use of ICT has not been limited merely to research, academic, and defence and military frameworks (Eriksson and Giacomello 2004; Wenger 2001; Valeri 2000) but it has become the basis of operation for all important social subsystems (administrative policy, scientific research, education and socialisation, economy, media, telecommunications and national security). At the same time, it has thoroughly changed the activity of individuals, social groups and institutions. As such it has also become the goal and the means for pursuing the interests of people and organizations in the area of security (Ratray 2001). It needs to be stressed that the ICT, mostly reflected through the internet as “the network of all networks”, has not only changed the operation of national spheres but it has contributed to its (communication) capabilities being used by non-state actors of all kinds (from civil society organizations to international crime and terrorism).

Regardless of the fact that there is a realistic restriction when we talk about the importance of the internet for the aforementioned processes (determining who and how socially relevant its users are, is especially problematic), (content) analyses of the internet may supplement other methods of sociological research. However, we need to be aware of another problem associated with the use of communication technologies. This problem is the fact that their nature in regard to social change is explicitly dialectic (on the one hand they merely mirror social changes, while on the other hand they also generate these changes themselves). The same is true of the media sphere in general. Unlike other media, the internet is the only interactive medium which, with its (more or less real) capacity of ensuring user anonymity, has revolutionized new security

threats, including extremism of all kinds. These, of course, should not all be associated with terrorist activities, although the assurance of anonymity creates fertile soil for one of the most important recent security threats (whether or not such perception is correct is in this case not relevant to our discussion). Empirical analysis of some internet sources and analysis of secondary sources as two basic methodologies have shown that South Eastern Europe, with special emphasis on Bosnia and Herzegovina, is no different from the rest of the world in this context. We can also see a growing number of internet sources in this area, which are to some extent local and to some extent (perhaps unintentionally) part of a global (pan)Islamic and radical ideology. Although some authors treat this ideology as the answer to (the west, liberal and secular) globalization (Gušić 2008), it is interesting to note that it has widely used the achievements of globalization, the most important of which is the general presence of information-communication technology or the internet. The internet has enabled the establishment of a virtual Islamic community or a connection between local extremist factors and the Diaspora or other similar ideological religious approaches around the world. That is why analysis of the expansion of (pan)Islamic ideology in South Eastern Europe has to include analysis of cyber (internet) operation or activity, regardless of its methodological restrictions and problems.

**The internet and security changes**

The use of ICT has become the source of change in the social environment, security actors and their threat sources. Characteristics such as: low admission expenses (unlike the production of high technology systems, the admission expenses for ICT are significantly lower, allowing its dispersion among social groups or countries with lower financial means); lack of clarity in traditional delimitation (the ICT - internet - has blurred or exceeded geographical, bureaucratic and jurisdiction borders as well as the extension of security treatment in a traditional state-focused (realistic) sense); increased possibility of influencing the perception of reality (new information technologies significantly increase the number and the strength of manipulative activities); possibility of use at the strategic (global) as well as tactical and operational level; and, unlimited geographic space, cause changes not only for the traditional security actors and their operation but also enable occurrence of



new ones (Svete 2006). On the basis of a theoretical research approach, which analyses the above mentioned changes in accordance with contemporary security theory, based on the three most important theoretical scientific research paradigms of international relations and security studies (realism, liberalism and constructivism), we will analyse the expansion of radical (pan)Islamic ideology to the West Balkans or South Eastern Europe and the importance of the internet in this process. Although contemporary security theories cannot, at first sight, provide answers to all the challenges associated with such a complex topic as the role of the internet in wider social or strategic changes, we have decided for this framework systematically. The biggest problem in internet scientific research is the fact that it has enabled the intertwining of the physical (real) and the virtual world which has no real connection to reality. On the basis of internet communication assets we can substantially change our perception of the world (it is especially the constructivists that warn about this and even claim that there is no physical, objective world but only a construction which depends on our upbringing, values, norms and media information), followed by changes which influence our lives. On the other hand the anonymous use of the internet allows for the expression of opinions of people who would otherwise never express their views publicly and openly. As such, the internet has become a kind of reflection of the social situation. However, the mentioned characteristics are only a few of the arguments for our claiming that the chosen theoretical basis is appropriate. Another argument worth mentioning is the discussion of security actors, namely who security refers to and who provides it. In this case our empirical part of the analysis is an exact example, showing that modern information communication technology has complicated the security environment in which we witness a confrontation of transnational, national and individuals' interests. It is within cyber space that all these actors are, at least for now, more or less equal.

Works of authors over the last century who have left their mark on theories in international relations, security and geopolitics, undoubtedly show that an analysis of cyber space is an indispensable element of every serious security analysis, whether in its theoretical or practical aspect. The thesis on cyber space as an element of geopolitics has also been completely accepted. Rothkopf stated, as early as in 1998, that the “realpolitik” of the future is actually cyber politics (orig. Cyberpolitik), since the main

actors have, for a long time now, not only been countries, and since it is possible to strengthen or increase social power on the basis of the power of information<sup>4</sup> (Rothkopf 1998). Today we are witnessing global tectonic movements and the redistribution of social power which is at the same time acquiring new forms and characteristics. The power of the individual and the elite, who are stepping into the forefront and determining the interests and the form of operation of national institutions, is becoming increasingly more important. National power in a virtual world, defined by media and information technology, is becoming increasingly more relative. Even the traditionally most powerful countries of the world appear weak when all they can do is watch helplessly as various crimes are being committed in Somalia, Rwanda, the Balkans and Iraq, and shown to the global public by individual users of such technologies as well as the electronic media/corporations. The same is true of global crime and information terrorism as security threats which the police and the military, being the countries' traditional answers to such threats, cannot prevent. Rothkopf concludes that the changes in the world power structure, based on the information revolution, are much greater than many would like because they relate to the increasingly more important social or political spheres. In the following pages we will present the “geopolitical conflict” in South Eastern Europe, which is taking place between western, secular values and panIslamic ideology. Besides different religious foundations, this ideology has completely different positions on the articulation of religion in everyday life, the new (global) social trends and the role of the individual.

**The use of the internet and radical panIslamic ideology in South Eastern Europe**

Next, we will focus on another actor that has used globalization (in the technological and social sense of the freedom of movement of people, goods and services) and the indecisiveness (different interests) of major forces in South Eastern Europe, in particular the Balkans. This actor is global Islamism or the expansion of radical panIslamic ideology in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

<sup>4</sup> The phenomenon of power in international relations is explained by numerous theories. The ones mostly dealing with it are realism (physical power within the context of political power) and constructivism (the concept of “soft” power). Before the end of the cold war Marxism was also important in dealing with this phenomenon, but now, being the third way or theory about international relations, it is persistently giving way to constructivism and critical theory.

Sandžak, and recently also among the Albanian population in Kosovo. The most important factors which contributed to the increase of Islamic radicalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina are undoubtedly foreign mujahideen or volunteers from other Islamic countries, the Active Islamic Youth (AIO) and humanitarian organizations (especially from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait). At this point I need to emphasize that we should not equate Islamic extremism in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Wahhabism as a religious movement within Islam, since this label has recently been used in an explicitly political context and since Islamic extremists do not perceive themselves as Wahhabis. On the other hand the term Wahhabi is now used for increasingly radical Islamic approaches which are far from representing Islam in its entirety<sup>5</sup>. We will thus use this term in dealing with internet activities only to a certain extent, in order to help us better understand the complexity of the situation.

Before we begin analysing the role of the internet in spreading radical panIslamic ideology in South Eastern Europe, we need to explain when the said ideology even begins to appear. As we have already mentioned, the radical and militant panIslamic ideology was brought to Bosnia by foreign combatants whose number is still today the subject of controversy. These combatants mostly come from Algeria, Syria, Sudan, Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey and the Arabian Peninsula. Their numbers range from several hundred to several thousand which, however, is not really relevant in this case. What is important is that these foreign combatants, having had much combat experience from Afghanistan at the time of Soviet occupation and from the Middle East and Caucasus, perceived the war in the former Yugoslavia as a global holy war (a global jihad). Their priority was not the particular national interests of The Bosniaks but rather the interests of Islam as a global religion or ideology, while the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina fit perfectly into the context of the Huntington's Clash of Civilizations in their perception. These combatants were the core of the military unit El Mudžahid which was

<sup>5</sup> Wahhabis are an exclusive Sunni religious movement. Their most typical requirement is the requirement of going back to the way of life of Mohammed and the first three generations after him. For Wahhabis this is the measure of all things. They require that faith cleanses itself of all novelties, superstition, idolatry, polytheism, namely all forms of withdrawing from the unity of God. We thus speak of a puritan, conservative movement. Wahhabis are fundamentalists in the sense that they speak in favour of going back to the foundations of Islam. Wahhabism is the first pre-modernist religious movement as defined by the scholar Fazlur Rahman. Ever since its appearance in the 18th century it has been the centre of attention of the Islamic world. Its influence in the past two hundred years has been diversified but the idea itself has survived and greatly contributed to the last Islamic revival (Valenčič, 2008).

part of the 3rd corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and proved itself exceptionally moral, prepared for (self) sacrifice and successful in war. Because of this they soon gained a good reputation among the local population and several hundred also remained in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the war. Many of them married local women and obtained citizenships. More than 10 years after the end of the war this, however, raised numerous questions about Bosnia being an Al Qaeda camp or a great source of threat for the neighbouring countries and especially the western world (some analysts discovered that Al Qaeda was paying special attention to the so-called “white” Muslims and converts to Islam, which would enable it to hinder the operations of western security authorities). Many sources dealing with the problem of Al Qaeda in Bosnia and Herzegovina appeared (Hećimović, 2006; Kohlmann, 2004; Arab Veterans of the Afghan War Lead New Islamic Holy War, 1994, Azinović, 2007) and foreign combatants (today the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina) became political targets in Bosnia and Herzegovina and abroad.

Regardless of the actual threat to regional and global security, we can definitely say that radical (pan)Islamism among the Bosniaks began and continued after the war in the 90s and has been expanding at an alarming rate from the very beginning. The internet plays a significant role here as well because it is one of the most important tools for the propaganda of radicalism, recruitment and creation of contacts among potential Islamists, the Bosnian Islamists being a great example of this. The internet is very suitable for circulating (extreme) religious materials, calling for boycotts of certain countries' products (e.g. Israel, but also Serbia and Croatia), publishing articles about the war in Bosnia and selling various video, audio, reading and other advertising material. What is more, Islamic ideology can also be expanded globally through links to related websites, chat rooms and special (sub)sites for children where they can access lyrics and religious computer games. Special attention is also given to the role of women and the role of the family within society (websites with advice on how to raise children to become orthodox Muslims etc. [www.nahla.ba](http://www.nahla.ba)). Although the expansion of radical panIslamic ideology in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a very complex example, we are going to mention a few key actors that are present in cyber space as well and were the subject of our

<sup>6</sup> We have mostly used content analysis, accessibility within the most widespread search engines, server locations for web hostings and associations with related websites throughout the world. Special attention has been given to the analysis of interactivity and expression of opinions.

empirical analysis<sup>6</sup>. We need to emphasise that their presence in cyber space is not reflected merely in the form of websites but that the use of the internet may be much more indirect, using chat rooms, mailing lists and other forms of communication the internet nowadays offers. The first organization is the Young Muslims (<http://mladimuslimani.com.ba><sup>7</sup>). As early as in the time of the former Yugoslavia, right after World War II, they formed an opposition movement (also a terrorist movement at the so-called Sarajevo process in the 80s) but are far from being a “Wahhabi”/Islamic movement today. The Young Muslims, including the deceased Izetbegović, became a party movement and thus part of the system even before the war. Their interpretation of Islam, however, is closer to the Iranian than Saudi Wahhabi extremists<sup>8</sup> (this fact also answers the question of the connection between certain SDA (Democratic Action Party) politicians and Iran which played an extremely important role in equipping the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with weapons). Next, we need to mention the website IslamBosna, the site of the Bosnian division of The Muslim Brothers, an international Islamic movement. Although

<sup>7</sup> In 1947, following the proposal of Omer Stupac, the organization drew up the following oath:

Z A K L E T V A

Neka je slava i hvala Allahu, Gospodaru svih svijetova!

Kao pripadnik organizacije zaklinjem se Svemogućim Allahom da ću se pridržavati svih propisa Kur'ana, da ću principe Islama unositi u svoj život i život svoje zajednice **i bezkompromisno se boriti protiv svega neislamskog, da ću žrtvovati na Božijem putu sve od sebe, pa i svoj život, ako to budu zahtjevali interesi Islama.**

Svijestan veličine cilja Mladih Muslimana, zaklinjem se da ću ispuniti sve uslove, načela, obaveze i zadatke, koje mi organizacija postavi, da ću interese organizacije uvijek pretpostaviti svojim ličnim i da neću neprijatelju nikada izdati svoga brata, niti bilo kakvu tajnu organizacije, pa ni pod najtežim okolnostima, znajući da me u protivnom čeka sramna smrt izdajice, poniženje na obadva svijeta.

Sav svoj život i sve svoje sposobnosti ulažem za širenje naše ideje i jačanje naše organizacije. Ustrajno ću se boriti za veličinu, moć i sjaj Islama, **i za dobrobit svih Muslimana svijeta.**

Molim Svemogućeg da mi dade volje, snage, hrabrosti i ustrajnosti na ovome putu džihada, a da otkloni od mene sve slabosti i mane i svu braću obaspe svojom najvećom Milošću.

Neka nas Allah uputi na Pravi put, na put onih Koji nisu zalutali!

(Members of the organization pledge to serve Allah, live according to the Koran, follow the principles of Islam, fight against everything non-Islamic and sacrifice their lives for the interests of Islam.

They also pledge to fulfill the goals of the organization and always put its interests before their own. They vow to use all their talents for spreading the organization's ideas and increasing its strength. They promise to fight for the grandeur, power and splendour of Islam, and for the welfare of all Muslims around the world.)

<sup>8</sup> At this point we need to clearly expose the conflicts between the Wahhabis and the Shiites. The first fights between the Shiites and the Wahhabis broke out during the time of the great Wahhabi revolt which led to the establishment of the first Saudi state which lasted until 1818. Imam Abdul Aziz ibn Muhamed ibn Suad killed many Shiites during the advancement towards Najaf and Kerbala in Iraq and died during an attack of a Shiite assassin. The same politics of clean-up was exercised by his son Saud ibn Abdul Aziz al Saud who conquered vast territories of southern Iraq, Syria and Jordan, and significantly expanded the Wahhabi religious power (Valencič 2008).

this site shows no examples of a radical Salafi<sup>9</sup>/Wahhabi interpretation which emphasizes tawheed, Islamic puritanism, jihad as the main duty, the rules for proper behaviour according to the Koran, a negative attitude towards democratic or other non-Islamic systems, introduction of Sheriatic law, obsession with the problem of innovations in Islam, its integration into global Islamism is very important. The third example is Dzemat.org (<http://www.dzemat.org/>), presenting the Wahhabi movement or one of the groups of this movement. This group is very active within the Wahhabi dawa and is part of the Wahhabi Bosnian Diaspora which is stationed in Vienna. It is comprised of numerous Imam Dais, mostly educated at Islamic schools in Arab countries (the deceased Dai Jusuf Barčić, who in the past year caused many problems for the Islamic community (Islamska zajednica), is also part of this group). Their influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the neighbouring countries and most European countries, including Slovenia<sup>11</sup>, is very strong. This group does not submit to the authority of the Islamic community and is established as a parallel institution of the Islamic community. It actually competes with the Islamic community for supremacy. This struggle can be characterized as a struggle between two interpretations of Islam - the correct "Wahhabi"<sup>12</sup> interpretation and the incorrect interpretation, represented by the Islamic community. The ideological conflict between the Islamic community and the Wahhabi is based on two different Islamic teachings: the moderate Hanafi teaching, combined with typical Bosniak tradition of Islam, and the rigid,

<sup>9</sup> Salafism ("predecessors" or "early generations"), is a Sunni Islamic school of thought that takes the pious ancestors (Salaf) of the patristic period of early Islam as exemplary models. Early usage of the term appears in the book *Al-Ansab* by Abu Sa'd Abd al-Kareem al-Sama'ni, who died in the year 1166 (562 of the Islamic calendar). Under the entry for the ascription al-Salafi he stated, "This is an ascription to the salaf, or the predecessors, and the adoption of their school of thought based upon what I have heard." He then mentions an example or more of people who were utilising this ascription in his time. However, an even earlier ascription of the term Salaf was used by Muhammad who noted, "I am the best Salaf for you." The principal tenet of Salafism is that Islam was perfect and complete during the days of Muhammad and his companions, but that undesirable innovations have been added over the later centuries due to materialist and cultural influences. Salafism seeks to revive a practice of Islam that more closely resembles the religion during the time of Muhammad. Salafism has also been described as a implied version of Islam, in which adherents follow a few commands and practices <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salafi>; Stanley 2005).

<sup>10</sup> Access to the website was not possible on 17 June 2008

<sup>11</sup> RTV Slovenija reported on its internet portal that a remarkably high number of Slovenian citizens attended the funeral of Jusuf Barčić.

<sup>12</sup> As has already been mentioned, the Wahhabi movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sandžak stands for radical Islamism, including the kind that is not associated with Wahhabism or even contradicts it. On the other hand, there are also real Wahhabis in South Eastern Europe, that is the ones that follow the kind of Islam that is the official religion of Saudi Arabia and Qatar. These came into open conflict with the official policy of the Islamic community, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, because they see Wahhabism as the only correct policy of Islam.

extremely conservative Hanbal teaching with added Al-Wahaba ideology, typical of Saudi Arabia. At this moment the above mentioned group from Vienna is still a minority group but in regard to its growing intensity and its strong influence within the Diaspora, as well as the number of Wahhabi adherents among the Bosniaks, it is constantly growing and expanding. Then there is a group (still among the Wahhabis) which gathers around the Islamic newspaper Saff (<http://www.saff.ba/>) and is mostly comprised of members of the former Active Islamic Youth (Adnan Pezo, the leader of AIO, declared its dissolution due to financial difficulties). At the moment the Vienna group is the strongest in spreading Wahhabi. It is still at the Dawa level but this level is a good starting point for potential extremists who with time progress to the global Jihadi interpretation (they pass from the Dawa level to the Dawa-Jihadi level). This level of radicalization may also be found among the Bosniaks - the Global Jihadi groups. The websites of the Abu Hamza brigade (<http://www.abuhamzabrigade.tk/>) and the Bosnian division of Ensari shariat belong to these groups as well. There is, however, another stronger global Jihadi group which is also very active on the internet. Its headquarters are in Vienna and it is strongly associated with the Wahhabis in Sandžak. This group was once connected with the first Vienna group but has now left the Wahhabi/Dawa level and moved on to the global Jihadi level, becoming very problematic from the point of view of security. There is evidence that it is directly associated with the arrested group of Wahhabis in Sandžak (the arrest took place last year, between March and June) but it is undoubtedly ideologically (if not otherwise) associated with the international terrorist group of Mirsad Bektašević (Zanić Nardini 2006). Its exterior ideological association includes global Jihadi groups which identify themselves with Al Qaeda in Lebanon, Iraq, Chechnya and Afghanistan. Interesting to note is especially their influence within the Diaspora.

Bosnian radical (pan)Islamism needs to be taken seriously because it is continuously growing, ideologically strong and organizationally successful<sup>13</sup>, despite the claim by the former federal premier and one of the founders of the Democratic Action Party (SDA), Edhem Bičakčić, that the Wahhabis in

<sup>13</sup> According to the latest research 3.3 percent of Bosniak muslims respect the Wahhabi teachings and 12.9 percent are willing to accept them. Considering statistical errors, we find that almost a fifth of the muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina are pro-Wahhabi oriented. The same is true of Kosovo and to a minor extent Macedonia, Albania and South Serbia (Valenčić 2008).

Bosnia and Herzegovina are unimportant or marginal (<http://hercegovina.ws/content/view/49/3/>). It is the globalization and proliferation of the media that caused (enabled) radical ideologies to connect with one another regardless of where their supporters are located. Therefore, we cannot comfort ourselves by thinking that Bosnian radical (pan)Islamism is only limited to Bosnia and Herzegovina and its neighbouring countries because the influence of Bosnian extremists is especially strong within the Bosnian Diaspora all over Europe<sup>14</sup>. Methodical expansion of the Wahhabi interpretation, heavily backed by Saudi money, leads to greater isolation of such communities and creates a radical process and fertile soil for potential radical elements. This leaves us only a step away from thinking about terrorism.

### **Final thoughts**

Although it seems that South Eastern Europe became largely stable after the end of the war (which is true when we compare today's situation with the situation from 13 or 15 years ago), the security and strategic vacuum, which appeared after the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, has not been filled yet. We also need to take into account the identity crisis suffered by the Muslims in this area. Unlike the rest of the actors in the tragic events, their national articulation was significantly weaker. Moreover, they were faced with a completely different Islamic practice, brought by foreign combatants in the time of war (Kalčić 2005), which still leads to numerous conflicts within the Islamic community in this area. Considering the role of the internet, which enabled a direct link between the (more radical?) Diaspora and its mother country and cooperation between the followers of radical Islamic ideas and similar groups in the world, it is clear that this role is quite significant in spreading Islamic ideology. We cannot and should not claim that it is only the internet that is responsible for all kinds of radicalisms (based on the fact that it enables the dark side of human nature to come to light). The relationship between the internet and social changes is truly dialectic and interactive. On

<sup>14</sup> Increasingly more frequent Swedish analyses today note that the biggest problem for integration is presented by the latest wave of immigrants who came to Sweden as refugees. They are a completely closed group which has not integrated into Swedish society even after being there for almost 20 years. Contemporary media such as cable and satellite television and the internet have made it possible for them to stay connected to their mother country. We can therefore say that this community only lives in Sweden in the physical sense, while it is mentally still within a completely different framework. This may lead to many security problems in the future.



the one hand the internet is a good indicator of social occurrences which are of interest to researchers and analysts, while on the other hand we need to be aware of its limitations, concerning methodological correctness and the possibility of us being not only researchers but also targets of manipulation, that is the internet (media) construction of the real world.

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GLOBALNI IN REGIONALNI  
ODZIVI NA GROŽNJO  
TERORIZMA  
PRENOS PROTITERORISTIČNIH  
DOBRIH PRAKS EU NA OBMOČJE  
ZAHODNEGA BALKANA  
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL  
RESPONSES TO A TERRORISM  
THREAT  
TRANSFER OF EU BEST  
PRACTICES IN COUNTER-  
TERRORISM TO THE WESTERN  
BALKANS

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**P O V Z E T E K**

*Terorizem ostaja ena temeljnih groženj svetovnemu miru in stabilnosti. Še več, v iskanju novih priložnosti vse hitreje menja svojo podobo in se prilagaja novim razmeram. Ena izmed značilnosti novodobnega terorizma, ki je za globalno varnostno okolje ena največjih ovir, je njegova transnacionalnost. Če gre za globalno varnostno tveganje oziroma grožnjo, je globalni odziv ustrezen rešitev. Pri soočanju s takšno globalno grožnjo se kot bistvene prednosti in priložnosti kažejo pravočasno in ustrezno obsežno mednarodno ter medresorsko sodelovanje, vzpostavljanje*

<sup>1</sup> Ministrstvo za notranje zadeve Republike Slovenije. Ministry of Interior of Republic of Slovenia.

*ustreznih protiterorističnih zmogljivosti in oblikovanje ter izmenjava dobrih praks. Ker nekateri bistveni varnostni izzivi za EU prihajajo z območja t. i. tretjih držav, med drugim tudi z Zahodnega Balkana, je evropsko varnostno okolje kot eno od priložnosti identificiralo prenos dobrih praks zoperstavljanja terorizmu, razvitih v EU, na območje držav Zahodnega Balkana. Tako ne samo, da se uresničujeta varnostna politika EU in aktualna protiteroristična strategija, temveč se nekako uresničuje globalna protiteroristična strategija, ki so jo Združeni narodi sprejeli septembra 2006 kot odgovor na zahtevo po boljši operacionalizaciji vsebine temeljnih mednarodnopravnih aktov na univerzalni ravni.*

**K L J U Č N E B E S E D E**

*Terorizem, globalna varnost, varnostni izziv, dobra praksa, Zahodni Balkan, EU.*

**A B S T R A C T**

*Terrorism remains one of the basic threats to world peace and stability. What is more, in seeking new opportunities terrorism is rapidly changing its nature and adjusting to new conditions. One of the characteristics of modern terrorism, which poses one of the major obstacles to the global security environment, is its transnationality. If global security is at risk or threat, then the global response is one of the available appropriate solutions. When facing a global threat, key advantages and opportunities seem to be timely and suitable international and interdepartmental cooperation, the establishment of adequate anti-terrorism capabilities, as well as the development and exchange of best practices. Since some of the key security challenges for the EU originate in the area of so-called third countries, among which is also the Western Balkans region, the EU has identified the security environment as one of the opportunities to transfer EU best practices in anti-terrorism to the area of Western Balkans countries. In this manner not only are established EU security policy and current anti-terrorism strategies being implemented, but in some way, so is the global anti-terrorism*

Albert Černigoj

*strategy, adopted by the United Nations in September 2006 as a response to the need for a better operationalisation of the content of the key international legal acts at the universal level.*

**KEY WORDS**

*Terrorism, global security, security challenge, best practice, Western Balkans, EU.*

**GLOBAL AND REGIONAL SECURITY RISKS AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS**

It could be said that more than ever before the current security environment follows the trend of new challenges, presented by rapidly changing world conditions. These are now, more than ever before, characterized by key social, economic and cultural changes. The world is changing, and consequently, so is its security environment.

The latter is particularly true, especially if we take into consideration the fact that the global security environment is becoming an area where enormous economic profits can be made. To confirm this are some findings claiming that the private security industry is likely to become the second most profitable industry in the world. If we are talking about a global phenomenon then no geographic or regional area is exempt from this fact. Certainly there is some deviation, characterized by numerous and especially a variety of factors.

South East Europe is not even exempt from this. What is more, past experiences indicate the important and distinctive role of South East Europe in the emergence of new security challenges and dealing with them. (Glann and Tara, 2002). In addition to well known historic facts, the important and distinctive role of South East Europe is also due to its distinctive cultural and religious diversity, as in a very small area there can be found numerous religious, cultural, ethnic and minority groups. Continuous conflicts, or better, *never ending stories*, compounded by business and political interests, drowning in corruption and demagogically set guidelines for regional development, foster *favorable conditions* for sustaining instability in the region. This in turn creates ideal conditions for the rise of all types of criminal activity, as well as some new security challenges, such as terrorism and extremism.

The challenge of terrorism and extremism is not a new phenomenon in the Western Balkans. After the Second World War so-called *domestic terrorism* and extremism were constantly present in the area. Nowadays, parallels can be found in the fact that this region is not threatened by international terrorism, at least not directly. However, due to the above mentioned reasons, this area is becoming increasingly favourable for the reemergence of new forms of domestic terrorism. This can develop from frequent conflicts between moderate and radical Islamic factions<sup>2</sup>, supported by choices, which defend the expansion of Islam. Since this area is characterized by a distinctive interconnection between politics and church within which individuals and individual interest groups are seeking their own, mainly economical-political interests, the area could easily become a source of various security risks.

