



# Sodobni vojaški izzivi

Contemporary Military Challenges

Znanstveno-strokovna publikacija Slovenske vojske

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## NA POTI K ZAGOTAVLJANJU MEDNARODNE VARNOSTI

*»Vse velike stvari so preproste in veliko jih  
lahko izrazimo s preprostimi besedami: svoboda,  
pravica, čast, dolžnost, sočutje in upanje.«*

*Winston Churchill (1874–1965)*

## ON THE PATH TO PROVIDING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

*»All the great things are simple, and many  
can be expressed in a single word: freedom,  
justice, honour, duty, mercy, hope.«*

*Winston Churchill (1874–1965)*

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# VSEBINA

## CONTENTS

Liliana Brožič	<b>7</b> UVODNIK
	<b>9</b> EDITORIAL
Eric Ouellet, Jérôme Lacroix-Leclair, Pierre Pahlavi	<b>11</b> INSTITUCIONALIZACIJA NEKONVENCIONALNEGA VOJSKOVANJA: PRIMER DARFURJA INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF IRREGULAR WARFARE: THE CASE OF DARFUR
János Besenyő	<b>25</b> MISIJA EVROPSKE UNIJE ZA USPOSABLJANJE V MALIJU – SODELOVANJE MADŽARSKE THE EUROPEAN UNION TRAINING MISSION IN MALI – HUNGARY'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE MISSION
Anton Bebler	<b>39</b> VARNOSTNI IZZIVI V JUGOVZHODNI EVROPI SECURITY CHALLENGES IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE
Damir Črnčec	<b>51</b> DOBRO UPRAVLJANJE OBRAMBNIH SISTEMOV V ČASU GLOBALIZACIJE GOOD GOVERNANCE OF DEFENCE SYSTEMS IN GLOBALIZATION ERA

Dragan Trivan	<b>69</b> VPLIV KORPORATIVNE VARNOSTI NA NACIONALNO VARNOST THE INFLUENCE OF CORPORATE SECURITY ON NATIONAL SECURITY
Valentin Areh	<b>99</b> VOJAŠKA STRATEŠKA POLITIKA UPRAVLJANJA MEDIJEV – OSEBNE IZKUŠNJE IZ RAZLIČNIH VOJN STRATEGIC MILITARY NEWS MANAGEMENT POLICY – PERSONAL EXPERIENCES FROM DIFFERENT WARS
	<b>117</b> AVTORJI AUTHORS
	<b>125</b> NAVODILA AVTORJEM ZA OBLIKOVANJE PRISPEVKOV
	<b>131</b> INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE AUTHORS OF PAPERS

## UVODNIK

Spoštovani bralke in bralci!

V teh jesenskih dneh mineva 15 let od izida prve številke Biltena Slovenske vojske, ki je z leti in postopoma pridobival kakovost obrambno-vojaških vsebin kot redka, a izbrana vrsta vina. Dvig kakovosti je prinesel tudi novo ime Sodobni vojaški izzivi. To ime pove o bistvu vsebine publikacije in ne samo o izdajatelju, kot je bilo zasnovano na začetku izhajanja.

Zadnja leta pri pisanju uvodov v posamezno temo pogosto uporabimo nekaj skoraj obveznih stavkov o tem, kako se svet neprestano spreminja, da je globalizacija prinesla spremembe na vseh področjih, tudi na področju varnosti, da je sprememba edina stalnica in podobno. Ob tem se počutimo razmeroma varne, saj tistih klasičnih, za nekatere generacije že zgodovinskih oblik nevarnosti, ni več.

So pa druge oblike nevarnosti in številni avtorji so v 15-letni zgodovini naše publikacije o tem že pisali. Imele so različna imena, na primer hibridne grožnje, izhajale so iz različnih razmer, nesorazmerij v svetu, neenakih možnosti za preživetje in številnih drugih okoliščin. Tako aktualnih vsebin na obrambno-varnostnem področju nikoli ne zmanjka. Nekatere možne oblike ogrožanja varnosti lahko predvidimo, drugih tudi ne. Povsem enako velja tudi za kraj, na katerem bi se lahko pojavile.

Gledano z geografskega vidika so nekatere države, kot sta Mali in Darfur, zelo daleč, a kljub temu blizu. V Maliju ima Slovenska vojska svoje vojake, ki skupaj z mednarodno skupnostjo prispevajo k varnosti in napredku države. Bistveno bližje je italijanski otok Lampedusa, kjer se dogajajo tragedije severnoafriškim prebežnikom. Težko rešljivo stanje, ki kliče na pomoč mednarodno skupnost in pomeni izziv za regionalno, pa tudi mednarodno varnost.

V tokratni številki smo se posvetili mednarodnim varnostnim temam.

Avtorji **Eric Ouellet**, **Jérôme Lacroix-Leclair** in **Pierre Pahlavi** v članku *Institucionalizacija nekonvencionalnega vojskovanja: primer Darfurja* pravijo, da se legitimnost kot družbenopolitični pojem velikokrat omenja pri obravnavi konfliktov znotraj držav, vendar se le redko neposredno analizira. V primeru Darfurja gre za primer konflikta, ki je podoben veliko drugim konfliktom v državah v razvoju, hkrati pa poudarja velik pomen legitimnosti, da država uporabi silo. Avtorji konflikt analizirajo.

V članku *Misija Evropske unije za usposabljanje v Maliju – sodelovanje Madžarske* avtor **János Besenyő** obravnava trenutne varnostne razmere v tej državi, potek dogodkov in odločitev znotraj EU za njeno reševanje ter kako se je Madžarska odzvala s svojimi oboroženimi silami.

**Anton Bebler** v članku z naslovom *Varnostni izzivi v Jugovzhodni Evropi* predstavlja celovit pregled varnostnih razmer v tem delu Evrope s poudarkom na pomenu njenega sodelovanja in vpetosti v mednarodne varnostne integracije.

*Dobro upravljanje obrambnih sistemov v času globalizacije* je naslov članka **Damirja Črnčca**, v katerem obravnava vpliv globalizacije na obrambno-varnostne sisteme. Vključuje pojav krize, ga analizira in se sprašuje, kako globalna je globalna kriza. Predlaga izhodišča za razpravo o tej temi v Sloveniji.

