



# Sodobni vojaški izzivi

Contemporary Military Challenges


Znanstveno-strokovna publikacija Slovenske vojske

ISSN 2463-9575  
Junij 2017 – 19/št. 2



REPUBLIKA SLOVENIJA  
MINISTRSTVO ZA OBRAMBO  
GENERALŠTAB SLOVENSKE VOJSKE

W  
R  
U  
G  
A  
B  
Z  
W  
R  
U  
A  
U  
Z



# Sodobni vojaški izzivi

Contemporary Military Challenges

Znanstveno-strokovna publikacija Slovenske vojske

ISSN 2463-9575  
UDK 355.5(479.4)(055)

Junij 2017 – 19/št. 2



REPUBLIKA SLOVENIJA  
MINISTRSTVO ZA OBRAMBO  
GENERALŠTAB SLOVENSKE VOJSKE

<b>Izdajatelj</b> Publisher	Generalštab Slovenske vojske General Staff of the Slovenian Armed Forces
<b>Glavni urednik</b> Executive Editor	generalmajor Alan Geder (OF-7)
<b>Odgovorni urednik</b> Managing Editor	dr. Liliana Brožič
<b>Gostujoči urednik</b> Guest Editor	dr. Vladimir Prebilič
<b>Uredniški odbor</b> Editorial Board	višja vojaška uslužbenka XIII. razreda dr. Valerija Bernik (OF-4) višji vojaški uslužbenec XIV. razreda dr. Denis Čaleta (OF-5) polkovnik dr. Tomaž Kladnik (OF-5) dr. Igor Kotnik dr. Maja Garb dr. Tibor Szvircev Tresh, Militärakademie an der ETH, Zürich dr. Thomas Young, Center for Civil-Military Relations, Monterey
<b>Sekretar</b> Secretary	višja praporščakinja Nataša Cankar (OR-9)
<b>Uredniški svet</b> Editorial Council	dr. Andrej Anžič, Evropska pravna fakulteta, Nova Gorica dr. Gorazd Bajc, Narodna in študijska knjižnica, Trst dr. Anton Bebler, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Ljubljana dr. Damir Črnčec, Fakulteta za državne in evropske študije, Brdo dr. Bastian Giegerich, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London dr. Olivera Injac, Univerzitet Donja Gorica, Podgorica dr. Sergei Konoplyev, Harvard University, Cambridge generalmajor v pokoju Ladislav Lipič (OF-7, ret.) dr. Julie T. Manta, US Army War College, Carlise dr. Thomas Mockaitis, DePaul University, Chicago dr. Klaus Olshausen (OF-8, ret.), Clausewitz-Gesellschaft e.V., Hamburg generalpodpolkovnik dr. Iztok Podbregar (OF-8), Fakulteta za organizacijske vede, Kranj
<b>Prevajanje</b> Translation	Tamara Derman Zdravec, Vlasta Deželak, Katarina Deželak, Kristina Grilc, Katarina Rogelj, Iris Žnidarič
<b>Lektoriranje</b> Proofreading	Justi Carey, Služba za strateško komuniciranje
<b>Oblikovanje</b> Design & Graphic	Skupina Opus Design
<b>Tisk</b> Print	Collegium Graphicum
<b>ISSN</b>	2232-2825 (tiskana različica/print version) 2463-9575 (spletna različica/ on line version)
<b>Naklada</b> Edition	300 izvodov/copies Izhaja štirikrat na leto/ Four issues per year
<b>Revija je dostopna</b> na spletni strani Publication web page	<a href="http://www.slovenskavojska.si/publikacije/sodobni-vojaski-izzivi/">http://www.slovenskavojska.si/publikacije/sodobni-vojaski-izzivi/</a> <a href="http://www.slovenskavojska.si/en/publications/contemporary-military-challenges/">http://www.slovenskavojska.si/en/publications/contemporary-military-challenges/</a>
<b>E-naslov urednice</b> Managing Editor e-mail address	liliana.brozic@mors.si

Prispevki, objavljeni v Sodobnih vojaških izzivih, niso uradno stališče Slovenske vojske niti organov, iz katerih so avtorji prispevkov.  
**Publikacija je uvrščena v bibliografsko zbirko podatkov COBISS.SI in PAIS International.**

Articles, published in the Contemporary Military Challenges do not reflect the official viewpoint of the Slovenian Armed Forces nor the bodies in which the authors of articles are employed.  
**The publication is indexed in bibliography databases COBISS.SI and PAIS International.**

## VETERANSKE ORGANIZACIJE – ALI JIH SPLOH POTREBUJEMO?


*»Ni večjih domoljubov od tistih dobrih mož, ki so bili  
ranjeni v službi svoje domovine.«*

*Napoleon I, Politični aforizmi, 1848*

## VETERAN ORGANISATIONS – ARE THEY EVEN NEEDED?

*»There are no greater patriots than those good men  
who have been maimed in the service of their country.«*

*Napoleon I, Political Aphorisms, 1848.*



# VSEBINA

## CONTENTS

Liliana Brožič	<b>7</b> UVODNIK VETERANSKE ORGANIZACIJE – ALI JIH SPLOH POTREBUJEMO?
Liliana Brožič	<b>9</b> EDITORIAL VETERAN ORGANISATIONS – ARE THEY EVEN NEEDED?
Vladimir Prebilič	<b>11</b> UVODNIK VETERANI IN DRUŽBA
Vladimir Prebilič	<b>13</b> EDITORIAL VETERANS AND SOCIETY
Vladimir Prebilič	<b>17</b> VETERANSKI IMPERATIV DANES VETERANS IMPERATIVE TODAY
Carmen Sorina Rijnoveanu	<b>35</b> PONOVRNO OVREDNOTENJE STATUSA VETERANOV V POSTKOMUNISTIČNIH DRUŽBAH – PRIMER ROMUNIJE THE REAPPRAISAL OF VETERANS' STATUS IN POST-COMMUNIST SOCIETIES - ROMANIA'S CASE

	<b>49</b>	
Jörg Echternkamp		OD SOVRAŽNIKA DO PRIJATELJA? VETERANI KOT GONILNA SILA MEDNARODNE SPRAVE PO DRUGI SVETOVNI VOJNI FROM FOE TO FRIEND? VETERANS AS A DRIVING FORCE OF INTERNATIONAL RECONCILIATION AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR
	<b>59</b>	
Nadine Akhund-Lange		VETERANI IN FILANTROPIJA PO VELIKI VOJNI: VLOGA IN STALIŠČA FUNDACIJE CARNEGIE ZA MEDNARODNI MIR VETERANS AND PHILANTHROPY AFTER THE GREAT WAR: ROLE AND REPRESENTATIONS FROM THE CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
	<b>71</b>	
Valerija Bernik		VETERANKE DRUGE SVETOVNE VOJNE WOMEN VETERANS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR
	<b>89</b>	
Niels Bo Poulsen Jakob Brink Rasmussen		DOLGA POT DO URADNE DANSKE VETERANSKE POLITIKE, 1848–2010 THE LONG ROAD TOWARDS AN OFFICIAL DANISH VETERANS' POLICY, 1848-2010
	<b>107</b>	
Alojz Šteiner Tomaž Čas		DOMOLJUBNE IN VETERANSKE ORGANIZACIJE – PRIMER SLOVENIJE PATRIOT AND VETERAN ORGANISATIONS – THE CASE OF SLOVENIA
	<b>126</b>	
		AVTORJI AUTHORS
	<b>131</b>	
		NAVODILA AVTORJEM ZA OBLIKOVANJE PRISPEVKOV
	<b>131</b>	
		INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE AUTHORS OF PAPERS

## UVODNIK

### VETERANSKE ORGANIZACIJE – ALI JIH SPLOH POTREBUJEMO?

Ko razpravljamo o veteranih in veteranskih organizacijah, je običajno prva misel povezana s preteklostjo. Najprej pomislimo na različne vojne in njihove posledice. Na vse tiste, ki so v vojnah sodelovali in imeli srečo, da so ostali zdravi in nepoškodovani. In tudi na vse tiste, ki jim je vojna pustila različne posledice, nekaterim telesne ali čustvene, še več pa je takih, ki se spopadajo z obojimi.

Čeprav imamo danes veliko srečo in so vojne na območju Evropske unije predvsem predmet zgodovinskih razprav, smo se v uredniškem odboru Sodobnih vojaških izzivov odločili, da posvetimo tematsko številko tudi temi veteranskih organizacij in njihovi vlogi v sodobni družbi.

Vojni veterani so sestavni del slovenske, širše evropske in globalne družbe. Prepoznavamo jih glede na različne vojne in posamične oborožene konflikte. V različnih okoljih so obravnavani in organizirani zelo različno, tudi njihov vpliv na oblikovanje sodobne družbe se razlikuje. Nekateri med njimi pa nimajo ničesar, ker so bili na napačni strani. Napačna stran ni več povsod problematizirana, kot je bila nekoč, saj se je razumevanje konflikta iz preteklosti preoblikovalo v tvorno sodelovanje za prihodnost.

Vprašanje veteranskih organizacij oziroma vprašanje, ali jih sploh potrebujemo, ostaja tako retorično vprašanje, še posebno ob pojavu novih veteranskih organizacij, ki jih sestavljajo veterani različnih mednarodnih operacij in misij, tudi v državah, ki sicer drugih (vojnih) veteranov sploh nimajo.

Tematska številka, ki je pred vami, je nastala v sodelovanju z Vladimirjem Prebiličem kot gostujočim urednikom in nekaterimi udeleženci mednarodnega posveta, ki je bil v Ljubljani lansko poletje.

**Vladimir Prebilič** nas uvodoma v članku z naslovom *Veteranski imperativ danes* seznanja s temeljnimi pojmi veteranov, kdo sploh so, kaj in kakšen je veteranski imperativ in kako se kaže v sodobnih družbah, še posebej v tistih, v katerih so oborožene sile profesionalizirane, s čimer so teme, povezane z nacionalno varnostjo in vojaštvom, potisnjene na obrobje.

O obravnavi veteranov v prejšnjem stoletju v Romuniji razpravlja **Carmen Sorina Rijnoveanu** v članku *Ponovno ovrednotenje statusa veteranov v postkomunističnih družbah – primer Romunije*. Romunija se je najprej pridružila nemškemu rajhu v boju proti Sovjetski zvezi, pozneje pa prišla pod njen vpliv, kar je bilo slabo za nekatere veterane. Po letu 1990 se je situacija ponovno spremenila.

Velik izziv so po drugi svetovni vojni predstavljali veterani v Nemčiji in Franciji, ki so kljub temu, da so bili na nasprotujočih si straneh, razvili uspešno sodelovanje. O tem zanimivem pojavu piše **Jörg Echternkamp** v članku *Od sovražnika do prijatelja? Veterani kot gonilna sila mednarodne sprave po drugi svetovni vojni*.

*Veterani in filantropija po veliki vojni: vloga in stališča fundacije Carnegie za mednarodni mir* je naslov članka **Nadine Akhund-Lange**, ki se je posvetila raziskovanju organizacije, ki je bila ustanovljena po prvi svetovni vojni, predvsem z nalogo poskrbeti za vojne veterane in vojne invalide. O tem, kako uspešna je bila, lahko več preberete v njenem članku.

**Valerija Bernik** v članku z naslovom *Veteranke druge svetovne vojne* predstavlja mobilizacijo žensk v oborožene sile različnih držav, ki po oboroženih spopadih niso dobile enakega statusa veterank kot njihovi moški kolegi, ne le v formalnem, temveč tudi v družbenem smislu.

Članek z naslovom *Dolga pot do uradne danske veteranske politike, 1848–2010*, sta napisala **Niels Bo Poulsen** in **Jakob Brink Rasmussen**. Pišeta o danski veteranski politiki, ki je uraden dokument na tem področju dobila šele leta 2010. Veliko različnih dejavnikov je vplivalo na to, da na Danskem to področje ni bilo urejeno, najbolj zanimivi pa so tisti, ki so nedavno tega končno omogočili spremembo.

O tem, kako je urejeno področje veteranskih organizacij v Sloveniji, sta članek napisala **Alojz Šteiner** in **Tomaž Čas**. *Domoljubne in veteranske organizacije – primer Slovenije* je naslov njenega prispevka, v katerem obravnavata številne domače veteranske organizacije in njihovo družbeno vlogo. Teh organizacij je sorazmerno veliko, imajo raznoliko programsko vsebino in so večinoma zelo aktivne.

Želimo vam veliko zanimivega branja in prijetno poletje!

## EDITORIAL

### VETERAN ORGANISATIONS – ARE THEY EVEN NEEDED?

When discussing veterans and veteran organisations, one usually first thinks of the past. We first think of different wars and their consequences. We think of all those who participated in those wars and were lucky enough to stay well and unharmed. And we think of all those who came out with different issues, be it physical or emotional; however there are even more of those who have had to deal with both.

Although we are today very lucky and the wars on the flanks of the European Union are mainly the subject of historical discussions, we in the Editorial Board of the Contemporary Military Challenges decided to dedicate one of the thematic issues to veteran organisations and their role in the modern society.

Military veterans form a constituent part of Slovenian, broad European and global society. They are identified according to different wars and individual armed conflicts they participated in. In different settings, they are treated and organised in very various ways; even their impacts on the formation of the modern society vary. Still, to some of them, nothing of this applies, because they fought on the wrong side. However, the wrong side no longer represents a problem everywhere, as it used to be the case, since the perceptions of conflict from the past have been transformed into fruitful cooperation for the future.

The question of veteran organisations or the question whether or not they are even needed, thus remains a rhetorical one, especially considering the emergence of new veteran organisations comprising veterans of different international operations and missions, even in the countries, which otherwise do not even have other (war) veterans.

The thematic issue in front of you was prepared in cooperation with Vladimir Prebilič as guest editor and some of the participants of the international panel discussion held in Ljubljana last summer.

**Vladimir Prebilič** opens this issue with his article *Veterans imperative today*, where he informs us about the basic terms of veterans, who they are, what is the veteran imperative and how it is manifested in modern societies, especially those where the armed forces were professionalized, which marginalized the topics related to national security and the military.

Veterans in the previous century in Romania are discussed by **Carmen Sorina Rijnoveanu** in her article *The reappraisal of veterans' status in post-communist societies - Romania's case*. At first, Romania joined the German Reich in its fight against the Soviet Union, but eventually came under the rule of the latter, which was not a favourable situation for some of the veterans. After 1990, the situation again changed.

After the Second World War, the veterans in Germany and France represented a great challenge, since despite the fact that they had fought on the opposite sides, they managed to develop successful cooperation. This interesting phenomenon is discussed by **Jörg Echternkamp** in his article *From foe to friend? Veterans as a driving force of international reconciliation after the Second World War*.

*Veterans and philanthropy after the Great War: role and representations from the Carnegie endowment for international peace* is the title of the article by **Nadine Akhund-Lange**, who engaged in the research of an organisation, which was established after the First World War mainly with the aim to provide for war veterans and war disabled. You can read more about how successful it was in its endeavours in her article.

**Valerija Bernik** in her article *Women Veterans of the Second World War* writes about the mobilisation of women in the armed forces of different countries, who after the conflicts never enjoyed the same status as their male counterparts, neither formally nor socially.

The article titled *The long road towards an official Danish veterans' policy, 1848–2010* was written by **Niels Bo Poulsen** and **Jakob Brink Rasmussen**. They write about Danish veteran policy, which was regulated with the first official document in this field as late as in 2010. Several different factors influenced the fact that Denmark had not properly regulated this area beforehand, but the most interesting ones are certainly those which have recently facilitated this change.

**Alojz Šteiner** and **Tomaž Čas** wrote about the regulation of veteran organisations in Slovenia. In their article *Patriot and veteran organisations – the case of Slovenia* they write about several Slovenian veteran organisations and their role in the society. Those organisations are relatively numerous. They have different programmes and are mostly very active.

We wish you plenty of interesting reading and a nice summer!

## UVODNIK

### VETERANI IN DRUŽBA

V Atenah je bila leta 2015 sprejeta odločitev, da prihodnjo konferenco vojaških zgodovinarjev v raziskovalni skupini za proučevanje konfliktov (Conflict Studies Working Group – CSWG) znotraj programa Partnerstvo za mir gosti Slovenija. V sodelovanju in s finančno podporo Ministrstva za obrambo smo oblikovali organizacijski odbor, ki so ga sestavljale štiri ustanove: Vojaški muzej (za MO), Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, Fakulteta za družbene vede in francosko obrambno ministrstvo, ki ga je predstavljala Agencija za veterane in žrtve vojne. Ministrici za obrambo Andreji Katič in brigadirju Milku Petku pa smo hvaležni za podporo pri organizaciji, financiranju ter razumevanju vloge Republike Slovenije v mednarodnih znanstvenih krogih. Razumevanje in vsestranska podpora sta nam omogočila uspešno izvedbo odmevnega mednarodnega posveta. Na njem smo se uspeli soočiti s (pre)nekaterimi izkušnjami in predstaviti številne izzive. Predvsem pa so vsi udeleženci zapuščali Ljubljano s prijaznimi vtisi in novim znanjem o slovenskem obrambnem sistemu ter naši zgodovini.

Pri izbiri tem, ki naj bi jih raziskovalci iz več kot 30 držav raziskovali in nato tudi predstavili na letni konferenci, smo se strinjali, da bi tokrat morda postavili v ospredje manj izrazito vojaško temo – veterane. Zakaj? Vojaški zgodovinarji smo vse prevečkrat osredinjeni na pomembne spopade, bitke in vojne, v katerih imajo najpomembnejšo vlogo vojaški poveljniki, politični odločevalci in koalicije sil. Z vso vnemo proučujemo taktiko, operatiko, strategijo, razlagamo vlogo vseh mogočih bolj ali manj pomembnih dejavnikov, ki so vplivali bodisi na potek spopada bodisi na njegov rezultat. Posledice spopadov, bitk in vojn analiziramo in tolmačimo z veliko količino arhivskega gradiva in odstiramo tančice skrivnosti številnih, morda že običajnih dejstev ...

Toda, ko orožje utihne in besedo ponovno prevzamejo politiki, ko se življenje na različne načine začne vračati v čim normalnejše razmere, saj so vojna in njene

posledice nedvomno nenormalne, se v ospredje postavi odpravljanje posledic te vojne. Obnova porušenih mest in infrastrukture ter vsestransko oživljanje gospodarstva so v središču pozornosti. Vojske, tako tiste, ki so zmagale, še bolj pa tiste, ki so bile poražene, stopijo v ozadje. Še bolj v ozadje pa stopijo vojaki, morda najbolj tisti, ki zaradi vojnih posledic ne morejo več nadaljevati dela v vojaških strukturah. In prav te nepopravljive posledice nepovratno in vsestransko spreminjajo njihove osebnosti, da pogosto za vedno spremenijo način življenja. Največkrat tako, da se njihov status, družbeni, socialni in tudi vsestranski, spremeni na slabše. Prav zaradi tega so se oblikovale različne veteranske organizacije, ki niso namenjene le vzdrževanju stikov med nekdanjimi vojaki, temveč so tudi združenje, ki zagovarja njihov status in njihove pravice ter opozarja na njihovo neenakost v družbi. Pričakovati bi bilo, da je položaj veteranov tako zadovoljivo rešen in da kakršna koli nadaljnja marginalizacija nekdanjih pripadnikov oboroženih sil ni več mogoča, pa vendar ni tako.

Čeprav je odnos države do veteranov pravzaprav ogledalo njene zrelosti, občutljivosti do ranljivih ter spoštovanja do najbolj zaslužnih, ta pogosto ni tak, kot bi pričakovali. Razlogi so na obeh straneh: tako pri odločevalskih elitah, ki veliko prehitro dajejo prednost drugim, nemara aktualnejšim izzivom, pa tudi pri veteranskih organizacijah, ki bi prav gotovo morale biti z boljšim načinom organiziranja neposreden in tudi trši pogajalec, ko se razpravlja o statusu veteranov. Med gospodarsko krizo, ko skoraj po pravilu posledice prizadenejo nižje družbene sloje, ni dosti drugače tudi z veterani. Manjšanje nacionalnih ter obrambnih proračunov pomeni zmanjševanje sredstev tudi za veterane, največkrat se finančni rezi začnejo prav pri njih.

Zato je razprava o statusu veteranov zelo primerna tudi danes. Hkrati pa so prav veteranske organizacije živ zgodovinski spomin na izjemne napore in velike žrtve, zato nas opominjajo na krute posledice vojn in dogodke po njej. Zelo, zelo bi se morali odločevalci zgledovati po njih ... Mogoče ta razprava in njej podobne vsaj malo spremenijo tudi odnos do njih.

Vam, spoštovane veteranke in veterani, pa se moramo zahvaliti in pokloniti ter z velikim spoštovanjem negovati čim pristnejše odnose z vami. Vemo, da je temeljna značilnost veterana, da je pred svoje interese ter interese svojih bližnjih in drugih skupin postavil narod kot celoto. Da je bil zanj pripravljen žrtvovati največ – svoje življenje. Zato je prav in tudi spodobi se, da našim veteranom z dostojnim odnosom in vsestranskim vključevanjem v sodobno družbo zagotovimo kakovostno življenje.

## EDITORIAL

### VETERANS AND SOCIETY

In 2015, in Athens, a decision was made that the upcoming conference of military historians under the auspices of the Partnership for Peace programme in the Conflict Studies Working Group (CSWG) would be hosted by Slovenia. In cooperation with the Ministry of Defence and with its support we established an organisational committee, consisting of four institutions: the Military Museum in the name of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia, Institute of Contemporary History, Faculty of Social Sciences, and the French Ministry of Defence, represented by the Veterans and War Victims Office. We would like to thank the Minister of Defence Andreja Katič and Brigadier Milko Petek for their assistance with the organisation, financing, and understanding of the role of the Republic of Slovenia in the international scientific community. This understanding and complete support were crucial for the realisation of a successful international consultation, where we managed to confront an overabundance of experiences and present numerous challenges, as well as ensure that all the participants left Ljubljana with plenty of good impressions and new knowledge, also about the Slovenian defence system and our history.

Regarding the selection of topics, which the researchers from more than thirty countries would research and then present at the annual conference, we agreed that this time we would focus on a topic that was not as distinctively military: war veterans. Why veterans? We, military historians, far too often concentrate on important conflicts, battles and wars, where the most important roles are in the hands of military commanders, political decision-makers, and coalitions of forces. With great zeal we study tactics, operations, strategies, and analyse the impact of every possible more or less important factor that influenced either the course of the conflict in question or its results. We analyse and interpret the consequences of engagements, battles and wars by means of various archive materials, revealing layers of secrets involved in what may already be numerous conventional facts...

However, when the weapons fall silent, as the stage is once again taken over by politicians and as normal life in its myriad of ways resumes (as war and its consequences are undoubtedly abnormal circumstances), the elimination of the consequences of war comes to the forefront. Everyone focuses on the restoration of devastated cities and infrastructure as well as on the revitalisation of state economies. The militaries of the victorious as well as – even more so – the defeated side retreat to the background. Soldiers, perhaps especially those who cannot continue working in the military structures due to the consequences of wars, become even less visible. Precisely these consequences of wars leave permanent scars on the soldiers. They can alter the soldiers' personalities irreversibly and completely, and often change the way of the former soldier's lives forever. Unfortunately it frequently happens that the soldiers' societal, social and general status takes a turn for the worse as well. Precisely for this reason a number of various veteran organisations have been established, whose purpose is not only to maintain contacts between the former soldiers but also to represent them, their status and their rights, and bring the attention to their unequal position in the society. One would expect that the status of veterans would thus be addressed properly and that further potential marginalisation of the former members of the armed forces would no longer be an issue, but unfortunately that is not the case.

Although the attitude of the state towards the veterans in fact reflects its maturity, sensitivity to the vulnerable, and respect of its most meritorious citizens, this issue is often not settled in a manner that one would expect. The reasons for this situation can be found on both sides: on the side of the decision-making elites, which far too eagerly assign top priority to other, possibly more pressing issues; as well as on the side of the veteran organisations themselves, which should certainly operate in such a way as to represent a direct and tougher negotiator when it comes to the status of veterans. During the economic crisis, when the negative consequences almost as a rule affect the lowest social strata most adversely, the situation of the veterans is not much different. The cutbacks of national and consequently defence budgets result in the diminished resources available for the veterans. Most often the veterans are where the financial cuts actually begin.

For this reason the discussion about the status of veterans is a very pressing topic, even today. At the same time the veteran organisations are the ones that represent a live historical memory of extreme efforts and great sacrifice. As such they are a living reminder of what wars and post-war events represent. The decision-makers should learn so much from them... And perhaps these sorts of discussions will contribute to changes in these relations.

Esteemed veterans, we should thank you, pay our respect to you, and endeavour to maintain the sincerest possible relations with you. As it is, it is a fundamental characteristic of every veteran that they have put their nation as a whole before their own interests as well as before the interests of their loved ones and those of other groups. For this noble goal they have been prepared to sacrifice everything: their

lives. For this reason it is only proper and decent that the highest possible quality of life be ensured for our veterans by means of sincere relations and by including the veterans in all aspects of life in the modern society.



## VETERANSKI IMPERATIV DANES

## VETERANS IMPERATIVE TODAY

**Povzetek** Obramba domovine, države in naroda je bila in ostaja brezčasna in univerzalna vrednota, saj poleg obstoja zagotavlja tudi varnost. Obrambne sisteme predstavljajo in gradijo posamezniki, ki so pripravljeni za varnost drugih zastaviti vse, tudi svoja življenja, zato bi lahko pričakovali dostojno in spoštljivo obravnavo vseh, ki so znotraj obrambnega sistema aktivno delovali za varnost drugih. In vendar ni tako! Zaradi odsotnosti velikih varnostnih izzivov in oblikovanja zgodovinskega spomina prav obrambni sistemi doživljajo velike proračunske reze. Med njimi so predvsem tisti, ki za sistem niso več nujni, to so veteranske organizacije. Takšno ravnanje lahko negativno vpliva na vrednote v sistemu, sproži upadanje pozitivne podobe, načenja obstoj vojaške identitete ter končno povzroči zmanjšanje bojne morale. Če upoštevamo, da so prav veteranske organizacije most med civilnim in vojaškim okoljem, ki lahko pomembno prispeva k razumevanju nalog obrambnega sistema, bi bilo nujno negovati naš odnos do veteranov in njihovih organizacij. V takšnem stanju se vse prevečkrat ustvarjajo okoliščine, ko so veterani potisnjeni na družbeni rob.

**Ključne besede** *Vojak, veteran, oborožene sile, obrambni sistem, vrednote.*

**Abstract** Defence of the homeland, country and nation has always been, and still is, a universal value ensuring both existence and security. Defence systems are represented and created by individuals who are ready to put everything at risk, even their own lives, in order to ensure the security of others. Therefore one would expect that all those who were actively involved in providing security for others within the defence system would be treated with honour and respect. Unfortunately there are many examples where this is not so! In the absence of great security challenges, and with the creation of historical memory, defence system budgets are being severely cut. In this process veteran organizations are recognized as a non-vital element of defence systems. Such acts lead to an erosion of values within defence systems, and do a

great deal of damage to the positive image and the existence of military identity, and, finally, contribute to declining combat morale. Added to these facts is also the unique position of all veteran organizations in acting as a bridge between the civilian and military environments, and as a facilitator to understanding the functions of the defence system. It is therefore not only proper to support them, but also necessary. More and more examples show that veterans are being pushed to the verge of modern society and ingloriously left behind.

**Key words** *Soldier, veteran, armed forces, defence system, values.*

**Introduction** What all defence systems around the world have in common is the defence of the state and its citizens, which is carried out on the basis of institutionalized, systemically organized and centralized activities under an executive power. The existence of the national security system, part of which is the defence system, enables the existence and functioning of the state, in which national authorities have a monopoly on the use of force, and, in exchange, they provide security to the citizens at both national and individual levels. Its functions are defined within the obligations arising from various alliances, which often extend beyond the national framework.

Every social system is based on people, who enable its existence and functioning through their actions. The same applies to defence systems, whose basic building blocks are soldiers. However, a defence system is distinctly different in its specifics from other social systems. A particularly prominent specific is the force individuals have at their disposal, with the extreme purpose of taking their opponents' lives. In addition, each member of the armed forces must understand the level of risk to their own lives, and take into consideration the possibility of losing their lives during the performance of their functions. For this reason defence systems have precisely defined rules regulating interpersonal relationships, which are based on clear rules, two of which are especially important for military organizations, namely the unity of command and subordination.<sup>1</sup> In addition, the conduct of members of the armed

---

<sup>1</sup> *The Slovenian Armed Forces are organized hierarchically in a way that enables effective, proper and flexible leadership and command. The superior-subordinate relationship is the essential element of leadership and command. The organization of the command establishes superiors and subordinates according to the principle of the unity of command. All military personnel must know at all times who they are subordinate to, and what their powers are. Clearly defined relationships regarding the command are absolutely necessary for the execution of any order. Effective organization of command according to the principle of subordination provides every commander with the maximum freedom possible in the fulfilment of the duties under their authority. This enables the development of their responsibility, initiative and independence. Superiors are obliged to provide to subordinates information relating to the performance of tasks in the extent necessary (Rules on Service in the Slovenian Armed Forces, Official Gazette No. 84/2009).*

forces is regulated by other internal rules, including the rules on service<sup>2</sup> and military codes<sup>3</sup>, as well as the legal norms of nation states and provisions of international humanitarian and military law<sup>4</sup>. The goal of all limitations and guidelines regarding the conduct of members of the armed forces is control over the potential use of force, and the setting of standards governing their conduct within and outside the system. According to Južnič (1993, p. 306), soldiers and officers are in the service of defending and looking after the interests of a state, and they must completely identify with it. For this reason, military service is the most distinct public service, where national and military identities intertwine. National identity is closely linked to space, which defines the living space of a nation and, indirectly, also its characteristics. The foundation of military identity is also the living space which must be defended. Even though efforts are being made nowadays to put the understanding of military identity in connection with national identity in perspective, I maintain that the relation between the two identities has in no way changed, despite some new functions and forms of the manning of units. What is more, defence systems of modern states are based on those foundations, and are consequently effective in their performance of their functions. On the other hand, relativizing the foundations undermines the most important basis of the military organization; a process we have witnessed in the Slovenian Armed Forces<sup>5</sup>, which suffers identity under-representation in core elements. One would expect a complementarity of military and civil values, but there is a growing gap between them. According to public opinion polls, there are no identical values to be found among the core values listed in the Military Code of Ethics of the Slovenian Armed Forces. Based on that, the conclusion can be drawn that military values do not reflect civil values, which would significantly increase the possibility of understanding of the military system, its necessity and its functions. Veteran organisations, which are indirectly linked to the military system, share a similar fate.

<sup>2</sup> *The Rules on Service in the Slovenian Armed Forces (hereinafter: the Rules on Service) regulate the rights and duties of military personnel during military service, their code of conduct during military service, relationships, order in facilities used by the Slovenian Armed Forces, work and internal services, guard service and alarm systems, and military ceremonies and mourning. During war, the Rules on Service are applied in accordance with the war situation and the Rules on Combat Operations of the Slovenian Armed Forces. The Rules on Service apply to all personnel performing military service in the Slovenian Armed Forces (Rules on Service in the Slovenian Armed Forces, Official Gazette No. 84/2009).*

<sup>3</sup> *During military service, members of the Slovenian Armed Forces must comply with the Military Code of Ethics of the Slovenian Armed Forces (hereinafter: the Code), which is the code of the Slovenian Armed Forces as a military organization. The primary purpose of the Code is to ensure that all members of the Slovenian Armed Forces perform their military service with honour and in accordance with ethnic guidelines and principles set out in the Code. Members of the Slovenian Armed Forces must comply with and follow this Code throughout their performance of military service in the Republic of Slovenia and abroad (Military Code of Ethics of the Slovenian Armed Forces, Official Gazette No. 52/2009).*

<sup>4</sup> *The provisions of the international law of war are based on international treaties, and represent limitations to the use of force, the protection of vulnerable groups, and rules on the conduct of combatants during the conduct of operations. Compliance with these provisions is obligatory, and represents an upgrade of the national legal order for states and their armed forces (Jogan, 1997, p. 3).*

<sup>5</sup> *The five basic identity elements are: defence of the state, clearly defined patriotism, respect for authority, strict compliance with international war and humanitarian law, and high ethical and moral standards (Prebilič and Juvan, 2012, p. 67).*

However, it is not always exclusively a question of values. Due to the economic crisis, numerous cuts have been made and economic measures taken with a view to reducing the expenditure of social systems which could not be funded from national budgets as a result of the loss of income. Defence budgets are no exception. De France (2015, pp. 1-4) states that, without exception, European national defence budgets were reduced over the period 2008-2014. It is possible to observe a correlation between the severity of the crisis in a state, and the scope of the reduction in the defence budget. Interestingly, defence budgets of mostly Southern European countries were reduced by 30%. A result of that is the internal restructuring of the defence budget, which reduces expenditure on training and the supply and maintenance of equipment, while expenditure on salaries, which represents an increasingly large proportion of defence budgets, remains the same.

The question of financing veteran organizations, which are usually (insofar as they do not have their own ministry) under the Ministry of Defence, is therefore quite common. A decline in resources is to be expected; in circumstances where the system itself is in financial peril, such expenditure represents a dispensable component of the system. The bonuses awarded to veterans are also uncertain. The question of that expenditure is therefore more than fair. The answer is not clear-cut, as is not in regard to the definition of the term veteran; but that expenditure can be extremely high. On that subject, Stiglitz and Bilmes (2009, pp. 61-90) mention expenditure on veterans in the US, which includes all form of rehabilitation, disability allowances and benefits for the veterans' family members; psychological and physical consequences suffered by veterans change the lives of entire families. Considering the fact that there are around 24 million veterans in the US – meaning those who have the status of veteran – of which 3.5 million claim various benefits on account of injuries, it is to be expected that after the conclusion of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, where 1.6 million soldiers have conducted military operations, the number of beneficiaries will increase dramatically. The two authors estimate that after the conclusion of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan the costs will be between \$422 and \$717 million. It is true that over the last two years there has been an increase in defence budgets, especially in Central Europe where SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) researchers found an increase of 13% (SIPRI, 2017), but the question is how and, even more importantly, to what degree, the funds allocated to veteran organizations have been aligned with these changes.

Working in the defence system undoubtedly involves specific limitations, which is understandable; however, it is less understandable when the question arises regarding the status of those who no longer perform tasks in the system for various reasons. What benefits are possible, and what could be their scope of work done in the defence system? What is the status of those who have fought, and exposed and risked themselves for the security of others? Why does this remain a topical question despite otherwise clearly defined relations? How is it possible that within the defence system, and even more outside of it, veterans are overlooked, and maybe even rejected and discouraged from continuing their activities? And finally: why is

the funding of veteran organizations and the meagre benefits paid to the defenders of the nation even a political question, and subjected to austerity measures in the state and society? The responsibility for these and similar situations is at least three-fold: the first entity responsible is represented by national institutions which take and implement decisions; the second is represented by veteran organizations, because it seems that they are not active enough in pointing to certain issues; and the third entity is civil society, which should be considerably more proactive when it comes to discussions on the status of veteran organizations. What their cooperation looks like, who is responsible and to what extent, and why it seems that the role of veteran organizations in modern societies must be given more room in terms of quality and quantity, are the topics discussed in this article. One should bear in mind that by acknowledging veteran organizations, and with an appropriate attitude to veterans and their unanswered questions, the state and citizens acting on its behalf show only due respect. The attitude to veterans is also a good indicator of the attitude to national history.

## 1 WHO IS A VETERAN?

Even though it may seem unnecessary, certain dilemmas and questions relating to veteran organizations and veteran status should be highlighted. It must be clearly stated immediately that there are two aspects to the word “veteran”: the first aspect is about the legal status, and is based on the legal definition and connected to status benefits determined by law; the second is represented by a significantly looser understanding of veterans, and refers to participation in combat tasks and missions, and to the termination of active service in the armed forces. In both cases there is no clear boundary marking the status of veterans. The predominant reason for this lies in the way of manning of the armed forces, and the tasks performed by members of the armed forces on behalf of the state. These tasks have recently exceeded the basic missions of all armed forces – the protection of national territory from the aggression of outside threatening elements. They are a result of a changed security architecture including various forms of alliances, which in addition to safety benefits bring certain obligations. Despite emphasizing these systemic changes, there are also specifics at the national level of individual states. On that subject, the capabilities of states themselves must be stressed, and more importantly, the attitude that states foster towards the defence system and consequently those who have carried out its tasks.

When defining who a veteran actually is, one discovers that there are various different definitions of this concept. Multiple meanings can also be found. The term “veteran” does not necessarily denote only former military personnel. The Dictionary of Standard Slovenian specifies that a veteran can also be “an elderly and experienced worker in a certain field”<sup>6</sup>. Such understanding undoubtedly applies to the military organization, because it refers to experiences as virtues and skills acquired during service in an organization or system. The Dictionary of Standard Slovenia draws

<sup>6</sup> *Dictionary of Standard Slovenian. Available at: <http://bos.zrc-sazu.si/sskj.html>.*

attention to that fact by listing two meanings of the word “veteran”. A veteran can be “an old experienced soldier or one who is no longer in active service”<sup>7</sup>, or “an elderly and experienced worker in a certain field”<sup>8</sup>. International Encyclopedia of Military History<sup>9</sup> explains that the definition of a veteran varies according to the nation or state where veterans live. Simply put, veterans are people who have served in the armed forces during combat, although the use of that term has different meanings depending on the historical period and nation. In the US, for example, the term is applied to someone who has served in the armed forces<sup>10</sup>, while other nations reserve this term essentially for someone who has actually fought, i.e. taken part in combat tasks. An example of such description is used in the UK; namely, “ex-service” is a term denoting someone who has served in the armed forces, while the term “veteran” applies to someone who has actually fought<sup>11</sup>. Australia and Canada have yet another definition of a veteran. The first awards veteran status only to those who have been actively involved either in operations abroad or in wars the state fought in the past (Burdett, 2012, p. 2). Similarly, the Netherlands associates veteran status with participation in operations; the term “veteran” describes every military person who has participated in a war, or has been included in international operations and UN operations. Canada redefined the term in 2000: a veteran is every person who has served honourably in the Canadian Armed Forces or their allies at any time. In 2001, the extended content of the definition of a veteran included all former military personnel and members of the contract reserve who meet the conditions set out by the Canadian Department of National Defence, and have concluded their service with an honourable discharge (Sešel, 2007, p. 20). The International Military and Defense Encyclopedia<sup>12</sup> explains the term veteran depending on whether it is used in peacetime or wartime. A veteran during wartime is someone who has combat experience, while the term in peacetime often applies to those who have fought during wartime (in a war). From the military perspective, the term usually describes people who have served for a period of time in the armed forces, have retired from active service, and receive suitable benefits for their loyal service to the state. Bowyer (2004, p. 250) identifies a veteran as a person with extensive combat experience, which fundamentally does not include retirement from the defence system, and

<sup>7</sup> *Dictionary of Standard Slovenian*. Fran Ramovš Institute of the Slovenian Language, Research Centre of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts. Available at: [http://bos.zrc-sazu.si/cgi/a03.exe?name=sskj\\_testa&expression=veteran&hs=1](http://bos.zrc-sazu.si/cgi/a03.exe?name=sskj_testa&expression=veteran&hs=1)

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup> *International Encyclopedia of Military History, 2006, Volume 2: K-Z.*

<sup>10</sup> *In the US, the term denotes every person who has actively served a minimum of two years in the army, and has been awarded at least the status of honourable upon leaving the armed forces, irrespective of whether they have participated in combat operations or not, or a person who has been permanently injured or disabled due to the consequences of war (Sešel, 2007, p. 19).*

<sup>11</sup> *The definition of a British veteran is short and unquestionable: veterans are everyone who has served in the armed forces for longer than one day (Dandeker et al., 2005, pp. 161-177). This highly inclusive definition represents over 5.5 million former military personnel in the UK, which, together with the relatives these people are responsible for, and widowers/widows (which the definition joins with the veteran status), amounts to around 13 million people or around 20% of the British population. A more restrictive definition of a veteran has been proposed, but has not been adopted due to public disapproval (Sešel, 2007, p. 20).*

<sup>12</sup> *International Military and Defense Encyclopedia, 1993, Volume 6: T-Z.*

consequently a person who is entitled to benefits arising from veteran status. He also points out another specific feature: it is becoming increasingly common to use the term veteran for those who have completed a military mission – Gulf War veterans, Falklands War veterans, etc.