It is true that the latest reports, including a United Nations report<sup>3</sup>, more or less thoroughly address the security situation and new security challenges in the area of the Western Balkans. These reports consider this area, in terms of security, as one of the most stable in Europe. However, we must be cautious, especially if we consider the cultural facts and, even more importantly, global political interests which show that this region has legalities of its own, just as any region in the world probably does. In this context it would be wise to consider its geographical importance since its status and *security conditions* are mostly influenced by the proximity of the EU and its security challenges, both Balkan routes, as well as by the post-war transitional period. The latter, with the justification of establishing modern democracies, enables the unjust attaining of wealth and creates a concentration of capital which in turn plays a key role in developing new national policies. In this context, crime plays a principal role. Since these security risks are not only a security challenge for the region itself, the EU and the global security environment identify common denominators which are reflected in shared risk. Once these common denominators are recognised, we can also easily identify available opportunities for a uniform approach to addressing such risks. These are mostly reflected in the provision

<sup>2</sup> At the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina individual groups started to appear, the members of which were increasingly radical. Their organization followed the example of Islamic groups, formed abroad. Thus the signs of Vahabism soon appeared, followed by Takfir movements. Nowadays in Bosnia and Herzegovina these movements are relatively ununified and scattered. Also noticeable is the trend of transition to other areas, such as Sandžak and some peripheral areas of Montenegro;

<sup>3</sup> Crime and its impact on the Balkans and affected countries, UN, 2008;

of the appropriate scope and quality of cooperation, the standardized/unified, and most importantly, unselfish approach to defying contemporary security risks. Identification, formulation and implementation of best practices are certainly appropriate solutions.

**WESTERN BALKANS AND NEW SECURITY RISKS**

Besides the above-mentioned main historical reasons, due to which the region of the Western Balkans remains the subject of constant monitoring, when reviewing the situation and the assessment of risk we can easily spot major factors, which greatly influence the security situation in the region and consequently impact the area of the EU and global environment (Margetić, 2006). These major factors include:

- transnationality of the terrorism and extremism threat,
- development of a new terrorism doctrine. After the Afghanistan War and September 11, Al-Khaida developed a unique organizational structure with the distinctive trend to unify and join Islam. Due to its dimensions, nowadays it is in theory unclear whether this is still an organization or perhaps a global take-over of Al-Khaida philosophy. This kind of structure, the influence of which can also be seen in the area of the Western Balkans, has been characterised mainly by:
  - globality,
  - multinationality,
  - self-funding,
  - religious-political connotations;
- contemporary formations containing structures of organized and traditional crime and terrorism;
- development of a new terrorist doctrine, based on unconventional operations;
- the search for new opportunities for terrorism and Islamic extremism structures;
- the impact of security risks in the EU on the emergence of new security risks in the Western Balkans.

**GLOBAL THREAT REQUIRES A GLOBAL RESPONSE**

Terrorism has been a global challenge for decades. Confirming this are the efforts within the United Nations (Boulden and Ewiss, 2004), which to date



have managed to prepare 16 umbrellas, universal international legal acts. 13 conventions and 3 additional protocols<sup>4</sup>, not to mention all the most important UN Security Council resolutions<sup>5</sup>, should at first sight, as acts at the universal level provide almost a sufficient extent of provisions on the basis of which the global security environment should achieve far better results in the fight against threats of terrorism. In order to ensure better efficiency there also exist some resolutions which, together with some established UN subsidiary organs<sup>6</sup>, represent additional efforts, included in umbrella act provisions, for the operationalisation and implementation of international will to suppress terrorism. Since it is obvious that the above-mentioned international legal acts at the universal level are not sufficient, the global security environment took a step forward when, under the auspices of the United Nations, it developed a *Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy*<sup>7</sup>. The strategy, adopted in September 2006, is a solid basis for the preparation of a concrete action plan<sup>8</sup> which addresses key challenges in the fight against all forms of terrorism, and include:

- limitation of factors which encourage the emergence of terrorism,
- terrorism prevention,
- establishment of so-called anti-terrorism capabilities,
- reinforcement of the UN role in the fight against terrorism threats,
- provision of the highest standards for the respect of human rights and freedoms in the fight against terrorism.

Since the EU has been, especially since September 11, one of the key actors in the prevention of international terrorism, it has decided to immediately contribute to the implementation of the above mentioned strategy within its Justice, Freedom and Security Policy.

The EU for some time has recognised that it is practically impossible to provide security within the EU through a security policy which focuses on internal factors only. The bigger threat comes from outside its borders, from

<sup>4</sup> See <http://www.un.org/terrorism/instruments.shtml>;

<sup>5</sup> Resolutions of the General Assembly (49/60, 51/210 and 60/288) and the Security Council 1267 (1999), 1373 (2001), 1540 (2004), 1566 (2004) and 1624 (2005);

<sup>6</sup> ...such as Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), Counter-Terrorism Committee or Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate... Besides these organs there are also special committees established for the needs of operationalisation of individual conventions which define a concrete area;

<sup>7</sup> Global Counter Terrorism Strategy, UN, 2006;

<sup>8</sup> UN Action to Counter Terrorism, UN, May 2007;

so-called third countries which with more or less direct connections with increasing extremism in the EU:

- enhance their capabilities,
- represent one of the most important promoters of radicalism for the purposes of terrorism,
- provide extremists with sources, support, logistic help and shelter.

In order to limit the threat and ensure an effective prevention factor which stems from the Counter-Terrorism Strategy<sup>9</sup> and its revised Action Plan<sup>10</sup>, the EU has identified the current most problematic areas in terms of security issues in so-called third countries. In addition to North Africa, these areas also include the Western Balkans, characterised by the above mentioned factors.

## EU AND THE WESTERN BALKANS

After the fall of the old regimes and the aggressive disintegration of old state structures and a simultaneous formation of new structures in some new formed countries, the area of the Western Balkans was characterised by the emergence of wider instability and a potential source of various forms of security threats in direct proximity of the EU territory. The wider, relatively unstable area of the Western Balkans is actually surrounded by EU member states and as such is also a source of potential threats to the EU in the fields of organized crime, uncontrolled weapons and explosive smuggling, as well as international terrorism (Prezelj and Gaber, 2005).

For EU member states the goal and at the same time the method of eliminating such threats could be reflected in the early application of the standards of democratic states and human rights protection, as well as in the application of security standards, applicable in the EU, including Western Balkan countries<sup>11</sup>. Western Balkan countries need to be aware of and not ignore the fact that recommendations and the adoption of EU norms would be in their favour. However, they should prove this by taking concrete measures and steps along the path of their own development<sup>12</sup>.

Considering the Stabilisation and Association Process of the Western Balkans region, the so-called *Thessaloniki Agenda*<sup>13</sup>, adopted by the EU Council in

<sup>9</sup> The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, doc. 14469/4/05;

<sup>10</sup> Implementation of the Action Plan to Combat Terrorism, doc. 15704/05;

<sup>11</sup> Commission Communication, doc. COM(2008)127;

<sup>12</sup> Transfer of EU best practices in counter-terrorism to Western Balkans, doc. SN 1560/08, Room Document;

<sup>13</sup> The Thessaloniki agenda for the Western Balkans, Council Conclusions, December 2002;

December 2002<sup>14</sup>, and the decision of the EU Council session of December 2007 that the place of the Western Balkans is in the EU, the EU has tried to identify some opportunities to facilitate the pre-accession efforts of the Western Balkans. One of the most interesting opportunities is known as the *transfer of EU best practices in counter-terrorism to the Western Balkans*.

The point is to meaningfully transfer the best practices used within the EU by EU member states, which have proved to be an effective and useful tool in terrorism identification and prevention, to the national anti-terrorism policies/strategies of the Western Balkan countries, and in doing so consider some of the regional characteristics of the Western Balkans. 16 special recommendations, which are the result of the First Peer Evaluation of National Mechanisms in the Fight Against Terrorism in the EU<sup>15</sup>, carried out between 2003 and 2005, were selected as the EU's best practices in anti-terrorism. To date, 95% of the 16 recommendations which refer to organizational structures, their performance, coordination and capability for cooperation at interdepartmental and international levels have been implemented<sup>16</sup> by EU member states.

Why does the EU consider the transfer of best practices as a key opportunity? During the preparation of the assessment of risk and review of the situation, which was based on the long-term monitoring of the security situation in the relations between the Western Balkans and the EU, the following conclusions were reached:

- The countries of the Western Balkans<sup>17</sup>, participating in the project, have relatively modern legislation that includes most of the current anti-terrorist standards. These reflect the most important universal international legal acts,
- Most countries have developed various strategies, action plans and guidelines for the purposes of implementation and operationalisation,
- Most countries have established or are establishing so-called anti-terrorist capabilities.

<sup>14</sup> <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/>;

<sup>15</sup> The subject of the first round of peer evaluation was 'Evaluation of national arrangements: improving national capability for the fight against terrorism';

<sup>16</sup> An implementation report on this implementation was approved by the Council on 19/20 April 2007 (5356/2/07 REV 2 ENFOPOL 30);

<sup>17</sup> So far the following countries have joined the project: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (police structures of the Ministry of the Interior, Federal police structures and police structures of the Serbian Republic), Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia;

However, past experiences, as well as their visions on the suitability and effectiveness of national mechanisms have indicated numerous problems that mainly appear during:

- Cooperation and information exchange at the national/interdepartmental level,
- Cooperation and information exchange at the international level,
- Information exchange with appropriate EU agencies.

Since in the past the EU itself and most EU member states have experienced problems at eliminating deficiencies due to insufficient anti-terrorist planning and unsatisfactory cooperation at the national level, it was more than appropriate that the EU, as an option, recommended and recommends that the Western Balkans region should accept cases of best practices.

It could also be said that this project is a meaningful continuation of the project to establish anti-terrorism cooperation among Western Balkan countries. To this purpose Slovenia in 2006 hosted a meeting of anti-terrorism experts from republics of the former Yugoslavia. When realising that similar security challenges were in question, the experts agreed to continue the cooperation that would be upgraded with the preparation of a special memorandum on cooperation of police/partner services. On this basis the preparation of a joint risk assessment would follow, as well as envisaged joint trainings and the preparation and exchange of best practices. This informal association would establish cryptographic communication means to exchange operational information. The added value of this association lies in the fact that it is not limited to the police structures of the Western Balkans. If countries outside the region show interest, and some already have, they can also join this association.

## **TRANSFER OF BEST PRACTICES, CHALLENGES AND ADVANTAGES**

After wide political consent, reflected in the decision that the Western Balkans was one of the priorities of the EU, the first step was to prepare a risk assessment which identified major security risks both for the area of the Western Balkans as well as the EU. Even more, during its EU presidency Slovenia took a step forward and in light of the security threat that the Western Balkans poses to the EU emphasised that perhaps the EU is a security threat

for the Western Balkans as well. In other words, the impact of some security risks in the EU is reflected in the area of the Western Balkans.

On the basis of a wide discussion at the expert level<sup>18</sup> (working bodies addressing internal and external factors) during the Slovenian EU Council presidency, the EU:

- Identified competent EU partners who could contribute to the implementation of the project to transfer best practices;
- Preliminarily presented its intent to the Western Balkans countries;
- Organized an expert meeting where anti-terrorism experts from the Western Balkans and EU presented their own views on current and future security challenges, and identified opportunities for a joint approach to the terrorism and extremism threat.

The experts at the meeting, besides the findings that the Western Balkans and EU were actually facing shared security risks and that a unified, and more importantly, a joint approach was necessary for the fight against threats of terrorism in the region, also reached some concrete conclusions:

- it is more than obvious that there is a will to continue the cooperation on the basis of initial efforts;
- to present the current EU anti-terrorism standards to interested Western Balkans countries;
- to review opportunities for an actual implementation of the transfer of best practices and the help needed for their standard implementation at the national level.

As already mentioned, the point is to establish sufficient anti-terrorism capabilities and so-called architecture to provide effective cooperation at the national/interdepartmental level, as well as the capacity for cooperation at the international level.

After achieving wide political consent, it is now the turn of the Western Balkans region. This should, at the political level, decide if there actually is the will and power for such cooperation with the EU and its competent

<sup>18</sup> One of the conclusions of the regular working session of the Terrorism Working Group, EU Council, internal factor, was that Slovenia as a presiding country of the EU should, during its mandate, conduct the first negotiations with Western Balkan countries in order to present the EU's intent.

agencies and organs. Considering the expressed will, reflected in their pre-accession efforts and the Stabilization and Accession Agreement, both partners, if they take into consideration the regularities of both parties, are likely to find a common denominator in the area of security and take a step forward in unifying security standards. Ultimately, before the envisaged accession to the EU, the Western Balkans region will have to prove that as such it is capable of introducing and implementing common EU security standards. As already mentioned, a global threat requires a global response. This in turn requires a unified, and more importantly, mutually coordinated regulations to make such cooperation more effective and rational.

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# IZZIVI ZOPERSTAVLJANJA TERORIZMU V JUGOVZHODNI EVROPI: MAKEDONSKI VIDIK

## COUNTER-TERRORISM CHALLENGES IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE: THE MACEDONIAN PERSPECTIVE

### POVZETEK

*Balkan je zaradi velike verske in narodnostne raznolikosti zelo dojemljiv za različne ideologije. Nekateri balkanski narodi ne izbirajo sredstev za doseg nacionalnih ciljev, kot so iskanje identitete, njeno dokazovanje ali vzgajanje močnega čuta za »nacionalno« ozemlje. Po drugi strani pa so tu močni evropski narodi, ki 'demokracijo' pojmujejo zelo fleksibilno. Ta prilagodljivost pogosto zmede druge države, ki svoje sisteme ves čas izboljšujejo, da bi dosegle standarde, ki jih je postavila Evropska skupnost. Dejstvo je, da postanejo sistemi zaradi nenehnega spreminjanja za doseg standardov ranljivi za različne grožnje, zato je varnostno situacijo zelo težko nadzorovati. To povzroči tudi nastanek nezakonite sile, katere obliko in vrsto je težko določiti. V večini primerov je to kombinacija terorizma, upora in organiziranega kriminala. V nekaterih primerih uporniki za doseg ciljev uporabljajo teroristično taktiko, v drugih pa so uporabljene taktike upora ali pa se zločinci zatečejo k terorizmu, da bi imeli več svobode pri doseganju svojih ciljev, vendar se skrivajo za podobo upora, da bi imeli nadzor nad položajem na*

<sup>1</sup> Častnik v Ministrstvu za obrambo Republike Makedonije. Duty officer in Ministry of Defence of Republic of Macedonia.



*tleh. Pri takšni postavitvi je težko najti ustrezne protiukrepe, prav tako je težko, da ne bi prišlo do kršitev mednarodnih zakonov, ženevskih konvencij in človekovih pravic. Postavlja se tudi vprašanje, ali bi morali imeti proaktivno varnostno politiko ali pa bi morali izboljšati reaktivne ukrepe. O tem lahko razmišljajo in razpravljajo države z močno demokracijo in močno strategijo za varovanje narodnih interesov. Države, katerih obrambni sistemi so v nenehni reformi, pa ne bodo zmožne proaktivnih ukrepov. Za boj proti terorizmu ni splošnih rešitev. Prav tako ni dobro, da države rešitve za nekatere težave prevzemajo od drugih, saj tako ustvarjajo še več težav, namesto da bi jih reševale.*

#### **K L J U Č N E B E S E D E**

*Terorizem, protiterorizem, varnostna politika, varovanje nacionalnih interesov.*

.....

#### **A B S T R A C T**

*Taking into consideration the diversity of nations and religions in the Balkans, the region is very vulnerable to different ideologies. Seeking identity or proving it, or having strong feelings for "national" territories, some Balkan nations have not yet chosen the means to achieve national goals. On the other hand, we have powerful European countries in which their term for democracy is very "flexible". This flexibility often confuses countries that are continuously improving their systems in order to achieve standards set up by the European Union. The fact is that if a country constantly reforms its system in order to achieve such standards, the system will become so vulnerable to various threats that it becomes very difficult to control the security situation. This also produces illicit forces of a form and type that is difficult to define. Most of the time, they are a mix of terrorism, insurgency and organised crime. There are examples of insurgency in which insurgents use terrorist tactics to achieve their goals, and there are examples of terrorists using insurgency tactics or situations in which criminals get involved in terrorism in order to have more freedom in achieving their goals and hide behind the image of insurgency to*

Zoran Ivanov

*control the situation on the ground. In a constellation like this, it is very complicated to find proper countermeasures that do not conflict with international law, the Geneva Convention or human rights. An additional question is raised: should there be proactive security interventions or should reactive measures be improved? This can be debated in countries that have strong democracies with a strong strategy for protecting national interests. Countries whose defence systems are in continuous reform, however, will be not capable enough to take proactive measures. There is no general solution for countering terrorism. Also, it is not ideal to export solutions for certain problems, because of the risk of creating more problems instead of solving them.*

**KEY WORDS**

*Terrorism, Counter terrorism, Security Policy, Protection of national interests.*

.....  
**FOREWORD**


This article gives a Macedonian perspective on understanding terrorism in the region. Using recent events in defining threats to South Eastern European countries is a very good example of a new stage of evolution of terrorist threats. Using historic events for identifying and learning from mistakes is the best way to improve our counter-terrorism strategy.

**DEFINING TERRORISM**

From reading books and articles from eminent professors and analysts, one gets the feeling that, even in the present day, terrorism is the only term that still does not have a clear definition. In criminal law, unlawful acts, including violence and different types of attacks on civilians or societies or infrastructure of the state, are clearly defined. Many authors define terrorism as “violence against civilians to achieve political or ideological objectives by creating fear”. According to Article 313 of the Macedonian Criminal Law, an act of terrorism is: “deliberately attacking the Macedonian Constitution and its security to cause or threaten explosion, fire, flood or any other dangerous act on civil society or act of violence in order to create a feeling of insecurity and fear”. In

order to be more specific and more successful in prosecuting acts of terrorism, there are many sub-articles to this definition which explain which acts Macedonia considers terrorism.

Every state, with its national interests and surroundings, constitutes a specific case. Each tries to define terrorism explicitly in order to protect its citizens. This is one of reasons that in various definitions of terrorism we easily recognise the same elements: violence, force, political acts, fear, terror, threat, strategy, psychological effects, victim and many more. Taking this into consideration along with understanding threats to our societies and countering them, it is impossible to come up with a single definition to describe terrorism in general. Different perspectives on understanding threats and protecting national interests will always produce different definitions of terrorism and countermeasures. Some will be very successful whereas some will create more problems. The old definition of terrorism in the Macedonian Criminal Law was very general and full of gaps. Today, this definition has become so extensive that each subsection is a separate definition by itself. Every society seeks to improve its security systems. This means that threats will also change their form and type and will adjust to any improvements in finding new “innovative” ways to circumvent them and reach the desired goal. This process, through time, is what makes terrorism so flexible<sup>2</sup>. Looking from a bird’s-eye perspective, it seems that security systems and terrorism are related in a closed circle.



<sup>2</sup> Bruce Hoffman - “Inside Terrorism”, p. 20.

The question is how to properly define terrorism. We need to look at the big picture and understand the interconnections between organised crime, insurgency and terrorism. In the past decade, guerrillas, ordinary criminals and terrorists have often used very similar tactics for the same purposes.<sup>3</sup> In basic ideology and motivation, we can see differences between them, and thus can we really put them into one basket and treat them as a single threat? Successively complementing their ideology and motivation, supported and executed with similar tactics, their threat to the security system has taken on a new dimension. A good example is the operation “Mountain Storm” of the Macedonian MOI in November 2007. They successfully suppressed a criminal group which planned to create a crisis situation in the northwest part of Macedonia.

When these “irregular” forces begin their activities, governments usually start reacting very emotionally, and making mistakes is inevitable. Finding a proper way to fight them while still avoiding conflict with UN conventions and international law is very difficult. Defining the type of these forces is strictly up to the country itself. This is very complicated, because there are countries with strong democratic societies and laws, and they are completely capable of fighting against them. On the other hand, there are countries with no or very weak democratic or very complex societies which can generate more problems while fighting against such forces. Serbia tried to suppress the Albanian insurgency in Kosovo. According to different sources, the KLA was identified as a successful guerilla movement. The movement started in the late '70s from among expelled doctors, professors and other formal and informal leaders from the Serbian government. The group was formed in Switzerland in the beginning of the '80s. This group took the Irish Republican Army (IRA) as a model. Ideology was implemented through armed rebellion to unify all territories (Kosovo, South Serbia, Macedonia, Greece and Albania) in the Balkans where ethnic Albanians lived and to create a “Great Albania”. Like every other rebellion group, they had close ties with the Albanian mafia. This cooperation was a benefit for both. With time, the KLA became very much involved in organised crime. The Serbian authorities considered this group a terrorist group. The Serbian government reported that the KLA had killed and kidnapped at least 3276 civilians, Serbs, Albanians, Roma and others.<sup>4</sup> A Human Rights Watch report on humanitarian law violations

<sup>3</sup> Bruce Hoffman - “Inside Terrorism” p. 35.

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.arhiva.serbia.sr.co.yu/news/2002-07/08/325076.html>.

in Kosovo from 1998 states: “The growth of armed opposition by the KLA, however, and the intensification of fighting between government forces and this armed insurgency have altered the nature of the conflict in Kosovo. Since February, intense fighting has resulted in an estimated six hundred deaths and the displacement of 300,000 persons, while hundreds of villages have been destroyed. Documented abuses include extrajudicial executions, the use of disproportionate force, indiscriminate attacks against civilians, and the systematic destruction of civilian property by the Serbian special police and Yugoslav Army, as well as abuses, such as hostage taking and summary executions, committed against Serbian and Albanian civilians by the KLA.”<sup>5</sup> With the continuous escalation of the situation in Kosovo, NATO got involved in order to minimise violations of human rights. After the NATO bombings, Serbian leaders and NATO agreed to a peace settlement in which Kosovo would be under UN governance, with the KLA demilitarised and transformed into the Kosovo Protection Corps. All infrastructure in the country had been attacked in order to suppress the Milosevic regime and, on the other hand, Kosovo become a UN protectorate, where it could have been expected that demilitarisation and transformation of the KLA would not be very successful. The result was a spreading of Albanian insurgency ideology into the neighbouring regions of South Serbia (Presevo, Medvedje and Bujanovac) and northwest Macedonia.

Taking a detailed look at the tactics which NATO was using to suppress the Milosevic regime, we recognise the tactics and procedures of unconventional warfare.

In responding to the issue of how to control guerilla movements and how to prevent transforming them into terrorist organisations that will flee into neighbouring regions, experts in unconventional warfare and terrorism gave different explanations, but were basically saying to cut off support on the ground. But the question is: “What will happen to the ideology?” Generalising the problem and exporting solutions from one region to another can only create new problems. There is always the very real potential threat of spreading the insurgency ideology around the region, which will create new problems with long-term consequences. As such, we can look at the shape of terrorism in this region as a combination of organised crime and insurgency.

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.hrw.org/reports98/kosovo/Kos9810-11.htm>

These irregular forces successfully complement each other and become a threat to Balkan countries which can easily spread into neighbouring countries; thus it is very hard to find the right countermeasures.

**“Spill-over” effect**

This effect is characteristic for South Eastern Europe because in this region a single entity can be spread around in at least two or three countries. In this demographic constellation, spreading ideology is very easy; ideology will always have enough support from civilians just to engage states laws, sovereignty, civilian freedom and safety. Considering this, we can begin to look at the conflict in the Republic of Macedonia in 2001 as a good example of a “spill-over” effect.

The human psychology of losing status within some organisation or environment damages the ego and kicks off a self-defence reaction. Immediately the human mind starts looking for a space and reasons to restore the lost position. The feeling of abandonment is a very good starting point for looking for peers, organising them and starting something new that will satisfy personal needs and egos. The ideology of “under-cover” freedom fighters for better human rights continued to spread around the region after the peace agreement between the Serbian government and NATO was signed and after the transformation of the KLA into the KPS.

Soon after, two organisations were identified in South Serbia and northwest Macedonia very similar to the KLA with the ideology of liberation of the ethnic Albanian territories.<sup>6</sup> The situation in Macedonia was not even close to what it was in Kosovo 10 years before under Milosevic's repression. Political representatives of the Albanian minority were already in the government after the independence of the state in 1991. In Macedonia, on 20 Jan 2001, Macedonian security forces were attacked with sporadic explosions. Responsibility for the attacks was claimed by the new National Liberation Army - NLA. In the next period, the NLA occupied Albanian villages along the northwest Macedonian border with Kosovo. Macedonian authorities continued with calm politics even though the situation on the ground had become much more tense. Consequently, KFOR increased border patrols along the Macedonia-Kosovo border and NATO allowed the Serbian Army to

<sup>6</sup> Ivan Babanovski - “NLA - Terrorist paramilitary in Macedonia”, 2002.

return to the demilitarised zone. The Macedonian government got the support of the international community in its effort to fight against the NLA. The NLA increased their operation, and the situation in the part of Macedonia where Albanians represented 30% more of the population became confused and agitated. In February, the NLA, with support from Kosovo, seized the village of Tanusevci. The number of armed personnel increased and they seized several villages along the northern border of Macedonia. With good cooperation between KFOR and Macedonian security forces, the NLA was split up. Hardliners from Kosovo supported by certain Albanian politicians in Macedonia did not have enough trust in the existing Albanian parties in the Macedonian government to support their ideology; they formed a new radical political party, the National Democratic Party - NDP, headed by a leader who was a participant in the actual government. The ideology that Albanians were second-class citizens and that the Macedonian Army and police were “occupying” forces spread among the Albanian population. In March 2001, more than 20,000 Albanians peacefully marched on the streets of Skopje. The next day, the radical NDP political party organised a violent demonstration in Tetovo. About 10 armed NLA members were hidden among the demonstrators and opened fire on the Macedonian police. They set up mortar positions in the hills around Tetovo and started bombing the centre of town. Other Albanian political parties were encouraged and started using this to express their ideas, a modification of the “Great Albania” ideology of seeking ethnic equality and for the Albanian minority to become a second constitutional nation of the Republic of Macedonia.<sup>7</sup> About the situation in Macedonia CNN said: “It was matter of time when this would happen, because the main source of exporting problems in Macedonia was never removed - that is, ethnic Albanians hardliners who operate in Kosovo.”