Zahodni Balkan je geografsko izhodišče **Dragana Trivana**, ki razmišlja o *vplivu korporativne varnosti na nacionalno varnost* v istoimenskem članku. Pravi, da je varnost pogoj in ključna za stabilni gospodarski razvoj ter uspešno izvajanje javnih služb. Obe spodbujata legitimnost in krepitev socialne kohezije v državi.

**Valentin Areh** v članku *Vojaška strateška politika upravljanja medijev – osebne izkušnje iz različnih vojn* kot vojni dopisnik predstavlja napake in primere dobre prakse iz različnih vojsk. Glede na njegove osebne izkušnje je najboljše razvit in izpiljen koncept odnosov z javnostmi program gostujočih medijev iz ZDA, ki se je izkazal kot uspešen tako z vidika vojske kot medijev.

## EDITORIAL

Dear readers,

In these autumn days, we celebrate 15 years since the first issue of the Slovenian Armed Forces Bulletin, which has over the years gradually grown, gaining the quality of the discussed defence and military issues as a rare and selected type of wine. The increase in the quality has also brought a new name – Contemporary Military Challenges – name that denotes the essence and contents of the publication, not only the publisher, as it was planned in the beginning of our publishing.

In recent years, our introductions to various topics often included a few almost mandatory sentences about how the world was constantly changing, how globalization had brought about changes in all areas, including the field of security, how change was the only regular feature, and the like. At the same time, however, we feel relatively safe, as those classic, for some generations even historical, forms of danger no longer exist.

Nevertheless, there are other forms of threats, and, in the 15-year history of our publication, many authors have written about them. They were given a variety of names, e.g. hybrid threats that arise from a variety of situations, imbalances in the world, unequal opportunities for survival and many other factors. Topical issues in the field of security and defence thus never end. Some of the potential threats to security can be predicted, some not. Exactly the same applies to the locations where these threats arise.

From a geographical point of view, some countries, such as Mali and Sudan, are very remote, but still close. In Mali, the Slovenian Armed Forces participate with troops, which work hand in hand with the international community to contribute to the security and prosperity of the country. The much less remote Italian island of

Lampedusa is the location where North African immigrants are struck by tragedy. A complex situation, calling on the assistance of the international community, represents a challenge for, both, regional and international security.

In this issue, international security issues are in the focus of our interest.

Authors **Eric Ouellet**, **Jérôme Lacroix-Leclair** and **Pierre Pahlavi** in their article *The institutionalization of irregular warfare: the case of Darfur* claim that legitimacy as a social-political notion is oftentimes invoked to study intra-state conflicts, but it is rarely analyzed directly. They use and analyse the case of Darfur as an example of conflict that is similar to a number of other conflicts in the developing world, but highlights the critical importance of legitimacy in the use of force by a state.

In the article *The European Union training mission in Mali – Hungary’s involvement* **János Besenyő** discusses the current security situation in the country, the course of events and decisions within the EU regarding its resolution and the involvement of Hungarian Armed Forces.

In his article *Security challenges in South Eastern Europe*, Anton **Bebler** presents a comprehensive overview of the security situation in the region of South Eastern Europe, with an emphasis on the importance of its participation and integration in international security structures.

*Good governance of defence systems in globalization era* is the title of the article by **Damir Črnčec**, who examines the impact of globalization on the defence and security systems. He includes the emergence of crisis, its analysis and his queries on how global the global crisis really is. He proposes a platform in Slovenia for discussions on this topic.

The Western Balkans is a geographical base for **Dragana Trivan** who reflects on the *Influence of corporate security on national security*. He says that security is a prerequisite and of vital importance for a stable economic development and successful implementation of public services. They both promote legitimacy and strengthening of social cohesion in the country.

In his article *Strategic military news management policy – personal experiences from different wars* **Valentin Areh** as a war correspondent presents the errors and examples of good practice from different armed forces. According to his personal experience, the most elaborate and developed public relations concept is the U.S. “embedded media program”, which proved successful from the perspective of the military as well as the media.

Eric Quellet,  
Jérôme Lacroix-Leclair,  
Pierre Pahlavi

## INSTITUCIONALIZACIJA NEKONVENCIONALNEGA VOJSKOVANJA: PRIMER DARFURJA

### INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF IRREGULAR WARFARE: THE CASE OF DARFUR

**Povzetek** Legitimnost kot družbenopolitični pojem se velikokrat omenja pri obravnavi konfliktov znotraj držav, vendar se le redko neposredno analizira. Avtor članka z institucionalno analizo kvalitativno in neposredno oceni vlogo državne legitimnosti pri nekonvencionalnih konfliktih. Uporabi primer Darfurja, vendar ne le zato, ker gre za konflikt, ki je podoben dinamiki številnih drugih konfliktov v državah v razvoju, temveč tudi zato, ker poudarja velik pomen legitimnosti pri tem, da država uporabi silo. Študija na primeru Darfurja pokaže, da se normativni in kognitivni dejavniki pri razvoju zavezništva med Kartumom in milicami džandžavid povsem prekrivajo z racionalnimi parametri, izmenično pa opredeljuje tudi nekaj globljih razlogov za ranljivost tovrstnega zavezništva.

**Ključne besede** *Legitimnost, institucionalna analiza, nekonvencionalno vojskovanje, Darfur, Sudan.*

**Abstract** Legitimacy as a social-political notion is oftentimes invoked to study intra-state conflicts, but it is rarely analyzed directly. This article uses institutional analysis to assess qualitatively, but more directly, the role of state legitimacy in irregular conflicts. It uses the case of Darfur not only because it is a conflict that is similar in its dynamics to a number of other conflicts in the developing world, but also because it highlights the critical importance of legitimacy in the use of force by a state. This study shows in the particular case of Darfur that normative and cognitive factors are fully imbricated with rational parameters in the development of the alliance between Khartoum and the Janjaweed, and in turns identifies some of the deeper reasons for the fragility of such alliance.

