



Sodobni vojaški izzivi

Contemporary Military Challenges

Znanstveno-strokovna publikacija Slovenske vojske

ISSN 2463-9575
Oktober 2018 – 20/št. 3



REPUBLIKA SLOVENIJA
MINISTRSTVO ZA OBRAMBO
GENERALŠTAB SLOVENSKE VOJSKE

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Izdajatelj Publisher	Generalštab Slovenske vojske General Staff of the Slovenian Armed Forces
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Lektoriranje Proofreading	Marjetka Brulec, Vesna Vrabič, Justi Carey, Vlasta Deželak
Oblikovanje Design & Graphic	Skupina Opus Design
Tisk Print	Collegium Graphicum
ISSN	2232-2825 (tiskana različica/print version) 2463-9575 (spletna različica/ on line version)
Naklada Edition	300 izvodov/copies Izhaja štirikrat na leto/ Four issues per year
Revija je dostopna na spletni strani Publication web page	http://www.slovenskavojska.si/publikacije/sodobni-vojaski-izzivi/ http://www.slovenskavojska.si/en/publications/contemporary-military-challenges/
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
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Publikacija je uvrščena v bibliografsko zbirko podatkov COBISS.SI in PAIS International.
 Articles, published in the Contemporary Military Challenges do not reflect the official viewpoint of the Slovenian Armed Forces nor the bodies in which the authors of articles are employed.
The publication is indexed in bibliography databases COBISS.SI and PAIS International.

PESCO – VEČ VARNOSTI ZA EVROPO

*»No, Maister, ki od misli ti in sanj,
bilo je dano priti do dejanj...
Kaj hočem jaz, ki v tega časa zmede
metati morem prazne le besede!«
Oton Župančič, V zarje Vidove, 1920*

PESCO – MORE SECURITY FOR EUROPE

*»Well, Maister, you have seen your dreams come true,
your acts were thoughts you'd followed through.
But I, I throw my empty words around
this puzzled world, devoid of sense or sound!«
Oton Župančič, V zarje Vidove, 1920
(translated by Urban Soban)*



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UVODNIK

PESCO – VEČ VARNOSTI ZA EVROPO

Konec leta, natančneje 13. decembra, bo prva obletnica ustanovitve Pesca. Angleška kratica izhaja iz *Permanent Structured Cooperation*, kar pomeni Stalno strukturno sodelovanje.

Pesco naj bi poglobil obrambno sodelovanje med državami članicami Evropske unije (EU), in sicer pri razvijanju skupnih obrambnih zmogljivostih, skupnih projektih in operativni pripravljenosti ter prispevanju oboroženih sil.

EU je v zgodnjih začetkih največ pozornosti namenjala ekonomskemu napredku držav članic, kar je bil v desetletju po koncu druge svetovne vojne zelo logičen cilj. Varnost in obramba sta se pozneje pojavljala v zametkih v obliki Zahodnoevropske unije, skupne zunanje in varnostne politike itn. Do začetka vojne v nekdanji Jugoslaviji EU ni imela resnih razlogov, da bi se področju varnosti temeljito posvetila. Varnostna politika je bila ena izmed politik, ki so bile prisotne predvsem »na papirju« in v različnih razpravah, kar je prišlo najbolj do izraza prav pri vrenju v tako imenovanem balkanskem kotlu. To je bil dober preizkus delovanja EU in prav tu se je pokazalo, da bo treba nekaj temeljito spremeniti. Eden od rezultatov je bilo tudi večje angažiranje v mednarodnih operacijah in na misijah. Opazovalna misija je bila napotena v Gruzijo, policijska in pravosodna na Kosovo, za pomoč pri posledicah cunamija v Indonezijo, za boj proti piratom v Somalijo in za zaščito beguncev v Mali.

Drugi prelomni preizkus delovanja EU na področju varnosti in obrambe je bila evropska migrantska kriza leta 2015, pri čemer je prišlo najbolj do izraza pomanjkanje ustreznih politik na ravni EU. Šlo je za kontradiktornost politik, ki veljajo znotraj EU za države članice in njihove prebivalce ter za vse druge države in njihove prebivalce, za katere visoke vrednote, etične norme in socialne ugodnosti prenehajo veljati, kadar gre za izjemno veliko število prišlekov. Preden so se pomembni organi EU sestali, posvetovali, odločili in ukrepali, so se problemi na različnih področjih namnožili, eden izmed ključnih pa je bil varnostni problem.

Drugih vplivov, ki so bili vzrok za nastanek Pesca, je bilo še veliko, o njih v nadaljevanju pišejo avtorji. Naj le omenim, da je EU na prelomnici, saj je vedno bolj prisoten evroskepticizem, o katerem so veliko govorili tudi na Strateškem forumu na Bledu.

Ali bo Pesco zgodba o uspehu, ugotavljata **Petra Culetto** in **Jure Himerajh** v članku *Pesco – na poti k evropski varnostni in obrambni uniji ali še en spodletel poskus evropske skupnosti?* Avtorja trdita, da sta glavna namena Pesca nadaljnja integracija in poglobitev sodelovanja na varnostnem in obrambnem področju. Kakšna bo njegova prihodnost in vloga Slovenije pri tem?

Strategija in vojaške zmogljivosti za odvrčanje je naslov članka **Anžeta Rodeta**, v katerem preučuje strateške spremembe v varnostnem okolju, nove oblike groženj in pozicioniranje malih držav pri zagotavljanju svoje obrambe v odnosu do velikih. Velike države so v mednarodnih zaveznih kljub vsemu v nekoliko drugačnem položaju kot male, zato avtor predlaga nekaj pobud za Slovenijo in Slovensko vojsko.

O odzivih na spremembe v mednarodnem varnostnem okolju pišeta **József Padányi** in **László Földi** v članku *Modernizacija v madžarski vojski*. Ugotavljata, da je posodabljanje opreme in tehnologije pomembno v oboroženih silah. Treba je iti v korak s časom, skrbeti za varnost posameznika in svoje države ter odigrati svojo vlogo v zavezništvu.

Paket ciljev zmogljivosti za Slovensko vojsko za leto 2017 predvideva postavitev srednjih bataljonskih bojnih skupin z vozili, ki so opremljena s 30 mm topom, pravi **Viktor Potočnik** v članku *Oklepni transporter ali bojno vozilo pehote v srednji bataljonski bojni skupini*, kar po mnenju avtorja pomeni nekaj strokovnih neznank. Te so pojasnjene v članku. Avtor ponuja celo nekaj rešitev.

Džihadizem in radikalizacija v izbranih regijah Evrope, Bližnjega vzhoda in Severne Afrike – študija primera je tema članka **Józsefa Kisa-Benedeka**. Izhaja iz trendov zadnjih dveh let, ko se državljani različnih evropskih držav aktivno vključujejo v boje v Siriji in se iz njih vračajo nazaj v matično državo. Kaj to za matične države pomeni v varnostnem smislu? Avtor z nami deli nekaj zanimivih, drugačnih pogledov.

Varnostni trendi določajo spremembe na več področjih in področje varnosti se spreminja že samo po sebi. Po navadi sicer prepočasi, a pri varnosti gre za občutljive vsebine, ki morajo biti dobro premišljene, odlično zapisane in vsestransko organizirane. Zato je pomembno, da znanstveniki in strokovnjaki, civilni in vojaški, izmenjujejo izkušnje, poglede in ideje glede prihodnje varnosti. Ena izmed možnosti je tudi sodelovanje v naši publikaciji.

Vabljeni k branju in pisanju!

EDITORIAL

PESCO – MORE SECURITY FOR EUROPE

The end of this year, more precisely 13 December, will mark the first anniversary of the initiation of PESCO. The acronym PESCO refers to Permanent Structured Cooperation.

The objective of PESCO is to deepen defence cooperation of EU Member States (EU) in the development of common defence capabilities, joint projects and operational readiness as well as military contribution.

In its early beginnings, the EU devoted most of its attention to the economic progress of its member states, which was a very logical goal in the decade following the end of World War II. Later on, the rudiments of security and defence appeared in the form of the Western European Union, Common Foreign and Security Policy and the like. Until the start of war in the former Yugoslavia, the EU did not have a serious need or reason to particularly focus on security. Security policy was just one of the policies that had mainly been present on paper and in various debates. This became particularly obvious in the case of the intensive developments in the Balkans. This case very well tested the functioning of the EU and revealed the need for fundamental changes. One of the results was also an increased engagement in the field of international operations and missions: an observation mission in Georgia, a police and the rule of law mission in Kosovo, mission to assist in the aftermath of a tsunami in Indonesia, a counter-piracy mission in Somalia, and a mission protecting refugees in Mali.

The second key milestone in the EU's security and defence engagement was the European migration crisis in 2015. Here, the lack of appropriate policies at the EU level became most evident. More precisely, it revealed the contradictory application of the policies within the EU to member states and their citizens, and to those other countries and their inhabitants who do not benefit from the high values, ethical standards and social advantages when they arrive in unimaginably large numbers.

Before the important EU bodies met, consulted, decided and acted, many problems in different areas had been identified. One of the key issues was the security problem.

However, there were still many other influences that gave rise to the creation of PESCO. They are discussed by the authors in this issue. Nevertheless, let me just mention that the EU has in some way found itself at a turning point due to the increasingly present Euroscepticism, which was also discussed at this year's Strategic Forum at Bled.

In their article *PESCO - on the way to a European security and defence union or another dead end?* **Petra Culetto** and **Jure Himerajh** try to establish whether or not PESCO will become a success story. The authors argue that the main purpose of PESCO is to further integrate and deepen the security and defence cooperation. What will be its future and the role of Slovenia in it?

Strategy and military deterrence capabilities is the title of the article by **Anže Rode**, in which he examines the strategic changes in the security environment, new forms of threats and the positioning of small countries in securing their defence against bigger ones. After all, in the international alliances, the position of big countries is slightly different. Therefore, the author proposes several initiatives for Slovenia and the Slovenian Armed Forces.

In their article *Modernization within the Hungarian Armed Forces* **József Padányi** and **László Földi** write about the changes in the international security environment. They find that the modernization of equipment and technology in the armed forces is important. It is therefore necessary to keep abreast of the times, provide for the security of individuals, their country, and perform one's role in the Alliance.

The 2017 Capability Targets of the Slovenian Armed Forces foresee the generation of medium infantry battalion groups with vehicles fitted with 30mm cannons, says **Viktor Potočnik** in his article *Armoured personnel carrier or infantry fighting vehicle in a medium infantry battalion group*. According to the author, this opens a few unknowns, which are defined in the article. What is more, the author even provides some solutions.

Jihadism and radicalisation in selected regions of Europe, the Middle East and North Africa - a case study is the article by **József Kis-Benedek**. It emerges from the trends of the last two years, when the citizens of various European countries have been actively engaging in the fights in Syria and have been returning from these fights back to their countries. What does this mean for their native countries security-wise? The author shares some interesting and different viewpoints.

Security trends demand changes in several areas, and the field of security changes in itself. Usually, changes happen too slowly, but the field of security is a sensitive one

and the changes need to be well thought out, perfectly written and comprehensively organized. It is therefore important that scientists and experts, both civilian and military, exchange their experiences, views and ideas about security in the future. One of the options to do that is our publication.

You are most welcome to read and write!

PESCO – NA POTI K EVROPSKI VARNOSTNI IN OBRAMBNI UNIJI ALI ŠE EN SPODLETEL POSKUS EVROPSKE SKUPNOSTI?

PESCO – ON THE WAY TO A EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION OR ANOTHER DEAD END?

Povzetek V članku sta predstavljena razmeroma celovit pregled dejavnikov, ki so pripeljali do Stalnega strukturnega sodelovanja, in dejanski politični postopek, vključno s pravnimi določili, ki so omogočili notifikacijo v EU in Sloveniji, ter s pogoji, ki bodo morali biti izpolnjeni, da bo PESCO uspešen. Vse od druge svetovne vojne si je Evropska skupnost prizadevala oblikovati tesnejše vezi na področju obrambe. Eden glavnih prebojev se je zgodil decembra 2017, ko so članice EU po več kot šestih desetletjih usklajevanja in dogovarjanja aktivirale nekatere manj vidne člene Lizbonske pogodbe ter tako vzpostavile stalno strukturno sodelovanje na obrambnem področju. Glavni namen Pesca sta nadaljnja integracija in poglobitev sodelovanja na varnostnem in obrambnem področju. S priključitvijo Pescu so države članice potrdile svojo pravno zavezujočo odločitev, da bodo izboljšale učinkovitost na področju koordinacije in sodelovanja, obrambnih investicij, postavitve zmogljivosti in operativne pripravljenosti. Najpomembnejši dejavniki, ki bodo prispevali k uspešnosti Pesca, so ohranjanje obrambnih in varnostnih vprašanj visoko na evropski politični agendi in izpolnjevanje prevzetih obveznosti.

Ključne besede *Stalno strukturno sodelovanje, Evropska unija, Slovenija, obrambna industrija, obrambni proračuni.*

Abstract This article aims at providing the reader with a fairly comprehensive overview of the conditions that have led to PESCO and the actual political process of, including the legal provisions for, getting PESCO notified in the EU and in the Republic of Slovenia. Also, the authors analyse the conditions that need to be met for PESCO to be successful. Ever since the Second World War, the European Community has been struggling to form closer ties in the area of defence. One of the major breakthroughs took place in December 2017, when member states activated some of the less publicised articles of the Lisbon Treaty and thus established a permanent structured cooperation in the area of defence. The main purpose of PESCO is to

further integrate and strengthen cooperation in the field of security and defence. By joining PESCO, member states have confirmed their legally binding commitment to improve efficiency with regard to coordination and cooperation, military investment, capability development and operational readiness. For PESCO to be successful, it is crucial that the EU keeps defence and security issues high on the European political agenda and that member states fulfil their commitments.

Key words *Permanent Structured Cooperation, European Union, Slovenia, defence industry, defence budget.*

Introduction The acronym PESCO has been a "buzz word" since its inception in December 2017. While most people understand that it stands for Permanent Structured Cooperation, many still have difficulties comprehending why PESCO is the most important development in the area of European defence since the failed European Defence Community Treaty. This article aims at providing the Slovenian and the broader audience with a fairly comprehensive overview of the conditions that lead to PESCO and the actual political process of, including legal provisions for, getting PESCO notified in the EU and in Slovenia, and conditions that need to be met for PESCO to be successful.

The article starts with a historical overview of the European defence integration. Throughout the six plus decades, the trend of improving cooperation among European countries in the field of defence has mostly been slow but positive. The pace changed with the emergence of new threats and recent developments in the global geopolitical environment. The crisis in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region following the Arab Spring, the re-emerging Russian threat, recent terrorist attacks in several European countries, the Brexit and some of the emerging American policies have provided a much-needed push and shifted momentum in favour of closer integration that led to PESCO.

The section of the article titled Shifting gears attempts to look beyond official EU definitions and various common interpretations to explain what PESCO is. That explanation is upgraded with the analysis of the decision-making process for notifying PESCO within the legal frameworks of the EU and Slovenia. It is important for strategic leaders to understand this process as they will be responsible for the implementation of PESCO.

Authors conclude with the potential risks and the conditions that need to be fulfilled in order for PESCO to be successful. These include internal factors (interconnection and timing of defence tools, such as CARD, EDF, CDP and project realisation) and external factors (complementarity with NATO and economic interests of member states).

1 THE ROCKY ROAD OF THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE INTEGRATION

Soon after the inception of the European Coal and Steel Community, its members began pursuing the idea of common European defence structures. The idea matured with the proposed "Treaty Establishing the European Defence Community", that among other provisions called for a European army with 40 divisions, a common budget, joint procurement and common institutions (EPSC Strategic Notes, 2015, p. 7). The treaty was never implemented because in 1954, the French Parliament failed to ratify it.

Since then, the effort to revive the idea of a common defence structure has been gaining and losing momentum. With the expansion of the European Community and the increased number of member states, the potential for further defence integration diminished. Furthermore, the establishment of NATO supplanted the need for a common European defence structure.

1.1 From Petersberg tasks to the Common Security and Defence Policy

It was only after the fall of the Iron Curtain and the beginning of the Balkan wars that members of the European Community, in this case the Western European Union (WEU), put defence back on the political agenda. With the Petersberg Declaration, signed in 1992, the WEU members agreed to engage in humanitarian and rescue tasks, as well as peacekeeping and crisis management. The Declaration established a framework for the EU civilian and military missions and operations (EU External Action, 2016).

The following 15 years showed very slow progress in the area of common defence. Perhaps the most important event was the Saint-Malo summit between Tony Blair (UK Prime Minister) and Jacques Chirac (French President) in December 1998. The meeting signalled a change in position by the UK, once a strong opponent to closer European defence integration. The Saint-Malo Joint Declaration on European Defence paved the way for the creation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) at the European Council meeting in Cologne in June 1999.

1.2 Gaining momentum


In the following years, the momentum was carried on via:

- the Helsinki Military Headline Goal for 2003 of setting up a corps level force of about 60,000 strong, deployable within 60 days and sustainable for a year (Helsinki European Council Conclusions adopted in 1999);
- Berlin Plus Agreement, which formalised the EU-NATO relationship (March 2003);
- the development of the European Security Strategy (published in December 2003);
- Treaty of Lisbon, which expanded the Petersberg tasks, created the European External Action Service and the position of the High Representative for Foreign

Affairs and Security Policy, as well as a framework for the Permanent Structured Cooperation (signed in October 2007, entered into force in December 2009).

However, it was the actual security threats that significantly shifted the pendulum towards stronger cooperation and consequently created conditions for the implementation of the structured cooperation. From the unrest in Egypt, Libya and Syria to terrorist attacks and the migrant crisis that shook the foundations of the EU and facilitated Brexit, member states finally realised that the area of defence had been neglected for far too long and that it was time to act. After more than 60 years, the efforts to establish a common European defence structure came to a full circle with the establishment of PESCO in December 2017.

Graphics 1:
European defence integration timeline (EPSC Strategic Notes, 2015, p. 7 with additional events added by the authors)



2 SHIFTING GEARS

While in the period before 2014, the EU progress in the area of defence had been slow, it has since gained significant momentum. The following factors have been regarded as the major reasons:

1. *Crisis in the MENA region following the Arab Spring in 2010.* The resulting conflicts, especially in Libya and Syria, have created conditions for millions of refugees and displaced persons to come to European countries, overwhelming the border security and demonstrating the inability of the EU members to protect the Schengen Area. Vague EU policies regarding the movement of migrants and refugees are still creating divisions among Europeans. In addition, operations in Libya have shown critical shortage of strategic enablers and poor readiness of fixed and rotary wing assets (EPSC Strategic Notes, 2015, p. 3).
2. *Re-emergence of the Russian threat following the Russian Federation's annexation of Crimea and subsequent actions in the Donetsk and Luhansk area.* Russian activities in Ukraine, which shares borders with four EU members, again brought conventional war to the doorstep of the EU. Close economic ties and dependence of certain EU members on Russian energy sources further complicate the situation. The prospect of a large-scale war on the EU's eastern flank contributed to the reversal of decreasing defence budgets in many EU member states and set the course for closer cooperation in the area of defence.
3. *Threat of terrorism in Europe.* Since 2015, there has been a sharp increase in both the number of attacks and deaths caused by terrorism in Europe (2015 Paris, Charlie Hebdo, 2016 Brussels, Nice, Berlin, 2017 Stockholm, Paris, Manchester, Barcelona and London). With the downfall of ISIS, the threat of terrorist attacks has not diminished. European extremists who fought in Syria and Iraq are returning to their home countries.
4. *The British decision to leave the European Union.* The British have long been considered a show-stopper for European cooperation in the area of defence. That changed to a degree with the failure of the EU to prevent the war in Kosovo and the Saint-Malo Declaration in 1998. However, it was the Brexit Referendum in June 2016 that eliminated one of the major obstacles, the traditional British opposition, for closer EU defence integration.
5. *Election of Donald J. Trump as the President of the United States of America.* One of the pillars of Trump's presidential campaign was the "America First" policy (Glasser, 2018). Since 2016, he has often publicly criticised NATO members of freeriding and bandwagoning, taking advantage of the USA military spending while shining away from own responsibilities and cutting down defence budgets. Trump's threats of the USA not honouring Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty have had a strong echo among EU leaders, especially those geographically close to the Russian Federation.
6. *Increased defence budgets of the Russian Federation, China, and Saudi Arabia.* These countries have significantly increased their defence budgets while European countries have been cutting defence costs. Furthermore, cyber-attacks are becoming a common occurrence, instability in the MENA region is becoming

a breeding ground for the ISIS type organisations, etc. It seems that the time of relative peace following the fall of the Iron Curtain is slowly coming to an end.

The above-mentioned reasons have tipped the scale in favour of what Jean-Claude Juncker has called "the Sleeping Beauty of the Lisbon Treaty" – the Permanent Structured Cooperation.

3 WHAT IS THE PERMANENT STRUCTURED COOPERATION (PESCO)?

To truly understand what PESCO aims for, one needs to know how the main actors in the EU reached the consensus to establish it. Once the UK, with its predominantly Euro-Atlantic focus, was out of the picture, it was mostly up to France and Germany to determine how the EU would progress in the area of defence (Working group no. 5 – Eurocorps, 2018, p. 6). After Brexit, both countries will claim about 50 percent of military and industrial capabilities within the EU (Major, 2018). The French, in favour of strong expeditionary forces, advocated for a smaller, exclusive cooperation focused on building operational capabilities. This is a more pragmatic approach that would circumvent EU's tedious bureaucratic processes. The Germans, on the other hand, preferred an inclusive approach and saw the advance of the European defence based on the development of a robust European defence industry.

Despite two opposite approaches and without a solid compromise, there was enough political will to establish PESCO. The official definition is that "Permanent Structured Cooperation is a treaty-based framework and process to deepen defence cooperation among participating member states to develop capabilities and increase their operational availability" (EU External Action, 2018). While this statement seems fairly straightforward, the interpretations of it vary: they extend from another half-hearted EU attempt to advance cooperation in the area of defence to an emergence of a European army.

The simple explanation is that PESCO is a structured (not an *ad hoc*) cooperation established by a treaty (and therefore, it is legally binding). It is the driving force behind the EU's long-term goal to establish a European Security and Defence Union. This goal will be achieved by advancing along the following parallel lines of effort via common projects:

- Transforming the EU's defence industry and procurement system, thus increasing the effectiveness of military spending;
- Significantly reducing the number of different weapons systems, vehicles and other military equipment, which will increase interoperability and substantially reduce costs;
- Significantly improving operational capabilities of member states to include the revival of the EU Battle Groups (EUBG) and actually deploying them to operations;

- Integrating PESCO, European Defence Fund (EDF) and Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) under the Common Defence and Security Policy (CSDP).

Even though interpretations of PESCO differ, there is a common theme throughout the studied literature, that is, the importance of increased investment in the area of defence. By joining PESCO, member states have willingly taken on an additional pressure to invest more and better in defence. What was supposed to be an "exclusive" group of the capable and willing now includes nearly all of the EU members. For a change, there is also a mechanism to sanction states.

In addition to very general goals that could enhance European defence capacity, there are specific commitments linked to PESCO. These are included in the binding Common Commitments and grouped according to a common theme (five areas set out by Article 2 of Protocol No. 10 and twenty common commitments stated in the Notification):

- *Funds*; members are to regularly increase defence budgets in real terms, raise investment expenditure to 20 percent, increase number of strategic projects and link them to EDF funding, increase research and development expenditure to 2 percent, and establish regular review of commitments.
- *Improve national defence apparatus*; implement and completely support the CARD, close identified capability gaps, increase involvement of EDF in multinational procurement, agree on requirements for all capabilities, jointly use existing capabilities, and increase efforts in the area on cyber defence.
- *Enhance availability, interoperability and flexibility of member states' forces*; make available strategically deployable formations in addition to EUBG, create a common database with records of available and rapidly deployable capabilities, review national decision-making processes and shorten them, fully support CSDP operations, substantially contribute to EUBG, simplify and standardise cross-border military movement, optimise the existing multinational structures (EUROCORPS, EUROMARFOR, etc.), and increase funding of CSDP operations and missions.
- *Work within NATO to overcome shortfalls perceived in the framework of the Capability Development Mechanism (CDM)*; close capability gaps identified in CDM and CARD to increase EU's strategic autonomy and strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), use a collaborative approach to close national capability gaps, and take part in at least one strategically relevant PESCO project.
- *Develop joint or European equipment programmes in the framework of the EDA*; use EDA as the European forum for joint capability development, consider Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR) to manage projects, avoid overlap and make European defence industry more competitive, and make sure acquisition strategies have a positive impact on the EDTIB.

In the long-term, PESCO is a part of the EU's goal to fundamentally transform member states' approach to defence integration. Starting point is implementation of common projects and integration of other EU defence tools (CAP, CARD, EDF, etc). Gradual progress will occur under a comprehensive CSDP and in a complementary manner with NATO. The end goal is a European Security and Defence Union.

4 THE EU'S LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEADING TO PESCO

PESCO roots back to the ideas of closer and enhanced cooperation in EU policy-making laid down in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and the 2001 Nice Treaty. However, the Lisbon Treaty's key articles that enabled the establishment of PESCO in December 2017 were already included in the draft Constitutional Treaty in 2003 (Article I-41(6), Article III-312 and a dedicated protocol), which the French and the Dutch voters rejected in 2005. After the re-thinking period of two years, the Lisbon Treaty was signed in 2007 and successfully entered into force two years later. It incorporated largely unchanged provisions on PESCO from the Constitutional Treaty, now governed by Articles 42 (6),¹ 46² and Protocol No. 10 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU).

¹ »Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework. Such cooperation shall be governed by Article 46. It shall not affect the provisions of Article 43«.

² 1. Those Member States which wish to participate in the permanent structured cooperation referred to in Article 42(6), which fulfil the criteria and have made the commitments on military capabilities set out in the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation, shall notify their intention to the Council and to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

2. Within three months following the notification referred to in paragraph 1 the Council shall adopt a decision establishing permanent structured cooperation and determining the list of participating Member States. The Council shall act by a qualified majority after consulting the High Representative.