**TERRORISM AND ORGANISED CRIME**

After the conflict in 2001 in Macedonia, many articles and books were written about what happened in 2001. The question was posed: Was the Albanian insurgency ideology of liberation of ethnic Albanian territories under Milosevic's repression in Kosovo exported, or did the insurgency itself start in Macedonia where the justice system is more democratic and all minorities enjoy all rights

<sup>7</sup> Ivan Babanovski - “NLA - Terrorist paramilitary in Macedonia”, 2002.

according to the Macedonian Constitution? The fact was that when Macedonia became independent in 1991, the Albanian political party did not vote for the new Macedonian Constitution, because their demand was that the Albanian people must be equal to the Macedonian people and must be considered an equal nation under the new Macedonia Constitution. At that time, Albanians were a minority, which means less than 25% of the total population, and the Macedonian Constitution was accepted in Parliament without the vote of the Albanian political party. Learning from the Kosovo experience and the benefit of insurgency that was achieved with the armed conflict supported by Albanians from Macedonia, the same ideology spilled over to Macedonia. At that time all Albanians enjoys all rights according to the Constitution as a minority. They were already part of the system, with an active political party in Parliament, schools in the Albanian language, newspapers, TV stations, etc. The strong belief, however, was to start an armed conflict in Macedonia in order to change the Macedonian Constitution, or in other words to achieve a political goal through violence. The inability of the Macedonian political and military authorities to face the threat and find an acceptable solution to the problem led to Macedonia coming into conflict with the international community, and the situation became very complicated. On one hand we have an entity that declared itself as insurgents fighting for human rights and against the “torture” of the Macedonian government and the occupying Macedonian Army and police, and on the other we have an organisation with a *criminal* background<sup>8</sup> and with tactics of strictly using fear to achieve *political goals*. If we analyse their mode of operation we immediately identify terms describing terrorist tactics which correspond to identical elements in various definitions of terrorism. Accordingly, we cannot clearly state that the Republic of Macedonia was facing an insurgency. In May 2001, the NLA occupied the dam on Lipkovo Lake that supplied the city of Kumanovo with drinking water and threatened to cut off the water supply to the city if the government did not comply with their demands for better rights for Albanians in Macedonia. Among many others examples like this, Macedonia was facing a “mixed force” with terrorist tactics actively involved in organised crime in the guise of freedom fighters. If we take a detailed look at the genesis of these forces we will find out that all of them, whether before or after the conflict, were connected to organised

<sup>8</sup> Criminal activities are proven from various reports from the Ministry of the Interior in cooperation with other partner services.



crime. Organised crime is characteristic of all the Balkan countries. Wars, economic crises, social, political and other upheavals have all created fertile soil for this malaise. The primary objective of organised crime is the acquisition of material wealth; this is accomplished through illicit activities with a high rate of return: drug smuggling, gunrunning, prostitution, trade in human organs and persons, etc. Corruption also appears alongside organised crime.<sup>9</sup> The people of Kosovo and the northwest part of Macedonia live in clans in which there are young people fighting for national liberation who are at the same time active members of the mafia, young people who forced their relatives and other girls into prostitution. They obey clan rules, they use the same logic, the same view of the world - and there is no difference between one young man who sells drugs on the streets and another who fights in the mountains.<sup>10</sup> It is very interesting to consider that all these organisations that were fighting in the guise of freedom fighters, after the conflict in 2001 are still active in their field of operation of organised crime. Because the political goal was achieved, they are still active in smaller groups involved in criminal activities and connected with other foreign extremists and Islamic radical groups.<sup>11</sup> Most of them have committed serious criminal acts, abuse drugs, have some military experience, are armed with light infantry weapons and explosives, and are connected with a number of corrupt individuals in the security system, who provide inside information to them if there are countermeasures planned against them. These criminal groups do not have a strict organisational hierarchy, and in most cases emulation ends up with execution. They do not have support from the local population. The motives and interests of this mutual cooperation between criminals and foreign extremists and Islamic radical groups is beneficial for both. In this manner, criminals accumulate personal material wealth and in coordination with extremist and Islamic radical groups they gain greater authority and political power. In order to avoid criminal justice they declare themselves part of a group and act in the name of “national” or religious interests. On the other hand, extremist and Islamic radical groups use these criminal groups - to carry out terrorist attacks and other acts of violence, and to gain significant financial support. In the region of Sara Mountain in the

<sup>9</sup> Darko Trifunovic - “Terrorism and Organized Crime in South-eastern Europe: The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina - Sandzak, Kosovo and Metohija”.

<sup>10</sup> Ivan Babanovski - “NLA - Terrorist paramilitary in Macedonia” 2002.

<sup>11</sup> Analysis of the genesis of the groups is from operational reports from the Ministry of the Interior.

northwest part of Macedonia which borders Kosovo and Albania, illicit groups have been active. Most of the members were part of different extremist groups in the region of Macedonia, Kosovo and South Serbia. At the end of August 2007 some extremists from Kosovo joined a group, some of whom were members of the Islamic “Selefists”, a group planning to execute terrorist acts and other acts of violence and provoke crisis situations in order to declare a “free territory”. With the operation of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Macedonia, this group was overwhelmed and charges of act of terrorism were brought against some of the members. They used patriotism as a cover for their criminal activities during the war in Bosnia. Afterwards, however, a portion of the Muslim population in Bosnia and Herzegovina replaced nationalism with a new ideology of Islamic fundamentalism. Islamic fundamentalists with a criminal background have substantial advantages in BiH:

1. Fast and easy access to weapons and explosives
2. In-depth knowledge of smuggling routes
3. Connections with corrupt officials and politicians
4. Influence in local media and NGOs
5. Connections with a large diaspora in the US and Western Europe

Terrorist networks have seized upon these advantages of local criminals-turned-Islamic fundamentalists, creating a new model of terrorist funding.<sup>12</sup>

### Counter-terrorism challenges

Counter-terrorism is the process of combining all capabilities of a state’s infrastructure to close the gaps in the defence system that will block terrorist attempts at challenging our capability of securing our freedom. In order to achieve this we must constantly develop and improve our security and defence capability. We must improve our technology in security and defence systems and improve ourselves to better recognise the indicators of possible threats in order to secure our freedom. At the same time, while we are occupied with achieving our goals and at the moment we say that we have done everything we can to protect ourselves, terrorists will come up with

<sup>12</sup> Darko Trifunovic - “Terrorism and Organized Crime in South-eastern Europe: The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina - Sandzak, Kosovo and Metohija”.

something new, something that we didn't see or even think about, or didn't believe would challenge our defence system, and the same cycle will start all over again. Lately, terrorism has become so flexible and sophisticated that if we try to generalise the solutions and export them to different regions we will create more problems and do more harm than the terrorist act itself. It is very important to understand that every act of terrorism should be treated independently according to the victim country and its neighbouring region. Mutual cooperation between countries and their services is essential in order to understand terrorists' strengths and weaknesses, and to improve capabilities of identifying indicators of new threats and devise appropriate countermeasures.

# PROTITERORISTIČNI UKREPI V REPUBLIKI KOSOVO

## COUNTER-TERRORISM MEASURES IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO

**POVZETEK**

*Članek obravnava protiteroristične ukrepe in z njimi povezano presojo sredstev, ki jih je v boju proti terorizmu uporabila Republika Kosovo in z njo povezane institucije.*

*V članku so najprej predstavljene politične razmere, zmogljivosti pravne države ter socialno-ekonomske in varnostne institucije v Republiki Kosovo.*

*Nato je obravnavana trenutno prevladujoča oblika terorizma. Sledi predstavitev protiterorističnih ukrepov. Čeprav je glavni poudarek na vprašanjih, kot so sedanja infrastruktura in predlogi za prihodnje zmogljivosti, politika kosovskih institucij in projekti za spopad s terorizmom, članek ni omejen zgolj na te teme.*

*Nazadnje je govor o prihodnosti in razvoju najboljših praks pri oblikovanju demokratičnega, varnega in zavarovanega okolja, ob tem, ko potekajo notranji in zunanji protiteroristični boji za Republiko Kosovo.*

**KLJUČNE BESEDE**

*Protiteroristični ukrepi, kosovske institucije.*

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**A B S T R A C T**

*This article analyses the counter-terrorism measures and a related audit of means being taken by the Republic of Kosovo and related institutions to combat terrorism. First, the document will consider the political situation of the Republic of Kosovo, rule of law capacities, and socioeconomic and security institutions that are present in Kosovo. Second, the paper will introduce the current mainstream of terrorism. Third, the document will explore counter-terrorism measures. However, the main focus will be in addressing issues such as the current infrastructure and suggestions for future capacities, policies of Kosovo institutions and projects to combat terrorism. Finally, the article will present future and best practices in developing a democratic, safe and secure environment while combating terrorism is present internally and externally in the Republic of Kosovo.*

**K E Y W O R D S**

*Counter-terrorism measures, Kosovo institutions.*

**I N T R O D U C T I O N**

The Republic of Kosovo declared independence from the Republic of Serbia (formally part of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia) on 17 February 2008. The declaration followed eight years of UN administration. The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo entered into force on 15 June 2008, and thereby many Kosovo institutions gained the necessary authority for governing the country. Nevertheless, the main security institutions, such as the Kosovo Security Force, Ministry of Defence (military components), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Justice and the respective intelligence agencies, have yet to be developed. Capacities related to this topic must be advanced within the Ministry of Internal Affairs and in subordinate pillars within public safety and most predominantly the Kosovo Police Force (hereinafter: KPS).

Kosovo has gone through a long period of political and economical transition. The fall of communism in Europe in the period 1990-1999 found Kosovo under a repressive Serbian regime, which ended with the 78-day war and

the withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo. Yet the economy of Kosovo is hampered in various areas. Rebuilding Kosovo faces challenges that are directly linked to poverty, such as the lack of opportunity, security and participation in decision-making, difficulties of the economy to generate jobs, and the great sense of insecurity among the population as regards income, health, personal safety, etc. (World Bank, 2005).

Kosovo has the youngest population in Europe. Young people in Kosovo face many difficulties: a low level of education, a low level of participation in decision-making processes, a lack of employment, etc. (Human Development Report, 2006). All these challenges have to be addressed by the new Institutions of the Republic of Kosovo in order to increase the level of legitimacy and inclusion of young people in the new political system in general and in security institutions of the new state in particular.

State agencies across the world define terrorism in diverse terms. This includes the myriad of agencies that combat terrorism within various countries (i.e. the USA). However, what is most important is not the number of definitions but rather that governmental definitions have legal and political consequences. For example, the USA has many ways of interpreting “terrorism”, and the same applies in many countries all around the world. The differing internal and external definitions can be attributed, in part, to the respective countries' experience with national and/or international terrorism. A country may define terrorism in different ways within their respective agencies. Thus, one state in the USA may define terrorism in a different manner than another state, both potentially differing from the federal definition. Whittaker focuses on the USA and gives a common definition of terrorism as:

*The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or sociological objectives (FBI).*

*The calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies as to the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological (US Department of Defense).*

*Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetuated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience (US State Department). (Whittaker, 2003: 3)*

Nevertheless, scholars in many different countries agree on certain key features of terrorism: political aims, use of violence, spreading fear, etc. One such definition comes from Hoffman:

*Terrorism is*

1. *ineluctably political in aims and motives;*
2. *violent, or equally important, threatens violence;*
3. *designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target;*
4. *conducted either by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell structure (whose members wear no uniform or identifying insignia) or by individuals or a small collection of individuals directly influenced, motivated, or inspired by the ideological aims or example of some existent terrorist movement and/or its leader;*
5. *perpetrated by a sub-national group or non-state entity* (Hoffman, 2006: 40)

This definition includes much more than the elements of political goals, legitimacy and means to achieve them. These are the main elements that distinguish terrorists from other criminals and irregular fighters (Hoffman, 2006: 40). However, there are a number of risks in defining terrorism, since terrorists engage in different illegal and criminal activities (robbery, drugs trade, arms trade, smuggling, extortion, etc.) to finance their aims, and thus the political ends are crucial for terrorists, otherwise they would be considered “normal” criminals (Van Leeuwen, 2003: 3).

Terrorism is present in many countries in the world. The 11 September 2001 attacks in the USA have especially shown that terrorism is becoming global and more unpredictable. Regardless of the political system of the country, democracy, authoritarian or totalitarian, many countries have experienced some form of terrorism. The United Kingdom, as one of the oldest democracies in the world, has had experience in combating terrorism, with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) at home and abroad in Cyprus. Several countries in Latin America have combated and continue to combat terrorism; the same applies in North Africa and numerous other countries in the Middle East, Europe and Asia.

What is it that motivates terrorists to use violence and other methods to reach their goals?

Ideology is one of the most important components within terrorist groups. Targets and strategies of terrorists are most often selected based on their ideology. Drake identified the following categories of ideology used by terrorists:

1. *separatism*,
2. *religion*,
3. *liberalism*,
4. *anarchism*,
5. *communism*,
6. *conservatism*
7. *single-issue*,
8. *organized crime* (Drake, 1998: 16).

Yet terrorist organisations believe that they are fighting for the “right cause”. Most terrorist groups need some form of public support or sympathy for their activities. Not all terrorist groups are active in changing the existing political system, as some of them fight for a single issue or a certain policy. Terrorist groups that are active in changing the form of the political system or even in creating a new state are based on stronger support and legitimacy of their people. Once again legitimacy is a concept of political science, based on the belief that a certain society or group in society has in a political system (Lipset, 1960: 77). It is widely believed that legitimising political activities in democratic societies is easier than in other political systems; through participation in the political system, there are possibilities to be active in political parties or interest groups. This means that political actors accept certain “rules of the game” and try to achieve their goals within the system. This does not apply to authoritarian or totalitarian regimes, in which there is another “way out”. Public protest, civil resistance and guerrilla warfare are some of the actions that might be considered as forms of influence to further the goals of terrorist groups. Nevertheless, studies show that democracy and terrorism are linked. Eubank and Weidenberg’s analysis confirms that during the 1980s most terrorist activities took place in stable democratic countries and that most terrorist attacks were executed by people who lived in democratic countries. In societies with repressive regimes, terrorist groups were not as active or successful. Thus the authors conclude: “the more democracy, the more terrorism” (Eubank and Weidenberg, 2001: 160).



The civil rights that are guaranteed in the most stable democracies can be abused by terrorist groups. Freedoms of expression, assembly, association, religion, education, etc. enable terrorist members to get to public places and recruit new members through spreading propaganda. Thus, democratic societies have to face this phenomenon more than other political systems.

Not all resistance movements arrive at terrorism as a means for pursuing political goals. Guerrilla warfare is one of the responses to oppressive regimes that do not allow any freedom of expression or political activity. Since there is sometimes a link between terrorism and guerrilla warfare, it must be clear that the distinguishing features of both consist of three basic elements:

1. *the aims of its perpetrators,*
2. *their modus operandi in deploying a particular form of violence upon the victims,*
3. *the target audience.* (Schaffert, 1992: 14).

According to Wilkinson, anyone who deals with political terrorism must examine the use of violence in that it:

1. *is indiscriminate on the selection of victims,*
2. *appears arbitrary and unpredictable,*
3. *does not provide for non-combatant status or other rules of warfare,*
4. *observes no moral constraints on weaponry or tactics,*
5. *justifies any means to achieve its ends,*
6. *regards extreme violence as inspirational and the most effective means available,*
7. *regards vengeance as a moral necessity,*
8. *justifies the use of terror to avoid the greater evil represented by the enemy.*

(Wilkinson in Schaffert, 1992: 14)

The cost-benefit approach, the logic of the businessman or military strategist, is also used by terrorist organisations. The balance between the scale of violence used and the message sent through the act must be well calculated. Hence, targeting, the needed resources and implementations are in fact well assessed. Nevertheless, this does not always occur. Sometimes terrorists lose their “support” through the means used. Overestimating public sympathy, such as by the Tupamaros in Uruguay and the ERP (People’s Revolutionary Army) and Montoneros in Argentina can be a fatal mistake for terrorist groups (Whittaker, 2003: 19).

Terrorist motivations are shaped by rational, psychological and cultural elements. Thus there are distinguishing features in the modus operandi that can be observed with some overlapping of the above categories. Rational terrorists operate using a cost-benefit approach, achieving their goals in ways that are less costly and more effective. Group membership and committing atrocities are some of the most important elements of psychologically motivated terrorists; the end goals must be set very high in order to have continuity in their activities. Nevertheless, cultural aspects are vital in terrorist groups; various societies with collective systems of values are not always rational in their behaviour. Vendettas, martyrdom and self-destructive group behaviour seem unbelievable for Americans (Whittaker, 2003: 19-21).

Terrorist strategy is interlinked with the ideology of terrorist groups. Thus, left-wing terrorist groups attack the symbols of capitalism; the IRA attacked the symbols of Great Britain; the Irgun attacked the building where the administration of Great Britain was located; Al Qaeda attacked the US Pentagon, attempted to strike the White House and did in fact strike the World Trade Center, the symbol of world commerce. According to Drake, the link between ideology and strategy is as follows:

*Whilst the ideology of a terrorist group sets out the moral parameters within which they operate, the selection of targets is also affected by the effect or effects which they wish their violence to achieve. In practice, whilst terrorist may have simple political aims, they may pursue a number of strategic objectives in order to achieve the aim. The strategic objectives which they set themselves affect the target which they choose because they hope that by attacking such targets, they will maximize the pressure upon the psychological target to behave in certain fashion.”* (Drake, 1998: 53)

The third element is a feature that should attract our attention. Terrorist means are mostly based in the strategies of different groups. Harmon asserts that: *Strategy is the considered application of means to advance one’s ends. Terrorists, far from being “mindless” as American politicians often claim, are disturbingly calculating about the means they use.* (Harmon, in O’Day, 2004: 275)

Harmon identifies five of the most common terrorist strategies around the world, stating that:

1. the first strategy is to create or further a sense of societal dislocation, fear, and even anarchy;

2. the second strategy is to discredit, diminish or destroy a particular government, and replace it with another;
3. the third strategy is economic;
4. the fourth is military damage; and
5. the fifth strategy is for international effect. (Harmon, in O’Day, 2004: 275-280)

Our focus should be on the second strategy mentioned by Harmon: discrediting and destroying the existing government. Two of the key elements of this strategy that are of concern are the use of political propaganda and the use of political front organisations. Initially, propaganda was promulgated through newspapers - Lenin with his *Iskra*, IRA and *Phoblacht*, PLO and Hezbollah with leaflets - and then through the use of broadcasting - Hezbollah’s television and radio station “Voice of the Oppressed”, and the PKK’s broadcasting from Syria. Front groups function mostly as political parties of terrorist groups: North Vietnamese Communists controlled the National Liberation Front, Sinn Fein (“Ourselves Alone”) is a front for the Irish Republican Army “Provisionals”, ETA and the Spanish Basque political party Herri Batasuna (Harmon, in O’Day 2004: 282-287).

**State of play in Kosovo**

Specific to matters in Kosovo, the audience, international and Kosovo national government entities, must have a realistic and functional understanding of the internal and external situation for and within Kosovo. Prior to and upon its declaration of independence, the Kosovo region, and now country, has had problematic issues in combating terrorism, and building the safety and security of its infrastructure. Kosovo has been hampered in its counter-terrorism effort due to a number of important issues and areas:

1. Kosovo since the inception of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo and to the present day has a permeable border (and former boundary points) that allows easy access and exit.
2. The easing of corruption at multiple levels within law enforcement and governmental entities, at times involving both local and international individuals.
3. The past and current situation regarding payroll allowances to official entities tasked with the rule of law, judicial officials, law enforcement,

border enforcement, custom officials, etc., has presented opportunities for corruption.

4. Even with the use of NATO/KFOR patrols in areas along the border, and in particular green border zones, terrorists can exploit numerous passable border-point roads that have existed for hundreds of years. (United States Embassy, 2006)

The Kosovo Border Police are the “first line of defence” for our country. To perform a job which requires detection and prevention, and protecting and securing the borders from terrorists and from entry of weapons of mass destruction while at the same time facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel, the Border Police are vitally important to Kosovo and its population. Initiatives to identify individuals who pose a risk for Kosovo must be implemented by the Border Police at airports, green/blue borders and official border-crossing points. The multi-level inspection process, as well as advanced passenger information systems to regularly refuse entry to those who pose a threat to the security of Kosovo, are basic examples of ways that the Border Police currently ensure the security of Kosovo.

Smarter borders to deter terrorism can be created by the Border Police extending their “zone of security” beyond Kosovo’s physical border. Simply put, this requires liaison meetings, networking and Memorandums of Understanding with each neighbouring country to establish ties, exchange information, identify border crimes and criminals, and maintain on-going interaction to improve the security of each country’s border. Based on this smart strategy, low-risk travellers and commercial cargo entering Kosovo are quickly processed and allowed entry without delay; yet, the focus must be maintained on criminal activity such as smuggling of drugs, trafficking in humans, contraband and cross-border terrorist movements.

Fighting terrorism is not one person’s or one agency’s responsibility. At the border, all agencies must continue to work in unison, by combining their inspectional workforces and broad border authority, to make Kosovo a safer and more secure country.

Additionally, and still a concern, is the past UNMIK allowance of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) that are suspected of funding terrorists directly or indirectly within Kosovo. With the advent of UN Resolution 1244, the movement was made to allow municipalities to govern and

attempt to regulate the more than 400 NGOs within Kosovo (prior to and after independence). The attempt in the past was oriented to preventing extremists from using the shadow of an NGO to gain negative influence on the citizens of Kosovo. However, the movement allowed municipalities to manage the use of public facilities for legitimate or otherwise religious gatherings only if the relevant community consented. However, with such a subjective approach there is no clear determination whether such a way of regulating this situation under the UNMIK provision can show quantitative results and qualify realistic purposes (United States Embassy, 2006; specific to the section on Kosovo indicated in para. 2, page 2). Additionally, along with an overview of the situation and concerns within Kosovo is the respective look to the European Union (EU). The EU as a whole has been hesitant to ensure measures and forward progress to block the assets of such charitable institutions or entities that are associated with or derive funding from Hamas and Hezbollah (United States Embassy, 2006). There are also the recent concerns about the possibility of an EU-lead mission in Kosovo regarding the lack of some European countries to hold onto terrorists brought before their respective courts. In respect of capacity-building with the upcoming transition from a purely UN-run mission to an EU mission (currently known as EULEX) is Kosovo's desire to draft laws which will reflect sensitive and necessary EU admission regulations. However, and as an example, border laws pose a concern. Terrorists have sought the use of Kosovo's borders to move into other countries and/or develop operations in some manner within Kosovo. Additionally, the development of laws that will reflect EU-type border regulations (and possibly admission into Schengen in the future) has found that terrorists take advantage of such EU regulations for ease of movement throughout EU states and surrounding countries (United States Embassy, 2006; specific to the section on Kosovo, para. 2, page 2).

The problems of Kosovo are in many ways similar to those of well developed countries, with the difference that Kosovo has only been developing laws and the capacities of ministries since 10 February 2008, truly validating the statement "new born". The factors of human rights and advancing a democracy versus proactive and effective counter-terrorism are never the easiest to balance. Kosovo still must build on areas of concern regarding combating terrorism, whether in the form of Islamist terrorism, ethnic, nationalist or separatist terrorism, left-wing or anarchist terrorism, right-wing terrorism, and/or single-issue terrorism (EUROPOL, TE-SAT, 2008).

Within the public service area are the KPS's attempts to build a counter-terrorism unit (CTU) (established in 2006) and related functionalities with assistance from international mentors, monitors, investigators. However, the unit itself lacks not only the proper training and equipment to combat terrorism, but a restriction of cooperation from surrounding countries to further internal and external efforts to counter terrorism within Kosovo's borders, and assisting relevant authorities in other countries in combating terrorism abroad. Currently, with the lack of a functioning intelligence cell for public safety and law enforcement (and in respect of populating a database to combat terrorism) the KPS, and specifically the CTU, must use outside sources. Even with the recent EU court decision that will assist Kosovo, as in the 2006 Italian case whereby the "...court advised that the impact of individual terrorist actions needs to be seen in the wider criminal plan of a terrorist organization...", there is a need for further criminal investigation, counter-terrorism and judiciary functionality to combat terrorism (EUROPOL, TE-SAT, 2008).

Specifically, the CTU uses the UNMIK Central Intelligence Unit (CIU) and UNMIK Police Intelligence Liaison Unit (ILU). However, the CIU and ILU in conjunction with the CTU face many problems collecting and properly analysing pertinent data. This can be seen as currently problematic due to UNMIK, UNMIK Police, KPS NATO / KFOR and inter-related agency (EUROPOL, TE-SAT, 2008; specific to the section on Kosovo, para. 2 and 3) investigation units having their own intelligence means, databases and relevant investigative tools to combat differing crimes, although many facets of the crimes could develop into intelligence for countering terrorism (i.e. human trafficking, narcotics, false documents for entry and exit to and from Kosovo, etc.)

Kosovo's public safety and intelligence capacity will continue to build on strategic levels to combat terrorism with three main concerns:

1. Kosovo has to target the greatest terrorist threats, as has been done successfully by other nations in targeting, for example, the worst of the transnational drug cartels. Kosovo should develop a high-priority list of people and organisations that pose the greatest threat and then focus our resources on them.
2. Kosovo has to organise information from all available sources - law enforcement, the intelligence community, foreign partners and the private

sector - in order to identify and draw connections among terrorist groups, and develop best practices and available means to combat said threat.

3. We have to use every tool at our disposal, whether it be the KPS or other public and private entities to, for example, identify counterfeit currency, and locate financial assets and weapons that assist the work of terrorists. Also, our prosecutors must be aggressive in furthering law enforcement efforts (Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey, 2008).

With the assistance of government entities to respond to the needs of the intelligence and public safety sectors within Kosovo, the movement to combat terrorism will focus on a strategy (National Strategy for Combating Terrorism: Background and Issues for Congress, 2007) that will encompass:

1. democratisation as a [Kosovo] counter-terrorism strategy;
2. the validity of the Strategy's assumptions about terrorists [externally and internally regarding Kosovo];
3. whether the [Kosovo] Strategy adequately addresses the situation in Kosovo including any foreign national or national presence as a catalyst for international terrorism;
4. the [Kosovo] Strategy's effectiveness against rogue (National Strategy for Combating Terrorism: Background and Issues for Congress, 2007) states;
5. the degree to which the Strategy addresses threats reflected in recent National Intelligence Estimates;
6. mitigating extremist indoctrination of the young; and
7. the efficacy of public diplomacy.

Accountability to protect people and counter terrorism is not a dead issue or hopeless for the Republic of Kosovo, but it is fragile. Success is already encouraged on the path to better infrastructure, safety, security and rule of law by the desire of Kosovars and their governance to work toward a democracy and fight terrorism. The fact that Kosovo, in principle, now retains the right of entrance into legitimate world economies and political structures has made it easier for the world body to broker for another ally in the fight against terrorism. The fight for Kosovo and the competent authorities will need some clearer successes if it is going to survive. However, clearing the way for success in counter-terrorism is moving forward and is an excellent example of the past system not forcing the path

for the future, a future that is focused on democracy, aware of the needs to develop safe and sound protection of the Republic, and the will and integrity to fight against those elements that are or assist terrorist entities by whatever means.

This Strategy represents a significant step forward in confronting the evolving challenges posed by international terrorism, but it is only the first step. We are building a new democracy that we believe will be able to fight the threat posed by terrorism for years to come. To do that we must have a unified effort within our Republic, the citizenry and our public-safety entities, and especially our foreign partners to deal with the problem, or we risk failure. Just as we now look back with appreciation to all those who assisted and supported the independence of Kosovo, which has proved so successful, we want to help design a new programme that future generations will look back on as being responsible for dismantling the modern, local and global threat of terrorism. For the sake of future generations, this is a prudent, necessary and vital goal. We cannot underestimate or overestimate the threats that Kosovo must understand when combating terrorism (Defeating Terrorism, Economist.com, 2008).

## **CONCLUSION**

The realistic and idealistic viewpoints described here are just an initial outline of the role that the government of the Republic of Kosovo has begun evaluating and putting forth in the form of best practices to combat terrorism. In a short period of time, the Republic of Kosovo has made advances in acknowledging the potential use of the country by those entities that would promote or facilitate areas of terrorism. The Republic of Kosovo has directly and in continued cooperation with the international community begun the process in rule of law, safety and security, and realistic capacity-building of governmental authorities, to advance the understanding of the necessity to combat terrorism. Not even in well developed countries has such a diverse and complex problem been fully captured by these types of tools before, and the solution will require significant exploration before it can become fully effective. As terrorist organisations have become more complex, the Republic of Kosovo will need more powerful tools and allies to help us administer, recognise and break through this complexity.



The Republic of Kosovo continues to take an interest in combating this threat, not only via an ideological approach in explaining the concerns of terrorism internally and externally for our country, but realistically. It is our sincere concern to continually increase Kosovo border competencies, safety and the security of the country, protection of our private, public and economic infrastructures, to develop realistic counter-terrorism and intelligence units, to increase social well-being for our citizens, and to ensure not only domestic tranquillity, but reaching assurance benchmarks for international communities to assist in combating terrorism.

The Republic of Kosovo, through direct and continued international assistance, realises the need to combat terrorism by making its best efforts to decrease poverty at the national level, which may indirectly affect terrorism. Additionally, though analyses of our country's economic situation, and of terrorist activities and groups are relatively underdeveloped, we can gain insight into these activities by looking at the economic model of crime. In developing the social well-being of our citizens there is little reason for confidence that a reduction in poverty or increase in educational attainment will lead to a meaningful reduction in the level of potential domestic and/or international terrorism without other changes.