**Key words** *Legitimacy, institutional analysis, irregular warfare, Darfur, Sudan.*

## Introduction

As experts like Van Creveld predicted in the early 1990s, most wars of the late 20<sup>th</sup> and early 21<sup>st</sup> century belong to the category of intra-state conflicts (Van Creveld, 1991). Many reasons have been invoked to explain why such conflicts are becoming more prominent. One of them is based on the idea that with the end of the Cold War, the inherent weaknesses of the state in many developing countries became more acute and visible. Such weaknesses can be measured through a number of classical indicators such as GDP, life expectancy, average level of education, crime rate, etc. Yet, one of the more fundamental elements of state power is often ignored from mainstream analysis, namely how legitimate a state is. After all, as Max Weber famously noted one hundred years ago, if the state is the entity having the monopoly of the legitimate means of violence over a particular population and territory, then legitimacy is at the center of the state's existence. But legitimacy is a parameter that is often overlooked mainly because it is a qualitative concept which is harder to measure than quantifiable parameters, such as the GDP or crime rate. This paper proposes a qualitative way to assess state legitimacy through a case study of the conflict in Darfur, Sudan.

This case has been selected not only because it is a conflict that is similar in its dynamics to a number of other conflicts in the developing world, but also because it highlights the critical importance of legitimacy in the use of force by a state. In many regards, the war in Darfur is symptomatic of the political unrest and ethno-cultural conflict that have shattered the unity of Sudan for more than fifty years (Lesch, 1998, p. 299). The same as the parallel conflict in southern Sudan, violence in Darfur has drawn media attention since 2003, arousing international indignation (Khalil, 2009, p. 41). Some media and NGOs quickly labelled the horrific fighting as “genocide,” “ethnic cleansing,” and “slaughter—more than just a conflict” perpetrated by “the actions of government troops, rebel groups, and tribal militias” (El-Battahani, 2009, p. 43). Beyond the humanitarian dimension, the complex dynamic of the conflict hinges on the alliance between the government in Khartoum and the Arab militias known as the Janjaweed. To understand the issue of Darfur, one must first understand the logic and the underlying social and political forces that determine this unusual association between an irregular force<sup>1</sup> and a Sudanese State deprived of the proverbial monopoly over the means of violence.

It would be reductive, however, to characterize the relationship between Khartoum and the Janjaweed as a mere marriage of convenience. That limited view would also obscure some important elements concerning the domestication of irregular warfare by relatively new states still trying to emulate the Westphalian model,<sup>2</sup> and thereby,

<sup>1</sup> *Irregular forces and warfare refer to both legal and social standards of behavior about the use of force that go against the legitimate use of force by a recognized nation-state. Such deviations can cover a wide range of issues, such as wearing recognisable uniforms, having an accountable chain of command, protection of civilians, etc. As the actual reality of any legal regime is fundamentally dependent on the concrete acceptance of the social norms that are underwriting it, the notion of irregular force cannot be studied solely as a legal issue.*

<sup>2</sup> *There are many definitions of the Westphalian state, but they are all built on the notions that each state is sovereign, and they respect other states' sovereignty while agreeing to common rules of behavior based on legal principles or frameworks. However, many analysts have noted over the years that the Westphalian state model is essentially a set of Western social norms that is not necessarily shared to the same extent in the non-Western world, and to frame it in a legalistic perspective is also very reductive (see among others, Krasner 1993, 1999, 2001).*

trying to establish a degree of legitimacy for themselves. The very notion of irregular warfare can also be construed as an anathema to the foundation of the Westphalian state that has emerged during the last 400 years, because the modern state, at its very core, is by definition an ongoing effort to legitimize power relations through regulating the king's armed bands, as the late Charles Tilly (1992, pp. 68-70) noted. At a time when those states are finding it extremely difficult to establish their authority and legitimacy over populations that they are nominally ruling, the crisis in Darfur is an example of a sovereign power using "illegitimate" militias, i.e. armed non-state actors, as spearheads in counter-insurgency.

We must therefore consider the deeper motivations for such an apparently unnatural association. By exploring the relationship between the government led by President Al-Bashir and the Janjaweed militias, this study will go beyond the traditional explanations limited to geopolitical and material factors, or the legalistic dimensions, in examining the sociopolitical factors underpinning the institutionalization of irregular warfare in the Sudanese conflict. In order to provide an effective framework to capture those institutional dynamics, this paper is built on institutional analysis, in part inspired by the work of Richard Scott (2008).

## 1 INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AS A FRAMEWORK

There are many mechanisms that create orderly behavior in a society, but it is social and formal institutions that underpin most effectively social order in any given collectivity. With order, however, come also restrictions and unequal (and potentially unfair) influence over social affairs for some individuals. Thus, for social institutions to exist and be supported by members of a society, the expectation of orderly behavior that they create must appear legitimate, in spite of the ostensible inequalities they create. In other words, an institution cannot regulate a society if it does not enjoy a degree of legitimacy. But the world is not a static place, and there are always new pressures from the social environment of an institution that questions and challenges the social order that it creates. The integrity of an institution, therefore, is never assured, and must be protected, as an institution is always at the mercy of these environmental forces. In this light, the state is also a social and formal institution that creates inequalities that must be perceived as legitimate, and that expends a fair amount of its social and political resources to protect its legitimacy from external challenges that inevitably arise over time. Institutional analysis of the state is, therefore, about evaluating how this particular institution reacts and adapts to pressures and changes while protecting the foundation upon which its legitimacy is based.

Throughout the 20th century, several schools of thought on institutions coexist; however, there is one recent approach in particular, that of Richard Scott from Stanford University, that provides a substantive and synthetic framework to study institutions, and it is presented below. Institutional analysis, however, is not without criticism. One of the most important is the one argued by Donaldson (1995, 2008)

about the risk of ignoring pragmatic realities by focusing too much on institutional legitimization processes. Nevertheless, even if an institutional analysis tends to simplify the social reality (the same as any model) and if proper attention is paid to the context, useful knowledge about deep underlying dynamics can be uncovered.