The interchangeable use of the terms “veteran” and “combatant” as synonyms is very common. The Military Encyclopaedia (*Vojna enciklopedija*)<sup>13</sup> also defines a veteran as a combatant; it says that “veteran” is a title awarded to retired soldiers, old combatants and meritorious persons who have performed various social functions for a longer period of time. In Slovenia, the term combatant applies to Second World War veterans. According to Rogač (2007)<sup>14</sup>, the term veteran in Slovenian legislation is applied explicitly to people who fought in the First and Second World Wars.

### 1.1 A veteran as a former combatant

The status of a veteran as a former combatant is a logical and necessary process stemming from two earlier processes: demobilization and reintegration. Both processes relate to conventional armed conflicts which are based on call-ups, i.e. the mobilization of additional human resources, a wide use of force, and the consequences of war. Such understanding of war is most frequently founded on the defence of the nation and the territorial integrity of the state. In that context, Garb (2002, p. 32) discusses the need for the transition between “the soldier’s war and the nation’s war”, and between “the soldier’s story and the nation’s story”<sup>15</sup>. “The soldier’s story” or the rehabilitation of a war veteran as a full and content member of society, takes place under circumstances surrounding general reconstruction, and is therefore marked with or limited by other reconstruction efforts (for example, the rivalry in the labour market), and simultaneously embedded in general efforts and addressed in the framework of international, national and local politics. At the national level, demobilization and reintegration programmes are being developed, and a legal basis for providing help to these groups is being adopted. There is an opinion that the demobilization of combatants is a solely logistic problem, while their integration is simply a development problem. Former combatants should therefore not require special attention, and should not be a special target group entitled to assistance. Garb (2002, p. 138) stresses that veterans are not the only group which needs to be integrated into society. Returning refugees and displaced people usually exceed even the number of veterans. Emphasizing the category of war veterans as a special target group in a post-conflict society, and dealing with their problems separately, may lead to a sense of neglect of other groups which also suffer due to the consequences of war. Despite that, Garb<sup>16</sup> notes that arguments for helping war veterans as a special

<sup>13</sup> *Vojna enciklopedija*, 1975, Volume 10: Tirani-Žažul.

<sup>14</sup> Lara Rogač, 2007, *Družbeni položaj vojnih veteranov*, Ljubljana.

<sup>15</sup> *Model and Haggerty in: Garb, 2002, p. 137.*

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

group in need of assistance have prevailed. Several arguments justifying that war veterans must be given appropriate attention after armed conflict<sup>17</sup>:

1. Humanitarian reasons – veterans may have a variety of social and economic issues (they are often unemployed, and far away from home; their basic needs and accommodation must be provided for);
2. Due to their sacrifice for the state, or as a compensation for missing education and other rights due to compulsory enlistment in the armed forces;
3. Former combatants can contribute significantly to the overall development of the community and society as a whole;
4. Failure to pay attention to former combatants may endanger peace and development processes. War veterans may turn to crime, or join political options advocating the use of violent means.

It should be noted that there is a clear difference between the demobilization and reintegration of professional soldiers and conscripts; especially because the latter is undeniably more challenging and long-lasting. In principle, the attitude to veterans – former combatants – is not undefined. People who have participated in national conflicts and the defence of the nation and territorial integrity enjoy a certain status and related benefits in every state. A legal framework clearly defining who is eligible to be a member of a veteran organization is normally established as well. The state forms a positive attitude in relation to them, for they represent an important part of the national historical memory, as one of the key components of national identity. They are the representatives of the historical memory; live witnesses to key national historical events.

However, it must be noted that veteran organizations based on the rule of former combatants have no future. The removal of conventional conflict entailing mobilization, the introduction of professional armed forces on a global scale, and the discontinuation of the conscript system do not enable new members to be included in veteran organizations. Such organizations are therefore condemned to the aging and gradual loss of their members. During that process, the above-mentioned historical memory fades, and the attitude to national security culture changes; the latter should be based on a broader understanding of security culture relating to the participation in collective efforts to defend the state<sup>18</sup>. A special, unfortunately largely overlooked, category comprises veterans who have served in international operations and missions. Participants in these functions undoubtedly perform tasks which exceed the understanding of peacetime operations, but are also not conventional combat tasks. This discussion undeniably lacks attention to the performance of tasks outside Slovenia's territory; there can be no doubt that members in international operations and missions not only participate in the concept of providing collective security, but indirectly also increase the safety of Slovenia's citizens.

<sup>17</sup> Kingama and Ball in: *Garb*, 2002, p. 138.

<sup>18</sup> *Modern understanding of security culture relates mostly to resource and company management. In that sense it is perceived as part of the organizational culture which plays an important role in companies, mostly in the form of defining their own system of values and norms, which define the activities of all company stakeholders (Sedonja Kardoš, 2011, p. 19).*

## 2 VETERANS' IMPERATIVE

Veterans are inextricably linked to the armed forces because they have served or still serve in their structures. Their position in society is therefore a reflection of the situation within the defence system, and the presence of the system itself in civil society, which is usually more or less distant from it. A typical aspect of the armed forces is the functional and social imperative which in its essence defines the legitimacy of the armed forces. Gow (1992, p. 27) describes the legitimacy of the military as “the quality of the relationship between the armed forces and their sociopolitical environment”, and talks about two types of legitimacy<sup>19</sup>: functional<sup>20</sup> and socio-political<sup>21</sup>. He believes that it is possible for the socio-political imperative to “collide” with the functional one, and that one of the aspects of legitimacy of the armed forces is the balance between functional and socio-political demands. “The armed forces must be capable of fulfilling their basic functions, and simultaneously not distance themselves from their society” (Gow, 1992, p. 28). In other words, the armed forces face demands and expectations with regard to their obligations and powers. The achievement of social and political imperatives is reflected in the form of citizens' support to the military organization. The level of harmony is therefore connected with the level of legitimacy, which as a concept represents the significance of understanding the relationship between the armed forces and society. In the process of legitimizing the armed forces, two sides are confronted: the army, which requires legitimacy, and the citizens of the state, which, under certain conditions, can provide legitimacy. In that sense, the loyalty of the public or civil society can be viewed through the prism of understanding the armed forces as the holder of fundamental social values. On that basis, a field of interaction is formed between the armed forces and civil society which defines civil-military relationships. The level of harmony or the integration of the military into politics is connected with the notion of legitimacy as a concept which is crucial for the understanding of relationships between the armed forces and society (Jelušič, 1997, pp. 13-14). The legitimization of the armed forces calls for the consideration of specific circumstances of civil society, which are based on social norms and values falling into two categories: (1) universal values comprising those shared by societies at an approximately equal level of development, or closely comparable with them, and (2) national values which are held by individual nations, and are therefore not directly comparable, and are a result of historical, territorial, sociological and other circumstances. What is most important is that the armed forces gain legitimacy exclusively on the basis of interaction between the two environments: the defence system and civil society. Legitimacy cannot be forced or acquired through various forms of pressure exerted

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 27-28.

<sup>20</sup> *Functional legitimacy relates mostly to the effective achievement of the functional imperative or the basic task of the armed forces, namely the defence from outside physical threats. Their legitimacy would be seriously undermined if the armed forces were unsuccessful at fulfilling that basic function. Gow states that the armed forces can meet their functional imperative in two ways: 1) in a latent or covert way, i.e. without the active use of force, and 2) in a more obvious way, i.e. by engaging in an open conflict against other armed forces.*

<sup>21</sup> *Sociopolitical legitimacy refers to the effective achievement of the social and political imperative, which the author defines as a set of non-functional requirements made by society to the armed forces.*

on civil society. Quite the opposite; it undermines legitimacy, and consequently calls into question the acceptability of the defence system as a centre of power.

According to Huntington (1957, pp. 1-3), the relationship between the civil environment and the military organization is formed on the basis of two imperatives: the functional and the social. The functional imperative stems from the functions expected to be fulfilled by the military, especially in relation to the dangers threatening state security. The social imperative is composed of other functions assigned to the armed forces as a result of ideologies, values and cultural norms. When it comes to providing legitimacy to the armed forces, a balanced approach must be taken in carrying out both the functional and social imperatives. If the defence system completely dedicates itself to meeting the demands and expectations of the social imperative, it can no longer fulfil its functional obligations. And vice versa: if the military fails to pay enough attention to the social imperative, it will soon distance itself from civil society, and therefore, in extreme circumstances, become illegitimate and as such unnecessary and even unwanted.

## 2.1 The functional imperative of veteran organizations

A similar parallel can be drawn in the status and role of veterans and veteran organizations. If the basic functional imperative of the defence system is to provide security to the civil environment, this imperative in the field of veteran organizations represents the position of veterans in society. It relates to the formal legal framework, specifically the fulfilment of the legal imperatives and conditions which define veterans. As emphasized above, this area is characterized by great diversity, which is undeniably reflected in national characteristics of organizing and functioning of veteran organizations in individual societies. The functional imperative refers to veterans and their position in society, while the social imperative dictates the presence of veteran organizations in civil society. Both are interconnected and complement each other, but are not always in balance. The absence of one imperative normally affects the other, which over a longer period of time results in the deterioration of the veteran status on the one hand, and the gradual removal of veteran organizations from the civil environment.

One of the important factors of the functional imperative is the establishment of normative bases defining the rights and duties of veterans, which are represented by veteran organizations on behalf of individuals. The variability of benefits depends on national legislation, and also on the military tradition, the formal and informal status of soldiers in society and the state, and the financial capabilities of individual states. In the case of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, US budget planners will have to take veteran benefits into account for the next 10 years or longer. Stiglitz and Bilmez (2008, pp. 78-79) have assessed that expenditure on the basis of 751,000 US soldiers who were deployed to both crisis areas and are entitled to various forms of benefits due to physical or mental injuries sustained during the performance of tasks on the battlefield. In total, over 1.7 million US soldiers have been deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. The assessment includes the costs of direct medical treatment

and future compensation. Over the period 2007-2017, the costs are estimated to increase together with the growth rate from \$1.3 billion to \$6.2 billion. During the entire ten-year period, the costs are estimated to reach \$37 billion. That is significant expenditure; there are 24 million veterans in the US, of which 3.5 million receive various forms of disability benefits which amount to \$34.5 billion per year (Stiglitz and Bilmez, 2008, p. 71).

However, these compensations in and of themselves do not solve a number of issues affecting soldiers, who are exposed to stressful situations including facing and carrying out tasks in asymmetric combat<sup>22</sup> involving direct urban warfare and the violation of international military and humanitarian law. Bobrow (2015, p. 33) draws attention to the consequences of post-traumatic stress disorder, which continue even after veterans attend different counselling programmes and receive professional medical help. The effects of the disorder persist; it is important to acknowledge them and try to mitigate them. However, one question remains unanswered: what is the quality of life of the individuals and their loved ones, if there is any to speak of at all? That cannot be translated into numbers and determined financially. But it is indisputable that in many aspects these consequences leave negative traces, mostly in the mental health of soldiers. Balfour and others (2014, p. 165) note that between 18% and 30% of those who have worked in war areas suffer from various forms of mental disorders, which often lead to the destruction of families and loss of homes, reducing them to the life on the social margins of society<sup>23</sup>. Although all veteran and other benefits relating to the veterans' health conditions, and premiums granting them a decent life, are defined by legislation and paid by national governments, they represent an area where veteran organizations can contribute significantly to the understanding of the numerous problems facing veterans, on the basis of their activities and the monitoring of veterans. From that aspect, veteran organizations should and must be an important partner in national discussions, and thus carry out their functional imperative for the protection of veteran rights, even when

<sup>22</sup> *One of the definitions has been provided by Svete (2002, p. 29), who explains that asymmetric warfare takes place when "the actors, including individuals and international coalitions (ad hoc and permanent), use methods and means over a certain period of time, and cause the most disproportionate effects in relation to the resources invested while taking into account the adversary's and their own defensive and offensive capabilities and vulnerabilities. It entails the use of military and non-military forms at all levels of interaction between the actors encompassing situations from peacetime to war."*

<sup>23</sup> *The latest research suggests that every fourth soldier will have suffered the consequences of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) after military service in Afghanistan and Iraq. These assumptions are based on the fact that 103,792 members of the US Armed Forces were diagnosed with PTSD in the period between 2000 and 2012. Experts from the field of mental research in the armed forces point to the phenomenon of a new generation of veterans with post-traumatic disorders which is predicted to emerge in the next five years. Because these disorders lie at the base of stigmatization within the military system and signify a likely end of the military career, a timely recognition of such problems is still extremely difficult (Balfour, 2014, p. 166). Severe depression can manifest itself in various forms of deviant behaviour, including suicide. The number of suicides has risen dramatically over the last decade – over 8,000 veterans have taken their own lives, which equals 22 suicides per day and exceeds the number of suicides committed by active members of the armed forces – and statistics indicate one suicide every 36 hours. 30,000 members of the US Armed Forces, either veterans or active soldiers, die every year as a result of suicide. While there were 9.6 suicide cases per 100,000 people in 2004, the number has increased to 29.2 cases per 100,000 people by 2012. According to experts' forecasts, the trend will continue to grow in the future (Carlos and Kintzle, 2014, p. 1).*

interference with their rights and benefits is to be expected. Veteran organizations are therefore expected to function in the sense of a union, which should not imply the politicization of the veteran question and organizations. Veterans should not be denied the right to become members of political parties, which is limited by law in numerous states; however, the code of conduct should be considered with regard to veterans who have served the state and not individual political elites, which is why diametrically opposed conduct on behalf of veterans is not to be expected. Political polarization usually leads to the disintegration of veteran organizations, as a result of the lack of the element of cohesion as the most fundamental aspect of their functioning and existence represented by patriotism, i.e. loyalty to the state and politics, and their elites. What is important is dialogue, and a presentation of the actual situation among veterans supported by valid arguments, which ultimately mirrors the situation in the defence system, and particularly in the military system of a state. The tasks of the functional imperative can therefore be directly linked to the position of veterans in relation to their health, finances and status in civil societies. Their position must be balanced, and reflected in civil societies in such a way as to prevent the marginalization of veterans on the one hand, and the excessive privilege of their status on the other, which can lead to social confrontation. The first stages of a growing dissatisfaction are evident in the reduction of legitimacy of veteran organizations, which usually has implications for their funding and may significantly affect the funding of the entire defence system of individual states. Although veteran organizations are difficult to understand in their institutionalized fight for veterans, I nevertheless believe that it is possible to be more proactive than Slovenian society is nowadays.

## 2.2 The social imperative of veteran organizations

The social imperative comprises the activities of veteran organizations with regard to the interaction between civil society and the defence system. They could even be marked as the ambassadors of the defence system; owing to the value system which defines them, they represent the mission and values of the defence system in a most credible way. The Military Doctrine of the Slovenian Armed Forces defines the following values:

- honour
- courage
- loyalty
- esprit de corps and
- selfless service.

These values derive from the most basic value, namely patriotism, which is defined as the awareness of allegiance to Slovenia, and unselfish performance of duties in accomplishing common goals (Military Doctrine, 2006, p. 18).

In a society where different attempts are made to change the security system and even re-evaluate the fundamental values which regulate the functioning of all societies, it is crucially important to not only defend but also continually give meaning to the

value system via different institutions. It should be stressed that military values are social values, and are in that sense a mirror of values (Norton-Taylor, 2011). Unlike modern societies, defence systems, and the armed forces as their most important part, represent a very conservative side to changes in values, of which ethical conduct<sup>24</sup> on the part of members of the armed forces holds a special position and should be seen as the guardian of legal and legitimate performance of functions (Robinson, 2008, p. 21). As hierarchical systems they can only function when values are continually respected, which is why these values are extremely difficult to change. Seen from that perspective, veteran organizations have great social capital which often remains unexploited, which is also due to an increasingly precise and consistent distinction between the civil and the military (Prebilič and Juvan, 2012, p. 58). Considering the thesis that an important source of the deepening economic crisis facing modern societies is the severe erosion of fundamental social values, the social capital of veteran organizations could help these organizations to become a significant and important corrective factor in these societies. In this way, veteran organizations could carry out their social imperative to a considerable extent.

Seen from the perspective of the social imperative, veteran organizations represent a bearer of military experiences and historical memory. A war as an act which irreversibly changes societies and leaves indelible traces is prohibited by international law<sup>25</sup>, and yet it is a constant companion of humanity. The more the memory fades, and the more distant wars and conflicts become in space and time, the more important it is to draw the attention of decision-makers and civil society to the unacceptability of war and especially its consequences. Civil society bears a large proportion of the consequences which it cannot imagine (Prebilič and Juvan, 2007, p. 261). It can be argued that veteran organizations play the role of the ambassador of patriotism in the context of sacrifice for the home, the state and the nation.

Veteran organizations can also be seen as a bridge between the defence system and civil society; they no longer carry out the tasks of the defence system in the formal legal sense, but having served in the system for a long time, they know it extremely well. They can therefore explain and interpret the activities of the defence system, and inform civil society even when the defence system is unable or unwilling to do so for various objective or subjective reasons. Veteran organizations can represent a

<sup>24</sup> *The effectiveness of the defence system is based on military ethos, which most often consists of conservative values and norms which are necessary for discipline, morale and obedience. However, the armed forces must simultaneously reflect liberal values and norms to be supported by society. It is to be expected that soldiers will fight for their homeland and defend the system of rights they identify with personally, that their morale will be highest when they are able to carry out tasks in accordance with their own rights, and that they will fight hardest when they understand the political values they are fighting for. That means that the defence system may be different from society, but its legitimacy must be provided from its integration in the civil-social value concept (Garb: 2009, p. 106).*

<sup>25</sup> *War should be understood as a state of regulated armed conflict between different groups, usually states, which relates mostly to the conventional understanding of war as articulated in international law and treaties. Seen in the wider context of armed conflict, which has significantly impacted the lives of modern societies especially in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, war can be interpreted as a state in which organized violence is either used or is threatened to be used by the armed forces (Speller and Tuck, 2008, p. 1).*

specific form of strategic reserve in the national security system, particularly in an era of diminishing security culture of modern societies, and considerable widening of the gap between civil society and the defence system, which is partly a result of the professionalization of the armed forces on the one hand, and the changing security architecture with new security challenges on the other. Representatives of veteran organizations could participate in an open curriculum at different levels of the formal educational system, significantly contribute to the formation of more distinct patriotic feelings of young people, assume the role and tasks of the national security system, and with a set of positive values co-create modern, active and responsible young citizens (Prebilič and Juvan, 2014, p. 262). However, the potential unprincipled political activities of veteran organizations should also be noted; although I do assess that their value concept is perhaps the best defence mechanism.

The balance between both imperatives, i.e. the functional and the social, enables the provision of the legitimacy of defence structures in civil society. The imperatives put forward clear demands and expectations to the military, which are more difficult to fulfil in certain circumstances – a substantial reduction in financial sources coupled with the expectation of effective performance of tasks and functions. Such circumstances are undoubtedly frustrating for everyone: the defence system and its employees, and civil society, whose expectations are not realized. Such circumstances create the impression that balance between the two imperatives is difficult to find, which is finally reflected in the legitimacy of the defence system. Therefore, “the final goal of all civil-military relations, such as the balance between values and beliefs, and the agreement on the most appropriate role of the armed forces in society”, is not achieved (Edmonds, 1988, p. 132). The same applies to the existence and functioning of veteran organizations. The problem arises when values held by a specific group (for example, veterans) become substantially different from the dominant values of civil society. Under such conditions, the doors to first the incomprehension of existence and then the marginalization of veteran organizations are wide open, which has a significant negative influence on the image of the defence system as a whole. Taking into account the observation that the most fundamental value of both the defence system and veteran organizations is patriotism, then this is the moment of truth: is patriotism still the value that holds the right to homeland within civil society? If the answer is negative, it is easier to understand the low level of security culture in Slovenia, and the high level of unwillingness to defend one’s own homeland.

**Conclusion** Veterans exist and are a fact in all states which have been involved in armed conflict in the course of their history. That is why states must deal with the question of veterans. All discussion about the rationality of the existence of veterans and their role in society should be senseless and unnecessary. And yet, the reality is different. The meaning and role of veterans are changing under the influence of various external and internal factors. A profound difference in the understanding of the importance of the veterans’ mission can be perceived, which can be partially explained by the difference in the political culture in different states.

And yet, a similar understanding of the veterans' imperative is expected despite all its specifics. Just as the functional and social imperatives provide legitimacy to the defence forces, there is ample space in both fields with regard to veteran organizations. These organizations are not exactly comparable institutions; however, they must ensure their legitimacy in relation to its users, i.e. veterans, and to civil society. While the first group holds expectations in the field of the functional imperative, the expectations of civil society, namely the social imperative, should not be underestimated. Diminished legitimacy usually leads to two situations: the failure to meet the expectations of the first causes the undermining of internal cohesiveness in the group of veterans, while the distancing from the civil environment leads to the lack of understanding of the mission and general existence of veteran organizations. If important changes in values and the disagreement between the military and civil society is added to these situations, the conditions for the marginalization of veterans are quickly met.

In the past, veterans were individuals who were prepared to sacrifice their lives for their homeland. That is another reason why they are entitled to certain rights, and why they deserve respect from civil society and political elites. Some battles and wars would not have been won without veterans. Veterans are an essential pillar of historical memory, and a reminder of challenging events. They can act as an important link between civil society and the defence system, and thus contribute significantly to the strengthening of civil-military relations and the legitimacy of the armed forces. But without the awareness of that fact first among veterans and veteran organizations themselves, changes in the current, not very enviable, state cannot be expected.

## Bibliography

1. Rogač, L., (2007). *Družbeni položaj vojnih veteranov*, Faculty of Social Sciences, Diploma thesis, Ljubljana.
2. Sešel, R., (2007). *Socialni problemi veteranov britanske vojske*, Faculty of Social Sciences, Master's thesis.
3. Stiglitz, J. in Bilmes, L., (2009). *The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Costs of the Iraq Conflict*, Penguin Books Group, New York, USA.
4. Bowyer, R., (2004). *Dictionary of Military Terms*, MacMillan Press, Bloomsbury, pp. 250.
5. *Slovenska vojska in etika (2010). Posebni tematski sklop, Vol. 10, No. 14, The Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia.*
6. French, S., (2005). *The Code of the Warrior: Exploring Warrior Values Past and Present*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., USA.
7. Južnič, S., (1993). *Identiteta*, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ljubljana.
8. Valjavec, S., (2006). *Medijski pogled na sodelovanje Slovenske vojske pri zaščiti in reševanju*, Diploma thesis, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ljubljana.
9. Jelušič, L., (1997). *Legitimnost sodobnega vojaštva*, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ljubljana.
10. Garb, M., (2002). *Demobilizacija in reintegracija vojaškega osebja v razmerah sodobne družbene tranzicije*, Doctoral thesis, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ljubljana.
11. *Veliki splošni leksikon (1998), Te-Ž, Državna založba Slovenije, Ljubljana.*

12. Dandeker, C., et. al. (2005). *Feasibility Study on the Extent, Causes, Impact and Costs of Rough Sleeping and Homelessness Amongst Ex-Service Personnel in a Sample of Local Authorities in England*, King's Centre for Military Health Research, King's College, London.
13. Dandeker, C.; Wesseley, S.; Iversen, A.; Ross, J., (2006). *What's in a Name? Defining and Caring for "Veterans": The United Kingdom in International Perspective*, *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 161-177.
14. Prebilič, V. and Juvan, J., (2014). *Vloga in pomen veteranskih organizacij v sodobnih družbah*, *Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino*, Vol. LIV, No. 1/2014, pp. 259-273.
15. Bobrow, J., (2015). *Waking Up from War: A Better Way Home for Veterans and Nations*, Pitchstone Publishing, USA.
16. Nickerson, M. in Goldstein, J., (2015). *The Wounds Within: A Veteran, a PTSD Therapist, and a Nation Unprepared*, Skyhorse Publishing, USA.
17. Huntigton, S. I., (1957). *Soldier and a State*, The Bleknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, UK.
18. Sedonja Kardoš, L., (2011). *Varnostna kultura z vidika zlorab poslovnih skrivnosti*, Faculty of Social Sciences, Master's thesis, University of Maribor, Maribor.
19. Jogan, S., (1997). *Mednarodno vojno (humanitarno) pravo*, Center vojaških šol, The Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia.
20. *The Rules on Service in the Slovenian Armed Forces*, Official Gazette, No. 49/1996.
21. *The Military Code of Ethics in the Slovenian Armed Forces*, Official Gazette, No. 52/2009.
22. Burdett, H., (2012). "Are you a Veteran?" *Understanding of the Term "Veteran" among -UK Ex-Service Personnel A Research Note*, *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 53, No. 1, pp. 1-9.
23. De France, O., (2015). *Defence budgets in Europe: Downturn or U-turn*, EU Institute for Security Studies, Brief SSUE, EDA, Brussels, available at: [http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief\\_12\\_Defence\\_spending\\_in\\_Europe.pdf](http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_12_Defence_spending_in_Europe.pdf).
24. Gow, James (1992), *Legitimacy and the Military: the Yugoslav Crisis*, Printer Press, London.
25. Edmonds, M., (1988). *Armed Services and Society*, Leicester University Press, p. 132.
26. Castro, A. and Kintzle, S., (2014). *Suicides in the Military: Post-Modern Combat Veteran and the Hemingway Effect*, *Military Mental Health*, Springer Science + Business Media Press, New York.
27. Balfour, M.; Westwood, M. and Buchanan, M., (2014). *Protecting into Emotion: Therapeutic Enactments with Military Veterans Transitioning Back into Civilian Life*, *Research in Drama Education*, Vol. 19, No. 2, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, pp. 165-181.
28. Svete, U.; Guštin, D.; Črnčec, D., (2011). *Asimetrija in nacionalna varnost: od zgodovinskih izkušenj do sodobnih izzivov*, *Defensor*, Radomlje.
29. Parham, J.; Gordon, S., (2016). *Military veterans bring many positives – and some needs – into teaching*, *Building a better teacher*, *Phi Delta Kappan Magazine*, Sage Journals, Vol. 97, No. 7, pp. 43-47.
30. Garb, M., (2009). *Divergentno in konvergentno v odnosu med vojsko in družbo*, *Teorija in praksa*, Vol. 46, No. 1-2, pp. 105-125.
31. Tylor-Norton, R., (2011). *Military can show society the way on moral values and ethics*, says Dannatt, *The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/nov/08/military-moral-values-ethics-dannatt>
32. Robinson, P., (2008). *Ethics Education in the Military*, Ashgate Press, UK.
33. Lucas, G., (2016). *Military Ethics: What Everyone Needs to Know*, Oxford University Press, UK.

34. Prebilič, V. and Juvan, J., (2012). *(Ne)obstoj slovenske vojaške identitete*, *Contemporary Military Challenges*, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 55-67.
35. Prebilič, V. and Dobaja, D., (2014). *Domobljubje v Sloveniji med svetovnima vojnama*, *Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino*, Vol. 54, No. 1, pp. 209-230.
36. *The Military Code of Ethics in the Slovenian Armed Forces (2009)*, *Official Gazette*, No. 55/2009, p. 7650.
37. Prebilič, V. and Juvan, J., (2014). *Vloga in pomen veteranskih organizacij v sodobnih družbah*, *Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino*, Vol. 54, No. 1, pp. 259-273.
38. Speller, I., and Tuck, C., (2008). *Understanding Modern Warfare*, Cambridge University Press, UK.
39. *Sipri Yearbook (2017)*, *Military expenditures by country*, available at: <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Milex-constant-USD.pdf>, 10 April 2017.
40. Furlan, B., (2006). *Military Doctrine, Doctrine, Development, Education and Training Command*, The Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia, Ljubljana.



## PONOVNO OVREDNOTENJE STATUSA VETERANOV V POSTKOMUNISTIČNIH DRUŽBAH – PRIMER ROMUNIJE

### THE REAPPRAISAL OF VETERANS' STATUS IN POST-COMMUNIST SOCIETIES - ROMANIA'S CASE

**Povzetek** Status vojnih veteranov v Romuniji je v vsem obdobju komunizma veljal kot občutljivo in zapleteno vprašanje, kar je treba pripisati svojski angažiranosti vojske med drugo svetovno vojno, ko se je Romunija kot zaveznica Nemčije med letoma 1941 in 1944 obrnila proti Sovjetski zvezi. Geopolitična stvarnost povojnega obdobja je Romunijo pahnila na sovjetsko vplivno območje, s čimer se je v komunističnem režimu oblikoval tudi način obravnave statusa veteranov, ki so se borili proti sovjetski zaveznici, in sicer tako, da jim je odrekel posebne pravice in privilegije. S spremembo političnega sistema po koncu hladne vojne je bil status veteranov ponovno ovrednoten in postavljena sta bila tudi temelj za obsežne spremembe nacionalne zakonodaje ter predvsem opredelitev vloge veteranov v družbi. Z novimi obveznostmi, ki jih je Romunija prevzela na mednarodnih vojaških misijah in v operacijah pod vodstvom Nata, EU in OZN, se je po letu 1990 oblikovala nova kategorija veteranov. Čeprav se njihov status normalizira, še naprej ostaja predmet razprav.

**Ključne besede** *Veteran, vojna, združenje, status, zakonodaja.*

**Abstract** The status of war veterans in Romania was regarded as a sensitive and complex issue throughout the Communist period. This was due to the particularities of the military involvement during the Second World War, when Romania joined Germany against the Soviet Union between 1941 and 1944. The geopolitical realities which emerged after the war pushed Romania within the Soviet sphere of influence, and this was to shape the way in which the Communist regime approached the status of the veterans who fought against the Soviet ally, by denying them specific rights or privileges. With the change of the political system following the end of the Cold War, the status of the veterans was re-evaluated, settling the ground for broad changes with regard to national legislation and, in particular, the role played by the veterans in society. After 1990, a new category of veterans was established, given the new

responsibilities assumed by Romania as part of the international military missions and operations under the lead of NATO, the EU and UN. Although the status of veterans in Romania has normalized since 1990, this remains a dossier which needs to be further considered.

**Key words** *Veteran, war, association, status, legislation.*

**Introduction** With the end of the Communist regime in Romania, the transition towards democracy led to important changes which allowed the state and society to develop a new transformative path and to introduce innovative reforms which covered all sectors and fields of activities. Within this new emerging political and social setting, we integrated changes in the national legislation regulating veterans' status which resulted in the establishment of a new perspective based on inclusiveness and broad representations of the Romanian veterans.

The following paper seeks to decipher the main dynamics which characterized the evolution of veterans' status in Romania, the historical particularities, and the specific developments which emerged against the background of the power shift of 1989. In analyzing the status of the veterans following the collapse of the Communist regime in Romania, two important aspects need to be considered. The first concerns the veterans from the Second World War whose rights were not recognized during Communist times. The second considers the veterans who participated in the post-Cold War military missions and operations in the war theatres of the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq. There are specific differences between the two categories of veterans but, nevertheless, both represent an integral part of the national historical culture, which explains the special role of veterans in society and the broad support provided by the state in order to keep their memory alive and, in case of veterans after 1990, to help them re-integrate into society.

## 1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In a brief historical perspective, the term of war veteran was first introduced in Romania on April 29, 1902, through royal high decree adopted by King Carol I. At that time, the status of veteran referred to those fighting in the war of independence of 1877, and was regarded as a tribute and recognition of the merits of the men "who were willing to sacrifice their lives for their country". The war of independence was the war fought by Romania against the Ottoman Empire as part of the larger conflict which opposed Russia and the Ottoman Empire known as the Russian-Turkish War (1877-1878). Romania fought on the Russian side, and the defeat of the Ottomans allowed Romania to gain its independence from the Ottoman Empire. This was officially recognized by the Congress of Berlin in 1878.

According to the existing records, troop mobilization for the war reached over 100,000, of which the operative army contained 1,062 officers and 57,638 military

personnel. The army of operations which was engaged in the war had about 38,000 military personnel. The casualties of the Romanian army included 4,287 deaths (40 officers and 4,247 NCOs and soldiers) and 3,316 injured (70 officers and 3,246 NCOs and soldiers) (Scafeset al, 2002). In Article 2 of the royal decree, it was stated that: “each veteran soldier shall be provided with peace and position for the rest of his life, and shall receive all he needs for this purpose as a stimulus for future generations”. At that time, the status of veterans had rather a symbolic character and it remained mostly a vague concept, due to the lack of specific measures to generate practical support for those fighting in the war. The documentary evidence regarding the veterans of the war of independence are mostly missing from the historical literature, and this is another reason explaining the narrow research focus on this specific matter. However, one can notice that the veterans were not established as a significant force; they had no significant role in society; and they lacked any form of coordination or the ability to forge a specific framework of cooperation.

### 1.1 War veterans in the First World War

It was not until the First World War that war veterans gained a special relevance at the level of public and political debate<sup>1</sup>. In order to understand the situation of the war veterans, it is important to explain the broader context of Romania's engagement in the First World War. The outbreak of war found Romania in a complicated geopolitical position. Due to the agreement signed in 1883 by King Carol I, of the German House of Hohenzollern, Romania was part of the Triple Alliance, and therefore was expected to fight alongside Germany and Austro-Hungary. Nevertheless, most of the political elite and public opinion were in favor of joining the Triple Entente and wanted to engage in the war alongside France and Great Britain. This complicated domestic equation forced King Carol I to accept the decision taken during the Crown Council held on August 3, 1914 to endorse the decision of neutrality (Torey, 2012, p. 18). At the core of Romania's decision of neutrality was the special dossier of the Romanian territories from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in particular the region of Transylvania with its mainly Romanian population. According to the views shared by the majority of the political elite, regaining the Romanian lost territories, at that time held by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, was assumed as the main national priority, and this was to become the engine driving Bucharest's agenda towards the two opposing European military alliances. In order to secure Romania joining the war against the Central Powers, the Entente made significant territorial concessions to Romania following complicated negotiations between 1914 and 1916. An important episode which influenced Romania's position took place on October 1, 1914 when the Russian-Romanian secret agreement was concluded; the so-called Sazonov-Diamandi Convention. According to this document, Saint Petersburg committed to defending Romania's territorial integrity and recognizing its claims to Romanian territories held by the Dual Monarchy (Oprea, 1998, p. 73; Ceausescu, 1988, p. 340; Iordache, 1972, p. 329). Having secured the necessary support for its territorial

<sup>1</sup> We include in the category of veterans those fighting in the war as well as the “invalids” of war and the descendants of the deceased.

claims, Romania signed the military convention and the political treaty with the Entente powers – France, Great Britain, Russia and Italy – on August 17, 1916, and entered the war against the Habsburg Monarchy. On the night of 24/25 August, 1916, the Romanian Armed Forces launched an ample military offensive along the Carpathians, crossing the border of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The outcome of the war, which ended with the defeat of the Central Powers and the profound reshaping of the European map following the disintegration of the historical empires (Austro-Hungary, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire), allowed Romania to fulfil its national aspiration of territorial unification by bringing the Romanian provinces – Transylvania, Bukovina and Bessarabia – back to the homeland.

The impact of the war was felt deeply at all levels of society and had tremendous effects on the country's internal dynamics. Within this configuration the issue of the veterans gained a special relevance, which can be deciphered as part of a broader analysis. Two dimensions are particularly important to explain the dynamic of this dossier. The first was connected to a trend which emerged in many European countries which mobilized vast human resources to fight in the war; the former combatants became an active force lobbying for greater financial benefits and a form of recognition, leading to the creation of various organizations and associations of veterans. This was to become an important model, shaping the agenda of the actions of the veterans in Romania. The second dimension concerned the level of human mobilization and the great casualties suffered by the Romanian army during the war. The figures are especially revealing: in August 1916, of the 8,000,000 inhabitants of Romania, 813,758 people were mobilized, with another 416,000 reserves that could be called up. This was 30% of the total male population (Torrey, 2012, p. 29; Kiritescu, 1922, p. 109). By the end of the war, an estimated 220,000 military personnel had been killed or were missing in action (2,330 officers and 217,016 soldiers). This made up 3% of the country's population (Kiritescu, 1989, p. 497). The number of "invalids", officially reported, accounted for 35,717 military, while the number of war widows was 55,906. The estimated number of orphans was 48,445, and of them 9,365 were sheltered by the state within special institutions (94 orphanages and 11 sanatoriums which belonged to the Society "The Protection of War Orphans") and another 565 were accommodated in facilities provided by other institutions (Kiritescu, 1989, p. 497). Against this background, it was obvious that the issue of the veterans could not be ignored, and this was to define the way the veterans behaved, public attitudes, and the political reactions to the problem.

In analyzing the veterans' issue, there is another important factor which needs to be considered. As the result of the war, the Romanian borders were significantly extended, so that in 1920 the Romanian state was more than twice the size it had been in 1914. This new reality raised several important questions regarding the status of the Romanian military who were mobilized to fight in the Austro-Hungarian and Russian armies; the re-integration of the former combatants from the new territories which were incorporated by the Romanian state; and the status of the military of non-Romanian origin who chose not to leave Romanian territory after the war ended

and the new territorial borders had been established. It is important to mention that the Romanian state provided equal treatment and recognition to all men and women in uniform who fought in the war, regardless of the particular army that they had had to serve (Romanian, Austro-Hungarian or Russian).

Against this background, the Romanian state had to deal with multiple challenges: to re-integrate the former combatants; to take care of the “invalids” and of the families of those who lost their lives; and to generate a legal framework for regulating their rights and benefits while adjusting to civilian life. An important measure taken during the war, which was announced by King Ferdinand in 1917 when the Romanian Armed Forces were struggling to counter the military offensive of the Central Powers, was to promise land to the peasants who enrolled in the army. This decision grounded the first major agrarian reform, which was officially approved in 1921 (Axenciuc, 1996). This decision taken by King Ferdinand was doubly motivated: on the one hand, it was a way to recompense the soldiers and their families for their sacrifices during the war, and, on the other hand, it aimed to prevent the spread of revolution, which became a serious matter of concern under the influence of the dramatic events in Russia which toppled Russia's Tsar (February Revolution of 1917).