However, as this article has addressed concerns for the Republic of Kosovo in combating terrorism, we understand the need for assistance from the international community, and thereto we remain vigilant to avoid undue influences masked with international cooperation but facilitating terrorist ideologies. The Republic of Kosovo realises the need to respectively advance the education of the citizens of Kosovo, government officials, civil servants, public safety employees and our founding defence forces and take realistic approaches in awareness of potential terrorism threats. The Republic of Kosovo further realises that to increase our economic and industrial base, including public services (i.e. electricity, water and natural gas), we must educate our private and public infrastructure leaders. Additionally, the Republic of Kosovo has been and continues to develop legal and policy innovation in an attempt to mitigate the tension between protecting the privacy interests of non-terrorists while still improving the state's ability to monitor and deter potential terrorist threats.

This paper has attempted to shed some light on key issues related to terrorism and developing the "how to" in effectively combating terrorism within the

Republic of Kosovo. Countering such a broad issue in a developing country such as ours requires an equally broad composition of actions taken, most importantly in the rule of law. The explained actions must be implemented at all levels of a developing global society to achieve the best effect.

Realistically, the greatest test for the Republic of Kosovo over the next few years will be to bring about an effective long-term counter-terrorism strategy that is able to be implemented with available resources. On a direct line the Republic of Kosovo must contribute to countering terrorism by building in areas that continue to protect the citizenry and the country's infrastructure, always preserving human rights and resisting becoming a "police state". On a global level, the Republic of Kosovo must continue to be a responsible and resourceful partner to the international community in a combined effort to combat terrorism.

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# MERJENJE STALIŠČ PRIPADNIKOV OBOROŽENIH SIL GLEDE ZOPERSTAVLJANJA TERORIZMU – PRIMER SLOVENSКИH OBOROŽENIH SIL

## MEASURING THE VIEWS ON COUNTER-TERRORISM TAKEN BY MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES – THE EXAMPLE OF THE SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES

### **POVZETEK**

*Merjenje stališč pripadnikov oboroženih sil o zoperstavljanju mednarodnemu terorizmu je lahko pomemben dejavnik pri ocenjevanju resnične vloge oboroženih sil v operacijah kriznega odzivanja. Republika Slovenija in s tem tudi Slovenska vojska sta bili v zadnjih desetih letih zelo dejavni pri stabilizaciji Zahodnega Balkana. Med vzvode, s katerimi mednarodna skupnost pomaga posameznim državam, spada tudi uporaba oboroženih sil. Te so prve, ki začnejo vzpostavljati varnostno okolje, v katerem bo omogočeno delovanje mehanizmov, ki zagotavljajo učinkovito zoperstavljanje terorizmu. Iz primerov saniranja kriznih razmer v posameznih državah Zahodnega Balkana je razvidno, da je za zagotavljanje učinkovitega*

<sup>1</sup> Slovenska vojska. Slovenian Armed Forces.

*delovanja zoper grožnje, kot je terorizem, med drugim izrednega pomena tudi učinkovito delovanje pripadnikov mednarodnih oboroženih sil. V prispevku se posebej osredinjam na stališča pripadnikov in pripadnic Slovenske vojske do vloge, ki jo ima Slovenska vojska pri preprečevanju terorizma v mednarodnem okolju.*

**K L J U Č N E B E S E D E**

*Sodobni terorizem, oborožene sile, operacije kriznega odzivanja, stališča pripadnikov Slovenske vojske.*

**A B S T R A C T**

*Measuring standpoints taken by members of the armed forces regarding countering international terrorism could be an important factor in evaluating the role of the armed forces in crisis response operations. The Republic of Slovenia, and thus the Slovenian Armed Forces, has been strongly involved in the stabilisation of the Western Balkans over the past ten years. Armed forces are one of the mechanisms used by the international community in assisting certain countries. They are the first to initiate the establishment of a security environment in which the operation of mechanisms ensuring so-called internal security is facilitated. Through the stabilisation of particular crisis situations in some countries of the Western Balkans, it is evident that the efficient operation of members of multinational armed forces is crucial in protecting against threats such as terrorism. The scope of implementation also includes fighting terrorism. This article focuses on the positions of members of the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF), specifically, the role of the SAF in terrorism prevention within the international environment.*

**K E Y W O R D S**

*Modern terrorism, armed forces, crisis response operations, position of SAF members.*

**INTRODUCTION**

South Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans in particular are still in the process of transition and attempting to integrate into Euro-Atlantic structures. Along with the transition of the entire society, the reorganisation of national security systems is also taking place, focusing mainly on the rationalisation and increased efficiency of operations of various authorities of these national security systems. Essential for the efficient implementation of the above processes is clearly the need for appropriate action in fighting terrorism, as terrorism is one of the main threats to national and international security. Countries which are not fully capable of implementing all the mechanisms of the national authority within their territory require the help of the international community, whose assistance is provided by different mechanisms within the scope of international legal frameworks. Such countries represent a strong focal point for international terrorist groups. These countries, due to their limited control over their national territories, offer terrorist groups an opportunity to establish logistic bases for their operations, recruitment, training and financing of their operations and ultimately an opportunity to use these territories to conduct attacks on planned targets in third countries. The armed forces are one of the mechanisms used by the international community in assisting individual countries. They are the first to initiate the establishment of a security environment in which the operation of mechanisms ensuring so-called internal security is facilitated. There are many different typologies of peace operations currently undergoing development and operational changes in accordance with emerging crisis situations. There are first-, second- and third-generation peace operations; traditional and complex operations; non-armed monitoring of armed peacekeeping operations; and operations of peace keeping, peace building, peace enforcement and preventive diplomacy. Modern peace operations are supposed to stop conflicts and limit threats spreading from the crisis area (Jelušič 2003:627).

A comparison of the tasks of the armed forces in providing international security in fighting terrorism reveals that the vast majority of tasks within the framework of providing stability and reconstruction in crisis areas are linked to the prevention of causes for the emergence of terrorist acts. Tasks within NATO and the EU directly or indirectly linked to terrorism prevention can be defined as the conduct of combat operations within the

scope of collective defence (Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty), counter-terrorism, international peacemaking operations and operations for ensuring international peace, the tasks of protection and rescue, humanitarian aid and intervention, demonstration of force, enforcement of sanctions undertaken within international institutions, arms control, military support to civil bodies and special forces operations. The objectives adopted within the ESDP for the year 2010 (HG 2010) anticipate possible scenarios also linked to terrorism prevention or having an indirect influence on its occurrence. These scenarios envisage the engagement of forces within the framework of crisis management and within conducting stabilisation and reconstruction processes in a country. Worth special mention are peacekeeping, establishment of national defence security institutions and the conduct of security reforms, conflict prevention, including the tasks of preventive engagement of the armed forces, preventive deployment, operations of joint disarmament, prevention of weapons proliferation, especially weapons of mass destruction, and the conduct of operations for the provision of embargos in the area of arms trade. Tasks in the area of engagement for consequence management are limited to the operations of evacuation from a crisis area and assistance in reconstruction and recovery.

Through the stabilisation of particular crisis situations in some countries of the Western Balkans, it is evident that the efficient operation of multinational armed forces is crucial in protecting against threats such as terrorism. Crisis response operations, and with these, operations of members of multinational armed forces, represent a global form of peaceful preventive measures against spreading threats in the region and wider international environment (Jelušič, Garb and others 2004: 80-98). For this reason my further research focuses on the positions of members of the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF), specifically the role of the SAF in terrorism prevention in the international environment.

### **MEASURING STANDPOINTS TAKEN BY MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES REGARDING COUNTERING TERRORISM - THE EXAMPLE OF THE SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES**

The role and especially the effectiveness of the armed forces in solving the problems of terrorist threats depend on various factors which include the success of cooperation between the armed forces and local

authority structures. Besides cooperation with the security structures of the host nation, civil-military cooperation, or cooperation with the local population, also plays a very important role in crisis response operations. This cooperation is conducted through various programmes which are not necessarily limited only to providing humanitarian aid but branch out into different areas through which the armed forces can provide assistance to the local population and at the same time win their favour.<sup>2</sup> The attitude of the organisation's members to the goals and mission of the said organisation plays a very important part in the success of cooperation in every organisational structure. If we look at this fact in relation to the armed forces, the position of members on their role in fighting terrorism has a very important influence on the success of the operation (Čaleta 2008: 447).

The assessment of factors influencing incidences of terrorism has a very special role in terrorism research. All important authors, such as Hoffman 1998 and 2001, Sloan 1998, 2006, Combs 2003, Crenshaw 2001, Anžič 2002, Bebler 2005, Žabkar 2004, Grizold 2005 and others who deal with issues of terrorism, treat the influence of various factors in their research. The assessment of factors influencing incidences of terrorism plays a very important role in searching for measures to fight it. It is a fact that the assessment of these factors also holds the answers to implementing appropriate measures to ensure the reduction or elimination of the causes of terrorism within a certain community. Communities perceive particular terrorism factors differently due to cultural and sociological patterns specific to their community.

After 1991, the Republic of Slovenia started conducting research and analysis<sup>3</sup> dealing with the study of public opinion on the problem of national security and other related problems and issues. The research dealt with terrorism only superficially, greater attention being given to this topic only after the tragic events in the US in 2001. Analysis of the above research is very important for the appropriate assessment and understanding of the views of members of a certain community. In our example the problem of terrorism is examined, along with its manifestations. Researchers at the

<sup>2</sup> In the English literature this process is known as "Win the hearts and minds of the local community".

<sup>3</sup> The Defence Research Centre at the Faculty of Social Sciences has the leading role in researching the area of public relations in regard to national security issues.



Faculty of Social Science at the University of Ljubljana determined that, among members of the armed forces who conduct crisis response operations, there is a divergence between expectations regarding tasks on a mission which are shaped by individuals, and preparations and real tasks which are conducted in the theatre of operation (Jelušič, Garb, Vegič and Trifunović 2004: 5). In any society the armed forces represent a special organisational structure with certain rules of engagement and an organisational structure that is different from other institutions. Behaviour patterns and the views of some community members on certain problems can differ from the general opinion of said community. On account of their special form of operation, linked to intervention in various crisis situations in areas all over the world, these community members face more threats and have a different opinion of the assessment of individual risk factors. Due to this situation, the SAF conducted special research on 369 of its members, which provided insight into their positions on the discussed problems. In all, 5.27% of all employed SAF members were included in the research. The opinion polls were conducted very systematically. Questionnaires were proportionally distributed and completed in all of the SAF commands and units. This provided adequate data and a balance among organisational structures which, while performing their duties, are met with various forms of work and environments, and consequently different forms of threat. Among the respondents there were 65 female members, representing 17.6% of all respondents, also indicating the percentage of female members within the entire structure of the SAF. With the demographic data it is worth mentioning that 144 of these female members have already taken part in certain crisis response operations, their percentage being 39.01% of all respondents. On the basis of the analysis of the problems linked to terrorism threats, it was also possible to make a comparison between the positions of armed forces members and those of the wider community. In engaging various mechanisms to provide a suitable security environment in crisis areas, the international community has to be aware of the fact that the armed forces can influence the reduction or increase of certain kinds of threats through their activity in crisis response operations. We examined the SAF members' perception of the armed forces presence in crisis response operations against terrorism. The findings are presented in the diagram below.




Diagram 1 - Perception of the armed forces in crisis response operations against terrorism

The above findings indicate that SAF members understand that the presence of armed forces in crisis response operations is an important factor which, on the basis of 193 answers, or 52% of all answers, defines the possibilities for the occurrence of terrorism or its intensification. A total of 144 members, or 31%, believe that the presence of armed forces reduces the possibility for the occurrence of terrorism, whereas 32 members, or 9%, believe that it has no influence. A large percentage are of the opinion that the presence of armed forces intensifies the possibility of an incidence of terrorism. Such opinion undoubtedly stems from the fact that the armed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan are a target of ever more frequent terrorist attacks. This direct influence of current events in the area of terrorism threats towards armed forces members is not reflected in the answers to the questions which are linked to the assessment of the importance of individual strategies in fighting terrorism. We will look at the answers and examine the political, military, police, economic, social and legal strategies. The answers were evaluated on a scale of 1 to 5. With a mean value of 4.25, SAF members defined political strategies as the most important among the presented range of strategies. Among these they included the use of military strategies with a mean value of 3.75. The lowest rated were legal strategies, which ranked last among the possible strategies, their mean value being 3.43. The following diagram shows the ratio between the answers linked to the assessment of the importance of fighting terrorism strategies, the categories ranging from very important (5) to unimportant (1).




Diagram 2 - Perception of the importance of strategies for fighting terrorism

In perceiving the importance of strategies it is interesting to note that SAF members rate police and legal strategies, which until now have had the most visible role in fighting terrorism, the lowest. The low assessment of legal strategies can be attributed to the inability of the international community to adopt a comprehensive definition and fully regulate the international fight against terrorism. The reason for the negative influence on the perception of the above strategies can also be attributed to the relative inefficiency of international legal and police authorities in fighting terrorism within crisis areas, particularly during the time when the armed forces are transferring the care of security to the mentioned institutions.

The general perception of the importance of strategies only partly confirms or coincides with researching the importance of certain subjects of the national security system of the Republic of Slovenia which, in performing their activities, use police and legal strategies for fighting terrorism. The importance of the police was assessed with a mean value of 4.2, possible answers ranging from 1 to 5, while 48.8% of the SAF members evaluated it as very important (5). The assessments of judicial authorities conducting legal strategies came fairly close to the above valuations within the category of importance of strategies.

Courts received a mean ranking of 3.54 on the value scale (1-5), while the prosecutor's office received a mean ranking of 3.73. This, however, is still considerably lower than the SAF, which received a mean ranking of 3.9. The difference in perception of the importance of the Slovenian police in relation to the courts and the prosecutor's office can also be seen from the answers in the category of very important (5). A total of 23.3% of the respondents opted for this category for the courts, 26.8% for the prosecutor's office, and 27.4% for the SAF. The role of the SAF can also be set in the context of examining opinions of SAF members on how citizens perceive the role of their organisation in the area of terrorism. In the questionnaire, members assessed the statement that the citizens of the Republic of Slovenia see the SAF as one of the main factors in fighting international terrorism.




Diagram 3 - Assessment of the statement that the SAF is one of the main factors in fighting international terrorism

The diagram shows that SAF members assess the role of the armed forces in fighting terrorism lower through the eyes of citizens than they themselves see and perceive it as members of the military. This is in part due to the fact that the Republic of Slovenia has luckily so far not been a target of major terrorist attacks. This fact influences general public opinion on how terrorism as a security threat to the Republic of Slovenia is perceived. Indirectly, it also influences the role of subject matter in the national security system within the framework of fighting threats. The SAF members perceive terrorism as a more definite threat because the environment they operate in is more demanding and fraught with various asymmetric threats, the threat of terrorism prevailing. In crisis response operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, Lebanon and Africa,

where SAF members currently operate, various terrorist attacks take place every day. This has had a significant influence on the position of SAF members on the importance of terrorism as a source of threat to their safety in crisis response operations and terrorism as a general threat.




Diagram 4 - Perceiving terrorism as a threat

The armed forces can conduct their activities in fighting terrorism through the use of both preventive and authoritarian measures. To ensure that these measures are conducted efficiently, it is important to monitor the position of armed forces members and their views on the performance and effectiveness of measures in fighting terrorism. The public has always perceived the armed forces as an authoritarian body, conducting specific tasks which are not characteristic of other bodies in the national security system but assigned to the armed forces because of their missions and capabilities. Eliminating terrorism is undoubtedly a complex process, one which can only be successful if it is tackled by using various measures which focus on eliminating the causes of its creation. Due to this fact, the armed forces have recently been performing more and more tasks in the area of preventive measures to prevent the creation of conditions for the occurrence of terrorism. SAF members

assessed the success of suppressive and preventive measures in fighting terrorism.

Western European security establishments divide the activity of the armed forces into four main areas of operation, namely antiterrorism,<sup>4</sup> counter-terrorism,<sup>5</sup> consequence management<sup>6</sup> and military cooperation. The first and last measures belong to the category of preventive measures, while the others represent suppressive measures and response measures to previously committed terrorist acts. In assessing the role of the armed forces in these four areas of measures we have determined that SAF members evaluate all four areas as approximately equally important. Military cooperation deviates slightly in the mean value of answers (1-5). Members perceive it as the most important area of operation and role of the armed forces in fighting terrorism, rating it with a mean value of 3.95. Following are the areas of antiterrorism and counter-terrorism, with an identical mean value of 3.75. The last is the area of consequence management, with a mean value of 3.68. I will present an analysis of the answers for all four areas in more detail, according to the categories of very important (5), important (3) and unimportant (1). From the analysis we see that military cooperation in the category of very important deviates significantly from the rest of the estimated values. This could mean that members have had positive experiences with the various forms of military cooperation, reflected through joint training and other similar activities that the members of different armed forces conduct with the goal of increasing the efficiency and readiness of the armed forces in fighting terrorism. On the other hand, lower results in perceiving the importance of consequence management can be attributed to the fact that the Republic of Slovenia has so far not been a target of more "severe" terrorist attacks, which is also the reason that members of the armed forces have not been actively engaged in such tasks. Members have also not linked the engagement of the SAF in consequence management of natural disasters, which the armed forces are actively involved in, with the defined activities in consequence management.

<sup>4</sup> Antiterrorism (AT) signifies the use of protective measures to reduce the vulnerability of forces, individuals and property to terrorism. It includes protective and dissuasive measures, focused on preventing attacks or reducing its effects (English-Slovenian Dictionary of Military Terms, 2006:23).

<sup>5</sup> Counter-terrorism (CT) signifies the use of offensive measures to reduce the vulnerability of forces, individuals and property to terrorism. Measures include justified activities to protect individuals and measures for controlling the situation, performed by military and civilian forces or organisations (English-Slovenian Dictionary of Military Terms, 2006:154).

<sup>6</sup> Consequence management (CM) signifies the use of measures to mitigate and eliminate the destructive effects of terrorism (AAP-6 - NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, 2005:39).




Diagram 5 - Assessment of armed forces measures in fighting terrorism

SAF members assess the effectiveness of preventive strategies in fighting terrorism higher than suppressive strategies. This is also confirmed by the assessments of statements in which the members assessed the general effectiveness of individual strategies in fighting terrorism. Within the scope of answers (1-4) the members rated the effectiveness of preventive strategies with a mean value of 3.05, while the effectiveness of suppressive strategies in terrorism reduction was rated with a mean value of 2.57. In connection with this, the perception of the importance of individual types of units is also very important. These are units that the armed forces can generally use in fighting terrorism in crisis response operations. The respondents had the possibility to choose among the indicated types of units where they had to assess their adequacy, given the scope of answers from 1 to 5, from the category of adequate to the category of inadequate. It is interesting to note that, among those types of units deemed as very adequate for conducting activities in fighting terrorism, special units were assessed a very high value. These, for their form of operation, mostly belong to the area of suppressive strategies, which were previously rated lower than preventive strategies. The reasons for such conclusions are multilayered and likely linked to various explanations. One of the explanations is undoubtedly the fact that the general assessment of strategies is not necessarily linked to the perception of roles of individual structures in the process of fighting terrorism. Another explanation is the

generally rooted opinion that only special units play an important role in fighting terrorism. Next, let us look in detail at which types of units the SAF members defined as important in fighting terrorism.




Diagram 6 - Assessment of the adequacy of types of units for fighting terrorism

It is clear from the stated mean values that according to the opinion of SAF members there are three types of military units that stand out, namely special units, security and intelligence authorities of the armed forces and military police units, which received a higher mean value of 4.0. What is surprising is the relatively low assessment of air units and the units for conducting NBC defence. The resources for these two types of units in most countries are concentrated in the armed forces, which are capable of conducting more extensive activities. The tasks of air units include air policing and the handling of situations in the event of a plane being hijacked or shot down.<sup>7</sup> On the other hand, the armed forces, together with their personnel and capabilities, play a very important role in consequence management and prevention, using NBC resources. Other types of units appear as support elements in fighting terrorism and do not play a key role in the system of preventive and suppressive measures against terrorism.

The Republic of Slovenia, with its armed forces, cooperates actively in mitigating conditions within various crisis areas. Thus, the occurrence of international terrorism can be a threat to the members of an armed force,



conducting operations abroad, and to the Republic of Slovenia and its national security. We examined the positions and views of members of the armed forces on the interests of the Republic of Slovenia for cooperating in crisis response operations in relation to the occurrence and influence of terrorist threats on national security. The survey contained the statement that one of the interests of the Republic of Slovenia in SAF involvement in crisis response operations in the Balkans is also the reduction of terrorist threats for our country. In all, 21.9% of the respondents answered that they strongly agree with the statement, 42% agree with it partly, 19.6% hardly agree with it, 11.9% do not agree with it and 4.6% were undecided. In the scope of answers from 1 to 4 the mean value was 2.8, which shows that the members also perceive the importance of their engagement in Balkan operations as a way of reducing terrorist threats for our country. A comparison of perceiving threats to national security on account of participation in crisis response operations and the current EU presidency was also conducted. The findings are presented in the following diagram.




Diagram 7 - Threat assessments of the Republic of Slovenia in relation to cooperating in crisis response operations and presiding over the EU

<sup>7</sup> Within NATO these measures are known as “renegade”.

In assessing both stated factors and their influence on the threat to national security in relation to international terrorism, we can see that the members assess the possibility of increasing the threat to national security of the Republic of Slovenia as relatively high. Considering the influence of SAF members' cooperation in crisis response operations, in particular in Iraq and Afghanistan, the members defined the possibility of threat with a mean value of 2.7, while the threat from presiding over the EU received a mean value of 2.8.

**FINAL THOUGHTS**

Terrorism today is international and transnational, which means that country borders have lost their former meaning. Terrorist acts, which have been occurring throughout the world and have ever greater destructive effects, constantly place us in a dilemma as to whether or not we are witnessing “new terrorism”, which, unlike terrorism known in the distant and recent past, is even more deadly and uncontrollable. Terrorist groups today are part of a much more complex system that is much wider and more networked than what we have been used to seeing in the past.

Fighting terrorism has recently become an important part of the dynamics of international relations. Terrorist threats have become a greater risk factor, which governments and the general public perceive as a great source of threat at an individual, national and international level. Awareness of the importance of terrorist threats changes and even declines within certain time frames, but new terrorist acts keep placing it at a very high level. Attacks by various terrorist groups place the security environment in which we live into a framework where terrorist threats are constantly present and are the result of instability and political violence. Terrorist attacks have transformed their forms of operations, for which subjects of such threats at a national and international level have not always been fully prepared in the past. These threats also influence the development of new technologies and as such represent the “new world disorder”.<sup>8</sup> Terrorism in essence is no longer only a local threat. After 11 September 2001, terrorism stands as a type of conflict in which terrorists have the motivation and means to execute attacks which result in a great number of casualties. It is specifically due to this fact that “new terrorism” is considered a global threat. The role of the armed forces and their members is thus very

important in ameliorating situations in crisis areas which terrorist groups could use to conduct their operations.

The importance of the armed forces in the process of fighting terrorism can also be seen from the position of SAF members with regard to the stated risk factors. It is important that we continuously upgrade and consider relatively positive viewpoints of armed forces members on their roles in the process of countering terrorism. In conclusion it is important to disclose the views of SAF members that the armed forces are able to resist terrorism only within the framework of accepted international legal norms. This is a key factor which, in the category "I strongly agree", was chosen by as much as 34.1% of the respondents, while the category "I agree" was chosen by an additional 34.3%. Only 8.9% of members do not agree with the statement. This generally shows the commitment of SAF members to operate against terrorism within legally accepted norms.

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<sup>8</sup> "New World Disorder" (Sloan, 2007:11).

*Denis Čaleta*

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# PREDSTAVITEV NOVEGA ZAKONA IN DELO URADA PRI PREPREČEVANJU FINANCIRANJA TERORIZMA

## PRESENTATION OF THE NEW LAW AND MEASURES OF THE OFFICE FOR PREVENTING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM

### **P O V Z E T E K**

*S sprejetjem nove zakonodaje so se naloge Urada RS za preprečevanje pranja denarja razširile tudi na preprečevanje financiranja terorizma. Novi zakon je želel predvsem spodbuditi finančne ustanove, da se področja pranja denarja in financiranja terorizma lotevajo sistematičneje, zato jim je naložil precej novih nalog. Organizacije morajo tako izdelati analizo tveganja in z njo določiti oceno tveganja posamezne skupine ali vrste stranke, poslovnega razmerja, produkta ali transakcije glede na mogoče zlorabe za pranje denarja ali financiranje terorizma ter skladno z oceno tudi delovati. Zakon po novem sploh ne uporablja več izraza »identifikacija«, ki je v resnici pomenil suhoparen vpogled v neki dokument, temveč »pregled stranke«. Prvič pa je zakonodaja posegla tudi na področje, ki se ne nanaša samo na točno določene organizacije, ampak na vse fizične in pravne osebe, ki opravljajo dejavnost prodaje blaga, vse to seveda zato, da se finančni sistem Republike Slovenije ne bi zlorabljal*

<sup>1</sup> Urad za preprečevanje pranja denarja, Republika Slovenija. Office For Money Laundering Prevention.

*za storitev kaznivih dejanj pranja denarja in financiranja terorizma.*

**K L J U Č N E B E S E D E**

*Financiranje, terorizem, priporočila, FATF, ZPPDFT.*

**A B S T R A C T**

*With the adoption of new legislation, the tasks of the Office of the Republic of Slovenia for Money Laundering Prevention have been expanded to include measures for preventing the financing of terrorism. The principal aim of the new law is to encourage financial institutions to deal with money laundering and financing of terrorism in a more systematic way; therefore, a number of new tasks have been imposed upon these institutions, requiring that they prepare a risk analysis and make a risk assessment for individual groups or clients, business relationships, products or transactions with respect to their potential misuse for money laundering or terrorist financing, and act accordingly. The modified law no longer uses the term “identification”, which literally meant routine access to certain documents, but the term “client verification” instead. This was the first time the legislation intervened in the area, which refers not only to specific organisations but also to all natural and legal persons who are engaged in the sale of goods, with the intention of preventing abuse of the financial system of the Republic of Slovenia for criminal offences of money laundering and terrorist financing.*

**K E Y W O R D S**

*Financing, terrorism, recommendations, FATF, ZPPDFT.*

**I N T R O D U C T I O N**

After the terrorist attacks in the USA and Europe the international community adopted multiple different measures for more effective fight against terrorism,

while the majority of these measures regard the domain of financing terrorism. Slovenia, according to the recommendations of international organisations and Directives of the European Parliament and Council, has changed the national legislation in a way that it directly introduced certain EU Directives into the legal order and has simultaneously changed or is still changing legislation in the domain of sanctioning as well as prevention. Thus, from 2004 onwards the Penal Code treats financing of terrorism as a criminal offence. In 2007 the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Act was adopted which adds additional tasks in the domain of financing terrorism to the Office for Money Laundering Prevention and other organisations that have been so far carrying out tasks in the money laundering domain.

**Liabile agents according to ZPPDFT and their tasks**

The Office of the RS for Money Laundering Prevention, in the continuation the Office, is an affiliated body to the Ministry of Finance and has its tasks assigned according to the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Act (Official Gazette of the RS, no. 60/07, in the continuation ZPPDFT) relating to prevention and detecting money laundering and financing terrorism and other tasks stipulated by this Act. Thus, the Office receives, collects, analyses and provides data, information and documentation acquired pursuant to the provisions of this Act.