The analytical framework inspired by the work of Richard Scott (2008) is based on three generic institutional dynamics. The first one is the regulative which refers to the rules and laws governing a community that are invoked to justify and legitimize the decisions of the institution, whether they are formal or informal, and the reward and punishment systems that underwrite them (Scott 2008, p. 52). The second dimension emphasizes the cognitive predispositions of a community, and encompasses shared conventions, systems of thought, and individually shared mental schemas used to provide legitimacy for its decisions. More specifically, it is a matter of what is considered true, correct, meaningful or proven (Scott, 2008, p. 57). The third component focuses on normative aspects, to include norms, values, deeply held beliefs and whatever underwrites ethics in a particular community. These norms specify the way in which things are to be done and the manner in which decisions are to be made so that they are perceived as acceptable, good, right, desirable, or just (Scott 2008, pp. 54-55). As well, the normative dimension is also the foundation upon which the identity of a particular group or community is ultimately defined (Scott 2008, p. 56), as every human collective self-defines itself, consciously or not, to be unique, special, or superior in some respects to others.

As it is generally done in institutional analysis, applying a model involves evaluating each of these dynamics' individual roles and then analysing their interactions in order to measure how legitimacy is created and maintained so that the community in question can continue to act as a collective whole. Resting on the threefold nature of this model makes it possible to identify if a community is tending towards instability or stability by examining the divergence or convergence of these dynamics. Some dynamics in the institutions of the state may show opposing trends. For example, the regulative dimension may conflict with the normative one, as was the case when certain French officers recommended the use of torture in Algeria in the 1950s, contravening the law of armed conflicts, and ultimately leading to the political and moral defeat of the French Army in Algeria, even if it contributed to a military victory on the ground (Ouellet & Pahlavi, 2011).

## 2 THE CONTEXT IN DARFUR

The crisis in Darfur is rooted in a conflict over land between nomadic and sedentary or semi-sedentary peoples (Dika, 2006, p. 11). Historically, these communities were able to accommodate and cohabitate with each other. However, recently, successive periods of drought and the demographic evolution of Darfur have led traditionally nomadic tribes, which are mostly Arab, to migrate into richer lands owned and worked by the sedentary or semi-sedentary tribes of Darfur (Tubiana, 2006, pp. 115-116). Given the direct link between the refusal of sedentary tribes to share their

lands with the nomadic tribes and the initial eruption of violence, it may appear on the surface that the conflict is only about land and access to agricultural resources (Dika, 2006, p. 11) But the Sudanese crisis equation is more complex.

The conflict is also complicated by ethnical and ideological differences (El-Battahani, 2009, p. 46). The population in Darfur have in common Islam as a religion and Arabic as a language, but they are divided ethnically and culturally by some tribes being Black African while others are Arabic, the latter harbouring feelings of superiority against the former. The “Arabic” tribes consist of the Baggara, Rizaigat, Zayadia, Maalia and Beni Halba (El-Tom, 2009, p. 85). while the “Black African” tribes are made of the Zurqa, Fur, Massaleit, Berti, Meidobe and Zaghawa (who are related to the president of Chad, Idriss Déby, explaining in part the military support offered by that country). However, one must note that this ethnic division is not a neat one and it is complicated by the existence of many mixed families and the cultural “arabization” of some Black African tribes.

It is in this background of land and ethnic issues that a complex conflict emerged. In the early 2000, in reaction to Arab settlement, two local groups, the Sudanese Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) formed and rose up against the Sudanese authorities, who were perceived as favouring colonization by Arabs (Lavergne, 2005, p. 131). In response to the local rebellion, Khartoum formed ties with Arab-majority tribes, which in turn organized themselves into armed militias: the future Janjaweed, which would become by 2003 the cornerstone of the counter-insurgency efforts of the Sudanese regime (Amnesty International, 2006, pp. 3-4).

The term “Janjaweed,” it should be noted, has a complex history. It was originally associated with outlaws and bandits, but its meaning has expanded to include both paramilitary forces and “Arab militia acting, under the authority, with the support, complicity or tolerance of the Sudanese State authorities, and who benefit from impunity for their actions” (Annan, 2005, p. 34). However, “Janjaweed” is not necessarily synonymous with “Arab tribes,” as some Arab tribes have allied themselves with the rebels and fought against the Janjaweed (Haggar, 2007, p. 114). Adding to the confusion is the fact that some non-Arab tribes have also fought as part of the paramilitary forces (Annan, 2005, p. 35). This means that, as Ali Haggar points out, the original Janjaweed are only a part of what is called “Janjaweedism,” a larger phenomenon that includes armed groups which were not initially considered as Janjaweed (Haggar, 2007, p. 113).

In addition, the exact nature of the paramilitary forces, most of which are led by Arab groups, is quite nebulous; they make up a galaxy of militias without any coherent or fixed structure. According to the typology established by the UN in 2005 and completed in 2007 by Ali Haggar (2007, p. 128). it is possible to group them into three broad categories (Annan, 2005, p. 35). The first is informal forces that receive sporadic financial and material support from the government for specific missions.

The second is militias that are more formally organized into paramilitary units. The third and final category consists of the Popular Defence Forces (PDF) (Salmon, 2007) and the Border Intelligence Service (BIS) (Annan, 2007, p. 35). It can be further noted that the PDF are sub-divided into five groups: (1) the more or less permanent elite units, (2) students and other civilians forced into military training, (3) officers and indoctrinated civil servants, (4) local militias, and (5) networks of informers (Salmon, 2007, p. 17). For the sake of simplicity and clarity, the term “Janjaweed” will be used in this study to refer to all of the paramilitary forces representing the Janjaweed movement.

## 2.1 The normative dimension

The alliance between the Janjaweed and the government is more than a simple matter of costs and benefits. There are profound sociological and institutional forces that underpin this alliance found in shared, but mostly unconsciously taken-for-granted, norms and values that create “natural” conditions for it. Many nomadic tribes that have fallen into poverty and have been forced to become sedentary (Prunier, 2005, pp. 49-50) feel that they have been treated unfairly due to the power held at the local level by the Black African majority of sedentary peoples. This perception of historical injustice has participated in creating an identity built on revenge among some Arabic tribes.