Also, as a sign of recognition of the merits of the military during the war, King Ferdinand introduced, on September 26, 1916, the highest military decoration granted to the officers who distinguished themselves in battles, named Order “Michael the Brave”. Those who were honoured with this distinction were granted special privileges and benefits. The special law adopted on May 12, 1927, endorsed specific material rights to the officers who have received the Order “Mihai the Brave”, such as 25 hectares of land, a house lot of 500 square metres and other particular benefits.

Although the war veterans became an important object of public and political interest, their practical role had rather mixed results. Their re-integration into civilian life proved more difficult than expected, while the economic downturn of the late 1920s imposed further setbacks with regard to the state's ability to provide the expected care and other benefits. Despite the fact that the war veterans became an importance force in Romanian society at that time, which they could use in order to enhance their role and national profile, they did not generate a powerful platform of action in order to project their voice based on an articulated agenda of objectives. As a consequence, in the inter-war period, we see the emergence of numerous associations, groups or other initiatives created by the veterans, also including the “invalids” and the descendants of the deceased. Such examples include: The Association “Scouts from the War of 1916-1919”, the Veterans' Association “Maresti”, The Society “The Tombs of the Heroes Dead in the War”, etc. Some of them succeeded in getting an international profile by joining other European, especially French, associations, and becoming part of the broad European community focused on protecting the rights of the veterans. However, the veterans did not establish a broad, nationwide association, as they remained rather attached to their own groupings with specific interests according to the character of the association that they belonged to.

## 1.2. War veterans in the Second World War

The Second World War brought structural changes regarding the veterans' status, which consequently led to a broad reconsideration of the legal framework regulating the veterans' issue. The new legislation, introduced by the Communist regime after 1945, had a large discriminatory character. This was a consequence of Romania's history of engagement in the Second World War, as Romania switched its alliance from fighting against the USSR to joining it as an ally.

It should be mentioned that during the inter-war period Romania was part of the system of alliances built by France as a counterweight to both USSR and Germany, which was also aimed at preventing a possible German-Soviet entente. The disintegration of the regional security arrangements, starting with September 1938 (the Munich Agreement), the rise of Germany, the fear of the Soviet Union, and the defeat of France in June 1940, forced the Bucharest leadership to re-assess its alignment strategy and seek accommodation with Nazi Germany. Within this new geopolitical architecture, Romania signed, on September 27, 1940, the Tripartite Pact, officially allying itself with Germany, Italy, and Japan (Hillgruber, 1994). When Germany launched Operation "Barbarossa" on June 22, 1941, invading the Soviet Union, Romania, under the lead of Marshal Ion Antonescu, the ruler of Romania (*Conducator*), joined the German forces. The war engagement alongside Germany and against the Soviet Union allowed Romania to recuperate the lost territories of Bessarabia and Bukovina which were occupied by the Soviets in June 1940 (based on the provisions enlisted in the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of August 23, 1939). Following the liberation of the Romanian provinces (July 1941), Ion Antonescu decided to continue alongside Germany and continue the military offensive towards the East, so that the Romanian army participated in the extensive military operations in Odessa, Crimea, south of Kharkov, Stalingrad and further south in Kuban and Caucasus (Dutu et al, 1999, pp. 8-9).

The change of military dynamics starting at the end of 1942, the successive defeats of Germany and the advance of the Soviet Union accelerated Bucharest's efforts to seek strategic alternatives. The climax was reached on August 23, 1944, when Ion Antonescu was removed from power. Romania broke with Nazi Germany and joined the Coalition of United Nations, fighting on its side until the end of the hostilities on May 9, 1945. Despite its military contribution to the Allied war effort, the Peace Treaty signed on February 10, 1947 did not recognize the co-belligerent status of Romania. Moreover, the new geopolitical setting, agreed at the end of the war between the great victorious powers, left Romania under the Soviet sphere of influence, a reality which settled its overall political and military configuration throughout the Cold War period.

The military engagement in the Second World War was to clearly define the status of the war veterans in Romania. As already mentioned, Romania's war engagement was split into two phases: the Eastern campaign which lasted from June 22, 1941 till August 23, 1944, when the Romanian army fought against the Soviet Union as

an ally of Nazi Germany; and the Western campaign from August 23, 1944 to May 9, 1945 when it joined the United Nations forces against Germany. This was to be a major factor in shaping the overall Communist position and policy towards the war veterans in Romania. According to the estimated data, Romania fielded over 2.5 million troops in the Eastern campaign, on a rotational basis, and 553,121 on the Western front. During the Eastern campaign, Romania lost 624,740 military (71,585 deaths, 243,622 wounded, 309,533 missing in action), while during the Western campaign, the losses reached 169,822 military (deaths, wounded and missing in action) (Dutu et al, 1999, p. 8; Rotaru, 1995, p. 197).

The official approach towards the war veterans cannot be separated from the political developments which emerged in Romania with the Communist takeover of power in December 1947 (the first Communist government was formed as early as March 6, 1945). Under close supervision from Moscow, the Romanian Communist regime launched an extensive process of re-shaping not only the country's political orientations and military doctrines, but also integrating a broad range of practices, ideological patterns and typology of behavior imposed by the Soviet Union. Under these new circumstances, the war against the Soviet Union was considered a major act of aggression and all those found guilty were to be held accountable.

The veterans' issue was settled based on Law Decree no. 440 of June 4, 1945, which granted the status of veteran to those who had fought in the wars of 1913, 1916-1919 and 1941-1945. **The new law introduced a major distinction between those engaged on the Western front, who were granted the status of veteran, and those fighting on the Eastern front, who were denied any official recognition as war veterans.**

The Romanian military who fought in the Eastern campaign were subjected to a regime of discrimination, and this policy was also applied to those detained in the Soviet camps as prisoners of war. As stated by the documentary evidence, on April 28, 1956 there were still 187,367 Romanian military held prisoner in the Soviet Union (6 generals, 5,697 officers, 181,664 NCOs and soldiers) (Varatic, 2013: xxi). According to the Soviet archives, 132,755 prisoners were released and repatriated, and 54,602 persons were reported dead (Varatic, 2013, p. xxi). They were excluded from any official recognition and most of them were subject to retaliatory measures once they were brought back home.

The Communist regime conducted an oppressive policy against high ranking officers who had fought on the Eastern front. These were treated as war enemies due to their role in the military campaign against the USSR. According to the known figures, between 1944 and 1961, out of over 100 imprisoned generals, 43 lost their lives. A high number of low-ranking officers had a similar fate.

In October 1963, the Committee of Former Fighters and War Veterans against Fascism was created, under strict Communist Party supervision. Participation in this

Committee was only permitted to those who had fought in the Western campaign, alongside the forces of the United Nations including the Soviet Union. The term veteran was in practice where placed with that of anti-fascist fighter, so only those who were engaged in the campaign against Germany were granted recognition for their roles in the war and accepted as veterans. Unlike the military engaged in the Eastern campaign, who were excluded from the category of veterans, this status was granted to the volunteers who had joined the “Tudor Vladimirescu-Debrețin” Division and the “Horea, Closca and Crisan” Division. Both were military units created in the territory of the Soviet Union, starting in 1943, which included Romanian prisoners of war. Both Soviet-made divisions joined the Red Army and once they entered Romania played a significant role in bringing the Communist regiment power. The decision to recognize them as war veterans became a matter of debate after 1990, due to their controversial role in the post-war regime change dynamics.

Nevertheless, during Communist times, veterans did not benefit from any special or particular state support or other privileges, having rather a low profile in society. A possible explanation rests with the fact that the Romanian military participation in the Second World War remained a contentious issue, due to the position towards the USSR and the controversies generated by Romania’s engagement in the Eastern campaign.

## 2 CHANGES EMERGING AFTER 1990

The restrictions imposed by the Communist regime defined the overall veterans’ dossier after 1990. The major priority was to generate a new legal framework to allow a more comprehensive approach, aimed at reconsidering the conditions and criteria for granting the status of veteran, including the “invalids” and the descendants of the deceased.

The new law regulating veteran status was adopted on July 1, 1994, namely Law No. 44 concerning war veterans, and the rights of the “invalids” and war widows<sup>2</sup>. The major innovation introduced by the new law was the embracing of a comprehensive and inclusive approach regarding the veterans. In this regard, according to Article 1, veteran status was equally granted to all those who participated in the First and Second World Wars, including “invalids” and war prisoners. Three major categories were to be considered:

- Romanian citizens who had enrolled on a voluntary basis and fought alongside the forces of the United Nations;
- The inhabitants of the Romanian provinces temporarily occupied between 1940-1945 and who were incorporated or mobilized compulsorily and fought in the armies of other states, if they kept or regained their Romanian citizenship;

---

<sup>2</sup> Law no. 44 of July 1, 1994, republished in *Official Monitor of Romania, Part. I, no. 783 of October 22, 2002*

- Those of German citizenship who were included compulsorily in units of the German army if they kept or re-gained their Romanian citizenship and residence in Romania.

An important dimension of the new law regarded the rights and benefits recognized to all the veterans, “invalids” and widows of veterans. The benefits were granted based on different criteria (military rank, military decorations received, the period that they were engaged in war). On October 10, 2007, Government Decision No. 1222 introduced War Veteran Day, which is celebrated each year on April 29.

Immediately after the collapse of the Communist regime, important changes were introduced with regard to the organizational framework of the veterans. On December 27, 1989 the National Association of War Veterans (NAWV) was created, which replaced the previous Committee of Former Fighters and War Veterans against Fascism. This is the most representative association of Romanian veterans and is recognized as the most influential and high profile institution in the field. After 1990, it played an important role in promoting war veterans in society and re-opening the veterans' dossier as a distinctive matter of interest at the political level. The Association was founded, and led ever since, by General (Ret.) Marin Dragnea, and it includes all Romanian veterans from the Second World War without discrimination. According to its legal status, the NAWV is an independent non-governmental organization, with no political affiliation. In the last 26 years, other smaller associations of veterans have joined it, a dynamic which has greatly increased the role and prestige of the NAWV. The fact that it is largely supported by the Ministry of National Defence is another important factor which contributed to the enhancement of its visibility at the national level. The NAWV developed a broad international network of relations with veterans associations from Russia, the USA, Great Britain, France, Germany, Poland and Ukraine, among others<sup>3</sup>.

With regard to membership, it should be mentioned that when it was founded, the NAWV had around 900,000 members (veterans, “invalids”, widows of veterans, and war widows). Currently, the association numbers approximately 130,000 members, of which about 14,666 are veterans and war “invalids”, 521 war widows, and 86,908 widows of war veterans<sup>4</sup>.

The major changes introduced following the end of the Communist regime did not manage to end some historical controversies which emerged among the veterans. The main issue in dispute regarded the rights granted as veterans to those who joined the two Soviet-made Divisions – “Tudor Vladimirescu-Debretin” and “Horea, Closca and Crisan”. One example of this is the National Union of War Veterans and their Descendants, which argued for the need to deny the status of war veteran to the

<sup>3</sup> According to documentary material provided to the author by the National Association for War Veterans in Romania

<sup>4</sup> According to the records of the National House of Pensions; relevant information contained in documentary material provided to the author by the National Association for War Veterans in Romania

members of the two divisions on legitimacy grounds. However, this kind of narrative does not have a real impact over the general dynamic concerning the issue of the veterans in Romania, since any distinction between different categories of veterans was excluded from the existing legal provisions.

There is also another category of veterans, called anti-fascist veterans, who were excluded through Law 44/1994 regulating the status of war veterans in Romania. On May 31, 2003, the Parliament adopted a legislative initiative concerning the rights of the anti-fascist combatants. They are represented by the Anti-Fascist Association whose National Committee has the right to grant the status of anti-fascist veteran. Currently, this Association has around 800 members. The rights of the anti-fascist veterans are similar to those of the war veterans, with the exception of their status as military.

Since 1990, the war veterans have been granted specific rights and material benefits in terms of financial contributions, healthcare, tax exemptions, free public transport, and so on. What is especially important is the fact that the war veterans enjoy a wider national respect and are honoured for their sacrifice and military virtues, as they are now recognized as having played an important role in preserving the national historical memory and in shaping the collective military culture.

### 3 THE POST-1990 VETERANS

In analyzing the issue of veteran status, it is important to mention that after 1990 a new category of veterans took shape. This includes the military who were engaged in the theatres of operations after 1990. Romania's military participation answered to certain specific strategic objectives as part of its allied obligations and commitments to contribute to the overall efforts of providing security and stability within and outside the Euro-Atlantic area. During the first 10 years of NATO membership, Romania participated in operations in the Western Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq and North Africa, under the aegis of NATO, the EU, the alliance with the USA (the "coalition of the willing") and other international organizations. The Romanian military presence consisted of 40,000 soldiers rotated in these theatres of operations<sup>5</sup>. For example, in Iraq, over 8,400 military personnel were engaged from 2003 to 2009, and in Afghanistan over 25,000. Twenty-five military personnel lost their lives and over 140 were injured and disabled, the major losses being in Afghanistan.

The increasing number of former combatants in recent international operations has raised the issue of recognizing their merits and the need to establish a legal framework to regulate their status and role in society. Emergency decree No. 82/2006<sup>6</sup> adopted by the Romanian Government represents the first legal document which settled this

---

<sup>5</sup> *Romania Defense 2014, Ministry of National Defense: 1*, [http://www.mapn.ro/publicatii/2014/defence\\_2014.pdf](http://www.mapn.ro/publicatii/2014/defence_2014.pdf), accessed on 7 June 2016

<sup>6</sup> *Published in the Official Monitor of Romania, No. 896 of November 3, 2016*

issue. Its implementation procedures were further developed and integrated through Decree No. M39 of 27 March 2009<sup>7</sup> and Decree No. M72 of 5 July 2010, adopted by the Minister of National Defence.

Emergency decree No. 82/2006 establishes the procedures for the recognition of the merits of the military personnel participating in military operations, including ways of granting distinctions and providing job opportunities. The Ministry of National Defence plays an important role in this regard by providing support to the “invalids” in finding jobs within various military structures which fit their physical and medical condition.

With regard to the status of veterans, there are two major criteria to be considered:

- Article 3: army personnel who have served in military operations, starting in 1990, for at least 12 months, continuous and cumulative, as well as the disabled personnel, regardless of the duration of their participation in military actions, is granted the honorific title of “Military Veteran”; civilian personnel are granted the honorific title of “Veteran”<sup>8</sup>.
- Article 4: military personnel who have served in military operations, starting in 1990, regardless of the duration, and who distinguished themselves during the mission by special manifestations of courage and loyalty, will be granted the honorific title of “Military Veteran”, and for civilians, the title of “Veteran”.

According to Article 2, military missions are considered as follows:

- missions conducted by the forces engaged in “fighting service”;
- training exercises, performed on the ground, with or without fight shooting;
- support actions for helping civilian authorities in emergency situations;
- humanitarian assistance missions<sup>9</sup>.

Compared with the status of war veterans, which regards the former combatants from the Second World War, the status of “Military Veteran” does not imply granting rights and benefits, but is rather a symbolic recognition of their military contribution and effort. The exception regards the invalids and those who suffered injuries, who receive consistent material support and other benefits (free public transportation, the exemption from particular state contributions, 12 free trips by rail and waterway, etc.). In 2015 it was established that the date of 11 November will be celebrated as the National Day of Veterans.

In 2013, the Association of Military Veterans and Disabled Veterans was founded, whose agenda is especially focused on helping veterans with social and medical

<sup>7</sup> Published in the Official Monitor of Romania, part I, No. 237 of 9 April 2009

<sup>8</sup> Decree regarding the modification and completion of the application of the methodological norms adopted through Emergency Decree No. 82/2006 for recognizing the merits of the military personnel participating in military actions and for granting them some rights, as well as for the descendants of the deceased, adopted through the Decree of the Minister of National Defence No. M39/2009

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid*

problems. In the long term, its goal is to create a Medical Recuperation Centre for providing support and medical assistance to disabled veterans who were engaged in the military theatres after 1990.

**Conclusion** The topic of war veterans has not been the subject of systemic research in Romania, and this makes a comprehensive investigation on the issue difficult. The rationales may be found in the lack of interest, poor documentary evidence or political constraints as happened during Communist times. With the change of the political regime after 1990, significant changes were introduced with regard to the way in which war veterans are acknowledged as an important national symbol and part of the historical collective memory. Nevertheless, this growing attention and reconsideration did not produce substantial historical research, which remains rather limited or confined to particular cases based on individual experiences and particular accounts.

It is obvious that the end of the Communist regime allowed a broad re-assessment of the role of war veterans in society. From this perspective, it should be mentioned that the Ministry of National Defence conducts various activities aimed at honouring the war veterans and providing them with support and recognition. A series of institutions were also established, with specific goals of coordinating and organizing activities related to war veterans, which work under the aegis of the Ministry of National Defence (the National Office of Heroes Memory, established in 2003, and the Direction of Personnel Welfare, created in 2009).

The major innovations introduced after 1990 with regard to the status of war veteran can be also seen as an attempt to repair the injustice done during the Communist regime, when most of them were denied any rights or official recognition. The new legislation which regulates the status of the war veterans has excluded any distinction between those who fought during the Second World War, and allowed their integration regardless of the nature or character of their military engagement throughout the war.

The new category of veterans which emerged after 1990 required a distinctive type of analysis. In this specific case, the research reveals the need for greater support in meeting the veterans' needs, especially in terms of health and healthcare (both physical and mental health), reintegration to civilian life, social life or employment transition.

In Romania the role of war veterans was significantly enhanced after 1990. They are regarded as part of the national symbolism contributing to strengthening the historical mindset and military culture. However, deficiencies still remain in terms of providing material support and other benefits, and this is something to be further considered since they represent a category which deserves the gratitude and nationwide recognition for their role and sacrifices during the greatest war of the 20th century.

## Bibliography

1. Atanasiu, V. (coord.), 2002. *Veterani pe drumul onoarei și jertfei: ultimele marturii, 1940-1945*. Bucuresti: Editura academiei de Inalte Studii Militare.
2. Axenciuc, V, 1996. *Evoluția economică a României. Cerceări statistico-istorice. 1859-1947, vol. II. Agricultura*. București: Editura Academiei.
3. Barboi, V., Ionita, G., Dutu, A., (eds.). 1994-1998. *Veterani pe drumul onoarei și jertfei (1941-1945), vol. I-IV*. Bucuresti: Editura Vasile Carlova.
4. Ceausescu, I. (coord.), 1988. *Istoria militara a poporului roman, vol. V*. Bucuresti: Editura Militara.
5. Dobrinescu, V. F., Dumitrescu, H., 2006. *Ion Antonescu si razboiul de reintregire a neamului*. Focsani: Pallas.
6. Dutu, A., Dobre, F, Loghin, L., 1999. *Armata Romana in al Doilea Razboi Mondial (1941-1945)*. Bucuresti: Editura Enciclopedica.
7. Dutu, A., (coord.), 2000. *Golgota Estului (iulie 1942-martie 1944)*. Bucuresti: Editura Fundatiei Culturale Romane.
8. Hillgruber, A., 1994. *Hitler, Regele Carol și Mareșalul Antonescu. Relațiile germano-române 1938-1944*. București: Humanitas.
9. Iordache, A., 1972. *Viata politica in Romania 1910-1914*. Bucuresti: Editura Stiintifica.
10. Oprea, I. 1998. *Romania si Imperiul rus, 1900-1924, vol I*. Bucuresti: Albatros
11. Otu, P., 2005. *Maresal Alexandru Averescu. Militarul, omul politic, legenda*. Bucuresti: Editura Militara.
12. Otu, P., Ozunu, V., 1999. *Înfrânți și uitați. Români în bătălia de la Stalingrad*. Bucuresti: Militara.
13. Popescu, T. (ed.), 1997. *Veterani pe drumul onoarei si jertfei (1941-1945): de la Nistru la Marea de Azov*. Bucuresti: Editura Vasile Carlova.
14. Rotaru, J., König, C., Dutu, A., (eds), 1995. *Romanian Army in the Second World War*. Bucharest: Meridiane.
15. Scafes, C., Serbanescu, H., Andonie, C., Scafes, I., 2002. *Armata romana in razboiul de independenta*. Bucuresti: Sigma.
16. Scurtu, I., Buzatu, G., 1999. *Istoria Romanilor in secolul XX (The History of the Romanians in the 20<sup>th</sup> century)*. Bucuresti: Paideia.
17. Stan, C. I., 2008. *Generalul Henri M. Berthelot si romanii*. Bucuresti: Paideia
18. Varatic, V., (coord.), 2013. *Prizonieri de razboi romani in Uniunea Sovietica. Documente 1941-1945*. Bucuresti: Monitorul Oficial.
19. *Romania Defense 2014*. Ministry of National Defense, [http://www.mapn.ro/publicatii/2014/defence\\_2014.pdf](http://www.mapn.ro/publicatii/2014/defence_2014.pdf), 7 June 2016.
20. *Official Monitor of Romania, Part. I, No. 783 of October 22, 2002*.
21. *Official Monitor of Romania, Part I, No. 237 of 9 April 2009*.
22. *Official Monitor of Romania, No. 896 of November 3, 2016*.



## OD SOVRAŽNIKA DO PRIJATELJA? VETERANI KOT GONILNA SILA MEDNARODNE SPRAVE PO DRUGI SVETOVNI VOJNI

## FROM FOE TO FRIEND? VETERANS AS A DRIVING FORCE OF INTERNATIONAL RECONCILIATION AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

**Povzetek** V 50. letih 20. stoletja so veterani druge svetovne vojne postali pionirji mednarodne sprave. V članku so z osredotočanjem na nemške in francoske vojake analizirane okoliščine, pojavitve in funkcije tega procesa v kontekstu zunanje in notranje politike Zahodne Nemčije. Postavljena je teza, da so organizirani vojni veterani sprejeli vzorce razlage in argumentiranja povojne družbe v Zahodni Nemčiji ter jih prilagodili svojemu konceptu zgodovine, da bi pridobili zgodovinsko samozavest. Predvsem pa so svoje mednarodno delovanje predstavljali kot evropsko pobudo o dogovoru. V nasprotju z 20. in 30. leti prejšnjega stoletja so bila prizadevanja nemških vojaških veteranov v 50. letih 20. stoletja skladna z vladno politiko. Na temelju pluralističnega kulturno-zgodovinskega ozadja so veterani vzpostavili stike na lokalni, območni in regionalni ravni v procesu, ki ga lahko poimenujemo sprava.

**Ključne besede** *Veterani, sprava, 50. leta 20. stoletja, Nemčija, Francija.*

**Abstract** In the 1950s, World War II veterans became pioneers of international reconciliation. Focusing on former German and French soldiers, this article analyses the conditions, manifestations, and functions of this process within the context of West Germany's foreign and domestic policies. The thesis is that organised war veterans accepted the patterns of interpretation and argumentation of post-war West German society, and adapted them to their concept of history for the purpose of gaining historical self-assurance. Most of all, they presented their international activity as a European initiative for a better understanding between nations. In contrast to the 1920s and 1930s, the efforts of German war veterans in the 1950s were in accordance with the policy of the government. Against the backdrop of a pluralistic cultural-historical background, the veterans established contacts at the local, district and regional levels in a process that can be called reconciliation.

**Key words** *Veterans, reconciliation, 1950s, Germany, France.*

**Introduction** War veterans of Hitler's *Wehrmacht*, as pioneers for reconciliation after 1945? The idea that the very men who had just fought an ideological war, and subjected large parts of Europe to an exploitative occupation as members of the National Socialists' (NS) armed forces, might have become pioneers for peace and democracy in Europe is surprising. After all, the veterans of World War I had turned out to be revanchist warmongers. Nevertheless, it is one of the paradoxes of the second post-war period that former combatants assumed an important role in the process of international reconciliation in the early 1950s; my argument is that they did not put the recent war to the back of their minds, but rather adjusted what they had experienced during the war to the constellation of the post-war period at home and abroad by ascribing to it a specific meaning and making it "suitable for reconciliation" (Schwelling, 2012).<sup>1</sup>

As far as Germany is concerned, I will focus on the fields of activity, forms of action, mental dispositions, patterns of interpretation and argumentation, and symbolic practice in the specific historical context which enabled "reconciliation" (Wienand, 2013) to take root. The fact that the source material is fragmentary and important sources are difficult or indeed impossible to access<sup>2</sup> may explain why thorough work on the international and transnational dimension of the European history of war veterans has not yet been undertaken. However, there are some empirical studies, especially on the history of Franco-German relations (Roessner, 2010), on which the following reflections are based; they are also based on my own work (Echternkamp, 2014) and on source analyses, in particular publications of associations, media reports, and memoirs.

We will begin with the way in which the view of history and the self-image of West German war veterans were a precondition for reconciliation (Part 1), then go on to the organisation and initial official contacts (Part 2), and finally discuss the various associated fields of activities and forms of action (Part 3). At the end I will summarise my reflections, which extend the view into the period after World War I and are intended not least as suggestions for further research.

<sup>1</sup> This article is based on my chapter "Veteranen als zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure der Versöhnung? Dispositionen, Handlungsfelder und Aktionsformen transnationaler Verständigung ehemaliger Kriegsteilnehmer in der frühen Bundesrepublik, in: Corine DeFrance und Ulrich Pfeil (eds.), 2016. *Verständigung und Versöhnung nach dem „Zivilisationsbruch“? Deutschland in Europa nach 1945 (= L'Allemagne dans les relations internationales / Deutschland in den internationalen Beziehungen, vol./Bd. 9)*, Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, pp. 443-463.

<sup>2</sup> Until further notice, stock B 433 (VdH) at the Bundesarchiv, Abt. Militärarchiv, Freiburg i.Br., is not available for use for conservatory reasons (Information BArch-MA, Abt. MA 1, dated 19 Feb 2015).

## 1 VIEWS OF HISTORY AND SELF-IMAGES AS FACTORS PROMOTING RECONCILIATION

Following a short phase of criticism during the immediate post-war period, against the backdrop of the Nuremberg Trials in 1945-46, the image of the Wehrmacht that rapidly spread was one in which its officers were presented as victims of a misused army and as soldiers who had nothing to do with the crimes committed by the SS. The myth of a "clean Wehrmacht" was henceforth the interpretative context in which former soldiers presented themselves as lovers of peace and staunch Europeans.

This corresponded with an ahistorical representation which ignored the specific character of the national socialist war – the fusion of warfare and genocide – and instead used characterisations which signified a general validity. Against this backdrop, the home comers returning from imprisonment were able to develop a self-image which allowed them to see themselves on the one hand as "victims", and, on the other, to a certain extent also as experts, with a very special insight into the conditions and consequences of war and violence because of their experience of suffering. They regarded their experience of imprisonment as vital, not only for the societal integration of a German republic, but also for European unity in peace and freedom (Echternkamp, 2014; Schwelling, 2012). "Comradeship" and "honour": these often quoted key categories of a soldier's self-description could also be applied beyond their nationalistic elevation and used for other soldiers, like a set of professional ethics that took no heed of borders.

The captivity of prisoners of war was an additional and crucial chapter in their experience of war. This was particularly emphasised by the German War Graves Commission (*Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge*, VdH), which represented approximately 520,000 members in 1950 (*Der Heimkehrer*, 6 (3 Sep 1955) 9, p. 4.). The home comers regularly considered the facts of having been taken prisoner by the enemy and spending years in custody, particularly in the Gulags, both as the real acid test and as a time of reformation. The VdH spoke again and again of a community of people who shared the same experience or fate and who also included the civilian population (*Der Heimkehrer*, 6 (3 Sep 1955) 9, p. 1). By contrast, reports of those who had "harassed" fellow soldiers, or of deserters or defectors on the eastern front, served as negative foils against which the idealising image shone even brighter.

The use of this historical self-image of former Wehrmacht soldiers as a factor for inducing international reconciliation becomes more understandable when account is taken of the philosophical horizon of the 1950s and the threat perception in the conflict of systems. The Christian-Occidental worldview emanating from the interwar period was popular again for the last time during the 1950s as the Cold War ideology. The confinement of prisoners of war was seen in this context as the experience of a "mass society" incriminated by cultural pessimism. Consistent with their self-image, war veterans believed that their "becoming an indiscriminate mass" during the absence of freedom turned them into champions of the concept of the

individual in freedom. In political terms, their idea was that only a united Europe could ward off the danger threatening the Occident from the East. Based on the Occident ideology, their interpretation of imprisonment inspired their enthusiasm for Europe, irrespective of the fact that different concepts of political order existed, thus creating a hotbed for international reconciliation with fellow soldiers from Western Europe. Traditional anti-communist attitudes did the rest.

## 2 FIELDS OF ACTIVITY, ACTORS AND SYMBOLIC PRACTICE

While the efforts to promote international understanding were only part of the veteran associations' work, their focus was on the search for missing soldiers, on assisting home comers and their relatives by providing medical care, accommodation and legal counselling, on political lobbying, and on the remembrance of soldiers killed in action. Nevertheless, international contacts were established as soon as a veterans' culture evolved in the new West Germany. This also went for the neighbouring French (Cochet, 1997; Roessner, 2010; Wienand, 2017). Even among former soldiers, Franco-German relations were a driving force in the reconciliation process. A comparison between France and Germany recalls the different structural conditions in the two countries. For example, imprisonment only really began in 1945 for many German soldiers, while for the French it ended that year. The demilitarisation policy implemented in the country of those who had lost the war delayed the veterans organising themselves and founding associations throughout the country until late into the 1950s, while in other countries, these associations formed shortly after their liberation, such as the *Fédération Nationale des Combattants Prisonniers de Guerre* (FNCPG) in France in November 1944. From the start, the Fédération's aim was to establish contact with equivalent organisations in other countries. There were soon international affiliations. In September 1949, a joint French, Belgian and Dutch initiative resulted in the founding of the *Confédération Internationale des Anciens Prisonniers de Guerre* (CIAPG); in 1950, the "International Federation of War Veterans Organization" (later: World Veterans Federation, WVF) was established in Paris. The first German war veterans association to join was the *Verband der Kriegsbeschädigten, Kriegshinterbliebenen und Sozialrentner Deutschlands* (VdK) (Schröder, Munimus, Rüdte, 2010; Donner 1960), which did so in 1953; the *Reichsbund* followed some time later (Die Zeit, 4 Sep 1958)<sup>3</sup>.

Achieving understanding with former Wehrmacht soldiers was at best a subordinate aim. Formal contacts initially developed between the eminent officials who represented their associations at events organised by third parties. The German reunions known as the *Heimkehrer-Deutschlandtreffen* (HKD) are an example of this. Delegations from Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands attended the 3rd HKD in Cologne, and reunions took place biannually until 1975. The only communist state to send delegates to Cologne was Yugoslavia, which had a special role in the eyes of the West since Josip Broz Tito's breakaway from the Soviet

<sup>3</sup> In 1960, the German section of the WVF was founded.

Union. This HKD was the first to be attended by representatives from American organisations, such as the committee of American Veterans (AMVETS), the association of World War II veterans (DH 10 (10 May 1959) 9, p. 1)<sup>4</sup>. The 3rd HKD was devoted to veterans' international networking activities. Beside the VdH flag, the flag of the World Veterans Federation (WVF) flew outside the Cologne exhibition centre. For the VdH, this was proof that it belonged to a multinational community of interests based on a transnational concept of comradeship. The "*Der Heimkehrer*" saw the WVF's symbol as a sign that "the strong comradeship between those coming home from war and imprisonment knows neither continental nor national boundaries when it comes to showing commitment to living in a free and peaceful world" (*Der Heimkehrer* (25 May 1959) 10, p. 1; (Wienand, 2017)). European unification and international reconciliation merged into one objective. The attraction of the peace and freedom formula at home was its diachronic and synchronic ambivalence. It not only aimed to achieve disassociation from World War II and the national socialist dictatorship, but also the abolition of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) dictatorship in East Germany and the reunification of the two German states.

A special relationship existed between German and Austrian war veterans, as over 1.3 million Austrians had served in the Wehrmacht (Grischany, 2015). There were therefore close contacts with the *Österreichische Kameradschaftsbund* (OKB). Association representatives at both national and regional levels did the honours (*Der Heimkehrer* 10 (25 May 1959) 10, p. 1). The chairperson of the Bavarian association represented the West German home comers on behalf of the VdH when the Austrian war veterans association *Heimkehrerverband Österreich* (HVO), established in 1957, inaugurated the home comers' memorial site at the Ulrichsberg, a mountain near Klagenfurt in Carinthia. The memorial carried a Christian message of reconciliation: a 20m high cross in memory of the soldiers killed in World War II. The memorial located in the tri-border area stands not only for the love for one's country, but also for "all the dead soldiers beyond national differences" and urges people to work for "international understanding and peace in a free and united Europe" (*Der Heimkehrer* 10 (25 May 1959) 10, p. 1).

Finally, international war veterans' associations also offered ideal opportunities for former Wehrmacht soldiers to establish and consolidate international and bi-national contacts. The CIAPG, the International Confederation of Former Prisoners of War, is a good example of this. A working congress of the confederation in Paris from 1 to 3 September 1955 was attended by 150 German delegates as representatives of over two million front veterans (*Der Heimkehrer* 6 (8 Sep 1955) 9, p. 1). The VdH already had representation in Paris. Besides the national executive committee and the ten state chairpersons, the delegates included members of the advisory boards which had been established to deal with prisoner-of-war matters and political and medical issues. The congress even voted for a German, August Fischer, the first VdH

---

<sup>4</sup> *AMVETS* was founded in late 1944 in Kansas City, Missouri, and on 23 Jul 1947 recognised by Congress as a World War II veterans association.

national chairperson, to be installed as its vice president. The major international event also attracted the interest of the people of Paris. The mayor of the city extended an invitation to a reception at the city hall, in the course of which Fischer was given the opportunity to sign the city's Golden Book.

### 3 FORMS OF RECONCILIATORY ACTION

The mechanisms of rapprochement, the social practice and cultural design of "reconciliation", and not least its political character, stood out very clearly at the local and regional levels of German war veterans associations. International contacts were also established and maintained at these levels.

One example highlighting the attendance of German war veterans at one major event of the equivalent French organisation was the national congress of the French war veterans' association in Metz in early September 1959. Representatives of the VdH district association from Merzig/Wadern, in the west of the state of Saarland, travelled to Metz. There, they entered into a partnership with the *Association des Prisonniers de Guerre du Département des Ardennes in Charleville*. The twin towns of Merzig (Saar) and Charleville were tasked to "coordinate" the partnership at the local and Département levels within the framework of their twinning agreement. As in similar instances, institutionalised contacts centred on memories of the wars. The German VdH was convinced that this was the way to prevent "people from either side ever having to face each other with a weapon in their hands". Against the background of developments in the security situation –having rearmed, the Federal Republic acceded to NATO in 1955 after the project of a European defence community had failed in 1954 – "*Der Heimkehrer*" had the hope that the Germans and the French would rather "support freedom together" (Gardner Feldman, 2012; 18 (25 Sep 1959) 13, p. 3).

In Metz, the chairperson of the Saar regional association, Helmuth Hinsicker, declared himself in favour of building "understanding" with the former enemy and "mutual trust". In his speech, he referred to the outbreak of the war 20 years earlier and reminded the audience of the human and material losses. Hinsicker omitted disturbing questions concerning responsibility and guilt when he emphasised that those present "had confronted each other as soldiers, hence, as enemies, through no fault or volition of their own [...]" – as if millions of men had nothing to do with the political system under which they had served. This remark reflected the myth according to which the Germans saw themselves as victims. Hinsicker looked ahead when he called upon those present to "live" what they had "experienced" in war: through friendship and cooperation, for example, in the form of exchange programmes for children (*Der Heimkehrer* 18 (25 Sep 1959) 13, p. 1)<sup>5</sup>. Thus, personal contacts between the

<sup>5</sup> During the 1950s, the reception of "holiday children" was a well-known programme furthered by the VdH, which at the same time enlivened contacts between West Germany and Berlin. War veterans enabled children from the "afflicted four-sector city" to spend their holidays with the families of home comers, especially by the North and Baltic Seas. Cf. *Berliner Ferienkinder in sonniger Sommerfrische*, in: *Der Heimkehrer* 18 (25 Sep 1959) 13, p. 3.

families of war veterans and also "exchange partnerships" (Der Heimkehrer 18 (25 Sep 1959) 13, p. 5) developed into a driving force for reconciliation.<sup>6</sup>

This practice not only applied to German-Franco relations. To develop contact with the Dutch prisoners of war association, the VdHENnepe/Ruhr district association organised a bilateral "holiday initiative". The Dutch-German "exchange of children" programme in June 1959 helped place the children of war veterans from one country with families in the other (Der Heimkehrer 10 (25 May 1959) 10, p. 8). In late 1959, the VdH general manager concluded that within one such "regular exchange programme", 7,000 members had travelled to another European country, while 1,000 war veterans from abroad accompanied by their spouses had paid a return visit to West Germany (Der Heimkehrer 18 (25 Sep 1959) 13, p. 6). Traditional associations also ran similar exchange programmes, with German youth groups including children of former members of the 16th Infantry Division, for example, visiting France. The "Greyhound Division", as this major Wehrmacht unit was later called, participated in the Western Campaign in 1940<sup>7</sup>.

The binational exchange programme for former soldiers was closely connected with another evolving reconciliation model: partnerships between towns and cities (Defrance/Hermann, 2016)<sup>8</sup>. The dynamics worked in both directions. War veterans' contacts were used to promote partnership programmes, while the latter brought veterans into contact with each other.

By contrast, more controversy existed in the field of civic education, which was another means used to achieve understanding and reconciliation. Since the late 1950s, the local, regional and district level war veterans' associations had been organising international seminars, "women's discussion weeks" and youth congresses at which people from different nations met.

International solidarity initiatives can also be seen as a means for achieving reconciliation among war veterans. The "Europa-Hilfe" aid programme was one example of such a tool for providing material help. As early as 1958, VdH members donated DM 22,000 to assist their fellow veterans from Holland when the Netherlands had to take in nationals expelled from the Dutch East Indies, among them 10,000 former prisoners of war. After all, they had each experienced the feeling of their countries "being overcrowded" with displaced people and refugees – this analogy

---

<sup>6</sup> To cite another example: When the chairperson of the local VdH association of Bochum-Wiemelhausen in North-Rhine Westphalia, Heinrich Schöppner, had a visit from the chairperson of the CIAPG of the 14th Arrondissement in Paris, Jean Taganti, they agreed to promote partnerships between former French and German prisoners of war. War veterans would regularly meet, accompanied by their spouses, and enable their children to spend their holidays in the respective neighbour country. Taganti who, by his own account, initially had to overcome doubts, asked for the addresses of neighbouring local VdH branches upon his return to Paris so that he could help build more partnerships. The sides agreed that the days of the "alleged hereditary German-Franco enmity" were over (ibid).

<sup>7</sup> See the reports in "Der Windhund", here, specifically British soldiers visiting the "Greyhounds".

<sup>8</sup> Cf. the list of current and planned partnerships in: Der Heimkehrer 10 (10 Sep 1959) 17, p. 2.

was drawn by VdH general manager Werner Kießling (*Der Heimkehrer* 18 (25 Sep 1959) 13, p. 6). And when the Austrian alpine foreland was hit by thunderstorms in the summer of 1959, a number of VdH local branches sent financial donations to affected members of the HVO under the "Europa-Spende" programme. The VdH interpreted the solidarity between German and Austrian soldiers not only as a sign of comradeship, but also as an expression of a "European sense of community"<sup>9</sup>. The contact was linked to the European idea and acquired an ideal value, even an excess of utopia.