3. Any Member State which, at a later stage, wishes to participate in the permanent structured cooperation shall notify its intention to the Council and to the High Representative. The Council shall adopt a decision confirming the participation of the Member State concerned which fulfils the criteria and makes the commitments referred to in Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation. The Council shall act by a qualified majority after consulting the High Representative. Only members of the Council representing the participating Member States shall take part in the vote. A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

4. If a participating Member State no longer fulfils the criteria or is no longer able to meet the commitments referred to in Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation, the Council may adopt a decision suspending the participation of the Member State concerned. The Council shall act by a qualified majority. Only members of the Council representing the participating Member States, with the exception of the Member State in question, shall take part in the vote. A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

5. Any participating Member State which wishes to withdraw from permanent structured cooperation shall notify its intention to the Council, which shall take note that the Member State in question has ceased to participate.

6. The decisions and recommendations of the Council within the framework of permanent structured cooperation, other than those provided for in paragraphs 2 to 5, shall be adopted by unanimity. For the purposes of this paragraph, unanimity shall be constituted by the votes of the representatives of the participating Member States only.«

For years, there have been requests for the EU member states to use the existing instruments, some of which, like PESCO, have remained unexploited until recently. The 2016 Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy already urged for more cooperation between member states in security and defence, which "might lead to a more structured form of cooperation, making full use of the Lisbon Treaty's potential" (Global Strategy, p. 48). In October 2016, the EU foreign ministers decided on the most important strategic priorities for implementing the EU Global Strategy. Among them, security and defence are one of the priorities with the aim to strengthen the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and CSDP. While NATO remains the primary framework, a more credible European defence is essential for EU's internal and external security. Therefore, "an appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy" is required for Europe's ability to promote peace and security within and outside its borders while translating objectives enshrined in the Treaties into action.

European Council Conclusions in June 2017 put PESCO at the forefront of strengthening EU security and defence as well as in the context of global geopolitical challenges (e.g. fighting terrorism, hybrid threats, economic volatility, climate change, and energy insecurity), with the aim to reach new levels of ambition defined in the EU Global Strategy. The heads of states and governments decided that within three months, member states would agree on a common list of criteria and commitments, together with concrete capability projects, in order to start this cooperation. In November 2017, 23 EU member states, with the exception of Denmark,³ Ireland, Malta,⁴ Portugal and the UK⁵, notified the High Representative Frederica Mogherini and the Council of their intention to join PESCO. The notification ceremony took place in Brussels on 13 November 2017 and was the first formal step to establish PESCO.

On 11 December, the Council adopted a decision establishing PESCO at the Foreign Affairs Council. After dealing with some domestic difficulties, Ireland and Portugal joined PESCO before it was formally established in December 2017, bringing the number up to 25. At the same time, member states participating in PESCO adopted a Declaration on PESCO Projects, which welcomed the political agreement identifying an initial list of seventeen projects to be undertaken under PESCO. The projects cover areas such as training, capability development and operational readiness in the field of defence. On 14 December 2017 the European Council welcomed on the highest political level in its Conclusions the establishment of ambitious and inclusive PESCO and stressed the importance of quickly implementing the first projects as well as called on the participating member states to deliver on their national implementation plans.

³ Denmark has remained out because it has had an opt-out from EU defence cooperation since 1992.

⁴ Malta is concerned that certain aspects of PESCO might be in breach of the neutrality clause of its Constitution. However, Malta has indicated that it might revise its position once it sees how PESCO is implemented in practice.

⁵ UK's decision is understandable since it is expected to leave the EU in 2019.

On 6 March 2018, the Council formally adopted the first set of projects and the project members for each of them⁶ as well as a Recommendation which set out a roadmap for the further implementation of PESCO. Each participating member state is required to annually communicate their National Implementation Plan (NIP), informing the other participating member states on how it is contributing to the fulfilment of the binding commitments it has undertaken. These NIPs form the basis of the assessment process, as described in the Council decision establishing PESCO. Each year, the High Representative will present a report on PESCO to the Council. On this basis, the Council will, also annually, review whether the participating member states continue to fulfil the more binding commitments listed in Section 3. In line with the Recommendation on the Roadmap, the participating member states will submit their NIPs every year in January. Based on the assessment done by the PESCO Secretariat, the High Representative will present the annual PESCO report to the Council in spring, in view of the Council's review of the fulfilment of the commitments by the individual participating member states.

On 25 June 2018, the Council adopted Conclusions which highlighted the significant progress in strengthening cooperation in the area of security and defence and a Decision establishing the common set of governance rules for the PESCO projects. The Decision includes an obligation to report on progress to the Council once a year, based on the roadmap with objectives and milestones agreed within each project. The European Council Conclusions from 28 June 2018 called for the fulfilment of the PESCO commitments and further development of the initial projects and the institutional framework, in a way that is fully consistent with CARD and the revised CDP adopted within the European Defence Agency (EDA). Each year, the process to generate new projects will be launched in view of updating the list of projects and their participants. An updated list of PESCO projects and their participants, including a second wave of projects,⁷ is expected by November 2018.

⁶ *The agreed-upon projects are:*

1. European Medical Command; 2. European Secure Software-Defined Radio (ESSOR); 3. Network of Logistic Hubs in Europe and Support to Operations; 4. Military Mobility; 5. European Union Training Mission Competence Centre (EU TMCC); 6. European Training Certification Centre for European Armies; 7. Energy Operational Function (EOF); 8. Deployable Military Disaster Relief Capability Package; 9. Maritime (semi-) Autonomous Systems for Mine Countermeasures (MAS MCM); 10. Harbour & Maritime Surveillance and Protection (HARMSPRO); 11. Upgrade of Maritime Surveillance; 12. Cyber Threats and Incident Response Information Sharing Platform; 13. Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance in Cyber Security; 14. Strategic Command and Control (C2) System for CSDP Missions and Operations; 15. Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle / Amphibious Assault Vehicle / Light Armoured Vehicle; 16. Indirect Fire Support (EuroArtillery); 17. EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core (EUFOR CROC). Slovenia as a member participates in two projects (Military Mobility and Network of Logistic Hubs in Europe and Support to Operations) and as an observer in five projects (Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance in Cyber Security; European Union Training Mission Competence Centre; Cyber Threats and Incident Response Information Sharing Platform; Indirect Fire Support and EUFOR Crisis Support Operation Core).

⁷ *For the new package of projects, Slovenia, together with Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, proposed a new project called CBRN Surveillance as a Service (CBRN SaaS) with the aim to develop capabilities to identify CBRN threats.*

5 SLOVENIA'S PATH IN JOINING PESCO

The decision-making process regarding EU affairs in Slovenia is regulated with the Cooperation between the National Assembly and the Government in EU Affairs Act and in subsection 2a (Procedure of dealing with EU affairs) of Chapter IV (Acts and procedures) of the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly.

On 13 November 2017, during the Foreign Affairs Council in the configuration of foreign and defence ministers, Slovenia signed the Notification. Before the actual signing, on 9 November, that is, during 155th Governmental session, the Slovenian Government adopted the decision to join PESCO at the very beginning and to inform the National Assembly's Committee on Defence and the Committee on Foreign Policy about its decision. The next day, the decision was discussed at a closed common session of the Committee on EU Affairs (148th session) and the Committee on Foreign Policy (99th session) under the first item on the agenda – Meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council, Brussels, 13 November 2017. The record of the session was not made public; however, taking into account that three days later, the Minister of Foreign affairs signed the Notification, we can rightly assume that both parliamentary committees supported the Government's decision.

Furthermore, on 17 November 2017, during its 149th session, the Committee on EU Affairs discussed the Government's positions on the meeting of the General Affairs Council on 11 November 2017, which included a draft agenda of the meeting of the European Council in December. The draft agenda announced defence as one of the main topics. At the committee session, the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained that the heads of states and governments were to get acquainted with the establishment of PESCO and that they would discuss the progress made regarding the EU-NATO cooperation. After a short discussion, the members of parliament adopted the proposed positions with unanimity.

Additionally, a common session of the Committee on EU Affairs (153rd session) and Committee on Foreign Policy (101st session) was held on 8 December 2017, where three points of the agenda were discussed (Meeting of the General Affairs Council, Brussels, 12 December 2017; Meeting of the European Council, Brussels, 14 and 15 December 2017; and the Meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council, Brussels, 12 December 2017). The documents included positions of the Foreign Minister and Prime Minister, adopted a day earlier at the 159th governmental session, to be presented at the meetings in Brussels. The public part of the session (only the first point) shows that all three points on the agenda included PESCO. Due to the public part of the session and the fact that the Prime Minister supported the establishment of PESCO at the December European Council, it is apparent that the committees took note of the Government's positions and supported them.

During its 60th urgent session on 29 January 2018, the Committee on Defence discussed the only item on the agenda – Explanation and Implementation Plan for

meeting the criteria and commitments of the Republic of Slovenia for inclusion in the Permanent Structured Cooperation in the field of security and defence of the European Union. The Government discussed and adopted the NIP during its 158th session on 30 November 2017. At the end of the committee's session, the members of parliament unanimously, with 10 votes for and none against, adopted two decisions (Sklepa 60. nujne seje Odbora za obrambo):

1. As it is apparent from the presentation itself at the Committee's meeting and in the documents, the aim of the cooperation is to strengthen security and defence in the territory of EU member states. Insofar as PESCO will be set up in such a way that the cooperation of the member states will bring added value to the integration and strengthening of security of the European Union, the Committee on Defence supports such cooperation.
1. Committee on Defence suggests to the Government to keep it fully and regularly informed on the progress of Slovenia's integration in PESCO.

6 WHAT NEEDS TO HAPPEN FOR PESCO TO WORK?

PESCO has great potential to change the way the EU member states organise their defence cooperation, in a structured way with a permanent, long-term perspective based on the accountability of the participating member states who have made more binding commitments to one another (PESCO Secretariat, 2018, p. 18). However, PESCO's ability to improve the participating member states' capabilities and enhance the deployability of their forces will depend on their ability to "keep the freshly awoken Sleeping Beauty from snoozing" (Nováky, 2018, p. 100). More specifically, a successful PESCO requires the implementation of specific internal and external factors. Firstly, regarding the internal factors, (1) the participating member states must do more than the minimum required to fulfil their binding commitments; (2) PESCO's implementation must be monitored rigorously at the national and EU levels and sanctions must be implemented when necessary; (3) PESCO needs to be synchronised with other relevant tools; (4) projects must produce results. Secondly, external factors which need to be taken into consideration are: (1) keeping complementarity with NATO in mind at all times; (2) coordination of national and economic interests; (3) fulfilling binding common commitments listed in Section 3.

6.1 Internal factors

i. Fulfilment of conditions, regular control and sanctions

It is paramount to preserve the core aspect that differentiates PESCO from previous defence cooperation initiatives, that is, the binding nature of the common commitments member states have signed up to. The way PESCO is implemented and monitored should unambiguously reflect this binding character. Hopefully, it will trigger a change of thinking of the EU decision-makers where the "European collaborative approach" should be considered "as a priority" (Commitment No. 16), with a view of ensuring more common planning, harmonised requirements, joint capability development and a common use of forces in the future (PESCO Secretariat, 2018, p. 18).

As Biscop (2018, p. 165) argues, developing a culture of compliance is crucial. For now, it seems that the mechanisms in place to ensure that member states will actually live up to their commitments are built on the NIPs. NIPs were presented at the PESCO launch and are foreseen to be updated on an annual basis. They outline how each of the member states intends to meet its overall commitments and the more specific objectives to be fulfilled at each phase. In order to also have a "stick" to sanction noncompliance, the Notification states that "as a last resort, the Council may suspend the participation of a member state who no longer fulfils the criteria, given beforehand a clearly defined timeframe for individual consultation and reaction measures, or is no longer able or willing to meet the PESCO commitments and obligations, in accordance with Article 46 (4) TEU". At the end of the day, the real question that arises is still whether the Council will be willing to suspend the participation of a member state that systematically fails to meet its commitments.

ii. **Interconnection and timing of tools (CARD, EDF, CDP)**

PESCO, as part of a comprehensive defence package, is closely connected to the CARD, EDF and CDP. According to official data (European Union External Action and PESCO Secretariat), these initiatives are planned to be complementary and mutually reinforcing tools supporting member states' efforts in enhancing defence capabilities. PESCO is embedded in and is a part of a logic sequence of efforts, starting with the definition of capability priorities and development of capability projects corresponding to the EU priorities identified by EU member states through CDP, also taking into account the results of the CARD. CARD, run by the EDA, through systematic monitoring of national defence spending plans, will help identify opportunities for new collaborative initiatives. The EDF, on the other hand, will provide financial incentives for member states to foster defence cooperation from research to the development phase of capabilities including prototypes through co-financing from the EU budget. The foreseen budget in the period 2021-2027 will be EUR 13 billion (EUR 4.1 billion for direct financing competitive and collaborative research projects and EUR 8.9 billion for common capability projects through co-financing prototype development).

Having in mind that PESCO is only one "tool of Europe's new defence toolbox and should be mutually reinforcing with CARD and EDF" (De France, 2017, p. 13), member states also need to focus on the coherent development and timing of PESCO, CDP, CARD and EDF. While each of these initiatives has its specific added value, they must all complement each other in a coordinated manner, leading to increased output of European defence, based on capability priorities agreed by the member states.

We can agree with several authors (De France, 2017; Lindstrom, 2018) who claim that the fulfilment of criteria by participating states should be assessed by an accountability mechanism. In this sense, the formation of CARD, although being conceived as a stand-alone initiative, could provide an adequate venue to report the fulfilment of the annual milestones and ensure effective coordination as well

as transparency. While recent official documents highlighted the voluntary nature of the review, this should not apply to PESCO participating states. In fact, CARD should rather represent an obligatory monitoring and assessment system in order to effectively support the achievement of the agreed list of common goals and binding commitments. In the end, the power and potential of these instruments lie in their complementarity and enforceability.

In conclusion, the challenge we observe is that the above-described tools and instruments are maturing at different rates. The CARD process will not be fully implemented until 2019. The EDF will not reach full funding levels until after 2020. As a result, the full extent of these benefits will not be visible till after 2020. Other developments in 2019, such as the ongoing Brexit process, European Parliamentary elections, and the end of the current European Commission's mandate, are likely to impact the progress (Lindstrom, 2018, p. 6).

iii. Project realisation

In order for the PESCO puzzle to be successfully completed, it is essential for member states to agree on strategically relevant projects. These projects must address common capability shortfalls. However, it currently seems that the division between strategically relevant and less relevant projects is not clear. In our opinion, this needs to be taken into consideration when planning and adopting the next package of projects. The multinational character of projects should nevertheless encourage member states to do their share of the project and assist with timely realisation. Additionally, some projects, even if they do not necessarily address capability shortfalls, will surely have positive results in the short-term and "will serve to demonstrate the value of PESCO to political leaders and publics alike, and help to keep the momentum going" (Biscop, 2018 p. 165). Another incentive to actually complete the projects, for the first time in the history of collective EU defence initiatives, is the EDF or, as Biscop (2018, p.163) puts it, "a new pot of common funding", which represents the "carrot" of PESCO.

6.2 External factors

6.2.1 Complementarity with NATO

Many past attempts for more Europe in the defence field have been faced with the NATO-first reflex mixed with the lack of political will. However, times seem to have changed and with greater transparency based on the Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation, this logic is no longer as relevant. "Washington, strategically pivoting to Asia, is now pushing for defence integration in Europe, seeing it as part of a stronger and more mature transatlantic alliance. The United States expect fair burden-sharing and more responsibility for Europe's security from European partners, because a stronger European defence will contribute to a stronger NATO" (EPSC Strategic Notes, 2015, p. 5).

In order to avoid unnecessary and expensive duplication of efforts as well as to achieve a more effective defence spending, close coordination and cooperation between PESCO and NATO should be developed. According to the Notification "a long-term vision of PESCO could be to arrive at a coherent full-spectrum force package – in complementarity with NATO, which will continue to be the cornerstone of collective defence for its members". As European governments assure, the establishment of PESCO is about reciprocity in dealing with common challenges. The Notification also emphasises that "enhanced defence capabilities of EU member states will also benefit NATO /.../ and respond to repeated demands for stronger transatlantic burden-sharing".

Last but not least, although taken forward in the EU framework, PESCO is developing capabilities which remain owned and operated by member states, who can choose to make them also available to NATO operations. Then, PESCO will deliver more usable, deployable, interoperable and sustainable set of capabilities and forces of the member states and will therefore also contribute to reinforcing the European contribution to NATO (PESCO Secretariat, 2018, p. 20). While for the above-mentioned reasons, some deconfliction may be necessary, PESCO will never fully replace NATO as a collective defence force. As Togawa Mercer boldly states, "at least as it stands now, PESCO is far from a NATO-slayer. There is a good chance that, /.../ it has a modest role to play. And the reason for its modesty is simple. There is one thing that PESCO and the EU lack that is central to NATO's success: the United States".

6.2.2 Economic interests

One of the reasons why the European defence sector has stayed fragmented until recently is in the fragmentation of military cooperation and conservative defence industry policies. On the one hand, Europe is the second largest military spender, but on the other hand, it is far from being the second largest military power. For decades, the EU has been unable to agree on more intense integration in the area of defence on the political level, let alone to motivate the industries to cooperate. This political fatigue combined with defence budget cuts have led to the point of aging technologies, a patchwork of bilateral and multilateral cooperation, growing shortfalls in capabilities at one place and duplication of capabilities at another, absence of new significant armaments programs, and lack of interoperability. In 2013, 84 % of all equipment procurement took place at national level, thereby depriving countries of the cost savings that come with economies of scale. It is estimated that the lack of coordinated spending "at the cost of more than the half of that of the US, Europeans obtain only a tenth of the capacity" (EPSC Strategic Notes, 2015, p. 3).

Europe's defence industrial landscape is characterised by a mix of large transnational firms and nationally-based companies. This will not change in the near future. But how can one engage small and medium-sized enterprises, in particular those located in smaller countries and experiencing great difficulties in becoming suppliers to

prime defence companies located in larger member states?⁸ In this regard, PESCO will need to enhance competitiveness and innovation in the defence industry. In particular, CDF will need to aim at stimulating European collaborative research and development projects, while at the same time strengthen the EDTIB. Finally, for the EU to significantly improve its capabilities and address current shortfalls, member states will still need to spend more on defence and come to an agreement as to where to invest in order for the stakeholders within the defence industry to gain trust and start cooperating.

Conclusion The European Union's defence matters have gone through a long process of numerous attempts to develop and intensify cooperation among member states in the area of security and defence. The momentum has gained significant strength, in general through the establishment of the PESCO, and specifically through the approval of the list of first seventeen common projects. In the long-term, PESCO, integrated with CDP, CARD and EDF, aims to achieve the EU's ambitious goal of establishing a European Security and Defence Union. Nevertheless, it will take political will to keep defence matters at the top of the EU agenda, increase defence investments, enforce mechanisms to sanction noncompliance, achieve complementarity with NATO, and change conservative defence industry policies.

As for Slovenia, the Government needs to stay committed to the decision and the realisation of the projects which, if rightly promoted, could benefit the Slovenian economy. The fact that joining PESCO was a national decision and not a project of one or two ministries needs to find an echo with the current and future governments. It is important to keep in mind that when it comes to security and defence matters, the Slovenian public is more inclined to support activities within the EU framework rather than NATO. Taking that into account, the Slovenian Presidency of the EU in the second half of 2021 will be a great opportunity to advance PESCO.

Nevertheless, at this stage, PESCO needs to remain within an intergovernmental framework. Not only is participation in PESCO voluntary, but decisions are taken by unanimity, which leaves the member states' sovereignty untouched. To the European defence, PESCO is what the Maastricht criteria are to the euro: a *sui generis* institution of European law because, as the name suggests, it is intended to organise (structure) something that already exists (cooperation) on the basis of enduring principles (permanently). The purpose of the process is to go beyond mere "cooperation" and achieve "integration" (European Parliament, 2017, p. 9). Thus, only time will tell whether with PESCO, the EU has put defence cooperation and integration on a fast track or that it again chose the slow, rocky road.

⁸ Keeping in mind the goal of any member state to get as much of its national industry involved the newly proposed CBRN SaaS project envisages possibilities for the participation of Slovenian enterprises. Five companies have shown interest: Institute IOS (having developed a very light sensor for organophosphates), Arctur d.o.o. (with its Gamma4 sensor), C-Astral d.o.o (with the possibility to ensure different air platforms), Em-tronic d.o.o (with different decontamination solutions) and Guardiariis d.o.o (with simulation solutions for training). The foreseen budget for 2019 and 2020 is EUR 5-6 million, with the expectation for EDF to finance 55%, and the rest is to be divided among participating states.

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STRATEGIJA IN VOJAŠKE ZMOGLJIVOSTI ZA ODVRAČANJE

STRATEGY AND MILITARY DETERRENCE CAPABILITIES

Povzetek Za zagotavljanje varnosti mora Slovenija v prihodnji strategiji upoštevati tudi silo, še posebej pri odvracanju groženj. Ob upoštevanju omejenih virov in spremenljivega, izzivov polnega okolja, je težko najti celovito strategijo, ki bi omogočala varnost, napredek in ekonomski razvoj Slovenije. Rešitev vidimo v odvracanju, tako z zavezniki kot z lastnimi silami. Da bi bili verodostojen partner v zavezništvu, moramo prevzeti svoj delež bremena in razviti lastne, z zavezniki dogovorjene zmogljivosti. Z vojaške perspektive so vidni trije pomembni elementi sprejemljive strategije: močno zavezništvo, razvite lastne vojaške zmogljivosti in odpornost družbe. Pri razvoju zmogljivosti mora Slovenska vojska upoštevati dogovorjeno metodologijo. Ključnega pomena za uspešen razvoj zmogljivosti in bojevanje v »večdimenzionalni bitki« je poveljevanje s poslanstvom.

Ključne besede *Slovenska vojska, odvracanje, vojaške zmogljivosti, strategija, poveljevanje s poslanstvom.*

Abstract Slovenia will use coercion – deterrence by denial in particular – as a basic concept for Slovenia's future defence strategy. Taking into account scarce resources, and a dynamic and volatile environment, it is difficult to find a wholly adequate strategy to provide for the safety, progress, and economic development of Slovenians. Deterrence – created by both our own capabilities and those gained through NATO membership – is our best way forward. In order to be a reliable partner in NATO Slovenia must carry its share of the burden, and develop its own capabilities. From a military perspective, there are three key elements for successful strategy: strong alliances, well-developed national military capabilities, and the resilience of society. In developing its military capabilities the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) must apply a DOTMLPF framework. Here we see mission command as pivotal for success in development and in Multi Domain Battle.

Key words *Slovenian Armed Forces, deterrence, military capabilities, strategy, mission command.*

Introduction

Slovenia, as a sovereign and independent state, is fully aware of the challenges and changes in the global world, and it takes seriously the full responsibility for its own and regional security. Of course Slovenia is also concerned with international security, but as a small nation it realises its limitations. This article will focus on coercion – deterrence in particular (Schelling, 1966) – as a basic concept for Slovenia’s future strategy. The United States’ Department of Defense, through its Joint Doctrine (JP-1), organises the instruments of power into four broad categories: Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic (DIME). Here we will focus on the military element of national power while remaining cognizant of the other elements of national power, and the way in which they interact with military power. As John Troxell has explained, military power is the most important instrument for the nation-state, and is used to protect the nation’s interest by influencing competitors, and also partners (Troxell, 2015).

The purpose of this article was to determine a basic concept for Slovenia’s strategy. We found that deterrence, in particular, is a basic concept for Slovenia’s future strategy. We used a descriptive method to define the strategy, and we analysed many primary and secondary sources. In this article the term ‘strategy’ refers to the Slovenian national or grand strategy, and strategy is defined as “a calculation of ways and means directed towards the accomplishment of ends, balanced against a continuous assessment of risk.”¹ The military capabilities of the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) are essential to credible deterrence: they communicate the Slovenian will to deny invasion or attack by any adversary.

The article begins by explaining Slovenia’s current threat environment, and potential routes to conflict. It then outlines a general security strategy, highlighting and focusing on the military means within that strategy. Within military means we will focus specifically on “mission command” as a requirement for the smart and purposeful use of military capability and expertise (Cohen, 2002). Using these key concepts the article will demonstrate that robust and intelligently-designed military capabilities are crucial to the deterrent capabilities of a small state – and thus to its ability to survive and thrive in the international system.

1 THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

To date, the 21st century has seen considerable change in the international security environment. The possibility of large global armed conflicts has decreased, but the vulnerability of modern states has increased as a result of new threats, challenges and risks to security. Flows of economic and war refugees, international terrorism,

¹ U.S. Army War College, Department of National Security and Strategy. *Directive – National Security Policy and Strategy* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2016), 4. As Tami Davis Biddle mentioned, it is essential for any scholar or practitioner who studies and/or works in the field of international security to articulate his own definition of the terms “strategy” and “grand strategy,” or to select from among the many available in the existing literature. See her essay *Strategy and Grand Strategy: What Students and Practitioners Need to Know* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2015), 2.

the hybrid war in Ukraine, the Russian annexation of Crimea (in 2014), and other threats to stability and security have grown into direct national threats to Slovenia.

Slovenia is/was part of the Eastern Mediterranean migration route; between October 2015 and March 2016 a total of 477,791 migrants and refugees arrived in Slovenia, with most continuing their journey to Austria and other Northern and Western European countries (International Organisation for Migration), with a peak of almost 13,000 in one day (Surk, 2015). Many of the security threats Slovenia faces are transnational, since borders, especially in Europe, are open or at least porous. Defence against these threats requires a high degree of international cooperation and a concerted response to crises.