Those formerly nomadic tribes became, unsurprisingly, a fertile ground for the central government’s propaganda, as well as a pool from which the Janjaweed has been recruiting (Marchal, 2004, p. 128). Like most postcolonial states, Sudan had to create a sense of nationhood while at the same time establishing some sort of centralized authority. Building on those identity tensions, the Sudanese government put forward policies for the Arabization and re-appropriation of Sudan (Flint, 2009, p. 15). The pro-Arab policy is a testament to the significance of deep normative factors in the Darfur conflict (de Waal, 2008, p. 49). This dynamic results in ethno-religious polarization: while the Black African militias draw their members from the mostly Black African sedentary or semi-sedentary tribes (Flint, 2009, p. 13), most of the Janjaweed recruits come from groups that are promoting the Arab cause and are opposed to the mixing of the populations living in Darfur (Tubiana, 2006, p. 112).

Thus, ideological and ethnocultural polarization have been added to the pragmatic considerations underlying the alliance between the central government and the Janjaweed. Propaganda and the Arabization policy served as a kind of catalyst for the development of an apparently purely rational line of reasoning that led the Al-Bashir regime to use the militias to make up for its limited regular armed forces (Flint, 2009, p. 23) which had been further weakened by years of purges (Lesch, 1998, p. 135).

## 2.2 The cognitive dimension

The socio-political conditions and strategic considerations were already in place when the alliance was precipitated by a series of key events. The most decisive of those

events was the attack by an anti-government coalition of the SLA/M and the JEM against Al-Fasher garrison on 25 April 2003. This demonstration of force directly threatened Khartoum's power and authority. In 20 years they had not succeeded in inflicting that much damage on the Sudanese army (Flint and de Waal, 2008, p. 121). It was a severe psychological shock (El-Tom, 2009, 101) for the central government: in Khartoum, the humiliation was keenly felt (Peninou, 2004, p. 3). Profiting from that success, the rebels gradually extended their areas of operation, which caused the regime to fear the total loss of the Darfur region (Flint and de Waal, 2008, p. 122). It was in the national interest for the government to find a quick, effective and inexpensive means of containing the threat posed by the rebellion (de Waal, 2007, p. 19; Prunier, 2005, pp. 96-97).

In that context, it appeared that employing the Janjaweed could be an advantageous solution. But there were also several other factors that encouraged the government to resort to using Arab militias. First among them were Al-Bashir's doubts about the capabilities of the regular army and his fear of a rebellion, or even a coup (Lesch, 1998, pp. 151-152), given that the majority of Sudanese military personnel were natives of Darfur and thus reluctant to fight against local combatants (Annan, 2007, p. 25; Flint and de Waal, 2008, p. 123; Lavergne, 2005, pp. 131-132). There was also the fact that deploying the regular forces in Darfur, which would have made it possible to reset the balance of power in Khartoum's favour, did not appear to be strategically sound, as the government was engaged in direct negotiations with the rebels at the time (Bastid, 2005, p. 145). In addition, the army was not accustomed to or trained for that type of non-conventional combat (Lavergne, 2005, p. 131), whereas the Arab militias had access to fighting forces that were experienced in irregular warfare and knew the terrain very well (Blaise, 2007, p. 33).

But again, practical concerns are intertwined with cultural and historical ones. In particular, the use of tribal militias was part of a long tradition (Pérouse de Montclos, 1998, pp. 203-211) dating back to the Mahdi rebellion at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>3</sup> More recently, during the 1980s, the regime of President Nimeiry, long before that of Al-Bashir, had often seen fit to arm Arab militias (Hassan, 2009, p. 161; Willemsse, 2009, p. 220). From 1985 onward, the militias were systematically employed by the transition government of General Abdel Rahman Suwar Al Dahab in the war in southern Sudan (Flint and de Waal, 2008, p. 23). In 1989, Arab militias were raised, in combination with the armed forces, to fight rebel incursions in southern Darfur (Flint, 2009, p. 16). That tradition was so entrenched that it became the basis for a doctrine that would remain the reference point for all the intra-state conflicts to come, particularly the one in Darfur (Haggar, 2007, p. 302).

Thus, it was a combination of all the above-mentioned cognitive and environmental determining factors that led the government to decide to use the Arab militias to

<sup>3</sup> *The Mahdi was a religious leader who organized a religious revolt against the Egyptian armed forces. He federated the tribes and used guerrilla techniques to lead an insurgency that enabled him to take power in Khartoum at the end of the 19th century.*

counter the rebellion. One must take all of those factors into account in order to understand why the Janjaweed became more than simple auxiliaries and how they were gradually absorbed and integrated into the armed forces. Now the analysis would not be complete without taking into account the role of regulative factors.

### 2.3 The regulative dimension

The assimilation of the militias into the military apparatus is also a legacy of past practices that became de facto legalized from the perspective of the Sudanese state. Beginning in 1989, the Murahelin were absorbed into the government militia led by the army (Human Rights Watch, 2004, p. 44). Similarly, the integration of the Janjaweed began in 2003, just two weeks after the attack on Al-Fasher (Flint, 2009, p. 20). In northern Darfur, the movement benefited from a particularly effective recruiting policy for the PDF that was implemented in April 2003 in order to absorb the Janjaweed (Hagggar, 2007, p. 128). From individual enlisted men to the brigade-level organizational structures, the Janjaweed were well assimilated into the Sudanese military apparatus (Hagggar, 2007, p. 129). The policy of assimilation was so effective that over time it became impossible to distinguish the Janjaweed from the regular armed forces and the conventional institutions in charge of state security (Willemse, 2009, p. 220). The reluctance of many Sudanese military officers, who were contemptuous of the militias (Flint, 2009, p. 22) or who wanted regular army units to be used for fighting the insurgency, had little influence on the assimilation process (Flint, 2009, p. 17).

The use of the militias very quickly became an integral part of the “normal” way of handling intra-state conflicts in Sudan (De Waal, 2007, p. 7). The same as in the past, the majority of attacks launched in the villages of Darfur were carried out by the regular forces working closely with the Janjaweed. The *modus operandi* almost invariably involved close cooperation between the air force, the militias and the army. As numerous observers have pointed out, the militias had become so normalized that there was total coordination between them and the government forces. However, even though the integration of the militias was largely a result of the legacy left by past conflicts, the phenomenon of the Janjaweed undoubtedly also received a boost from being legally and politically institutionalized by Khartoum.