Another reason for criticising other countries was the state of German war graves on former battlefields. In their publications, associations made every effort to promote "war grave trips" to Western and South-Eastern European countries, and later also to North Africa (*Der Heimkehrer* (8 Sep 1955) 9, p. 7)<sup>10</sup>. Again and again, the associations' publications deplored the poor state of war graves on former battlefields. One thorn in their side was the difference between the graves of soldiers of different nationalities. They concluded that equality in death meant equal status in the design of graves. "Soldiers are equal in death, but their graves are not" was a complaint made by "*Der Heimkehrer*" with regard to a cemetery in France where American, British, French and German soldiers were buried alongside one another.

International networking by association officials, international family and youth exchanges, educational activities with participants and lecturers from home and abroad, donation campaigns for foreign war veterans, municipality-level partnerships and trips to war graves in Western and Southern Europe: the various fields of activity and forms of action reflected the international dimension organised war veterans had achieved in West Germany. This variety showed that they were civil actors involved in a reconciliation process in which concern was shown both to foreign and domestic policy issues, in spite of the use of a rhetoric that was occasionally apolitical.

**Conclusion** Did Wehrmacht veterans after 1945 become pioneers of reconciliation which upended previous enemy perceptions? This was the initial question. Let me sum up the results in three points.

Firstly, the organised war veterans accepted the patterns of interpretation and argumentation of post-war West German society and adapted them to their concept of history for the purpose of gaining historical self-assurance. Here, historical awareness was equivalent to European awareness, and international activity was presented as a European initiative for understanding.

Secondly, the reconciliation efforts were helped by the domestic and foreign policy parameters and the mental disposition of the war veterans. As in the second half of the 1920s, the policy of rapprochement pursued by the then French and German

<sup>9</sup> Cf. the list in *Der Heimkehrer* 10 (10 Sep 1959) 17, p. 4.

<sup>10</sup> For details on a trip to Greece, see *DH* 8 (25 Feb 1957) 2, p. 6.

Foreign Ministers, Aristide Briand and Gustav Stresemann, was regarded by many as the driving force behind international reconciliation efforts and as a prerequisite for peace in Europe. While the process of reconciliation was stalled in 1933, however, when Germany left the League of Nations after the "seizure of power" by the Nazis and began its rearmament, the efforts of German war veterans in the 1950s were completely in line with the policy of the Adenauer government. In addition, the democratisation and pluralisation of West German society broadened the scope of action markedly after the Allies lifted the ban on forming organisations.

Thirdly, this cultural-historical background yielded several fields of activity for associations and their members at the local, district and regional levels, after and alongside the establishment of contacts at the functionary level; in these fields of activity, they were able to build bi- and international contacts based on civil commitment and thus initiate and carry on a process whose social practice and cultural design can, in this instance, be called reconciliation.

## Bibliography

1. Cochet, F., 1997. *Le rôle des anciens prisonniers et des anciens déportés dans le rapprochement franco-allemand*. In Pleury, A. & Frank, R (ed.) *Le rôle des guerres dans la mémoire des Européens. Leurreffet sur la conscience d'être européenne*. Frankfurt/M.: Peter Lang, pp. 123-135.
2. Defrance, C.; Hermann, T., 2016. *Städtepartnerschaften. Eine Instrument der 'Versöhnung' von unten?* In Defrance, C. & Pfeil, U. (ed.) *Verständigung und Versöhnung nach dem „Zivilisationsbruch“? Deutschland in Europa nach 1945*. Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, pp. 585-603.
3. Donner, W., 1960. *Die sozial- und staatspolitische Tätigkeit der Kriegsopferverbände*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
4. Echternkamp, J., 2014. *Soldaten im Nachkrieg. Historische Deutungskonflikte und westdeutsche Demokratisierung 1945–1955*. Munich: DeGruyter/Oldenbourg.
5. Echternkamp, J. & Mack, H.-H. (ed.) 2017. *Geschichte ohne Grenzen? Europäische Dimensionen der Militärgeschichte seit 1800*, Munich: DeGruyter/Oldenbourg.
6. Filipová, L., 2015. *Erfüllte Hoffnung. Städtepartnerschaften als Instrument der deutsch-französischen Aussöhnung, 1950-2000*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck& Ruprecht.
7. Gardner Feldman, L., 2012. *Germany's foreign policy of reconciliation. From enmity to amity*, Lanham/MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
8. Grischany, T. R., 2015. *Der Ostmark treue Alpensöhne. Die Integration der Österreicher in die großdeutsche Wehrmacht, 1938–1945*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck& Ruprecht.
9. Roessner, A., 2010. *Les anciens combattants et le rapprochement franco-allemand jusque dans les années 1960*. In: Defrance, C., Kießener, M., Nordblom, P. (ed.). *Wege der Verständigung zwischen Deutschen und Franzosen nach 1945. Zivilgesellschaftliche Annäherungen*, Tübingen: Narr, pp. 73-88.
10. Schwelling, B., 2012 (ed.). *Reconciliation, Civil Society, and the Politics of Memory. Transnational Initiatives in the 20th Century*. Bielefeld: Transcript.
11. Schröder, W., Munimus, B., Rüdert, D., 2010 (ed.). *Seniorenpolitik im Wandel. Verbände und Gewerkschaften als Interessenvertreter der älteren Generation*. Frankfurt/M.: Campus, pp. 106-169.
12. *Verband der Heimkehrer, Kriegsgefangenen und Vermissten-Angehörigen Deutschlands e.V. (1959), Der Heimkehrer. Stimme der Kriegsgeneration*. Bad Godesberg: Selbstverlag.

13. Wienand, C., 2013. *Versöhnung*. In: Colin, N., et al. (ed.) *Lexikon der deutsch-französischen Kulturbeziehungen nach 1945*. Tübingen: Narr, pp. 451-453.
14. Wienand, C., 2017. *Veteranen und Versöhnung. Der Verband der Heimkehrer und die deutsch-französische Freundschaft*. In: Echternkamp, J. & Mack H.-H. (ed.) *Geschichte ohne Grenzen? Europäische Dimensionen der Militärgeschichte seit 1800*. Munich: DeGruyter/Oldenbourg, pp. 163-172.

## VETERANI IN FILANTROPIJA PO VELIKI VOJNI: VLOGA IN STALIŠČA FUNDACIJE CARNEGIE ZA MEDNARODNI MIR

## VETERANS AND PHILANTHROPY AFTER THE GREAT WAR: ROLE AND REPRESENTATIONS FROM THE CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

**Povzetek** V letih 1918 in 1919 se je Fundacija Carnegie za mednarodni mir (CEIP) znašla v vodstvu akterjev, ki so izšli iz vojne in stopili na novo politično prizorišče. Kot nevladna organizacija se je na podlagi mednarodnega prava zavzemala za boljše razumevanje mednarodnih vprašanj. Namen tega prispevka, ki se opira na arhivsko gradivo Fundacije CEIP, je predstaviti, kako je velika vojna vplivala na pogled te fundacije na vojaka, ko se je ta vrnil v civilno življenje. V dokumentih se zastavlja veliko vprašanj, med drugimi: Kako je vojak opisan kot žrtev vojne? Kako bosta družba in vlada obravnavali vprašanje »invalidov«? Po vojni je fundacija začela uresničevati velikopotezen program, namenjen tako kratkoročnim kot dolgoročnim vprašanjem, ki so nastala zaradi vojne. V letih 1919 in 1920 je vodila dva velika projekta: v Beogradu je prevzela gradnjo velike knjižnice, ki naj bi stala v novem univerzitetnem naselju, v Rusiji pa je uvedla obsežen projekt pomoči beguncem. Vodenje obeh projektov je predala dvema veteranoma, častnikoma oboroženih sil ZDA. Članek je empirična študija, ki opisuje, kako sta ta nekdanja borca vodila projekta, ki sta bila v bistvu zasnovana kot programa za spodbujanje mednarodne sprave. Poleg tega poudarja tudi neposredni vlogi dveh ključnih voditeljev Fundacije CEIP, Nicholasa Butlerja, predsednika Univerze Columbia, in Elihuja Roota, prvega predsednika fundacije.

**Ključne besede** *Fundacija CEIP, mednarodne zadeve, prva svetovna vojna, veterani, ponovna vključitev.*

**Abstract** In 1918-1919, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) positioned itself at the vanguard of the actors emerging from the war in the new political

landscape<sup>1</sup>. As a non-governmental organization the CEIP promoted a better understanding of international issues through international law. Drawing from the Carnegie archives, this paper seeks to present how the Great War shaped the CEIP's perception of the soldier once he was back in civilian life. The documents raise an array of questions: How was the soldier described as a victim of the war? How would society and the government deal with the issues of the "invalids"? Following the war, the Endowment launched an ambitious programme addressing both immediate and long-term issues born out of the war. In 1919-1920, the CEIP ran two major operations: in Belgrade, the CEIP undertook the building of a large library to be located in the new university campus, and in Russia, it set up a large relief operation to help refugees. In both cases, the CEIP handed the operations to two veteran US military officers. This paper, an empirical study, describes how these two ex-combatants ran what was primarily a programme promoting international conciliation. It also emphasizes the direct role of two key Carnegie leaders, Nicholas Butler, the president of Columbia University, and Elihu Root, the first CEIP president.

**Key words** *Carnegie Endowment, international affairs, World War I, veterans, reintegration.*

**Introduction** In 1918-1919, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), a US-based philanthropic organization, was a newcomer on the international stage. Created a few years before the Great War on December 14, 1910, by Andrew Carnegie (1835-1919), the man known as the "King of Steel", the CEIP positioned itself at the vanguard of the actors emerging from the war in the new political international landscape (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), 1941). As a non-governmental organization, the Endowment played a substantial role in re-defining international affairs, institutionalizing the concept of peace through law elaborated by the pre-war Peace Movement at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>2</sup> Organized into the three divisions of International Affairs and Education, International Law, and Economics and History, the CEIP was structured as a transnational and transatlantic network, with offices located in New York and Paris. As one of the first "think-tanks" of modern times, the Endowment gathered together a group of cross-disciplinary international scholars and jurists; its members belonged to the academic elite and governmental circles on both sides of the Atlantic and thus formed a body of international experts.

The main feature of the CEIP was to study the causes of war, and especially to determine its impact on civilians both during warfare and after the conflict (Carnegie

<sup>1</sup> From its creation, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace was also called the Endowment. Today, as in this paper; historians and researchers continue to use both terminologies to describe Andrew Carnegie's international organization.

<sup>2</sup> The Peace Movement became institutionalized after the two peace conferences of 1899 and 1907, gathering 26 and 44 states respectively at The Hague. In 1907, the conference was called at the suggestion of President Theodore Roosevelt (1858-1919) addressing further the issues of the rules of war. James Brown Scott (1866-1943), the head of the CEIP International Law division, was part of the US delegation.

Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), 1941, p. V). How can one define the parameters and position of the Carnegie leadership in relation to the unexpected link between an organization advocating peace and its leaders' preoccupation with the study of war? The CEIP approach was to combine scientific philanthropy with strategic giving in order to advance the cause of peace (Peter Weber, 2015).<sup>3</sup> Two of its most prominent leaders, Nicholas Murray Butler (1862-1947), the high-powered president of Columbia University up to 1945, and Elihu Root (1845-1937), Andrew Carnegie's lawyer, former US Secretary of War and Secretary of State, decided before 1914 that the aim was to reveal the direct and indirect consequences of warfare and thus to address its validity in international affairs (The Berne Conference of Economists and Publicists, 1911). Consequently, the military – the soldier – was central to the study, viewed as a corollary to the civilian in warfare and perceived as a key element by the CEIP leadership. In the aftermath of the Great War, the ex-combatant acquired a particular dimension. For the CEIP leadership, the veteran embodied the consequences of the war in terms of his status, reintegration into civilian society and the practical aspects of the post-war reconstruction process, viewed, in the eyes of the CEIP leadership, as part of international conciliation.

Building on a previous work presented at the CSWG held in Athens in 2015 and following a similar approach, this paper is an empirical study based on the Carnegie archives.<sup>4</sup> The main purpose is to examine how the presence of ex-soldiers manifests itself within societies in the midst of the demobilization process. The paper presents how the veteran appears in the Carnegie Endowment archives from two angles: firstly, as a subject of thought and concern, and secondly in the way in which veterans participated in the reconstruction programme set up by the Endowment immediately after November 1918. On a broader scale, the Endowment leadership addressed the veteran as an individual, one of a kind, outside the army and the collective dimension that existed during the war. But, at the same time, the CEIP documents also sought to establish how the veteran was in need of a social structure in order to be able to define his status and defend his rights, considering his relationship to the state he belonged to.

## **1 THE VETERAN IN THE CEIP DOCUMENTS: PERCEPTION AND REPRESENTATION FROM THE CEIP LEADERSHIP**

### **1.1 The “returned soldier”**

As a preliminary remark, it is important to note that there were no military at the head of the Carnegie Endowment neither among the leadership nor among the trustees. Throughout the post World War I period, only Elihu Root, as ex-Secretary of War

<sup>3</sup> In this excellent article Peter Weber defines philanthropic internationalism and confronts the two giant figures of Andrew Carnegie and Edwin Ginn.

<sup>4</sup> CEIP Records, Rare Book and Manuscript Library (RBML), Columbia University, Series III, Topical volumes (1910-1940) and European Center, consisting of the letters exchanged between d'Estournelles de Constant and Nicholas Butler, as well as personal notes, press clips, official reports, recounts of meetings and visual material (photos and drawings).

(1899-1904), had a direct relationship with the military. However, since the CEIP's ultimate objective was to promote peaceful settlements of international disputes and to regulate war through international law, the soldier was a central figure, as a civilian who had been turned into a combatant/fighter and who, once the war was over, was returned to civilian life as an ex-combatant, one who has been enlisted in the army. The word "veteran" does not appear in the CEIP documents; instead, the term used for someone who had fought in a war is "the returned soldier".

The CEIP reports and exchanges between its leaders show how the soldier figured in the leadership's thoughts and concerns. In the post First World War context, the soldier back in civilian life is depicted from two specific angles: firstly, as a victim of the war and a mutilated person or maimed body. The head of the Carnegie office in Paris, d'Estournelles de Constant (1852-1924), in his correspondence addressed to Nicholas Butler in New York, described the physical trauma of the ex-combatants in poignant words, using a strong vocabulary and listing the visible and multiple details, the missing arms or legs, the crutches, the disfigured faces damaged forever (CEIP Records, 1921). He also underlined what he called the "mute despair" of the disabled soldiers, and how they were perceived by society as an "obstacle" (obstruction), "dead weight" or "object of horror".<sup>5</sup> The documents raise an array of questions, such as: What could be the conditions for their return into civilian society? How would civilian society deal with the issues of the "invalids"? How would the government take care of them, especially with regard to practical aspects, such as pensions and costs? The wording, as well as the issues described in the CEIP reports, are a reflection of the discriminatory attitudes that had prevailed before the war, when society associated disabilities with moral failure. One should also notice that d'Estournelles de Constant also addressed how the veterans, with their physical appearance resulting from the war, were aiming to build for themselves a new social identity. Consequently, they created organizations to influence state policies in order not only to be recognized as a collective social entity, but also to obtain enhanced benefits (Gerber, 2003). In 1918, d'Estournelles de Constant discussed at length the Congress of the Mutilated and Wounded held in Lyon on February 24-26 (Guieu, 2015).<sup>6</sup> This major meeting later gave birth to the Federal Union of French Associations.<sup>7</sup> He likened the congress to the *French Etats Généraux* of 1789, which led to the French Revolution (Sarthe Departementales Archives 1918). Besides this probably overstated but powerful image, d'Estournelles de Constant was genuinely concerned with how to implement practical measures to help the victims of the war. Further, he elevated ex-combatants to the status of a new, united and coherent social group with special needs to be addressed by the government. He also compared their claims for pensions to the demands made by the *Etats Généraux* in 1789, calling them by the same name "notebooks claims" or "*cahiers de revendications*". Finally,

<sup>5</sup> The terms used in French are: "poids morts", "objets d'horreurs", "ils sont encombrants".

<sup>6</sup> In 1918, associations of mutilated and discharged soldiers started to gather to form one single organization. Following the Congress of Lyon, the Federal Union (UF) was officially created.

<sup>7</sup> *Union fédérale des associations françaises d'anciens combattants et victimes de guerre*.

in an unexpected way, he conceived a new division of French society into three “orders” (again using pre-1789 terminology) that would include the bourgeoisie, the people, and the victims of the Great War. He attributed to the latter a power that will allow them to rise against all “war partisans past, present and future”. He saw this group as extending far beyond the French borders and rejoining other ex-combatants’ associations to form “Les États Généraux du Monde”, a transnational community. In that sense, one can see here an example of Patricia Clavin’s theory on the formation of transnationalism, when she writes that “transnationalism is about exploring connections” between elite groups and wider ones, including soldiers (Clavin 2005, p. 427).

The future of the ex-combatants is also addressed in terms of education. As d’Estournelles de Constant rightly underlined, “our youth” had been left without education for the past five years or more according to the age of the soldier (Sarthe Départementales Archives, 1919). How could these young men join or re-enter the workplace without training, instruction or even a basic school education? For Andrew Carnegie, education of the public was one of his main concerns. Following the war, giving free access to knowledge to everyone would be one of the CEIP’s objectives. As a scientific philanthropist, Carnegie established a unique and exceptional network of public libraries, a path continued by the Endowment leaders after 1919 (see after part II).

The second perspective in which the topic of the veteran is discussed in the CEIP archives is linked to the study of economic questions during and after the wartime period. Because of injuries and disabilities resulting from the war, the “returned soldier” was perceived as potentially being excluded from the workforce. Consequently, he was considered as a financial charge, a “burden” for the state, and included in the statistics dealing with the cost of the war. This approach goes back to 1911. On the initiative of Nicholas Butler, the CEIP launched a project to study the war using a scientific approach and focusing on the relationship between economics as part of the civilian domain and the war (CEIP Records, 1911). At a gathering in Berne, about 20 world economists specialists discussed the effects of the war and, opting for a quantitative approach, they included among the destruction of national productive forces both disability and the lost of human beings (CEIP Records, 1911).<sup>8</sup> The first application of this innovative thinking was incorporated in the Balkan Report of 1914, which examined the causes of the two Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913.<sup>9</sup> Chapter 6 of the report emphasized how the mutilated – the “invalids” – could “no longer be counted on for the prosperity of the land”. They were deprived and reduced greatly in strength. This concern for the “invalids” extended to the following unexpected comment: “This is an economic result of war to be noted: the creation of the artificial leg industry” (Report of the International Commission

<sup>8</sup> *The Conference was called by the Division of Political Economy and History.*

<sup>9</sup> *The Balkan Wars (October 1912-August 1913) set a precedent in the new century for massive atrocities on every single side. The military forces have been estimated at one million (700 000 against 300 000 Ottomans).*

to Inquire the Causes and Conducts of the Balkan Wars, 1914, p. 243). In a practical way, the author added that, “the period of regular financial settlement began” (Report of the International Commission to Inquire the Causes and Conducts of the Balkans Wars, 1914, pp. 235-236). In the Balkan Report’s appendix, one can find, in the statistics on the costs of the wars in the case of Bulgaria and Greece, a detailed account of how pensions should be granted to invalided soldiers and officers (Report of the International Commission to Inquire the Causes and Conducts of the Balkans Wars, 1914, p. 381 and p. 389). On a more positive note, Chapter 7 opens with descriptions of the returned soldiers and their participation in the victory celebrations with joyful processions, “triumphal arches, banners, flowers and music” (Report of the International Commission to Inquire the Causes and Conducts of the Balkans Wars, 1914, p. 266).

At the end of the conflict, the study of the war project resumed under the direction of James Shotwell (1874-1964), appointed as head of the CEIP division of Economy and History. About 150 volumes were published between 1921 and 1937, and several of them are dedicated to the specific topic of the ex-combatants and their reintegration as civilians into society. One can note the following examples, from the British series: Dr. E. Cunygham Brown, “Health of the Returned Soldiers” (1924), Edward T. Delvine, “Disabled Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Pensions and Training” (1919), and from the French series, Rene Cassin and de Ville-Chabrolle: “The Wounded Soldiers” (1924).

One could summarize the CEIP perception of the “returned soldier” as follows: based on the terrifying observation that the veteran was perceived primarily and foremost as “a mutilated body”, he was therefore incapable of rejoining the workforce and could no longer pursue a normal existence. Consequently, he became a financial charge for the state, which, however, was from then on responsible for his well-being and his new socioeconomic position in society.

## **2 THE VETERANS IN THE CEIP RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAMME POST WORLD WAR ONE**

The second part of this paper describes how the Endowment as a private organization, decided to call for military officers to run what was primarily a programme promoting international conciliation through reconstruction. In 1919-1920, the Carnegie leaders set up an ambitious programme addressing immediate and long-term issues born out of the conflict. The CEIP launched two major operations, one dealing with the refugee crisis in Russia in the midst of the Civil War, and the other addressing education of the public and free access to knowledge in the post war context. Why did the CEIP choose veterans to run these two post war operations? What was the process? How did these officers/ex-combatants work with civilians to face situations born of a war they had been involved in?

## 2.1 The Belgrade CEIP operation

In 1919, a reconstruction programme in urban areas was launched: the building of large libraries in Belgium, France and Yugoslavia (N. Akhund, 2011). The project, conceived as a triple European operation, was achieved in 1928 (CEIP Records, 1918).<sup>10</sup> In Belgrade, the building of a new university library began in 1920. It was a full Carnegie operation, involving a committee of seven members chaired by a former lieutenant in the US Navy, Leo Capser (1893-1975), who was hired as the CEIP representative. The construction process did not encounter any major obstacles; the Endowment was determined to achieve the building and the Serbian/Yugoslav authorities needed to rebuild the capital and to organize a complete new state altogether. In that sense, the University Library bore a symbolic meaning. The complexity of the task came from the articulation of the relationship between a private group that had taken the initiative to launch the project and two governments. Lieutenant Capser played a crucial role as coordinator. On June 23, 1921, a lavish ceremony for the laying of the cornerstone took place, and the University Rector, Slobodan Jovanović (1869-1958), praised the Carnegie Endowment as “one of the greatest and most humanitarian powers of our age...we are fortunate that our university is in this way connected to such a highly cultural country”.<sup>11</sup> He praised Capser personally for his work and his open sympathy for Serbia. Leo Capser answered in both English and Serbian, a gesture that the Serbian officials appreciated. He received the “Grand Cross of Saint Sava” from Prince Alexander. The building was officially completed in May 1926.

Who was Lieutenant Capser? What was his role in the running of the operation? Leo Capser was recommended by Cordenio Severance (1862-1925), one of the CEIP trustees, whom he had met in 1917 when Severance was travelling to Serbia as chairman of the US Red Cross Commission. Twenty-eight years old, Capser had studied engineering and business administration at the University of Minnesota.<sup>12</sup> In 1916, he was posted to Salonika as assistant manager to the local office of the Standard Oil Company of New York. Later, he joined the American Navy as a lieutenant and was stationed in France. Towards the end of the war, he was assigned to the American Relief Administration (Hoover Foundation) in Southern Serbia, and by 1919 he was back in the United States. Severance underlined Capser’s knowledge of Serbia as “by reason of his residence in Salonika at the time the Serbian government was located there, and through his subsequent service in relief administration, Mr. Capser has a very wide and intimate acquaintance with Serbian officials” (CEIP Records, 1920). Severance praised how Capser was willing to take full responsibility for carrying the work and how he seemed to be a very determined, engaging young

---

<sup>10</sup> Ladeuze, Rector of Leuven University, expressed his gratitude to the US national committee headed by Butler. The project of a library was justified because of the association of Mr. Carnegie, of his own personal work and of his benefactions with libraries..

<sup>11</sup> Speeches were made by the Mayor of Belgrade, the Rector, the Ministers of Education and the Interior, the American Charge d’Affaires, Capser himself, and the last one by a Serbian student.

<sup>12</sup> Capser was born in 1893. His grandfather had emigrated from Germany (Bavaria) in 1846 to the United States.

man (CEIP Records, 1920).<sup>13</sup> On December 11, 1920, Lieutenant Casper signed a contract to represent the Endowment in Belgrade for six months. In a personal letter, Butler spelled out his role and the task: Casper would be in charge of overseeing the entire building process and be responsible for all disbursements. He also had to have the entire project approved and signed by the Serbian authorities. On February 3, 1921, Leo Casper left New York for Belgrade.

The first meeting of the Committee took place on February 28, 1921, at the Ministry of Public Instruction. In attendance were the Minister of Education, Svetozar Prbićević (1875-1936), Slobodan Jovanović (1869-1958), Rector of the University in Belgrade and also a public figure as Professor of Law and History, the architects, Nikola Nestorović (1868-1957), Professor at Belgrade University, Professor Dragutin Georgević (1866-1933), Andra Stevanović (1859-1929) and the US ambassador, Percival Dodge. Leo Casper occupied the central position in this web of diverse people. One can only imagine the complexity of the task for someone coming from such a different environment as the United States (Minnesota). He maintained a thorough correspondence with the CEIP, showing a sense of duty, a professional consciousness and an awareness of what was at stake with this ambitious project. An overall friendly climate was established between the committee members, and Casper was at ease with everyone. All decisions were to be taken unanimously. Furthermore, payments and disbursements would bear the two signatures of Casper and Jovanović, showing the project as a full cooperation between the CEIP and Belgrade University. In the same spirit, Casper took the minutes of the meetings in English and Jovanović would translate them into Serbian.

Casper's reports are a valuable testimony. In his letters addressed to the CEIP leaders, Casper expressed personal opinions. He insisted on the remarkable cooperation from the officials and the architects, and repeatedly used the word "friendship". He spoke Serbian well enough to have a direct relationship with the people he was working with: "I am still glad to state that the officials with whom I have been working have given the most satisfactory cooperation and appear exceptionally competent, and have shown an initiative that makes me optimistic" (CEIP Records, 1921). The library can be seen as a symbol of Andrew Carnegie's life and achievement, even though he himself never saw the building or even the project, as he died on August 11, 1919. The entire project came to fruition because of the determination of Nicolas Butler and Cordonio Severance, and on the ground, thanks to Leo Casper. As a soldier, Casper asked an interesting question: Was it possible to attribute a political meaning to the library project? This point is an arguable, even a debatable question. However, I include it as Casper himself raised the issue linking the building of the library to the creation of the new Kingdom (CEIP Records, 1921). Casper made a strong political statement about the new constitution, "which at once gave confidence to the people and a noticeable change in the attitude of the officials and in the economic

<sup>13</sup> Severance wrote: *From the standpoint of view of education, experience and acquaintance, he is in my opinion an especially valuable man for this task. This is the original sentence from the archives. It can be corrected or modified. Thank you.*

perspective”. Furthermore, he saw this constitution as a unifying element for the new state. He perceived the new set of institutions, including the future University and its library, as a vital binding force. In an intriguing way, he began the last section of his report by describing the work’s progress, and then, without transition, he jumped to the topics of the constitution and the parliament. It almost seemed that the construction work of the library and one of the state institutions were completely merging. He ended his writing by advising the CEIP to pursue its aid in economic developments. Finally, he added a list of suggestions on how to help Yugoslavia, ranging from a call for funds to subsidising books written by members of the faculty or of the parliament. He also wished to attract the attention of US medical institutions, which could help the Medical Faculty in Belgrade. On several occasions, he presented the library not only as a gift from the Carnegie Endowment, but as a way to bring the USA and the Kingdom closer together. While at a press congress in Sarajevo, he insisted that the building would cement “the bonds of friendship between our countries” (CEIP Records, 1921).

The very active, personal and direct role of Leo Capser is to be acknowledged. From his reports and personal notes, it appears that his initiatives and his great understanding of the complex political situation were a decisive and essential contribution to the project. Leo Capser may be an unknown figure in history, but his role was influential and even essential.

## 2.2 The CEIP operation in Russia

The second operation run by the CEIP under the supervision of an ex-combatant took place in Russia, at the same time as the building of the Belgrade library was beginning. It was a relief operation and it bears what we call today a humanitarian feature. During the spring of 1920, the CEIP turned its attention to the dramatic distressed situation of White Russian refugees. Russia had initially been included in the plan, adopted by the CEIP Executive Committee in 1917, to assist European reconstruction along with France, Belgium and Serbia. However, by 1919 the Bolshevik Revolution had led the CEIP to limit aid to the refugees gathered in the various border areas of the former Russian Empire (J. Prudhommeaux, 1921, p. 46). If the February Russian Revolution had been welcomed and perceived as a peaceful end to the Tsarist regime, viewed as autocratic and despotic, the CEIP leaders became concerned by the Bolshevik government, the spread of violence and by the extreme brutality of the civil war. In this case, the CEIP did not appoint a local committee, as in Belgrade. The relief operation was organized by the American Central Committee (ACC) for Russian Relief, newly created in December 1919. However, Elihu Root, who was then the president of the Carnegie Endowment, had a strong interest in Russia, and was one of the four AAC vice-presidents.

As so often when it came to Eastern Europe, it was Nicholas Butler himself who took the initiative after discussing the matter with Root. By early April 1920, Root had drawn Butler’s attention to the following three points: first, the people who were fleeing Russia were precisely those the country was depending on to build the future

Russian Republic, i.e. professional and trained teachers, doctors, businessmen and other educated people. Second, they were badly in need of necessary relief and aid: “They must be fed and clothed and have medicine and medical care, or they will die” (CEIP Records, 1920). Third, he suggested organizing help through the American Central Committee for Russian Relief, as this committee was equipped and had the facilities for the application of such relief aid. Butler fully approved his friend’s proposal, as the situation in Russia “would make it perfectly justifiable to offer relief in the way you outline” (CEIP Records, 1920). In May, the board of trustees decided to use parts of the funds appropriated for reconstruction and relief in the regions devastated by the war to help the Russian refugees. James Scott Brown (1866-1943), head of the International Law division at the CEIP, was in touch with Montgomery Schuyler (1877-1955), a former US Army Captain who had served on the General Staff in Siberia in 1918-1919 and was the secretary of the AAC for Russian Relief. The two men met through Elihu Root. The allocated funds, a total sum of \$50,000, were then sent within a few weeks (CEIP Records, 1920).<sup>14</sup> Starting in the autumn-winter of 1920, the relief operation covered a very large geographical area that extended from Scandinavia, Finland, and the Baltic States to Istanbul, including Poland, Germany, France, Southern Russia (Crimea, Tifflis) and Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia, as well as on to Jerusalem and at its farthest point, Japan (CEIP Records, 1920). Captain Montgomery Schuyler was responsible for the exact allocation and distribution of funds in each country. When he asked what kind of publicity the Endowment was wishing for, the Executive Committee instructed him to mention that the funds had been taken from a Carnegie grant and should be advertised as such (CEIP Records, 1920). In the same documents, relief aid for civilians in Armenia and Syria was planned, but there is no evidence in the archives that this operation actually took place. Discussions were held in May-June 1919 with representatives of the American Committee for Armenia and Syrian relief, of which Elihu Root was also one of the directors.

Captain Montgomery Schuyler presents a very different profile from that of Lieutenant Capser in Serbia. Born in 1877, he graduated from Columbia University and started a career in diplomacy. In 1902, he was sent to Saint Petersburg as second secretary at the US Embassy, and again in 1907. When the war started, he returned to Russia as special agent to the State Department to assist the US Ambassador. Then, in 1916, he was once again in Russia as Special Correspondent for *The New York Times*, and he wrote about 20 articles that year, at least four of which were about refugees, displaced people and food supply issues in Russian cities. In 1919, he was Chief of Staff of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in Siberia.<sup>15</sup> His interests, gift for observation and detailed knowledge of Russian affairs and politics, in addition to his contact with Elihu Root, made him the perfect candidate to supervise the relief operation. According to the archives, it does not seem that Schuyler was hired specifically

<sup>14</sup> Overall, the files about Schuyler contain scarce information; there are no personal notes or letters.

<sup>15</sup> The American Expeditionary Force Siberia was a United States Army force sent during the Russian Civil War (1918-1920). However, due to Russia’s harsh weather conditions, the forces did not fight any battles. The AEF consisted of 7,950 officers and enlisted men.

by the CEIP to run the operation, nor did he sign a contract, but as AAC secretary he was fully in charge of it. He sent several statements to the Endowment leaders explaining how the funds had been divided between the various states located along Russia's borders (CEIP Records, 1920). Schuyler also mentioned that donations and distributions of warm clothing and food were made where relief seemed most necessary, according to the ACC's own reports.

In the post World War I context, the veterans represented here by Lieutenant Casper and Captain Schluyer created an unexpected link between the military and a well-known philanthropic organization, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In both cases, the CEIP handed the running of the operations to two veterans –two US military officers who monitored the entire logistics of the operation. These two operations also emphasize the direct and personal role of two key CEIP leaders, Nicholas Butler, the president of Columbia University, and Elihu Root, the first CEIP president.

**Conclusion** As a non-governmental organization, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace stands at the crossroads between the state authorities and private groups represented by leaders in the financial and industrial sectors. Therefore, following the war, the CEIP was in a unique position to better grasp the extremely complex transition phase in which the “returned soldier” found himself, being demobilized but not yet returned to civilian life. Even if the Carnegie leaders were not directly in charge of veterans, it demonstrated how a private group participated in the process of reinsertion and rehabilitation by taking the initiative to designate ex-combatants to complete projects linked to the aftermath of the war. Hiring military people can be seen as part of the process to return an ex-combatant back to civilian life. From “war maker to peace maker”, the soldier who fought on the front line was then put in charge of building an organized peace. Therefore the veteran stood at the intersection of military and civilian life (J. Eicheberg, 2013).

## Bibliography

1. Akhund, N., 2011. “The work of the Carnegie Endowment in the Balkans after World War I: The University Library of Belgrade 1919-1926”, *Infotheca*, 2/vol. XII, pp. 3-21.
2. “The Berne Conference of Economists and Publicists” 1911. *American Society of International Law*, vol. 5/4, pp. 1037-1044.
3. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Records, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University, New York Series IIIB, Topical volumes (1910-1940), European Center, Series IIIC.*
4. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (1941). Summary of Organization and Work 1911-1941. Washington.*
5. *CEIP Records*, vol. 142/box 480, *d’Estournelles de Constant to Butler, January 31, 1921.*
6. *CEIP Records*, vol. 148/box 483, *Butler to Clark, May 9, 1911.*
7. *CEIP Records*, vol. 148/box 483, *August 11, 1911.*
8. *CEIP Records* vol. 52, *Ladeuze to the National Committee, December 26, 1918.*
9. *CEIP Records*, vol. 63, *Politika (English translation), June 23, 1921.*

10. *CEIP Records*, vol. 53, November 17, 1920, Severance to Butler.
11. *CEIP Records*, vol. 59, Capser to the CEIP Committee, April 15, 1921.
12. *CEIP Records*, vol. 56, Capser final report to CEIP, September 28, 1921.
13. *CEIP Records*, vol. 56, Capser to CEIP, September 28, 1921.
14. *CEIP Records*, vol. 53, Root to Butler, April 5, 1920.
15. *CEIP Records*, vol. 53, Butler to Root, April 6, 1920.
16. *CEIP Records*, vol. 53, Scott Brown to Schuyler, May 15, 1920.
17. *CEIP Records*, vol. 53, Schuyler to Scott Brown, May 22, 1920.
18. *CEIP Records*, vol. 53, Schuyler to Scott Brown, June 9, 1920.
19. *CEIP Records*, vol. 53, Schuyler to Scott Brown, January 10 and 18, 1920.
20. Clavin, P., 2005. "Defining Transnationalism" *Contemporary European History* 14/4. pp. 421-439.
21. Eichenberg, J., John Paul Newman, John Paul (ed.), 2013. *The Great War and Veterans' Internationalism*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan
22. Gerber, D. A., 2003. "Disabled veterans, the state, and the experience of disability in Western societies, 1914-1950", *Journal of Social History* 36/4. pp. 899-916.
23. Guieu, J. M., 2015. *Gagner la Paix 1914-1929*, Paris: Seuil.
24. Mazower, M., 2012. *Governing the World*, New York: The Penguin Press
25. Prudhommeaux, J., 1921. *Le centre européen de la Dotation Carnegie pour la paix internationale 1911-1921*. CEIP: Rue Pierre Curie.
26. *Report of the International Commission to Inquire the Causes and Conducts of the Balkan Wars, 1914*. Washington DC: CEIP.
27. Sarthe Départementales Archives, Le Mans, France 12J385, d'Estournelles de Constant to Butler, March 4, 1918.
28. Sarthe Départementales Archives, Le Mans, 12J386, d'Estournelles de Constant to Butler, March 2, 1919.
29. Weber, P., 2015. "The Pacifism of Andrew Carnegie and Edwin Ginn: The Emergence of Philanthropic Internationalism", *Global Society* 29/4, pp. 530-550.

## VETERANKE DRUGE SVETOVNE VOJNE

## WOMEN VETERANS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

**Povzetek** Druga svetovna vojna je bila obdobje, ko so bile ženske prvič v zgodovini v velikem obsegu vključene v vojaško službo. Zavezniki so jih vključevali v vojaške aktivnosti že vse od začetka vojne, tako v civilnem kot v vojaškem sektorju. Sovjetska zveza je za vojaško službo mobilizirala največji odstotek ženske populacije, Združene države Amerike pa so oblikovale homogene ženske vojaške enote. Ženske so bile aktivne tudi v partizanskih vojskah v Evropi. Borke so pokazale izjemne sposobnosti, bile so dragocene za vojaško moč svoje države, vendar so bile množično demobilizirane, ko se je vojna končala. Veteranke so bile večinoma prisiljene sprejeti tradicionalne ženske družbene vloge in pozabiti na svoja medvojna junaštva.

**Ključne besede** *Ženske v vojski, veteranke, druga svetovna vojna, demobilizacija, reintegracija v družbo.*

**Abstract** World War II was the first time in history that women were called upon for military service to a great extent. The Allied military forces utilized women from the beginning of the war in both the civilian and military sectors. The Soviet Union mobilized the largest percent of female population to perform military tasks. The United States formed the all-female military units. Women were active in partisan armies all over Europe. Women soldiers proved themselves to be of great value for their countries, but when the war was over, they were demobilized en masse. As women veterans they were mostly forced to accept traditional feminine social roles and to forget about their inter-war bravery.

**Key words** *Women in the military, women veterans, Second World War, demobilization, reintegration into society.*

## Introduction

During the Second World War, the role of women in society changed dramatically. Most countries needed women to support the war effort more directly: to perform tasks usually performed by men at home, to perform jobs that had traditionally been held by men, and even to serve in the military. Women mostly enthusiastically embraced their new roles and responsibilities and many of them wanted to play an active role in the war and lobbied the government to form military organizations for women. They proved that the idea of women being too soft-hearted and too weak to kill was false and without any truthful fundamentals. Women engaged themselves in combat as regular soldiers in uniform and as resistance fighters or guerrillas. Mixed-gender units were formed and they mostly performed better than all-male units. Within these military units, women lived like men, fought like men and some of them died like men.