Slovenia is particularly alert to several significant changes in the global environment. These include: the redistribution of economic, political, and military power; the formation of a multipolar world; the increasing volatility of modern societies as a result of the information revolution; environmental issues; energy-related issues; societies with fragile democracy and lawlessness; the transnational character of terrorism; the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and the changing nature of conflict – from conventional to hybrid. Some of these security challenges could be addressed by the SAF; some must be addressed by Slovenian society; and some can be addressed or managed only by the entire global community working in concert. Slovenia must be ready and able to participate at every level, and the SAF must have the ability to understand where and how it can contribute to Slovenian security across the board.

Strategist Colin Gray has argued that no particular style of warfare is permanent; technological development, for instance, will bring specific, novel challenges and will ensure that, for every new solution, new problems will be discovered (Gray, 2010). He adds that: “War/warfare is a duel and a dynamic, unique, and unpredictable product of interaction between friendly and unfriendly forces, together with the workings of friction and chance. No matter what else changes, we can count on historical continuity in the form of a self-willed adversary,” (Gray, 2010, pp.12-13). If our adversaries have the capacity to adapt and learn, so must the security organisations that we set against them.

In a volatile and changing environment, Slovenia continues to seek security through institutions, in particular NATO, which Slovenia joined on March 29, 2004. Mary Foster (2017) has observed that “the U.S. and its European allies must not let family member squabbles undermine the security of the home they have built and shared for almost 70 years”. But in order to receive support and security assurance from NATO’s Article 5, (which specifies that an attack on one member shall be considered an attack on all (Coalson, 2015)), a member state must, according to the NATO

treaty's Article 3, be able to defend itself first.² This is a fundamental requirement in an anarchical international system that has its harshest edges softened by institutional cooperation. In order to receive security, Slovenia must be ready to aid in the security of others. Accordingly, Slovenia has recently deployed a number of troops to Afghanistan, Kosovo and elsewhere. Indeed, at one point recently, Slovenia had deployed more than 10% of the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) (Osterman, 2017). This is a testament to Slovenia's serious commitment to the principle of fair burden sharing.

The United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), NATO, and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) – plus other regional organisations and institutions that contribute to the solving of global conflicts and enhance regional integration – have key roles in providing for European security. They have the potential to provide frameworks for multilateral cooperation. Thus they will continue to play a significant role in stabilising the international security environment in the future (Furlan et. al., 2006). Slovenia is anxious to participate usefully and cooperatively in these institutions.

Slovenia is a member state of the European Union (EU). By treaty and by arrangement with NATO, existing EU forces are meant to complement – not parallel – NATO forces. Under the 'Berlin Plus' agreement, the EU is to handle humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, and crisis response, not combat missions (Furlan et. al., 2006). Slovenia perceives the EU as complementary to NATO regarding security – a means for gaining synergy and further leveraging the strength of international cooperation.

When operating in a NATO context, the military operations of the SAF will be multinational, joint, combined, high intensity and full spectrum. The SAF accepts and embraces the NATO doctrines (AJP-01, AJP-3.2) and also the US Army's Field Manual 3-0, Operations FM 3, and the concept of a broad and complex security environment (FM 3-0). This environment includes the rapidly-evolving capabilities of potential adversaries in new domains such as cyber, information and the electromagnetic spectrum. The SAF understands the need to be prepared for multi-domain battle. In this environment Slovenia and NATO could face major nation-state competitors who will fully emerge as peers on the battlefield.

Simultaneously, as Robert Brown and David Perkins (2017) have observed, conflicting interests and increased suspicion will dominate international relationships, creating an environment more vulnerable to miscalculation. Brown and Perkins (2017) predicted that beyond 2030 we can be certain that adversaries will continue to challenge US supremacy, if they have not already surpassed it in one way or another. Both technological and political developments over the next decade will continue

² *In Article 3 of the Alliance's founding treaty: "In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack."* NATO, "Resilience and Article 3" (22 June 2016), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm, (accessed October 15, 2017).

to shape the changing character of warfare through violent activity, as well as an increase in technological dependency and complexity.

To answer this challenge, Slovenia must be prepared to defend herself according to the NATO treaty's Article 3.

Slovenia and the SAF, as pointed out by Brown (2017, p. 4), must break their overreliance on technology and build a future force as an integrated system.

The SAF must look to the future, assessing likely threats with a keen and alert eye, so that it will understand how to provide security – and to do so in an ever-changing, volatile, and resource-constrained environment. It must also stay in alignment with the needs of its partners, and their own ongoing adaptations to a complex threat environment.

2 SEEKING A SUITABLE STRATEGY

The work of Thomas Schelling (1966) is rich in ideas that are directly relevant to the SAF; his core concepts about coercion – and in particular his explanations of the nuances of deterrence – are very useful in the context of Slovenia's security situation. Schelling (1966) argued that compellence (a threat intended to make an adversary do something) is inherently harder than deterrence (a threat to keep him from doing something). Seeking a suitable strategy, Slovenia must maintain freedom in its strategic options by building on Schelling.

In their new book, A. Wess Mitchell and Jakub J. Grygiel describe a strategy of accommodation, where nations should not place all their eggs in one basket (2016, p.101). In this strategy, nations are engaged in military self-help and regional alliance building without formally announcing their security links to the United States or to neighbouring small powers, in order not to limit their strategic possibilities (Mitchell, 2016, pp.101-102). Limited war – or simply forms of conflict that fall beneath the threshold of “war”, but still produce disruption and discontent – shifts the psychological burden of conflict away from the aggressor and places it on the shoulders of the defender. It raises the likelihood that a defender will perpetually under-respond to ambiguous provocations (and thus will lose control of strategically vital spaces by default) or will over-respond (and thus risk or provoke war) (Schelling, 1966).

Slovenia is a committed member of NATO. However, it is prudent for any state, even if it is a member of a strong alliance, to be as capable and self-reliant as possible. This not only makes it a better alliance partner, but also makes it able to respond to a wide range of threats, even those that may fall below NATO's threshold for action. As a small state Slovenia must realise that her adversaries may try to operate beneath NATO's threshold, or may try to split the Alliance over interests that do not align across all member states. In such situations Slovenia must have the resources

to work with her close neighbours, or to work on her own to defend her interests. This requires internal cohesion, resilience, strong civil-military ties, and up-to-date military capabilities.

In line with Slovenia's strengths, resources, and elements of national power, a key element of her security strategy must be "deterrence by denial." Drawing on the work of Schelling, A. Wess Mitchell (2015) has recently argued that there are two basic ways to deter an enemy. The first is deterrence by punishment: one deters by threatening the attacker with punishment (pain or harm). This form of deterrence depends on the fear that the defender will inflict a level of pain that exceeds whatever gains the attacker hoped to achieve through aggression. For deterrence by punishment to work, the defender's threat must be credible (Mitchell, 2015). A second way to deter an enemy is deterrence by denial: the defender deters by threatening to make it physically difficult or impossible for the attacker to achieve his objective. This form of deterrence also depends on fear, but this time of costs that will be inflicted during the act of aggression, in the place where it occurs (Mitchell, 2015, p.1).

Coercion relies on the threat of future military force to influence an adversary's decision-making and structure his incentives. One must assume that one's adversary is willing and able to undertake cost-benefit calculations relevant to his own decision process. This includes the assumption that a potential attacker will understand the defender's capability and will. For most nations, the primary role of a national military is to deter an attack on the nation's home territory, and to fight if deterrence fails. The willingness and ability to fight is central to deterrence by threat of denial.

As Mitchell (2015, p.1) argues, however, deterrence by threat of punishment is becoming increasingly difficult for defenders as they face an array of contemporary threats. In other words, it has become difficult to threaten punishment, or to actually punish adversaries as they develop tactics to stay under a retaliatory threshold, or to obscure any target for retaliation. This places a greater emphasis on deterrence by threat of denial, wherein a nation (and national military force) relies on its ability to check and counter an adversary's actions across a full spectrum of threats. Even a small nation, when faced with a much larger aggressor, can succeed in deterrence by denial by threatening to make its territory 'indigestible' (Mitchell, 2015, p. 4).

Slovenia will rely on its own capabilities for deterrence, but it will also rely on the extended deterrence provided by its NATO partners (Troxell, 2015, pp. 4-5). Extended deterrence carries some risks, of course. One must rely on an ally to take a risk or make a sacrifice beyond its immediate self-interest; one must trust the ally's pledge to do this on behalf of the alliance. But the robustness of extended deterrence relies in part on the willingness and ability of any given alliance partner to defend its own territory, and in part on the willingness of the alliance members to act on a threat that may not be, at any given moment, of vital importance to them. Adversaries can complicate alliance pledges and alliance cohesion by staying below a threshold that provokes a clear response. NATO's system of extended deterrence is working, but as

Grygiel and Mitchell (2016, p.137) point out, the system is weakening, and some of the allies doubt the political willingness of United States to intervene on their behalf in the event of military crisis.

Slovenia's reaction to this dilemma must include improving her ability to defend herself in the event of a crisis, and maintaining levels of military capability and competence that will enable her to participate effectively in NATO's deterrence and war-fighting missions. This would include possessing a "reputation for military virtues" that would turn the SAF "into an unattractive target, promising an aggressor costs incommensurate with any potential gains," (Rothstein, 1968, p.187). This reputation could be gained and sustained by participating in NATO's operations and exercises, and by cooperating with NATO's military goals, planning, and mechanisms for developing and maintaining military competence.

Alliances provide benefits to major powers too, of course. This is why NATO exists, and why it has worked up to this point. According to Grygiel and Mitchell (2016, p.137), alliances fill gaps in one's own capabilities; they provide for a physical presence beyond the limits of one's own territory, and for power projection into distant regions. Allies offer human, material, and geographic resources not otherwise available. They enable a single state to contend, potentially, with multiple rivals. The United States (US) is part of NATO because NATO serves US interests. But for this situation to continue, the NATO allies must provide resources and forms of support valuable to the US.

Consequently, Slovenia must prepare itself for future security challenges and find an adequate strategy to provide, long-term, for the safety, progress, and development of its people. Slovenia must establish a security policy and set up a political objective which will bring an appropriate result. Above all, we must be able to deter our potential adversaries. In most cases, though, Slovenia cannot do this alone. As a small state, Slovenia must rely on her alliance partners. But this means, equally, that we must earn our status as an ally: we must be perceived by our partners as capable, resourceful, and dependable. We must contribute to European security in an ongoing and productive way.

Slovenia has developed an armed force as an instrument of national power, with specific missions and tasks. The Slovenian Armed Forces can provide military defence independently or within the framework of an alliance, in accordance with international agreements.

For the Slovenian Armed Forces the only feasible deterrence is deterrence by threat of denial, in which the forces of the defender have the capability of denying the aggressor the attainment of his objectives (in space, time, function, etc.), ideally in close cooperation with allies. Deterrence by threat of punishment, in which the

defender raises the price that the aggressor will have to pay for the attainment of these objectives, is possible for Slovenia only by a direct contribution from her allies.³

As a small nation, Slovenia probably never will have any serious capability to attack an aggressor outside Slovenian territory. For this reason Slovenia must cooperate with its allies, and participate in alliance activities, to demonstrate that it is a credible partner. It is in Slovenia's interest to show every possible aggressor that the nation will defend itself, and that NATO will defend Slovenia.

Smaller states in an alliance, such as Slovenia, need assurances that they will not be abandoned in case of war. But alliance dynamics inevitably create complications for stronger states, since they pose a looming risk of those states being dragged into war over the local interests of smaller allies (Mitchell, 2017).

This balancing of risks and advantages is an unavoidable part of alliance participation, for all partners. Smaller states will thus work to make themselves useful as partners, and will seek to create a sense of responsibility and obligation among larger alliance partners. This is one of the reasons that Slovenia's troops are deployed in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Latvia, Lebanon, Mali and other countries.

The most difficult question the Slovenian Armed Forces must face is: What if deterrence fails and/or we have to fight alone? In an anarchical international system, every state must be prepared to defend itself in the event of a failure of deterrence. The Slovenian Armed Forces must be able to make the revisionist's coveted object harder to obtain or keep. Mitchell (2017) points out that "this is usually the best option when the ally in question is too weak to mount a credible defence but possesses sufficient willpower to make it indigestible for an attacker. Since the ultimate goal of revisionist powers is to achieve quick, easy grabs, this strategy seeks to make them prolonged and costly – what could be called the 'bitter pill' strategy". In addition to its contributions to NATO, the SAF must develop defensive techniques and build small but well-trained forces to advertise indigestibility to predators, and it must, in the worst case, be capable of waging guerrilla warfare against an attacker in order to outlast and drive out occupiers.

As we contemplate these questions we must look for solutions in the resilience of society. Resilience is the optimal answer to many modern threats, particularly

³ *This price can either be exacted from the forces of the aggressor which are attacking the defender, or from other forces or valuable assets of the aggressor, including in the aggressor's homeland. The capability to deter is often divided into three components:*

- The capability to deny attack or to punish an aggressor*
- The will to use this ability if challenged*

- Communication of the existence of this ability and will to the potential aggressor, to the defender's own population, and to third parties. All three components must be present for deterrence to work, but they may exist in different proportions, depending on the nature of the deterrent." Discussion in SAS-ET-DD, NATO STO, The Threshold Concept for and by Small Forces, Chair Alf Christian Hennem (NOR), Paris, 01 March 2016.*

those in “the Gray Zone.”⁴ The Gray Zone can be described as a war without war, “techniques short of major conflict – more gradual, less violent, and less obvious,” (Mazzar, 2015, p.1). For example, a cyber-attack on a nation’s vital systems has the potential to bring a society to its knees. According to Michael Mazzar (2015, p. 2), we can understand economic coercion, fifth column activities, clandestine disruption and sabotage, and information operations or propaganda, as techniques used in the Grey Zone.

Each modern state needs to have the resilience to withstand shocks like natural disasters (hurricane, heavy snow, floods), failure of critical infrastructure (internet network, pipelines, highways, power lines), and military attacks. NATO (2017) defines resilience as a “society’s ability to resist and recover easily and quickly from shocks, combining civilian, economic, commercial and military factors.”

The resilience of society – the combination of civil preparedness and military capacity – is the most important factor in dealing with modern threats. It connects the people, the government and the military, described by Clausewitz (1976, p. 89) as the “remarkable trinity.” The intrinsic links in this trinity may be the first target in any future conflict involving Slovenia, and this is why we must ensure that these links are robust and able to withstand shock and pressure. Slovenia must strengthen the links between the elements of her trinity, to build bonds between the people and the government. The most important is good governance, rule of law, and respect for human rights. These values, written into Slovenia’s constitution, will bond the people and the government. The SAF is highly respected by Slovenians, but it must work hard to maintain this respect and bond with the people. The most important virtues, even in peace time, are professionalism, subordination to civilian authorities, and completion of all tasks.

2 ASYMMETRIC RESPONSE

The alternative to overwhelming a stronger adversary is to mount an asymmetric response. In many cases, the willingness of a state to do this will give its potential adversary second thoughts about aggression. If Slovenia must cope alone with military aggression, the most promising strategy will be guerrilla warfare. This form of warfare has proven itself throughout history as a way for militarily weaker states to successfully oppose stronger ones. It proved successful, for instance, in World War II when the people in what was then Yugoslavia fought against Hitler’s more powerful troops. Guerrilla warfare is very costly to those who wage it: it exacts a high price in human casualties and imposes a high cost in time. But many states have

⁴ Michael J. Mazzar, “Struggle in the Gray Zone and World Order,” *War on the Rocks Online*, December 22, 2015, <https://warontherocks.com/2015/12/struggle-in-the-gray-zone-and-world-order/> (accessed August 30, 2017). At an April 2015 US Army War College conference, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Robert Work, used the term “The Gray Zone”. He argued that adversaries were increasingly using: agents, paramilitaries, deception, infiltration, and persistent denial to make those avenues of approach very hard to detect, operating in what some people have called ‘the gray zone.’

seen it as a viable alternative to tyranny, oppression, or physical extinction. A clear willingness and ability to fight asymmetrically may prevent a state from ever having to do so.

In this context, James K. Wither (2018) perceives modern guerrillas as state forces that employ new technology and asymmetrical methods of warfare. For Slovenia that would mean maintaining regular forces, including Special Operations Forces (SOF), as well as territorial defence units (reserve). These soldiers are defined by their war-fighting methodology which, therefore, could include both conventional war-fighting and guerrilla warfare. Wither (2018) suggested that it is envisaged that guerrilla units could be employed in all three phases of warfare: during hybrid operations before the formal outbreak of war, during conventional war-fighting following an invasion, and finally during national resistance after the occupation of territory.

Naturally this kind of warfare relies heavily on the direct and indirect support of the population, and this in turn places additional importance on the resilience of society. National values, tradition, and history have important roles; the willingness to make sacrifices is based on a belief that what one owns is worth preserving, even at the cost of pain and deprivation. Any adversary considering hostile action must carefully calculate risks as well as potential gains.

3 DETERRENCE

As we search for a robust but affordable deterrent posture, we must ask and answer the following questions:

- How can a smaller country make the threshold for a potential attacker as high as possible, but within affordable limits?
- What strategies or military concepts can smaller countries choose from, and how can we design cost-effective force structures to deter an attacker?
- How can smaller countries exploit small, light information, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) teams, SOF, and long range precision fires?

These questions involve technological, operational, and political challenges, but the answers have the potential to raise the threshold for a potential attacker” (SAS-131).

In answering these questions we will find solutions for our nation’s defence and future strategy. Right now Slovenian officials are comfortable that deterrence will work, and that it is a reasonable answer to our current and future security (military) challenges. But nothing remains static in the realm of deterrence and defence. No state can afford either over-optimism or complacency. It must, instead, seek out areas for ongoing improvement. It must work, always, to strengthen its indigenous defences and to bolster its alliance ties.

From a military perspective, there are three key elements: strong alliances, well-developed national military capabilities (the SAF), and the resilience of society.

Resilience will be even more important in the future, as new security issues will emerge (including cyber, environmental, and hybrid threats). The SAF can build resilience capabilities through the development of regular forces, including territorial defence forces and niche skills such as cyber defence, or the special abilities honed at the Centre of Excellence for Mountain Warfare. Slovenia's individual commitment to maintain and strengthen its resilience reduces the vulnerability of the NATO as a whole.⁵

These capacities do not replace core military capabilities, but complement them. Additionally, the SAF must be supported and undergirded by robust civil preparedness. In many NATO countries, including Slovenia, defence budget cuts since the end of the Cold War have created a search for innovative solutions. In many cases this search has led to an increased reliance on civilian assets. For instance, in large-scale operations, around 90% of military transport would be chartered or requisitioned from the commercial sector; on average, over 50% of satellite communications used for defence purposes are provided by the commercial sector; and roughly 75% of host nation support to NATO operations is sourced from local commercial infrastructure and services (NATO, 2017). However, national (civil) assets can be vulnerable to external attack and internal disruption in times of peace and war. Examples that come readily to mind include the power grid system, money transfer systems, the water supply system (critical infrastructure), and commercial air transport. By reducing vulnerabilities in these sectors, Slovenia reduces the risk of a potential attack. A high level of resilience is therefore an essential component of a credible deterrence.

4 MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STRATEGY

The overmatch that NATO enjoyed for the last decades has eroded, and our current ways of thinking, executing, and organising constrain our ability to keep pace with change. If the SAF would like to achieve or maintain an operational advantage comparable with other allies they must build a future force – military capabilities.

In joining NATO, Slovenia gained the security of collective defence, made explicit in the treaty's Article 5. But in joining NATO Slovenia also altered its military structure and planning (including the development of certain defence capabilities) in order to focus on those meant to support collective security. Alliance membership requires, among other things, "common defence planning, participation of the Slovenian Armed Forces in setting up joint response forces and their operation in crisis areas, and other forms of integrating Slovenia into Alliance activities to consolidate stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and to combat international terrorism and other asymmetric threats" (Furlan et. al., 2006).

⁵ *The resilience of each NATO member country needs to be sufficiently robust and adaptable to support the entire spectrum of crises envisaged by the Alliance. In this context, Article 3 complements the collective defence clause set out in Article 5, which stipulates that an attack against one Ally is an attack against all. Allies need to give NATO the means to fulfil its core tasks and, in particular, those of collective defence and mutual assistance. NATO, "Resilience and Article 3" (22 June 2016), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm 15.10.2017.*

Building military capabilities is a complex, iterative process that is never actually finished, since ongoing adaptation to change is imperative. The process encompasses combinations of operational, organisational, and personnel changes that exploit technological innovation. The main challenge, within an alliance, is tracking and following all the changes in the environment, and developing capabilities in concert with allies. One must be prepared to follow priorities set by the dominant member of the alliance. For example, after 2001 NATO became focused on COIN, developing “light and deployable” capabilities. But since Russia annexed Crimea and fostered unrest and war in Ukraine’s eastern provinces, NATO has shifted its emphasis to heavier mechanised forces.⁶ The US Army is moving to “Multi Domain Battle,” which requires the ability to fight a peer adversary in different domains (land, water, air, space, cyber) simultaneously. The abbreviation DOTMPFLI (Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Materiel, Personnel, Finance, Leadership, and Interoperability/Integration) is used by NATO’s Allied Command Transformation (ACT) to embrace the whole spectrum of capability-building and stress the need to synchronise all of its elements. However, the framework also offers a roadmap for developing military capabilities (NATO, 2015).

NATO member states do not develop capabilities in a vacuum; these are determined together with allies in the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP). This four-year cycle is the Alliance’s framework for harmonising national and Alliance defence planning activities to meet agreed capability targets in the most effective ways (NATO, 2015, p. 8). For the Slovenian Armed Forces this represents the rationalisation and optimisation of the design and development of current and future capabilities: the process determines where we are and where we want to be as an Alliance member seeking to meet NATO’s ambition (NATO, 2015, p. 8). It represents SAF ambitions as we try to align national and alliance needs within contemporary budget constraints. From a capabilities perspective, it identifies gaps and assigns requirements, based on the principle of fair burden sharing.

Understanding and addressing these issues requires examining today’s operating environment through the lens of the SAF’s main priority: medium battalion battle groups. Within this key framework, the SAF will expand investment in modernisation for greater future survivability, lethality and efficiency; it will build future capabilities through the entire doctrine, organisation, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities (DOTMLPF) spectrum. Development and implementation, an

⁶ *Moving to the present, and the aftermath of the 2014 Wales Summit, the key pivot point in the short-term will be the transition from the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission to the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan; though recent destabilising events on NATO’s eastern and southern flanks have shown the potential for other challenges to emerge, generating NATO’s Readiness Action Plan response. Although NATO will likely shift from a campaign to a contingency posture, ACT will be provided with a huge opportunity to drive the transformational process given the continuing requirement for ready, flexible, robust and interoperable forces. NATO, Allied Command Transformation, “What is transformation? An Introduction to Allied Command Transformation”, (January 2015), p.iii, http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2015/NATO_Introduction_AlliedCommand_Transformation_Jan2015.pdf, 14.10.2017.*

ongoing process, is led by the nations with NATO being on hand to provide any additional help that may be required (NATO, 2015, p. 8).

Developing these capabilities to face emerging security challenges represents one of the most important elements of transformation and implied tasks for the Slovenian Armed Forces. The Field Manual (FM) 3-0 identifies eight elements of combat power: leadership, information, mission command, movement and manoeuvre, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. Combat power is closely related to military capabilities; indeed it is one of its most important attributes.

The Slovenian Armed Forces consider Mission Command pivotal for success on the battlefield, and integral to nearly all parts of capability-building. The term “mission command”⁷ is explicitly mentioned in Slovenian doctrine, the concept is inherent in our concept of command and control. It is included in Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Materiel, Personnel, Finance, Leadership, and Interoperability/Integration. Application of Mission Command can give us a decisive advantage over an adversary in a Multi-Domain Battle (MDB). In a MDB, mission command offers the ability to: “manoeuvre to positions of relative advantage and project power across all domains to ensure freedom of action,” and to “integrate joint, inter-organisational, and multinational capabilities to create windows of domain superiority and preserve joint force freedom of manoeuvre and exploit temporary domain superiority by synchronising cross-domain fire and manoeuvre to achieve physical, temporal, positional, and psychological advantages” (Glenn, 2017).

According to Slovenian Military Doctrine, Command and Control is one of the key battlefield systems, made manifest by a commander’s activities and through a clearly-defined system. “It is an authority, prescribed by law that the commander needs in order to plan, organise, coordinate and control his assigned forces.” In addition it is a “process in which the commander *impresses his will and intent on his subordinates.*” Based on SAF values, command is comprised of “a commander’s competence and leadership abilities, as well as legal acts that give him professional, formal authority and responsibility, and on an efficient command and control system” (Furlan et. al., 2006).

Although the most recent Slovenian military doctrine was published in 2006 and is thus in need of updating, the SAF perceive the concept of Mission Command as central to full-spectrum high intensity warfare in the MDB – either for the

⁷ “The German concept *Auftragstaktik*, often translated as mission command (of the various translations offered for the term *Auftragstaktik*, Mission Command is the one used in American doctrine), denotes decentralised leadership: it is a philosophy of command that requires and facilitates initiative at all levels of command directly involved with events on the battlefield. It allows and encourages subordinates to exploit opportunities by empowering them to demonstrate initiative and exercise personal judgment in pursuance of their mission while maintaining alignment through the concept of the commander’s intent. The approach presupposes the existence of trust in the individual’s ability to act wisely and creatively when faced with unexpected situations, independently from higher authority.” Eitan Shamir, “The Long and Winding Road: The U.S. Army Managerial Approach to Command and the Adoption of Mission Command (*Auftragstaktik*),” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 33, no. 5 (October 2010): <http://usawc.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2010.498244>, , 1.10. 2017.

SAF alone, or in joint combined warfare together with allies. Mission Command is familiar to and accepted by most Western military forces, and by many civilian organisations as well. Core command philosophy in NATO is defined in the Allied Joint Publication - 01 (AJP-01): “Mission command gives subordinate commanders’ freedom of action to execute operations, according to the commander’s intent.” Through Mission Command, commanders in NATO will “generate the freedom of action for subordinates to act purposefully when unforeseen developments arise, and exploit favourable opportunities.” It encourages initiative and decentralised decision-making. Commanders delegating authority downwards must “state clearly their intentions, freedoms and constraints, designate the objectives to be achieved and provide sufficient forces, resources and authority required to accomplish their assigned tasks” (Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD), 2013).