The attitude and statements of Sudan’s top leaders reveal that the government’s support for the use of militias has become more and more obvious as the conflict has evolved (Bastid, 2005, pp. 143-145). Indeed, the decisions made by Ahmed Mohamed Haroun, Minister of the Interior, or by General Osman Mohamed Kibir, Governor of Darfur (Peninou, 2004, p. 3), show the extent to which the use of the Janjaweed has gradually been officialized at all levels of the local government of Darfur, from governors to commissioners (Annan, 2005, p. 30; Flint and de Waal, 2008, p. 123). The material and financial support provided are also obvious proof of the Sudanese government’s involvement. The members of the Popular Defence Forces received paycheques like their counterparts in the regular forces (Human Rights Watch, 2004, p. 46; Prunier, 2005, p. 98), while the tribal militias or their

leaders were paid in exchange for the attacks they carried out as occasional supplements to the regular forces (Annan, 2005, p. 36). The Janjaweed officers sometimes received extra income in addition to their paycheques (Prunier, 2005, p. 98).

Along with political recognition came official legal recognition of Janjaweedism. In November 1989, a presidential decree institutionalizing the PDF gave the paramilitary forces a legal framework and a chain of command reaching all the way to the highest levels of the government (Annan, 2005, p. 30). As Human Rights Watch notes in its analysis of a more recent directive in this regard, the government allowed the militias to conduct irregular warfare with relative impunity (Human Rights Watch, 2004, p. 5). As demonstrated by the 2005 decision not to charge the militia members suspected of war crimes, Khartoum deliberately exempted the Janjaweed from their responsibilities as combatants (Idid.). For almost three decades, there is much evidence of a real policy of impunity and immunity put in place and maintained by successive governments (Ibid.). The policy was initiated in the 1980s (Prunier, 2005, pp. 98-99) and more recently was institutionalized in laws protecting the Arab militias under international law on armed conflict or giving them immunity from legal action (Fricke and Khair, 2009, p. 279).

### 3 INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

The institutionalization of the Janjaweed as a branch of the Sudanese military was at confluence of several dynamics, which provided subtle but powerful incentives in addition to and beyond the more pragmatic interests of those in Khartoum and of the Janjaweed. The history of tribal warfare in Sudan, and of temporary alliances among tribes to evict those who were considered as intruders, created a commonly shared cognitive worldview and way of “doing business,” which were further reinforced by normative affinities between the Arab-dominated post-colonial Sudanese state and the Arab tribal militias. De facto and formal legalization of using militias as the preferred tool for counter-insurgencies by the Sudanese state was, in many ways, the later outcome of deeper institutional forces found in the normative and cognitive realms.

These dynamics, however, were also working against other powerful institutional forces, being those of the Westphalian state that are also shared, consciously or not, by the Sudanese state. Sudan is also seeking legitimacy, as a state, in the eyes of other states, and it is under a lot pressures to “behave” like a “normal” state too (be it in legal terms or based on social and moral norms). There were, of course, regulative pressures from the international community for Sudan to respect human rights, and the rule of law in general. But there were also other more subtle institutional pressures regarding the cognitive and normative legitimacy of what constitutes the normal armed forces of a state. The integration and assimilation of the Janjaweed in the Sudanese military apparatus, which was perceived by many Arab militias as a betrayal, beyond issues of command and control, would be hard to understand without integrating such institutional dynamics into the explanation. In other words,

social and institutional pressures towards the institutionalization of the Janjaweed into the formal state apparatus were coming from outside Sudan, while the dynamics from inside Sudan were pushing towards maintaining the status quo.

These internal and external forces were complementing each other until the legitimacy that they provided were starting work at cross purpose. The Sudanese state is in many ways a weak state, and it has limited legitimacy both in the eyes of its own population and of other states. To cater to both sources of legitimacy would soon become impossible to manage, and Khartoum had to make a choice. As it is frequently found in most institutions, and as institutional theory predicts, in the long term pressures from the external environment tend to be taken more seriously than the ones coming from the inside.

Hence, during the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, unsurprisingly, there were several indications that the honeymoon between Khartoum and the Janjaweed was over. The alliance, which had lasted more than 30 years, had become fragile and was heading for the “breakup” that had been predicted from the late 1980s onward by some high-ranking officers in the regular army (De Waal, 2007, p. 7). The event that triggered the divorce was the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) at Abuja<sup>4</sup>, Nigeria (Impe, 2007, p. 7). In the agreement, Khartoum committed to disarming and dismantling the Arab militias. It was a clear signal that it was ready to abandon the Janjaweed. Furthermore, the central government entered into an alliance with the rebel militias of Darfur, integrating more than 5,000 of them into the Sudanese army (Flint, 2009, p. 30). It was symbolic that Mini Minawi, the fiercest enemy of the Arab militias, obtained one of the highest positions: senior assistant to the President (Flint, 2009, p. 11). Once more, pragmatic political power certainly played a key role both in constituting the alliance and in dissolving it, but other subtle and yet powerful institutional forces were also at play.

Some saw the Sudanese government’s about-face as an expression of the national interest; others, as the pursuit of a dangerous logic leading the regime to favour the rebels as a way of ensuring its survival, while failing to consider the harm that could result if the Janjaweed became more and more uncontrollable (Dika, 2006, p. 16). Although many of them remained loyal to the government, many others became radicalized and broke away from it. By the mid-2000s, observers quickly noted that the government had lost all control over the Arab tribes (Dika, 2006, p. 40). Some of the tribes became mercenary units working for the highest bidder, while others turned to banditry. Yet, the real question, too often ignored, is whether the Sudanese state was ever considered as something legitimate in the eyes of Arab tribes in Sudan. The former allies are increasingly becoming enemies, which may appear counter-intuitive given the deep normative and cognitive bonds that exist between the Arab-dominated government of Khartoum and the various Arab tribes of the country.

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<sup>4</sup> *The Darfour Peace Agreement was signed on 5 May 2006 by the SLA/M, but in the end it was not signed by the Sudanese state.*

Once more, by excluding the institutional forces (legal or regulative, cognitive and normative) from the analysis, the situation in Sudan is difficult to comprehend.