The mobilization of women was the most effective in the Soviet Union where women were mobilized extensively into military tasks. This country was the first in World War II to use women in combat with regular armed forces. The key factors that had opened the door for Soviet women in combat were desperation, total militarization of society, and a communist ideology that promoted women's participation outside of traditional feminine roles. The Soviet system expected the soviet women to equally participate in, understand, and defend its regime (Vajskop, 2008, p. 3). Women participated in combat in large numbers, and their participation added to the Soviet Union's military strength. The Soviet case showed that women can be organized into effective large-scale military units and that the mobilization of a substantial minority of women soldiers increased the state's military power.

In World War II, in addition to the Soviet partisans, women participated in the **partisan forces** of other occupied countries as well – including Yugoslavia, Poland, Italy, Greece, and France. Female participation within the Partisan movements in the occupied Europe was significant. The communists officially declared women to be equal with men and that was the basis for the mobilization of women into partisan units. Women took part in street fighting, carried out assassinations, and performed intelligence missions.

The **United Kingdom**, in 1941, became one of the very first countries to conscript women. British women actively defended the nation against Hitler's Luftwaffe (often in anti-aircraft or non-combat roles), and there were even female officers in command of male soldiers (Vajskop, 2008, p. 3).

**American** women were not sent into combat and making women soldiers was a special task of the American government. The all-female units were formed to handle clerical and administrative jobs for the military (Campbell, 1993, p. 302). The all-female military units were formed in the U.S. and in Canada, which created its own women's forces. Women were able, for the first time in history, to serve the U.S. and Canada in uniform (Canada remembers Women at War, online).

On the other side there were countries much less conducive to the participation of women in war, countries that did not allow women into regular military forces. For instance, **Germany** faced chronic shortages of manpower. However, the Nazi ideology promoted gender division, with women assigned to the home and the production of German children. Therefore, Germany went into war with a different gender ideology than the Soviet Union and German women were neither trained in the use of arms nor were they allowed, under any conditions, to use them. They were aimed to guarantee the survival of the Aryan race. The only way in which Hitler utilized women before or during WWII was in industry, and only then of sheer desperation. The Nazis opposed weapons training for women auxiliaries until the final months of the war. In February, 1945, finding himself in an increasing desperate situation, Hitler created an experimental women's infantry battalion (Hershiser, 2003, p. 97). When the war was over, Albert Speer, Hitler's weapons production chief, regretted the fact that Germany had not brought its women into the military as other countries had. In his opinion, one of the biggest reasons Allied forces won the war was because of the use of their women (Permeswaran, 2008, p. 99).

The aim of this article is to present key facts and arguments about historical experiences with including women into military environment, with demobilization of women and with their integration into society. The main issue is to compare different historical approaches and models of integration of ex-female soldiers into society and to present social circumstances within which specific models of integration were implemented. The main methodological approach was to collect the information, find interpretation and compare the situation and models within different countries.

## 1 MOBILIZATION OF WOMEN

Prior to World War II, women had not served in the military in great numbers or in official units. Their role in the military in the World War I was very limited and their participation was on a very small scale. Because of the brutality and the totality of the Second World War military leaders of many invaded countries realized the necessity of utilizing women in the armed services. Women were mostly not drafted, but they were given the opportunity to voluntarily enter the army – “one of the last bastions of male exclusivity” (Scrivener, 1999, p. 361). The extent to which the country used its women for the militaries varied in accordance with the extent to which the country was immersed in the war. The degree to which the countries utilized their female population in military service varied enormously. The Soviet Union allowed the most extensive integration of women in the military and the United States utilized women in a limited role. Given that the U.S. did not have the battlefield in its own backyard, the pressure and the need to put women in combatant role did not exist. Unlike their Allied counterparts, the Russians had a long history of women serving the military, culminating with the Civil War (Hershiser, 2003, pp. 1-4).

Women who joined the army were mostly volunteers, but in Britain the conscription began in 1941 for all single women between the age of eighteen and thirty for the

auxiliary forces. There were over 640,000 women in the Britain's armed forces, including the Women's Royal Naval Service (WRNS), the Women's Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF) and the Auxiliary Territorial Service (ATS), plus many more who flew unarmed aircraft, drove ambulances, served as nurses and worked behind enemy lines in the European resistance in the Special Operations Executive. By the end of the war, nearly a half-million women served in the military comprising 12 percent of Britain's military strength and over 3,000 of them died in the line of duty. On the other hand the U.S. women's military was an all-volunteer force. (Hershiser, 2003, p. 4)

Women joined the resistance movements in Europe massively, but there were not so many female partisan fighters among them. The percentage of women partisan soldiers was high in Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia, but in France there was only a small number of women among the *maquis* (Diamond, 1999, pp. 112-124). In Italy, women joined mixed gender partisan units called *Gruppi di Azione Patriottica* and *Squadre di Azione Patriottica* (Slaughter, 1997).

## 1.1 Mobilization of women in Slovenia

Slovenia was occupied by the Axis powers in April 1941. Very soon afterwards, the national liberation movement emerged, its leaders being mostly communists. During the war years, women became significant members of the National Liberation Movement and participated in all aspects of the anti-fascist resistance in Slovenia - at that time part of Yugoslavia. Most women were engaged in mass resistance to Nazi and Fascist occupation in traditionally feminine support roles, but also the combat positions were opened for them. Nonetheless, in Slovenia just over 4 percent of the soldiers in the National Liberation Army were women. They were all volunteers. The official communist ideology declared them equivalent to men. They received the same kinds of minimal basic training as men, but first aid or medical training more often than men. In practice, women tended to remain at low ranks and to be concentrated in medical tasks. The role of medic became feminized. If there was a single woman in the unit, she would be designated the medic. But medics were usually fighters too and casualty rates were roughly equivalent between medics and fighters. Women partisans led the same life as men – they slept in same quarters, ate the same food, and wore the same clothes. The partisan army authorities severely discouraged sexual relations in the ranks, although arrangements were made for married couples (Bernik, 2002, pp. 106-126).

Women had participated in combat with good results. They had added to the military strength of their units, and sometimes fought even with greater skill and bravery than their male comrades. Accounts of the effectiveness of the women soldiers suggest that women made an important contribution overall. Though women proved themselves as politically and economically capable within the Partisan movement, a chauvinistic attitude maintained. Double standards were rampant and women were mostly concentrated in traditionally female roles (Ibid.).

## 1.2 Mobilization of women in the Soviet Union

The most substantial participation of women in combat has occurred in the Soviet Union during World War II. For Russia involvement of women in combat roles wasn't something new. At the height of the Russian Civil War in 1920 nearly 66,000 women were serving in the Red Army. The women's battalions were quite effective and successful. The involvement of women in Russian armed forces was therefore not a new concept. According to Marxist doctrine, women were equal citizens in their rights and responsibilities (Vajskop, 2008, pp. 12-13). State ideology said that Soviet women and men were no different and both were expected to be contributing citizens. In the USSR equality meant equal obligations, which also explains the willingness of Soviet women to fight in the Eastern Front in 1941. In this regard, however, the Soviet state in addition took priority over women (Nazemroaya, 2014). However, despite this historical pattern, women were not immediately accepted into combat in WW II, as war was an activity that was considered to be outside the scope of women's affairs.

Following a rapid, forced industrialization of the Soviet economy in the 1930s under Stalin, in which women were drawn into non-traditional labour roles, the Soviet Union faced a dire emergency when it was invaded by Nazi Germany in 1941. Over the next three years, the Soviets would count tens of millions of war dead, and large parts of their country would be left in ruins. The country was invaded, occupied, its cities decimated and besieged, its people starving. In this extreme situation, the Soviet Union mobilized every possible resource for the war effort. They mobilized over 90 percent of men and, eventually they allowed women to serve in the Combat zone. About 800,000 women served in the Red Army during World War II, and over half of these were in front-line duty units. There were additionally about 200,000 women in partisan (irregular) forces. Most of these women fought at the front. Women within the Red Army and the partisan units constituted about 8 percent of all combatants. Between 100,000 and 150,000 of them were decorated during the war (Campbell, 1993k, p. 318 - 320). Women made up 8 percent of all combatants and that percentage does not include the hundreds of thousands of additional women who served in non-combatant roles in the Soviet military. Furthermore, women of the home front worked in munitions factories, enrolled as air-raid wardens, marched in the labour squads conscripted to dig anti-tank ditches, and improvised mass evacuations eastward (Hershiser, 2003, p. 93).

In the first year of the war, women were mobilized into industrial and other support tasks. Early in 1942 the Central Committee of the Communist party agreed to allow women to join the fighting forces. Roughly 500,000 women were drafted to replace men in noncombat positions, tens of thousands of women were trained as combatants for mixed and all-women units. The first major presence women had in Soviet fighting was in the medical field. The Soviet government drafted female medical students and sent them to the front line, where they entered the battlefield under heavy fire in order to retrieve wounded men. They carried their own weapons and casualties among them were high. All nurses and over 40 percent of doctors in

the Soviet military were women. Medical support tasks in the Soviet military were integrated with combat to an unusual degree. Doctors and nurses served at the front lines under intense fire (Vajskop, 2008, p. 15).

By the end of 1943, 1943 women reached their peak level of participation throughout the Soviet military. There were areas of involvement, which became a feminized military specialty, such as nursing and air defence forces units (Engel Alpern, 1999). The women serving in the soviet Air Force were most recognized among all Soviet women that served. Women constituted up to 24 percent of the total Soviet Air Defence Forces. Already 1941 three all-female regiments were formed within the Soviet Air Force, where the whole of the personnel was female: pilots, navigators, mechanics, and ground crews. These three regiments were active until the end of war, one of fighter pilots (the 586<sup>th</sup> Fighter Regiment) one of bombers (the 587<sup>th</sup>), and the most famous, the 588<sup>th</sup> Night Bombers who proved so effective at hitting their targets that they were nicknamed by the Germans the Night Witches (*Nachthexen*) (Hershiser, 2003, p. 65). They flew a combined total of over 30,000 combat sorties. The Germans could not believe that the most destructive Soviet airmen were in fact fearless women. Women were engaged also in other gender mixed units and in some cases, they formed 80 or more percent of anti-aircraft personnel. They were active in famous battles as in the Battle of Kursk, where they engaged in some of the heaviest combat operations in history (Vajskop, 2008, pp. 16-18).

Women engaged in many military duties. Many of them were officially non-combatants such as medics, radio operators, or truck drivers, on the other hand many of them fought as partisans, snipers, tank drivers, combat pilots, junior commanding officers, political officers (Krylova, 2010). Thousands more fought the Germans as rank-and-file soldiers, as machine gunners, as snipers, as sappers, and as driver-mechanics in tank units. A few female officers led battalions of men into battle. The Soviet experience is an important historic case of large-scale women's participation in combat. Women performed very well in military duties and at least as well if not better than the average male comrades. They performed their duties with unusual physical strength and endurance, and they evoked tremendous respect from men around them. Women performed a very wide range of combat tasks and proved themselves, eventually gaining the acceptance and even admiration of Soviet military men who had been initially sceptical or hostile. On the other hand women encountered huge difficulties with sexual harassment from their superiors (Vajskop, 2008, pp. 19-20).

Women served in gender - integrated infantry units. Several hundred thousand received training in firing mortars, machine-guns, and rifles. A special school was established in 1943 which trained hundreds of women snipers. Soviet women snipers were a huge factor in the Soviet Union's success. They are credited with having killed or wounded thousands of *Wehrmacht* officers and soldiers. They hunted the German forces in all weather, risking bombardment and death under heavy fire. The most successful of them was Lyudmila Pavlichenko. She had been credited with

309 kills and regarded as one of the top military snipers of all time and the deadliest female sniper in history. The press called her *Lady Death* (Vajskop, 2008, p. 20).

Soviet women proved of equal military competence as men and they performed a wide variety of combat tasks effectively. Nevertheless male responses to female soldiers varied at first from rejection to acceptance, but with time female combatants became conceivable and feasible not just for the Soviet government, but also for male soldiers at the front. Male combat soldiers accepted women as comrades in arms (Krylova, 2010). Additionally female soldiers were often placed in a highly ambiguous situation, in which the Komsomol, which had recruited large numbers of young women into the army, promoted sexual abstinence, while the Party and Army agreed to the desire of commanders to take lovers from among their subordinates. Female soldiers faced sexual harassment on a large scale (Schechter, 2016). In some way they were waging two wars: one against the Germans and the second to defend themselves from the harassment of their male superior commanders. There were no problems with their male comrades in arms – they accepted them as their sisters and an incest taboo dominated the relationships between them. Their male comrades actually called woman soldier sister – *sestreichka*. But there were significant problems with superior military personnel, who often abused their positions (Engel Alpern, 1999, pp. 138-159).

Unlike in the Soviet Union, women in the West were not viewed as authentic soldiers. When Soviet women were fighting as tankers, snipers, and pilots to defend Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, and the entire Soviet Union, from Sevastopol to Stalingrad, they essentially had no Western counter-parts. The visit of famous Soviet female sniper, Lyudmila Pavlichenko, to the United States is very telling about the gap. After fighting to defend the Crimea from the Germans, Pavlichenko was shocked by Western perceptions about how women soldiers in the frontlines should act. While visiting the U.S. to lobby for the opening of a Western Front in Europe to relieve the Soviets from doing most the fighting against Germany, Pavlichenko was shocked to see that American society was more interested to know if female Soviet soldiers wore makeup instead of being interested in what role Soviet women played in resisting the Nazis (Nazemroaya, 2014).

### 1.3 Mobilization of women in the United States

In the USA the mobilization of women in the military was different from the Soviet one, and the all-female military units were organized, as most male soldiers were strongly opposed to the idea of women soldiers. Popular opinion was, that men protect their country and women stay at home. Many people in America didn't want women to work in, with, or near the army. One group that strongly opposed the idea was the Catholic Church. Because of conflict over whether women should serve in the army, Congress delayed creating the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC). Women themselves were split on the issue. Some women's groups expressed opposition to the idea, but others were enthusiastic about the chance to serve their country (Permeswaran, 2008, pp. 95-96).

In 1941-42 the military created its own women's forces. The Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) was formed early in 1942, soon after Pearl Harbour. In July of 1943 it became a regular part of the Army, as the Women's Army Corps (WAC) (Campbell, 1993, p. 303). Within the US Army, the incorporation of so many women was an unprecedented development. More than 150,000 women served in the Army during WWII (Permeswaran, 2008, pp. 99). The WAC encountered serious obstacles in recruiting American women, and it faced continual bureaucratic attacks from the War Department, the Surgeon General, and others. The WACs were never assigned to combat and rarely got near it. In performance of their duties the WACs showed even more diligence as men soldiers. WACs were often better than men at communications and clerical work, especially in listening to Morse code for long hours. But there were false and hostile rumours that WACs were sexual extremists (either promiscuous or lesbian). The rumours chilled recruitment and froze the Corps far below its intended size. The public opinion in the USA thought, that there was no place for women in the Combat Zone and the public opinion was stronger and more influential than the success of women serving in the military (Campbell, 1993, pp. 320-323).

With the United States more deeply mobilized for war and over a longer period, women's participation in the military increased dramatically, to about 3 percent of US forces at the peak. But America didn't allow sending women into battle zones. Women were encouraged to work in factories and to accept stereotypical low level jobs in the armed forces (Vajskop, 2008, p. 3). Particularly at the beginning of the war, women were typists, switchboard operators, stenographers, and file clerks. They were not allowed to wear arms (Fenner, 1998). As the war dragged on, however, women were frequently used in more "masculine" fields; for example, they served as truck drivers, airplane mechanics, gunner instructors, radio operators, repairmen, and parachute riggers (Scrivener, 1999, pp. 365-366). However, the right to command men was not given to women in any sector of the American Armed forces before or during WWII (Wilson, 2016).

Military women during World War II performed their duties across the United States and overseas, in the air, on the ground, and aboard ships. Over 5,000 of the 100,000 WACs who served in World War II were assigned to the Southwest Pacific in such jobs as postal clerks, intelligence analysts, cryptographers, and teletype operators. Another 40,000 WACs were assigned to Army Air Force commands throughout the United States and overseas. Women in the Marine Reserves served stateside as clerks, cooks, mechanics, and drivers. The Coast Guard Women's Reserves, called SPARs (Semper Paratus Always Ready), were assigned to such stateside jobs as clerks, storekeepers, photographers, cooks, and pharmacist's mates. In the Navy, thousands of Women accepted for Voluntary Emergency Service (WAVES) performed a wider range of jobs than had the Yeomen of World War I. They worked in aviation, medical professions, communications, intelligence, science, and technology (Trowell-Harris (ed.), 2011). The Women's Airforce Service Pilots (WASPs) worked in ferrying planes and as test pilots. About 1,000 women took part, and 38 died in the line

of duty. Women of the WASP piloted aircraft to destinations across the country. They also flew as low-target pilots in training missions, flew cargo and top secret weapons, and were test pilots. Although WASPs were subject to the discipline and training of military service, they were civil service employees (Scrivener, 1999, pp. 365-366). The Navy WAVES (Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service) participated in air traffic control, naval air navigation, and communications, starting in 1942. There was a Marine Corps Women's Reserve. At its peak in 1945, the WAC had 100,000 members (Goldstein, online).

Although soldiers and officers who worked with US military women in World War II adjusted to them and came to value their contributions, public opinion lagged behind. There was a "slander campaign" against WACs in 1943. The campaign promoted the idea that WACs were really prostitutes, or women with low morals. Leaders had to spend great energy trying to counteract this campaign both through public advertising and through attention to the women's appearance (feminine uniforms, skirts, long hair) and their actual morals, which were generally upstanding. Despite efforts to counteract the slander campaign, a survey of Army men in 1945 found that about half of asked men thought it was bad for a girl's reputation to be a WAC. Some men also worried that women would become too powerful after returning to civilian life (Goldstein, online).

American military women were often the targets of sexual harassment. The women's morals were questioned in the press, and rumours of sexual promiscuity were rampant. Women who joined the military were thought to be unfeminine, loose, or unable to find work or a husband. This gossip intensified when WAACs were sent overseas in early 1943. Morale and discipline were high among the military women, but gossip, jokes, slander, and obscenity about military women spread anyway. The investigations had revealed that male military personnel were the primary source of rumour. From the men, rumours had spread to their wives and girlfriends and then to the rest of the population (Scrivener, 1999, p. 365).

By the war's end, thousands of women had successfully contributed to the war effort by releasing men to fight in combat: 150,000 women had served in the WAAC/WAC (including 8,000 in Europe and 5,500 in the Pacific), 100,000 in the WAVES, 23,000 in the Marine Corps Women's Reserve, and 10,000 in the Coast Guard SPARS (The United States Coast Guard Women's Reserve), and 75,000 as officer-nurses (Goldstein, online and Scrivener, 1999, p. 366).

## 2 THE PROCESS OF DEMOBILIZATION OF WOMEN VETERANS

At the end of the Second World War the demobilization of mass armies had begun. Armies which included women as military personnel mostly urged quick demobilization of female soldiers. In all cases the women were summarily dismissed from the military after the war was over. Demobilization of women became top priority of military authorities. Many women left industrial work and military service

and readjusted back to home life. With the men returning home to their jobs, the need for women's labour and for women's military jobs diminished.

U.S military was faced with releasing 85 percent of its force. They were also faced with the task of caring for and rehabilitating large numbers of wounded soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. As result, In January of 1946, several military bureaus and offices requested that they be allowed to keep their female reservists and nurses. Despite this need, however, by September the demobilization of the women's reserve forces were largely completed (Hershiser, 2003, p. 42).

In Slovenia and in the Soviet Union all women partisans were demobilized. The extent of women's unprecedented participation in the Allied war effort was forgotten until nearly half a century when literature began to emerge depicting their invaluable contribution (Hershiser, 2003, p. 1).

### **3 THE PROCESS OF REINTEGRATION OF WOMEN VETERANS INTO THE SOCIETY**

The reintegration of ex-women-combatants to civilian life started just after the demobilization and was quite different from that of men. Only when women returned home the real troubles truly began, for many of them. After years of combat and trauma, it was difficult for ex-combatants to return to a "normal" lifestyle and many of them felt that their interwar sacrifice was not awarded enough. Women veterans faced lack of social support. When the war was over, women's contributions during the interwar period rarely received recognition, one reason being that the needs and priorities of a post-war society were very different from those of a society at war: whereas men and women were encouraged to act out similar roles as fellow soldiers in armies and guerrilla movements, post-war societies encouraged difference between the genders. This had important consequences for ex-women soldiers and for their sense of identity. In many cases, female ex-soldiers preferred to conceal their military past rather than risk social disapproval.

#### **3.1 The reintegration of Slovenian women veterans**

When World War II ended, newly communist Slovenia quickly barred women from military service. Yugoslav military authorities wanted for women members of the (ex) partisan army to return home promptly to reknit family life and their civilian careers. Women in Slovenia were mostly not allowed to enter military until 1983, when the first women military recruits after the end of World War II, joined Yugoslav People's Army voluntarily (Garb, 2002, pp. 127-137). But women were allowed to work as medics and two of them (Slava Blažević and Roza Papo) hold the rank of major general of Yugoslav People's Army (Vojna enciklopedija).

Women Veterans of the Second World War were highly respected in Slovenian society. They were praised for their military effectiveness and efficiency in the

period of war. Women who gained important positions in the partisan army or in the civil part of resistance movement in Slovenia were able to make successful careers in the time of peace. Demobilization awoke concern only to those who found army life more interesting, mobile, and satisfying than the civilian careers. The communist party organized the Antifascist Front of Women as a national organization in order to reintegrate women into post-war society. The communists promoted gender equality and women gained the right to vote in federal elections in 1945.

For Slovenian women we can say that they were brutalized by World War II but for many of them it meant social freedom and liberation. Their participation in the partisan army and in the resistance movement gave them sense of fulfilment they had not known before. The popular view in the post-war period dominated, that Slovenian women contributed a lot for the efforts of war and they were recognized as important part of society.

### 3.2 The reintegration of American women veterans

In the post war period female veterans were forced to get back in civilian lives, but civilian jobs were given with first priority to returning male veterans and commercial airlines would not even accept female pilots (Hershiser, 2003, p. 43). Official propaganda wanted women to become mothers and to serve their homes and their families (Michel, 1987).

After World War II the number of women in the US military dropped drastically, but never back to zero, because of female veterans. After the war was over, they began a massive letter writing campaign to persuade the congress to form women military units. This campaign proved successful and in 1948 the Women's Armed Services Integration Act was passed. Unfortunately little recognition had been given to these women who, without realizing the magnitude of what they had accomplished, changed the face of the American military forever (Hershiser, 2003, pp. 42-43). Thanks to them women did not live the military and in 1950, 2 percent of American military forces were female (Permeswaran, 2008, pp. 99).

The World War II experience remained a valuable benchmark of women's potentials as soldiers, which informed the later integration of women in the US military. Most women veterans of World War II benefited personally from their military experiences (Meyer, 1996). In spite of the harassment they faced, a majority of women deemed their time in the military as wonderful and believed "it gave them a broader perspective, made them more independent, and provided them with rewarding memories and lifelong friends" (Scrivener, 1999, p. 366).

It was not until 1948 that women became permanent part of U.S. military. After the war, Congress debated whether to make women a permanent part of the regular military. Gen. Dwight Eisenhower, who had led the allied forces in Europe, favored this. "The women of America," he said, "must share the responsibility for the security of this country in a future emergency as the women of England did in World War

II.” President Harry Truman signed the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act in June 1948. This authorized the enlistment of women and commissioning of female officers in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and newly formed Air Force. The separate Women’s Army Corps and female reserves of the other armed services continued for a while, but eventually were phased out. The integration of women finally put them fully “in” the regular armed forces—but with restrictions. Women could make up no more than 2 percent of the total military force. The number of female officers and the rank they could achieve were capped. Woman officers could hold no command authority over men. Nor could women be assigned to military aircraft and most Navy ships. Finally, women were prohibited from serving in combat (Constitutional Rights Foundation, online).

In the USA women organized the Women's Army Corps Veterans' Association in 1947 as a national organization. They associate volunteers to serve in Hospitals and Nursing Homes where veterans are patients. For the American women veterans nursing was the most honourable front-line role.

Women acquired more confidence, and opportunities for leadership within their military experience, but the additional responsibility came without any decrease in the demands of their traditional roles which was re-enforced by the containment policy in Post WWII America. They wanted to live a family life, with a husband, home and babies, and to do this their war service would have to remain in the past. Containment was the key to security and they would conform or be marginalized, stigmatized and just possibly disadvantaged as a result (Wilson, 2016). Only in the recent period the interest for interwar women's military history became more evident and there are many researches currently available about the U.S. military women in the period of WWII.

### 3.3 The reintegration of Soviet women veterans

As soon as Germany was defeated, most Soviet women were immediately discharged from service, and their military contributions were largely ignored. Although they received many thousands of military decorations and suffered proportionately higher losses than their male colleagues, Soviet women veterans were forgotten and their interwar bravery lost in the fray. Instead, they came home to official policies demanding their fast return to a steady, full – time civilian job, childbearing and nurturing, shopping, cooking, laundering and cleaning. Except for celebrations of Victory Day on May 9, when women veterans traditionally emerged, medal-bedecked, most official histories and commemorations bypassed them (Bliss Eaton, 2004). The soviet authorities forgot about war heroines and started to worship **the hero mothers** instead. The heroine Mother became an honorary title to all mothers bearing and raising 10 or more children. The idea of motherhood and working in the home was overwhelmingly emphasized by the state. Women gained extra money from the state for bearing more children. Women were encouraged to be softer, more feminine, and traditional. Women veterans and heroines rarely occupied positions of political power or any sort of strategic party positions (Vajskop, 2008, p. 28). Soviet

female veterans were almost completely invisible during the entire post-war period up to collapse of the Soviet Union. Many of them were hoping to lead a normal life and marry, but internally they lived with persistent traumas. The post-war Soviet official position on the matter proclaimed that women are physiologically unsuitable for becoming military or even civilian pilots (Hershiser, 2003, pp. 90-91).

The pure Marxist state that views everyone equally and expects an equal contribution from everyone, was forgotten and Stalin forced women back into traditional gender roles. Women veterans were subject to great amounts of criticism and distrust, even among allegedly good comrades of the Motherland. They were suspected of sexual misconduct in the military and women who wore military medals were said to have received them for sexual service (Vajskop, 2008, p. 26). Soviet women veterans were treated as immoral and promiscuous because of their military experiences. They were ashamed to wear their decorations and uniforms in public, as the pressure of public opinion was so hard. Although close to a million Russian women served with Stalin's armies, including 92 who became heroes of the Soviet Union, the experience of post-war public opinion was frustrating (Bliss Eaton, 2004).

Although the morale and discipline were very high among military women, in the post-war period the non-formal discourse emerged that disrespected female fighters as sexually immoral. The erasure of women's wartime achievements contributed to a radical popular derogation of women's role at the front. That hostile treatment developed independently of any official impetus. Allusions to women's sexual reputation played no role whatever in official commemoration of the war, but they dominated popular discourse. Despite the iconographic emphasis on women's purity and courageous self-sacrifice and the absence of sexualized public images, despite women's extraordinary achievements, their collections of medals and awards for bravery, and heroic action under fire, popular opinion in the Soviet Union insisted on stereotyping and stigmatizing women who served at the front as front-line whores. The acronym for *Polevaia Pokhodnaia Zhena - PPZhe* (mobile field wife) circulated widely in the post-war period, always with a derogatory meaning (Dombrowski, 1999). Women veterans as a group had to grapple with their reputation. Some persisted in affirming their wartime record; others became "as silent as fish." Most of the women decided to tell nobody they wore the uniform. They didn't want to say that they had been at the front in order not to be stigmatized as "the husband hunters" or PPZhe. These feminine soldiers felt guilty for something they hadn't done. They wanted to become ordinary girls once again, to get married and to have children. For women it was painful to be excluded from the celebrations of wartime achievements in the decades following the war (Engel Alpern, 1999, pp. 138-159). Women mostly wanted to prove to the society to be able to be good mothers and wives. The most important goal for young veterans was to forget the war, to get married, to have children, and to achieve standard of normality (Bliss Eaton, 2004). Discussing the interwar experiences became the forbidden theme for women in the Soviet Union. After the collapse of the soviet state some memories were published, but still not much is written about the post-war life of women veterans: the official pressure to

return to family and working life; the stigma of the PPZhe; or the fate of women invalids, physically or psychologically crippled, or those not recognized as heroes. Instead, most memoirs conclude by focusing on subsequent family life, careers — almost invariably made outside the military — or the camaraderie of veterans' life (Markwick, 2008, pp. 403-420).

During the war many Soviet female soldiers faced pregnancy in the military and that meant demobilization for them. Some Komsomol organizers in the Red Navy even treated pregnancy as a form of self-mutilation to escape duty. Pregnancy was generally a one way ticket out of the army. But there were two sides of the same coin: returning home, many faced serious stigma. Many female soldiers who were pregnant suffered from depression. Some were angry at the fathers of their unborn children, who they felt had used and betrayed them. Others refused to go home to their parents, fearing the shame of single motherhood. Many requested not to return home after demobilization, as they feared censure from family. Still others sought abortions, which had been illegal since 1936. Pregnancy outside of marriage was seen as shameful. But the government did have understanding for single mothers and pronatal laws in 1944 created the new legal category of "single mother" which was aimed to support and legitimize the status of women with children. These laws made it a crime to insult single women and shifted responsibility (in the form of alimony payments) for children out of wedlock from fathers to the state. This was a conscious policy aimed at offsetting the demographic crises that resulted from the war (Schechter, 2016).

Not until the 1960s did the soviet military once again recruit large numbers of women specialists. In the late 1980s there were several thousand women in the armed forces, in medical, communications, and administrative jobs; most held the low rank of warrant officers (Bliss Eaton, 2004).

In the post-war era most of the soviet women veterans decided to tell nobody they wore the uniform. They hoped their life would be back to normal again and they met a lack of understanding of what they really did during the war. But there were some veteran organizations trying to keep the memory alive and collect memories when the Soviet period was over (Porteret, 2006). Only after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the delegitimation of the Communist party, women were free to speak about their war experiences, to criticize the Soviet conduct of war and to emphasize the human cost of war, the price that people paid for victory. They exposed the abuses of power and privilege made by men and criticized the popular opinion about women fighters. They clearly stated that women who served at the front don't deserve to be called whores. There were actually very, very few promiscuous women among fighters. Women mostly lived honourably and fought honourably on the frontlines of war. Without Soviet women contribution to war activities the war would have ended with an entirely different outcome for the Soviet Union (Engel Alpern, 1999, pp. 138-159).

## Conclusion

The utilization of women in Allied forces during the Second World War was huge. Women were incorporated into military units in many different ways, depending on military necessity that emerged in each of individual countries. Women were mobilized in the army on large scale in the Soviet Union and in the United Kingdom. In the U.S. women were utilized in non-combatant jobs and the army's auxiliary women's forces were followed by establishment of women's branches of each of the armed services. In contrast to the British and the Russians, however, the U.S. women's military was an all-volunteer force. Additionally, the U.S. never utilized women in combat roles, as the public opinion strongly opposed to the idea that women would shoot men. In Europe, women volunteers joined partisan armies, as the case of Slovenia shows. Women partisans and Soviet female members of the Red Army have shown their abilities to perform military tasks with the same efficiency as the men do. They denied the idea that women are too soft-hearted to kill as they had shown that they can fight and they can kill as effectively as their male comrades can. They earned many medals and many of them were declared to be War Heroes. Gender roles were cast aside for fear of the lack of sufficient manpower needed to fight the Axis powers. But when the war was over all of that was forgotten. Countries wanted their women to become soft and feminine again in order to accommodate to new peaceful circumstances. Governments wanted for women to get many children in order to make the devastated population grow again. They also wanted the men to get into the factories and women to leave the jobs they occupied in the war period. The relevance of women to the outcome of the war was forgotten and women veterans did not have enough courage to publicly reveal their war experiences as they risked to be exposed to hostile rumours. Public opinion in the post-war period has shown military women as promiscuous and of bad morals. That same thing happened in the Soviet Union and in the U.S. Slovenian women veterans on the other hand did not face such a pressure and women veterans did become important positions within the Communist party.

The evidence shows that women who proved themselves as combatants in the period of the Second World War mostly did not gain much social support and acknowledgement as military veterans when the war was over and their contributions to the war effort were largely forgotten. On overall they met a lack of understanding of what they really did during the war. The societies expected from them to become housewives and mothers and to leave military jobs to men. For that purpose women were demobilized "en masse". In Slovenia and Yugoslavia women did gain the recognition for their war efforts, but were equally demobilized and forcibly pushed out of army, as in the Soviet Union and the United States.

Because of negative attitude of public opinion towards women veterans of the Second World War, they never tried to persuade the public about their huge contribution to the outcome of the war. Despite the numerous commendations these women received, the skills they demonstrated in the armed forces, the role of women in the military post WWII was nearly eradicated. Without their huge involvement in military actions the results of war would be different.

## Bibliography

1. Bernik, V., 2002. *Ženske v slovenski partizanski vojski (1941-1945). Seksizem v vojaški uniformi*. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede in Ministrstvo za obrambo Republike Slovenije, pp. 106-126.
2. Bliss Eaton, K., 2004. *Daily Life in the Soviet Union*. Westport, Connecticut, London: Greenwood Press.
3. Campbell, A., 1993. *Women in Combat: The World War II Experience in the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and the Soviet Union*, *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 57, No. 2, pp. 301-323. <http://americanhistoryprojects.com/downloads/ww2/combat.pdf>, 21 June 2016.
4. *Canada remembers Women at War*. Veterans Affairs Canada. <https://www.veterans.gc.ca/pdf/cr/pi-sheets/women.pdf>. 12 January 2017.
5. Diamond, H., 1999. *Women in the Second World War in France 1939-1948: Choices and Constraints*. Edinburgh: Pearson Education Limited.
6. Dombrowski, N. A., 1999. *Soldiers, Saints, or Sacrificial Lambs? Women's Relationship to Combat and the Fortification of the Home Front in the Twentieth Century*. *Women and War in the Twentieth Century. Enlisted with or without Consent*. New York and London: Garland Publishing inc., pp. 2-37.
7. Engel Alpern, B., 1999. *The Womanly Face of War. Soviet Women Remember World War II. Women and War in the Twentieth Century. Enlisted with or without Consent*. New York and London: Garland Publishing inc., pp. 138-159.
8. Fenner, L., 1998. *Either You Need These Women or You Do Not: Informing the Debate on Military Service and Citizenship*, *Gender Issues*, 1/2, pp. 5-32.
9. Garb, M., 2002. *Ženske na služenju vojaškega roka v JLA. Seksizem v vojaški uniformi*. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede in Ministrstvo za obrambo Republike Slovenije, pp. 127-137.
10. Goldstein, J.S. *Women Soldiers: The Historical Record*. <http://www.warandgender.com/chap2pap.htm>, 28 June 2016.
11. Hershisier, L., 2003. *The Utilization of Women in the Allied Military Forces During World War II United States, Britain, and Russia*. <https://www.hpu.edu/CHSS/History/GraduateDegree/MADMSTheses/files/2003LisaHershisier.pdf>. 1 July 2016.
12. Krylova, A., 2010. *Soviet women in combat. A history of violence on the eastern front*. New-York. Cambridge University Press.
13. Markwick, R. D., 2008. *A Sacred Duty: Red Army Women Veterans Remembering the Great Fatherland War, 1941-1945*, *Australian Journal of Politics & History*. Volume 54, Number 3, pp. 403-420.
14. Meyer, D. L., 1996. *Creating GI Jane. Sexuality and Power in the Women's Army Corps During World War II*. New York: Columbia University Press.
15. Michel S., 1987. *American Women and the Discourse of the Democratic Family in World War II; Behind the Lines. Gender and Two World Wars*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, pp. 154-167.
16. Trowell-Harris, I. (ed.), 2011. *America's women veterans. National Center for Veterans Analysis and Statistics*. [https://www.va.gov/vetdata/docs/specialreports/final\\_womens\\_report\\_3\\_2\\_12\\_v\\_7.pdf](https://www.va.gov/vetdata/docs/specialreports/final_womens_report_3_2_12_v_7.pdf). 2 July 2016.
17. Meyer, D. L., 1996. *Creating GI Jane. Sexuality and Power in the Women's Army Corps During World War II*. New York: Columbia University Press.
18. Navailh, F., 1998. *The Soviet Model. A History of Women. Toward a Cultural Identity in the Twentieth Century*. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, pp. 226-254.

19. Nazemroaya, M. D., 2014. *The Historic Role that Soviet Women Played in Defeating the Nazis in World War II. How the West Ignores Women as Actors in Otherized Societies: An Unraveling of the Logos of the Soviet Amazons.* <http://www.globalresearch.ca/how-the-west-ignores-women-as-actors-in-otherized-societies-a-sociological-unraveling-of-the-logos-of-the-soviet-amazons/5372529>. 1 July 2016.
20. Permeswaran, Y., 2008. *The Women's Army Auxiliary Corps: A Compromise to Overcome the Conflict of Women Serving in the Army.* <http://www.societyforhistoryeducation.org/pdfs/THH-NHDPemeswaranJR.pdf>. 9 January 2017.
21. Porteret, V., 2006. *Svetlana Alexievitch, La guerre n'a pas un visage de femme, Paris : Presses de la Renaissance, 2004, 399 pages.* *The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies*, Issue 4/5. <http://pipss.revues.org/489>. 9 January 2017.
22. Schechter, B.M., 2016. "Girls" and "Women". *Love, Sex, Duty and Sexual Harassment in the Ranks of the Red Army 1941-1945.* *The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies*. Issue 17. <http://pipss.revues.org/4202>. 10 January 2016.
23. Scrivener, L., 1999. *U.S. Military Women in World War II: The SPAR, WAC, WAVES, WASP, and Women Marines in U.S. Government Publications.* *Journal of Government Information*, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 361-383. [http://oberlinlibstaff.com/omeka\\_hist244/files/original/41704e6c93400bea6fcf23dbf0051e8c.pdf](http://oberlinlibstaff.com/omeka_hist244/files/original/41704e6c93400bea6fcf23dbf0051e8c.pdf). 4 January 2017.
24. Slaughter, J., 1997. *Women and the Italian Resistance, 1943-45.* Denver: Arden Press Inc.
25. Vajskop, S., 2008. *Elena's War: Russian Women in Combat.* <http://www.ashbrook.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/2008-Vajskop.pdf>. 4 January 2017.
26. Gažević, N. (ed.), 1973. *Vojna enciklopedija*, Beograd: Redakcija Vojne enciklopedije.
27. Wilson, G., 2016. *Hiding in Plain Site: The Women Veterans of World War II.* <https://www.mckendree.edu/academics/scholars/issue23/gerri-wilson.pdf> 2 July 2016.
28. *Constitutional Rights Foundation*, 2014. *Women in the Military.* <http://www.crf-usa.org/images/pdf/gates/Womin-in-Military.pdf>. 2 July 2016.