As Slovenia and the SAF have accepted AJP-01 as a STANAG (Standard Agreement) in our own legal framework as such, we follow a command philosophy wherein command is an intrinsically forceful human activity involving authority as well as personal responsibility and accountability. In NATO, command philosophy has four facets: “a clear understanding of the superior commander’s intent; a responsibility on the part of subordinates to meet that intent; the importance of making a timely decision; and a determination, on the part of the commander, to see the plan through to a successful conclusion” (AJP-01, p. 5-1).

The SAF believes that a commander determines a course of action and leads the command. Commander responsibilities also involve accountability and control. As stated in AJP-01, control is not an equal partner with command, but merely an aspect of it. The commander and staff share the execution of control between them (AJP-01, p. 5-1).

A notable problem which can inhibit the successful implementation of mission command is the perception, among soldiers, of a zero-defects climate. This climate can considerably hinder an officers’ initiative if he believes that initiative can lead to risk of failure, and thus no promotion. David McCormick (1998, p.143) explains, “zero defect also implies a leadership environment in which it is unacceptable to make mistakes and, by extension, officers are less willing, and less able, to demonstrate creativity and initiative.” This environment produces an unforgiving relationship between the commander and his subordinates – a relationship that may hinder a comparative advantage on the battlefield, which is even more unforgiving.

While the SAF has high regard for the concept of mission command, we realise that we have work to do in this area. In particular we must avoid a tendency to control subordinates too much. Senior leaders operating at the strategic level must be willing to delegate responsibility to subordinates, trusting that they will perform to the best of their ability. Thomas Williams (2016) has argued that mission command leadership is not “an act, or a process, or a position.” Instead, “mission command leadership is an evolving social perception concerning authority, relationships, shared understanding, purpose, trust, risk, and environment. In a mission command

environment, ceding control to subordinates is the norm (and paradoxically the best way to gain control, because the soldiers take as much responsibility for the mission as you [do].”

Successful commanders should share leadership. Williams (2016) argues further that,

“Mission command leadership is then the evolving development of relationships towards shared responsibility for the mission and the health of the profession.” Anthony King (2017, p. 7), describes the distinctive character of mission command in the 21st century: “By empowering subordinates to take a local decision in line with a superior’s intent, mission command accelerates decision-making while simultaneously maintaining operational unity. It is therefore seen as an optimal solution on a complex, fast-moving battlefield.” Leading empowered subordinates mean that superiors may pay the price for their mistakes, but empowered subordinates are essential to success on the modern battlefield (Brender, 2016).

Contemporary mission command is not only about the relationship between the commander and his subordinates, but also between commanders across levels. Mission command involves the entire network (commanders, all echelons, subordinates, and C2 systems); it requires, as King (2017, p. 8) points out, “intense, professionalised teamwork between commanders”. This concept is well-described by King (2017, pp.8-19), who points out the distinctiveness of contemporary practices through an examination of the generalship of Stanley McChrystal and James Mattis. In the SAF we would like to emphasise “shared consciousness” as practised by General McChrystal in his daily Operations and Intelligence Brief, and the “unified team” approach stressed by General Mattis.

The SAF will continue to aspire to mission command, as a guarantee of success. But that requires, as King (2017, p. 10) argues, “a certain quality of education and a common language.” This means, in turn, intensive and high quality military education and respect for procedures (Troop Leading Procedure (TLP), Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), Operational Planning Process (OPP), and COPD) and cultural dimensions. But this can be complex because national character and organisational traditions also play a part. According to Eitan Shamir (2010), “mission command has both procedural and cultural dimensions.” The former, he argues, “are relatively easy to emulate” while “the latter stem from national character and organisational traditions and are therefore more difficult to transfer.”

The SAF must find solutions to this issue, in particular because it has quite dispersed military education for officers. The SAF’s military education for officers follows contemporary military practice in all western armies, but is dispersed between the national Officers School, Command and General Staff School, and General Staff education. It includes training/schooling by our allies (at the United States Army War College (USAWC) and National Defense University (NDU) in the US; the *Fuehrungsakademie* in Germany; and schools in France, Italy and other NATO

countries). The SAF must learn to consolidate this diverse training and bring it into a common framework for the needs of our nation. A big advantage for the SAF is a lack of anti-intellectualism (McCormick, 1998, p.152). Indeed, all SAF field grades and senior officers are encouraged to graduate from universities and receive Master's degrees, and to embrace the advantages of formal education and the mindset it fosters. By the same token, however, our officers tend to prioritise troop duties and prefer command assignments – a problem sometimes referred to in the US as the “Muddy Boots” syndrome (McCormick, 1998, p. 146). To some extent this can undermine the impact of high educational standards.

As future strategic leaders and as officers who will practise mission command, SAF commanders will strive to improve their skills. As an organisation, the SAF will work hard on mission command, convinced that the effort will pay off in the future when, together with its allies, the SAF will contribute to national and international security.

Conclusion The SAF must make assumptions about future threats, calculate risks, and prepare for future security challenges. Taking into account scarce resources, and a dynamic and volatile environment, it is difficult to find a wholly adequate strategy to provide for the safety, progress, and economic development of Slovenians. But deterrence – created by both our own capabilities and those gained through NATO membership – is our best way forward. By contributing to a cohesive and capable NATO we help to stabilise security in Europe and reduce the threat of major regional or global war, both of which could be devastating to the people of Slovenia.

Slovenia will use coercion – deterrence by denial in particular – as a basic concept for Slovenia's future strategy. In order to be a reliable partner in NATO Slovenia must carry its share of the burden, and develop its own capabilities. In developing its military capabilities the SAF must apply a DOTMLPF framework, which connects doctrine, organisation, training, materiel, personnel, finance, leadership, and interoperability/integration. Here we see mission command as pivotal for success in development, and in Multi Domain Battles. Mission command is the brain and nerves of the system, and as such must be well established first. It is useless to have arms and legs one cannot control.

In mission command we have identified several important issues, which must be resolved as soon as possible. An updated SAF doctrine must include and precisely articulate the concept of mission command as it is understood in the West, particularly in the US Army. While mission command is a concept already well-accepted in the SAF, the formal embrace of specific language is important since we are working with allies and need to align with their concepts and language as closely as possible. In addition we must overcome a zero-defects mindset, which undermines initiative. With respect to the diverse education our officers receive, we must be alert to its advantages and disadvantages. Regarding the latter, we must seek to consolidate our diverse training and education, and bring it into a common framework for the

needs of our nation. This is only the beginning of the hard work to be done, since the creation and implementation of military capability is a demanding and never-ending project. It is, however, an essential project. Using key concepts this article has demonstrated that robust and intelligently-designed military capabilities are crucial to the deterrent capabilities of a small state – and thus to its ability to survive and thrive in the international system.

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MODERNIZACIJA V MADŽARSKI VOJSKI

MODERNISATION WITHIN THE HUNGARIAN DEFENCE FORCES

Povzetek V vsaki državi je najpomembnejša dolžnost vlade zagotoviti varnost državljanov. Skladno s tem se je vlada Republike Madžarske odločila, da z ukrepi o modernizaciji madžarskega obrambnega resorja in njegovega paradnega konja, madžarske vojske, ni več mogoče odlašati. Program za vojaški razvoj Zrinyi 2026 in sredstva, ki so v okviru njega zagotovljena, so tako po dolgem času omogočili nekaj pomembnih izboljšav v zmogljivostih madžarske vojske. V nadaljevanju bomo predstavili nekaj segmentov teh izboljšav. Začeli bomo s kratkim opisom trenutnih varnostnih razmer na Madžarskem in njenih varnostnih izzivov ter predstavili nekaj odzivov nanje. Predstavili bomo tudi glavne mejnike v razvoju vojaških zmogljivosti in opisali korake za izboljšanje organizacije, opreme, kadra in usposabljanja.

Ključne besede *Varnost, modernizacija vojske, zaščita območja, madžarska vojska.*

Abstract The security of citizens in every country is the main responsibility of the government. By accepting this, the Government of Hungary decided that it was no longer possible to postpone the modernisation of defence and its main attribute, the Hungarian Defence Forces. The Zrinyi 2026 military development programme and the resources alongside it make it possible for there to be tangible improvement in the capabilities of the Hungarian Defence Forces after a long delay. In this article we illustrate some of its segments, starting with a short description of the present security situation in Hungary, its security challenges and possible solutions to them. We will also demonstrate the main developments of the military capabilities, describing the steps in the improvement of organisations, equipment, personnel and training.

Key words *Security, modernisation of the military forces, area protection, Hungarian Defence Forces (HDF).*

Introduction Despite the fact that we can find more than a hundred different approaches on the internet, it is still difficult to put the notion of security into words. In the following we are going to attempt that, by the illustration of the defence situation in our own country to describe the modernisation of the defence system.

In the many coloured approaches to defence there are some areas where the majority of analysts agree. According to the generally accepted approach the security of some accentuated areas is a determinant when a country's security is evaluated. In this way the nature of the military, political, economic, environmental and social aspects of the security dimensions also illustrates the nature of the security of the examined community.

It is not our aim to introduce a detailed description of the different dimensions of security, so we are simply going to refer to their main components. The objective and subjective characterisation of military security had become quite one-sided in the previous decades¹. This was good from the point of view that Hungary was not part of military conflicts where regular or irregular military forces participated. We must not forget, however, that there was a civil war in neighbouring Ukraine at this time. The other point of view, which is less self-congratulatory, is that the full illusion of military security, both in the opinion of the decision makers and in the civilian population, downgraded the most important establishment of military security, our Army, the Hungarian Defence Forces (HDF). Development had stopped; the appreciation of the personnel was low. This appreciation had not improved significantly in spite of the hard work of our soldiers during flood defence, water supply and other humanitarian tasks. In the meantime, our work in international missions was appreciated by our allies, but their domestic value remained limited.

1 SECURITY SITUATION IN HUNGARY

The Security Strategy of 2012, which still applies today, defines in detail the risks posing a threat to the security of the country². It deals emphatically with the possibility and the danger of the local and regional appearance of conflicts based on ethnic, regional or other causes, not forgetting the wars in former Yugoslavia. It highlights the risk of the uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons and carriers, the threat of terrorism, financial security, cyber security, energy security, the impact of environmental changes, and the presence of organised crime, especially drug-related crime. At this point the security challenges of migration and that of extremist groups also appear.

¹ http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/download/b/ae/e0000/national_military_strategy.pdf downloaded: 14th August, 2018.

² *Government Decree 1035/2012 (21 February) on the National Security Strategy of Hungary, A Kormány határozata Magyarország Nemzeti Biztonsági Stratégiájáról.* http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/download/f/49/70000/1035_2012_korm_hatarozat.pdf downloaded: 14th January, 2018.

Today some of the statements in the security strategy have become somewhat outdated, so a new one is being prepared³. Among the reasons for this requirement it is indicated that there is a change in the security environment of Hungary, mass migration, and strengthening of the terrorism threat, as well as changes in the system of functions and tasks in the HDF. The working group is led by the deputy Secretary of State, who is responsible for defence policy and defence planning; the members of this group include the Minister of Defence, the Minister of the Prime Minister's Office, the Minister of Foreign Trade, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of the Interior, and representatives of secret services, and as invited guests, the President of the Hungarian National Bank and a person appointed by the Strategic Defence Research Centre at the National University of Public Service.

When discussing the security situation in our country we cannot omit the above-mentioned document, since its wording alludes to the threatening dangers and so it is fundamentally pertains to the answers.

In case of Hungary we must mention in the first place the fact that there is a civil war in neighbouring Ukraine. It is true, however, that this situation does not affect our borders, unlike the Balkan Wars, but the impacts are direct. We are talking about a country where there is a Hungarian minority who are quite often the target of Ukrainian nationalists. These actions include attacks against the symbols of the Hungarian minority, the acceptance of the language law, problems in domestic politics, and economic problems. To veil these problems, the rhetoric of the government became stronger from time to time, with reference to the risks of dual citizenship. All this is in a country where a strong and consequently balanced state is merely wishful thinking.

We cannot forget that in many countries in the Balkans the fire still invisibly glows. There are unsolved problems that make the relationship of the unformed states tense; visibly there are no answers to the questions of minorities and the issue of their territorial belonging comes up again and again. The question of the fate of the Hungarian minority requires special attention. The latest is a source of mutual disagreements even in countries where the governmental structure is strong and balanced.

The situation in some of our neighbouring countries is an opportunity for the appearance of security problems, such as the illegal arms and drug trade, organised crime, money laundering, environmental pollution crossing borders, or the recent problems of the violation of the regulations of animal health and their cross-border impacts.

³ *Common ministerial decree 57/2016 (24 November) on the formation of a supervising committee for overiewing the National Security Strategy, HM-MvM-BM-KKM együttes utasítás a Nemzeti Biztonsági Stratégia felülvizsgálatára létrehozott munkacsoportról.* https://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A16U0057.HM&ti meshift=fffff4&txrefere=00000001.TXT#lj0id906d Downloaded: 14 January, 2018.

The information society highlighted security threats in areas such as cybercrime or the failure of systems directed by computers. Today we are in a situation where we rely on computers every minute of our lives. In my opinion the reprogramming of large dispensing and directing units, even an uncontrolled situation left for just a minute, can produce serious harm to society. Let us just think about possible damage to the banking system, problems with air traffic control, or malevolent intrusion into the system of health protection (Kovacs-Krasznay, 2017).

When we speak about the security of our country we need to emphasise that natural and manmade disasters still comprise part of our everyday lives, even though we pay more and more attention to their prevention (Hornyacsek, 2017). According to the Hungarian National Bank, in Hungary in the first nine months of 2017 a total of 167 million forints were paid out as compensation by branches of the insurance companies excluding life insurance, which was 11% more than the previous year and reached the peak of 2010⁴.

Terrorism and security, both in theory and in everyday practice, are strongly entwined. Many experts have dealt with the concept of terrorism, the ways it occurs, and its characteristics. There have been as many opinions and approaches as writings, but there is one thing that everyone agrees on: of the factors endangering security, terrorism is the main one. It is not necessarily the number of victims, but more the methods of how it is committed that are in the highlights of the news.

Migration waves have shaken Europe and drawn well-seen demarcation lines on the map of the continent. The population of the target countries have realised that migrants of different cultures do not want or at least are reluctant to adapt to the society of their host country. Conflicts occurring every day in most countries led to the realisation that migration is a security issue. Those countries that prepared for this challenge in time, and filtered and limited or stopped migrants before entering their country, preserving their previous level of security, became wanted tourist attractions. Security is a basic investment issue so this fact also has a direct impact on investments (Ujhazy 2017).

2 NEW TYPES OF SECURITY CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS TO THEM

In our opinion the newly appearing security challenges do not necessarily pose threats unknown so far, but it is more that the previously known dangers appear in new forms. We are going to look at two of those now. One of them stems from a summary of challenges caused by overpopulation, while they mutually strengthen each other causing a serious security challenge.

⁴ *Disasters: This year (2010) was the third most expensive of all times for the insurance companies, Katasztrófák: minden idők 3. legdrágább éve volt az idei a biztosítóknál. <https://www.portfolio.hu/finanszirozás/biztosítók-penztarak/katasztrófák-minden-idők-3-legdrágább-éve-volt-az-idei-a-biztosítóknál.271601.html> downloaded: 15th January, 2018.*

The facts and the forecasts of experts show that our planet's population has been growing exponentially. This, expressed in numbers, means that at the beginning of history there were 200 million humans, by 2000 6.5 billion, and by the estimation of the UN the Earth's population may reach 9.8 billion in 2050. The situation is further worsened by the fact that because of rapid urbanisation the estimated number of people living in cities will grow from 3.4 billion people in 2012 to 6.4 billion by 2050. This crisis has developed step by step; the growth in population increases very quickly, but biological resources and supply systems can take the pressure. This is followed by a situation where resources will not be able to satisfy all the needs⁵. Crossing a critical point due to further growth in population, systems will collapse. This will be true of the water supply, production and supply of food, and the depletion of energy resources. This will consequently cause havoc that will lead to enormous dissatisfaction giving way to chaos, violence and eventually lead to the extinction of humankind.

I am not saying that this is where we are now, but in certain ways we are pushing the boundaries. A good example of this is the crises caused by climate change which has generated social tensions at several points of the world due to limitations in the water and food supply. Several experts have stated that the 21st century will be the century of the fight for fresh water. To demonstrate this here are some examples:

- The water supply in Crimea, which lacks natural fresh water sources, appeared immediately after the annexation of the peninsula (18 March 2014). Russian leaders admitted that this is the most serious problem in the peninsula annexed from Ukraine, since its water supply depends on an “outer source”. On 26 April 2014 Ukraine closed the Northern Crimean channel, which supplied the Crimean peninsula with fresh water. The channel connects the main branch of the river Dnieper with the Crimea and provides 85% of the fresh water supply of the peninsula.
- Security specialists agree that in the Iraqi and Syrian conflicts the defining reason for success is the acquisition and maintenance of control over water sources. In areas poor in water, rivers, channels, springs, and water-connected establishments are primary military targets for all belligerents. Potable water is a strategic device; its possession is indispensable for achieving permanent success in military operations.
- Egypt and Ethiopia have been in disagreement for a long time, and the reason for this is the use or diversion of the water of the Nile. The conflict sharpened when, in spite of the continuous opposition of Egypt, Ethiopia started to build the biggest dam and water power station on the Ethiopian part of the Nile. Egyptian leaders stated that because of the situation, which had become very problematic, they were considering an attack against Ethiopia.
- Mao Tze-Tung realised the special strategic importance of the plateau of Tibet, which is in a geographical buffer zone of 2.4 million square kilometres. This area is between China and India, as well as China and Afghanistan. The other reason is

⁵ <http://globalproblems.nyf.hu/globalis-problema/a-fold-tulnepsedese/> Downloaded: 17th January, 2018.

its priceless water reserve. Its elevation of 4500 metres gives the water excellent quality and keeps it fresh. The biggest water reserve after the Arctic AND the Antarctic is on the plateau of Tibet. This is the reason why it is called the “the third Pole”. There are many rivers which start their long journey here, such as the Honcho, the Yangtze, the Mekong, the Salween, the Sutlej and the Brahmaputra. The plateau of Tibet supplies water to more than half of the world’s population.

On the surface this problem does not apply to Hungary, but on the other hand, because of its geographical position, it is very vulnerable when it comes to fresh water. Our main rivers arrive from outside the borders, so we are not the primary owners of them. Our relationship with our neighbouring countries is good, but despite this fact it was not possible to arrange positively either the question of the power plant in Bos (Bős) or that of the cyanide pollution. Both show that we are not in exclusive ownership of the fresh water sources flowing through the country. In times of crisis we depend on the benevolence of others, and let us have no illusions; if it is necessary to make the decision that due to limitations it is necessary to reduce the consumption of water, each government will take its own side.

Another impact that has consequences up to the present day, both for Europe and for our country within it, is the pressure of migration. The majority of migrants started their journey for economic reasons, since in their countries there was a lack of the resources. To tackle the migration situation following 2015, we spent approximately 300 billion forints, which shows that it is impossible to avoid indirect effects. The building of the temporary border sequestration, its maintenance and its guarding requires further expense and considerable efforts from the bodies concerned.

It can be seen that no country can exclude itself from the impacts that multiply themselves even when the problems are outside the borders.

Another challenge worth mentioning is called hybrid warfare. Many people have dealt with this concept in different ways; this is what we have highlighted: *“Hybrid warfare as a complex strategic (system) model is nothing less than a system of devices for states and alliances to reach their goals that, with the limited application of military operations, guarantees to reach geopolitical aims decisively by transforming non-military resources and methods”* (Simicsko, 2017).

It is worth highlighting from the wording that it is definitely not the “military resources and methods” that dominate, but any other means that help reach the desired aims. It is a familiar approach; that there is “nothing new under the sun” in this area too can also be applied to the following:.

Belisarius (13 March 505-565) said: *“The fullest and the happiest victory is the one when you force the enemy to give up their goals without you being hurt”* (Kaiser, 2017).

Sun- Tzu (544-496BC) said the following about the same idea: *“Who wins a thousand of battles is not the best of the best. The best of the best defeats the enemy army without a fight”* (Tokaji, 2015).

The poet and military leader Zrinyi Miklos (1620-1664) was also familiar with this thought: *“A captain does not need to think immediately about a fight, but must try everything possible to fight the enemy either by hunger or by other tricks, because fight goes with luck and luck is uncertain”* (Kovacs, 2003).

These thoughts illustrate that the approach of showing the manifestation of will in a complex way is already well known. This system changed as the time went by, since it depends on the development of technology and on the level of knowledge and of military science. At the time of Sun Tzu there was no way that the arms race in space could even be imagined, and today the race is going on in cyberspace. The regulation “trinity” of the final state of traditional military operations had turned by the time of hybrid operations; in the place of primary success in the old wars “to destroy – occupy – break”, asymmetric warfare’s rule is “to exhaust – break – bleed out” and the rule of hybrid warfare is “to break – cause disfunctioning – occupy” (Resperger, 2017).

The demonstration of the full arsenal of hybrid warfare, in our opinion, has never happened in place or time, even though the USA and Russia mutually accuse each other of this. At the same time some elements are continuously present in our everyday lives, so our country also must prepare for such situations. The critical areas are the strengthening of society and the necessary development of the HDF.

3 STEPS TAKEN IN THE DIRECTION OF THE MODERNISATION OF THE HDF

The strengthening of society is served by the emphasis of patriotic values, their implementation, and their support in every possible way. The government of our country realised the security “gap” that is characterised by the lack of defence capability and the social acknowledgment that goes with it. The visible form of this realisation is the Zrinyi 2026 military development programme⁶.

Simicsko Istvan, the Minister of Defence, stated the following at a conference: *“The security of Hungary is based on three pillars: on the preparedness of the HDF and their knowledge, capabilities and spirit; on our NATO alliance; and on the patriotic commitment of our citizens.”*⁷ Thoughts referring to military security appear in the points of the development programme. The essence of the programme is that the HDF can provide answers to new challenges if it itself approaches the problems in a new way, whether that be migration or the appearance of hybrid warfare.

⁶ <http://abouthungary.hu/zrinyi-2026/> Downloaded: 14th August, 2018.

⁷ https://www.orientpress.hu/cikk/2017-09-29_simicsko-magyarorszag-biztonsaga-harom-pilleren-alapszik Downloaded: 14th January, 2018.

The government accepted an anti-terrorism package accordingly: the notion of terrorism was included in the main law. Thus with this law the prepared military units can assist the work of the law enforcement services. These aims are strengthened by the creation of the Military Police Centre, which serves the strengthening of the country, and besides that, it can be offered for working abroad, possessing the capabilities necessary for international missions⁸.

Taking part in border guarding is part of the complex approach. Approximately 13,000 soldiers have been in service at the southern border in recent times, and in parallel to that, our participation in international missions with the strength of 1000 personnel has not lessened. We participate in various missions in different places in the world, in about 15 countries.

An important breakthrough is that “the 1298/2017 (VI.2.) government decision concerning the accomplishment of the Zrinyi 2026 programme of defence and military development” opens new dimensions for the improvement of the HDF⁹. The defence and armed forces programme planned for ten years to modernise the HDF is the biggest venture of the past few decades.

A new national security strategy is being developed for the Zrinyi 2026 programme which is organised according to the new challenges, and on its basis the military strategy also changes.

It is obvious that these changes require resources. It is accepted by the government that the Hungarian military budget will reach 2% of GDP. Another important goal is that the budget’s expenditure profile is optimal: 40% should be spent on operations, 30% on wages and 30% on development. With the Hungarian 2018 budget of about 428 billion, which in terms of GDP is about 1.2% in the budget planning, we are approaching this optimal rate expected by NATO.

The important elements of the Zrinyi 2026 programme are the following:

To strengthen air transport capability, i.e. to change the An-26 and Jak-52s: Air transport capability is strategically important both for the security of our country and for the defence forces. As the first step two A-319 Airbuses arrived in February 2018. They are multifunctional, troop transport aircraft. It does not mean that the existing An-26s will be decommissioned; while they can still be safely used and have combat value, they will be used.

The short term and long-term establishment and maintenance of the equipment with rotating blades (helicopters): We are going to lengthen the operating time of the existing Russian helicopters, and we will modernise them as necessary, firstly the

⁸ https://honvedelem.hu/szervezet/mh_krk Downloaded: 2nd April, 2018.

⁹ <https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=A17H1298.KOR&txtreferer=00000001.txt> Downloaded: 2nd April, 2018.

four Mi-17s. After considerable refurbishment and upgrading they will be able to operate for another seven years, approximately until 2025. This does not mean that there is an aim to get new or new-ish helicopters.

The acquisition of devices, from small aircraft to fighters, on domestic basis, helps our pilots to train and develop.

An important part of the development is the strengthening of air defence capabilities, including the acquisition of the smallest aircraft up to the development of Grippen fighter planes.

Besides the above mentioned developments, and because of the continuously growing threat, the HDF is committed to the continuous development of cyber defence capabilities¹⁰ with the application of informatics experts, high-level related education and training, and the procurement of the latest hardware.

Concerning land forces, the development of the special purpose artillery and armoured engineer troops, as well as that of the field command system, is the main aim. To be able to maintain the special operational capacity of the HDF to meet the rapidly changing international challenges, it is necessary to re-examine the organisational structure, too. Part of this is the reorganisation of the regiment of special purpose into a brigade that, based on the experiences of the past and international feedback, enables it to establish a unit which better meets the international and domestic requirements for special operational capability. From the point of view of its professional makeup, similarly to other units, the present military organisation comprises a wide spectrum of soldiers of different branches who will remain after the enlargement. During the reorganisation, with the establishment of the brigade, the staff will grow only by one third of the present number and will not exceed 1500 people¹¹.