Besides this ZPPDFT also defines that the measures for detecting and preventing money laundering and financing terrorism are carried out before and at receiving, handing-over, changing, saving, making available and other acts regarding money or property (in the continuation of the text: transaction) in/at:

- banks, savings institutions and affiliates of foreign banks;
- saving-loaning institutions;
- organisations performing money transfer;
- the post office;
- companies managing investment funds;
- founders and managers of mutual retirement funds and retirement companies;
- insurance companies;
- companies issuing electronic money;



- foreign exchange offices;
- auditing companies and independent auditors;
- concessioners carrying out particular gaming in gaming houses i.e. saloons;
- organisers organising sporting bets;
- organisers and concessioners organising online gaming;
- pawnbroker shops;
- legal entities or physical entities performing transactions in regard to the following industries:
  - lending credits i.e. loans,
  - financial leasing,
  - issuing and managing paying instruments,
  - issuing guaranties and other commitments,
  - managing investments for third parties and consulting regarding the latter,
  - renting safes,
  - brokerage in credit and loan transactions,
  - insurance agents broking life insurances contracts,
  - insurance brokerage for life insurance contracts,
  - accounting services,
  - tax consulting services,
  - entrepreneurship and fiduciary services,
  - transactions with precious metals and precious stones and products thereof,
  - arts dealers,
  - organising and carrying out auctions,
  - real-estate transactions (in the continuation: the organisations).

Measures for detecting and preventing money laundering and financing terrorism, set-out by ZPPDFT, are also carried out at lawyers, lawyers' companies and notaries public. (In ZPPDFT the common term referring to the above mentioned organisations and lawyers, lawyers' companies and notaries public is "liable agent").

- Tasks to be carried out by the above stated organisations refer primarily to:
- review of clients entering into a business relationship with the organisation;
  - review of clients carrying out transactions amounting to more than 15.000 EUR;

- determining the actual owner of the client;
- setting-up the system for detecting foreign politically exposed entities;
- informing the Office on transactions exceeding 30.000 EUR;
- informing the Office on transactions when there are suspicious reasons regarding the transaction or the client and money laundering and financing terrorism.

According to the provisions of ZPPDFT the above mentioned measures, except for reviewing and informing on transactions above the stated sums, must be also carried out by lawyers, lawyers' companies and notaries public, when planning or carrying out transactions for their clients.

ZPPDFT also stipulates certain general limitations referring to:

- prohibition of use of anonymous products;
- prohibition of transactions including fictitious banks;
- entities carrying out sales of goods must not receive cash payments amounting to more than 15.000 EUR.

### **Submitting suspicious transactions**

Besides the already mentioned liable agents according to ZPPDFT (organisations, lawyers, lawyers' companies and notaries public), which must inform the Office with data on suspicious transactions, the Office can start an investigation when there reasons present connected to an entity or transaction and regarding to suspicion of money laundering and financing terrorism, also based on written argument-based recommendation from the following institutions (Article 60, Paragraph 1 ZPPDFT):

- Courts of Law,
- State Prosecution,
- Police,
- Slovene Intelligence and Security Agency,
- Intelligence-security services of the Ministry of Defence,
- Court of Auditors,
- Organ relevant for prevention of corruption,
- Budget Supervision Office,
- Customs Administration of the Republic of Slovenia.

The Office may start investigating transactions in the domain of money laundering and financing terrorism relating to operations of non-profit institutions, their members or affiliated entities also based on initiatives (Article 60, Paragraph 2 ZPPDFT):

- inspectorate relevant for internal issues,
- other inspectorate organs.

Furthermore, ZPPDFT stipulates also other corporate entities and organs which must inform the Office in written form when, during their operations or monitoring services, encounter facts that are or might be related to money laundering and financing terrorism, as follows:

- pursuant to Article 74 ZPPDFT:
  - (stock) exchanges,
  - Central Securities Clearing Corporation;
- pursuant to Article 89 ZPPDFT:
  - Bank of Slovenia,
  - Securities Market Agency of the Republic of Slovenia,
  - Insurance Supervision Agency,
  - Office for Gaming Supervision,
  - Tax Administration of the Republic of Slovenia,
  - Market Inspectorate of the Republic of Slovenia,
  - The Slovene Institute of Auditors,
  - BAR Association of Slovenia,
  - Notary Public Association of Slovenia.

**Tasks of the Office in suspicious transactions domain**

In the case that the Office estimates, in regard to transactions or particular entities submitted by the above mentioned liable agents, state organs or corporate entities, that there are reasons for suspicion of money laundering or financing terrorism, the Office can demand data, information and documentation from the latter and from other state organs and organisations carrying public authorities which it finds necessary for detecting money laundering and financing terrorism. Based on the so collected documentation the Office estimates whether there are well founded reasons for suspecting a criminal offence regarding the particular transactions or entities pursuant to

Article 252 of the Penal Code or financing terrorist acts pursuant to Article 388a of the PC. According to the estimation the Office can close the case in three ways:

- in the case that the Office can justify the reasons for the suspected criminal offences the Office informs the Police and/or the Prosecution in the form of the written notice on suspicious transactions;
- in the case that it is confirmed, in regard to the particular transaction or entity, that reasons for suspicion of other criminal offenses exist:
  - violating the free decision of voters pursuant to Article 162 of the PC, receiving bribe at elections pursuant to Article 168 of the PC, fraud pursuant to Article 217 of the PC, misuse of trust pursuant to Article 220 of the PC, organising money chains and prohibited gaming pursuant to Article 234b of the PC, bluffing at acquiring loans or benefits pursuant to Article 235 of the PC, bluffing with securities pursuant to Article 236 of the PC, forging or destroying business documentation pursuant to Article 240 of the PC, embezzlement of financial liabilities pursuant to Article 254 of the PC, receiving gratuities for illegal brokerage pursuant to Article 269 of the PC, giving gratuities for illegal brokerage pursuant to Article 269a of the PC and criminal association pursuant to Article 297 of the PC and other criminal offences sanctioned by the Code with five or more years of imprisonment, the Office submits a written notice to the relevant organs, and
- in the case that no reasons can be justified in regard to the above stated criminal offence the Office closes the case internally.

**Office and criminal offence of financing terrorist acts pursuant to Article 388a of the PC**

The criminal offence of financing terrorist acts is defined by the Article 388a of the PC and refers to entities that provide or collect money or property with the intent that it is partly or entirely intended for committing the following criminal offences:

- 144, kidnapping,
- 330, kidnapping an airplane or shipping vessel,
- 331, attack upon the safety of air traffic,
- 352, murdering the highest representatives of the state,
- 353, violence against the highest representatives of the state,
- 354, armed rebellion,

- 355, terrorism,
- 360, instigation on a violent change of constitutional order,
- 388, international terrorism,
- 389, endangering persons under international protection,
- 390, taking hostages
- or any other violent act.

Having the objective of bringing down the constitutional order of the Republic of Slovenia, provoking major disorders in public life or economy, causing death or severe physical trauma to the person not actively participating in a military conflict or having the intention of terrifying the population or forcing the state or an international organisation into doing or ceasing something.

All the above mentioned acts presume some violent act or a threat with violence, except for the instigation on a violent change of constitutional order, which urges on violence. Abroad there are already tendencies on an even broader incrimination of acts committed by terrorists or terrorist organisations. Primarily in the countries that have already experienced terrorist attacks there are advocacies to include all criminal offences at the international level as financing terrorist acts when committed or attempted to be committed by terrorists or terrorist organisations. In the light of the potential changes in the future the terms in ZPPDFT related to terrorism are defined particularly wider in comparison with the stipulation in the Penal Code, as follows:

financing terrorism pursuant to this Act is providing or collecting i.e. attempting to provide or collect money and other property from legal or illegal sources, directly or indirectly, with the intention or awareness that it would partially or entirely be utilised for committing a terrorist act, or that it would be utilised by a (male or female) terrorist (in the continuation terrorist) or a terrorist organisation. Terrorist act pursuant to this Act is a criminal offence, defined in Article 2 of the Act Ratifying the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (Article 2 of the Convention, Official Gazette of the RS - International Contracts, no. 21/04).

Terrorist pursuant to the Act is a person who:

- Commits or attempts to commit a terrorist act in any possible way;
- Participates in committing a terrorist act as a co-committer, instigator or helper;
- Organises the service of terrorist act or

- Contributes to the terrorist act of the group of people operating with the identical objective, if the person acts deliberately and with the intention of continuation of carrying out the terrorist act or if the person is aware of the intention of the group of people to commit a terrorist act.

Terrorist organisation pursuant to this Act is any group of terrorists that:

- Commits or attempts to commit a terrorist act in any possible manner;
- Participates in carrying out a terrorist attack;
- Organises services for terrorist acts or
- Contributes to the terrorist act of the group of people operating with the identical objective, if acting deliberately and with the intention of continuation of carrying out the terrorist act or if the organisation is aware of the intention of the group of people to commit a terrorist act.

### **International order in financing terrorism domain**

The most important international documents, which have most significantly influenced the changes in the Slovene legislation, are:

- 40 recommendations of the International Organisation FATF on money laundering;
- Resolution of the OUN number 1267 and amendments;
- 9 special recommendations on terrorist financing;
- Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (K 198), dated May 2005;
- Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing (Directive 2005/60/EC);
- Regulation (EC) No. 1889/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council on controls of cash entering or leaving the Community;
- Regulation (EC) No. 1781/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council on information on the payer accompanying transfer of funds;
- Commission Directive 2006/70/EC as regards the definition of “politically exposed person”;
- International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (UN 1999).

Changing the national legislation from the above mentioned, at least in the domain that regulates fight against financing terrorism, was primarily influenced by nine special recommendations by FATF on financing terrorism that were laid-down from 2001 to 2004. The recommendations refer to regulation of the following issues:

- Ratification and adoption of the OUN instruments,
- Incrimination of financing terrorism,
- Seizure and confiscation of assets from terrorist,
- Submission of suspicious transactions regarding terrorism,
- International cooperation,
- Alternative methods of money transfer,
- Data included in electronic transfers of money,
- Non-profit organisations,
- Messengers carrying cash.

Republic of Slovenia was harmonised with some of the stated recommendations even prior to adopting ZPPDFT, while with the adoption of the new Act we have harmonised the issue of submitting information on suspicious transaction referring to terrorism and regulation of confiscation of assets from terrorists, while the issue of data, which must accompany electronic transfers of funds, is regulated by the Regulation of the European Council 1781/2006 which is in effect in Slovenia from 5<sup>th</sup> of January, 2008..

**CONCLUSION**

The office is authorised to receive notices referring to financing terrorism only from 21<sup>st</sup> of July, 2007, therefore, up to now we have only received one notice that a particular transaction contains suspicious facts and that it could be related to financing terrorism. The mentioned notice was received from a related foreign agency and due to the fact that the surname of a Slovene citizen, who carried out the transaction abroad, matched the nick-name of the person being under limitation measures by international institutions. At the Office we determined by all means that the Slovene citizen and the person under limitation measures are not the same person and it is obvious that Slovene citizens having this, otherwise quite frequent surname, will have various inconveniences. Actually, the Office received quite a number of notices from Slovene

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financial institutions even prior to the adoption of the Act, relating to suspicions of money laundering, but in regard to the recipients or senders of transactions coming from Middle East it was obvious that the intention of the financial institution was to warn the Office about the possibility of connection between the transactions and financing terrorism. In none of these cases the Office found no reasons for suspicion that these transactions or persons could have been related to financing terrorism.





# ALI JE SLOVENIJA PRIPRAVLJENA NA »UMAZANO VOJNO« IS SLOVENIA READY FOR A "DIRTY WAR"

## POVZETEK

*Terorizem je v sedanjih političnih razmerah ena izmed največjih groženj nacionalni varnosti Republike Slovenije. Je tipičen primer sodobne asimetrične grožnje, na katero morajo biti pripravljene predvsem varnostne in obveščevalne službe. V zadnjih letih si teroristične skupine močno prizadevajo, da bi za svoje napade v sveti vojni proti »ne-verujočim« uporabile biološka ali radioaktivna sredstva, s katerimi bi njihovi napadi postali še bolj zastrašujoči. Od napada v ZDA leta 2001 je mogoče zaslediti več poskusov terorističnih skupin, da bi kupile orožje za množično uničenje, znanih pa je tudi nekaj primerov njegove uporabe.*

*Da do takšnih napadov ne pride, morajo biti obveščevalne in varnostne službe »nenehno pripravljene in na preži«. Nujno je, da si izmenjujejo vse relevantne podatke o vseh mogočih oblikah terorističnih groženj in napadov, in sicer na nacionalni in meddržavni ravni. Dobro organizirana oblika izmenjave obveščevalnih podatkov so t. i. skupni protiteroristični ali obveščevalni centri, v katerih se za lažje delo teh služb uporabljajo enotne, skupne baze podatkov. V RS moramo, tudi na podlagi pozitivnih izkušenj iz drugih držav, čim prej ustanoviti podoben center, saj je sedanja oblika boja proti terorizmu v obliki t. i. nacionalnega protiterorističnega koordinatorja že preživela.*

<sup>1</sup> Ministrstvo za obrambo Republike Slovenije. Ministry of Defence, Republic of Slovenia.

## **K L J U Č N E B E S E D E**

*Terorizem, islamski skrajneži, orožje za množično uničenje, merkurij, sarin, antraks, koordinator boja proti terorizmu, skupni protiteroristični center, baza podatkov.*

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## **INTRODUCTION**

In 2005 the English BBC television made a film titled “Dirty War”. In the film a group of fanatic Islamic extremists (the so called second generation of immigrants), living and working in London, prepares an attack against the city centre using a small radioactive bomb. The attackers purchase the radioactive material in one of the states that have emerged from the former Soviet Union, and they transport it through the Balkan route in a lorry and prepare for the attack.

In the suicide attack the two extremists activate the bomb in the very city centre. The abrupt explosion is a big surprise for everyone, both for the police as well as for the security services. The emergency teams and fire-fighters arrive and start rescuing when suddenly the radiation detectors worn of the presence of radiation.

The fire-fighters must retreat, since they do not have sufficient protective clothing and personnel who could fight the fires in the very epicentre of the suicide attack, and the emergency teams cannot even arrive at the location of the explosion since the police have to block the access to the explosion site due to the inappropriate equipment.

A frightening black cloud appears over the city and due to the winds keeps spreading away from the location of the explosion. The civil rescue teams intervene and along the police attempt to carry out a decontamination of the people that have been evacuated from the city. Due to the crowds of people and lack of appropriate equipment the decontamination cannot be carried out. All plans and measures, which have been set-up by the city authorities for such cases, prove to be completely inappropriate and unsatisfactory. The situation has become uncontrollable, panic and chaos settle in. With such an event a question arises by itself, are we prepared for something in Slovenia.

The film very realistically presents the situation that can be faced by any contemporary society, a Western country, today, even this moment. The Islamic

extremists in their “holy war” against the “non-believers” prove that nobody is safe against them, nowhere in the West, which has regretfully been already proved by terrorist attacks in Madrid, London and Istanbul.

## **TERRORISTS AND PURCHASING MEANS OF MASS DESTRUCTION**

The fact that the extremists in their “holy war”, besides bomb attacks, suicide attacks, kidnappings and other violent act, also attempt to use weapons of mass destruction gives reason for concern. Thus, e.g. in the 1997-2005 period a 300% increase in smuggling materials for mass destruction was recorded (Prett, Garmish; 2007). It is most concerning that international terrorist groups are well supported by countries having their own nuclear programme and themselves posses weapons of mass destruction.

International community and primarily intelligence services are well aware of endeavours of Al Qaida and Hezbollah to purchase the so-called “red mercury” in the market. Nevertheless, the red mercury as such does not exist, only mercury exists, a highly radioactive substance which is found in liquid state. Attempts of the Al Qaida to come in possession of the “red mercury” were blocked in Georgia in 2003 by the security forces who arrested a group of Islamic extremists in the very time the latter were attempting to purchase such material.

## **ATTEMPTS AND USE OF MEANS OF MASS DESTRUCTION**

One example from Iraq from 2003 is a testament that it did not stop merely with the attempt to purchase materials for designing a dirty bomb, when Al Qaida attempted to carry out the first such biological attack. The attempt included an attack with Sarin against US soldiers, luckily, the planners of the attack did not correctly use all the components of the nerve poison.

In Germany in 2005 a case was investigated when attacker(s) (still unknown) attempted to poison a water reserve with pesticides. If the latter had entered the water-system, 50 to 80.000 people could have been poisoned. Security and intelligence services reacted immediately on the event and the public was not informed. Only later the public was informed.

Supposedly, this attempt of poisoning was not an attempt of attack from some of the terrorist groups but from the so-called “domestic terrorists”, supposedly locals unsatisfied with the decisions of the local governance. Since

then onwards such and alike water reserves are fitted with special sensors monitoring and alarming if a change in composition or quality of water is detected.

Prior to the eruption of the Second Israeli-Lebanon War the terrorist group Hezbollah had artillery shells in its warehouses fitted with rat poison (rodenticide). In the case of an attack against Israel with such shells an extraordinary large territory would have been contaminated which would have been almost impossible to decontaminate. In humans poisoning with rat poison is supposed to cause extensive bleeding of internal organs which is, according to experts, very difficult to treat. Therefore, immediately after the eruption of hostilities with Lebanon the Israeli armed forces destroyed all pre-prepared artillery positions and simultaneously all long-range rocket sites by air strikes against the southern Lebanon.

In the case of anthrax attacks in the USA after 9/11 it was a classical example of an attack with biological weapons - biological terrorism (Probst, Garmish; 2007). After the appearance of anthrax experts were surprised by its high concentration. The discovered quantities of anthrax in letters in the USA would have e.g. been sufficient to have killed even up-to 250 million people. Who was the actual sender and where did anthrax come from is still not completely clear today, at least not in the public.

If we depart from the movie, which, in a way, very realistically depicts the situation that could take place in any larger city in the West, we ask ourselves: "Are we here, in Slovenia, prepared for such an event, an attack with a "dirty bomb"?" Do we have sufficient fire-fighters, rescue teams that could intervene in the case of such an event? Would anybody here even detect that an explosion of a bomb also includes the presence of radioactive radiation? Are our professional fire-fighting brigades during their daily tasks - interventions - even equipped with radiological detectors and suits for operations under RCB (radiological-chemical-biological) danger? Are urgent medical teams in Ljubljana capable of treating 300 people and do we even possess capacities to hospitalise that number of wounded or dead? How many un-notified drills have we held in the last five years, at the national level, where plans of attacks with RCB weapons used to be exercised?

All these questions arise when we attempt to reflect the film scenario to our environment here, the R. of Slovenia. We are severely sceptical and afraid that we would suffer many casualties in the case of such an attack. Most probably

due to our unpreparedness for such an event. We estimate that our key state documents include all key elements for fighting terrorism, but how would the entire system react in the case of an attack is not completely clear and has not been tested, not by a single drill. We are afraid that we have numerous documents, numerous own solutions, out of which none has been useful in practice.

**STRATEGY FOR FIGHTING TERRORISM IN R. OF SLOVENIA**

In Slovenia the key document for fighting terrorism is the Strategy of National Security. The Government of the RS is the key supreme above-ministry level organ responsible for anti-terroristic operations (Prezelj, 2007:75). This coordination of anti-terroristic operations in the R. of Slovenia is carried out (or is supposed to be carried out) through the National Security Council (SNAV) i.e. within the Secretary of the National Security Council (SSNAV), which is the operative organ of the Council. We have written down “supposed to be” since, to our knowledge, there is little of this coordination in practise. We are not aware of the reasons for this fact. There are two explanations. Is there a silent struggle for primacy between our security and intelligence agencies, which one is more important and which one will have primacy over the key information, or the concept of one entity, supposed to coordinate the national fight against terrorism, has been outdated and should be replaced?

At least up to now, in the RS, according to my experience, in the domain of coordination of the fight against terrorism, we have not witnessed larger successes i.e. the results of this coordination. Mutual distrust should be overcome and cooperation and exchange of information in real time should commence. And not information being one or even six months old.

It is our opinion that positive experience from abroad should be taken into account in the domain of exchange and cooperation for fighting terrorism.

Abroad there are the so-called anti-terrorist centres set-up where all relevant security and intelligence agencies and various other agencies and services are present that can improve this fight.

Therefore, we propose that such a joint national centre for fighting terrorism is established as soon as possible based on positive experience from abroad.

This centre, with its directing and management being linked to the president of the Government of the RS, would embrace knowledge, data and capacities from all security and intelligence services in Slovenia, RCB Battalion of the

Slovene Army, Administration of the Republic of Slovenia for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief, Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration, Jožef Štefan Institute and other agencies and services that would, if a need arises, offer their expert knowledge and capacities. The fundamental task of this centre would be exchange of operational information, composition of reports on terrorist threats in Slovenia and coordination and directing of efforts of various agencies and services in the case of an actual terrorist attack in Slovenia. This centre could also, in our opinion, completely overtake the tasks that are at the moment, based on the decision by the Government, being carried out by the Inter-ministry working group for supreme national threats.

**ANTI-TERRORIST CENTRES ARROUGH THROUGHOUT THE WORLD**

Soon after the attack in the USA certain countries acknowledged the importance of such operational centres which coordinate a whole spectrum of fight against terrorism. It is necessary that these centres also exchange their data with similar centres from other countries. This exchange itself prevented an attack of enormous proportions in 2007 when terrorists planned to explode at least 10 passenger airplanes over the Atlantic.

In Germany, soon after the attack on the Twin-towers, officials were made aware of the need for a joint cooperation of all security and intelligence services in the country. A joint anti-terrorist centre was established, having its seat in Berlin at the moment, which combines its work and data from approximately 40 various services and agencies. Each service has its own representative in this centre, where reports are drawn-up on a daily basis containing all major events that have taken place in the prior 24 hours on the German territory or related to Germany anywhere in the world. Similar centres are common in most western countries. In Kenya, the joint anti-terrorist centre (NCTC) was established immediately after the attack on the US embassy. It was established within the Ministry of Defence. It is led by a brigadier who is responsible for his work directly to the office of the prime minister.

Some time ago it was noticeable form mass media (newspaper Dnevnik) that the establishment of such a similar centre was announced in the Czech Republic.

In Great Britain a similar centre was established in 2002. The joint intelligence centre (JIC) combines forces and capacities of MI5, MI6, the governmental communicational centre (GCHQ), the special forces (SAS), anti-terrorist

forces (SO13) and other governmental agencies. This centre collects all key information on all terrorist threats in England, which have been numerous from 2002 onwards. One must not forget that the terrorist attack in the London city centre was the largest attack against the territory of Great Britain after the Second World War.

### **USE OF JOINT DATABASES IN ANTI-TERRORIST CENTRES**

Merely by establishing such an anti-terrorist centre the work of intelligence services does not stop here. Necessary working tools are quality databases. Thus, in Germany the so-called basic database on terrorists was established, a database on entrances into the country by all dangerous persons being connected to terrorists and a database on all security relevant persons. The most interesting is the database on terrorists which contains, according to the data from 2007, approximately 3000 people, not all of them having residence in Germany.

For its work the English JIC relies on various databases. One of these is the national DNA database which has been operational in England since 1995 onwards (Parker, Ohrid; 2008). This DNA database contains data on approximately 3 million Englishmen i.e. this database comprises as many as 5,24% of all population on the island. Pursuant to legislation the police in England from 2001 have the right to collect DNA from each person that is detained regardless of the reason. Experts point out that without this database the successful solution of the terrorist attack against the London city centre could not have been imagined. On the other hand, practical results of this DNA database can be seen in the fact that the police have resolved 88 murders and 45 attempted murders from 1995 to 2005 using this database.

### **CONCLUSIVE THOUGHTS**

In Slovenia, therefore, it is of key importance to be aware of the complexity of fighting terrorism and to activate all relevant institutions for the cause. It is necessary that we strengthen mutual cooperation between the relevant security services as soon as possible and ensure exchange of their operational information. In order for this exchange to be as effective as possible a joint i.e. mutual anti-terrorist centre is to be established at the level of the Republic of Slovenia as soon as possible. This centre would produce joint estimations



of endangerment of the RS and direct activities in the case that a terrorist attack actually takes place. In the R. of Slovenia it is also necessary that drills are organised as soon as possible that would play through different scenarios of terrorist attacks, including those with the most “black scenario” - use of the so-called “dirty bomb”. These drills should not be preannounced, should take place in various time points and at various locations, in order to truly test all services and agencies which would be the first to be called upon to rescue people and property in such cases. Let us remember when was the last time we have participated in an evacuation drill in the case of fire.

At this moment, as stressed by the expert on terrorism, Peter Probst (Probst, Garmish; 2007), the greatest threat comes from the possibility that terrorist make use of improvised means of mass destruction. And this will take place sooner or later. And Slovenia must not rely on the fact that this cannot take place here. The National Plan of Safety and Rescue was passed in 2004, it is necessary that it is reviewed and updated. Such a plan should be reviewed and updated each year. We estimate that, in the Republic of Slovenia, we are regretfully unprepared and disorganised to react to the situation presented in the film “Dirty War” and can only hope that something like that does not take place here.