**Conclusion** The institutionalization of irregular warfare is a complex phenomenon for which a reductive analysis will not suffice. The institutionalization of the use of the Janjaweed cannot be understood solely in light of geopolitical and logistical factors, by considering only rational motives, cost-benefit calculus or by a legalistic view. Historical, ideological, ethnic and cultural factors also contributed significantly to determining the rise and fall of the alliance between the Sudanese government and the Arab militias, as well as the institutional dynamics of the state. The objective of this study was specifically to take non-rational factors into account and examine them together with rational parameters in order to better understand all aspects of the development of the alliance between Khartoum and the Janjaweed. That analysis has made it possible to identify the deeper reasons for the fragility of the alliance and has yielded a better understanding of the current state of that relationship.

Legitimacy is a concept central to any power relationship, as a degree of power has to be given if one wants to rule without relying solely on brute force (which is unsustainable in the long run). Yet, degrees of legitimacy are difficult to measure as it is a social construct dependent on meaningful perceptions and interpretations. Beyond the specific case of Darfur, however, this paper illustrates that the qualitative notion of the legitimacy, when properly framed within the lens of institutional analysis, can be a useful tool to understand the evolution of conflicts.

If legitimacy cannot be reasonably measured in percentage like quantitative indicators, it can be assessed in terms of alignment, or lack thereof, between internal and external sources, as well between the three key dimensions of the institutional dynamics (regulative, cognitive, and normative). Sound alignment provides legitimacy and therefore stability, while lack of alignment requires that sooner or later adjustments must be made through change and compromise. The alliance between the Sudanese state and the Arab militias was able to last because there was institutional alignment, but as soon as the sources of legitimacy became misaligned, something had to be done.

States to continue to exist, even if they are dictatorial in nature, need to be perceived as legitimate both in the eye of their “internal” audience (i.e. with at least some segments of its population) and their “external” audience (i.e. other states). These two sources of legitimacy can be in conflict, forcing a state to make compromises that may appear irrational on the surface, but when properly assessed, they can be explained. Such discrepancy between internal and external legitimacy can be particularly pronounced in the use of irregular warfare.

Many weak states of the developing world are in situations comparable to the early days of the Westphalian era, short of social legitimacy, both internally and externally.

One of the main challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, for the international community, will be to support the establishment of legitimate states where there is not. This daunting task is fraught with many difficulties, and it will be requiring a lot of patience. This further calls for better understanding how legitimacy is established, how it evolves, and to develop a better grasp of its deep dynamics. Institutional analysis offers one avenue to frame with greater rigor the role of legitimacy in the dynamics of states using irregular warfare to exert its power.

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## MISIJA EVROPSKE UNIJE ZA USPOSABLJANJE V MALIJU – SODELOVANJE MADŽARSKE

### THE EUROPEAN UNION TRAINING MISSION IN MALI – HUNGARY'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE MISSION

**Povzetek** Po omejenem vojaškem posredovanju v Maliju leta 2013 se je Evropska unija odločila začeti misijo za usposabljanje za posodobitev vojske malijske vlade in zagotovitev vojaške pomoči v državi. Glavni cilj tega prispevka je predstaviti podrobno analizo misije EU za usposabljanje v Maliju (EUTM Mali). Avtor začne prispevek z opisom dogodkov, ki so privedli do oblikovanja misije, ter nadaljuje z opisom misije in njenega izvajanja do zdaj. V njem preučuje vzroke za krizo, ki jih misija poskuša odpraviti, in situacijske izzive, s katerimi se EU spoprijema v Maliju, ponudi pa tudi vpogled v vlogo Madžarske v EUTM v Maliju.

**Ključne besede** *Mali, Evropska unija, misija za usposabljanje, vojaška pomoč.*

**Abstract** Following the limited military intervention in **Mali** in 2013, the **European Union** decided to launch a **training mission** tasked with the modernization of the Malian government army and the provision of **military assistance**. The essay's main goal is to provide a detailed analysis of the EU's training mission in Mali (EUTM Mali), beginning with the events leading up to the creation of the mission, then proceeding with the description of the mission and its execution so far. The article examines the underlying causes that the mission strives to solve, as well as the situational challenges that the EU faces in Mali. It also provides insight into the role Hungary undertakes in EUTM Mali.

**Key words** *Mali, European Union, training mission, military assistance.*

**Introduction** One of the major events this year was the internationalization of the conflict in Mali, and then the intervention of France against the Islamist extremist groups. The consolidation of the country is now in progress, following the successful French-Malian

military operation, Operation Serval. The European Union, and Hungary in it, participates in the consolidation not only on a political-economic level, but also militarily, as the EU initiated a training mission (EUTM MALI) in the country. Within the framework of this operation, the experts of the member states perform the training and restructuring of the Malian army.

The involvement of the European Union in Mali is not without precedents, as in previous years it cooperated with the leaders of the country in the fields of diplomacy, economy, and security policy. After the MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) and the joining Islamist extremist armed groups declared the breakaway state of Azawad in April 2012, the representatives of the EU indicated instantly that they do not support any move that leads to the disintegration of the country of Mali. The organization did not approve sending a military force to Mali, or joining in the French operations,<sup>1</sup> but accepted a plan to provide training and logistical support for the government forces by European soldiers. However, the launch of the mission was delayed by the lengthy talks until the spring of 2013, when “Operation Serval” almost reached its end.

The French managed to eliminate or rout the extremist armed groups, and forced the rebelling Tuaregs and the government in Bamako – with the assistance of the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) – to conclude peace.<sup>2</sup> The reconstruction of the capabilities of the Malian military could start only then. The EU played a significant role in this with its training mission. This is right now one of the most important tasks, as only a strong, well-trained, well-prepared government army can safeguard the reconstruction and guarantee the safety of the country’s populace.