In the area of logistic support the improvement in personal operational equipment, and placement in barracks is an important development aim. In 2018 we spent 11 billion forints on the development of the bases in Hodmezovasarhely, Tata and Szolnok. Another important area is the procurement of new vehicles, which will also invigorate the Hungarian military industry. In cooperation with the MD Currus private company and Ikarus Vehicle Technics Ltd. the CURRUS ARIES-VOLVO type buses were made for the HDF, and 15 items were provided in the first phase. The VOLVO chassis-based new buses were supplied by a Euro VI engine. The vehicles are capable of transporting 40 people or 12 casualties. The 15 buses of 2018 will be followed by 40 more this year, and according to the plans, there will be 100 for the HDF by 2019¹².

¹⁰ https://honvedelem.hu/cikk/52074_a_jovo_egyik_fo_feladata_a_kibervedelem Downloaded: 2nd April, 2018.

¹¹ https://honvedelem.hu/cikk/65132_dandarra_alakult_a_kulonleges_rendeltetesu_ezred Downloaded: 2nd April, 2018.

¹² https://honvedelem.hu/cikk/109382_atadtak_az_uj_katonai_buszokat Downloaded: 2nd April, 2018.

We acquired 27 Raba trucks for approximately 3 billion forints, 8 mobile checkpoint kits, 4 kits of trailers used for the quick laying of wire obstacles and one forklift truck. We changed 20-25 year old freight vehicles to the Hungarian Raba H14s. At the acquisition an important point was that, unlike before, the products of only one manufacturer must be in the system; in this way operation and maintenance is much simpler. The mobile checkpoints will be used mainly in mission tasks, but they could be applied in the event of a terrorist attack¹³.

The modernisation of logistic support has also begun. Accordingly, the HDF established a field supply point, and bought automobiles with special devices for the military police; 49 new minibuses; Raba type trucks, some of which are supplied with NBC protection, and others are capable of transporting hazmat, ammunition, and explosives; trucks capable of lifting 18 tons; and telescopic loading machinery. One part of the recent acquisitions is a Mobile Autonomous Fire Range Kit element, which, thanks to its computer-led managing and evaluating system and target-moving equipment is capable, even without an established firing range structure, of carrying out infantry and special firing exercises¹⁴.

Another important step is the modernisation of the car pool. A visible result is the acquisition of 250 Suzuki cars, with which the revamping of the old car pool of 20-year-old cars has begun. With the acquisition of these 120 BHP, 1600 cm³, petrol- engine vehicles (with EURO6 environment protection qualifications), the MoD bought the best quality and best equipped cars. The new cars have everything necessary for safe driving such as ABS blocking obstruction, ESP electric movement stabilisers and a tempomat¹⁵.

One of the highlighted elements of the developments is the improvement in the personal equipment of the soldiers. The new uniform is more comfortable and it serves better for the new challenges ahead. Among other things it is supplied with light reflection, which aids better camouflaging. According to the plans the entire change in uniforms will take place in the next three years.

Another thing that serves the purpose of changing the personal equipment of soldiers is that soon the manufacture of infantry small weapons will commence in Hungary, based on a Czech licence: the first step is assembly, and domestic production will begin on 1st January 2019¹⁶.

The new voluntary reserve system, based on territorial defence, is one of the important pillars of improvements, and consequently we are going to discuss it

¹³ https://honvedelem.hu/cikk/109291_a_magyar_honvedseg_folyamatosan_fejlodik_minden_eszkozbeszerzes_az_oroszag_es_a_magyar_emberek Downloaded: 2nd April, 2018.

¹⁴ https://honvedelem.hu/cikk/60900_mi_a_katonat_latjuk_az_eszkoz_mogott Downloaded: 3rd April, 2018.

¹⁵ https://honvedelem.hu/cikk/109414_atadtak_az_uj_honvedsegi_szolgalmi_gepjarmuveket_a_fovarosban Downloaded: 3rd April, 2018.

¹⁶ https://honvedelem.hu/cikk/109462_uj_merfoldko_a_haderofejlesztesben Downloaded: 3rd April, 2018.

in detail. The HDF will transform and renew the voluntary reserve system and, as a new element based on the support of the local communities, will establish a voluntary territorial defence reserve service system.

The aim is the establishment of voluntary territory-protecting reserve companies in each county within the country, so that in the event of necessity there would be a well-trained applicable force. The members of the area protection reserve company, during their training, will get theoretical and practical knowledge which strengthens the defence capability of the local community, whether it is a defence or a disaster management situation. Since the soldiers may have protocol tasks as well, their presence may elevate the quality of local commemorations.

Contracts for the reserve service can be signed only by physically and mentally healthy people. The applicants must undergo the 2nd type of aptitude test, which examines their capability to acquire and keep small hand weapons, ammunition, gas and other non-lethal weapons. The examinations are financed by the HDF. Reservists have the right to be paid for the contract signing, for being available, for the training time, and according to the payment category, they receive a basic salary, accommodation in the barracks, free meals and free clothing and travel expenses.

In the event of actual military service (even for 1-2 days) there is payment according to rank, free clothing, food, and travel expenses.

It is very important that the training of reservists must be carried out where they live, mainly in their home district, or at least in their county. The training takes 20 days in a module system; in this way each training session is no longer than 4-5 days. The task of the personnel is to participate in different emergency situations such as flood defence, security at various events, further reservists' recruitment and parade tasks at different district and county events.

The aim of the development is that by 2026 there will be approximately 20,000 reservists in the forces, and there will be reserve units in all 197 districts¹⁷.

During the development of the military life model, the salary of the soldiers will rise by 5% in 2018, so between 2015 and 2019 their income will have risen by 50%. Another sign of the appreciation of soldiers is the introduction of the labour market bonus. This bonus applies to the crew besides the compulsory salary rise, and it depends on their school qualifications.

Assuring the trained human resources of each organisation, including the HDF, for the next generation is a determined aim. This is helped by the establishment of the Defence Sports Alliance, which helps to popularise military-type sports,

¹⁷ https://honvedelem.hu/cikk/109389_ujabb_merfoldkohoz_erkeztunk Downloaded: 3rd April, 2018.

strengthens the relationship between the military and society, and reorganises the system of military education. The main aim of the establishment of the Defence Sports Alliance is the development of a new generation of healthy patriotism leading to a healthy lifestyle.

The above-mentioned aims are also served by the establishment of the Military Sports Centres. Their aim is to include as many members of society as possible in the programme of defence education, through sport, on a voluntary basis. The programme does not only support fighting sports, but it aims to attract young people's interest in sports, including their health protection. This programme is not for schools; it is more for outdoor and free-time activities, and thus it allows organised sport activities. Consequently the facilities of the sports centres are not in schools. The provision of voluntary defence education for citizens is a public task and so the centres will provide opportunities for sports that give useful knowledge of defence.

The planned centres will be established as multi-functional, and usable for several purposes. They will be able to introduce sports such as shooting as a free time activity, and provide practice in safe, organised circumstances; practise sports important for defence such as martial arts, fencing, shooting and others; and teach first aid and navigation. At the same time they will provide a place for the programmes of the Defence Sport Alliance, social events connected to defence education, and function as a community area for different social events.

In the first phase of the new programme, in the budgetary years of 2017 and 2018, sports centres will be established in 40 sites in district and county centres, spending 17.5 billion forints. During the second phase the development will continue in a further 67 places. The establishments will be organised according to the local circumstances, and completely new facilities will be built or existing ones will be restructured, enlarged or modernised¹⁸.

Even though it is not a part of the Zrinyi programme, we must mention here the modernisation of the facility pool of disaster protection, since in the event of a natural or other disaster the army plays a crucial role. With the cohesive support of the EU, and with the financial association of the state, the development will take place within the Szechenyi 2020 programme, affecting 25 military groups. Eighteen of them will get capacity enlargement, and at the same time it will be possible to establish seven new groups.

The project "Development of the Capability of the HDF to Intervene in Disaster Management" mainly deals with the extension of the tool park necessary for defence against flooding. The 2,215 billion forint investment, with the aim of enriching the HDF, includes modern information and communication devices, broad band radios,

¹⁸ https://honvedelem.hu/cikk/66541_uj_elnoke_van_honvedelmi_sportszovetsegnek Downloaded: 4th April, 2018.

amphibian transport capacity, large capacity petrol-operated portable fresh water and tainted water pumps, 300m³ elastic fuel supply containers, damage protection canvases, equipment for field kitchens, equipment for diving, special portable chemical detection instruments, protection clothing, lifebelts and life vests, heavy land machinery and heavy machinery transportation carriages.

The result of this development will be that the effectiveness of those taking part in the flood defence will increase, as well as the security of the civilian population. The primary aim of the development is to maintain and enlarge the capacities for the present disaster relief tasks. The implementation of the programme is continuous. It is likely that further appliances will arrive in the second quarter of 2018¹⁹.

Last but not least, we must mention the renewal of the officer training of 2012. In that year the National University of Public Service was established, and one of its faculties is responsible for officer training. The Faculty of Military Science and Officer Training is the successor to all military further education establishments, such as the Zrinyi Miklós National Defence University. The Faculty is the only such facility in Hungary, and stems from the traditions of Hungarian officer training, following in the footsteps of our ancestors, yet it is modern, scientifically based, and at the same time leads practical training according to the military profession.

The educational units are organised into four institutes (leader training, operational training, logistic training and air force training institutes) and they envelop almost all military areas. The military science and military professional training at the faculty enables that young people who chose a military career get to the special area they are most interested in. From armour to artillery, from signals to IT, from military supply services to technicians, from air traffic control to air force technicians, there is a broad range of professions to master.

In the past six years the Faculty has continuously developed its educational and research capabilities following the needs of the HDF, adapting to the changing security environment. Education includes BSc, MSc, and PhD levels, but the Faculty also offers advanced leadership education, courses and language teaching.

The main part of the PhD education is the Doctorate schools. In the Doctorate School of Military Science and the Doctorate School of Military Technology, both civilians and the military can get a PhD.

This modernised military education provides committed, loyal, highly trained specialists in different units to the HDF.

¹⁹ https://honvedelem.hu/cikk/109089_kapacitasbovites downloaded: 4th April, 2018.

Summary

In previous decades several armed forces reforms began but stalled due to the lack of resources. The Zrinyi 2026 programme is the first comprehensive modernisation programme that envelops the entire military, and there are available resources for it. However, most of the development funds go to the procurement of equipment of a non-combat nature, which will play a key role in capability enhancement. The accomplishment of a modern combat mission and operability of a modern armed forces, besides many other factors, is based on technological advancement and superiority. The state and effectiveness of the logistics system can sometimes make the difference between success and failure. Mobility and manoeuvrability are also key components, e.g. airlift capability is necessary to take part in international operations and humanitarian and crisis management tasks. The developments that have started show that if the programme is successful, the HDF will be ready to meet national as well as NATO requirements, and face the newly appearing security challenges.

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OKLEPNI TRANSPORTER ALI BOJNO VOZILO PEHOTE V SREDNJI BATALJONSKI BOJNI SKUPINI

ARMOURED PERSONNEL CARRIER OR INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLE IN A MEDIUM INFANTRY BATTALION GROUP

Povzetek V članku je predstavljen poseben izziv, ki mu je, po mnenju avtorja, izpostavljena Slovenska vojska z novim paketom ciljev zmogljivosti 2017. Ta namreč predvideva vzpostavitev srednjih bataljonskih bojnih skupin (SrBBSk) z vozili, ki so opremljena s 30 mm topom. Srednja bataljonska bojna skupina predvideva opremljenost z oklepnimi transporterji, zato njeno bojevanje temelji na manevru izkrcane pehote, ne pa na samostojnem bojevanju vozila, ki pehoto izkrca le, če je treba. V tej luči vsebuje opremljanje vozil s 30 mm topom nekaj strokovnih neznank. Menimo, da bo treba za take srednje BBSk najti drugačne doktrinarne rešitve, ki pa jih v Slovenski vojski trenutno nimamo. Nekatere možnosti predstavljamo v tem članku.

Ključne besede *Slovenija, Slovenska vojska, srednja pehota, srednja bataljonska bojna skupina, bojno vozilo pehote, 30 mm top.*

Abstract This article highlights a specific challenge brought into the Slovenian Armed Forces with the latest NATO Capability Targets 2017. This calls for the delivery of Medium Infantry Battalion Groups, equipped with Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) mounted with cannons. The Medium Infantry Battalion Group, according to the latest NATO capability codes and capability statements (2016), is to be equipped with armoured personnel carriers; consequently its manoeuvre is based on dismounted infantry and not the vehicle. In light of that, equipping the Medium Infantry Battalion Group with a 30mm cannon presents some issues. We need to have a clear doctrinal answer on its employment. Some of the options are presented in this article.

Key words *Slovenia, Slovenian Armed Forces, medium infantry, medium infantry battalion group, infantry fighting vehicle, 30 mm cannon.*

Introduction

In 2017 Slovenia received¹ new Alliance Capability Targets with Medium Infantry Battalion Groups (INF-M-BNG) at their centre as the most militarily relevant capabilities. The Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) plan to have these equipped with (wheeled) infantry fighting vehicles (IFV), mounted with 30mm cannons (Kralj, 2017, p.34). That, however, opens a range of questions linked to SAF budgetary issues and, from our point of view even more importantly, the doctrinal use of such vehicles.

The existing wheeled 8x8 vehicles in the SAF (Patria AMV–Svarun) are by definition armoured personnel carriers (APC) armed with 12.7mm machine guns or a 40mm grenade launcher. With regard to ballistic and mine protection they do however exceed the minimum alliance requirements for medium units.²

This article first attempts to establish a doctrinal difference between APCs and IFVs, since there is none in either the Alliance or SAF doctrine. The article also presents the Alliance's doctrinal requirements for INF-M-BNGs, with an emphasis on their vehicles, where there are several terminological issues. This serves as a base for a discussion on the dilemmas which the 30mm cannon brings to the INF-M-BNGs concept. We finish by proposing solutions to the issues revealed.

1 DEFINING THE ARMoured PERSONNEL CARRIER OR INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLE

The first armoured vehicles appeared on the battlefield during the First World War, as heavy tractors pulling artillery pieces, and as rudimentary tanks. Following the First World War technology and doctrine development revolved primarily around tanks. However, it was not long before it was established that tanks on the battlefield need infantry support, and that following fast-moving tanks around the battlefield poses a serious problem for the "less mobile" infantry. A unique Soviet Second World War II solution where the infantry rode the tanks around the battlefield proved unacceptable due to the heavy losses the infantry suffered in chance encounters with the enemy (Dragojević, 1986, p.48).

The industry's first response to the needs of the infantry came in the form of half-trucks (e.g. the German Sd.Kfz 251 and American M2) and light wheeled reconnaissance vehicles (e.g. the Sd.Kfz 231 and M8 Grand). These first vehicles were effective in their main purpose of providing infantry mobility, making it available to tanks when needed, while at the same time providing some armoured protection during transport.

Following the Second World War, the development of the infantry armoured vehicle followed the development of tanks in two general directions. The first

¹ Through NDPP, which basically means they were agreed upon by both sides (NATO and Slovenia).

² Medium Infantry Battalions equipped with APCs are the base around which INF-M-BNGs are developed, according to CC&CS 2016.

followed the half-truck tradition of providing battlefield taxis, while the second followed the identified need in the 1960s of a closer cooperation between tanks and infantry, with the resulting infantry vehicles participating in armoured combat (Dragojevič, 1986, p.52). This difference, of providing infantry transport around the battlefield, with infantry fighting dismounted and participating in armoured combat with tanks, is the first and main difference between APCs and IFVs. And as we understand it, this is also the basic difference between motorised infantry (equipped with APSs) and mechanised infantry (equipped with IFVs). However, technology improvements in recent decades have blurred the lines, and one cannot even find a generally accepted definition of what is an APC and what is an IFV. The closest we have come to a generally accepted definition of both can be found in the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. The Treaty defines an APC as "...an armoured combat vehicle which is designed and equipped to transport a combat infantry squad and which, as a rule, is armed with an integral or organic weapon of less than 20 millimetres calibre." (OSCE, 1990, pp.3-4) The same Treaty defines an IFV as "... an armoured combat vehicle which is designed and equipped primarily to transport a combat infantry squad, which normally provides the capability for the troops to deliver fire from inside the vehicle under armoured protection, and which is armed with an integral or organic cannon of at least 20 millimetres calibre and sometimes an antitank missile launcher." It also states that IFVs "... serve as the principal weapon system of armoured infantry or mechanised infantry or motorised infantry formations and units of ground forces," (OSCE, 1990, p.4). However, the treaty does not provide a definition of armoured, mechanised or motorised infantry.

NATO has no definition of different types of vehicles. It does however have a description of different unit type capabilities, which dictate the capabilities of the vehicles in these units. They can be found in the NATO Capability Codes and Capability Statements (CC&CS). To understand what type of vehicles one should find in these units we must take a look at CC&CS in conjunction with STANAG 4569, describing the required combat power and armoured protection at different levels. There are however also some terminological gaps in the Alliance documents and doctrine that are causing professional conflicts. The 2016 NATO CC&CS talks of armoured, mechanised and motorised infantry within the framework of heavy, medium and light battalions. It is clear from ATP 3.2.1 and the 2016 CC&CS that heavy infantry is designed to fight with tanks, medium infantry is designed as an intermediate between heavy and light with an emphasis on battlefield and operational agility, and light infantry is designed for strategic mobility and fighting in close terrain (ATP 3.2.1, 2009, pp.3-2, 3-3).

The US reference in relation to the APC/IFV difference states that "any IFV must be able to carry a team or squad and have the three following characteristics:

- Lethality of a medium cannon or automatic grenade launcher,
- Protection against machine guns,
- Mobility to move off-road with tanks and fire weapons on the move.

If an infantry carrier cannot meet any of the above capabilities, it is not an IFV... Adding a medium cannon to a light-armoured wheeled APC does not make that vehicle an IFV, because it may not be able to accompany tanks, fire on the move, or survive first contact with the enemy,” (TRADOC, 2011, pp.3-1 in 3-2).

In conclusion we can establish that the APCs primary purpose is to transport infantry and not to fight. Units equipped with APCs conduct dismounted manoeuvre. On the other hand the IFV’s primary purpose is to conduct mounted manoeuvre and to fight with tanks. They will only dismount the infantry for close protection or when IFVs are unable to execute a task. The key to understanding the difference is to look at the vehicle through the elements of firepower, protection and mobility. IFVs are equipped with cannons (20mm or more) and have the capability to fire anti-tank guided weapons. They also have a minimum of K5/Mb3 level of protection (STANAG 4569)³. IFVs are capable of good off-road mobility, and above all are capable of following tanks in all terrains. However, regardless of the APC/IFV definition, if these three elements are not properly balanced, the system as a whole is exposed to increased risk. The doctrinal use of the vehicle needs to be adapted to the weakest of the three elements.

2 MEDIUM INFANTRY BATTALION GROUP CAPABILITIES

The Slovenian Armed Forces have already developed and affiliated a Light Battalion Battle Group into the NATO force structure. With the 2013 Capability Goals, the SAF planned to have one motorised (previously light (2008)) and one mechanised (previously medium (2008)) Battalion Battle Group. In 2017 the SAF were given a new set of capability goals with two INF-M-BNGs at their centre. It would seem that the SAF was given a more demanding goal to reach. However in this regard we are no exception in the Alliance. The changed geopolitical environment dictates strengthening the Alliance’s capabilities of fighting in high-intensity conflict.

However, at this point a detailed analysis of the Alliance’s INF-M-BNG requirements is necessary. The capstone capability for the INF-M-BNG is: “Capable of conducting land tactical activities alone and manoeuvre under fire to engage or defeat the opposing force by being organised as a combined-arms and battalion-sized force and by exploiting Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC) or medium/heavy Protected Patrol Vehicles (H/M-PPV) that will provide protected mobility and some fire support to ensure tactical and operational mobility” (CC&CS, 2016, p.67)⁴. Connecting this to the Medium INF BN requirements and STANAG 4569, this means that at a minimum the vehicles need to provide a K3/Mb2⁵ level of protection. At the same time the CC&CS also demands that the

³ 25 mm automatic cannon/155 mm artillery bursts at 25m and under belly 8 kg Blast AT Mine explosions

⁴ The framework unit for INF-M-BNG is a Medium Infantry Battalion as defined by CC6CS 2016 (pp.64-65)

⁵ 360° protection from sniper rounds 7;62x54R and 155mm fragments at 60m; and 6 kg AT mines under the center of the vehicle

Medium INF BN employs vehicle-mounted direct fire weapons to destroy enemy lightly armoured vehicles protected up to K3 level (STANAG 4569), and neutralise/suppress dismounted infantry at ranges beyond 200m. This of course means that the capabilities required of INF-M-BNG demand an APC and not an IFV. This is, at the same time, in line with ATP 3.2.1., which dictates medium infantry doctrine for NATO and requires medium infantry to fight predominately dismounted with the manoeuvre based on dismounted infantry and not the vehicle. This however is an important difference with regard to the previous Slovenian Capability Goals, which required the SAF to set up a mechanised infantry battalion group, based on IFVs; therefore SVN has actually been given “lighter” goals than previously.

However, based on available information, the SVN Capability Goals must have an additional requirement regarding the vehicle’s armaments. The SAF apparently plans to equip its INF-M-BNG vehicles with 30mm cannons (Kralj, 2017, p.34). Since the Capability Goals are unlikely to require all the vehicles to be equipped with cannon, we believe this was an internal SAF decision.

We believe this latter fact poses a serious dilemma for the SAF. This dilemma is not new, and nor is it specific to the SAF. The US Army established that the Russian Federation is equipping its Stryker equivalent with a 30mm cannon. This led to a demand that Strykers also be equipped with a 30mm cannon (Gregory, 2017). The adaptation process was fairly quick and the first US Army Stryker units in Europe are already equipped with 30mm Stryker vehicles. This being said, it is very clear to the US Army that such a Stryker is not meant to engage in decisive combat with enemy armoured or mechanised units, and that the conversion was done in a way that the vehicle has retained all the capabilities of dismounted infantry it had before (Judson, 2017). Some have also pointed out the possible disadvantages of such a conversion. There is a strong possibility that due to the conversion the vehicles will be doctrinally misused, as even the old Strykers are often misused (King, 2017). The US Army doctrine states: “By design, the Stryker family of vehicles does not have the level of protection to fight against heavily armoured vehicles. This concept is still true for the MGS (Mobile Gun Systems) ... they must rely instead on their mobility and manoeuvrability in coordination with other units to effectively engage targets and then displace. They cannot exchange fire with armoured fighting vehicles and expect to survive the engagement” (ATP 3-21.91, 2017, pp.1-7). None of the sources available state that the up-gunned Strykers would also be getting an increase in armour protection. The Stryker is an Infantry Carrier Vehicle or basically a classic APC, and is not meant to fight enemy vehicles. It was therefore conceptualised with an appropriate armament, armour and mobility (King, 2017). Its main advantage is strategic and operational mobility.

We also believe that the Russian BPM-97, which was used as a reason for up-gunning the Strykers, is not in the same category as the Stryker. The literature states that BPM-97 is a Russian border guards vehicle. It is supposed to have STANAG 4569 Level K4 armour protection, a V-shaped hull and a 30mm cannon

(http://www.military-today.com/apc/bpm_97.htm). This is supposed to make it an IFV, but the fact that it is a wheeled 4x4 and designed for a border guard role make it incomparable to the Stryker family of vehicles. This is similarly incomparable as the French VBR 4x4 (with 20mm cannon and K4 protection) and the Stryker. The VBR is a reconnaissance vehicle, and the Stryker an APC (Jane's, 2011, p.225).

The NATO Alliance has no definition of an IFV as a tracked vehicle, but it does have a clear requirement for an IFV to be able to fight with tanks. Wheeled 8x8 vehicle technology is supposed to make them capable of following tanks, but praxis does not show this to be a reality in any country. We believe that the off-road mobility of 8x8 vehicles is not up to the requirements of tracked vehicles.

When we consider adding an armament to a certain type of vehicle, we need to know exactly what is its intended role and the potential threats it could face. Based on this, we need to properly balance the elements of firepower, protection and mobility. World's Armed Forces inventories are full of wheeled vehicles with 20mm+ cannons; the Pandur II, Partia AMV, VBCI, Centauro VBM, BTR-90, Lazar, Ratel IFV, and MOWAG Piranha IV. All of them have the capability to upgrade their off road capability and armour protection to K4/K5 level. The industry also calls them IFVs, but we believe they are incapable of fighting with tanks and are therefore not real IFVs. Their manoeuvre is still based on dismounted infantry. The cannon is only an expensive bonus.

3 MEDIUM INFANTRY BATTALION GROUP VEHICLES

According to CC&CS2016, medium infantry battalions are based on mechanised infantry in APCs. However, there is a requirement in the Slovenian Capability Targets 2017⁶ for cannon on INF-M-BNG vehicles. From our point of view it is pointless to have a 30mm cannon on an APC if it is unable to provide a corresponding level of protection and mobility. An APC with a 30mm cannon cannot be used as an IFV to fight with tanks or against enemy IFVs or to defeat enemy strongpoints because it lacks the necessary protection and mobility and will therefore always be on the losing side. However, if such a vehicle is used as an APC we are not fully exploiting the potential of its cannon, and are therefore hard-pressed to justify the sense of a rather large investment into such a vehicle⁷.

⁶ *Since the NATO CAPABILITY TARGETS 2017 for Slovenia is a classified document, and therefore unavailable, we can only deduce that this requirement must be in it since there is no such requirement in any of the UNCLASSIFIED or doctrinal documents. In addition we have several sources stating that a cannon is a NATO capability requirement (e.g. MMC RTV SLO, 2018 and Mikelj, 2018). Since the required capabilities for each individual nation are defined in the NATO CAPABILITY TARGETS we can assume that a 30mm cannon requirement is contained within them.*

⁷ *According to available internet data (www.army-guide.com) the cannon-equipped turret price is somewhere between 10% and 25% of the vehicle price, depending on the type of turret and cannon..*

The way the SAF seems to understand mechanised infantry is in collision with NATO's understanding of it. The Yugoslav People's Army (YPA), where most of the SAF armoured officers were schooled, understood mechanised infantry as an integral part of an armoured unit. It was therefore equipped with IFVs, to fight alongside tanks. APCs, in YPA doctrine, were the domain of a motorised infantry (SSNO, 1976, p.11).