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NADOMEŠČANJE  
INFORMACIJSKIH  
PRIMANJKLJAJEV S  
KOMPLEMENTARNO RABO  
PROFILIRANJA IN POLIGRAFSKE  
METODE  
COMPENSATING INFORMATION  
GAPS THROUGH  
COMPLEMENTARY USE OF  
PROFILING AND POLYGRAPH  
METHODS

**POVZETEK**

*Prispevek opozarja na globalne razsežnosti terorizma in nezmožnost tipologizacije pripadnikov terorističnih skupin ter predstavlja občutek pripadnosti skupini in skupinsko identiteto (kot nadomestilo osebni/zasebni) kot ključna razlikovalna dejavnika ter vzgiba. Vzbujanje strahu opredeljuje kot nadnacionalni pojav in mogočo resno grožnjo javnemu zdravju neke skupnosti (države), kar utemelji z razlago mehanizma t. i. »medosebne« travmatične izkušnje.*

*Kriminalistika pojmuje terorizem kot obliko organiziranega kriminala. Pri preiskovanju kaznivih dejanj sta uporabni metodi*

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*profiliranja in psihofiziološkega preiskovanja verodostojnosti izjav s poligrafom. Drugo metodo je po nekaterih virih prav tako mogoče uvrstiti med metode profiliranja. V preiskovanju kaznivih dejanj z elementi nasilja se metodi dopolnjujeta in ju je smiselno povezovati ravno zaradi prekrivanja faz oziroma etap v izdelavi profila in pri poligrafski preiskavi (oboje kliničnega tipa oziroma usmeritve). Potrebne so skoraj identične vhodne informacije in zelo podobna priprava (ogled kraja kaznivega dejanja, temeljito poznavanje žrtve oziroma žrtev ipd.). Poligrafska metoda je v kombinaciji s profiliranjem uporabna za izločanje nevpletenih ali določanje zelo verjetno vpletenih v obravnavano (kaznivo) dejanje in za evalvacijo izdelanega profila. Poleg tega neoporečna uporaba poligrafske metode omogoča dodaten vir informacij in s tem modifikacijo profila neznanega storilca kaznivega dejanja z elementi nasilja. Zato bi bilo lahko povezovanje psihofiziološkega preiskovanja verodostojnosti izjav s poligrafom in (kriminalističnega) profiliranja pomembna naloga preiskovalne podpore tudi pri preiskovanju in preprečevanju terorističnih dejanj.*

**K L J U Č N E B E S E D E**

*Terorizem, nasilje, forenzična psihologija, profiliranje, poligrafska metoda, poligrafska preiskava, kazniva dejanja z elementi nasilja, strah, travma, posttravmatska stresna motnja.*

**A B S T R A C T**

*The article focuses initially on the global dimension of terrorism and the inability to establish typology of terrorist group members, and presents the feeling of affiliation (to a group) and the group identity (as a substitute for personal/private identity) as key distinguishing factors and motives. Creating fear is defined as a transnational phenomena and a potentially serious threat to public health of a certain community (the state), which is substantiated with the "interpersonal" traumatic experience mechanism. Criminal investigation considers terrorism as a form of organized crime. The two methods used in the investigation of criminal*

*Polona Selič in Andrej Juratovec*

*offences are the method of profiling and psycho-physiological veracity examination using polygraph. In investigating violent criminal offences, the methods complement each other. It is, therefore, reasonable to link them because of the overlapping of phases/stages in the profile production and at conducting a polygraph examination (both of clinical type or orientation). Needed for the investigation are almost identical input information and a very similar preparation (inspection of the crime scene, detailed identification of victim(s) and similar). In combination with profiling, the polygraph method is used as a method of eliminating the uninvolved persons or defining those who are most likely involved in the investigated (criminal) offence and as a method of the created profile evaluation. Sound use of the polygraph method also enables an additional source of information and thus a modification of the existent profile of the unknown perpetrator of a criminal offence involving violence. Therefore a meaningful integration of the psycho-physiological veracity examination using polygraph and the (criminal) profiling would also be an important challenge for investigation support in investigating and preventing terrorist acts.*

**KEY WORDS**

*Terrorism, violence, forensic psychology, profiling, polygraph method, polygraph examination, criminal offence involving violence, fear, trauma, post-traumatic stress disorder.*

**ISSUES**

**Global dimensions of terrorism**

Terrorism is a complex social phenomenon, generated by structural social and international factors and described as a deliberate causing and exploitation of fear (which is a consequence of violence) or threat with continuous violence with the aim to achieve a political goal (Whittaker, 2001). A terrorist act is always of political nature although it can also be motivated by religious or other ideological goals; religious and ideological goals are the ones which distinguish terrorism from other criminal acts. Terrorist violence is instrumental. The

chosen goals are different, violence is oriented towards innocent people, this creates a greater political pressure, it raises fear among the civil people and undermines the trust into government. The fear of the victim of terrorist attacks is not in the first plan; the most important is the feeling of fear of those who identify themselves with the victim. Since they are well presented in different media, violent acts are echoed and bear a message. In this way violence acts as propaganda and this has an influence on a choice of a target (symbolic meaning). Dynamic of events in a terrorist group is one of key psycho-social factors of terrorism. For some terrorists the feeling of affiliation to a group can be more important than political goals of the organization, which can be nationalistic, religious, left-wing, right-wing, anarchistic (Woolf, 2006). Some authors also use the term national terrorism.

Undoubtedly we percept terrorism in totally new dimensions after 11 September 2001, however most efforts are oriented towards a preventive disclosure of potential perpetrators and towards a curative prevention of consequences and not towards eliminating causes, including religious separatisms and fundamentalism, a gap between western and eastern civilizations, territorial threats, poverty diseases, oil, weapon etc. (Pavliha and Simoniti, 2006). Materialistic and atheist systems of values of more or less democratic societies are confronted with dissimilar systems of norms of different religious and cultural backgrounds without actually trying to achieve mutual understanding and respect. Terrorism as a global phenomenon creates an empty space for new comprehension of the world and it tries to substitute old contents with the new ones, which is shown in different forms of terrorizing and attempts of ideological, quasi-religious fanaticism and messianism to fulfill the space left empty by intimidation. Such conceptualism is related not only to international and national terrorism, but also includes understanding of war - its goal is nothing else but to conquer will and action of the defeated party by outmost means of violence. The only difference is that both tasks of terrorism are directly joined and interlaced (Bučar, 2006). Increasing number of terrorist organizations is a consequence of political situations and also of technology advancement. Ideological terrorism gives way before ethnically and religiously motivated forms which reach ludism. Messages on antiglobalism are formed as breaking in computer systems, creating computer viruses, in attempts to block financial transactions and bank systems (Belič, 2001), destruction of databases and constant facing with the police and testing its legal power and physical condition (Anžič, 2001).

**Psychodynamic dimensions of affiliation to a (terrorist) group**

A personality type, characterized as a terrorist, cannot be traced in professional literature. Terrorists do not deviate from the “norms” of social and cultural environment that they belong to. For the most part those are young men who are enthusiastically prepared to risk; women mostly appear in European left-wing groups. Most terrorists do not have mental disorders, their motif for terrorist acts is mostly revenge (Purg, 1997; Ganor, 2000), strong affiliation to the idea and faith that they will be remembered as martyrs who fulfilled gods’ will through a terrorist act. Muslim fundamentalists promise eternal life in paradise to their warriors. A family of a dead terrorist deserves all honors, respect, glory and financial support (Ganor, 2000). Terrorists need action, are aggressive people who need stimuli and seek excitement (Whittaker, 2001). Terrorist groups can be found in Japan, Philippines, India and South America. Most of them are more like resistance movements, although they also use actions, typical for terrorists. Affiliation to a group allows to an individual to substitute his/her individual identity with a group identity and this according to Lifton (1989) results in a control of social environment and communication, creating mystification of an organization, demands for purity, sacredness of confessions and “truth”, standard patterns of speech, belief in almightiness of the doctrine and capability to miss and substitute an individual.

**Fear and feeling of losing control - terrorism and public (mental) health**

The fourth objective of the European Community strategy called Fight against terrorism is to respond to events/acts, to plan management and reduction of terrorist attacks consequences, strengthen potentials for facing the consequences, coordinate response and adequately recognize the needs of victims (<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs>).

Different forms of terrorism have become a substantial part of human experience in war and non-war areas and cannot be held back by national borders. Experience of fear coming from terrorism becomes universal and a possible objective experience of terrorist attack is unpredictable. Exactly the impression, that there is no personal control over the experience of terrorist attacks, is particularly psychologically stressful for people, whereas the objective experience triggers an intensive and temporary, with some individuals also chronic psychosocial dysfunction (post-traumatic stress

disorder or PTSD). On the other hand this stress increases an overall level of anxiety and aggravates bio-psycho-social status of people ('s health) who are vulnerable in the field of mental health. To manage these experiences and to recover from them it is necessary to engage individual as well as interpersonal and institutional resources of help; unsuitable ways of attempts to manage traumatic experience (for example increased use of psychoactive substances, augmented collision in interpersonal relations with increased likelihood of auto and hetero aggressive reactions, other forms of risked life style, impulsive non auto protective behavior in social interactions) deteriorate the individuals' s psychosocial status and often make his/her psychosocial dysfunction chronic. Trauma is an unpleasant emotional experience with long-term effects on mentality. The feeling of losing control and awareness of unpredictability of events, which are of vital importance for an individual, are especially important in extreme stress (traumatic) experience (Ai, Cascio, Santangelo and Evans-Campbell, 2005). Experiencing a so-called post-traumatic stress syndrome (also PTSD - psychological and behavioral changes appear after a person has been exposed to different traumatic experiences) has a strong basis in a changed brain neurobiology. It is realistic to expect that traumatic experiences demand sacrifice on psycho-social and also on biological level (Brewin, Dalgleish and Joseph, 1996). Traumatic experience can also be caused by natural disasters - such form of traumatic experience is called an "impersonal" one, because it was not caused by a man. Linked to terrorism are also "interpersonal" traumas, including traumatic experience caused by known or unknown people - physical attacks, rape, various forms of political violence, discrimination of terrorism and war (Bleich, Gelkopf, Melamed and Solomon, 2005). Memory for traumatic events is not lost as in the case of ordinary learning. The hormones norepinefrin and adrenalin, triggered in traumatic situations, strengthen the long-term memory. Once the brain becomes sensitive for such learning, even parts of potential threat can activate the whole alarming somatic system. A potential threat for public (mental) health comes from the consequences of traumatisation. A common consequence of traumatic events is an unfavorable combination of passivity and excessive impulsiveness. It is an attempt to balance reduced response to daily stimuli and excessive response to certain stimuli and this can cause distinctive dysfunctionality. These experiences increase strongly the frequency of psychiatric disturbances. The signs of excessive excitement are anxiety and irritability, outbursts of anger,

concentration problems, excessive vigilance, sleep disturbances, excessive responses of fear (Polatin, Young, Mayer and Gatchel, 2005). Different factors in persons themselves, their immediate surroundings and wider system can soften the post-traumatic stress experiences or can aggravate them. (Harvey, 1996). In addition to personal potentials, past experiences and current (non) supportive relations, the experts conclude that for the PTSD management the fact to what amount the victim had a possibility to actively manage the situation, during traumatic event took place, is also important (Miller, 2004). The presented facts confirm the hypothesis that terrorism (as a form of group violence) is a serious threat for public health.

**The concept of investigation and terrorism prevention**

Crime science defines terrorism as a type of organized crime (Aleksić, 1987:123; Čuček, 1999). This is a planned, politically motivated violent act, oriented towards civil targets and places, where people are gathered (theatres, bus stops, underground stops, food markets, shopping centers etc. (Dvoršek, 2003:333). Forms in which terrorism appear, are diverse; most common are murders, kidnapping, keeping hostages, fires, explosions, armed attacks, attacks on the safety of special means of public transport, hijacking planes and ships, sabotage, diversions, premeditated threats to people or environment with hazardous substances, blackmailing, threats and misleading people by provoking mass riots, classical criminal offences, committed in crime organizations with the aim to disturb people, assassination attempts, nuclear attacks (Kečanović, 1995:63).

Terrorist acts are defined (also in international conventions) as a criminal offence, therefore police tries to limit them by official duty and according to police procedures. Building European operative police cooperation is especially important in this way. The fight against terrorism demands a complex approach with taking in consideration historical, political, social, psychological and criminal law elements, cooperation of intelligence services and special units for fight against terrorism, Interpol and Europol. Integrity of efforts is shown as political persuasion and diplomatic pressures, economic measures, direct armed attacks, secret operations (economic, political and war operations) and police measures and measures taken by courts, including investigation, prosecution, detention and conviction of terrorists. (Malvesti, 2001).



Terrorist groups usually do not form patterns of operation that could be recognized and could therefore allow immediate preparation for antiterrorist strategies (Purg, 1997: 67). International terrorism as a form of organized crime includes trained persons with different professional knowledge, acquires enormous financial means, and uses tools for execution of terrorist acts and hiding identification. Strong logistic support can become a weak point of terrorist organizations and this fact is considered by many antiterrorist strategies. Each functional strategic thinking should include also weak points of law enforcement authorities of these criminal offences (human, material and other sources). Preventive and repressive criminal strategies cannot be separated profoundly, because inspection of people, groups, control of traffic in illegal drugs and devices and control of suspected financial flows can serve for preventive and also to repressive purposes (Dvoršek and Maver, 2001). The Council of the European Union has adopted an EU strategy on fight against terrorism on a global level and at the same time it stands for the respect of human rights. One of the strategy objectives is to prosecute perpetrators of such criminal acts (terrorists), to prevent planning and journeys, to disturb communication, detect and destroy supporting networks, financing and access to materials for (terrorist) attacks.

**PROFILING OF UNKNOWN PERPETRATORS OF VIOLENT CRIMINAL OFFENCES AND POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION USED FOR COMPENSATING SHORTAGE OF INFORMATION**

Investigating violent criminal offences, the group where terrorist acts are classified in, is many times faced with the need to bridge shortage of information. This can be to an extent neutralized with the use of profiling of unknown perpetrators of criminal offences and with polygraph examination (polygraph method).

Psychological research of individual personal characteristics and structural elements (character, emotions, temperament, potentials to adapt, personal maturity etc.), which was conducted by the means of psycho-diagnostic tools of adequate measurement features, has confirmed that in general perpetrators of criminal offences do not differ from control groups, composed of “ordinary” citizens (Selič, 2002 (a)). Therefore we cannot talk about a “criminal personality type” or a “modal criminal personality”, because we must consider psychological factors as exclusively endogenous components,

as potentials, which are activated in certain conditions of socialization or in specific triggering situations. Only a certain person with its whole, special and unique life story, colored with its own unique and never repeating combination of motivation force, aspiration, points of view, capabilities and other personal features can commit a certain criminal offence in a certain manner (for example causing general threat, murders etc.) Some perpetrators of terrorist acts show more features of the operating terrorist organizations they belong to than individual special characteristics and profiling as a method has to take this into account.

Many scientific disciplines and not few experts strive to explain the violence and try hard to predict dimensions and dynamics of this interpersonal phenomenon. Unlike the experts, the investigators of severe criminal offences, including murder, rape, also terrorist acts are more eager to search for concrete perpetrators than to detect socio-dynamic latent roots. Detecting a concrete perpetrator or a group can be accelerated by the help of the findings coming from etiologically oriented research, in so far as they relate to concrete situations in their considerations and explanations and they complete concrete findings with the conclusions of profound analytical activities. Investigation of violent crimes is more or less a complicated and relatively demanding cognitive process which starts with a perception of a criminal offence and continues with collection, protection and verification of personal and material evidences (Selič, 2002 (a)). We describe it as a process of recognizing the truth (a gnoseological aspect) and as a formally arranged phase of collecting and finding the facts and these facts are either accepted by the court, confirmed and the court takes them into account or rejects them as unimportant (a legal issue).

From all the methods which are originally and/or in substance related to psychology and are in use in the field of criminal investigation in the broadest sense, the forensic psychophysiology is undoubtedly on the first place. There are several reasons for that - research activity is diversified and the use and applicability of the polygraph method is greater. Applicability depends on development, verification and introduction of new testing formats which follow the needs of users not only in the field of criminal investigation but also in the field of protecting constitutional regulation, in public sphere and economy. Profiling is not a psychological but a criminal investigation method, although psychological knowledge and conclusions are very often of main importance as profiling is regarded. It is based on an elaborate analysis of happening on

the site, investigation of life and habits of the victim, manner of perpetrators' activity, his personal seal and conclusions of forensic experts (Vorpagel, 1998). Crime investigators are more or less successful in dealing with the shortage of information and this phenomenon is more or less always present when trying to investigate the criminal offences. The method of composing versions should lead the investigators from possible to certain. In reconstruction, verification and confirmation of versions we can use profiling and polygraph method.

**Profiling**

A term profiling or criminal profiling was established in the previous century during expert discussions (Turvey, 1999; Douglas in Olshaker, 1996, 1999) and it still denotes an intuitive process and making conclusions by investigators (Turco, 1990). Douglas and Burgess (1986) equalized the process with the process of psychiatric diagnostics. Turco (1990) emphasized psychodynamic and analytical grounds for creating a profile of an unknown murderer; however forming databases at least seemingly switched the attention from psychodynamic and/or behavioral logic of creating a profile and understanding dynamics of certain criminal acts to the search for “typologically appropriate” perpetrators of these offences. A possibility for such conclusions seems much more reliable and safe, because it is possible to make conclusions with a high level of certainty on the basis of defined variables of more than hundred perpetrators of the same criminal offence, however this also brings some limitations and it does not abolish the idiosyncrasy of clinical approach. The experience in the USA has shown (Turvey, 1999; James, 1991) that profiling is not useful only to detect sexually motivated serial killers but it can also serve as a tool to define personal characteristics of an unknown perpetrator of a criminal offence involving violence. Profile quality and use is limited/defined by the inspection quality of the crime scene and by identified features/particularities with the help of which we can reconstruct the perpetrator's action on the place where the criminal act took place.

**SLOVENIAN EXPERIENCE/A MODEL**

Slovenian profiling practice (Selič, 1997) was based on the case study (see Annex), because it does not have databases and “homogenous” examples of

criminal offence treatment. The concept is the same as a “deductive” model, which was introduced by Turvey (1999). In individual cases the forensic psycho(physio)logist as a member of the investigation team helped to create a development of the investigation with creating the unknown perpetrator’s profile and his possible modifications along with new known facts and participated in all the phases, including perception of criminal offence and criminal complaint. (Selič and Juratovec, 2004). The studies have shown (Horvath and Meesig, 1996) that one of possible mistakes of crime investigators is that they mistakenly interpret discovered traces and the situation at the end of the crime and they overlook a certain type of (potential) material evidences, if they do not have enough time or knowledge and/or motivation for detection. This is an important argument why include a profiler immediately after criminal act is perceived. He/she has to lean his work in the first phase on the traces and exhaust situation analysis and only after that he/she can concentrate on the psychological aspects of the act.

**POLYGRAPHY**

Forensic psychophysiology is concerned with the use of psychophysical methods in detecting deception in the criminal law framework. In 1990 Yankee (1990) stressed that an adequately trained polygraphist is not just a technician or routine operator for a polygraph instrument, because the polygraph examination is one most demanding and most complex psychophysical examinations in general. He classified psychophysiology as a science which examines physiological responses to psychological stimuli without expecting any specific emotions that could be recognized on the basis of physiological parameters. This is a composed investigation, a process which starts with a pre-test interview (with a client) and continues with the polygraph tests administration, chart analysis and another interview and it ends with interpretation of charts and establishment of the opinion or evaluation. The evaluation is based on the analysis of the whole procedure, verbal and non-verbal behavior of the client and of course on the results of the testing itself - polygraph charts.

Forensic psychophysiological (polygraph examiner) should disclose truth, true facts and not only misleading facts (Matte, 1996:4). One of most important conditions for a higher level of work quality of polygraph examiners is introduction of new testing formats. We should also seriously consider

completing the clinical and numerical approach. More than a likely change of direction (from clinical/global to numerical) the use of verified and comparable testing formats is important. Any modifications or mixing originally excluding questions or formats and/or concepts can cause huge problems and makes interpretation more difficult, which was found out by Horvath (1991) when he verified the validity of Backster's control questions in Reid's CQT format. The most important test formats also base on consistent theoretical concepts and explanations, which were verified many times. Numerical evaluation of reactions also does not come from subjective impressions of the evaluator but it follows clear and defined measures and rules (for example Backster's laws (Backster, 1994)). Members of different polygraph schools in the world (Thompson, 1998:2) have been of unique opinion for a long time that within the prescribed test structure the correct formulation of questions is of key importance for the result of polygraph testing/psychophysiological veracity examination. The significance of question formulation was also clearly demonstrated when introducing computer polygraphs and algorithms, used for evaluation of polygraph charts. Among most verified and used testing formats are Zone Comparison Test (ZCT) and Modified General Question Test (MGQT) but all this is of course true for the USA and English language (Selič, 2002 (b)). A quality test is a necessary but not also a sufficient condition for a reliable and technically founded result of a polygraph examination. The result mostly depends on the level of expert knowledge of a polygraph examiner. However it has to be noted that a simple translation of any other verified testing format without knowledge and considering original concepts and theoretical grounds can lead to erroneous evaluations.

**SLOVENIAN EXPERIENCE**

The Slovenian practice of psychophysiological veracity examination using polygraph was in the past successful mainly due to the use of Peak of Tension Tests (POT). The test requires, that questions for a person, who is not involved, are such that each questions is equally (un)important and/or (un)threatening for her/him (Selič, 2002 (b)). Some authors (for example Lykken and Nakayama) called such a test the Concealed Information Test (CIT). It is a series of questions among which one is relevant (it relates to a true information on criminal offence), and other questions are neutral, but

likely for an uninvolved person equally. The Japanese practice of forensic psychophysiology is based above all on the use of CIT tests. It is usually about a series of up to ten concealed information tests and each set consists of five questions, the position of the relevant question changes between the second, third and fourth place in the sequence. The Japanese do not like to use the control question tests, because these tests include only one aspect of the criminal offence (usually this is a direct question about the involvement), whereas the series of CIT tests highlights the criminal act from different angles and includes particularities which are known only to a perpetrator. In this regard a special consideration is always paid to a possibility and likelihood that the perpetrator has noticed these “particularities” and remembered them. For possible recidivists and/or series of criminal offences the tests are composed exclusively for the last crime which should be most fresh in the memory and accessible for recall.

North American and Israeli forensic psychophysiology uses the term “guilty knowledge (on the criminal offence)” rather than “concealed information”. Guilty Knowledge Tests (GKT) have an important precedence over Control Question Tests in the field of psychophysiological diagnostics (Selič, 2002 (b)). Critical (relevant) information is related to a criminal offence and if it is not compromised (in media or during the investigation process), the format protects the uninvolved person, because the questions are balanced, equally possible and logical. The test construction is standardized, evaluation of psychophysiological responses is quantified and therefore the discussion before the court about the evidence value of the GKT results is totally in place. GKT is based on intact psychophysiological theoretical issues and numerous investigative confirmations.

A relatively rare use of GKT in crime offence investigations in the USA is due to compromising the relevant data in the media. An uninvolved person, who read about the crime in the newspaper, could be actually evaluated as “false positive” after the use of a series GKT. Therefore Israeli authors suggest a solution on two levels - first level is less GKT tests (less relevant, only the perpetrator known facts) and at the same time more repetitions enable an efficient psychophysiological diagnostics, and second level - a different manner of police work which reduces the possibility of critical information compromising. The first recommendation concerns the process of testing implementation itself and the second exceeds the power and possibilities of

polygraph examiners' decision making - not only in Israel or the USA but also elsewhere in the world.

CIT and GKT are in concept peak-of-tension tests, the difference is just in the name and not in the construction and operation manner. In Slovenia Peak-of-tension tests are usually called an "indirect method". Already when the crime investigators inform the polygraph examiner and allow him the polygraph inspection of the crime site prior to dynamic phase of criminal scene investigation, they create necessary conditions for a later use of the peak-of-tension tests. If they take advice on which critical information is important for later polygraph examination disclosing information to the public, then the possibility of the peak-of-tension tests is even greater.

**COMBINING PROFILING AND POLYGRAPH METHOD - A MODEL BY SELIČ AND JURATOVEC (2004)**

The construction process of the perpetrator's profile for a certain criminal offence is in the sense of idiographic treatment very similar to the construction process in clinical and psychological practice in the process of psycho diagnostics and planning clinic-psychological treatment (Selič, 1996). It is necessary to properly evaluate collected data, reconstruct dynamics, which lead to the tortuous situation and then to set the hypothesis. This is followed by profile construction, verification of its suitability and collection of feedback information. This is a typical problem situation and the basic premises of the described creative synthesis process are in the idea that intrapsychic structure (way of thinking, sentiments etc.) directs human action. This is the grounds for the whole profile construction - from the analysis of collected information (including legally relevant facts) and classifying them, reconstruction of the event to the profile establishment. The postulate on psycho-logical link between the personal characteristics (structure) and behavioral manifestations is only true if we understand and explain the behavior as a result of interaction between a personality and situational circumstances. Many times life situations which could have a huge impact on person's behavior are already a result of this person's activity, therefore it is logical to define interaction between a situation (which for example led to a criminal offence) and personal characteristics of an individual (perpetrator) by psychic phenomena as wishes, expectations, motives and interests, which all have an impact on creation and choosing situations of certain kind.

**Information needed to replace other information gaps**

A necessary basis for the profiling and/or polygraph examination is a criminal offence site inspection which was performed with quality and adequate amount of collected information. The use of both supportive investigation methods starts with the inspection and continues in successive phases. Collecting information has to be extensive. For creating a profile of an unknown perpetrator of criminal offence involving violence we need several groups of data or materials (Selič, 1996), for example photographs and/or video tapes of the criminal site, information about the neighborhood (placing the criminal offence site in socio-cultural and ethical framework), integral and exhaustive report on inspection and notes on all collected reports (it is important to immediately evident documented conversations, because later recordings are imperfect due to forgetting details, reorganizing and classifying information, not seldom selection and evaluation). All above is important also in polygraph examination. Information on possible real suspects is counterproductive in profiling and in preparatory phase of the polygraph examination, because they can unconsciously affect the attention and brain production (Selič and Juratovec, 2004).

Psycho physiological veracity examination using polygraph is according to some sources possible to classify as a profiling method. (Turvey, 1999:257). Geberth (1993:474) believes that on time inclusion of technically competent polygraph examiner and the use of polygraph method can lead the investigation to the right way and profiling shows the characteristics of a true perpetrator (Geberth, 1993:492). In investigation of criminal offences involving violence, the methods complement each other, in both cases it is (also) about evaluation of behavioral and personal characteristics (of perpetrator and victim) and use of these evaluations in the context of criminological and criminalist knowledge. Therefore it would be reasonable to combine them in investigation and in prevention of criminal acts, because overlapping of phases/steps in establishing a profile and polygraph examination occurs (both clinic type and direction). The latter has to lean on the use of tests for recognizing circumstances (CIT or GKT); because it does not have other faultlessly adapted and edited testing formats. The preparation of the series of (criminal act) circumstance tests (Concealed Information Test) overlaps establishing a profile of an unknown perpetrator and in the test all defined circumstances have to be considered. Forensic psychophysiology is in combination with profiling useful as a method



of eliminating uninvolved (from the circle of suspects) or a method of defining very likely involved persons in the criminal act. It can also serve as a way of evaluation of the established profile. In the ideal case that would mean that on the basis of established profile of the unknown perpetrator we define a circle of suspects, verify the veracity of the statements with a polygraph examination and in interview after polygraph tests administration the person admits the crime. Declaration of the suspected person is then compared to the reconstruction of the event as it was drafted in the profiling process and the characteristics of the actual suspect are compared to the ones in the profile.

Definition of a motif or motives is a creative ground for completing profiling and psycho physiological veracity examination using polygraph. In the profiling process we analyze the perpetrator's behavior in the context of a trace at the crime scene and characteristic of a victim and this together composes and represents the issue for defining his/her motivation. In this way a profile is a (psycho) logical component, related exclusively to an investigated crime. A motif for a criminal offence is a factor which can be additionally highlighted or confirmed by a polygraph method. If it is defined wrongly then it is possible to modify a profile exactly on the basis of the polygraph test results.

## **CONCLUSION**

Logical combination of psycho physiological veracity examination using polygraph and (criminal) profiling could represent an important challenge also in investigation of terrorist acts. A key shift of attention from an individual to a (terrorist) group that he (she) personifies does not have an impact on the profile construction and implementation of polygraph examination. An idea on complementarity of profiling and polygraphy (Selič and Juratovec, 2004) necessary problemises professional competence of operators/investigators. Profiling is not a synonym for psychologising, because it requires an excellent knowledge of crime investigation tactics, technique and methodology, understanding of forensic medicine and additional and special psychological knowledge. Investigating support (profiling and polygraph examination) efficiently acts as an up building of all criminal knowledge with additional psycho(physio)logical knowledge. It's cognitive and guidance role depends on direct criminal investigation.

The system of work (investigation, profiling, polygraphy) must not allow any confirmation of (proper) hypothesis. Therefore the results of polygraph

examination should be objectified through a numerical evaluation of polygraph charts and consistent inclusion of second (expert) opinion, however the profiling process should be evaluated every moment by verification of statements' (of a suspect) authenticity with a polygraph. Any closing of the self-confirmation circle of the investigative support disables a creative dialogue and cooperation with direct investigators, because the investigative support and crime inspectors operate as reflexion and correction to each other. Eventual systematic introduction of profiling and polygraph examination in prevention and investigation of terrorist acts can strike against the question, if distinction between the both methods (polygraph method and profiling) according to necessary (input) information, human resources and the principles of functionality, methodology, professionalism and specialization is logical at all and also which method (if we persist on separation) is actually superior. The answers on practical and academic level are not necessary the same.

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**AN EXAMPLE OF COMBINING PROFILING AND POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION**

**EXAMPLE \***

Middle aged man was murdered in his room in the night from Saturday to Sunday. Unknown perpetrator(s) used cold fire-arms. Medical examiner concluded that two injuries led to death (injury from a shot and stabbing injury). The traces on the site showed that the perpetrator and the victim fought and jostled and the perpetrator(s) won only after he had used fire-arms. The perpetrator left bloody footprints.