## DOLGA POT DO URADNE DANSKE VETERANSKE POLITIKE, 1848–2010

### THE LONG ROAD TOWARDS AN OFFICIAL DANISH VETERANS' POLICY, 1848-2010

**Povzetek** Čeprav je Danska država, ki je imela v več sto letih več deset tisoč vojnih veteranov, so raziskave na to temo še vedno na začetni stopnji v primerjavi z drugimi državami. To najboljše pojasnjujejo številni zgodovinski, kulturni in politični dejavniki, od katerih je najbolj presenetljiva resnična odsotnost vojne že od leta 1864. Zaradi vedno večje vključenosti Danske v misije OZN in Nata od konca hladne vojne pa je pojem danskih »veteranov« ponovno oživel kot politični dejavnik in kot predmet proučevanja. Vlada je zato leta 2010 prvič v zgodovini sprejela državno veteransko politiko. Članek obravnava skoraj popolno neprepoznavnost vojnih veteranov v danski družbi in odsotnost uradne veteranske politike do leta 2010. Vzrok, zakaj je Danska šele pred kratkim sprejela politiko veteranov, najverjetneje izhaja iz kombinacije dejavnikov, kot so majhno število vojnih veteranov, socialna država, politična konjunktura in sprememba danskih čezmorskih vojaških operacij iz prvotnih operacij za ohranjanje miru v prave bojne operacije.

**Ključne besede** *Vojni veterani, vojaška zgodovina, Danska.*

**Abstract** Despite Denmark being a nation that over the course of hundreds of years has produced tens of thousands of war veterans, research on this subject is still in its nascent phase compared to that of other nations. This is best explained by a number of historical, cultural and political factors, of which the virtual absence of war since 1864 is the most striking. Following Denmark's increasing involvement in "hot" UN and NATO missions since the end of the Cold War, the notion of Danish "veterans" has resurfaced, both as a political factor and as a subject of study. Consequently, in 2010 the government adopted the first-ever Danish veterans' policy. This paper addresses the virtual invisibility of Danish war veterans in Danish society and the absence of an official veterans' policy until 2010. It is argued that a combination of factors, such as the low number of war veterans, the existence of a welfare state,

political conjunctures, and the change in Danish overseas military operations from primarily involving peacekeeping to being actual combat missions, may explain why Denmark has only recently adopted a veterans' policy.

**Key words** *War veterans, military history, Denmark.*

**Introduction** During his annual address at the parliamentary opening after the summer break in 2010, the Danish Prime Minister, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, stated, "Denmark has one of the world's best welfare societies, but we are still only learning what it means to be a veteran after serving overseas in international missions" (Rasmussen, 2010). He subsequently announced that the Government would soon present the first-ever national Danish veterans' policy. The words spoken by the Prime Minister were not fully apprehensible – how can a society learn what it is like to be a veteran, one might ask? But the meaning was clear when read in context; for a prolonged period, Danish society had neither been acutely aware of its veterans nor created special policies to address veteran-related issues. Until early in the 2000s, the term "war veteran" found limited usage in Denmark, essentially being only applicable to ex-soldiers from foreign armies and/or the Napoleonic era and older.

This paper traces the gradual emergence of the notion of Danish war veterans since the 1990s and the closely related surfacing of a political discussion of how to honour the veterans and address their material and emotional needs. By studying a variety of veterans' groups, it provides an understanding of how different their relationship to society in general was and thus why Denmark did not adopt a veterans' policy much earlier. We also look into how the current policy was born and subsequently revised, and argue that the fact that Denmark's veterans' policy is a comparatively modest one is best explained by a combination of historical experience and the strong welfare state.

## **1 THE DISAPPEARANCE OF WAR VETERANS – DENMARK 1848-1994**

Being frequently involved in wars until the mid-nineteenth century, Denmark, like most other nations, had always had war veterans. But it is debatable at what point Danish nationalism reached such cohesion as to create a strong link between the nation as such and the soldiers defending it – thus establishing the idea of a national obligation to support and celebrate the nation's war veterans. It is safe to say that until 1849, when Denmark became a constitutional monarchy and introduced general conscription, the army and navy were the king's personal forces, not the nation's. It was also the king's obligation to care for the well-being of infirm or needy soldiers who had been discharged in good grace. This was regulated by various royal decrees, some dating as far back as the early seventeenth century. When possible, ex-soldiers and NCOs were assigned other jobs (e.g. as customs officials) when discharged, as a means of both tapping their skills and catering for their well-being. In addition,

special institutions such as *Kvæsthuset* (literally: the house of the wounded) were set up, serving both as military hospitals and as homes for infirm veterans.

These tasks were eased by the fact that the armed forces in early modern Denmark, by and large, consisted of a standing force of hired, often foreign, soldiers with a service span of around twenty years – so the soldiers rarely lived long after being retired, if they even reached retirement age. Nevertheless, with the emergence of a nationalist public opinion during the late eighteenth century, first among Copenhagen civil servants and intellectuals, and gradually as a mass phenomenon, the well-being of the members of the armed forces were increasingly seen as an obligation of the whole nation. This notion first emerged in earnest in Denmark during the Napoleonic wars, in which the country fought a brief war with England in 1801 and participated on the French side from 1807 to 1814 (Lundgreen-Nielsen, 1992). Following these events, a popular remembrance culture dedicated to the veterans came into being. It was during this period that Danish war monuments first began to celebrate “the common soldier” in their dedication texts (Adriansen, 2010). Significantly, this was also the first time private initiatives were taken to secure the material well-being of the wounded servicemen, as well as of the widows and orphaned left behind by those who had perished (Lundgreen-Nielsen, 1992, p. 113).

It was the combination of nationalism, democracy, general conscription and a new war – the Slesvig War of 1848-1850 – that in earnest created the conditions for the general acceptance of the idea that the nation ought to celebrate and, if need be, materially support its veterans and their dependants. In 1859, the veterans of the 1848-1850 Slesvig war organized themselves in *De danske Våbenbrødre* (the Danish brothers-in-arms): the first mass veterans' organization we know of in Denmark. As the name indicates, the term “veteran” was not the preferred self-description of these men. Indeed, when reading the material left by the *Våbenbrødre*, one does not find the term being used at all. This association had a threefold purpose: according to its statutes, the *Våbenbrødre* came together firstly in order to commemorate their joint experiences during the war; secondly, with the aim of strengthening the will to defend Denmark; and finally in order to render support to members in need. At its peak in 1877, after having admitted into its ranks the soldiers who fought in the 1864 war against Prussia and Austria, the association had around 30,000 members – a very respectable figure for its time (Poulsen, 2016). While a veritable “cult of the fallen soldier” – to use George Mosse's formulation – arose in Denmark over the next decades, the veterans achieved few tangible material benefits from having fought for Denmark (Mosse, 1991). But, more importantly, neither did they seem to expect such benefits. In line with the way various strata of society in medieval and early modern Denmark had established guilds which not only represented the members' corporate interests and maintained their identity, but also provided social security for them, the *Våbenbrødre*, via the association's membership fee and other sources of income such as a lottery, provided cheap loans, funerals and assistance to widows and orphans after the death of members.

Rather than vying for material support, the *Våbenbrødre* sought due recognition of the war veterans as national heroes, and in 1877, after sustained agitation, it obtained the reward of a medal to all men who had fought in the wars of 1848-1850 and 1864. Furthermore, in 1888, a 40-year anniversary gift was granted by the government to those who had fought in the 1848-1850 war. In 1898, all the veterans from the war of 1848-50 were declared eligible to receive an annual lump sum of 100 Danish Kroner as a token of the nation's appreciation. In 1914 – when the 50-year anniversary of the 1864 war was commemorated – this same gesture was also extended to the veterans of this war. It was, however, a very modest sum – equivalent to less than 1,000 euro a year in present-day value (Slaegtsalbum.dk). Furthermore, given that this annual gift was introduced as late as 50 years after the first of the Slesvig wars, only a fraction of the veterans benefited from this. Thus, while the almost 100,000 veterans of the 1848-50 and 1864 wars were held in high esteem by the nation, this did not turn them into an entitlement group deriving sizeable monetary or other material benefits from their service.

The 1864 war, in which Denmark was utterly defeated, was to become the last prolonged war fought on Danish territory. The defeat signalled the beginning of a time period characterized by a strong pacifist, if not outright defeatist, trend in Danish politics. Until 1949, when Denmark joined NATO, the Danish polity was deeply divided in its view of the utility of armed forces, and even during the Cold War Denmark remained, as aptly phrased by the historian Poul Villiaume, a “reluctant ally” (Villiaume, 1995). Three in particular of the four dominant political parties – *Venstre* (the Liberals), *Socialdemokratiet* (the Social Democrats) and *RadikaleVenstre* (the Left Liberals) – were manifestly anti-militaristic, and their virtual domination of the political landscape during most of the twentieth century contributed greatly to preventing the *Våbenbrødre* from playing a political role as such. The *Våbenbrødre*, in turn, contributed to their own increasing political impotence by deciding after the 1864 war not to admit new members. In contrast to neighbouring Germany, a strong patriotic and militaristic movement of veterans and ex-conscripts thus never materialized (Poulsen, 2016). Equally importantly, while considerable commemoration of the wars took place, a comprehensive veterans' policy was never adopted, and there were virtually no material benefits rendered to the veterans except for some of the most highly decorated and severely disabled, as indicated above.

Denmark's ability to keep itself neutral during World War I, together with the rapid German invasion of Denmark on 9 April 1940, were highly significant factors in further limiting the role of war veterans in Danish society. This virtual absence of war between 1864 and Denmark's participation in the 1999 NATO action in Kosovo meant that the country ceased to produce war veterans, at least if we limit the definition to soldiers officially sent to war by the government under the Danish flag. This, however, does not imply that no war veterans emerged in Denmark during the first half of the twentieth century; only that the Danish armed forces as such did not produce any.

After World War I, part of the territories lost to Germany in 1864 were recovered, resulting in Denmark “inheriting” 30,000-35,000 war veterans from Germany – the majority being members of the Danish-speaking population in Slesvig. In order to integrate this group into society, the Danish government adopted a generous package of measures to cater for the disabled veterans, as well as for the dependants of fallen soldiers. However, this legislation was not made universal, as it was limited to World War I veterans only (Marckmann, 2001).

During the decades following World War I, Danish citizens fought in such wars as the Russian Civil War, the Spanish Civil War and the Finnish-Soviet Winter War. These volunteers to foreign wars were, like previous groups of volunteers such as Danes fighting for the Entente during World War One, small and not awarded any official recognition as veterans.

World War II generated, if one applies a broad definition of “war veterans”, four distinct groups of veterans – all essentially having gone to war without any official recognition from the Danish state. Firstly, around 6,000 Danish citizens volunteered for German armed service during the war, primarily in the Waffen-SS. Secondly, around 1,000 Danes joined the Allied forces. Thirdly, another 6,000 Danish sailors manned ships sailing for the Allies. Finally, a diverse movement of resistance fighters emerged. Depending on whether one only counts the hardcore of fighters, carrying out sabotage or applying other violent means, or everyone rendering support to the resistance fight, the figure is between a few thousand and up to 50,000 (Poulsen, 2016).

These groups related to official Denmark in very different ways in the post-war period. The former SS-soldiers were sentenced for treason, and in cases where they had been NCOs or officers in the Danish armed forces prior to their enlistment in the SS, they lost their positions and pensions. Believing that they had been unjustly treated, some of the veterans organized and tried to influence popular opinion in order to have their sentences nullified and to be rehabilitated. Their efforts were not crowned with any success, and most of the former SS-soldiers, instead of fighting a lost cause, turned their energies inward and established their own internal networks for both material assistance and commemoration. During the early post-war period the SS-veterans' associations were monitored by the Danish intelligence service, and as of today the only monument explicitly dedicated to these men is a small stone on a private lot of land in western Denmark (Poulsen, 2016).

In contrast, the members of the resistance movement and Danes in the Allied armed services were treated as heroes after the war. A significant number of monuments in their honour were erected, and the Danish state maintains a special museum dedicated to the resistance movement. Members of the resistance movement were, however, not given any special veteran status by the authorities, and their material and medical needs were administered under a piece of legislation devised for all who had been negatively affected by the occupation – the so-called *Erstatningsloven*

(the Compensation Act) (Kirchhoff 2002, p. 126). The most significant step towards bestowing official recognition on the ex-resistance fighters was parliament's adoption of a fast-track procedure for obtaining a junior officer rank in the armed forces for those who so desired. However, only a minority of ex-resistance fighters availed themselves of this opportunity. Instead of seeking privileges for its members, the resistance movement officially declared that its members had simply done their patriotic duty, and expected neither medals nor entitlements. This set the tone, and no comprehensive set of measures was adopted. This in turn had consequences for the limited number of Danish soldiers who had seen combat on either 9 April 1940, the day of the German attack, or on 29 August 1943, when the Germans tried to disarm the remaining Danish forces. During the war a special commemorative medal had already been planned, but after the liberation in Spring 1945, when it became clear that the resistance movement did not want a medal for its members, the project was quietly shelved (Jørgensen, 2009). The only step taken was the introduction of an honorary gift, essentially modelled on the measures taken after the wars over Slesvig, to the wounded soldiers and the dependants of the fallen soldiers (Retsinformation.dk, 1940). Even today, the question over a medal to the soldiers fighting on 9 April and 29 August is debated in the Danish parliament at infrequent intervals (Krarup, 2016).

While the resistance movement members and the armed forces were celebrated nonetheless with numerous monuments and annual commemorative dates, such as 29 August and 5 May, one group whose members also had seen – at least indirectly – armed action was virtually forgotten: the war sailors. Almost one in six had died during the war, and Danish sea men had not only played a role in manning the ships that ran the gauntlet between German submarines in the Atlantic, but some had also served as crew members on the ships taking part in the Normandy landings in June 1944. The lack of popular – and state – recognition of the deeds of these men probably reflects both that the sailors were seen as essentially non-combatants, and also that the rank-and-file sailors came from the lower segments of society. On top of that, many sailors continued sailing abroad, and thus had limited visibility in Denmark, just as they had no strong organization to represent their interests. Only in 1969 was the above-mentioned legislation, related to those victimized by the war, extended to cover the sailors, and not until 2014 was a monument dedicated to the sailors erected, on Utah Beach in Normandy. In addition, a monument at the memorial complex *Mindelunden* in Ryvangen, devoted to resistance fighters executed by the Germans, has been planned (Arkitektforeningen, 2016).

Following the end of the war, the Danish defence force was only slowly and with considerable difficulty rebuilt, and after 1949 integrated into NATO. Whereas the dominant role of the armed forces during the Cold War was to participate in defending the country against an invasion from the east, Denmark also contributed to UN peacekeeping missions, both by seconding individual officers and by sending out contingents of regular troops, e.g. to Gaza and Cyprus. In addition, between 1948

and 1954, a Danish brigade was stationed in north-western Germany as part of the Allied occupation forces there.

These postings were by and large undramatic and virtually without any occurrence of combat or casualties. Although various small and informal “clubs” were established by the troops returning from the missions mentioned above, these associations were primarily inward-looking and did not really try to influence the greater public, or politicians for that matter. It was during this period that what eventually became the most influential contemporary Danish veteran organization, *De Blå Baretter* (The Blue Berets), was established. Although it was founded in 1968, this association enjoyed a relatively tranquil existence until the early 1990s, primarily serving as a venue for nostalgic and backward-looking activities rather than being a visible veterans’ lobby organization.

One of the main reasons for this state of affairs may well have been the general anti-military attitude that characterized Denmark from the early 1960s until the 1980s. There was limited political interest in establishing a veterans’ policy. Rather, the decision-makers’ attention and energy was consumed by simply maintaining a credible defence force during a time period characterized both by successive periods of economic recession and by ever-growing demands for funding from other sectors. This was also the period during which a Danish welfare state was established in earnest, thus also eroding any need for special measures targeting the material wellbeing of veterans.

As this survey shows, the period 1848-1993 was characterized by a virtual absence of a comprehensive veterans’ policy. This development can be explained by several factors. Firstly, the most distinct, popularly acknowledged and well-organized veterans – the *Våbenbrødre* – were active at a time when the state only had limited means at its disposal and when state support of citizens in need was virtually unheard of in Denmark, as well as abroad. In addition, the *Våbenbrødre* failed to put the question of material support for needy veterans on the agenda. Secondly, after 1864 the general population increasingly became alienated from the idea that a small state like Denmark could benefit from the use of military power – forcefully formulated by a leading opinion maker as *Hvad skal det nytte?* (translation: To what end should we defend ourselves?) Thirdly, after 1864 Denmark virtually ceased to produce veterans – at least if we define them as people being sent to war by the Danish state. As the *Våbenbrødre* failed to link up to associations of former conscripts or to open its own ranks to other veterans, such as the Danes who had fought in the Kaiser’s army during World War I, no strong veterans’ movement ever emerged. During the Cold War there was widespread disbelief that the defence force would ever be used for waging war, and if this did come to pass nonetheless, it was believed that such a war would rapidly escalate into a thermonuclear conflict, thus rendering any idea of a subsequent veterans’ policy absurd. Furthermore, at least before the 1990s, Danish troops being sent on peacekeeping missions were generally the laughing-stock of the defence force. These soldiers were seen as holiday fighters whose biggest risk was

getting sunburnt, excessively drunk, or experiencing an accident due to hazardous driving. This negative image of the Danish veterans, together with the establishment of a welfare state with generous benefits to the sick, maladjusted and needy, rendered a veterans policy both inexpedient and unnecessary, at least until the end of the Cold War.

## **2 FROM COLD WAR TO COMBAT MISSIONS: THE GRADUAL EMERGENCE OF THE NOTION OF DANISH WAR VETERANS, 1992-2010**

Considering this background, it is hardly surprising that neither the Danish government, the defence force, nor the population in general realised that the soldiers tasked with peacekeeping missions in former Yugoslavia from 1992 onwards were treading new territory.

The experiences of Danish soldiers in Croatia, and especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereafter “Bosnia”, differed significantly from what soldiers had become used to on missions such as to Cyprus. The more than three years of fighting between the different nationalist armies and paramilitary groups was characterized by an almost total neglect of the rules and customs of war. In contrast to the Cold War conflicts, where United Nations peacekeepers had been deployed and were by and large respected by the parties of the conflicts, events in Croatia and Bosnia showed that neutral peacekeepers could also be targeted by the warring parties – the range of incidents ran from threats and hostage-taking over extensive mining to sniping and shelling. Furthermore, the peacekeepers had to tackle such threats with inadequate mandates informed by their previous missions, where actual fighting had normally ceased and the parties were in the phase of peace negotiations (see for instance Rasmussen, 2014; Burg & Shoup, 1999).

As the war in Bosnia dragged on, it soon became obvious that there was absolutely no peace to keep. In addition, due to the weak mandates, the international peacekeepers could do little when extreme violence was directed toward civilians. The prime example of the Security Council’s inadequate means of response to new types of conflict was the genocide in the Srebrenica enclave in July 1995, in which a Dutch battalion was incapable of stopping the advancing Bosnian Serb units from entering the area and subsequently killing around 8,000 Muslim men and boys. Albeit on a lesser scale, Danish soldiers, in both Croatia and Bosnia, experienced similar events during their deployments between 1992 and 1995 (Rasmussen, 2014). To a certain extent, the situation was repeated when Danish troops were sent to Kosovo in 1999. However, dramatic as they were, events in the Balkans were surpassed by what happened when Danish contingents from 2001 and 2003 respectively, were seconded to Afghanistan and Iraq; in contrast to the missions in the Balkans, the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq were actual combat deployments.

Thus, from 1992 onwards an almost uninterrupted stream of soldiers returned from “hot missions abroad”, and in 2009 it was estimated that Danish soldiers had served almost 60,000 tours of duty abroad since the end of the Cold War.<sup>1</sup> During the last two decades, Denmark has thus experienced a significant change in its political willingness to use military force, accompanied by an equally remarkable shift in how the population perceives the military. Following activities in Afghanistan and Iraq, it has become somewhat more publically acknowledged that casualties accompany participation in war. Between 2002 and 2014, Denmark suffered 43 casualties – the highest national rate in the ISAF force relative to population size.

Both politicians and the population responded to the severe fighting and the high number of casualties with remarkable tolerance. Seen in the context of decades-long scepticism towards using the military instrument, this signified a remarkable change in the role and visibility of the armed forces in society (Jakobsen, 2004). Another, related, change was on its way, too: the notion of Danish war veterans. Until the late 1990s, how to care for former servicemen was something contemporary Danes associated with American Vietnam war movies. But now a number of popular initiatives appeared. A yellow ribbon calling for the support of “our soldiers” was introduced in 2007 by a newly established association for family members of soldiers deployed on international missions (Hornemann, 2009). The bumper-sticker version rapidly gained visibility and appeared on a large number of vehicles across the country. In less than a decade this and other steps to honour the veterans developed into an elaborate body of official and semi-official measures, including almost a dozen different associations related to war veterans. On 5 September 2009, the nation celebrated its first national flag day to celebrate both veterans and those who are currently deployed. One year later the first-ever Danish veterans’ policy was adopted, and in 2011 a major national monument, dedicated to Denmark’s fallen in international military missions since 1945, was inaugurated.

It is safe to claim that prior to Denmark’s decision to deploy troops to Afghanistan, following 11 September 2001, there was limited public awareness of the fact that more and more Danish soldiers were returning from missions in warlike conditions abroad. It is instructive that the word “veteran” was virtually absent from public discourse at the time and only came into use as a term for Danish soldiers returning from abroad during the 2000s.

Likewise, the actual term “war veteran” or simply “veteran” only appeared in earnest in parliamentary debates after the adoption of the veterans’ policy in 2010.<sup>2</sup> It was therefore not until the spring of 2011, when MP Holger K. Nielsen, from the leftist *Socialistisk Folkeparti* (the Socialist People’s Party), asked the MoD a question about economic compensation to “war veterans”, that the term entered parliamentary

<sup>1</sup> This figure does not, however, represent the total number of veterans, as a considerable number of personnel completed more than one tour of duty.

<sup>2</sup> Based on a search of the official records of the parliament at <http://www.ft.dk/>.

debates (Question no. S 1677, 2011). The only exception was a debate from 2009 in which MPs discussed the possibility of establishing a “veterans’ home” (Question no.1591, 2009).

While some debate about the well-being of returning soldiers had taken place in parliament during the Yugoslav wars of succession, it was clearly the much more “warlike” missions in Afghanistan and Iraq which ignited a much deeper popular and political interest in Denmark’s homecoming soldiers. In contrast to the discussions during, and in the immediate aftermath of, the Balkan missions of the 1990s and early 2000s, a novel feature characterized the new discussions: the preventive element; the focus on preventing occurrences of PTSD was reflected in several inquiries to the MoD. For instance, in February 2003 MP Villy Søvndal – also from *Socialistisk Folkeparti* – posed the following question to the minister:

Does the minister intend to inform the Danish soldiers who are to be sent to the war in Iraq that previously deployed [soldiers] have returned with diseases that in public debates are referred to as “the Gulf Syndrome”? (Question no. S 2090, 2003).

While the quotes above concern purely clinical issues related to international deployments, the discussions following Afghanistan and Iraq also took a rather socio-economic turn. This was reflected later in 2006, when MP Holger K. Nielsen asked the MoD the following question:

“What initiatives does the minister intend to undertake in order to ensure that relatives of deployed soldiers who die or incur debilitating injuries during deployment avoid falling into economic hardship as a result of the Danish Defence’s inadequate compensation regulations?” (Nielsen, 2006)

This review of Danish debates on the status of Danish soldiers returning from international missions points to a general tendency: discussions about veterans seem to have been dependent on Danish participation in a new type of mission beginning in the early 2000s. That they triggered growing public and political interest in the matter was probably due to a combination of factors. First of all, these missions were much more violent than previous ones, thus resulting in more casualties and a greater number of veterans in need of physical rehabilitation. In addition to a number of soldiers developing psychological problems following participation in Iraq and Afghanistan, it was also at about this time that it became clear to the public that some of the soldiers who had been posted to the Balkans during the 1990s were suffering from mental health problems. Thirdly, it deserves mention that Denmark’s participation in the American-led war against Iraq in 2003 severely divided politicians. Although all politicians spoke in a pro-veteran discourse, one cannot avoid wondering whether the increased focus on the veterans’ wellbeing by some of the politicians who were against the war in Iraq was a subtle attempt to delegitimize the war.

### 3 THE FORMULATION OF DENMARK'S VETERAN POLICY IN 2010

In October 2010, the Danish government adopted the country's first-ever national veteran policy. The adoption of the 2010-2014 defence agreement, which preceded the veteran policy, was backed by all parties except for *Enhedslisten* (the Unity List) – a socialist party known for its opposition to the country's armed forces. The period surrounding the adoption of the policy triggered some interesting public debates regarding veterans' position in Danish society, as well as debates about the need to offer veterans special treatment in a number of areas. These debates could be observed in both press and parliamentary settings. The following section will focus on the discussions in the press.

It was during 2008 that the idea of formulating a national veteran policy gained momentum.<sup>3</sup> It seems that the debate was pushed forward by individuals and not as a result of extensive group mobilization “from below”. Among the most noteworthy of these individuals was MP Jørgen Poulsen from the ultra-liberal party *Ny Alliance* (New Alliance), the former secretary general of the Danish chapter of the International Red Cross. In April 2008, Poulsen commented harshly on how the Danish population as a whole and the government in particular responded to being at war. According to Poulsen, Danes simply did not realize that Denmark was now a belligerent nation. This was due to the nation's lack of military experience in the past, which had resulted in a non-existent “culture of war and veterans”:

“Other countries that are more experienced belligerent nations have a system that gives the impression that it is not only soldiers who go to war but the whole nation. (...) There is a need for the [Danish] government to implement a genuine veteran policy. (...) [W]e have generally failed in developing a culture in which we as a nation express our appreciation of the effort that the soldiers make and the sacrifices that some soldiers face, as well as the grief that this causes their families” (Poulsen, 2008).

Poulsen's comments brought to light exactly what seems to have been the challenge for Denmark at this point; the almost complete lack of war experience from 1864 up until the 1990s had left the country (and its politicians) in a peculiar situation: the nation as a whole had virtually no experience with “modern veterans” and absolutely no knowledge of the challenges associated with returning war veterans.

Following almost a decade of continuous participation in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, public debates intensified between 2009 and 2010, one of the main points of contention being whether disabled war veterans should be given preferential treatment. Members from the *Dansk Folkeparti* and *Venstre* argued in a major Danish newspaper that veterans should enjoy special treatment in Danish society. They argued, “that those folks who have fought for ideals enjoy special rights, or at least they ought to” (Kingsey, 2009). A high-ranking member of the largest

<sup>3</sup> A survey of the media by means of the Danish news media search engine INFOMEDIA.dk indicates that there was absolutely no media coverage of the subject prior to 2008.

opposition party at that time, *Socialdemokraterne*, used the same rhetoric in the same article (Kingsey, 2009). However, not all parties in parliament shared this view. The parliamentary party speakers on disability politics from *Det Radikale Venstre* and *Socialistisk Folkeparti* argued against secluding Danish veterans from the general health system and establishing a privileged system for them. They argued that even though veterans constituted a “special group” who should be offered services related to their needs, it would be an improper move if the Danish government decided to start treating its citizens differently – even though some of them had served in international military missions (B. dk, 2009).

It was not only politicians who tried to impact the debate prior to the adoption of the veteran policy in 2010. Other actors within the military forces, former officers and NGOs also had their say in the debate. Bjarne Hesselberg, then president of *De Blå Baretter*, argued in late 2009 that Danish society was obliged to offer special treatment for its veterans because it had sent them to war:

“Society has to define for itself what commitments it has towards the soldiers and their families before and after a deployment. Society is designed to take care of citizens who live in Denmark (...); now we will see problems [related to war veterans] arising because of policies decided by a majority in parliament.” (Svendsen, 2009).

Directly asked whether Danish society should establish a kind of parallel health and welfare system geared towards veteran care, Hesselberg argued that:

“(...) if the soldier returns with a disability and is ready to get back to life, to rehabilitation and disability housing, which the municipal system cannot offer at the moment, there is a need for an extraordinary allocation [of resources] compared to other disabled people. You might call that a parallel system.” (Svendsen, 2009).

Finally, Hesselberg argued that the main argument in favour of special treatment of veterans lies in the soldier’s profession:

“You can have a political opinion on whether Iraq, Afghanistan or the Balkans were a good idea. The soldiers who are deployed can privately assess whether they agree or not, but they do what a parliamentary majority has asked them to do.” (Svendsen, 2009).

The discussions on how to treat Danish veterans also caused representatives from Danish disability NGOs to take part in the debate. Susanne Olsen, president of *Dansk Handicap Forbund*, agreed with Hesselberg that veterans constituted a special societal group and *could* be entitled to special treatment (Kingsey, 2009). However, it is interesting to note that, six months later, Susanne Olsen radically changed her opinion. Following a comment by Colonel Lars R. Møller in March 2010, that veterans should enjoy preferential treatment when it came to certain clinical services, Susanne Olsen made the following statement in a Danish newspaper:

“(…) I think it is unacceptable that a military commander demands special status for soldiers by demeaning all other human beings with a disability. It is despicable that we even have to have this discussion. Soldiers should be treated on equal terms and with the same respect as anyone else with the same disability” (Pedersen and Westh, 2010).

It seems that the closer the adoption of the veteran policy came, the more public discussions turned into a battle between different stakeholders about the limited resources allocated to the disability sector.

It is important to note that not all veterans called for treating veterans differently from other citizens, and thereby did not agree with people such as Hesselberg. Debates between the veterans themselves also surfaced a few months before the government adopted the veteran policy. An example of this is Danish veteran Kasper Kiran Larsen, who had lost half of his right arm and all of his right leg. Larsen argued that he thought it would be wrong if society differentiated between injured soldiers and people born with a handicap or someone who had been involved in a traffic accident (Vaaben, 2010). As he stated during an interview:

“I would not like to take somebody else’s place [in the queue], just because he had not been deployed to Afghanistan” (Vaaben, 2010).

On the other hand, the same year a fellow severely handicapped veteran argued in an interview that as he had fought for Denmark in Afghanistan, veterans like him were entitled to special treatment by the Danish authorities (Ravnø et al., 2010). Thus, as in the debate between Danish politicians, the debate between veterans themselves revolved around whether “veterans” were to be seen as a distinct societal group with special privileges, or whether they should be treated in the same way as any other Danish citizen.

This debate by and large ended with the government’s official veterans’ policy in 2010. After uttering the words quoted at the beginning of this article, the prime minister announced that an official veterans’ policy would be adopted very soon, and he concluded with the words, “Our veterans shall be given the necessary support and treatment” (Rasmussen, 2010). This was hardly a revolutionary statement, and when the policy was presented to the public a week later, it essentially represented a consolidation and comprehensive review of existing means and policies, rather than the breaking of new ground (FMN, 2010). The policy was named “recognition and support”, reflecting that these were considered to be the two main aspects of the issue. Among the main innovations in the policy was the establishment of a Veterans’ Centre with subunits in a number of major towns. This centre was to assist the veterans and act as a “single point of entry” – thereby addressing what many veterans believed to be a major problem: the public sector’s tendency to point to another agency when a problem related to veterans needed to be addressed. Another important element in the policy was that physically and mentally disabled

veterans were placed on an equal footing with respect to the rules regulating their right to a disability pension. Funding to veterans' self-help groups and peer-to-peer counselling (i.e. counselling from one veteran to another) was also increased. In terms of recognition much had already taken place prior to the adoption of the policy – the annual flag day had already been established in 2009, and the national monument, which was inaugurated in 2011, had also been decided upon earlier. The most tangible addition to these measures was the introduction of a veteran's card – a credit-card-sized document which attested that the person in question was a war veteran. However, the card in itself carried no privileges with it, and the government had made no initial arrangements with private companies or other non-state actors for providing discounts in restaurants and amusement parks, for example. When the first cards were issued, the Minister of Defence, Gitte Lillelund Bech, merely stated, "I would like to invite private companies, NGOs and public institutions to find new ways of recognising our veterans. It may be free bus rides on national flag day on 5 September, a 10% discount at the auto repair shop, or free access to the town festival; the only limit is your own imagination, and I hope that private initiatives will flourish" (Bech, 2011).

In the autumn of 2016 the veterans' policy was reviewed; without, however, any major changes being introduced, and without substantial popular debate (FNM, 2016). Evidently, all the major political actors and interest groups have bought into the existing, rather modest policy.

**Conclusion** Based on the above background, one might ask why it took Denmark so long to adopt a veterans' policy and why the existing policy is rather a modest one?

This is best explained by a number of historical, cultural and political factors, among which the virtual absence of war since 1864 is the most striking. Following Denmark's increasing involvement in "hot" UN and NATO missions since the end of the Cold War, the notion of Danish "veterans" has resurfaced, both as a political factor and as a subject of study. As demonstrated in this article, virtually all groups of veterans prior to the 1990s have enjoyed rather limited benefits and have in many cases been marginalized. That Denmark suddenly adopted a veterans' policy was fostered by the new missions in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq. These missions created a whole new generation of more vocal war veterans, just as the wars they participated in represented a new type of military engagement for Denmark.

Danish war veterans have, however, not evolved into becoming an entitlement group with the right to special health care or access to substantial social privileges. This may be explained by the existence of a strong welfare state and a relatively well-functioning health care system. More significant is the upsurge in support for the veterans ranging from the large and visible public initiatives, such as the national monument or the flag day, to numerous private initiatives.

It remains to be seen whether we are currently experiencing the peak of Denmark's newfound interest in its veterans. On the one hand, one may argue that the area has been depoliticized, as virtually all parties are subject to the defence agreement and the veteran policy, which was adopted as a result of said agreement. Furthermore, the various veterans' organizations have – save for a number of small and rather inconsequential ones – endorsed the official veterans' policy. It may also be speculated that given that neither the war in Afghanistan nor the war in Iraq resulted in a solid victory, the Danish population and Danish politicians have increasingly become war-weary and there are no indications that we are going to see Danish troop participation in land warfare on a scale equivalent to the period between 2001 and 2014 for years to come. Hence, in the foreseeable future, Denmark is unlikely to produce as many veterans as during the last decade.

Yet, there are also signs that the veteran cause may not fully have run out of steam. First of all, Denmark now has a significant number of its population with “war veteran” written in their CVs, and this part of their identity may actually grow rather than fade over time. Secondly, if we look at such historical cases of severe trauma as concentration camp inmates and Holocaust survivors, it is known that severe psychological problems often only fully emerged decades after returning from the camps. Thus, the current number of cases of maladjusted veterans may only be the tip of the iceberg. In addition, since contemporary Danish culture is considerably influenced by American culture, American ways of honouring war veterans may be adopted as part of the general transfer of culture. An early example of this could be seen when the movie “April 9” was shown for the first time in March 2015. In a gesture quite uncommon to Danish movie audiences (but well known to anybody who has been to a spectator sport in the United States), a Danish veteran from April 9, 1940, who was present in the auditorium, was given a standing ovation.

Although major political adjustments to the current veterans' policy are hardly likely for the foreseeable future, one may conclude that the very fact that Denmark now, for the first time in a century, is home to a significant number of war veterans, means that the last word about how to support and honour the Danish veterans has not yet been spoken.

## Abbreviations

MOD: Ministry of Defence  
 MP: Member of Parliament  
 NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
 NCO: Non-Commissioned Officer  
 NGO: Non-Governmental Organization  
 PTSD: Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome  
 UN: United Nations

## Bibliography

1. *Adriansen, I., 2010. Erindringssteder i Danmark. Monumenter, mindesmærker og mødesteder. Copenhagen: Museum Tusulanums Forlag.*
2. *Arkitektforeningen, 2016. <https://www.arkitektforeningen.dk/konkurrence/mindesmaerke-i-mindelunden>. Accessed 15 October 2016.*
3. *B.dk, 2009. Politikere splittede over veteran-hjælp. Berlingske. Available at:*
4. *<http://www.b.dk/danmark/politikere-splittede-over-veteran-hjaelp>. Accessed 5 December 2016.*
5. *Bech, G. L., 2011. I Danmarks tjeneste. [Online] Bornholms Tidende. Available at :<http://tidende.dk/?Id=29245>. Accessed 7 December 2016.*
6. *Burg, S. L. and Shoup, P. S., 1999. The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. London: Routledge.*
7. *FMN, 2010. Anerkendelse og Støtte. Veteranpolitik. Forsvarsministeriet. Available at: <http://www.fmn.dk/temaer/veteraner/veteranpolitik/Documents/Veteranpolitik.pdf> Accessed 30 November 2016.*
8. *FMN 2016. Danmarks Veteranpolitik 2016. Forsvarsministeriet. Available at: <http://www.fmn.dk/temaer/veteraner/Documents/danmarks-veteranpolitik-2016.pdf>. Accessed 1 October 2016.*
9. *Ft.dk, 2006. § 20-spørgsmål S 6588 Om erstatningsregler for danske soldater. [Online] Available at: <http://www.ft.dk/samling/20051/spoergsmaal/S6588/index.htm>. Accessed 7 December 2016.*
10. *Hornemann, Johanne Duus, 2009. Hærens gule sløjfer går som varmt brød. [Online] Kristeligt Dagblad. Available at: <https://www.kristeligt-dagblad.dk/danmark/h%C3%A6rens-gule-sl%C3%B8jfer-g%C3%A5r-som-varmt-br%C3%B8d>. Accessed 5 December 2016.*
11. *Jakobsen, P. V., 2004. "Har Danmark et body bag syndrom?", Militært Tidsskrift, No. 1.*
12. *Jørgensen, T., 2009. "Den umulige medalje. Historien om de udekorerede veteraner fra 9. april 1940", Militært Tidsskrift, No. 1.*
13. *Kirchhoff, H. ; Lauridsen, J. T.; Aage Trommer (eds.) 2002. Gads Leksikon om Dansk besættelsestid 1940-1945. Copenhagen: Gads Forlag, 2002.*
14. *Kingsey, M., 2009. V og DF. Krigsveteraner skal foran i boligkøen. [Online] Information.dk. Available at: <https://www.information.dk/indland/2009/07/v-df-krigsveteraner-foran-boligkoeen> [Accessed 5 December 2016].*
15. *Krøner, M., 2016. Question (No. 141) by MP Marie to the Minister of Defence, 3 May 2016. Available at <http://www.ft.dk/samling/20151/almdelel/FOU/spm/141/index.htm>, Accessed 15 October 2016.*
16. *Lundgreen-Nielsen, F., 1992. På sporet af dansk identitet. Copenhagen: Spektrum.*
17. *Marckmann, A., 2001. "Sønderjyske krigsinvalidere fra 1. Verdenskrig. Sociale og lægelige aspekter", Sønderjyske årbøger 2001, pp143-180.*
18. *Mosse, G., 1991. Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars. New York: Oxford University Press.*
19. *Nielsen, H. K. 2006. Question no. S 6588 to the Defence Minister, 2006. <http://www.ft.dk/samling/20051/spoergsmaal/S6588/index.htm>. Accessed 7 December 2016.*
20. *Pedersen, L. N., and Westh, A., 2010. Pro/Kontra: Skal sårede soldater foran i køen?. [Online] Viden.jp.dk. Available at: <http://viden.jp.dk/undervisning/sites/danskereikrig/artikler/defysisksaaerede/default.asp?cid=151014>. Accessed 5 December 2016.*
21. *Poulsen, J., 2008, Det er på tide vi vågner. [Online] Fyens.dk. Available at:*
22. *<http://www.fyens.dk/modules/mobile/article?articleid=972205>. Accessed 5 December 2016.*
23. *Poulsen, N. B., 2016. "Den danske krigsveteran i internationalt lys". Fra Krig og Fred, No. 1, pp. 97-125.*

24. Rasmussen, J. B., 2014. "Danish Peacekeepers in the Republic of Serbian Krajina (Croatia), 1992-1995. Abridged version". *Baltic Security and Defence Review*, No. 16, 1, pp. 70-124.
25. Rasmussen, L. L., 2010. Statsminister Lars Løkke Rasmussens tale ved Folketingets åbning tirsdag den 5. oktober 2010. [Online] Available at: [http://www.stm.dk/\\_p\\_13260.html](http://www.stm.dk/_p_13260.html). Accessed 28 June 2016.
26. Ravnø, L., et al., 2010. Såret soldat føler sig svigtet. [Online] TV 2. Available at: <http://nyheder.tv2.dk/article.php/id-28205010%3As>. Accessed 7 December 2016.
27. Retsinformation.dk, 1940. Lov om Udbetaling af Hædersgaver til efterladte efter faldne og til saarede den 9. April 1940. [Online] Available at: <https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=19498>. Accessed 20 May 2016.
28. Slaegtsalbum.dk. Medaille for deltagelse i de Slesvigske Krige. [Online] Available at: <http://www.slaegtsalbum.dk/Dannebrogsmand%20,Medaille%201864/medaille.htm>. Accessed 7 December 2016.
29. Svendsen, 2009. "Fysisk og psykisk skadede soldater skal have særlig gode vilkår", *Politiken*, 2009. Available at <https://www.pressreader.com/denmark/politiken/20091209/282394100549554>. Accessed 28 March 2017.
30. Vaaben, L., 2010. Jeg ville ikke bryde mig om at tage pladsen for en anden. [Online] *Kristeligt Dagblad*. Available at: <https://www.kristeligt-dagblad.dk/danmark/jeg-ville-ikke-bryde-mig-om-tage-pladsen-en-anden>. Accessed 7 December 2016.
31. Villiaume, P., 1995. *Allieret med Forbehold – Danmark, NATO og den kolde krig*. Copenhagen: Vandkunsten.