NATO, however, has a different doctrinal stand on mechanised infantry. Based on ATP 3.2.1 and CC&CS 2016 it is clear that in NATO the infantry in both APCs and IFVs is treated as mechanised. Further, there are no requirements in NATO for all vehicles in manoeuvre units of the medium infantry to be equipped with cannons, and there is also no requirement for the medium infantry to be equipped with IFVs – IFVs are only required in heavy infantry units. In fact NATO medium infantry doctrinally perfectly corresponds to the US Army Stryker doctrine, where only one platoon per company is equipped with a 105mm Mobile Gun System (MGS). The MGS vehicle does not have the ballistic protection of a tank but more that of an APC, as it is not meant to fight with tanks or against IFVs, but to provide direct fire support to the infantry riding around the battlefield in APCs.

The SAF has vehicles in its inventory that provide the crew with 360° protection against 14.5mm machine guns and can supposedly even protect frontally against 30mm APFSDS. They also protect against 10kg anti-tank mines (Balažić, 2010, p.9 & Gregorčič, 2012). This corresponds to STANAG 4569 level K4/Mb3 at a minimum. This is due to the fact that the vehicles were intended to equip a mechanised battalion for the purposes of creating a framework for a mechanised battalion battle group in line with the Capability Goals valid at that time (SOPR 2007-20012 & SOPR 2013-2018). A mechanised battalion battle group at that time required IFVs capable of fighting with tanks⁸. However these vehicles were later only equipped with 0.50 calibre machine guns and 40mm automatic grenade launchers, due to procurement issues; they therefore cannot be treated as IFVs⁹.

Apparently SAF plans to have two battalions equipped with IFVs (30mm cannon, ATGW and K4/Mb3 level of protection). Such vehicles are however still not capable of fighting with tanks and are still vulnerable to IFV escorting tanks. For the purpose of fighting with tanks and against enemy IFVs, NATO has heavy infantry units with K5/Mb3 level of protection.

⁸ NATO requirements for different types of capabilities are regularly publicized in Bi-SC Capability Codes and Capability Statements. Relevant to us are the 2008, 2011 and 2016 editions. In CC&CS 2008 we can find capabilities as they pertained to light, medium and heavy infantry; in it we could find very specific requirements for a medium infantry battalion group – 31xIFVs (wheeled or tracked) with a cannon or 21xIFVs and 10xtanks. The 2011 CC&CS have changed that into motorized and mechanized infantry, where motorized infantry was equal to 2008 light infantry and mechanized infantry combined the 2008 medium and heavy infantry. The 2011 CC&CS did not specifically state the details for the vehicles but it was clear from the list of required capabilities that mechanized infantry should have IFVs. The 2016 CC&CS however returned to the light, medium and heavy classification, but this time it is specifically stated that medium infantry is equipped with APCs and heavy infantry with IFVs. It does not however state whether these vehicles are tracked or wheeled.

⁹ As already mentioned the vehicle needs to have all three elements (protection, mobility, firepower) corresponding to IFV level. If it fails in any of the elements it cannot be considered an IFV.

It may look like a good solution to have better protection than required in combination with cannon. It would of course be pointless to argue against less protection for the troops. However we believe these vehicles to be a good solution only as long as the SAF medium infantry will be doctrinally used as dismounted infantry with vehicles in support. Any other use has a large potential for unwanted catastrophic results. We believe this that the temptation to use the vehicles in an IFV role, with the infantry mounted until the last possible moment, will be too much for the commanders to resist.

4 SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES OPTIONS REGARDING VEHICLES IN MEDIUM UNITS

The SAF now has several options on how to proceed in building the INF-M-BNG with 30mm cannon.

One option for the SAF would be to procure additional 8x8 vehicles already in its inventory, with the addition of a 30mm cannon on some or all of these so that they can provide the required direct support to dismounted infantry. This would be the optimal option from a purely military perspective. However, due to serious political constraints¹⁰, this option is out of the question.

The first viable option (COA1) is for the SAF to form two medium infantry battalions in accordance with Stryker doctrine¹¹ with a PLT of cannon-equipped vehicles per manoeuvre company (FM 3-21.31, 2003). In this case cannon-equipped vehicles on an existing SAF 8x8 chassis (K4/Mb3) could even risk engaging enemy IFVs, but they should not get decisively engaged. This would, however, present an issue of combining different types of combat vehicles at company level. Therefore it would be better to equip manoeuvre companies with a single type of vehicle. This would potentially be the best option, and the SAF would fulfil its Capability Targets 2017 as they relate to INF-M-BNG¹². There would also be very little need to invent our own tactical doctrine as to how to utilise this unit, since it would basically correspond to the US Stryker units. Above all such a unit would be perfectly in line with ATP 3.2.1.

¹⁰ *Having in mind the fact that the original procurement of the 8x8 vehicles was clouded by corruption charges at the highest levels of government in Slovenia.*

¹¹ *“The SBCT achieves decisive action with combined arms at the infantry company level by applying the effects of direct fire from the mobile gun system (MGS), indirect fire from mortars and artillery, and joint effects of other services to support the infantry assault. (p.1-1)....The infantry battalions (Figure 1-5, p.1-14) serve as the primary maneuver force for the brigade and are designed as a three-by-three organization of three rifle companies with three rifle platoons each. Companies fight as combined arms teams with a section of organic 81-mm mortars, an MGS platoon, and a sniper team (p.1-13).” Ppk. Burggrave in his SAMS essay points out that budgeting issues have resulted in not all Stryker companies being equipped with MGS PLT. Instead MGS vehicles were held at BDE level. This of course took away much of the desired COY level combined arms capabilities. One of the ways to get around this issue is to introduce 30mm cannon to COY level (Burggrave, 2016, pp.39-46).*

¹² *Assuming there is no requirement in any of the Alliance documents (CLASSIFIED) for all vehicles in maneuver companies to be equipped with 30mm cannons. In that case a platoon of 30mm guns per company would suffice. It would be very hard to understand why a Alliance expert would demand all APCs to be equipped with a 30mm cannon, but we recognize this is a possibility.*

The second viable option (COA 2) is to procure a new type of vehicle¹³ for the medium battalions of the SAF, and equip all of the vehicles in manoeuvre companies with a 30mm cannon. Here too the SAF must make a decision whether or not to include the existing SVARUN 8x8 vehicles into such formations. However, such vehicles, in accordance with CC&CS16 and Capability Goals 2017, would still basically be APCs, and therefore the units manoeuvre would still have to be based primarily on dismounted infantry. Such a unit would also be hard-pressed to bring all of its firepower to bear. The cannon would also represent a temptation for the SQD and PLT leaders to decisively engage enemy IFVs – a fight they could not win, due to the inferior protection and mobility. This is even the US Army Stryker units' experience from NTC (King, 2017).

However, it seems that the SAF will go with COA 2 and procure a new type of 8x8 cannon-equipped vehicles (BOXER)¹⁴. In addition these will have the same level of protection and mobility as the existing 8x8 vehicles. This is an unnecessary waste of already very limited resources. Such vehicles are not required for medium infantry and will give their users a false sense of security and capability. Leaders and commanders will tend to treat them as IFVs, which they are not, and the consequences will be disastrous.

It is also of interest to note the above options through their financial consequences, as presented below in Tables 1 to 3. They are based on the following assumptions:

- That the SAF will require from 136 to 160 8x8 vehicles in order to equip its two INF-M-BNGs¹⁵;
- That a manoeuvre company consists of fourteen 8x8 vehicles;
- That the prices found on www.army-guide.com are roughly realistic in terms of the relationship between the prices of a pure APC compared with an APC with a gun turret¹⁶.

For comparison purposes the option with Patria AMV vehicles is included in the tables, although we recognise it is politically unacceptable. The first point to notice from the tables is a considerable increase in cost when we increase the vehicles' protection level from K3/2b to K4/3b. In the case of Piranha vehicles, the difference is anywhere from 168 million EUR to 228 million EUR, depending on the chosen

¹³ Not necessarily new vehicles directly from a production line; it should be a new platform (APC instead of IFV) currently non-existent in the SAF – but it could also be used or leased.

¹⁴ The Government has been informed of the intention to join OCCAR (the organization managing BOXER vehicles) in FEB 2018 (http://www.mo.gov.si/si/medijsko_sredisce/novica/8235/) and its proposal (http://www.vlada.si/delo_vlade/dnevni_redi/dnevni_redi/article/185_redna_seja_vlade_rs_dne_26_julija_2018_61563/) to join OCCAR to Parliament has been submitted (<https://siol.net/novice/slovenija/vlada-v-dz-s-pobudo-za-pravno-podlago-za-nakup-oklepnikov-473811>)

¹⁵ The difference in numbers being the direct fire support platoon IAW Stryker doctrine in COA 1. This additional fire support platoon in a company would consist of four (4) 8x8 vehicles equipped with 30mm cannons.

¹⁶ We compared the price of the BOXER with (LAT) and without a turret (DEU, NDL), the LAV III with (CAN) and without (US Stryker) a turret, and the PATRIA AMV with (POL Rosomak) and without (SVN) a turret (Source: www.army-guide.com).

option. It also follows from the tables that what we consider as optimal (COA1) is not necessarily the most affordable option. This is due to the fact that COA 1 has 24 more vehicles, and when this is considered, the cost difference is not as great. Also 12 more vehicles per battalion means much more space for different enablers to be transported around the battlefield. According to the calculations, COA 2 would more affordable, but for the reasons specified above, it is still not an optimal solution. As for combining different types of vehicles in manoeuvre units, we believe the logistical problems of having different vehicle types are simply not worth the financial savings, especially for an army of our size.

Table 1:
Piranha III

	SAF SVARUN (PATRIA AMV)	PATRIA AMV	Piranha III (in accordance w/NATO min. requirements K3/2b)	Total vehicles	Total cost (million EUR)
Unit cost	0 EUR	3M EUR	2.5M EUR		
30mm Turret cost	300k EUR	3.3M EUR	3.0M EUR		
N.A.	30	24w/t+106		160	397,2
		100w/t+6		136	348,0
COA1	30		24w/t+106	160	337,0
			24w/t+136		412,0
COA2	30		100w/t+6	136	315,0
			100w/t+36		390,0

Table 2:
Piranha V

	SAF SVARUN (PATRIA AMV)	PATRIA AMV	Piranha V (exceeding NATO min. requirements – K4/3b)	Total vehicles	Total cost (million EUR)
Unit cost	0 EUR	3M EUR	3.9M EUR		
30mm Turret cost	300k EUR	3.3M EUR	4.6M EUR		
N.A.	30	24w/t+106		160	397,2
		100w/t+6		136	348,0
COA1	30		24w/t+106	160	523,8
			24w/t+136		640,8
COA2	30		100w/t+6	136	483,4
			100w/t+36		600,4

Table 3:
BOXER

	SAF SVARUN (PATRIA AMV)	PATRIA AMV	BOXER (exceeding NATO min. requirements – K4/3b)	Total vehicles	Total cost (million EUR)
Unit cost	0 EUR	3M EUR	4.9M EUR		
30mm Turret cost	300k EUR	3.3M EUR	5.9M EUR		
N.A.	30	24w/t+106		160	397,2
		100w/t+6		136	348,0
COA1	30		24w/t+106	160	661,0
			24w/t+136		808,0
COA2	30		100w/t+6	136	619,4
			100w/t+36		766,4

Conclusion The INF-M-BNG presents a major challenge for the SAF. The decisions it will make concerning it will have a determining influence on the future of the SAF, and the wrong decisions will have disastrous consequences. The SAF and its civilian leadership are focusing on the INF-M-BNG as the core SAF capability for national and NATO tasks. In all honesty the 2xINF-M-BNG are the only military relevant contributions the SAF are making to NATO. But the doctrinal approach the SAF has taken is misaligned with NATO's doctrinal purpose and tasks for medium infantry. There is also the question of understanding the role of the SAF's INF-M-BNG in its national and NATO defence plans, as we can find no discussion on that within the SAF.

At the centre of it all are the vehicles. From both the doctrinal and budgetary perspectives they will have determining effects on the SAF for the next 20-30 years. They have the potential to make or break the SAF. Perhaps part of the problem is in understanding NATO doctrine and plans; maybe the SAF has put too little effort into understanding it.

Above all the SAF needs to understand that the vehicles are not a solution on their own. Having big shiny toys with great cannons will mean very little if the people operating them are not trained in proper doctrine and do not intimately understand the vehicles' capabilities and limitations and the roles they can(not) play on the battlefield.

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DŽIHADIZEM IN RADIKALIZACIJA V IZBRANIH REGIJAH EVROPE, BLIŽNJEGA VZHODA IN SEVERNE AFRIKE – ŠTUDIJA PRIMERA

JIHADISM AND RADICALISATION IN SELECTED REGIONS OF EUROPE, THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA – A CASE STUDY

Povzetek Terorizem in z njim povezani pojavi, kot sta radikalizem in džihadizem, so eni največjih izzivov našega časa. S predstavitvijo primerov v nekaterih pomembnih državah avtor analizira vzroke in posledice terorizma. Pomembno je, da se pri tej tematiki osredotočimo le na nekaj držav, saj se vzroki za radikalizem in džihadizem razlikujejo in s časom spreminjajo ne le znotraj regije, temveč tudi znotraj posameznih držav. Radikalizem in džihadizem sta večinoma tesno povezana s kriznimi območji. Poleg analize tematike so v študijo vključeni tudi predlogi za obvladovanje in reševanje tega problema.

Ključne besede *Terorizem, džihadizem, radikalizem, tuji bojavniki, Bližnji vzhod, Evropa, Severna Afrika.*

Abstract One of the biggest challenges of our time is terrorism and its concomitant phenomena, such as radicalism and jihadism. The author analyses the causes and consequences of terrorism by describing relevant cases in certain significant countries. Reducing this topic to some concrete countries only is important, because the causes of radicalism and jihadism are different and can change over time not only across a region, but also within a single country. Radicalism and jihadism are mostly closely connected to crisis areas. Beyond the analysis of this topic, the study also touches upon proposals to handle and solve this problem.

Key words *Terrorism, jihadism, radicalism, foreign fighters, middle East, Europe, north Africa.*

Introduction

The terror-wave hitting the West in 2016 and 2017 had a significant impact on political elections and the policy of governments (e.g. The Netherlands, France and Germany), while migration has an effect on the elections in Austria, Italy and Hungary. The causes that trigger terrorist actions have not abated at all, and terrorists will certainly continue their activities in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Nigeria. In spite of the defeat of the caliphate in Iraq and Syria, the conflict is not yet over. This will entail further migration waves and force many citizens to leave their homes. The terrorist organisation ISIS has proved its strong operative capability in Europe, and its members will remain active for several years in Iraq, Syria and other countries. This may modify the policy of governments in 2017 and 2018, and not only in those countries where elections will be held (TSG IntelBrief, 2015).

For the topic of this study it is important to define terrorism, jihadism and radicalism. Terrorism does not have a universal definition, but this is not a scientific problem, rather a political one. According to the AAP-06 NATO Glossary of terms and definitions, terrorism is "the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives" (NATO AAP-06 2014).

Jihadism is more complicated to define because of the different interpretations of actions. The Arabic word means *effort* or *struggle*. In Islam it can be used to describe an individual's internal struggle against the baser instincts in the interests of building a good Muslim society. But jihadism or the jihadist movement means a struggle (even with arms) against infidels and apostates. The term jihadist has been used by Western academics to distinguish between violent and non-violent Islamists, and is not used by many Muslims. For Muslims "jihad" is very different from "fighting against non-Muslims". Based on this theory, many Muslim academics use "the so-called jihad" rather than "jihad" alone. In the Muslim world the "Islamist threat" is not accepted; they use "extremists claiming affiliation with Islam". "Islamist terrorism" does not exist; they use "insurgents". These examples clearly show how different the viewpoints are concerning this topic.

Radicalism and extremism have many meanings and could be the subject of many doctoral theses, especially if we consider the understanding of different countries and the fight against this phenomenon. As understood by this author, radicalism is a political orientation aiming for an essential change in society and government. Extremism talks about radical actions to gain more support for radical behaviours. We must not forget: not all radicals are terrorists, but all terrorists are radical.

1 FOREIGN FIGHTERS

2018 is the eighth year that civil war has been raging in Syria. This devastating conflict has reduced the country to ruins, deteriorated Syria's relations with its neighbours, increased the regional influence of Russia and Iran, and in addition, has severely tested the peacekeeping capability of the United Nations. As we have seen

in Afghanistan, even if combat activities come to an end, one side autonomously declares itself the winner, but the fight or revolt continues. The author has the view that we have little chance of avoiding this scenario in Iraq and Syria, but due to the very different interests of the regional powers, it will happen in a more complicated way.

Europe will also have to cope with migration in 2018. The countries of origin are not only the crisis areas of the Middle East, but also the African continent. The agreement concluded with Turkey in March 2016 has significantly reduced the number of illegal migrants arriving in Europe through the Balkan route. Since the handling of the migration crisis represents a political trump card in the hands of European politicians, they cannot afford to neglect it. Even sporadic terrorist attacks can exercise a very negative effect on the political situation, let alone a potentially significant terrorist attempt.

After the appearance of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, many foreign fighters arrived to join the organisation from several countries. It is these fighters that constitute the core staff of the organisation, in terms of combating personnel. They came mainly from Tunisia, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Belgium, France, Great Britain and Russia (primarily from Chechnya and Dagestan). Researches pursued during the last 2-3 years have shown that a number of the terrorist fighters left their homes and moved only into another area of their own country, while others went to a foreign state. We can therefore make a difference between local and regional terrorist hotbeds. These hotbeds often have different features, but also have a common denominator; their “personnel” are very radical extremists.

In this connection it is necessary to note that – after the Paris and Brussels attacks – the media have been talking about Muslim ghettos that offer places for extremist hotbeds and bases, where unemployment is soaring, where the police do not dare to enter, and where radical orators and activists recruit future terrorists. This issue has been studied primarily by the Soufan Group. It was Ali Soufan and Daniel Schoenfel who clearly showed that there are such hotbeds, network nets inside regions and settlements, where ISIS can easily recruit fighters. However, the relevant studies also point out that – despite intensive radicalisation efforts – the overwhelming majority of Muslim citizens have not been yet radicalised and are not inclined to be, even if they are living under difficult circumstances.

The security vacuum after the Iraqi war, as well as the Syrian civil war, attracted many foreign fighters to the combat areas. Although the intensive presence of foreign fighters is a new phenomenon, it has also been evident in the past, though to a smaller extent. Between 1980 and 2011, it is said that there were about 10,000-30,000 foreign fighters in Muslim countries (Hegghammer, 2010). According to US intelligence sources, foreign fighters arrived in Syria and Iraq from more than 100 countries in 2015, mainly from Muslim states (TSG, 2015). They were immediately involved in combat activities. However the number of

newly arrived foreign fighters cannot be determined, because their arrival is not continuous and their number always fluctuates. For example, in 2014, 12,000 fighters arrived from 81 countries, and by December 2015 – in the assessment by the Soufan Group – 27,000-31,000 terrorists had come from 84 states (Barrett, 2014). These data are identical to those published by the Americans. However, the number of new fighters in Syria and Iraq drastically diminished, thanks – among other things – to the relevant restrictive measures taken by western states, and due to the deteriorating situation in Iraq and Syria. At the same time, Libya became a new target for extremist fighters (Strobel and Stewart, 2016).

As I have mentioned above, most foreign fighters are from North Africa and the Middle East, but it is necessary for us to note that about 5,000 of them arrived from Europe. This number does not come as a surprise at all, because the most numerous Muslim communities – apart from the Arab world – live in Europe. The Soviet successor states “provided” 4,700 militants, although President Putin talked about 10,000 people (Flippov, 2017). From the south-east Asian countries 900 came, while 500 foreign fighters arrived from the Balkans.

We would not be precise enough if we were to fail in clearly determining the following: inside a given country, which are the towns, and inside the towns which are the districts or areas, where the jihadist hotbeds have emerged? In general, these hotbeds came into existence much earlier than ISIS appeared on the scene. Such towns as Derna in Libya, Ben Guerdene and Kasserine in Tunisia or the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia, for example, had been jihadist nests for a long time, providing fighters for the conflicts between Muslim states.

Talking about specific countries, it is worth mentioning that of the 5,000 European foreign fighters, 3,700 people came from only four countries. The Molenbeek district of Brussels “brought up” the most terrorists and became the focus of international attention with regard to the attempts committed in Paris and Brussels. If we analyse the recruitment areas, we can see that there are significant differences according to the social, ethnic, economic and demographic circumstances of the given town or district.

With regard to motivation, the grievances and problems of a group or an individual can play a significant role in radicalisation, and can induce people to join a terrorist organisation. Although ISIS and the Assad regime represent a strong attractive force, personal problems are more important motivators. We can see a strengthening trend by which the personal examples and activities of charismatic leaders represent a strong motivation in the hands of recruiters, especially in Europe. Another prevailing trend is that those young Muslims who have a criminal record or a very uncertain future can be recruited relatively easily. It is necessary to mention that closed Muslim communities are especially preferred hunting grounds for recruiters.

2 COUNTRIES MOST HIT BY RADICALISM

In this section, I will try to analyse those countries and areas inside countries that have a great impact on radicalisation.

2.1 Tunisia

It was Tunisia that “sent” the most fighters to Iraq and Syria, and later also to Libya. The official figure is about 6,000, and non-official ones talk about 7,000 foreign fighters. If we consider that the country has 11 million inhabitants, it is rather surprising that from every thousand Tunisians, 55 people are followers of extremist organisations. Nearly 1,500 fighters went to the Libyan ISIS and al-Qaeda in Islam Maghreb and other radical groups (Packer, 2016). According to some estimates, half the foreign fighters are Tunisian citizens.

At this time, the majority of the Arabs fighting in Afghanistan against the Soviets were Tunisians, so this problem is not a new one. It is not surprising either that the “mother country” of the Tunisian Combat Group is Afghanistan. During the Balkan War, Tunisian jihadists also fought in Bosnia against the Serbs. The Tunisian ex-President Ben Ali took very serious measures against the radicals. However, this only served to strengthen radicalism. At the beginning of the Arab revolution, many extremists escaped from prisons, increasing the number of radicals. Among the reasons for radicalisation, it is worth mentioning marginalisation, partially due to decentralisation. After the revolution, intensive political activity took place even outside the capital, which had not been the case before. Among the main reasons for radicalisation were social exclusion and discrimination, rather than economic hardship. Compared to fighters deriving from other countries, a relatively large number of the Tunisian fighters were highly educated and graduated from higher schools. This played a significant role in choosing the ISIS leadership from among Tunisian extremists. In the light of this, this author thinks that the view of the famous French Professor Olivier Roy, who pointed out in several studies that European radicalism does not derive from Salafism or the Islamic Revolution, or from the anger of Muslims against imperialism, but from the generational, political and cultural marginalisation of youth, is quite understandable. These young men are fascinated by violence, and it is their disappointment about their future and the denial of the way of life represented by their parents that leads them to take another course, different from traditional Islam (Roy, 2015). By contrast, another famous French Islam researcher, Gilles Kepel, asserts that jihadism can be understood only if we start from Islam. Jihadist terrorism starts from the Salafist standpoint, whose roots can be found in the Middle East, and it was this that led to schism (Daumas, 2016). Both views can be accepted, because they are not mutually exclusive, and this can be demonstrated in several fields. In this connection, we cannot ignore the fact that in Europe the period of radicalisation has become ever shorter.

It is important to note that Tunisian foreign fighters originate not from Tunisia as a whole, but from certain “contaminated” territories within the country. Such a

territory is the town of Ben Guardane, for example, situated close to the Libyan border, which has for years been a centre for smuggling bands and illegal arms dealers. At the same time, it seems to be the largest recruitment place for foreign fighters. All of the perpetrators of Tunisian terrorist attempts (Bardo Museum, Sousse Resort) lived in this town. If we examine the concrete causes, we can see that Ben Guardane is found in the southern part of Tunisia, far from the northern tourist destinations; its development is extremely neglected by the government; it is characterised by poverty and unemployment; and its citizens are practically isolated from Tunisian society.

Another jihadist spot in Tunisia is Kasserine, situated alongside the Algerian border. The proximity of the border allows the jihadists to maintain close contact with their Algerian partners, and the Kabylia mountain area offers excellent possibility for concealment. The Tunisian hotbed is not a new one, because Tunisians actively participated in the Afghan War in the 1980s. Today the main targets for recruitment are young men, who are generally unemployed; in addition, the recruiting activists have no difficulty in penetrating into the young Muslim community.

The third known hotbed is Bizerte, which can be found in the northern part of the country. Of the ISIS foreign fighters, about 11% are from Bizerte (TSG IntelBrief, 2015). The inner core of radical groups consists primarily of those extremists who spent time in prison before the 2011 revolution and later escaped to participate in the revolution.

2.2 Libya

Due to the lack of an efficiently working government, it is very difficult to determine the number of fighters who travelled to Syria and Iraq. According to some estimates, this number is about 600, but we must take into consideration the fact that Libya not only “sends”, but also “receives” extremist fighters. The ISIS Libyan centre has been established in the town of Sirte, which was the mother town of Qaddafi and the seat of his tribe (TSG IntelBrief, 2016). ISIS has integrated into its ranks many soldiers of Qaddafi, similarly to Iraq, which “enlisted” Baath Party members.