The post-mortem examiner identified two types of injuries on the body - cuts and stabs and fire-arm injuries. Stabs came from different directions and cuts were identified as defense injuries. In addition there were some skin injuries - abrasions and suffusions.

*\* Description of the case is based on the data, presented to the public via media*

After both, the polygraph inspection of the crime site and analysis of first collected reports, were completed, two activities were being performed simultaneously: preparation for the use of polygraph method and profile construction. Crime investigation followed the versions which did not take into account (enough) some indices. So the elements of the profile could be verified only after longer period of time.

**Elements of the profile**

After the analysis of collected information was completed we established a profile of a couple of criminals. We introduce just one, but both are finally convicted.

**“Slaughterer”**

- A woman or a man rather short (up to 170 cm),
- Body weight does not exceed 65-70 kg,
- socio-cultural origins in the environment which gives priorities to cold weapon,

- possible affiliation to ethnical minority/special ethnical group (for example Roma),
- person is unskilled of martial arts,
- person is not skilled in handling cold weapon,
- person without own (secondary) family, intimately not attached or only weakly attached,
- does not belong to an organized criminal organization,
- has average physical strength,
- does not know the victim personally,
- in a couple relation submissive and can be guided,
- intellectually inferior,
- incapable of planning and anticipating events,
- incapable to efficiently solve problematic situations,
- is attracted to the act to do the “dirty job”,
- expects material benefit from the act,
- prone to panic responses,
- bad control over impulses,
- great possibility of decompensation,
- traumatizing due to event - maybe sleep disturbances, alcohol abuse and/or drugs as a consequence.

**Elements used for drawing up the recognizing circumstances tests**

To the “slaughterer” known circumstances (elements to introduce in drawing up the series of tests for recognizing circumstances) and unknown to the public:

- taking the shoes off,
- access to the room,
- the victim was sleeping on the bed - location of the bed in the room,
- first stab failed,
- the victim was resisting,
- pushing out of the room,
- help of the co-perpetrator with fire-arms,
- the victim falls due to a shot,
- stabbing of a lying victim,
- place of last (deadly) injury.

After certain period of time passed, the circumstances wanted that the attention of crime investigators was paid to a younger man and his acquaintance. Both agreed to voluntarily participate in the polygraph examination. With the first one the polygraph method was first used for some other criminal offence which the suspect also confessed to have committed and then after a pause and consultation with the lawyer he also agreed to take a test, related to the murder, of statements' authenticity with a polygraph. The suspect knew and cleared the circumstances which were unknown to the public and he could not have known them unless he participated in the criminal act. The content of his declarations was possible to use for drawing up additional tests on recognizing the circumstances for other suspects, because his confessions substantially filled the lack of information related to the preparations to the act. In the conversation after the use of polygraph tests he told where he and his collaborator left the car. The collaborator told him where to go. He took his shoes off because he did not want that they would squeak. He entered the room and stabbed the person sleeping on his bed. He was surprised because the victim jumped up - the man was big and strong, he screamed, defended himself and pushed the suspect out of the room. The suspect stabbed him several times in the meantime, but without visible/fatal consequences. All was bloody and horrible, totally different as he imagined beforehand. Only the shot by a co-operator calmed down the victim. The man fell on the floor and the suspect stepped back to him, upset and shocked. In anger he stabbed the man lying on the floor once more.

During the exhaustive conservation it was possible to verify the elements of the profile and relationship between the perpetrators. The collected data confirmed the profile of the "slaughterer" and significantly contributed to the increase of suspicion level related to some other persons. It is a process which needs a constant inspection of the work quality and reduction of subjective estimates with giving a second opinion.

Technically intact use of the polygraph method also enables additional inflow of information and with this the modification of an existent profile of the unknown perpetrator of criminal offence involving violence. In the practice the psychophysiological veracity examination using polygraph has justified and not on few occasions exceeded expectations of the crime investigation, however only when considering professional rules and criteria; therefore it is easy to refuse the considerations of all those who doubt in the usefulness

of the method. The use of the polygraph method has contributed in the case mentioned above to the investigation of several criminal offences and identification of several suspects. In the described case the successful use of polygraph method goes to a thorough preparation and exact knowledge about the event. The reconstruction, which was during the profiling based on inclusion of all elements the forensic experts expressed in their opinion, was used as an issue for drawing up the tests on recognizing the circumstances. The reconstruction was created only after a profound discussion with the post-mortem examiner. In this regard the profiling process and/or preparation for the use of polygraph method should not be limited only to inspection of documented material. The suspect confessed the crime after he was undoubtedly faced with his own psycho physiological responses. The interview after the polygraph tests administration was adapted to the characteristics of the perpetrator from the “slaughterer” profile. The happening strongly exceeded the estimates in the profile as all dimensions are concerned, especially by the intensity of emotions, but the profile was proven to be right according to the perpetrator's emotions during and after the act, although the experienced “real” reality cannot be compared to the “written” one.

# SAMOMORILSKI TERORIZEM IN ATENTATI – IZZIVI DELOVANJA OBVEŠČEVALNIH SLUŽB SUICIDE TERRORISM AND ASSASSINATION - CHALLENGES FOR THE OPERATIONS OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

## **POVZETEK**

*Čeprav so pogledi na pojme atentatorji in samomorilci – teroristi in njihove definicije različni, sta za njihovo lažje razumevanje ključnega pomena nasilje in grožnja z njim. Obe dejanji po svoji vsebini in značilnostih spadata v terorizem, ki pa ima zaradi svoje narave širšo pojmovno opredelitev v strokovni javnosti. Skupne definicije ali opredelitve pojma na mednarodni ravni kljub večkratnim poskusom še vedno ni.*

*Študije navajajo več kot sto različnih definicij terorizma in 22 različnih elementov definicije, vsem pa sta skupni lastnosti nasilje in grožnja z njim.*

*Razlogi naj bi bili različni, saj se do besede terorizem sprte strani ali tiste, katerih interesi nimajo veliko skupnega, različno opredeljujejo. Povsem razumljivo je, da si nasprotujoče si strani želijo z uporabo ter označevanjem oponenta in njegovih dejanj*

<sup>1</sup> Slovenska vojska. Slovenian Armed Forces.



*v konfliktu z besedo terorizem pridobiti legitimnost lastnega delovanja ali uresničevanja interesov, čeprav so njihova dejanja lahko podobna.*

*Ob primerjavi atentata s samomorilskim napadom ugotavljava, da imata obe dejanji veliko skupnih značilnosti, pri čemer skušava z analizo študije primerov poiskati podobnosti in razlike ter tako v zaključku prispevka opozoriti na nujnost in potrebnost njihovega upoštevanja pri razumevanju ter oblikovanju strategij in konceptov za boj proti takim grožnjam. Eno ključnih vlog pri tem imajo obveščevalne službe.*

**K L J U Č N E B E S E D E**

*Terorizem, samomorilski napad, atentat, obveščevalne službe.*

**A B S T R A C T**

*Despite various views on and various definitions of the assassinations and the suicide terrorists, the violence and violence threat are of key importance for easier understanding of the topic. With regard to their characteristics, both are placed under terrorism, which is more broadly understood by the expert public. Regardless numerous attempts, there is still no common definition of terrorism on an international level.*

*The studies state over 100 different terrorism definitions and 22 different definition elements, confirming common characteristics such as violence and violence threat.*

*Reasons for this differ greatly because the parties in conflict or the parties, who do not share common interests, have different opinions about terrorism. It is quite understandable that the opposing parties want to legitimize their own actions or the realization of interests, which are in conflict, by using and defining the opponent and its actions with the word terrorism, even though the actions performed, can be similar.*

*By comparing the assassination and suicide attack, the authors assess that the two actions have a lot in common. With the case study analysis the authors will try to find the similarities and the differences, concluding the article by underlying the urgency*

*and the necessity to take into consideration the above mentioned differences and similarities at understanding and forming strategies and concepts for the fight against such threats. At which the intelligence services play one of the key roles.*

**KEY WORDS**

*Terrorism, suicide attack, assassination, intelligence services.*

.....

**INTRODUCTION**

Definition and interpretation of terrorism, especially after the “black” September of 2001, is multi-dimensional, while, on the other hand, countering terrorism is mainly directed toward preventive identification of potential committers and removal of consequences. The world community has made minimal efforts in order to remove the causes, such as religious differences, fundamentalism, gaps between civilisations, territorial aspirations, poverty, oil, arms, disputes and injustices, and expression of political views.

“Contemporary terrorism” in its forms and variants has transformed itself to the extreme. Due to appearances of separatist, nationalist, neo-fascist and anti-American organisations, extremists who mercilessly and non-selectively slaughter both soldiers as well as politicians, sportsmen, media-press personnel, labourers, by-passers, children, women, and other helpless, the mode of familiarisation with operations and other known principles change.

Terrorism is to be viewed as multi-layered; one must discover its fundamental causes and back-grounds, which is significant for its solving, but it cannot be achieved in a small number of steps. By knowing the fundamentals of this problem the key actors in the fight against terrorism can suitably prepare suitable measures.

Despite of existence of various definitions of assassinations and suicide-committers as terrorists, it is crucial for understanding that these acts have violence and violence threats in common. With its content and characteristics these two both classify as terrorism that, on the other hand, regarding its nature has a broader notional definition in the professional public. A general definition or notion of terrorism at the international level is still non-existing. The reasons behind this are allegedly various since the conflicting parties or parties having less mutual interests differently define the word terrorism.

The fact, that the “conflicting parties” strive, by using and labelling the opposing side and its acts in the conflict with the word terrorism, to gain the legitimacy for their own acts and to achieve interests, is significant while the acts being carried out might be similar.

Terrorism and the relating events in the past decade have become one of the themes that have become a part of our everyday living. Regardless of whether one might follow media and press releases, significant political activities from our homes both domestic and international or as scientific research of the threats to the modern society, terrorism has become one of the most important issues. Terrorism in the eyes of the public (from the individual to the state and its institutions) represents an extreme form of security threat because in such a state of affairs the existence and the balanced development of the society and of the individuals are not provided for (Prezelj, 2000: 15-22).

By reviewing, studying and comparing the professional literature of different authors we attempt to represent the temporary security issue of terrorism, what it actually is and what are its fundamental characteristics. We compare assassination and suicide attack as the two of the most extreme forms and attempt to present differences and mutual characteristics of the acts.

In the conclusion of the contribution we critically reflect on the organisation and operation of security services as carriers of the fight against terrorism and implicate on the system alterations. As soldiers, in the sense of prevention of the members of the Slovenian Armed Forces and of the allies in the crisis response operations who are the most exposed to such threats, we have accounted for the key factor - timely flow of security information at the tactical, operational and strategic level.

**Terrorism**

“Political interpretation” of terrorism is particularly interesting after the 11th of September 2001. Often the same event is viewed as terrorist while some other entity might be interpreted as guerrilla. Some might view an organisation as terrorist due to its ways and methods while others refer to it as legitimate fight for national independence.

There are many theories and definitions what terrorism actually is and what organisations represent terrorism in regard to their particular method of

operation. Undoubtedly, in regard to terrorism and terrorist organisations the following characteristics should be pointed out (Krunič, 1997: 154-160):

- it differentiates from delinquency by a political goal, primarily in the part where the terrorists expect to achieve political changes through their acts;
- Illegitimate - violent act;
- Represents continual - conscious acts;
- Provokes fear (the root of the word derives from Latin terror, terroris and means powerful fear and also has roots in Indo-European term “tras” which designated trembling as a state of fear);
- Immediate victims are of secondary significance to the terrorists and are often even random. The objective is to slaughter while causing as much fear as possible;
- Regarding their acts communication is accounted for primarily through mass media;
- Terrorists act cruelly and ruthlessly;
- Terrorists and their organisations are well organised, equipped and trained and have developed all functions of organisational functioning;
- Operation of terrorist organisations is secret.

We assess that the majority of analysts take into account the above-mentioned characteristics prior to labelling an organisation as terrorist. It is sufficient that only one of the above-mentioned characteristics is missing and a problem to the definition arises.

The Verbinc Vocabulary defines terrorism as utilisation and carrying out of terror as a political method, while figuratively as violence and fear.

**Assassination**

In regarding the notion and understanding of the word assassination it is peculiar that it has its roots in Latin and means attentare - attempt (Verbinc, 1994). The fundamental notion of assassination in the international professional community is defined by various meanings that are a consequence of cultural differences and different perception of security risks. Not only in regard to cultural differences but also to historical differences the latter exist in the interests of the particular era. Detailed studies into politically motivated assassinations reject the stereotypes and definitions: “all assassinations are

not always political and political assassinations do not always include the immediately visible political goals (Cassidy, 1997: 3)”.

Assassination is a planned act having the final goal of killing an important representative of a country or an important group and is committed in public or covertly. With this violent act particular groups and/or an organisation remove a person regarded as the most dangerous i.e. operating against them. Besides the immediate effect upon the important person and the environment in his/hers immediate surrounding, it also has a terrorising impact upon the wider public. People feel endangered since they can see that even a well-protected person is vulnerable and can clearly see that there is no complete protection. Assassinations in public are also utilised in order to attract the attention of mass media; such a method has the utmost psychological (terrorising) impact upon the public. The notion of assassination varies from one author to another but the political element is common in most cases. Thus, different authors define assassination as:

- Attack, violence, violation of other’s rights, in narrower and usual sense, intentional murder or attempted murder of a ruler or another important political figure driven by political motives (Šafar et al, 1973:93);
- Murder of a politically or operationally, strategically important individual by special methods and intentions when such an act represents a means or an element of social policy (Cassidy, 1977:5).

Similar to the definition of terrorism it is also true here that the term is not defined singularly. On the other hand, it points out to vital elements (Krunič, 1997: 132-135):

- Target or the object of the attack represents a politically important person (senior public officials, senior representatives of armed forces, presidential candidates, prime ministers and presidents);
- Consequences of the act in regard to the result must be political;
- Motive of the assassinator must be political.

Studies have indicated that the probability of assassination against oppositional candidates is greater than against the opponents from the ruling fraction (Crotty, 1970), moreover even greater against the candidates for presidential positions, which is a stable orientation for relevant state institutions and organs in order to prepare counter measures.

In our contribution we will focus on and present the phenomenon of terrorist suicide attacks and assassinations. We asses that these forms of threats should be given particular attention due to the inter-personality of committers, therefore, the phenomenon as a subject of interest is of particular significance.

Revealing causes and motivational as well as psychological and social elements of such phenomena are, in our opinion, of special interest for intelligence agencies that through their pro-active and preventive policy must foresee and/or prevent such threats.

**Suicide attacks - appearing form of terrorism and assassinations**

A suicide attack is a form of attack which requires death of the attacker carrying out the attack, while the committer is aware of the inevitability of his/her death; in this case his/her life is of no importance, and even less the lives of the often random victims.

Suicide attacks have been common in the international security space since 1983. Terrorist commit such attacks due to their advantages in comparison to other methods of terrorist operation. Still, the fact remains that the suicide terrorist attacks require substantial, primarily psychological preparations and acquiring suitable personnel, which may be a big obstacle for terrorist organisations, so that such attacks are utilised only for the more important attacks.

According to the opinion of the wider public religious fanatics commit these acts. The majority of experts who have studied the phenomenon of suicide terrorists, disagree on this, among them also Riaz Hassan who claims that suicide attackers are lead more by political than religious fanaticism.

**Characteristics**

Suicide attacks i.e. attackers have characteristics that surpass other forms of attack. They are intelligent, adaptable since they can choose their own time, location and circumstances for the attack - these characteristics as a rule are not contained in other weapons. The psychological effect is enormous and the latter a relatively less expensive method (weapon) as long as there are enough volunteers. The victims and the material damage caused by such terrorists through such acts are asymmetrically large in comparison to the loss of one suicide attacker. Suicide attacks are inexpensive and effective; on the

other hand they are less sophisticated but extremely effective in regard to propaganda and continually covered by mass-media. They are connected to various interests: can be material, moral, political, they are linked to moral purity, enlightenment, sacrifice and last but not least revenge. In general, it could be said that suicide terrorists are “in a way smart bombs”. Maybe the most significant fact is that suicide attacks split the public and create distrust toward the government, the institution or the association against which they are aimed.

Because of all these reasons suicide terrorism has spread from the Middle East to Sri Lanka, Turkey, Argentina, Chechnya, Russia, Algeria and the USA.

**CAUSES, MOTIVATIONAL ELEMENTS**

Causes for committing terrorist acts are to be viewed as multi-layered. The causes for suicide terrorism can be divided into four categories regarding the existing approaches:

- Individual-psychological approach that stresses the psycho-pathological level of the individual, down-gradation, disappointment and issues of personality as the main cause;
- Organisational-strategic approach that supports that the suicide terrorism is an effective military and political strategy;
- The environmental approach is orientated towards religion, nationalism or social factors, which enable favourable conditions for the rise of the phenomenon of suicide attacks;
- Multi-cause approach that point out multiple causes for suicide attacks.

**National motivational elements**

The national motive appears as a consequence of an occupation or an annexation of a territory from a nation or group of people, and of course in combination with the religious motive and hate. The politics and religion are closely connected in the Muslim world.

**Economic motivational elements**

Economic insufficiency by itself is not a sufficient reason for such a boom of suicide terrorism. Living in poverty can only be an additional motivation in deciding for a suicide attack, but by no means the only one. If such was true

i.e. the economic motive for committing a suicide attack was prevailing, the similarity to the common suicide or murder would be evident.

### **Hate and revenge**

Factors that influence suicide terrorism can be cultural, economical, social and political but all have one common denominator - hate. Thus, political or ideological hate, supported by psychological, cultural, social and economic factors. Religion, national ideology or the rush for revenge usually triggers hate. Another reason, why someone might decide to become a suicide attacker, can also be revenge. This can be revenge for the death or injury of a family member, a relative, a friend. Disapproval of injustices committed - real or imagined - is personal and transferred from generation to generation.

### **Religion**

Terrorist acts having religious background are among the most dangerous ones since their acts are against everyone not belonging to their group. One must not forget the fact that the engine behind terrorist activities in the 70 and 80 of the 20th century was ideology, while towards the end of the century it was ever more being replaced by religion.

On the contrary to the common terrorist groups having political or social goals the religious terrorists justify their acts with the religious mission. Terrorist acts are fundamentally opposed to the basic ethical principles of the human society and often even opposed to the major principles of their own ideology or religion.

### **PSYCHOLOGICAL ELEMENTS**

Attempting psychosocial profiling of a suicide terrorist is designing a construct. Differences that exist between terrorist organisations are even greater when it comes to the individuals fighting for their own objectives.

Psychologists and psychiatrists dealing with terrorism have developed multiple typologies of terrorists. They differentiate e.g. political terrorists motivated by ideological or social objectives, criminals motivated by the material award, and psychopathic terrorists driven by irrational reasoning belonging to individuals or groups. Psychological components of terrorism, therefore, should be supplemented by the historical, social, political, economical and last but not least cultural dimension.



The majority of psychiatrists and psychologists have discovered in their studies that such committers are mentally healthy and have no behavioural disorders. It is interesting that the majority of researchers determine that the common characteristic of terrorists is actually their normality. This is particularly true for those groups usually being denominated as political terrorists since they do not have social and ideological objectives.

**Fanaticism**

Fanaticism can be defined as a passionate or blind devotion to certain beliefs while simultaneously hating other beliefs. It is our opinion that suicide terrorist can be classified as fanatics. Namely, these are passionately devoted to their ideas and beliefs. But they are not lunatic fanatics as being imagined by the wider public. Often there are attempts by official politics to represent them as lunatic fanatics in order to mask the actual reasons behind their acts.

**SOCIAL ELEMENTS**

In Palestine these are no longer typical suicide terrorists as were known in the past. They are between 18 and 38 years of age, not uneducated, poor, immature or depressed. Many of them come from the middle social class and have well paid jobs. More than a half is a refugee from the territories now belonging to Israel. They seem normal family people. Polite, mature and within their community have a reputation of well upbringing. Very religious (Hassan, 2001). Influence of the family to a suicide terrorist plays an important role here. In the case of the Palestinian suicide terrorist it is very important to have the support of the family - and they mostly have. In the case of Al Qaeda, on the other hand, suicide terrorist mostly do not have the support of the family.

**Sex**

Most of the committers of suicide attacks are male but the number of women highly rises, since they are not even expected, do not match the expected profile and are less suspicious. It has been proven that women are calmer under stress, and striving for assertion. Organisations are also aware that the Arabic and Asian culture forbid touching the female body and this makes females consequently less exposed to physical check-ups. The addition to this reasoning are attacks by Palestinian females dressed like expecting women

who are respected and untouchable as carriers of a new life and, thus, in the fake belly more explosives can be installed.

Tamil Tigers have been using female suicide attackers for some time. Let us remember the assassination of the former Indian Prime-minister Rajiv Gandhi which was committed in 1991 by a female suicide attacker wearing belts of explosives around her waist.

In Chechnya, on the other hand, “black widows” are active in suicide actions. The members of the Black widows are women who have lost their husbands, sons, fathers, etc. fighting the Russians. They are motivated into suicide acts by one and only - the wish to revenge the deaths of the beloved ones.

### **Age**

In spite of the increase of the number of suicide attacks in the past several years the profile of the suicide attacker has remained unchanged, with the average age of 21. It is also true, on the other hand, that in the last period the trend can be observed of the increase of suicide bombers being younger than 15 years of age, also a case is known when a 6 year old boy was sent to a suicide mission. This fact is monstrous in extremely worrying, especially if the fact is taken into account that children are most often merely a mean of transporting the explosive device, while the device is triggered by someone else remotely. The motives here are various, while it is a fact that children commit such acts frequently under the influence of threats and force, and even worse is the fact that often children are not even aware what are they being used for and serve merely as transport for explosives which they carry on their baby-carriage, bicycle, in their bag to in order to transport the explosives from one point to the point of explosion where the explosion is triggered remotely and the child, thus, is sacrificed. In these cases child trafficking is frequently present when parents sell their child for these purposes. Terrifying.

### **Education and social status, physical appearance and environment**

In regard to education those thinking of uneducated unrefined people would be very wrong. On the contrary, most of the terrorists are very well educated, most often in the West. The social class that suicide attackers belong to represents the average of the society from which they come from. In most cases these are single males and also the social status does not influence the decision

of the individual in regard to carrying out the suicide attack. Terrorists are usually of average height, without peculiar physical appearances, disabilities, genetic failures, permanent tattoos or alike to make them recognisable. The physical appearance is becoming important and terrorists are well aware of this, therefore, prior to carrying out the attack they blend very well with the environment. It is a fact that this method of operation has asserted itself in a particular environment, while not in other.

### **Common characteristics**

In comparison between assassination and suicide attack it can be immediately concluded that both acts have numerous common characteristics.

In both cases one can speak of non-conventional forms of warfare with common planning where much attention is allotted to the selection of time, location and circumstances of the attack. Thus, one can speak here of deliberated acts both having the same objective or target such as murder/ killing of a more prominent i.e. significant representative of a group or a country, committed against non-combatant targets and easy civil and passive military targets. Both forms of attack should be undoubtedly connected to the general objectives of the organisation, or the individual, carrying them out or supporting them, but in most cases a problem arises when the attack or the act is to be connected to these objectives. These include various attempts in order to influence the immediate circumstances in different government systems or even the wider society itself. The objective can be influence upon the value system with a political, military and economic motivated background but the entirety almost always has a wider particular political frame. Usually terrorist acts have only one main objective e.g. to bring down the contemporary system of government or the government in place. Achieving the objective in a short time period is almost impossible, thus, on a longer time scale a revolutionary atmosphere is created (Martin 2006: 348), which can also be described as provoking fear or similar insecurities among the population of the community. The impact at the psychological level is fascinating<sup>2</sup> since, in this way, a split in the public and creating distrust in the wider community, governments, institutions and coalitions can be influenced. It can also merely be an element of political protest and pressure upon the particular political option.

<sup>2</sup> In February 2006 the number of attacks in Iraq increased compared to the prior period, which was a reason to make use of the inconclusiveness in setting up the future Iraqi “transitional” government.

Definition (notion), that terrorism (indirectly suicide attacks and assassinations) is a case of totally asymmetric warfare, since from its origin up to today the means for achieving the objectives are non-selective, is true. In committing their deliberated acts terrorists do not account for the potential collateral damage, only achieving the objective is important, anything destructive is welcomed by terrorists. The methods and means of attack have a very wide range, particularly the principle of unpredictability is utilised supported by a large portion of improvisation, whereas creativity is of key importance. Prevention or pro-active operation in order to prevent these acts is very difficult in regard the unpredictable methods of committing the atrocities that are adjusted or improvised in a way that the time, location and method of delivery are always on the side of the committer. Here we speak of fundamental characteristics that enable the attacker or the committer a great amount of freedom in tracking, detecting, preparation, organisation, carrying out and lastly withdrawing and covering traces.

The most frequent method of delivery is setting up explosive devices, by firing arms, kidnapping and at the moment most terrifying method - suicide bomb attacks. These types of attacks are, due to the final outcome or the desired effect, utilised in the most widespread form with no attention to the location and timing of delivery or the potential victims. The objectives are all on the opposing side and in these cases the deaths of innocent civilians do not represent a problem or a circumstance that would balance the decision against carrying out the attack. The actual threats are usually detected by experience gained by analysis of prior acts (quantitative and qualitative analysis). The fear rises only at thinking of the potential methods and means of attack which terrorist might use in the future. The methods of mass destruction are classified in this group. In regard to the consequences both acts are, as well as terrorism in general, outside rules, characterised by asymmetric methods of operation, where conventional differences between the guilt and innocence and/or combatant and non-combatant are obliterated (Kurtz 2000:500).

**Differences**

After defining certain common characteristics based on comparison between assassination and suicide attack there are also certain differences. Regardless of the numerous common departure-points for the discourse everything is not

identical as it may seem at the first glance. After reviewing and comparing the definitions of the term assassination and suicide attack, even in the beginning one might determine that the first is about a murder of a special kind, with a political motive, characterised by the target being an important political figure. So, regarding the number it is all about one person. The suicide attack, on the other hand, in most cases does not include elimination or murder of one person but in these cases also collateral damage is desirable with the intention of utilising the event for attracting the attention of the domestic or wider international community. So, it is an act that is not to be hidden from the public not the question on the alleged committer. All together might be supported by footage later publicized in the internet, whereas the act is being filmed during the preparations and later during the act itself and later put online. On the other hand, the classical assassination includes the option that it remains hidden from the public since not all assassinations are politically motivated because they do not always include the identifiable political objectives. It might the case of a mentally disturbed committer and the motive or drive behind the act might prove difficult to determine.

Thus, both acts are about eliminating the person regarded as most dangerous i.e. operating against them. The difference is in the number of victims and the consequence that arises from the criminal act since the damage from the suicide attack is incomparably larger, wider and harder to grasp and accept by the society. Committers of suicide attacks are members of groups and might be “true believers” who are characterised by high motivation. Suicide attacker commits **the attack** even though he/she certainly knows that he/she will also **die** in the attack, so, in this case, the committer’s death is necessary, which is not true for assassins. For them life itself is valuable and cherished, thus, it is not expected from the committer to sacrifice itself. To the planner of suicide attack life itself is worth nothing, it is not valuable enough to make him/her to change mind, which is in most cases supported by the excuse that these acts include the committer going to heaven. The committers are only the tools for carrying out the attack, thus, expandable.