## DOMOLJUBNE IN VETERANSKE ORGANIZACIJE – PRIMER SLOVENIJE

## PATRIOT AND VETERAN ORGANISATIONS – THE CASE OF SLOVENIA

**Povzetek** V prispevku predstavljamo ugotovitve, ki izhajajo iz proučevanja slovenskih domoljubnih in veteranskih organizacij. Na tej podlagi razpravljamo o značilnostih funkcionalnega in socialnega imperativa. Pri tem obravnavamo devet organizacij, ki so povezane v posebno koordinacijo. Veteranstvo na Slovenskem ima več kot 140-letno tradicijo in posebno razvojno pot vse do obdobja po osamosvojitvi Slovenije pred četrto stoletje. Slovenski primer tako vključuje domoljubne in veteranske organizacije, povezane z veterani prve in druge svetovne vojne ter osamosvojitvenega obdobja 1990–1991, pa tudi generacije, povezane z mednarodnimi operacijami in misijami, v katerih slovenski vojaki in policisti sodelujejo zadnjih dvajset let. Slovenija ima sodoben in tudi zelo liberalen pristop k organizaciji ter delovanju domoljubnih in veteranskih društev in zvez, ki jih financira prek obrambnega ministrstva, izjema so organizacije vojnih in civilnih invalidov vojn, ki jih financira pristojno ministrstvo za socialne zadeve. Dve slovenski posebnosti sta povezani z vprašanjem, kako in kdo ščiti vrednote, ki jih zastopajo in ohranjajo domoljubne in veteranske organizacije, ter kako te dejavnosti lahko prispevajo k spravi zaradi dejanj, ki so med nacistično in fašistično okupacijo ter družbeno revolucijo najbolj razklale in razdelile številne generacije Slovencev, takrat in pozneje. Ugotovitve kažejo, da tranzicijsko obdobje teh zadev v Sloveniji še ni končano.

**Ključne besede** *Domoljubne in veteranske organizacije, društva, Koordinacija domoljubnih in veteranskih organizacij Slovenije, vojni veterani, zaščita vojnih veteranov.*

**Abstract** The paper presents the findings from the study of Slovenian patriot and veteran organizations (PVOs). On the basis of this, we discuss the characteristics of the functional and social imperative. In this respect, nine different PVOs are discussed, which are linked through a special coordination. Veteran activities on Slovenian soil have had an over 140-year old tradition and a special development path up to the

period after Slovenia gained independence a quarter of a century ago. Slovenian example includes PVOs related to First and Second World War veterans, veterans of the 1990 through 1991 independence period as well as the generations associated with international operations and missions, which have included Slovenian soldiers and police officers for the last twenty years. Slovenia has a modern, but also a very liberal approach to the organization and functioning of patriot and veteran societies and associations, which are financed by the Ministry of Defence, with the exception of military and civilian war-disabled organizations, funded by the Ministry responsible for social affairs. Two Slovenian particularities are linked to the question of how and who is protecting the values represented and cherished by PVOs, and how their activities can contribute to the reconciliation with respect to the offenses which during the time of Nazi-Fascist occupation and social revolution divided the then and many subsequent generations of Slovenians. According to the findings, the transition period with regard to these matters in Slovenia is not yet complete.

**Key words** *Patriot and veteran organizations, societies, coordination of patriot and veteran organizations of Slovenia, war veterans, protection of war veterans.*

**Introduction** On the occasion of the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of independence of the Republic of Slovenia and the War for independent Slovenia, nine Slovenian PVOs took part in the preparation and execution of the 16<sup>th</sup> Annual Conference of the PFP Conflict Studies Working Group "Veterans and Society" Demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants through history. The invitation to participate was also the beginning of research and study of the Slovenian case, which was later completed (Šteiner and Čas, 2017). In this paper we use and present a part of this research.

In the presentation of the applied methodological framework, we wish to emphasize that our study and discussion were based on the hypothesis that the structure and functioning of Slovenian organisations in the field of war veterans and military disabled was rather specific and was historically conditioned with its extremely transitional characteristics. In this respect, we have focused on nine patriotic and veteran societies and associations joining war veterans, civilian war veterans and the corps of military elders of four generations<sup>1</sup>. For the purposes of an explanatory single case study<sup>2</sup> our question was, what is the organisation of Slovenian PVOs, what are their mission, activities and the implementation of the public interest. Our research focused on finding answers to how the functional imperative<sup>3</sup> of PVOs was implemented and what were Slovenia's particularities with regard to the borderline between patriots and veterans, cooperation with state authorities, their financing, mutual and international cooperation, structure and number of members, as well

<sup>1</sup> These include First and Second World War elders, independence process and War for Slovenia elders and elders from post-cold war international operations. More in Guštin, 2016 and 2014, pp. 9–12.

<sup>2</sup> For the methodological basis of the explanatory single case study see Yin, 2009, p. 9.

<sup>3</sup> For the definition of functional and social imperative of veteran organisations related to the First and Second World Wars see Prebilič and Juvan, 2014.

as the implementation of their mission and tasks. The above-mentioned questions are also being answered in the discussion, where, in addition to those questions, we also seek answers related to reconciliation and the implementation of other social imperative elements, such as values, attitude towards the historical memory and, most of all, patriotism, and to the question whether or not we need veteran organisations. In this respect, we start by providing the definitions of patriotism and war veterans, patriot organisations, veteran organisations and the attitude of the state towards these questions.

Our comparative analysis focused on the processing of statutory documents of the above-mentioned societies and associations and statistical indicators as well as the materials and presentations prepared for the aforementioned conference held in 2016 in Slovenia. Our main tool for the presentation of the situation and our findings was the descriptive method. Our semi-standardized interviews included the most prominent representatives of nine societies and associations under consideration. However, the authors obtained an important part of their findings from the participant observation within the Coordination organisation of Patriot and Veteran Organisations of Slovenia (CoPVOS). This article would certainly not be possible without the support and assistance of the president and members of the CoPVOS in the final part of our research and effort to prepare an article, for which we are grateful.

## 1 THE NOTION OF PATRIOTISM AND WAR VETERANS

### 1.1 The notion of patriotism

The Dictionary of Standard Slovene (Slovar slovenskega knjižnega jezika) defines patriotism (domoljubje) as love of home, homeland (SAZU, 2010). According to Žalec, patriotism is a special emotion or value; it is love of one's homeland. Love of homeland and patriotism are not the same as love of one's country or one's nation. A state is a means necessary for a good living of people with different homelands. Homeland primarily defines one's identity. (Žalec, 2006, p. 78). According to Putnam (2002, pp. 96–97), however, we must all live and judge from our own respective heritages while remaining open to insights and external criticism. To love home and one's homeland in a wider context is and will always be a noble act, since it helps and provides the livelihood both of a family and, consequently the people and the nation (Prebilič and Haček, 2011, p. 11).

In a patriotic society, one can rely on and trust other people, because they know they are patriots. If there is no such trust, there is room for manipulation with the people's feelings, and for the unnecessary and expensive politicization of various issues. The feeling of common identity, affiliation to a certain group of people, the feeling that other people are a part of us, helps us maintain the attitude of trust, mutual trust and solidarity, which the citizens need (Kymlicka, 1999, p. 27). Modern societies depend on a spontaneous support of their members, who have to be aware that the modern society is a joint venture and that cosmopolitanism and patriotism are not

mutually exclusive. Patriotism is also the basic component of a positive self-esteem. Democracy, personal growth and positive self-esteem are the values, which take the highest place on the chart of moral values and are closely related. Patriotism is like a foundation for their implementation. It is therefore a publically and socially important value and as such should also be nurtured in the public morals and ethics (Žalec, 2006, p. 79) or at all levels, but mainly with some public services and entities providing for national security of the Republic of Slovenia.

It is therefore hard to talk about patriotism, if we neglect or even conscientiously overlook the past. In this respect, one does not need to go too far back to find meaning of the patriotism of the Slovenians, knowing that they had fought for their independence since their inception. In the beginning, of course, these efforts were less successful and visible than in the contemporary history (Čas, 2009b, p. 38). Even in our former common state of Yugoslavia, we showed the love of our country and all the nations within it. However, we felt more for our narrow homeland – Slovenia, the Slovenian nation, the values of the Slovenian nation, our own identity (Čas, 2009a, p.177). In fact, we had no other option but to maintain our open patriotism and cosmopolitanism and to fight as Slovenians in the former Yugoslavia against non-open forms of patriotism. This had brought us to the point where we have expressed the identity of the Slovenian nation and patriotism through the independence of the Republic of Slovenia and demonstrated our open patriotism and cosmopolitanism by joining our new community, the European Union. Such open patriotism and cosmopolitanism is also expected from those who aspire to join the European Union (Čas, 2009b, p. 38). In none of those cases, however, the affiliation to the European Union cannot imply the renouncement of any system characteristic that defines us as a nation. Quite the opposite, a national identity is a prerequisite for the European one. You can only be a European if you are German, Slovenian, French, member of one of the European nations (Bučar, 2009, p. 70).

Generally, we can say that the worse people feel in their respective environments, the less patriotism is present. Even excessive accentuation of merits of those “most deserving”, which clearly scorns others, does not enable or at least inhibits the identification with the “homeland”. It is the “home” of us all (Hribar, 2009, p. 18). »Despite the fast globalization process, patriotism will remain a topical sentiment, since home and homeland will also be known in the future. How they will be loved and treated in the future, however, depends on how well we will know it and how much pride we will take in it. One should not forget that patriotism has significantly contributed to the building of social cohesion of individual societies and, consequently, the homeland (Prebilič and Barle Lakota, 2010, p. 56).

## 1.2 The notion of war veterans

A war veteran is often defined as an old experienced soldier who had served his turn, or an elderly and experienced worker in a specific field (SAZU, 2010). In its definition, the War Veterans Act (ZVV-UPB2, 2006, Art.1) focuses on war veterans of 1991 and on persons who can hold a veteran status. Later, the act additionally

describes veterans as the persons who have participated in the national-liberation war (Second World War fighters and other people related to this war) and members of the national revolutionary organisation TIGR.

The role and the tasks of veteran organizations can in general be defined as an organisation representing veterans in their effort to obtain, maintain and improve their social status, assistance in all types of health care, improvement of their psycho-social status, and the formation of common standpoints, socializing, mutual assistance and omnipresent social reintegration and preservation of the historical memory and values in the system as well as in the society. Just as patriot organizations, war veteran organizations play an important role in the civil society. There is an important bastion of values in a modern society, an urgent pillar of historical memory and a reminder of difficult events and an important link between the civilian society and the defence and security system as well as someone who can provide assistance in the education process of the young.

### 1.3 War veteran and patriot

Considering the definition of a war veteran from the War Veterans Act, it is clear who a war veteran is. A war veteran can of course also be a patriot. However, everyone who considers themselves as a patriot cannot also be a war veteran. This fact should also be taken into consideration when determining the status of a veteran or patriot organization and can be highlighted as a subject of a separate discussion.

## 2 SLOVENIAN VETERAN AND PATRIOT ORGANISATIONS

Below we present nine Slovenian patriot and veteran societies and associations through their official definition, mission statement, activities and initial activities as well as their transition at the establishment of the independent Republic of Slovenia. We continue by presenting the organizations, which on 16 September 2008 in the Office of the President of the Republic of Slovenia and in his presence, officially signed the Agreement on the cooperation of patriot and veteran organizations of Slovenia<sup>4</sup>.

**The Association of "General Maister" Societies** (acronym ZDGM) is a federation of patriot associations which bring together descendants of General Maister's combatants and other people who want to preserve the memory of the historical work and patriotic message of General Rudolf Maister and his fighters for the northern border, as well as those who were actively involved in the efforts for the formation of independent Slovenia and are actively involved in patriot societies nurturing patriotism (Statutory contract, Art.1). The ZDGM covers mainly veteran activities related to the First World War.

<sup>4</sup> In 2012, the Association of Civilian War-Disabled of Slovenia also joined the CoPVOS, which now includes nine members (Podržaj, 2017).

The mission of the ZDGM is to promote national awareness of the Slovenians, to educate young generations of Slovenians in the form of patriotic activities and to preserve historical memory of the fights for the northern border, fights against fascism and fights for an independent Slovenia. In cooperation with the Slovenian Armed Forces and by working together with other patriot and veteran organizations, they promote patriotism and enhance the defence abilities of the Republic of Slovenia (ZDGM, 2016).

In the independent Slovenia, the ZDGM was established on 15 September 2005 (ZDGM, 2016), while the Ljubljana society had been active since 1998.

**The Association cultivating the patriotic traditions of the Organization TIGR of Primorska** (shorter name **Primorska TIGR Association**, acronym **TIGR**) is a patriot association which connects members cultivating the traditions based on TIGR's tradition (TIGR, 2016).

The mission of the society is to cultivate the memory of the activities of the wartime TIGR organization and to raise awareness about the importance and role of antifascism in the region of Primorska between the two world wars as well as the real role of TIGR and its contribution to the annexation of the region to the native country (<http://www.tigr-drustvo.si/>). Efforts have been directed towards the goal to acknowledge after the years of silence the role of TIGR members and their importance in the fight against fascism and to provide the organisation with a historically justified value (TIGR, 2016).

The current TIGR society was founded on 21 May 1994. It was joined by the surviving members of the Organization TIGR of Venezia Giulia in Italy (the today's Primorska region), which had operated from 1927 to 1941, their relatives, supporters and friends, and others. Members of the society are also the Slovenians living in Italy<sup>5</sup>. It is a unified society, which is organized into nine territorial units.

**The Union of Slovenian Veteran Associations for the Values of the National Liberation Struggle of Slovenia** (acronym **ZZB NOB Slovenia** or **ZZB**) is a veteran organization of those involved in the fight against Nazism and Fascism and their younger supporters. It is one of the largest civil society organizations in Slovenia<sup>6</sup>, since, in addition to the still living fighters and activists of the National Liberation Struggle (hereinafter NOB), victims of war violence and other participants of the 1941-1945 National Liberation Struggle, it includes members who have a respectful and positive attitude towards NOB and are willing to participate in the efforts to promote the values of this struggle. These values include in particular: patriotism, liberalism, fight against Nazi-Fascism, sovereignty, comradeship,

<sup>5</sup> *In the ethnically mixed area of Italy, territorial clubs are active in Trieste, Gorizia and Veneto (ibid).*

<sup>6</sup> *Both due to its membership (42,000) and its 705 regional clubs in 82 societies.*

equality, solidarity, humanity, fairness, social justice and other values that ensure respect for human rights<sup>7</sup>.

The predecessor of the ZZB was established on 4 July 1948. In 1991, the ZZB exited the Yugoslav Association, and a year later reorganized and renamed itself. Since 1997, it has also been accepting those who had not participated in the National Liberation War. It obtained the current name in 2007 (ZZB, 2016). It has been full member of the World Veterans Federation (WVF) since 1993.

The **Union of War-Disabled Societies of Slovenia** (acronym **ZDVIS**) is a voluntary, autonomous, independent and non-profit union of war-disabled associations. It is a representative disabled people's organization for military wars and peacetime military disabled persons with the status of war-disabled, and other persons entitled to protection under the War Disability Act (Statute ZDVIS Art.1 and 2). It connects association of war disabled from the Second World War, the Slovenian Liberation War and the 1991 War for Slovenia.

The mission of the ZDVIS is to provide social and health protection and the protection of war disabled veterans. It provides assistance in exercising the rights guaranteed to beneficiaries, helps to overcome life difficulties due to disability, and provides training to maximize their independence in every-day life (<http://www.zdvis.si/o-nas>).

The predecessor of the ZDVIS in the post-war Yugoslavia was founded in 1945<sup>8</sup>. The ZDVIS was established on 19 December 1994. It has been actively involved in the disability movement of Slovenia and has since 1995 been linked to the National Council of Disability Organizations of Slovenia (hereinafter NSIOS). It has been full member of the WVF since 1997 (ZDVIS 2016).

The **Association of War-Disabled Civilians of Slovenia** (acronym **ZDCIVS**) is a representational disability organization of associations of civilian war disabled whose aim is to note, advocate and meet the specific common needs of the war-disabled civilians and represent their interests (Statute ZDCIVS, Art. 1). The ZDCIVS's activities are considered to be complementary to the work of public services in care for the disabled.

The association and the societies operate on the basis of human relations and solidarity between the people and are committed to peaceful settlement of disputes between people, between nations and between countries. With its international activities, the association aims at opposing war and all forms of aggression and terrorism (ZDCIVS Statute, Art. 10. and ZDCIVS, 2016).

<sup>7</sup> Adapted from <http://www.zzb-nob.si/kdo-smo/o-nas/>.

<sup>8</sup> On the Slovenian ground as early as in 1875, the Maribor Veterans and Healthcare Association was established (ZDVIS, 2016).

The predecessor of the ZDCIVS was established on 22 December 1970; in 1977, it was renamed the Association of Slovenian civilian war-disabled and retained its name in independent Slovenia. It has been operating under today's name since 2002. It has been actively involved in the disability movement of Slovenia, and since 1995 a part of NSIOS. In the international environment, it has been a co-founder of the European Association of War Invalids (ZDCIVS, 2016).

The **Union of Veterans of the War for Slovenia** (acronym **ZVVS**) is a veteran organization whose members took part in the preparations for war or in direct defence activities during the war in the period from May 1990 to October 1991 (ZVVS, 2016). It is non-partisan, non-political, non-profit organization of societies and individuals with the status of the 1991 war veterans (<http://www.zvvs.si/?stran=onas.html>).

The ZVVS's mission is to preserve the historical memory<sup>9</sup> of the said period, and to develop patriotism and care for social status and position of war veterans in Slovenia as well as to cooperate internationally with similar organizations in order to increase the visibility of the organization in Slovenia and abroad (VRO, 2016).

The ZVVS was established as the Association of Veterans of the War for Slovenia on 10 October 1993. In 2000, it was transformed into the Union of the Veterans of the War for Slovenia. (ZVVS, 2016). It has been full member of the WVF since 1994.

**The Association of Police Veteran Societies “Sever”** (shorter name **Association “Sever”** or acronym **ZPVDS**) is a veteran organization related to Slovenia's independence process. It is a voluntary, apolitical and patriotic association of police veteran societies. Members of the “Sever” societies are members of internal affairs bodies of the Republic of Slovenia (hereinafter ONZ) or volunteers who had taken part in ONZs' activities to protect the democratic processes in Slovenia or in the 1991 War for Slovenia (Sever, 2016). In 2017, the veterans within the ZPVDS adopted a special Charter of Fundamental values which defines the eight values on which to base the formation of goals and implementation of tasks of the ZPVDS and society members<sup>10</sup>.

The Association “Sever” was founded on 26 March 1994 as an integrated association for the entire country. The association was named after the famous operation “Sever” (North) and the activities and then ONZs of 1 December 1989 in Ljubljana<sup>11</sup>. The transformation of the association of societies in today's association began in 1998

<sup>9</sup> *The ZZVS celebrates its day on 17 May in memory of the day when the 1990 order to hand over the weapons from Territorial Defence depots was ignored and the National Defence Manoeuvre Structure (MSNZ) project was launched.*

<sup>10</sup> *See more at <http://www.zdruzenje-sever.si/sl/news/zdruzenje-sever/redna-letna-skupscina-zveze-policijskih-veteranskih-drustev-sever2.html>.*

<sup>11</sup> *This was a meaningful activity to disconnect from the federal authorities and their repressive bodies. Therefore, 1 December also marks the memorial day of the Association “Sever” (ZPVD, 2016).*

and was completed in 2002. Since 2009, it is also a full member of the WVF, which is a unique example in this international association.

**The Association of MORiS clubs and societies** (shorter name **Association MORiS** or acronym **MORiS**) is a non-political and volunteer organization that connects clubs and societies whose members act in the public interest in the field of defence and war veterans.

The mission of the association is to combine and preserve the historical significance of the MSNZ, the 27<sup>th</sup> Territorial Defence Safety Unit and the 30<sup>th</sup> Development Group, later called the 1<sup>st</sup> Special Brigade MORiS during the preparations for the independence, defence of independence and statehood, and during the War for Slovenia (Vaš, 2017 p. 3). Through its programme the association carries out educational, cultural, artistic, sports and recreational activities. Through its members, it retains veteran, country-loyal and patriotic traditions, high ethical standards and a model of Slovenian military professionalism and Slovenian soldiers throughout the historical period of national existence (ibid).

The MORiS association was founded by ten societies on 11 November 2008. Its structure results from the guideline to ensure a broad integration of civilian associations<sup>12</sup>.

**The Association of Slovenian Officers** (acronym **ZSČ**) is a voluntary, independent, expert, stakeholder and professional association of societies. It joins military officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers as well as other experts both active and reserve component. In this respect, they particularly seek to strengthen patriotism, support and solidarity, and conservation activities and forms of organization in defence and security as well as to preserve the activities and organisational form in the field of defence and security, and civil disaster relief (ZSČ, 2016).

The predecessor of the association was founded in 1952 as an expert organization of reserve military elders. The Officer Association of Slovenia (acronym ZČS) was founded after the Slovenia's gaining of independence on 12 October 1993. On 10 March 2007, it was renamed the Association of Slovenian Officers (ZSČ) as we know it today. The Association of Slovenian Peacekeepers (acronym ZSM)<sup>13</sup> was founded in 2013. In the process of defence and military transition, the ZČS/ZSČ carried out an extremely important role in the demobilization of military personnel after the war of independence and in the suspension of the model of mass armed forces, transition to professional manning, and the professionalization of armed forces (ZSČ, 2016). The ZSČ is involved in several forms of international and bilateral cooperation.

<sup>12</sup> In March 2017, the following societies were incorporated into the association: 13 shooting, 3 veteran and martial arts respectively, 2 sports and soccer respectively, and one automobile, equestrian, aviation, archery, singing, student and history club respectively (Adapted from Vaš, 2017, p. 6).

<sup>13</sup> It includes the so-called fourth generation of veterans who have since 1997 participated in international operations and missions, but also their predecessors from 1950s and 1960s.

### 3 DISCUSSION

In the discussion, we will touch upon the relationship of the state and its representatives towards the values followed by the veteran PVOs as well as the issue of their contribution and role in the reconciliation. We continue by assessing the impact of the society's transition characteristics on the operation of PVOs as well as the examples of politicizing and the approach to the financing of the PVOs. We note the characteristics of civil-military cooperation of the discussed PVOs with the Slovenian Armed Forces and the Police. Additionally, we present the findings and discuss the specificities of Slovenian PVOs in view of their mission, status within the WVF and specific status of public interest in the Slovenian society. This is associated with the representativeness in the field of war veterans and the implementation of the functional imperative of veteran organizations as well as the number of PVO members and the number of war veterans within them.

We shall begin the discussion with the **attitude of the state and its representatives towards the values** as an important starting point. Patriot and veteran organizations are in a specific way related to people, values and the historical memory. In this respect, a historical distance can affect the preservation of historical memory, which war veterans consider a very delicate area. This is particularly true in the case of converting generally accepted historical facts and interference with socially accepted values and fundamental human rights. The practice has already provided answers to the question of whether the death of the last veteran gives an end to veteran values of a certain generation. As we observe these changes and development in the transition countries, it is precisely with the PVOs that the question arises when with regard to the feelings and perceptions of values and events these should be preserved and when faulted, and whether with war veterans this is at all possible and reasonable. It is a challenge of a transformative character, since it requires complex changes – be it at the individual level - from warrior into a peacekeeper, between good and evil, between a war offender and a victim, or be it at the level of society - between the right and a wrong side in time of war violence. It can also affect the relations between occupiers and defenders, or uprising and collaboration, all through to the dilemmas of a good or bad country and its social structure and administration during which war veterans implemented their mission. A continuously respective positive attitude towards the abovementioned facts by the state or state representatives is very important. This challenge is also difficult due to the stance of veteran organizations as natural and representational defenders of values and messages as well as the belief that their socially acknowledged actions had been appropriate. As a rule, this was in conflict with some counterparties, thus it is also important to touch the questions and challenges related to the reconciliation.

With regard to the **contribution and role of Slovenian PVOs to reconciliation**, we should state that there are no visible results. The trend is even directed and managed in the opposite direction. This means that there is more emphasis of readiness and highlighting of the importance of reconciliation, but the practice does not follow this. The reasons for this could be found in a branched and diverse structure of Slovenian PVOs, which includes veterans of the first and second world wars, the independence

war and post-cold war international operations. However, more than that, the reasons for the politicization attempts of PVOs lies in the strengthening of ideological divisions in the society, in the cases of misrepresentation and reinterpretation of historical facts and in the emergence of intolerance. Moreover, the diverse structure of a generation's veteran organizations is not an isolated phenomenon in Europe, especially when it comes to the so-called third generation of veterans from the period at the end of the Cold War and democratization processes. We have already presented nine PVOs. However, due to *weltanschauung* and ideology-based divisions, it comes to the establishment of parallel PVOs in Slovenia. It can be concluded that as a result of the abovementioned facts Slovenian PVOs, are more than on the reconciliation focused on the protection of the historical memory and values arising thereof.

In addition to what has been mentioned, in assessing **the impact of transitional characteristics of the society on the functioning of PVOs** several examples of politicization and party subordination of PVOs can be highlighted in Slovenia. This is primarily reflected in the functioning of parallel PVOs (for example: Association for the Values of Slovenia's Independence (acronym VSO) and the Patriotic TIGR - May 13). The question is whether the new law on NGOs, which is being prepared in accordance with European legislation, will manage to stop the politicisation of veterans with the definitions that non-governmental organizations, including patriot and veteran organisations must not establish political parties. With regard to their role in the social development, the political sensibility of war veterans is understandable and in line with the expectations of the public. It has been particularly obvious among second- and third-generation veterans. If in the former Yugoslavia, Second World War veterans and national liberation struggle fighters enjoyed the status of a political party through their veteran organization, they are now faced with especially difficult challenges due to the attempts of marginalization or distortion of historical facts. On the other hand, 3<sup>rd</sup> generation veterans, who had through military and non-military independence and democratization activities and other transitional changes gone through special personal and social transformation, became sensitive to the labelling with the forces of continuity. This is especially due to the fact that the transformation did not occur only in the field of politics, but also in the field of the repressive apparatus in which they were involved, as well as its operation<sup>14</sup>. The above-mentioned facts represent the characteristics of the process of the reintegration of war veterans into the society, which has proved as special in transition countries.

Examining the **financing of PVOs** in the case of Slovenia indicates that the Ministry of Defence is the administrator and financier of the discussed PVOs (ZDGM, TIGR, ZZB, ZVVS, ZPVDS, MORiS). Funding from the state budget is implemented on the basis of the applicable rules on the criteria for co-financing the activities of societies or associations of war veterans<sup>15</sup>. The programmes of societies in the field of war disabled

<sup>14</sup> Operation of the ONZ (today's police structures) of 1 December 1989 or the reaction to the attempted seizure or weapons to Slovenian Territorial Defence forces in May 1990 can be highlighted as the most important ones.

<sup>15</sup> See more at [http://www.mo.gov.si/si/medijsko\\_sredisce/sporocila/archive/2017/3/browse/1/](http://www.mo.gov.si/si/medijsko_sredisce/sporocila/archive/2017/3/browse/1/).

and victims of war violence are co-financed by the Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities (hereinafter Ministry of Labour). The Slovenian Armed Forces, on the other hand co-finances the ZSČ. Funds from the state budget are an important source of financing of the discussed associations. However, it is also important to mention the resources that the societies get within their local communities from the municipalities or from membership in the form of compulsory membership fees and other financial contributions.

The **cooperation of the Slovenian Armed Forces** with the discussed PVOs is conducted within the framework of the so-called civil-military cooperation (hereinafter CIMIC). This in Slovenian case also include several other civilian organizations, associations and societies operating in the public interest in the field of defence, sports, training and humanitarian activities. For this purpose, annual CIMIC plans are drafted for each organization following the principle of transparency and reciprocity. It should, however, be noted that annual plans are also signed for the cooperation of the Police and the ZPVD Sever. They are used to coordinate joint projects and activities.

The study further reveals **more specifics of Slovenian PVOs**. The first one is associated with the already mentioned PVOs connecting four generations of veterans. In fact, only two generations have been granted the status of war veterans by the state (the second and the third). Further, we note that in the case of Slovenia it is not possible to clearly distinguish between veterans and other patriot organizations. If in this attempt, we classify Slovenian veteran PVOs according to whether they are connected with the WVF<sup>16</sup>, we find that there are only four in the case of Slovenia: ZZB, ZDVIS, ZVVS and ZPVDS.

**The representativeness of PVOs** in the field of war veterans and war invalids can be credibly verified through the fact whether a majority of their members enjoy the status of war veterans or war disabled and civilian war disabled. The study shows that, under that criterion, there are two such veteran (ZVVS and ZPVDS) and two disability organizations (ZDVIS and ZDCIVS) in Slovenia. It should be added, however, that the association, which is responsible for the mission of First World War veterans and the society of the TIGR organization no longer have any veteran with the appropriate status from that period<sup>17</sup>, that at the end of 2016, the veteran organization (ZZB), which takes care of the Second World War veterans and national liberation struggle fighters had only 8,000 members with the status of Second World War veteran<sup>18</sup>, out of a total of 42,000 members in the societies it comprises.

<sup>16</sup> *The World Veterans Federation (WVF) is the largest international non-profit, non-governmental organization. Established in Paris, France in 1950 by founding members from 8 countries, namely: Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Turkey, USA and Yugoslavia. The WVF is now a Federation of 172 veteran organizations from 121 countries representing some 45 million veterans worldwide. The WVF for Europe includes over 70 different national veteran associations from 40 countries (<http://www.wvf-fmac.org/>).*

<sup>17</sup> *The last General Maister's fighter in Slovenia was Friderik Kralj, Slovenian NCO, partisan and Maister's fighter for the northern border; born in 1900, who died in 1999. The last TIGR member and participant of the national liberation struggle died in 2013; it was Franc Čopi - Borotin, born in 1916.*

<sup>18</sup> *And just over 1,600 members with a status of victim of war.*

When classifying Slovenian PVOs according to the **status of public interest** granted to them by the state, it can be established, in addition to the peculiarities of statuses granted by state authorities, that out of the nine discussed organizations there are five veteran, two war disabled, one professional (ZSČ) and one patriot (TIGR). The public interest in the field of defence has been granted to four associations, but is practically implemented by all nine PVOs, if we take into consideration the annual agreements on cooperation with the Slovenian Armed Forces. As a special feature, we can add that two PVOs implement the public interest in the field of education and one in the field of culture. Seven types of public status, however, have been granted in the areas covered by five ministries. Officially, only five of them, plus two conditional (war disability organizations, AN) have been officially granted the status of a veteran organisation. However, considering the above-mentioned representativeness, there are only four such associations. The overview of acquired statuses of public interest broken down by PVOs in 2016 is presented in Table 1.

**Table 1:**  
Overview of  
acquired statuses  
of public interest  
by PVOs in 2016

No	PVO	Area of public interest for which the status has been granted						
		war veterans	war disabled	war graves	war violence	defence	education & training	culture
1.	ZDGM	X				X	X	X
2.	TIGR						X <sup>19</sup>	
3.	ZZB	X		X	X			
4.	ZDVIS		X					
5.	ZDCIVS		X					
6.	ZVVS	X				X		
7.	ZPVDS	X		X				
8.	MORIS	X				X		
9.	ZSČ					X		
TOTAL		5	2	2	1	4	2	1

When examining the **mission and the implementation of the functional imperative of veteran organizations** one can determine that patriotism is prevailing. In this respect, in the missions of PVOs, the functional imperative concerning the care for the social security of veterans, care for the health safety and assistance as well as the care of sick veterans, the participation in the regulation of the veteran status affairs and maintenance of memorials and war graves is somehow pushed aside. That is also confirmed by the fact that the state has granted 17 statuses of public interest to

<sup>19</sup> Also includes the field of national consciousness strengthening.

nine PVOs. It is our estimate that Slovenian PVOs in their effort to compensate for status-covered war veterans and war disabled resort under the umbrella of patriot organizations and the wide openness enabled by the Societies Act. This transitional change in the functional imperative of veteran organizations can be characterized as a shift from caring for war veterans to the efforts to maintain the mission and their historical role. The shift is conditioned by the fact that veterans are aging and passing away. In the social imperative, the change can be seen in the shift from the emphasis on the acquisition and merit to the achieving of understanding and respect for the values for which the veterans strive. In other words, the functional imperative is a shift from material to immaterial components, while the social imperative is a shift from the exposure and exaltation of heroes to the highlighting of messages inherent to peace and justice.

When **displaying the number of war veterans in Slovenia**, we emphasize that the granting of the status of war veterans and official records are the responsibility of the State and its administrative units. It is a Slovenian peculiarity that the normatively veteran protection of independence-war veterans, who enjoy very limited benefits, is associated with the age of 55. This leads to the fact that individuals identify the importance of the status, which leads them to attempt to acquire it. However, the status of veterans in Slovenia has not yet been normatively settled for the fourth generation of veterans who had participated in international operations and missions<sup>20</sup>. The data presented in Table 2 show a comparison of the structures between 2015 and 2016 by category, as classified by the competent ministry.

The presented facts face us with the challenge of **identifying and displaying the number of veterans and PVO members**. We emphasize that it is not possible to determine the precise number of veterans in Slovenian PVOs due to the procedure required to access public and personal data. It is clear, however, that the number of war veterans cannot be equated with the number of PVO members, especially if these organizations also enrol persons who have no disability or veteran status, which, on the other hand, is not contrary to the Societies Act. In addition, veterans' members in PVOs intertwine and, consequently, the number even doubles. The growth of members in societies can be represented as the development of societies and associations on the one hand, and the growth of the number of veterans in Slovenia on the other. The increasing number of veterans can be attributed to the fact that the 2006 War Veterans Act introduced 14 new categories of veterans. Moreover, there is a feature that, according to the relevant ministry - Ministry of Labour, since 1996, when the first law on independence war veterans was passed, not one procedure has been introduced to verify the veteran status against fraud. Neither were any of the members deprived of their veteran status. Table 3 presents the number of societies and members of the discussed PVOs in Slovenia, and the collected data on the number of veterans in them.

<sup>20</sup> *In the twenty years of participation of the Republic of Slovenia in international operations and missions, over 11,300 members of the armed forces, about 600 members of the police and over 40 civilian functional experts have been involved.*

**Table 2:**  
Comparison of  
the structure of  
war veterans,  
war disabled and  
victims of war in  
Slovenia between  
2015 and 2016  
**Source:**  
MDDSZEM, 2017.

	Category according to the Ministry of Labour	31 Dec 2015	31 Dec 2016	Index	Structure
					%
1.	<b>NATIONAL LIBERATION STRUGGLE WAR VETERANS</b>				
1.1.	National Liberation Struggle (NOB) fighters	6,811	5,643	82.85	70.11
1.2.	Civilian participants younger than 15	1,702	1,587	93.24	19.72
1.3.	NOB fighters from other parts of former Yugoslavia	764	648	84.82	8.05
1.4.	Members of allied armies	30	18	60.00	0.22
1.5.	War prisoners 1941	18	14	77.78	0.17
1.6.	Other beneficiaries	157	139	88.53	1.73
TOTAL		9,482	8,049	84.89	100.00
2.	<b>WAR DISABLED</b>				
2.1.	Military war disabled	590	473	80.17	15.44
2.2.	Military peacetime disabled	893	857	95.97	27.97
2.3.	Civilian war disabled	837	781	93.31	25.49
2.4.	Disabled of the 1991 aggression against Slovenia	93	92	98.92	3.00
2.5.	Family members of the deceased disabled	979	861	87.95	28.10
TOTAL		3,392	3,064	90.33	100.00
3.	<b>1991 WAR VETERANS</b>				
3.1.	Territorial Defence	38,838	38,270	98.54	64.20
3.2.	Police veterans	8,205	8,205	100.00	13.76
3.3.	National protection	6,305	6,075	96.35	10.19
3.4.	Working duty recruits	3,974	4,018	101.10	6.74
3.5.	Other	3,072	3,044	99.09	5.11
TOTAL		60,394	59,612	98.71	100.00
4.	<b>WAR VICTIMS</b>				
4.1.	Camp prisoners	1,119	995	88.92	2.72
4.2.	Prisoners	405	358	88.40	0.98
4.3.	Deportees	10,616	9,875	93.02	26.96
4.4.	Internees	841	738	87.75	2.01
4.5.	Working deportees	452	375	82.96	1.02
4.6.	Refugees and outcasts	11,435	10,817	94.60	29.53
4.7.	Stolen children	314	275	87.58	0.75
4.8.	Forced draftees	1,076	828	76.95	2.26
4.9.	Children of the fallen NOB members	12,199	11,431	93.70	31.21
4.10.	Children of the executed parents in NOB units	730	696	95.34	1.90
4.11.	Former interned Italian soldiers from the Primorska region	16	13	81.25	0.04
4.12.	Refugees due to NOB activities and others	238	227	95.38	0.62
TOTAL		39,441	36,628	92.87	100.00

The table shows that the nine PVOs in Slovenia have a total of nearly 90,500 members. According to our estimates, a third of them enjoy a disability or veteran status. The comparison of data on the status of war veterans, war disabled and victims of war shows that at the end of 2016, there were 70,725 persons with status in Slovenia and an additional 36,628 people with the status of victims of war<sup>21</sup>. One third of the latter were members of a PVO.