Libya’s modern history has been determined by tribal relations, nationalism and the possession of oil. If there was any change in the area of religion, it happened in secrecy. From a religious standpoint, Libya has always been rather homogeneous, with a strong Sunni denomination. With regard to tribal relations, today it is necessary for us to judge them critically, because the Libyan tribe is no longer an old, traditional social structure, but rather a unity of social organisations. Religious radicalism appeared after the removal of Qaddafi, because this kind of radicalism had been persecuted by the dictator. This can explain the fact that the radical religious groups had previously pursued their activity mainly outside Libya. The relationship between the local inhabitants and ISIS was very contradictory. Most of them did not support the ISIS fighters, because they see in them the return of Qaddafi’s soldiers.

ISIS obtained a foothold first in 2014 in Derna, from where the foreign fighters mainly came. The town's extremists had a certain role in the Afghan and the Iraqi wars as well. When experts analysed al-Qaida's Iraqi activity, it turned out that most of the suicide bombers came from Libya, specifically from Derna. The radicalisation of this town's extremists was also due to the fact that Qaddafi rigorously prohibited the activity of Islam extremists in the 1980s and 90s.

2.3 Egypt

According to the Egyptian government, 600 citizens joined ISIS, but foreign sources talk of 1,000 men. After the removal of President Mubarak, Islamist groups continuously posed a serious threat to the country's security. The best known Islamist group is Ansar Bajt al Makdis in the Sinai Peninsula. The core of this organisation consists of Bedouin tribes, which have been engaging in smuggling for years. Their leader, Abu Osama al Masri, took an oath of loyalty to Abu Bakr al Bagdadi, the leader of ISIS. The motive for recruitment is, in this case, strong dissatisfaction with the government's policy. The inhabitants of the Sinai Peninsula have not received any government support for developing their economy and infrastructure. The Sinai organisation of ISIS, the Wilayat Sinai, carried out many terrorist attacks against police stations and military checkpoints (between 2015 and 2018). The largest attacks against soldiers and policemen took place in July 2015, when the terrorists killed a total of 70 Egyptian soldiers, policemen and health workers arriving at the scene. The deadliest attack took place in November 2017, when more than 305 people were killed after the perpetrators detonated bombs and opened fire in a crowded mosque in the Sinai Peninsula (Dahir, 2017). The Egyptian authorities are unlikely to be capable of completely eliminating the terrorist organisation, which seems to be still strengthening today.

The basis of the radicalisation here is the hostile relationship between the Bedouins and the Egyptian government, which considers them collaborators with Israel, qualifying them as "the fifth column". Many Bedouins do not have citizenship and thus do not do military service. The fact that the government practically neglected them and did not give them economic or financial support has created and strengthened the black economy and market, including the human, drug and illegal arms trades. The Bedouin radicalisation has been promoted by the recruitment activity of extremists arriving from the Gaza Strip. First, they recruited Bedouin fighters, and later involved them in the leadership of some militant groups or inserted some of them into Egyptian security organisations. In this way they were able of conducting successful terrorist attacks. This success was also due to the fact that many members of the Sinai terrorist groups had gained experience in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Syria, although a great number of fighters also arrived from Libya.

After the removal of President Morsi in 2013, a new "chapter" began in the life of radical organisations. They judged the removal of Morsi completely illegal; thus they considered their activities to be justified and legitimate. Although the

two big terrorist organisations (Ansar Bayt al-Makdis and the Wilayat Sinai), had some internal conflicts, they continued to strengthen their ranks. Today we can confidently state that the Wilayat Sinai constitutes part of ISIS's global strategy and can even become its successor organisation. It is true that Egypt and Israel do make efforts to develop their anti-terrorist cooperation; however, this cannot be considered to be really effective at all.

2.4 The Caucasus and the former Soviet Republics

North Caucasus has always been a citadel of Islam extremists, and since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, it has been serving as a recruitment place. Political Islam and nationalist feelings triggered two wars in Chechnya against Russia, so Chechnya represented a strong attractive force for foreign fighters. Local differences also gave an impulse to radicalisation. In 2007, jihadists established the Islamic Caucasus Emirate with the aim of creating an independent emirate against Russia and its supporters (Stanford University, 2014). It was this emirate that sent many fighters to Syria and Iraq or to the Caucasus Wilayat. This region has been a militant territory for a long time. In North-Eastern Georgia, the Pankisi Gorge also constitutes a hotbed for radical Islamic organisations. During the Chechen War, it served as a base for jihadis to start from to support the war.

In North Caucasus, it is Dagestan that is the most problematic of the former Soviet republics. Dagestan has been "inflicted" by different clan systems, religious hostilities, crimes and Islam radicalism. At the beginning it was Sufita Islam that prevailed, but in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Salafists gained ground. In 1999, the Russian armed forces prevented the establishment of a Dagestan Islamic Republic, but the extremists have not yet given up on setting up an emirate. We can confirm that the decisive action of the Russian armed forces has curbed the radical endeavours, which was demonstrated by the killing of the two significant leaders of the emirates (Abu Mukhamad and Abu Usman). At the same time, we must not forget that the Caucasus Islamic State has made an oath of loyalty to ISIS.

In the Pankisi Gorge of Dagestan, the existence of Islam radical organisations is in close connection with ISIS's activities in Iraq and Syria. The future of ISIS will have a significant impact on the activity of radical forces in North Caucasus.

Since the assassination of the Russian Ambassador accredited to Ankara, the Russian authorities have been intensifying their control over the Caucasian and Central-Asian Islam communities, and their imams. Turkey plays a key role in transit traffic; therefore – among others – we cannot expect Russian-Turkish relations to tangibly deteriorate. As in the case of Europe, foreign fighters make efforts to return to Russia, but the Russian law enforcement forces are doing their best to prevent the extremists from "infecting" the country once again.

2.5 Belgium

All of the Belgian foreign fighters who joined ISIS were from Brussels (Higgings and De Freytas-Tamura, 2016). The majority of them were born in the Molenbeek district or spent a long time there. This district is characterised by poverty, migrants and unemployment, which is the highest in Belgium. The capital has many Muslim inhabitants, but their number is quite different in the various districts. The migrants arrived primarily from North African and Middle East countries.

When talking about Brussels, we must not think of the capital in a narrow sense. The city of Brussels consists of 19 districts; it is the most densely inhabited territory of Belgium, directed by 19 mayors and town councils. Brussels is practically a capital-region, which has two parts (as does the whole country): Flanders – with its own language – and French Wallonia. The Brussels region has its own administrative system, with a chaotic network of several institutions, primarily owing to the different languages. If we want to draw a clear picture of Islamic radicalisation in the capital, we must take into consideration this chaotic situation, which can be attributed – among other things – to the fact that the security services cannot cooperate smoothly with the local town councils, because they are also subordinated to the local authorities. In addition, the residences of potential foreign fighters are in different districts and inside different Muslim communities. Most of them live in the old, former industrial, impoverished, mainly Muslim-populated north-western areas.

As in France, the integration level of Muslims is very low. In effect, the Muslims from Molenbeek have only a very small chance of working their way out of their situation. Young Muslims are very often coping with an identity crisis. These circumstances make the youth really attractive to the charismatic recruiters. Among the Molenbeek recruiters, Khalid Zerkani (“Papa Noel”), who guided the largest recruitment network, was well-known throughout Europe. He is of Moroccan nationality; he arrived in Brussels in 2002 and first of all made an intensive research among the young Muslims with a criminal record. He had an easy job, as he looked for those young men who could not insert themselves into society, and he was able to convince them that what they did or committed (even their criminal acts) were morally right and in harmony with Islamic ideology, because they had done something against the infidel Belgians. The money gained from smaller crimes was used to buy air tickets. Of the 300 recruited Belgian Muslims, at least 45 belonged to Zerkani’s recruiting network (Van-Ostaeyen, 2016). However, the number of his group was probably higher and considerably more dangerous than officially reported. It is enough if I mention only one of its members, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, a co-organiser of the 2015 Parisian and the 2016 Brussels terrorist attacks. Salah Abdeslam and Najim Laachraoui, who are believed to have produced the bombs for the attack on Brussels airport, also belonged to this group. Zerkani was finally arrested by the Belgian authorities for his recruiting and radical activities. During the ensuing investigations it turned out that of the suspected terrorists, at least 14 people were from the Molenbeek-cell, 11 of them had Moroccan origin, and all had a criminal record.

It is important to note that the terrorists are very often friends or personally know each other. The make-up of the Belgian cell showed that terrorist groups employ people who know each other, rather than outsiders.

Belgian Muslim fighters arrived at the operational area from the whole country, but most of them came from the Islamic communities concentrated along the Brussels-Antwerp axis. Besides this concentrated area, there are also other “contaminated” territories; the largest is the region of Liège-Verviers. Liège is the fifth largest town in Belgium; if we consider the number of its Muslim inhabitants, it is among the 10 largest towns. From our topic’s standpoint, Charleroi, Genk, Namur and Ghent (and their surrounding areas) are also important places. This information indicates that it would be a mistake to concentrate our attention only on Brussels and its Molenbeek district.

When examining the Brussels-Antwerp axis, we must not ignore the fact that it was in this area that the neo-Salafist group of Belgium, Sharia4Belgium, was established. We must also take into consideration that this group was formed from the British al-Muhajiroun and Islam4UK movements; the well-known missionaries Omar Bakri Muhammad and Anjem Choudary participated in the setting up of these movements (see later in the British section). These organisations were created to make the rights of Muslims acknowledged, and to convert non-religious Muslims. They called on Muslims to demonstrate rebellious behaviour against the ban on headscarves, through which the organisations obtained many Muslim sympathisers.

Sharia4Belgium – in addition to its British sponsors – has built up close relations with like-minded foreign organisations, e.g. with Millatu Ibrahim in Germany, Forcane Alizza in France, and Sharia4Holland. When these organisations established their international relations, the authorities evaluated them as a kind of rebel group, rather than as a security risk. Later on, when these organisations took “too decisive” steps, the Belgian authorities arrested their leader, Fouad Belkacem, which, however, resulted in an irreversible radicalisation of their followers. When legal, open activity of the organisations was banned, the Syrian crisis offered them new opportunities for their activities, and many Islamists began travelling to Syria as foreign fighters. Sharia4Belgium sent 80 warriors to Syria. A court decision put the group on the list of terrorist organisations (Torfs, 2015).

Without going into detail, I would like to emphasise that – from the standpoint of the spread of Muslim extremism – the Belgian regions can be divided into sub-regions and towns. Alongside the already mentioned Brussels-Antwerp axis, within Mechelen and Vilvoord there are at least 13 active groups. However it is a special feature of this territory that no foreign fighters went from here to Syria (Eriksson, 2016).

We must be very cautious when evaluating the assumption which decidedly asserts that radical extremists come from among poor people. By contrast, there are terrorists who do not conform to this assertion. For example, if we analyse the case of Abdelhamid Abaaoud, who participated in the Paris attempt, and who was the grandson of a Moroccan migrant arriving in Belgium as a miner, we can see that his father established a successful, profitable textile business and sent his oldest son to an elite school to enable him to take over the direction of the textile shop later (Van Vlierden, 2015). In pursuing the house search, the police realised that this terrorist lived under very good financial circumstances in his villa, which even had a swimming pool. This also supports my view that we cannot treat everything alike, and that generalisation is a big mistake.

The European data show that 90% of foreign fighters come from larger towns and their surrounding areas (Van Ginkel and Entenmann, 2016). However, with regard to Liège and its vicinity, the case is different. It is rather the “traditions” that have a dominant role there, given the fact that this area had the biggest lignite quarry, which in the 1960s attracted many Moroccan and Turkish migrant workers; this accounts for the large Muslim community.

2.6 France

France has at least 100 neighbourhoods as bad as Belgium’s jihadi hotspot of Molenbeek (MailOnline 2016). The biggest hotspot for jihadis is the French Riviera, where some immigrants try to replace French law with their own Islamic rules. Dozens of people have left from Nice to join the Islamic State. The population of immigrants is growing; many of them are from the second or third generation from the Muslim countries of North Africa, and there is rising concern that they refuse to assimilate. Many people in France believe that the real reason Nice has become a jihadist hotspot is because it is a symbol of decadent and fun-loving western lifestyles.

During the investigations after the terror attacks in Belgium and in France, it came to light that networks uncovered in Belgium interacted and cooperated with their counterparts in other European countries such as France, the Netherlands and the UK, as well as with terrorist groups located in conflict zones such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria and Yemen (Nesser, 2015).

According to French intelligence services, 690 French nationals are currently (November 2017) fighting in Iraq and Syria. Of these, 295 are women. Around 28 French jihadist fighters are minors under the age of 15. An estimated 400 children have either been born into French jihadist families in Iraq and Syria, or have been brought to these countries by their parents. A total of 398 French nationals have so far returned from the jihadist hotspots, and all of them have been placed under formal investigation. Of these, 260 are currently in pre-trial detention, and 138 are under judicial supervision, meaning they must regularly report to the authorities (Molins, 2017).

2.7 Great Britain

European jihadist ideology first arrived in Great Britain even before 9/11. Osama bin Laden and his deputies operated numerous organisations in Europe in order to recruit followers and raise funds for terrorist groups. The European migration laws framed in the 1990s made it possible for imams persecuted in their own countries to come to Europe (Stewart, 2016). Great Britain was in the vanguard of this process. By this mistaken step, the British brought many radical imams to Europe, but later they tried to get rid of them by framing new laws and regulations, including immediate expulsions. One such prominent radical figure was (before 9/11) the Egyptian Abu Hamza al-Masri, who moved in London in 1979 as an Afghan jihadist leader. He came to London after his Afghan activity and became the imam of the largest mosque, which was situated in Finsbury Park. This mosque created a relationship between al-Qaida and the people recruited in London. Another charismatic leader was Omar Bakri Muhammad, who came from Syria in 1980 and immediately received asylum in England (Griffin, 2014). Today, such mistakes are hard to believe, but at that time the British authorities were naive enough to grant political asylum to nearly everybody who was supposed to be persecuted in their own country. Bakri had a “pupil”, Anjem Choudary, who by 2015 had become the most influential ISIS recruiter, and had a significant role in sending 750 British fighters to Iraq and Syria (Anthony, 2014). He was a permanent “actor” in the public media, thus obtaining great popularity among young Muslims.

Similarly to other European states, Great Britain has been facing a serious security risk: the return of ISIS foreign fighters. At the beginning, despite the activity of radical imams, the ultraconservative radical school did not spread in England. That was the case until 1988, when Salmon Rushdie published his book “Diabolic Poems”. The government of Margaret Thatcher – despite the requests of moderate Muslims – did not ban the book, referring to freedom of speech. This encouraged the radicals, who began propagating the idea that the British and the despot Asian Muslims were enemies of Islam and had formed an alliance against Islam. They harshly criticised the British government for its attitude during the Gulf War and for its failure to send troops – during the Balkan war – to Bosnia in defence of Bosnian Muslims. They also condemned the British policy pursued in the wake of 9/11, especially the counter-terrorist cooperation of Great Britain with the USA.

Between 2000 and 2015, the British government adopted numerous resolutions on the fight against terrorism. It extended the police’s sphere of action and made it a punishable offence even to have documents that seemed to pose a threat to security in one’s possession. The Muslim community interpreted these anti-terrorist measures as intended to ostracise and marginalise Muslims, and violate their religious rights. Many Muslims in England are now susceptible to ISIS ideas, not only in London, but also, and especially, in Birmingham and Bradford. British Muslims are from many countries, so their organisations are very heterogeneous. For this reason ISIS concentrates on “the common denominator” – the dissatisfaction of Muslim youth – during its recruitment campaigns.

Radicalisation in Great Britain, based mainly on grievances, is the result of a long historic process and has today been influenced to a great extent by the activities of ISIS, the wars and conflicts in the Muslim world, and the foreign fighters who are returning to the country. We can certainly state that the British government programmes designed to tackle radicalisation and terrorism have not yet produced the expected results.

2.8 The Western Balkans

The Western Balkans has been considered the home of Islamic extremists for a long time, and it is not accidental that 330 of the 850 people who travelled to the operational areas from the region were Bosnians. Just as in Chechnya, Bosnia constituted a concentration area for foreign fighters, and they arrived in Bosnia, just like Chechnya, to participate in the war on the side of their Muslim brothers. It is only natural that the fighters brought along with them the Salafist ideology. However, in 2010-2011, security forces began expelling the jihadist groups from the capital, which caused the extremists to withdraw to the small northern settlements, where they enjoyed popular support. The withdrawn and somewhat dispirited and dispersed Muslims were encouraged and driven together by the imam Husein “Bilal” Bosnić, who later claimed for himself even the role of supervising the practice of Muslim religious rights in Bosnia. With the emergence of ISIS, Bosnia has increasingly become a recruiting base. The principal motivations were the high level of unemployment, and the fact that the young people had no promising perspective at all. Bosnić was arrested in 2014 and sentenced in 2015 to seven years’ imprisonment for having disseminated jihadist ideas. Nevertheless, the relationship between the Bosnian jihadists and ISIS has remained effectively active, and the country continues to be a transit place for foreign fighters.

Some researchers do not agree with the opinion that there are jihadist hotbeds in the Western Balkans. According to Florian Qehaja, (Director of the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies), no jihadist hotbeds or conservative Islam nets are in existence in the Western Balkans today. Although there are some people supporting Islamist ideology in the north-eastern part of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), south-eastern Kosovo, north-western Macedonia and south-western Serbia, there is no one place where the Islamists are concentrated. The followers of conservative Islam are present in different numbers in these places. Among those Muslims who practise their religion, three groups can be distinguished: the first group is unprejudiced (liberal – most Muslims belong to this group); the second is non-violent conservative, and the third is violent conservative. The difference between these last two groups is only that one of them uses violence, while the other does not. In BiH, there are two conservative Islamist centres: Gornje Maoce and Osve. It is these two settlements that “sent” the most foreign fighters to Iraq. Similar settlements include Zenica-Doboj, Tuzla, Sarajevo and Una-Sana. The recruitment of fighters is pursued mainly on the internet.

The number of mosques in Skopje (Macedonia) is higher than experts had previously determined. From here, 146 people went to Syria to fight. It was difficult for the authorities to make a distinction between the Macedonian and the Kosovo Muslims, owing to their family and friendly relationships. In Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia, moderate and radical citizens blend together intensively. With regard to the radicals, I just wish to mention the following important settlements: Kacanik (Kosovo), Pogradec (Albania), and Sijenica (Serbia). These are the places where the most atrocities happened, and from where the most fighters went to Syria and Iraq.

To sum up, we can state that the followers of conservative and extremist Islam endanger the secular system by labelling normal, moderate religious people as apostates. Many radical people are organised in small groups, in a heterogeneous environment, under the subordination of a radical imam. The rate of recruitment inside the conservative Muslim population is 10-30%, but it has not been shown yet that all of the recruited men really left for the operational area.

Conclusion and recom- mendations

The main catalysts of radicalism are: poverty, unemployment, lack of opportunity, uncertain prospective, juvenile delinquency, drugs, political and economic marginalisation, and last but not least, the ideological impacts. All these can strengthen and overlap each other, can prevail differently in various environments, and can create fertile soil for radicalism. In order to efficiently face radicalism, it is necessary for us to identify and treat its roots and study its history, as well as its connections and internal elements, in accordance with the given, concrete environments where radicalism has appeared. Historical analyses can creatively contribute to clarifying its causes, and in this way, we can also see the differences between the radicalism witnessed in the 1960s and today. According to Olivier Roy, already mentioned above, we must disassociate ourselves from false or mistaken viewpoints. Such a false viewpoint is, for example, that young Muslims or the religion of Islam itself cannot be integrated into western society or even into the current, modern world system. It is a similarly mistaken standpoint inherited from the colonial era that we must exclude Muslims from western societies, but – at the same time – we cannot say either that the intervention of the West, for example in the Middle East, is the direct cause of jihadism. In reality, these are not the real causes of the violent, militant behaviour demonstrated by young Muslims in Europe (Roy, 2015).

Today's jihadism is the third wave of jihadism, pursued by the second and third generations of western Muslim youth. It is about three closely linked events – effectively about a continuous stream. The first was the 2004 revolt in France, which resulted in a conflict between third generation Muslims and the French government. The second took place in 2005, provoked by the call of Abu Musab al Sui for a global Muslim resistance; while the third consisted of the communication and recruitment process on the internet and YouTube.

The examples I have described show that, with regard to jihadist recruitment, there are differences between countries, regions and even towns or districts. We must collect concrete information on all of these if we want to elaborate counter-activity. We must identify, in each case and place, the specific grievances and complaints. These concrete facts may be more important than the general causes (e.g. unemployment, poverty or wrong governmental policy). I fully recognise and admit the significance of these general causes, but these in themselves do not necessarily lead to radicalisation. It is instrumental for the competent authorities to take into consideration the concrete factors, causes and grievances, because in this way they can become capable of initiating an effective “counter-recruitment” programme, making the work of Islamist recruiters much more difficult.

There are now (in 2018) at least 5,600 citizens or residents from 33 countries who have returned home. Added to the unknown numbers from other countries and to the so-called “home grown” terrorists, this represents a huge challenge for security and law enforcement entities (Barrett, R., 2017). In implementing this programme, the authorities must contact and continuously maintain relations with the Muslim social strata that are against radicalism. They must also permanently counterbalance the strong media propaganda pursued by ISIS.

Through the examples I have mentioned in this study, I have shown that the Islamist recruiters (e.g. in Molenbeek and the remote villages of Bosnia or even in Great Britain) are very popular, and they have purposefully built up a strong background network for their activities. They continuously rely on the already recruited Islamists. It is naturally very difficult for the authorities to penetrate the Islamic communities, generally divided into small closed groups, created on the basis of strong family and friend relationships. In sum, they must “attack” and deny exactly those arguments that are used by the recruiters.

It may be an important recommendation that in the fight against radicalism we must avoid any political marginalisation. The measures taken by the counter-terrorist, security or military organisations cannot be carried out at the expense of the political dimension (International Crisis Group 2016). Exaggerated military actions can trigger further radicalisation not only in the Middle East, but in Europe as well. The jihadist, radical hotbeds in the Middle East are the symptoms of current instability rather than its causes. The appearance of jihadist groups raises the need not only for security, but for a political solution as well.

I would also like to emphasise the importance of prevention in a general sense. We must prevent in some way the formation of such close communities in which foreign radicals can have a role.

Last but not least, we would need a well-functioning, comprehensive European counter-radicalisation strategy, which could also include a de-radicalisation programme.

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RECENZIJ

»POŠTEN

THOMASA DURELLA YOUNGA

Lani je pri britanski založbi Bloomsbury izšla nova knjiga dr. Thomasa Durella Younga z naslovom *Anatomy of Post-Communist European Defense Institutions: The Mirage of Military Modernity*.

Avtorja verjetno ni treba posebej predstavljati vsem tistim, katerih delo je povezano z varnostnimi in obrambnimi zadevami. Za vse druge pa naj navedem, da gre za dolgoletnega predavatelja Centra za civilno-vojaške odnose iz Montereyja v Kaliforniji v Združenih državah Amerike. Pred tem je bil raziskovalec na inštitutu za strateške študije na ameriški Army War College, kjer se je posvečal področju nacionalne obrambe in politično-vojaškemu vprašanju ter tudi združenemu načrtovanju, izvajanju sistemov in opravljanju postopkov. Doktoriral je iz mednarodne ekonomije v Ženevi. Je avtor več monografij. Od leta 1989 do 2017 je bil urednik publikacije *Small War and Insurgencies*, zdaj pa je urednik pri *Defence & Security Analyses*.

Pomembno je, da je v okviru svojega dela v centru prepotoval večino evropskih držav in zelo dobro pozna njihove obrambne sisteme, obrambno in vojaško zgodovino ter številne odločevalce in strokovnjake na obrambnem in vojaškem področju, s katerimi je delil svoje poglede in izkušnje, v večini držav pa je bil tudi v funkciji obrambnega svetovalca.

Gre torej za avtorja, čigar raziskovalno področje je zelo bogato tako v teoretičnem kot tudi v aplikativnem smislu, zato ne preseneča, da nova knjiga odraža odlično poznavanje zgodovinskega ozadja nekdanjih komunističnih držav, njihovih obrambnih sistemov in oboroženih sil.

Delo je razdeljeno na devet poglavij. Poleg uvodnega in sklepnega poglavja si sledijo naslednji vsebinski sklopi: Stanje komunističnih obrambnih institucij in oboroženih sil leta 1990 (*The State of Communist Defence Organisations and Armed Forces, circa 1990*), Nato izvaža svoj »novi vojaški model«: Zakaj ne deluje (*NATO Exports*

its »New Model Army«: Why it Did Not Take), Obrambne institucije nekdanjih sovjetskih republik (Former-Soviet Republics' Defence Institutions), Obrambne institucije nekdanjih republik varšavskega pakta (Former-Warsaw Pact Republics' Defence Institutions, Obrambne institucije nekdanjih jugoslovanskih republik (Former-Yugoslav Republics' Defence Institutions, Vzpostavitev obrambnih institucij: vpeljevanje zahodnega načina (Building Defence institutions: Sharpening the Western Mind) ter Spreminjanje zahodne politike in menedžmenta obrambnih reform (Reforming Western Policy and Management of Defence Reform). Zadnje poglavje ima naslov Prehod k »pošteni obrambi« (Getting to Honest Defence).

Pri podajanju vsebine je Young zelo sistematičen in analitičen ter uporablja vse zakonitosti primerjalne analize. Povsod tam, kjer so zgodovinska, politična, obrambna in vojaška izhodišča identična ali zelo podrobna, pojasni, kaj je povzročilo pomembne razlike v nadaljnjem razvoju oziroma zakaj do sprememb ni prišlo ali pa te razlike niso bile dovolj obsežne. Pri tem je zelo pronicljiv. Glavno vodilo pri njegovem raziskovanju ali merilo za ocenjevanje obrambnih institucij nekdanjih komunističnih držav je tako imenovano zahodno načelo ali, kot ga imenuje sam, »western mind«. Na kratko bi zahodno načelo v odnosu do vzhodnega lahko opisali kot razlike pri načrtovanju, odločanju, vodenju in izvajanju obrambne funkcije države. Pri izvajanju teh politik Young kot pomembna merila upošteva pregled obrambnih institucij, javni politični okvir in konceptualno usklajenost, tehnike obrambnega načrtovanja, poveljevanje na nacionalni ravni, proces vojaškega odločanja, koncept operacij, logistično podporo in profesionalizem.