The difference between assassination and suicide attack can also be found in the method of operation. Since the objective of committing assassination with the intention of mere substitution, making changes, silence the opponent, a part of propaganda and last but not least also satisfaction of pathological needs

(Crotty, 1970), for the delivery itself poisonous gas, silenced weapons, explosive devices etc. might be used, whereas only the undesired person is eliminated<sup>3</sup>.

**Intelligence services**

Intelligence services are a tool of the ruling establishment in an individual country and serve to support the implementation of the interests of the national elite and to provide national security. They operate by the method of preventive monitoring the circumstances in the domain of threatening national security and implementing measures for detecting threats and their timely removal. This can be implemented by utilisation of agents or by special forces or indirectly with psychological operation i.e. special operation with the task of redirecting threats. Every intelligence service carries out this in its own - secret - way. Successful intelligence services act proactively today. They forecast the development of events and reactions to the latter or create “own battlefield”, thus, create circumstances that something being in their interest takes place. Due to the abundance of data, diverse and global threats today this requires the change of organisation of intelligence services. “Classical agents” known from the era up to the end of the Cold War are being replaced by experts in predicting events (statistics, politics, psychology and sociology), reactions of people and experts in the information technology domain. Due to the new distribution of forces in the world, joint military and other operations within NATO and EU, the intelligence services face great challenges; in order to provide national security data and information must be provided to the political leaders, on the other hand, information must also be provided to the headquarters of operations where their armed forces are present. Contemporary intelligence (security) systems are well extended and include numerous agencies. Due to asymmetric sources of threats they must embody as wide domain of operation as possible i.e. protection, whereas aggregation of new data takes place. Since today’s threats are indicated in very unusual ways it is important that intelligence services have well developed organisational units for detecting various types of dangers. It is necessary that trends of threats and preparatory activities that can lead to threats are detected.

<sup>3</sup> After the attempt to assassinate Margaret Thatcher, which she survived, the committers (IRA) messaged the following after the act: “This time you were lucky. But you must always be lucky, and we only need to be once”.

With a proactive role intelligence services today preventively monitor operations of extremist and terrorist groups, attempt to block their sources (financial), to bring down the system of recruitment and of the members and the support of the population, to build the prominence of an individual country in third countries by information and psychological operations and persuade the world population on evilness and inappropriateness of terrorism. Successfulness of operations of intelligence services in today's world can be measured by the level of timeliness of detection of threats, providing information and removal of threats.

## **CONCLUSION**

By all means one of the fundamental conclusions is that suicide terrorist acts and assassinations are led by organised groups having different final goals. The basic method or way of their operation is utilisation of the very assassinations, suicide attacks and similar criminal offences having extreme violence as the basic characteristic. In achieving their goals they are very innovative, use very unusual techniques, knowledge, equipment and procedures. This type of violence is the most dangerous for the society and they embrace it as such. Very rarely a terrorist act is committed by an individual not belonging to any group having its goals predefined and clearly messaged to the wider public. In the cases of lone attempts or acts it is all about solving personal disturbances having no long-term background for achieving particular goals. In such cases there is frequently no political motive of the individual which, although it is a criminal offence nevertheless, is less evil to the social community in comparison to organised terrorist groups.

Countries, allies and international organisations, devoted to keeping peace and world stability, face new challenges which will reflect on the reorganisation of intelligence services. Politics, in its institutional relationship of the state in regard to the intelligence services, will have to seek mechanisms for effective operation of these services in the new security environment, while simultaneously protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms as the basic fundament of democracy. Contemporary intelligence services are burdened with enormous number of information. Time and space represent a new situation for the intelligence services along with new technologies; analyses by intelligence services indicate errors committed in the past in regard to providing information at the tactical level. Experience of particular services and military

units in operations of crisis responses, i.e. in battle conditions; indicate that the units at the tactical level were provided with suitable security data but not with processed and evaluated information. Therefore, erasing the “clear line” of providing security information from the strategic to the operational level and down to the tactical and vice versa should be considered. Such procedures are still a reflection of the Cold War which is out of date today. Primarily the transfer time of information between the tactical and operational level of command and control should be shortened. Key operational commanders at the tactical level must have the same authorisation to access the secret security data compared to the operative or strategic level. In this case the horizontal transfer of information must be suitably supported by information technology.

Future greater effectiveness of the operations by intelligence services is based on international connectivity and “greater trust” in exchanging security products. Understanding new threats regarding suicide attackers requires profound changes in the education and training system of the security personnel; regarding civilisations, history, religion and geography, knowledge of the customs of nations, international law and languages.

In the future, in the sense of protecting the fundamental democratic and human values of the developed countries, exchange of information between intelligence services is of key importance in order to timely detect and prevent terrorist attacks. On the other hand, in order for such partnership and cooperation in exchanging data and information to take place reorganisation of intelligence services is of key importance.

Dynamic globalisation and appearance of various types of threats directly represents new threats to security and challenges to the tasks of the intelligence services. The latter have a significant role in the domain of processing, detecting and interpretation of these and other forms of terrorism. With an appropriate system of education and training, organisation and timely preparation of adequate measures intelligence services can contribute a decisive advantage in detecting and preventing various types of threats.

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# VLOGA MEDRES PRI USTVARJANJU, UTRJEVANJU TER PROMOCIJI TERORIZMA IN EKSTREMIZMA

## THE ROLE OF MADARIS IN CREATING, HARBOURING AND PROMOTING TERRORISM AND EXTREMISM

### **POVZETEK**

*Islamske verske šole (medrese) naj bi bile globoko vpletene v utrjevanje terorizma in vzbujanje protizahodnih ekstremističnih čustev. Medrese naj bi bile glavni centri za naborništvo in spodbujanje terorističnih dejavnosti. Stvarnost pa ni nujno taka. Medrese pravzaprav niso bistvenega pomena za nastanek in razširjanje terorizma. So le majhni igralci na političnem prizorišču, ki jih državni in nedržavni politični akterji izkoriščajo v politične namene in za hegemonске pristope.*

### **KLJUČNE BESEDE**

*Medrese, terorizem, ekstremizem.*

### **ABSTRACT**

*Islamic religious schools (madaris) are widely believed to be involved in harbouring terrorism and provoking anti-Western,*

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*extremist emotions. Madaris are thus considered major centres of recruitment and propaganda for terrorist activities. In truth, however, this might not be at all the case. As a matter of fact, madaris are not the key elements responsible for either the emergence or expansion of terrorism. They are only small players exploited by state and non-state political actors in bigger “games” involving the struggle for superiority and hegemony.*

**KEY WORDS**

*Madrasah, terrorism, extremism, flaws of policies.*

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**CONTEXT**

The prospects and dimensions of terrorism and extremism are too broad to be covered comprehensively in a single text. Hundreds of books, articles and op-ed pieces have been written on this topic to date.

Therefore, it is more appropriate to choose a theme relevant to the broader context of terrorism and extremism. In this respect, madaris, widely referred to as Islamic religious schools, and their role in the spectrum of terrorism and extremism are worth considering.

Before explaining the current mood of understanding of madaris and the reality of madaris and terrorism, the true meaning and history of madaris will be briefly elaborated. Following that, the history of the emergence of *madrasah* culture on the Indian subcontinent in general, and in Pakistan in particular after its independence from British rule in 1947, will be specifically discussed.

*Madrasah* (pl. *madāris*) is the Arabic word for any type of school, secular or religious. The word *madrasah* relates to learning or teaching, and therefore *madrasah* literally means “a place where learning/teaching takes place”.

In the Arabic language, the word *madrasah* (also *madrasa*) implies no sense other than that which the word “school” represents in the English language, such as private, public or parochial school, as well as for any primary or secondary school whether Muslim, non-Muslim or “Secular” secular. The correct Arabic word for a university, however, is *jami’a*.

**Brief history**

The formation of madaris can probably be traced back to the early Islamic custom of meeting in mosques to discuss religious issues. At this early stage, people seeking religious knowledge tended to gather around certain more knowledgeable Muslims; these informal teachers later became known as *shaykhs*, and these shaykhs began to hold regular religious education sessions called *majalis*.

The first universities in the modern sense, namely institutions of higher education and research which issue academic degrees at all levels (bachelor, master and doctorate), were medieval madaris, known as jami'a, founded in the 9<sup>th</sup> century. The University of Al Karaouine in Fez, Morocco, is recognised by the Guinness Book of World Records as the oldest degree-granting university in the world, with its founding in 859<sup>2</sup>. Al-Azhar University, founded in Cairo, Egypt, in 975, was a jami'a (“university” in Arabic) which offered a variety of post-graduate degrees.

**Madaris in India**

**BRITISH RULE: DEOBAND AND OTHER RESPONSES**

On the Indian subcontinent, after the freedom war of 1857 against British rule and the subsequent suppression of the uprising by the British, the British attempted to rule Muslims strictly.

The need to adapt to British rule produced two major educational movements for Indian Muslims. Some Muslim scholars believed that Muslims had been left behind in modern education and scientific progress. They thought that English learning was the only way to acquire the requisite know-how and knowledge. This group advocated the establishment of modern schools for Muslims. On other hand, there were scholars who saw the Western system of education as a threat to Islamic doctrine. Thus, at one extreme was the development of English learning at Aligarh College in Uttar Pradesh, and at the other was the madrasah of Deoband, also in Uttar Pradesh. The introduction of English education and Western sciences threatened traditional Muslim learning. The advent of the British system had endangered the core values of the clergy. Thus, Darul Uloom Deoband, established in 1867, “became one of the responses to the power of the West”. By the end of the

<sup>2</sup> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Madrasah>.

nineteenth century, around two dozen Deobandi madaris had been set up in Indian towns. According to a report on the *Boston Globe* website published in 2004, there are around 30,000<sup>3</sup> operating madaris in India.



Madrasah of Jamia Masjid in Srirangapatna, India. This mosque dates back to the 1700s.

### Madaris in Pakistan

Immediately after independence in 1947, Pakistan - then divided between West and East Pakistan - was split by a power struggle among elite groups. The first generation of political leaders were anglicised and Western educated but lacked secure constituencies in the new country. In Pakistan's formative years, the political elites and the civil-military bureaucracy wrestled for power but held the clergy at bay. Some leading *ulema* were co-opted to give the new state a symbolic Islamic identity, but by and large the clergy were excluded from the power game. Much like General Musharraf, Field Marshal Ayub Khan (the president of Pakistan from 1958-1969) professed liberal ideas and took an anti-clerical stance. Ayub opted to expand state control over religious institutions to cultivate a state

<sup>3</sup> [http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2004/04/04/rumors\\_of\\_jihad/](http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2004/04/04/rumors_of_jihad/).

version of modern Islam and to legitimise military power domestically, and as a rallying cry against India. Since the regime was also aligned with the U.S. in the Cold War, military rulers were motivated to create a modern Muslim identity for Pakistan to counter godless communism. This was how madaris in Pakistan came to prominence, and remain as such even today.

In addition to countering the threat of communism looming on its north-western border, another reason for the promotion of religious institutions in Pakistan, mostly Sunni-based, was the victory of the Shiite Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979. President Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan (1977-1988) felt a serious threat from Shiism due to the victory of Shiite Islam in Iran. The considerable Shia population of Pakistan further aggravated this concern. Many Sunni Islamic learning centres and militant organisations such as Lashkar-e Taiba and Sipah-e Sahaba were by-products of the strategy to counter the influence of Shiite Islam from neighbouring Iran and Indian control of Kashmir.<sup>4</sup>

**Madaris, terrorism and extremism**

Madaris are often alleged to be Islamic religious schools playing a key role in promoting extremism. Madrasah students are believed to be taught only lessons of hate. This kind of understanding is very widespread, and nations and governments believe this connotation. Whether this perception is correct or has been falsely assumed needs to be evaluated in detail.

The question at issue is whether madaris are indeed responsible for creating, harbouring and promoting terrorism and extremism? This can be answered from two different angles, ideologically and politically, in which case the answer is both yes and no.

Ideologically the answer is a “no”, although many people may differ on this point. As mentioned earlier, historically the term madrasah has always referred to a teaching place, or a school in the general sense. Learning is a basic part of Islam and is not associated with religious education only. So when madaris were initially started, they had every component of the educational system prevailing at the time. This included Islamic religious education and other subjects such as astronomy, architecture, philosophy and math. The status quo concerning madaris continued for centuries, and madaris produced a considerable number of great scholars and researchers of the times, including for example: Ibn al-Haytham,<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Disputed territory between India and Pakistan.

who is considered the pioneer of experimental physics in the 11<sup>th</sup> century; Abu Rayhan al-Beruni (973-1048), whose discoveries in the fields of physics, chemistry, pharmacy and mathematics are well known; mathematician Mohammad Ibn Musa al-Khwarzimi; the development of the astronomical observatory in Baghdad during the rule of Caliph Mamun (813 to 833 A.D); and the list goes on. The Muslim part of the world was a hub of knowledge. The work of Muslim scholars and scientists laid the foundation for many new areas of learning.

Before the fall of the Uthmani Empire, madaris had never played the role of institutions where hate lessons or terrorism were promoted, except on the Indian subcontinent in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, when British rule had already resulted in an ideological struggle with Muslims. Throughout the history of Islam since its advent in Mecca, there had been no distinction between religious and non-religious schools.

The division between the state and religion in the Islamic world was first introduced after the fall of Uthmani Empire, when the Salafite school of thought joined efforts with Abdul Aziz bin Saud of the then territory of Hijaz<sup>6</sup> in the war against the Uthmanis from 1900 to 1924.

It was after the establishment of the independent state of Saudi Arabia that Salafite Islamic spiritual followers were given a role in the religious affairs of the state in recognition of their efforts in bringing down the Uthmani caliphate, thus introducing a distinction between the state and religion for the first time. Ever since, madaris (hereafter referred to as Islamic religious schools only) have been exploited politically by different state and non-state actors to achieve political or military goals.

Examples of madaris being exploited for political purposes are numerous - a glance at the Cold War era makes it clear whether anti-Soviet holy warriors, most of whom either came from madaris or were inspired by these religious institutions in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Islamic world, fought that war for Islam or for the sake of other states.

### **Islam and political exploitation of madaris?**

It is a question whether Islamic Ideology is responsible for the political exploitation of madaris, be it by secular groups or secular governments?

<sup>5</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic\\_Golden\\_Age#Sciences](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_Golden_Age#Sciences).

<sup>6</sup> Now the Royal Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

The answer is again partly yes. There is no doubt that there are numerous injunctions in the Holy Qur'an and the traditions of the Prophet in regard to *jihad* (holy war), the sovereignty of Islamic lands and rejection of authority of foreign powers over Muslim territories and nations. Although these injunctions have come in a broader context and with wider interpretations not applicable for political exploitation, the low level of understanding of common Muslims of these Qur'anic verses makes it easy for so-called spiritual leaders who cruise around in the latest Landcruisers they get from God-knows-who to work for the cause of God-knows-who to exploit people's Islamic feelings. They do so by interpreting and twisting Qur'anic verses to their own interests and to the interests of their masters. They take advantage of the general lack of understanding of the correct interpretation of Islam and thus succeed in recruiting and dispatching thousands upon thousands of holy warriors on the path to heaven, not only from madaris, but also from among ordinary people.

Recent examples of political exploitation of Islamic emotions can also be seen in Iraq, where the majority of fighters - Sunni or Shiite - come from religious groups. The majority of members of the Mehdi Army of Iraq are followers of Shiite Cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, son of prominent Shia spiritual leader Baqer al-Sadr, assassinated during Saddam Hussein's regime. Even the majority of al-Qa'ida's fighters and suicide bombers in Iraq come from religious institutions in Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries.

A report published on the Jamestown Foundation website in 2005 titled "The Salafi-Jihadist Movement in Iraq: Recruitment Methods and Arab Volunteers" suggested that the majority of warriors of the then Abu Musab al-Zarqawi-led al-Qa'ida in Iraq came from Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern states.<sup>7</sup>

**Suicide attacks, key factors**

As many bombing and suicide attacks have been linked to madrasah institutions, the key factors involving suicide bombings are worth considering. Although not all recorded cases of suicide attacks are linked to students of madaris, some are. There were two cases of foiled suicide attacks by madrasah students as young as 14 years old in 2007 and 2008 in Afghanistan. One of the suspected suicide bombers was Shakirullah, the son of Yasin Ali, resident of

<sup>7</sup> <http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369842>.



South Waziristan in the tribal areas, now under detention in Afghanistan. He was interviewed by the British newspaper, *The Independent*.<sup>8</sup>



Shakirullah



President Karzai, Rafiqullah

The other teen suicide bomber captured by Afghan security officials last year was Rafiqullah. President of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Hamed Karzai granted him amnesty, and subsequently he was allowed to return to his home. Both boys had come from different madaris in Pakistan where apparently their mentors had lured them into fighting the Americans and the British in Afghanistan in retaliation for the blood of their fellow Muslim brothers and sisters.

There are clearly multiple reasons why people commit suicide attacks. But one point remains key in all cases: the would-be bomber must be justified that he/she is dying for a great cause, and in the case of Islam the action will lead the bomber to heaven.

## **Ideology**

Ideology does play a role if there is justification, such as when a country comes under aggression or occupation, or when religion is at stake. As this article is aimed at genuinely analysing factors of terrorism, I have avoided statements that merely “feel good” on hearing them. It is worth facing the truth even if it is bitter and harsh. And the truth is that there are religious injunctions that urge followers to treat “aggressors” the way they treat them. There is a verse in the Qur'an on this. But there are specific circumstances for when these

<sup>8</sup> <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/the-14yearold--afghan-suicide-bomber-843535.html>.

injunctions come into play, such as the physical presence of foreign armies in Muslim lands and killing of fellow Muslims and countrymen. In such cases, when the enemy is too strong to be fought or defeated in face-to-face battle, militants find it justified to resort to suicide bombings.

A newly released video by the Haqqani network of militants (a group led by former anti-Soviet commander Jalaluddin Haqqani) in Afghanistan shows a Turkish citizen chanting a poem about how he was preparing to go to heaven where the blessing of God was awaiting him before slamming his explosive-laden truck apparently into a US military base in southern Afghanistan.

Some examples of ideology-related suicide attacks in the contemporary history of the Central and South Asian region dates back to the India-Pakistan war of 1965. Pakistani history textbooks claim that Pakistani soldiers strapped on explosives and blew themselves up under Indian tanks when a huge contingent of Indian tanks were marching towards Lahore, the capital of the Punjab province of Pakistan, in August of that year. According to Afghan contemporary history, suicide attacks were first carried out in 2001 when two Taliban affiliates posing as journalists killed a commander of the Northern Alliance (a coalition of Afghan political and military groups that resisted Taliban rule).

**Retaliation**

Unfortunately, in Afghanistan and elsewhere in Islamic lands, there have been increasing incidents of so-called collateral damage in which coalition air and ground assaults resulted in a huge number of civilian casualties. This issue has become a matter of serious concern for the government of Afghanistan, where recurring incidents of civilian deaths in coalition and NATO attacks have caused people to become disenchanted with the government.

Media reports on 6 July 2008 stated that more than 40 people, participants in a wedding ceremony, including the groom and bride, were killed in a coalition air attack in eastern Konar Province in Afghanistan. The coalition planes mistook the wedding congregation for Taliban militants.

On 17 July 2008, a coalition air raid in the Bakwah district of western Ghowr Province killed eight civilians. On Sunday 20 July 2008, 13 policemen and civilians were killed in a coalition air raid in the same province. Such repeated military blunders fuel insurgency and drive more and more people into the ranks of insurgents and terrorists.

*Qisas* (retaliation) is allowed in Islam. “An eye for an eye and blood for blood”. When people lose their family members in uncalculated, uncoordinated attacks, not only their family members but also their kin may join the insurgency as the only way to retaliate. This is not only justified in Islam, but tribal tradition in Afghanistan also makes it an obligation on relatives of victims to take revenge. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why insurgent activities have sharply risen in Afghanistan.

**Other factors**

There can be several other factors such as an incurable ailment or disease. When an ill person realises that he/she will die, they may commit a suicide attack on foreign troops or foreign installations in return for money for their family, or for the cause of their religion if lured to do so by clerics. Although such cases are very rare, they cannot be ruled out categorically.

**Flaws of policies**

An in depth, impartial study of the issue reveals that the root cause of terrorism and extremism lies in misconceived policies. This viewpoint requires some investigation into such policies and strategies.

Is there any concrete example or precedence that proves that madaris have attacked a non-Muslim country in the form of a military expedition with intent to invade that country? In principle and historically, madaris have always acted in reaction, in defence. And what about the September 11 attacks and the attacks on US military establishments in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere?

The answer is, except for the September 11 attack, that the majority of other attacks have occurred in Muslim countries where the USA and other Western countries have bases or a military presence of some sort. And the people involved in those attacks have not been madrasah students. Reports suggest that some of them were Western-educated or had graduated from non-religious institutions in Muslim countries. Many of them were individuals of high calibre with higher-education degrees. In the case of the New York attacks, the suspects even held Western nationalities. Hence, investigating these circumstances would lead one to the conclusion that the real problem lies somewhere in policies and strategies, not in madaris alone.

*Aminullah Lashkari*

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In my understanding, the biggest policy problem in this respect has been the militaristic approach to solving problems of Third World countries. This approach has recently translated into direct military interventions and establishment of permanent or long-term military bases. In fact, the military presence of foreign powers in Islamic countries is regarded as one of the factors leading to the emergence of militancy. Our past and contemporary history substantiates this point. A study of the history of British rule on the Indian subcontinent and the former Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan speak volumes about this.

There are numerous other examples in our contemporary history when suppression and oppression have caused violence and militancy, particularly when people have not been granted the free will to determine the political system of their choice, such as in Kashmir, Chechnya and Tibet. It has been a common experience that when a country deploys military troops in another country, particularly in Muslim lands, other rival states that see their interests at stake seize the opportunity to mobilise their proxies and spiritual or political leaders. These proxies use religious texts to provoke people. Thus, students of madaris, as well as ordinary people, are encouraged to wage holy war. Hence, whether the solution is a crackdown on madaris or political and economic engagement with Muslim countries with proper regulation of madaris is anyone's guess.

### **Can madaris be closed down?**

Let us assume that madaris are the root cause of terrorism and extremism -why not close them down? All it would take to do so would be to quietly cut off - without inciting public rage - the lifeline of madaris, i.e. their sources of funding.

### **Where do madaris draw funding from?**

Funding for madaris in the majority of Muslim countries primarily comes from state-regulated institutions called Wafaq al-Madaris - charitable trusts. Other informal financial sources of madaris are wealthy Muslim individuals, particularly in Arab countries and the Islamic world at large who have contributed huge sums as donations to support madaris and religious teaching centres. Therefore, if madaris are registered, it is not difficult to regulate and monitor their sources of funding.

But whether the will to stop or close them down actually exists is a question. To my understanding, there has been no such intention to date. As long as madaris remain a source for recruiting proxies to achieve political objectives, they will continue to operate freely. And, as long as there is a politics of interests, madaris will remain a source of so-called terrorism and extremism.

**Are madaris alone subject to exploitation?**

The answer is simply no! What about the Naxalite militant movement in India? What about the Maoists of Nepal before they ran in elections this year? What about the Tamils of Sri Lanka? What about the separatist movement in Tibet? They are all non-Muslim militant movements, and the list could go on.

The fact that these movements are not designated internationally as terrorist or extremist movements because they are not seen by some leading states as a threat to their interests is a different issue, but militant organisations they indeed are. All of the aforementioned movements have waged armed opposition to challenge the authority of legitimate governments.

Thus, radicalism, militancy, extremism and terrorism are not phenomena exclusive to Islam. How would one describe armed groups in India such as the Communist Party of India (Maoist)<sup>9</sup> which is fighting the government? Has this group ever been labelled communist-extremist or communist-terrorist? The Provisional IRA of Northern Ireland, which long resisted British influence, has never been described as capitalist-extremist. There is no such description or depiction of non-Islamic militant movements. Then why are Muslim individuals or groups involved in militancy called extremist Muslims? Why are concepts of terrorism and extremism exclusively linked to Islam?

**Afghanistan and the challenge of madaris from Pakistan**

Madaris took an active part in the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan. They produced jihadi literature, mobilised public opinion, and recruited and trained jihadi forces. The Pakistani military, especially the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), funnelled American and Arab money and was responsible for training jihadis at camps inside Afghanistan and in Pakistan's tribal areas. The message of jihad was originally targeted against communism. International patrons supplied arms and religious literature that flooded Pakistani madaris.

<sup>9</sup> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naxalite>

Special textbooks were published in Dari and Pashtu, designed by the Centre for Afghanistan Studies at the University of Nebraska-Omaha under a USAID grant in the early 1980s.<sup>10</sup>

Written by American Afghanistan experts and anti-Soviet Afghan educators, they aimed at promoting jihadi values and militant training among Afghans. But what went wrong is that this trend continued after the fall of the Soviet Union. After the war ended, these textbooks were still used in Afghan schools.

Consequently, the subsequent Afghan governments, including that of Mojahedin established in 1992 subsequent to the ouster of Russia-installed leader Dr Najib, had to bear the brunt. The Pakistani government continued mobilising madaris against the government of *mujahedin* in Kabul under the pretext of implementing Sharia law. Eventually, the mujahedin government collapsed, and the Taliban established a strictly Sharia-based regime in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan.

Unfortunately, this trend continues today. The elected government of Afghanistan still suffers immensely from the menace of terrorism and extremism that has found sanctuary on the other side of Afghanistan’s southern borders. But the question still remains as to whether the current militancy and insurgency is a direct outcome of madaris, and the answer is clearly no. It is the result of the policies and strategies of states. Madaris are just small players in the context of the “Great Game” in South and Central Asia. And Afghanistan has to pay the price for being geographically at the crossroads of both.

**CONCLUSION**

Terrorism and extremism are more the result of wrong, unjust and uncalculated policies rather than of an ideology. The fact that ideology acts as a catalyst to promoting terrorism and extremism is primary to the fact that such policies result in the very creation of such phenomena.

My understanding is that an economic system is more about the just and fair distribution of wealth rather than its production. Hence, establishing a just economic system to ensure a fair distribution of wealth and resources of a country, investment and creating employment opportunities, reduction of poverty and pre-eminence of justice and a limited, less visible military presence could significantly reduce the threats of terrorism and extremism.

It is therefore recommended that leading world nations in particular, and the

<sup>10</sup> [http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south\\_asia/036\\_\\_\\_pakist\\_an\\_madrasas\\_\\_extremism\\_and\\_the\\_military\\_amended.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_asia/036___pakist_an_madrasas__extremism_and_the_military_amended.pdf)

international community in general, should engage politically and economically with Third World countries. Governments of underdeveloped countries should be supported through greater political, economic and technical assistance to stand on their own feet. Underdeveloped countries need support and assistance, but they must be helped to stand independently.

Madaris, today, are institutions where rules and teachings of religion are taught. Madaris have the potential to be exploited and misused by extremist groups and states. If the exploitation of madaris is not prevented, it may lead to a clash of civilisations between Islam and other religions.

Suicide attacks are promoted by luring and misguiding people, including children and women. This is done through brainwashing in madaris. This sometimes even involves provocation of personal hostilities.

Over the past three years, many cases of suicide attacks by young children were registered in Afghanistan. The exploitation of children as militants and suicide bombers has been the biggest concern of the government of Afghanistan and society at large. Such a new generation of young people with a mentality of violence and terror can become a long-term threat for Afghanistan, the region and the entire world. It is thus important to devise a comprehensive strategy to ensure Afghanistan's transition to democracy in this period of international and regional crisis.

The government of Afghanistan understands the benefits of democracy, promoted by Western states. That is why the Afghan government has remained steadfast in its battle against forces of darkness to ensure that enlightenment and prosperity can prevail.

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