**Table 1:**  
Overview of the number of associations, PVO members and veterans with status on 31 December 2016.

No	PVO	No of societies	No of members	Veterans with status <sup>21</sup>	War disabled with status	Note–double count
1.	ZDGM	25	1,489	6 %		94
2.	TIGR	1	1,137	47 %		536
3.	ZZB	82	42,000	9,667		
4.	ZDVIS	14	2,973		2,160	
5.	ZDCIVS	6	1,005		904	
6.	ZVVS	57	24,500	13,600		
7.	ZPVDS	12	6,268	5,103		
8.	MORIS <sup>22</sup>	30	3,350	730		
9.	ZSČ	52	7,740	60 %		4,650
TOTAL		279	90,462	29,100	3,064	6,010

Let us conclude our discussion by answering the question whether or not veteran organizations are needed. As part of an affirmative answer in the studied case, it is a fact that the war veterans in Slovenia have more than a 140-year tradition and a historical dynamics from both world wars and the end of the Cold War, as well as at least a fourfold change of government regulation and the transition of veterans and the care for their rights, health and social protection from one institution to another. With regard to the discussion, it could be concluded that veteran organizations are needed, especially since they are also patriotic, and represent an important link between the civil society and the national security system of the Republic of Slovenia.

<sup>21</sup> Total number on 31 December 2016 consist 107,353 persons or 5.2 percentage of Slovenian population.

<sup>22</sup> Data percentages are given in order to avoid duplication of the number of enrolled veterans, which is presented in the note.

<sup>23</sup> Number of members refers to the date of 7 April 2017 (Vaš, 2017, p.6).

## Conclusion

The presentation of the findings of the survey and study of PVOs in the case of Slovenia lists a string of characteristics, which fall within the exercise of both functional as well as social imperative of generations of Slovenian veterans. Two ministries are responsible for the funding of PVOs from the state, while these organisations realise the public interest in seven public areas under the jurisdiction of five ministerial sectors. According to our estimation, about a third of just over 90 thousand members in 279 societies incorporated within the discussed associations, are veterans, war disabled and civilian victims of war. Slovenian PVOs are strongly focused on patriotism and our research shows that by reducing the number of veterans this feature reinforces to the benefit of other society members. This is referred to as a shift from veteran elements of the functional imperative to the patriotic ones. In the case of Slovenia, all of the above is together with other factors demonstrated through the fact that it is not possible to set a clear dividing line between the veteran and patriot organizations, although the veteran status granted by the state and the public interest in this field are a publically recognised category.

The discussion also presented other characteristics of the case of Slovenia, confirming the hypothesis that the structure and functioning of Slovenian organizations in the field of war veterans and war disabled are specific and historically conditioned with distinct transition characteristics. We drew special attention to the problem of politicization, attempts of breaking the organizations, falsifying the historical memory to which veterans are very sensitive. We have also pointed to the fact that in the case of Slovenia, one cannot talk about the positive cases related to the reconciliation. We draw attention to the phenomena that contribute to the erosion of patriotism. Therefore, the public's and PVOs' expectations towards the representatives of the government and institutions as protectors of the values are increasingly coming to the forefront and serve as a starting point for further successful operation of the PVOs.

## Bibliography

1. Bučar, F., 2009. *Identiteta Slovencev v družbi evropskih narodov. V T. Kladnik (ur.) Pogovori pri predsedniku republike, Domoljubje. Ljubljana: Defensor; pp. 67–70.*
2. Čas, T., 2009a. *Domoljubje in milica oziroma policija v obdobju osamosvojitvenih procesov. Bilten Slovenske vojske, 11 ( 4), pp. 175–182.*
3. Čas, T., 2009b. *Pogovor predsednika republike - diskutant. In: T. Kladnik (ed.). Pogovori pri predsedniku republike, Domoljubje. Ljubljana: Defensor; pp. 11–63.*
4. Guštin, D., 2014. *Veteranske organizacije na Slovenskem : štiri generacije. Svobodna misel, 22/5, ZZB; Ljubljana, pp. 9–12.*
5. Guštin, D., 2016. *Four generation of veterans in Slovenia. Presentation at: 16<sup>th</sup> annual conference Euro-Atlantic Conflict Studies Working Group Partnership for Peace Consortium, Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes »Veterans and Society, Demobilisation Reintegration of ex-Combatant through History«, Ljubljana, 4–7 July 2016.*
6. Hribar, S., (2009). *Razprava o domoljubju in nacionalizmu. In T. Kladnik (ed.) Pogovori pri predsedniku republike, Domoljubje. Ljubljana, Defensor; pp. 17–22.*
7. Kymlicka, W.I., 1999. *Education for citizenship. The School Fiedl 10 (1/2).*
8. MDDSZEM, 2017. *Podatki o kategorijah veteranov in žrtev vojnega nasilja 2015 in 2016.*

9. *Ministrica za obrambo s pooblaščenci društev in zvez vojnih veteranov podpisala pogodbe o sofinanciranju* [http://www.mo.gov.si/si/medijsko\\_sredisce/novica/archive/2017/3/browse/1/article/1\\_2332/7968](http://www.mo.gov.si/si/medijsko_sredisce/novica/archive/2017/3/browse/1/article/1_2332/7968), 7 April 2017.
10. Podržaj J., 2017, *O KoDVOS*, Ljubljana: ZDVIS.
11. Prebilič, V. in Haček, M., 2011. *Analiza odnosa mladih do domoljubja*. In: T. Kladnik (ed.) *Pogovori pri predsedniku republike, Mladi in institucije demokracije*, Ljubljana, 27 January 2011. Ljubljana: Defensor, pp. 8–28.
12. Prebilič, V. in Juvan, J., 2014. *Vloga in pomen veteranskih organizacij v sodobnih družbah*. V *Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino*, 54/1, INZ: Ljubljana, pp. 259–273.
13. Prebilič, V., Barle Lakota, A., 2009. *Domoljubje in mladi*. In: T. Kladnik, (ed.) *Pogovori pri predsedniku republike, Domoljubje in mladi : Vače*, 15 December 2009. Ljubljana: Defensor; 2010, pp. 8–56.
14. Putnam, H., 2002. *Must We Choose between Patriotism and Universal Reason?*. In: *Martha Craven Nussbaum, Joshua C., For love of country: debating the limits of patriotism*. Boston: Beacon Press.
15. SAZU. 2010. *Slovar slovenskega knjižnega jezika*. Ljubljana: DZS.
16. Spletna stran TIGR. <http://www.tigr-drustvo.si/>, 7 April 2017.
17. Spletna stran WVF. <http://www.wvf-fmac.org/>
18. Spletna stran ZDCIVS. <http://www.zdcivs-zveza.si/>, 7 April 2017.
19. Spletna stran ZDGM. <http://zvezadgm.javno.si/index.php>. 7 April 2017.
20. Spletna stran ZDVIS. <http://www.zdvis.si/>, 7 April 2017.
21. Spletna stran ZPVDS. <http://www.zdruzenje-sever.si/>, 7 April 2017.
22. Spletna stran ZSČ. <http://www.zsc.si/>, 7 April 2017.
23. Spletna stran Zveze MORiS. <http://www.zvezamoris.si/>, 7 April 2017.
24. Spletna stran ZVVS. <http://www.zvvs.si/>, 7 April 2017.
25. Spletna stran ZZB-NOB. <http://www.zzb-nob.si/kdo-smo/o-nas/>, 7 April 2017.
26. Statut ZDCIVS. <http://www.zdcivs-zveza.si/ozvezi.html>, 7 April 2017.
27. Statut ZDVIS. [http://www.zdvis.si/uploads/statut%20ZDVIS\\_27\\_3\\_2014.pdf](http://www.zdvis.si/uploads/statut%20ZDVIS_27_3_2014.pdf), 7 April 2017.
28. Statut ZPVDS. <http://www.zdruzenje-sever.si/>, 7 April 2017.
29. Statutarna pogodba ZDGM. <http://zvezadgm.javno.si/index.php/o-zvezi-dgm/statutarna-pogodba>, 7 April 2017.
30. Šteiner, A. in Čas, T., 2017. *Slovenske DVO : raziskava - verzija* 7 April 2017.
31. TIGR, 2016, *Predstavitveno gradivo (dopolnitev 4/2017) Sežana: TIGR Primorske*.
32. Vaš, P., 2017. *Predstavitve Zveze društev klubov MORiS. Kočevska reka: ZDK*.
33. Yin, R. t K., 2009: *Case Study Research, Fourth Edition*. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE.
34. *Zakon o vojnih veteranih (uradno prečiščeno besedilo ZVV-UPB2)* <https://www.uradni-list.si/glasilo-uradni-list-rs/vsebina/73723>, 7 April 2017.
35. ZDCIVS, 2016, *Predstavitveno gradivo (dopolnitev 4/2017) Ljubljana: ZDCIVS*.
36. ZDGM, 2016, *Predstavitveno gradivo (dopolnitev 4/2017) Ljubljana: ZDGM*.
37. ZDVIS, 2016, *Predstavitveno gradivo (dopolnitev 4/2017) Ljubljana: ZDVIS*.
38. ZPVDS, 2016, *Predstavitveno gradivo (dopolnitev 4/2017) Ljubljana: ZPVDS*.
39. ZSČ, 2016, *Predstavitveno gradivo (dopolnitev 4/2017) Ljubljana: ZSČ*.
40. ZVVS, 2016, *Predstavitveno gradivo (dopolnitev 4/2017) Ljubljana: ZVVS*.
41. ZZB, 2016, *Predstavitveno gradivo (dopolnitev 4/2017) Ljubljana: ZZB*.
42. Žalec, B., 2006. *Pomen domovinske edukacije*. V A. Barle Lakota, (ur.) et al. *Državljska in domovinska vzgoja : zbornik*. Slovenska Bistrica: Beja.

Avtorji

Authors



Vladimir Prebilič

**Izr. prof. dr. Vladimir Prebilič** je izredni profesor na Oddelku za obramboslovje Fakultete za družbene vede Univerze v Ljubljani. Diplomiral je iz zgodovine in geografije (1998), magistriral (2001) in doktoriral (2004) pa iz obramboslovja. Na dodiplomskem programu predava vojaško zgodovino, sodobne politične sisteme in obrambno geografijo, na podiplomskem pa geopolitiko. Vodi tudi različne projekte slovenske vlade, namenjene domoljubju in domovinski vzgoji.

**Assoc. Prof. Vladimir Prebilič, PhD**, is an associate professor at the Defence Studies department, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana. He holds a BA in history and geography (1998), and master's degree (2001) and PhD in defence studies (2004). He gives lectures on Military History, Contemporary Political Systems and Defence Geography on the undergraduate level, and Geopolitics on the post-graduate level. He leads different research projects for the Slovenian government in the field of patriotism and homeland.



Carmen Sorina Rijnoveanu

**Dr. Carmen Sorina Rijnoveanu** je znanstvena raziskovalka na Inštitutu za obrambno-politične vede in vojaško zgodovino pri romunskem Ministrstvu za obrambo. Diplomirala je na Fakulteti za zgodovino ter doktorirala iz mednarodnih odnosov na Državni šoli za administrativne in politične študije v Bukarešti. Je avtorica številnih študij in člankov, povezanih z romunsko obrambno-varnostno politiko med hladno vojno in po njej, dinamiko regionalne varnosti ter črnomoškim sodelovanjem.

**Carmen Sorina Rijnoveanu, PhD**, is scientific researcher with the Institute for Political Studies of Defence and Military History, Romanian Ministry of National Defence. She graduated from the Faculty of History and holds a PhD in international relations from the National School of Administrative and Political Studies in Bucharest. She is author of various studies and articles published in Romania and abroad in the field of Romanian defence and security policy during and after the end of the Cold War, regional security dynamics and Black Sea cooperation.



Jörg Echternkamp

**Izr. prof. dr. Jörg Echternkamp** je doktoriral na univerzi Bielefeld in je znanstveni direktor Centra za vojaško zgodovino in družbene vede nemške kopenske vojske v Potsdamu v Nemčiji. Kot izredni profesor predava sodobno zgodovino na univerzi Martin-Luther v Halle-Wittenbergu v Nemčiji. Je tudi koordinator meddisciplinarnega projekta Centra za vojaško zgodovino z naslovom Vojaška zgodovina vzhodne in zahodne Nemčije 1970–90 in sourednik nemškega vojaškozgodovinskega zbornika *Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift*. Bil je tudi vodja katedre Alfred Grosser na inštitutu za politične vede Sciences Po v Parizu.

**Assoc. Prof. Jörg Echternkamp, PhD** holds a PhD from Bielefeld University, and is Scientific Director at the Centre for Military History and Social Sciences of the German Army, Potsdam, Germany. As adjunct professor he also teaches Modern History at Martin-Luther-University, Halle-Wittenberg. He is coordinator of the Center's interdisciplinary project East and West German military history 1970-90 as well as co-editor of Germany's journal of military history (*Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift*). He held the chair Alfred Grosser at the Institute of Political Studies Sciences Po, Paris.



Nadine Akhund-Lange

**Dr. Nadine Akhund-Lange** je pooblaščená znanstvena sodelavka na Inštitutu Sorbonne-IRICE v Parizu. Doktorirala je iz sodobne evropske zgodovine na univerzi Paris IV Sorbonne in poučuje zgodovino Jugovzhodne Evrope na Univerzi SIPA v Kolumbiji. Je članica mednarodne komisije za slovanske zgodovinske vede in izvršnega odbora konvencije pri Združenju za proučevanje narodnosti na univerzi Kolumbija (2010–2013). Od leta 2013 je zaposlena na inštitutu Knjižnice za družbene vede v New Yorku, kjer se ukvarja s štipendijami, povezanimi s psihologijo in ideologijami vojne.

**Nadine Akhund-Lange, PhD**, is accredited research associate at the Sorbonne-IRICE Institute, Paris. She holds a PhD in Contemporary European History from Paris IV Sorbonne University and has taught Southeastern Europe History at SIPA, Columbia University. She has been member of the International Commission of Historical Slavic Studies and of the convention executive committee of the Association for the Study of Nationalities, Columbia University (2010-13). Since 2013, she has been working at the institute, Library of Social Science, New York promoting scholarship related to psychology and ideologies of war.



Valerija Bernik

### **Višja vojaška uslužbenka XIII. r. dr. Valerija Bernik**

je doktorirala iz zgodovine. Na Ministrstvu za obrambo je zaposlena od leta 1997, v Vojaškem muzeju Slovenske vojske je vodja skupine za vojaškozgodovinske študije. Raziskuje in predava na različnih področjih vojaške zgodovine, posveča se predvsem slovenski vojaški zgodovini in zgodovini kemičnega bojevanja ter vključevanju žensk v oboroženi boj.

**Senior Military Specialist, Class XIII, Valerija Bernik, PhD,** *has been employed at the Slovenian Ministry of Defence since 1997. She holds a PhD in history. She has been a leading member of the Military-history studies group within the military Museum of the Slovenian Armed Forces. She conducts research and teaches courses in military history. Her main areas of expertise include Slovenian military history, history of chemical warfare, and history of women in combat.*



Niels Bo Poulsen

**Dr. Niels Bo Poulsen** je direktor Inštituta za vojaško zgodovino in vojne študije na danskem kraljevem obrambnem kolidžu. Je avtor ali soavtor številnih knjig in člankov o vojaški zgodovini. Nedavno je izdal knjigo o bojevanju na vzhodni fronti v letih od 1941 do 1945. Strokovno se največ ukvarja z obdobjem med obema svetovnima vojnama, s sovjetsko vojaško zgodovino in vojaškimi veterani.

**Niels Bo Poulsen, PhD,** *is Director of Institute of Military History and War Studies at the Royal Danish Defence College. He is the author or co-author of a number of books and articles on military history. His most recent work is a book on warfare at the eastern front 1941-1945. His main fields of expertise are the two world wars, Soviet military history and war veterans.*



Jakob Brink  
Rasmussen

**Mag. Jakob Brink Rasmussen** je doktorski kandidat na univerzi Aarhus in znanstveni sodelavec na Inštitutu za vojaško zgodovino na danskem kraljevem obrambnem kolidžu. Je specialist za polpreteklo dansko vojaško zgodovino, na to temo je napisal tudi več člankov. Trenutno proučuje skandinavski vojaški prispevek k mirovniški dejavnosti v BiH v obdobju po vojni, v letih od 1995 do 2004.

**Jakob Brink Rasmussen, MA**, is PhD student at Aarhus University and research fellow at the Royal Danish Defence College's Institute of Military History and War Studies. He is specialised in recent Danish military history – a subject on which he has written a number of articles. Currently, he is studying Scandinavian military contributions to the peacebuilding efforts in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995-2004.



Alojz Šteiner

**Upokojeni generalmajor dr. Alojz Šteiner** je doktor znanosti s področja obramboslovja. Diplomiral je na Fakulteti za sociologijo, politične vede in novinarstvo v Ljubljani, magistriral na Industrijskem kolidžu oboroženih sil na Nacionalni obrambni univerzi v Washingtonu, ZDA, in doktoriral s temo *Transformacija oboroženih sil po koncu hladne vojne – primer Slovenske vojske* na Fakulteti za družbene vede v Ljubljani. V svojih delih obravnava predvsem razvoj in spreminjanje oboroženih sil. V slovenskih obrambnih silah je bil zaposlen med letoma 1979 in 2014, zdaj pa je predsednik Zveze slovenskih častnikov.

**Major General (Ret.) Alojz Šteiner, PhD**, holds a PhD in defence studies. He obtained the BA degree from the Faculty of Sociology, Political Science and Journalism in Ljubljana, master's degree from the Industrial College of Armed Forces, National Defense University, Washington, USA, and PhD in Transformation of armed forces in the post-Cold War period – the case of the Slovenian Armed Forces from the Faculty of Social Sciences in Ljubljana. He writes in the field of development and transformation of armed forces. He was member of the Slovenian Armed Forces between 1979 and 2014 and is currently President of the Military Officers Association of Slovenia



Tomaz Čas

**Izr. prof. dr. Tomaž Čas** je upokojeni pomočnik načelnika slovenske Milice in nekdanji državni sekretar na Ministrstvu za obrambo. Je magister pravnih znanosti in doktor obramboslovja, izredni profesor za varnostni sistem na Evropski pravni fakulteti, Fakulteti za državne in evropske študije, Fakulteti za varnostne vede, Višji šoli v Šolskem centru Kranj in na Čas – Zasebni šoli za varnostno izobraževanje, d. o. o. Je avtor več prispevkov s policijske, zasebnovarnostne, varnostnoobrambne in drugih varnostnonadzorstvenih dejavnosti.

**Assoc. Prof. Tomaž Čas, PhD**, is a retired Assistant to Chief of the Slovenian Police and the former State Secretary at Slovenian Ministry of Defence. He holds a master's degree in legal science and a PhD in defence studies. He is Associate Professor for the Security System at the European Faculty of Law, Graduate School of Government and European Studies, Faculty of Criminal Justice and Security, Higher Vocational College at Schools Centre, Kranj and ČAS – Private School of Security Education. He has authored several articles in the field of police, private security, security and defence and other security control activities.

Navodila avtorjem  
za oblikovanje prispevkov

Instructions for the authors  
of papers

## NAVODILA AVTORJEM ZA OBLIKOVANJE PRISPEVKOV ZA SODOBNE VOJAŠKE IZZIVE IN VOJAŠKOŠOLSKI ZBORNIK

### Vsebinska navodila

#### Splošno

**Sodobni vojaški izzivi** je interdisciplinarna znanstveno-strokovna publikacija, ki objavlja prispevke o aktualnih temah, raziskavah, znanstvenih in strokovnih razpravah, tehničnih ali družboslovnih analizah z varnostnega, obrambnega in vojaškega področja.

**Vojaškošolski zbornik** je vojaškostrokovna in informativna publikacija, namenjena izobraževanju in obveščanju o dosežkih ter izkušnjah na področju vojaškega izobraževanja, usposabljanja in izpopolnjevanja.

Kaj objavljamo?

Objavljamo prispevke v slovenskem jeziku s povzetki, prevedenimi v angleški jezik, in po odločitvi uredniškega odbora prispevke v angleškem jeziku s povzetki, prevedenimi v slovenski jezik.

Objavljamo prispevke, ki še niso bili objavljeni ali poslani v objavo drugi reviji. Pisec je odgovoren za vse morebitne kršitve avtorskih pravic. Če je bil prispevek že natisnjen drugje, poslan v objavo ali predstavljen na strokovni konferenci, naj to avtor sporočiti uredniku in pridobiti soglasje založnika (če je treba) ter navesti razloge za ponovno objavo.

### Tehnična navodila

#### Omejitve dolžine prispevkov

Prispevki naj obsegajo 16 strani oziroma 30.000 znakov s presledki (avtorska pola), izjemoma najmanj 8 strani oziroma 15.000 znakov ali največ 24 strani oziroma 45.000 znakov.

#### Recenzije

Prispevki se recenzirajo. Recenzija je anonimna. Glede na oceno recenzentov uredniški odbor ali urednik prispevek sprejme, če je treba, zahteva popravke ali ga zavrne. Pripombe recenzentov avtor vnese v prispevek.

Zaradi anonimnega recenzentskega postopka je treba prvo stran in vsebino oblikovati tako, da identiteta avtorja ni prepoznavna.

Avtor ob naslovu prispevka napiše, v katero kategorijo po njegovem mnenju in glede na klasifikacijo v COBISS spada njegov prispevek. Klasifikacija je dostopna na spletni strani revije in pri odgovornem uredniku. Končno klasifikacijo določi uredniški odbor.

<b>Lektoriranje</b>	Lektoriranje besedil zagotavlja OE, pristojna za založniško dejavnost. Lektorirana besedila se avtorizirajo.
<b>Prevajanje</b>	Prevajanje besedil ali povzetkov zagotavlja OE, pristojna za prevajalsko dejavnost oziroma Šola za tuje jezike Centra vojaških šol.
<b>Navajanje avtorjev prispevka</b>	Navajanje avtorjev je skrajno zgoraj, levo poravnano. <i>Primer:</i> Ime 1 Priimek 1, Ime 2 Priimek 2 V opombi pod črto se za slovenske avtorje navede, iz katere ustanove prihajajo. Pri tujih avtorjih je treba navesti tudi ime države.
<b>Naslov prispevka</b>	Navedbi avtorjev sledi naslov prispevka. Črke v naslovu so velike 16 pik, natisnjene krepko, besedilo naslova pa poravnano na sredini.
<b>Povzetek</b>	Prispevku mora biti dodan povzetek, ki obsega največ 1200 znakov (20 vrstic). Povzetek naj na kratko opredeli temo prispevka, predvsem naj povzame rezultate in ugotovitve. Splošne ugotovitve in misli ne spadajo v povzetek, temveč v uvod.
<b>Povzetek v angleščini</b>	Avtorji morajo oddati tudi prevod povzetka v angleščino. Tudi za prevod povzetka velja omejitev do 1200 znakov (20 vrstic).
<b>Ključne besede</b>	Ključne besede (3-5, tudi v angleškem jeziku) naj bodo natisnjene krepko in z obojestransko poravnavo besedila.
<b>Besedilo</b>	Avtorji naj oddajo svoje prispevke na papirju formata A4, s presledkom med vrsticami 1,5 in velikostjo črk 12 pik Arial. Na zgornjem in spodnjem robu naj bo do besedila približno 3 cm, levi rob naj bo širok 2 cm, desni pa 4 cm. Na vsaki strani je tako približno 30 vrstic s približno 62 znaki. Besedilo naj bo obojestransko poravnano, brez umikov na začetku odstavka.
<b>Kratka predstavitev avtorjev</b>	Avtorji morajo pripraviti kratko predstavitev svojega strokovnega oziroma znanstvenega dela. Predstavitev naj ne presega 600 znakov (10 vrstic, 80 besed). Če je avtorjev več, se predstavi vsak posebej, čim bolj zgoščeno. Avtorji naj besedilo umestijo na konec prispevka po navedeni literaturi.

## Strukturiranje besedila

Posamezna poglavja v besedilu naj bodo ločena s samostojnimi podnaslovi in ustrezno oštevilčena (členitev največ na 4 ravni).

Primer:

1 Uvod

2 Naslov poglavja (1. raven)

2.1 Podnaslov (2. raven)

2.1.1 Podnaslov (3. raven)

2.1.1.1 Podnaslov (4. raven)

## Oblikovanje seznama literature

V seznamu literature je treba po abecednem redu navesti le avtorje, na katere se sklicujete v prispevku, celotna oznaka vira pa mora biti skladna s harvardskim načinom navajanja. Če je avtorjev več, navedemo vse, kot so navedeni na izvirnem delu.

*Primeri:*

*a) knjiga:*

Priimek, ime (lahko začetnica imena), letnica. *Naslov dela*. Kraj: Založba.

Na primer: Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

*b) zbornik:*

Samson, C., 1970. Problems of information studies in history. V S. Stone, ur. *Humanities information research*. Sheffield: CRUS, 1980, str./pp. 44–68. Pri posameznih člankih v zbornikih na koncu posameznega vira navedemo strani, na katerih je članek, na primer:

*c) članek v reviji*

Kolega, N., 2006. Slovenian coast sea flood risk. *Acta geographica Slovenica*. 46-2, str. 143–167.

## Navajanje virov z interneta

Vse reference se začenjajo enako kot pri natisnjenih virih, le da običajnemu delu sledi še podatek o tem, kje na internetu je bil dokument dobljen in kdaj. Podatek o tem, kdaj je bil dokument dobljen, je pomemben zaradi pogostega spreminjanja www okolja.

Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, str. 45–100. <http://www.mors.si/index.php?id=213>, 17. 10. 2008. Pri navajanju zanimivih internetnih naslovov v besedilu (ne gre za navajanje posebnega dokumenta) zadošča navedba naslova (<http://www.vpvs.uni-lj.si>). Posebna referenca na koncu besedila v tem primeru ni potrebna.

## Sklicevanje na vire

Pri sklicevanju na vire med besedilom navedite le priimek prvega avtorja in letnico izdaje. *Primer:* ... (Smith, 1997) ...

Če dobesedno navajate del besedila, ga ustrezno označite z narekovaji, v oklepaju pa poleg avtorja in letnice navedite stran besedila, iz katerega ste navajali.

*Primer:* ... (Smith, 1997, str. 15) ...


Pri povzemanju drugega avtorja napišemo besedilo brez narekovajev, v oklepaju pa napišemo, da gre za povzeto besedilo. *Primer:* (po Smith, 1997, str. 15). Če avtorja navajamo v besedilu, v oklepaju navedemo samo letnico izida in stran (1997, str. 15).

## Slike, diagrami in tabele

Slike, diagrami in tabele v prispevku naj bodo v posebej pripravljenih datotekah, ki omogočajo lektorske popravke. V besedilu mora biti jasno označeno mesto, kamor je treba vnesti sliko. Skupna dolžina prispevka ne sme preseči dane omejitve.

Če avtor iz tehničnih razlogov grafičnih dodatkov ne more oddati v elektronski obliki, je izjemoma sprejemljivo, da slike priloži besedilu. Avtor mora v tem primeru na zadnjo stran slike napisati zaporedno številko in naslov, v besedilu pa pustiti dovolj prostora zanjo. Prav tako mora biti besedilo opremljeno z naslovom in številčenjem slike. Diagrami se štejejo kot slike. Vse slike in tabele se številčijo. Številčenje poteka enotno in ni povezano s številčenjem poglavij. Naslov slike je naveden pod sliko, naslov tabele pa nad tabelo. Navadno je v besedilu navedeno vsaj eno sklicevanje na sliko ali tabelo. Sklic na sliko ali tabelo je: ... (slika 5) ... (tabela 2) ...


Primer slike:



Slika 5: Naslov slike

Primer tabele:

Tabela 2: Naslov tabele



## Opombe pod črto

Številčenje opomb pod črto je neodvisno od strukture besedila in se v vsakem prispevku začne s številko 1. Posebej opozarjamo avtorje, da so opombe pod črto namenjene pojasnjevanju misli, zapisanih v besedilu, in ne navajanju literature.

## Kratice

Kratice naj bodo dodane v oklepaju, ko se okrajšana beseda prvič uporabi, zato posebnih seznamov kratic ne dodajamo. Za kratico ali izraz v angleškem jeziku napišemo najprej slovensko ustreznico, v oklepaju pa angleški izvornik in morebitno angleško kratico.

## Format zapisa prispevka

Uredniški odbor sprejema prispevke, napisane z urejevalnikom besedil MS Word, izjemoma tudi v besedilnem zapisu (text only).

<b>Naslov avtorja</b>	Prispevkom naj bosta dodana avtorjeva naslov in internetni naslov ali telefonska številka, na katerih bo dosegljiv uredniškemu odboru.
<b>Kako poslati prispevek</b>	Na naslov uredništva ali članov uredniškega odbora je treba poslati tiskano in elektronsko različico prispevka.
<b>Potrjevanje sprejetja prispevka</b>	Uredniški odbor avtorju pisno potrdi prejetje prispevka. Avtorjem, ki sporočijo tudi naslov svoje elektronske pošte, se potrditev pošlje po tej poti.
<b>Korekture</b>	Avtor opravi korekture svojega prispevka v treh dneh.
<b>Naslov uredniškega odbora</b>	Ministrstvo za obrambo Generalštab Slovenske vojske Sodobni vojaški izzivi Uredniški odbor Vojkova cesta 55 1000 Ljubljana Slovenija Elektronski naslov Odgovorna urednica: liliana.brozic@mors.si

**Prispevkov, ki ne bodo urejeni skladno s tem navodilom, uredniški odbor ne bo sprejemal.**

## INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE AUTHORS OF PAPERS FOR THE CONTEMPORARY MILITARY CHALLENGES AND THE MILITARY EDUCATION JOURNAL

### Content-related instructions

#### General

**The Contemporary Military Challenges** is an interdisciplinary scientific expert magazine, which publishes papers on current topics, researches, scientific and expert discussions, technical or social sciences analysis from the field of security, defence and the military..

**The Military Education Journal** is a military professional and informative publication intended for education and informing on achievements and experiences in the field of military education, training and improvement.

What do we publish?

We publish papers in Slovene with abstracts translated into English. If so decided by the Editorial Board, we also publish papers in English with abstracts translated into Slovene.

We publish papers, which have not been previously published or sent to another magazine for publication. The author is held responsible for all possible copyright violations. If the paper has already been printed elsewhere, sent for publication or presented at an expert conference, the author must notify the editor, obtain the publisher's consent (if necessary) and indicate the reasons for republishing.

### Technical instructions

#### Limitations regarding the length of the papers

The papers should consist of 16 typewritten double-spaced pages or 30,000 characters. At a minimum they should have 8 pages or 15,000 characters and at a maximum 24 pages or 45,000 characters.

- Reviews** All papers are reviewed. The review is anonymous. With regard to the reviewer's assessment, the Editorial Board or the editor accepts the paper, demands modifications, if necessary, or rejects it. Upon receiving the reviewers' remarks, the author inserts them into the paper.  
Due to an anonymous review process, the first page must be designed in the way that the author's identity cannot be recognized.  
Next to the title, the author should indicate the category the paper belongs to according to him and according to the classification in the COBISS<sup>1</sup>. The classification is available on the magazine's internet page and at the responsible editor. The Editorial Board determines the final classification.
- Proofreading** The organizational unit responsible for publishing provides the proofreading of the papers. The proofread papers have to be approved.
- Translating** The translation of the papers or abstracts is provided by the organizational unit competent for translation or the School of Foreign Languages, Military Schools Centre.
- Indicating the authors of the paper** The authors' name should be written in the upper left corner, aligned left.  
*Example:*  
Name 1 Surname 1,  
Name 2 Surname 2,  
In the footnote, Slovenian authors should indicate the institution they come from. Foreign authors should also indicate the name of the state they come from.
- Title of the paper** The title of the paper is written below the listed authors. The font in the title is bold, size 16 points. The text of the title is centrally aligned.
- Abstract** The paper should have an abstract of a maximum 1,200 characters (20 lines). The abstract should include a short presentation of the topic, particularly the results and the findings. General findings and reflections do not belong in the abstract, but rather in the introduction.
- Abstract in English** The authors must also submit the translation of the abstract into English. The translation of the abstract is likewise limited to a maximum of 1,200 characters (20 lines).
- Key words** Key words (3-5 also in the English language) should be bold with a justified text alignment.
- Text** The authors should submit their papers on an A4 paper format, with 1.5 line spacing, fontArial size 12 points. At the upper and the bottom edge, there should be approx. 3 cm of space; the left margin should be 2 cm wide and the right margin 4 cm. Each page consists of approx. 30 lines with 62 characters. The text should have a justified alignment, without indents at the beginning of the paragraphs.

<sup>1</sup> Co-operative Online Bibliographic System and Services

**A brief presentation of the authors**

The authors should prepare a brief presentation of their expert or scientific work. The presentation should not exceed 600 characters (10 lines, 80 words). If there are several authors, each should be presented individually, as shortly and as comprehensively as possible. These texts should be placed at the end of the paper, after the cited literature.

**Text structuring**

Individual chapters should be separated with independent subtitles and adequately numbered.

*Example:*

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Title of the chapter (1<sup>st</sup> level)
- 2.1 Subtitle (2<sup>nd</sup> level)
- 2.1.1 Subtitle (3<sup>rd</sup> level)
- 2.1.1.1 Subtitle (4<sup>th</sup> level)

**Referencing**

In the bibliography, only the authors of references one refers to in the paper should be listed, in the alphabetical order. The entire reference has to be in compliance with the Harvard citing style.

*Example:*

Surname, name (can also be the initial of the name), year. *Title of the work*. Place. Publishing House.

*Example:*

Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

With certain papers published in journals, the author should indicate, at the end of each reference, a page on which the paper can be found.

*Example:*

Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. 45-100.

**Referencing internet sources**

All references start the same as the references for the printed sources, only that the usual part is followed by the information about the Internet page on which the document was found as well as the date on which it was found. The information about the time that the document was found on the Internet is important, because the WWW environment changes constantly.

Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. p. 45-100. <http://www.mors.si/index.php?id=213>, 17 October 2008.

When referencing interesting WWW pages in the text (not citing an individual document) it is enough to state only the Internet address (<http://www.vpvs.uni-lj.si>). A separate reference at the end of the text is therefore not necessary.

**Citing**

When citing sources in the text, indicate only the surname of the author and the year of publication. *Example:* ..... (Smith, 1997) ...

When making a direct reference to a text, the cited part should be adequately marked with quotation marks and followed by the exact page of the text which the citing is taken from.

*Example:* ...(Smith, 1997, p.15) ...

**Figures, diagrams, tables**

Figures, diagrams and tables in the paper should be prepared in separate files which allow for proofreading corrections. The place in the text where the picture should be inserted must be clearly indicated. The total length of the paper must not surpass the given limitation.

Should the author not be able to submit the graphical supplements in the electronic form due to technical reasons, it is exceptionally acceptable to enclose the figures to the text. In this case the author must write a sequence number and a title on the back of each picture and leave enough space in the text to include it. The text must likewise contain the title and the sequence number of the figure. Diagrams are considered figures.

All figures and tables are numbered. The numbering is not uniform and not linked with the numbering of the chapters. The title of the figure is stated beneath it and the title of the table is stated above it.

As a rule, the paper should include at least one reference to a figure or a table.. Reference to a figure or a table is: ... (Figure 5) ..... (Table 2) .....

Example of a figure:




Figure 5: Title of the figure

Example of a table:

Table 2: Title of the table



**Footnotes**

The numbering of the footnotes is not related to the structure of the text and starts with number 1 in each paper. We want to stress that the aim of the footnotes is to explain the thoughts written in the text and not to reference literature.

**Abbreviations**

When used for the first time, the abbreviations in the text must be explained in parenthesis; therefore no additional list of abbreviations is needed. If the abbreviations or terms are written in English, the appropriate Slovenian term should be written along with the English original and possibly the English abbreviation in the parenthesis.

**Format type of the paper**

The Editorial Board accepts only the texts written with a MS Word text editor and only exceptionally those in the 'text only' format.

<b>Author's address</b>	Each paper should include the author's address, e-mail or a telephone number, so that the Editorial Board can reach him or her.
<b>Sending the paper</b>	A print or an electronic version of the paper should be sent to the address of the Editorial Board or the members of the Editorial Board.
<b>Confirmation of the reception of the paper</b>	The Editorial Board sends the author a written confirmation regarding the reception of the paper. The authors who also list their e-mails receive the confirmation via e-mail.
<b>Corrections</b>	The author makes corrections to the paper within three days.
<b>Editorial Board address</b>	Ministry of Defence Slovenian Armed Forces General Staff Contemporary Military Challenges Editorial Board Vojkova cesta 55 1000 Ljubljana Slovenia Electronic address: Editor in Chief: liliana.brozic@mors.si

**The Editorial Board will not accept papers, which will not be in compliance with the above instructions.**









### Vsebina

Liliana Brožič	UVODNIK: VETERANSKE ORGANIZACIJE – ALI JIH SPLOH POTREBUJEMO? EDITORIAL: VETERAN ORGANISATIONS – ARE THEY EVEN NEEDED?
Vladimir Prebilič	UVODNIK: VETERANI IN DRUŽBA EDITORIAL: VETERANS AND SOCIETY
Vladimir Prebilič	VETERANSKI IMPERATIV DANES VETERANS IMPERATIVE TODAY
Carmen Sorina Rijnoveanu	PONOVNO OVREDNOTENJE STATUSA VETERANOV V POSTKOMUNISTIČNIH DRUŽBAH – PRIMER ROMUNIJE THE REAPPRAISAL OF VETERANS' STATUS IN POST-COMMUNIST SOCIETIES - ROMANIA'S CASE
Jörg Echternkamp	OD SOVRAŽNIKA DO PRIJATELJA? VETERANI KOT GONILNA SILA MEDNARODNE SPRAVE PO DRUGI SVETOVNI VOJNI FROM FOE TO FRIEND? VETERANS AS A DRIVING FORCE OF INTERNATIONAL RECONCILIATION AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR
Nadine Akhund-Lange	VETERANI IN FILANTROPIJA PO VELIKI VOJNI: VLOGA IN STALIŠČA FUNDACIJE CARNEGIE ZA MEDNARODNI MIR VETERANS AND PHILANTHROPY AFTER THE GREAT WAR: ROLE AND REPRESENTATIONS FROM THE CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
Valerija Bernik	VETERANKE DRUGE SVETOVNE VOJNE WOMEN VETERANS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR
Niels Bo Poulsen Jakob Brink Rasmussen	DOLGA POT DO URADNE DANSKE VETERANSKE POLITIKE, 1848–2010 THE LONG ROAD TOWARDS AN OFFICIAL DANISH VETERANS' POLICY, 1848-2010
Alojz Šteiner Tomaž Čas	DOMOLJUBNE IN VETERANSKE ORGANIZACIJE – PRIMER SLOVENIJE PATRIOT AND VETERAN ORGANISATIONS – THE CASE OF SLOVENIA