Kot ugotavlja, so to glavna področja, na katerih prihaja med nekdanjimi komunističnimi državami do odločujočih razlik, ki so sicer povezane s preteklim režimom in miselnostjo. Nekatere države so razlike skozi čas zelo uspešno premagale in uvedle zahodno načelo, druge pa pri tem niso bile tako uspešne.

Čeprav je avtor vzel zahodno načelo kot merilo za ugotavljanje stopnje razvoja obrambnih sistemov vzhodnih držav, ne trdi, da je edino in najboljše. Ravno nasprotno. V poglavju Nato izvaža svoj »novi vojaški model«: Zakaj ne deluje podrobno razloži, kje, kdaj in zakaj so se zgodile napake ali pomanjkljivosti, ki še danes vplivajo na to, da nekaterim državam članicam zavezništva nikakor ne uspe v njem odigrati svoje vloge.

Ne zaobide dejstva, da zahodni demokratični koncepti upravljanja obrambnega področja ne morejo biti le nekaj, kar enostavno naredimo po modelu, kakršnega imajo drugi, temveč morajo biti ta področja funkcionalna in učinkovita ter prilagojena vsaki državi posebej. V knjigi avtor navaja kar nekaj primerov slabih praks, hkrati pa izpostavi nekatere unikatne dobre rešitve posameznih držav. Kljub vsemu je v posameznih poglavjih mogoče najti različne posebnosti po posameznih področjih in državah, ki jih je težko uvrstiti glede na dobre ali slabe, ostajajo le posebnosti, ki potrebujejo nove rešitve z višjo stopnjo funkcionalnosti.

Najnovejša monografija Thomasa Younga v sklepnem delu daje predloge za vzpostavitev obrambnih institucij po zahodnem načelu. Institucije je treba najprej nadgraditi, da bodo bolj prilagojene za učinkovitejše odzivanje na nova varnostna tveganja. Za mlade države, ki so bile pred približno 20 oziroma 25 leti še v konceptu komunističnega delovanja, pa predlaga nov pristop, ki ga imenuje poštena obramba. Ta je sicer namenjen vsem, ki gradijo kolektivno obrambo. Prinaša dobrodošlo novost za ljubitelje tovrstnih vsebin, hkrati pa je vsestransko uporabno in koristno študijsko gradivo za strokovnjake, ki želijo in morajo poiskati rešitve in priložnosti za novo varno prihodnost.

V monografiji so zanimivi konkretni primeri iz posameznih držav, ki jih avtor strokovno in kritično komentira. Med njimi so primeri dobrih in slabih praks. Med njimi je tudi analiza razvoja obrambnega sistema in institucij v Sloveniji, ki omogoča razumevanje našega razvoja in prepoznavanje lastnih pomanjkljivosti, pa tudi prednosti, nevtralnega zunanjega opazovalca.

REVIEW

»HONEST DEFENSE« BY THOMAS DURELL YOUNG

Last year, a new book by Dr. Thomas Durell Young was published by the British publisher Bloomsbury, entitled *Anatomy of Post-Communist European Defense Institutions: The Mirage of Military Modernity*.

The author probably does not need any special introduction for those whose work is related to security and defence matters. For all others, though, let me mention that he is a long-time lecturer at the Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) from Monterey, California, USA. Prior to joining CCMR, Dr Young was a Research Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, where he focused on European politico-military issues, as well as on joint planning, execution and management of systems and procedures. He holds a PhD in international economics from Geneva, and has authored several monographs. From 1989 to 2017 he was an editor of *Small War and Insurgencies*, and he is currently an editor of *Defence and Security Analyses*.

An important fact is that his work has led him to travel to the majority of European countries and, as such, he is very well acquainted with their respective defence systems, defence and military history, as well as many defence and military decision-makers and experts, with whom he had shared his views and experiences. In most of these countries he has also acted as a defence adviser.

Dr Young is an author whose field of research is extremely rich, both in theory and practice. It is therefore no surprise that his new book reflects his thorough knowledge of the historical background of the former communist states, their defence systems and their armed forces.

The work is divided into nine chapters. In addition to the introduction and conclusion, it includes the following thematic sections: The State of Communist Defense Organisations and Armed Forces, circa 1990; NATO Exports its “New

Model Army”: Why It Did Not Take; Former Soviet Republics' Defense Institutions; Former Warsaw Pact Republics' Defense Institutions; Former Yugoslav Republics' Defense Institutions; Building Defense Institutions: Sharpening the Western Mind; Reforming Western Policy and Management of Defense Reform. The concluding chapter is entitled Getting to Honest Defense.

Young is very systematic and analytical when presenting the topic, and uses all the characteristics of comparative analysis. Wherever historical, political, defence and military bases are identical or highly similar, he provides a thorough explanation of the reasons for significant differences in further development, as well as those who had prevented the occurrence of changes or their sufficient implementation. He is very insightful in his attempts. The basic principle of his research or the criterion for the evaluation of defence institutions in the former communist states is the “Western Mind”, as he calls it. In short, a comparison of western and eastern thinking reveals key differences in planning, decision-making, leadership and implementation of the state’s defence function. The important criteria Young considers when implementing these policies are a review of defence institutions, the public policy framework and compliance of concepts, defence planning techniques, national-level command, the military decision-making process, and the concepts of operations, logistics and professionalism.

According to his findings, these are the major areas where the former communist states differ. The differences between them are normally related to the past regimes and mind-sets in the respective countries. With time, some of the countries have managed to successfully overcome those differences and implement the “Western Mind”, while others have not been so successful.

Although the author uses the Western Mind as the criterion to establish the level of development of defence systems in eastern countries, he does not claim this to be the only and the best criterion everyone should aim for. Quite the opposite: in his chapter “NATO Exports its ‘New Model Army’: Why It Did Not Take”, he provides a thorough explanation of where, when and why critical mistakes or flaws have been made, which still prevent some NATO members to perform up to their potential within the Alliance.

He does not, however, miss the fact that the western democratic concepts of defence management cannot serve just as a means to simply follow the model of others. Rather, these areas must be functional and effective, as well as adapted to each separate country. In his book, the author lists several examples of bad practice, highlighting at the same time some of the unique and good solutions put forward by some countries. Nevertheless, individual chapters reveal some of the characteristics specific to a subject area or a country, which are hard to classify as good or bad. They are just special features that require new solutions with a higher level of functionality.

In the conclusion, the latest monograph by Thomas Young lists proposals on how to build defence institutions using the Western Mind. These institutions first must be upgraded in order to be more effective in responding to new security threats. For young countries, which some twenty or twenty-five years ago still used communist concepts, Young proposes a new approach called "Honest Defense", which is generally intended for all those building collective defence. The approach brings something new for amateurs of such topics, and at the same time serves as a broadly useful and helpful study material for experts who wish and are obliged to find concrete solutions and opportunities for a new and safe future.

The monograph includes interesting concrete examples from individual countries, which the author professionally and critically comments on. The discussed examples comprise both good and bad practice. Additionally, they include an analysis of the development of the defence system and institutions in Slovenia, which enables a neutral external observer to understand our development as well as identify their own strengths and deficiencies.

Avtorji

Authors



Petra Culetto

Mag. Petra Culetto je univerzitetna diplomirana politologinja (mednarodni odnosi) in magistrica znanosti s področja mednarodnega prava. Na Ministrstvu za obrambo je od leta 2015 vodila Kabinet ministrice, od oktobra 2018 pa vodi Sektor za strateško in poslovno planiranje. Pred tem je bila zaposlena v Državnem zboru kot strokovna sodelavka za zunanjo in obrambno politiko. Med letoma 2008 in 2009 je kot raziskovalka sodelovala pri raziskavah Obramboslovnega raziskovalnega centra Fakultete za družbene vede Univerze v Ljubljani. V času predsedovanja Slovenije EU je bila zaposlena v Sektorju za EU na Ministrstvu za zunanje zadeve.

Petra Culetto, MSc, holds a bachelor's degree in Political Science (International Relations) and a master's degree in International Law. Between 2015 and 2018, she was Head of Minister's Office at the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia. Since October 2018, she has been Head of the Ministry's Strategic and Business Planning Division. Before 2015, she worked at the National Assembly as a foreign and defence policy advisor. Between 2008 and 2009, she was a researcher at the Defence Research Centre, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana. During Slovenian Presidency to the EU she worked at the Department for EU Affairs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia).



Jure Himelrajh

Major Jure Himelrajh je diplomiral na ameriški vojaški akademiji leta 2006 iz systemskega inženiringa. Opravil je več tečajev, med drugimi tudi tečaje kopenske vojske ZDA: Maneuver Captains Career Course (2011), Command and General Staff Officers Course (2017) in Advanced Military Studies Program (2018). Ima dva magistrska naslova: Master of Military Art and Science in Master of Arts in Military Operations. V Slovenski vojski je deloval na več dolžnostih taktične in strateške ravni in bil napoten v MOM v Afganistan (2008) in na Kosovo (2009 in 2012/13).

Major Jure Himelrajh, MA, MMAS, graduated from the United States Military Academy in 2006, with a degree in Systems Engineering. He graduated from the US Army Maneuver Captains Career Course (2011), Command and General Staff Officers Course (2017) and from Advanced Military Studies Program (2018). He holds a Master of Military Art and Science and Master of Arts in Military Operations degrees. Major Himelrajh has completed numerous military courses and held various positions on tactical and strategic levels. He has been deployed to Afghanistan (2008) and Kosovo (2009, 2012/13).



Anže Rode

Polkovnik dr. Anže Rode je diplomiral na Fakulteti za strojništvo in magistriral na Fakulteti za družbene vede Univerze v Ljubljani. V okviru višjega štabnega šolanja na Poveljniško-štabni šoli je magistriral na Fakulteti za logistiko Univerze v Mariboru in tam tudi doktoriral. V Slovenski vojski je opravljal različne poveljniške in štabne dolžnosti. Bil je poveljnik SVNKON 13 Isafa v Afganistanu in SVNKON 29 Kforja na Kosovu. Na US Army War Collegeu je magistriral leta 2018 in pridobil naziv magistra strateških študij.

Colonel Anže Rode, PhD, graduated from the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering and obtained a master's degree from the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana. As a student of the Command and Staff School, Senior Staff Programme, he obtained a master's degree from the Faculty of Logistics, University of Maribor, where he later obtained a PhD. He held several commanding duties in the SAF, including Commander of SVNCON 13 ISAF, Afghanistan, and Commander, SVNCON 29 KFOR, Kosovo. In 2018, he graduated from US Army War College, and obtained the title Master of Strategic Studies.



József Padányi

Generalmajor prof. dr. József Padányi je univerzitetni profesor in prorektor za znanost na Nacionalni univerzi za javni sektor. V vojski se je zaposlil leta 1981. Dve leti je deloval kot mirovnik v BiH. Leta 1995 je doktoriral iz vojaških ved, leta 2008 pa pridobil naziv doktor Madžarske akademije znanosti. Je avtor 260 znanstvenih del, od tega osmih knjig in petnajstih poglavij. Deluje kot raziskovalec in predavatelj na področju civilno-vojaškega sodelovanja, inženirske podpore, reševanja ob nesrečah in varnostnih vprašanj, povezanih s klimatskimi spremembami.

Major General József Padányi, PhD, is a university professor and the Vice-Rector for Science at the National University of Public Service. He entered the military in 1981. He spent two years in Bosnia and Herzegovina as peacekeeper. He obtained his PhD in Military Science in 1995, and earned the title 'Doctor of Hungarian Academy of Sciences' in 2008. He has authored a total of 260 scientific works, including eight books and fifteen book chapters. He acts as a researcher and lecturer on civil-military cooperation, engineer support, disaster relief operations and security questions of climate change.



László Földi

Polkovnik dr. László Földi je univerzitetni raziskovalec na področju kemije in se je v vojski zaposlil leta 1990 kot častnik za JRKBO. Od leta 1999 je univerzitetni predavatelj. Doktoriral je leta 2003. Trenutno je docent na Fakulteti za vojaške vede in usposabljanje častnikov Nacionalne univerze za javni sektor ter načelnik podskupine za JRKB-obrambo. Je vodilni član doktorske šole za vojaško tehnologijo in vodi raziskovalnega področja vojaške okoljske varnosti. Na strokovnem področju se posveča kemičnim bojnim sredstvom, strupenim industrijskim materialom, okoljski varnosti in obvladovanju nesreč.

Colonel László Földi, PhD, obtained a university degree of researcher chemist and joined the Army as NBC carrier officer in 1990. Since 1999, he has been a university lecturer. He earned his PhD in 2003 and is currently a professor at the Faculty of Military Sciences and Officer Training of the National University of Public Service, and chief of the NBC defence subgroup. He is a leading member of the PhD School of Military Technology and Head of the “Military environmental security” research area. His main areas of expertise include chemical warfare agents, toxic industrial materials, environmental security, and disaster management.



Viktor Potočnik

Major Viktor Potočnik je v Slovenski vojski zaposlen od leta 2001. Bil je poveljnik motoriziranega voda, minometne čete in motorizirane čete v mirovni operaciji ter načelnik S-3 v 1. brigadi Slovenske vojske. Udeležil se je treh mirovnih operacij in misij ter opravil več izobraževanj in usposabljanj v tujini, predvsem s področja združene ognjene podpore. Leta 2011 je končal višje štabno šolanje na CGSC v Fort Leavenworthu v ZDA in pridobil naziv Master of Military Arts and Science. Od leta 2013 dela v Generalštabu Slovenske vojske.

Major Viktor Potočnik, MMAS, was commissioned in 2001. So far, he has performed duties of a Motorised Platoon Commander, Mortar Company Commander, Motorised Company Commander on deployment, and Chief, S-3 of the 1st Brigade. He has been deployed three times, and has attended several career and functional training courses abroad, mainly in the field of joint fire support. In 2011, he completed Senior Staff Course at CGSC, Fort Leavenworth, USA and obtained the title Master of Military Arts and Science. Since 2013, he has been working at the SAF General Staff.



József Kis-Benedek

Polkovnik dr. József Kis-Benedek je častni profesor, ki je večino svoje kariere delal na področju vojaške obveščevalne dejavnosti. Doktoriral je iz vojaške znanosti. Njegova zadnja vojaška dolžnost je bila namestnik direktorja produkcije vojaške obveščevalne pisarne. Kot obrambni ataše je služboval deset let v tujini. Predava na različnih fakultetah na Madžarskem. Kot raziskovalec se posveča področjem Bližnjega vzhoda, terorizma, obveščevalne dejavnosti in kriznega menedžmenta.

Colonel József Kis-Benedek, PhD, is an honorary professor with a background in military intelligence. He holds a PhD in Military Sciences. His last military position was deputy Director of Production at the Military Intelligence Office. He served abroad as a defence attaché for ten years. He currently gives lectures at many universities in Hungary. His areas of research include the Middle East, terrorism, intelligence and crisis management.

Navodila avtorjem
za oblikovanje prispevkov

Instructions for the authors
of papers

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Vojaškošolski zbornik je vojaškostrokovna in informativna publikacija, namenjena izobraževanju in obveščanju o dosežkih ter izkušnjah na področju vojaškega izobraževanja, usposabljanja in izpopolnjevanja.

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Objavljamo prispevke v slovenskem jeziku s povzetki, prevedenimi v angleški jezik, in po odločitvi uredniškega odbora prispevke v angleškem jeziku s povzetki, prevedenimi v slovenski jezik.

Objavljamo prispevke, ki še niso bili objavljeni ali poslani v objavo drugi reviji. Pisec je odgovoren za vse morebitne kršitve avtorskih pravic. Če je bil prispevek že natisnjen drugje, poslan v objavo ali predstavljen na strokovni konferenci, naj to avtor sporočiti uredniku in pridobiti soglasje založnika (če je treba) ter navesti razloge za ponovno objavo.

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Prispevki naj obsegajo 16 strani oziroma 30.000 znakov s presledki (avtorska pola), izjemoma najmanj 8 strani oziroma 15.000 znakov ali največ 24 strani oziroma 45.000 znakov.

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Prispevki se recenzirajo. Recenzija je anonimna. Glede na oceno recenzentov uredniški odbor ali urednik prispevek sprejme, če je treba, zahteva popravke ali ga zavrne. Pripombe recenzentov avtor vnese v prispevek.

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Primer:
Ime 1 Priimek 1,
Ime 2 Priimek 2
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- Povzetek** Prispevku mora biti dodan povzetek, ki obsega največ 1200 znakov (20 vrstic). Povzetek naj na kratko opredeli temo prispevka, predvsem naj povzame rezultate in ugotovitve. Splošne ugotovitve in misli ne spadajo v povzetek, temveč v uvod.
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- Ključne besede** Ključne besede (3-5, tudi v angleškem jeziku) naj bodo natisnjene krepko in z obojestransko poravnavo besedila.
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- Kratka predstavitev avtorjev** Avtorji morajo pripraviti kratko predstavitev svojega strokovnega oziroma znanstvenega dela. Predstavitev naj ne presega 600 znakov (10 vrstic, 80 besed). Če je avtorjev več, se predstavi vsak posebej, čim bolj zgoščeno. Avtorji naj besedilo umestijo na konec prispevka po navedeni literaturi.
- Strukturiranje besedila** Posamezna poglavja v besedilu naj bodo ločena s samostojnimi podnaslovi in ustrezno oštevilčena (členitev največ na 4 ravni).
Primer:
1 Uvod
2 Naslov poglavja (1. raven)
2.1 Podnaslov (2. raven)
2.1.1 Podnaslov (3. raven)
2.1.1.1 Podnaslov (4. raven)

Oblikovanje seznama literature

V seznamu literature je treba po abecednem redu navesti le avtorje, na katere se sklicujete v prispevku, celotna oznaka vira pa mora biti skladna s harvardskim načinom navajanja. Če je avtorjev več, navedemo vse, kot so navedeni na izvirnem delu.

Primeri:

a) knjiga:

Priimek, ime (lahko začetnica imena), letnica. *Naslov dela*. Kraj: Založba.

Na primer: Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

b) zbornik:

Samson, C., 1970. Problems of information studies in history. V S. Stone, ur. *Humanities information research*. Sheffield: CRUS, 1980, str./pp. 44–68. Pri posameznih člankih v zbornikih na koncu posameznega vira navedemo strani, na katerih je članek, na primer:

c) članek v reviji

Kolega, N., 2006. Slovenian coast sea flood risk. *Acta geographica Slovenica*. 46-2, str. 143–167.

Navajanje virov z interneta

Vse reference se začenjajo enako kot pri natisnjenih virih, le da običajnemu delu sledi še podatek o tem, kje na internetu je bil dokument dobljen in kdaj. Podatek o tem, kdaj je bil dokument dobljen, je pomemben zaradi pogostega spreminjanja www okolja.

Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, str. 45–100. <http://www.mors.si/index.php?id=213>, 17. 10. 2008. Pri navajanju zanimivih internetnih naslovov v besedilu (ne gre za navajanje posebnega dokumenta) zadošča navedba naslova (<http://www.vpvs.uni-lj.si>). Posebna referenca na koncu besedila v tem primeru ni potrebna.

Sklicevanje na vire

Pri sklicevanju na vire med besedilom navedite le priimek prvega avtorja in letnico izdaje. *Primer:* ... (Smith, 1997) ...

Če dobesedno navajate del besedila, ga ustrezno označite z narekovaji, v oklepaju pa poleg avtorja in letnice navedite stran besedila, iz katerega ste navajali.

Primer: ... (Smith, 1997, str. 15) ...


Pri povzemanju drugega avtorja napišemo besedilo brez narekovajev, v oklepaju pa napišemo, da gre za povzeto besedilo. *Primer:* (po Smith, 1997, str. 15). Če avtorja navajamo v besedilu, v oklepaju navedemo samo letnico izida in stran (1997, str. 15).

Slike, diagrami in tabele

Slike, diagrami in tabele v prispevku naj bodo v posebej pripravljenih datotekah, ki omogočajo lektorske popravke. V besedilu mora biti jasno označeno mesto, kamor je treba vnesti sliko. Skupna dolžina prispevka ne sme preseči dane omejitve.

Če avtor iz tehničnih razlogov grafičnih dodatkov ne more oddati v elektronski obliki, je izjemoma sprejemljivo, da slike priloži besedilu. Avtor mora v tem primeru na zadnjo stran slike napisati zaporedno številko in naslov, v besedilu pa pustiti dovolj prostora zanjo. Prav tako mora biti besedilo opremljeno z naslovom in številčenjem slike. Diagrami se štejejo kot slike. Vse slike in tabele se številčijo. Številčenje poteka enotno in ni povezano s številčenjem poglavij. Naslov slike je naveden pod sliko, naslov tabele pa nad tabelo. Navadno je v besedilu navedeno vsaj eno sklicevanje na sliko ali tabelo. Sklic na sliko ali tabelo je: ... (slika 5) ... (tabela 2) ...


Primer slike:



Slika 5: Naslov slike

Primer tabele:

Tabela 2: Naslov tabele



Opombe pod črto

Številčenje opomb pod črto je neodvisno od strukture besedila in se v vsakem prispevku začne s številko 1. Posebej opozarjamo avtorje, da so opombe pod črto namenjene pojasnjevanju misli, zapisanih v besedilu, in ne navajanju literature.

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Kratice naj bodo dodane v oklepaju, ko se okrajšana beseda prvič uporabi, zato posebnih seznamov kratic ne dodajamo. Za kratico ali izraz v angleškem jeziku napišemo najprej slovensko ustreznico, v oklepaju pa angleški izvornik in morebitno angleško kratico.

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Generalštab Slovenske vojske
Sodobni vojaški izzivi
Uredniški odbor
Vojkova cesta 55
1000 Ljubljana
Slovenija
Elektronski naslov
Odgovorna urednica:
liliana.brozic@mors.si

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- Abstract** The paper should have an abstract of a maximum 1,200 characters (20 lines). The abstract should include a short presentation of the topic, particularly the results and the findings. General findings and reflections do not belong in the abstract, but rather in the introduction.
- Abstract in English** The authors must also submit the translation of the abstract into English. The translation of the abstract is likewise limited to a maximum of 1,200 characters (20 lines).
- Key words** Key words (3-5 also in the English language) should be bold with a justified text alignment.
- Text** The authors should submit their papers on an A4 paper format, with 1.5 line spacing, fontArial size 12 points. At the upper and the bottom edge, there should be approx. 3 cm of space; the left margin should be 2 cm wide and the right margin 4 cm. Each page consists of approx. 30 lines with 62 characters. The text should have a justified alignment, without indents at the beginning of the paragraphs.
- A brief presentation of the authors** The authors should prepare a brief presentation of their expert or scientific work. The presentation should not exceed 600 characters (10 lines, 80 words). If there are several authors, each should be presented individually, as shortly and as comprehensively as possible. These texts should be placed at the end of the paper, after the cited literature.

¹ *Co-operative Online Bibliographic System and Services*

Text structuring

Individual chapters should be separated with independent subtitles and adequately numbered.

Example:

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Title of the chapter (1st level)
- 2.1 Subtitle (2nd level)
- 2.1.1 Subtitle (3rd level)
- 2.1.1.1 Subtitle (4th level)

Referencing

In the bibliography, only the authors of references one refers to in the paper should be listed, in the alphabetical order. The entire reference has to be in compliance with the Harvard citing style.

Example:

Surname, name (can also be the initial of the name), year. *Title of the work*. Place. Publishing House.

Example:

Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

With certain papers published in journals, the author should indicate, at the end of each reference, a page on which the paper can be found.

Example:

Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. 45-100.

Referencing internet sources

All references start the same as the references for the printed sources, only that the usual part is followed by the information about the Internet page on which the document was found as well as the date on which it was found. The information about the time that the document was found on the Internet is important, because the WWW environment changes constantly.

Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. p. 45-100. <http://www.mors.si/index.php?id=213>, 17 October 2008.

When referencing interesting WWW pages in the text (not citing an individual document) it is enough to state only the Internet address (<http://www.vpvs.uni-lj.si>). A separate reference at the end of the text is therefore not necessary.

Citing

When citing sources in the text, indicate only the surname of the author and the year of publication. *Example:* (Smith, 1997) ...

When making a direct reference to a text, the cited part should be adequately marked with quotation marks and followed by the exact page of the text which the citing is taken from.

Example: ... (Smith, 1997, p.15) ...

Figures, diagrams, tables

Figures, diagrams and tables in the paper should be prepared in separate files which allow for proofreading corrections. The place in the text where the picture should be inserted must be clearly indicated. The total length of the paper must not surpass the given limitation.

Should the author not be able to submit the graphical supplements in the electronic form due to technical reasons, it is exceptionally acceptable to enclose the figures to the text. In this case the author must write a sequence number and a title on the back of each picture and leave enough space in the text to include it. The text must likewise contain the title and the sequence number of the figure. Diagrams are considered figures.

All figures and tables are numbered. The numbering is not uniform and not linked with the numbering of the chapters. The title of the figure is stated beneath it and the title of the table is stated above it.

As a rule, the paper should include at least one reference to a figure or a table.. Reference to a figure or a table is: ... (Figure 5) (Table 2)

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



Figure 5: Title of the figure

Example of a table:

Table 2: Title of the table



Footnotes

The numbering of the footnotes is not related to the structure of the text and starts with number 1 in each paper. We want to stress that the aim of the footnotes is to explain the thoughts written in the text and not to reference literature.

Abbreviations

When used for the first time, the abbreviations in the text must be explained in parenthesis; therefore no additional list of abbreviations is needed. If the abbreviations or terms are written in English, the appropriate Slovenian term should be written along with the English original and possibly the English abbreviation in the parenthesis.

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The Editorial Board accepts only the texts written with a MS Word text editor and only exceptionally those in the 'text only' format.

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