## 1 THE TRAINING MISSION ORGANIZED BY THE EUROPEAN UNION

On 18<sup>th</sup> September 2012, the President of Mali approached the leaders of the EU, requesting their help to restore the territorial integrity of the country. As the situation in the country was alarming, the meeting of the EU<sup>3</sup> member states on 15<sup>th</sup> October 2012 voted to support the territorial integrity of Mali and the restoration of the democratic government and order. The possibility of the launch of a training mission was also raised. The concept of the operation was approved on 10<sup>th</sup> December, and after that Dioncounda Traoré, the temporary head of state of Mali, officially asked the

<sup>1</sup> *A minor group of European states – independently from the later EU Training Mission – provided logistical support for the French operation. These countries are the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Sweden and Denmark. In the early rounds of coordination, Hungary offered a 10 man medical team for Operation Serval that the French acknowledged, but in the end they did not request the sending of the unit. Source: Besenyő 2013, 126.*

<sup>2</sup> *While the peace treaty was considered a substantial success, it does divide the society of Mali. It is thus a question if the case of the former treaties does recur, when the government simply ignored them. In this case, however, another Tuareg rebellion can be expected that could pose a serious threat to the greatly weakened country. Source: Whitehouse 2013.*

<sup>3</sup> *Part of the information used in this chapter originates from the operation’s own webpage. See: <http://www.eutmmali.eu/>*

leaders of the EU to launch the mission to train and retrain a part of the Malian army (Council of the European Union 2013e). On 17<sup>th</sup> January 2013, at the meeting of the EU’s foreign ministers, the representatives of the European countries approved the formation of the training mission to launch in Mali (Council of the European Union 2013f). On the same day, they also decided that the EU would – if necessary – provide logistical and other support for the UN-supervised, but African-led AFISMA (African-led International Support Mission to Mali), too (European Union 2013c). The seriousness of the European initiative is also demonstrated by the fact that the European Union offered 50 million Euros for the operation of the AFISMA in the Mali Donor Conference in the Ethiopian city of Addis Ababa, and asked the other participants to follow suit (Council of the European Union 2013d).

The European Union Training Mission in Mali is planned for a term of 15 months, with a budget of 12.3 million Euros. French Brigadier General Francois Lecointre, who has major experience in Africa, was appointed as the commander of the operation (European External Action Service 2013a). He already conducted a preliminary situation assessment between 20<sup>th</sup> and 23<sup>rd</sup> January 2013 to learn about the prerequisites to initiate the mission. After the assessment, the General made quite a disappointed statement about the status of the Malian military, and expressed his opinion that the 15-month mandate of the mission would not be enough for the EU to achieve lasting results in Mali (Reuters 2013b). According to him, the army of Mali should be trained to a level similar to the Chadian troops, experienced in desert warfare (International Crisis Group 2013, 8). The General warned against applying the NATO or the Western model to Mali, as it is less adapted to local circumstances than the Chadian. This is also supported by the failure of the former training activities of the US in the area that was also acknowledged by their political and military leadership. For the same reason, the European Training Mission focuses on unit training instead of individual training. In this framework particular emphasis would be put on forging together the soldiers arriving from different backgrounds (Reuters 2013a). It is a question, though, if the 12.3 million Euros intended for the expenditures of the mission will allow the EU to conduct its activities more efficiently than the United States that spent almost 40 times of this sum (about 520 – 600 million USD) on the training of the Malian soldiers (Nossiter, Schmitt and Mazzetti 2013). In January 2013, the majority of European states – except for the Southern European countries – did not favor the sending of troops to Mali, but their position changed by February 2013. Furthermore, the non-EU member Norway also joined the operation (Marchal 2013). Although the initially planned budget was doubled and the mission received a stronger mandate, the organizing went on slowly. At that time they only planned to train 2500 Malian troops together with the soldiers of the ECOWAS, and decided only later to launch an independent mission. Less than 50 soldiers were originally tasked with force protection, and Belgium was reluctant to offer for the mission its A109 rescue helicopters that provided support for the French in “Operation Serval”. These questions were settled after multiple rounds of coordination, and on 18<sup>th</sup> February 2013 a decision was finally reached about the launch of the training mission (Council of the European Union 2013b).

On 25<sup>th</sup> February, the European Union and Mali have signed the agreement regulating the operation of the training mission (European Union 2013a). The EU originally planned to send 250 military trainers and 200 soldiers responsible for logistics and force protection (European External Action Service 2013b). In the end, the actual EU Training Mission launched with 200 training personnel, a 150 men strong unit providing medical and logistical support and handling administrative duties, and another 150-strong unit tasked with force protection (Council of the European Union 2013a).

The headquarters of the mission are located in Bamako, their work is assisted by a support team set up in Brussels. The training activity itself is not conducted in Bamako, but in the city of Koulikoro, 60 kilometers north-east of the Malian capital. The EU provides only the costs of the operation, while the contributing nations provide for the equipment, salary, and travel of the delegated troops. The military trainers of the EU cannot take part in combat activities - that task is reserved for the French and AFISMA/MINUSMA units - but are authorized to use weapons in self-defense.<sup>4</sup> The mission does fulfill not only training, but also advisory functions – in the fields of leadership and management, logistics, human resource management and human rights – to speed up the reconstruction of the military of Mali and restore the territorial integrity of the country. However, they do not provide financial-logistical support for the Malian government forces.<sup>5</sup> The mission has to cooperate closely with the EU operation in the neighboring Niger (EUCAP SAHEL Niger), as well as with other international and regional organizations participating in the reconstruction of the country, most importantly with the UN, the African Union and the ECOWAS (Council of the European Union 2013c).

The mission supports the country's government in achieving the following goals:

- Restoring of the constitutional and democratic order in Mali,
- Securing the free elections of 2013, according to the plan approved by the Parliament on 29<sup>th</sup> January 2013 (Roadmap for Mali's Transition),
- Negotiating with armed groups that reject terrorism,
- Restoring the power of the government in the entire territory of the country,
- Making peace between different communities and ethnic groups,
- Observing and enforcing human rights,
- Neutralizing organized crime and terrorist threats.

<sup>4</sup> *The only problem with that is that the training and equipment of African troops fall considerably short of expectations, thus their deployability – except for the Chadian troops led by the son of the President of Chad, Idriss Deby – is very limited. Possibly these troops would also need the training provided by EUTM MALI. Many have criticized the operational capabilities of the AFISMA operation, funded almost completely from Western sources. Among them, Michael Shehaan, a leading official of the US Department of Defense warned that African units are „completely incapable” that should change (Bamat 2013a). Probably that is why the UN decided that, merging the AFISMA operation, it will create with a politically and financially better founded, broader mandate another, 12600-strong own peace support operation (MINUSMA – UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali), beginning on 1<sup>st</sup> July 2013 (source: United Nations 2013).*

<sup>5</sup> *Informatics and logistical experts participate in the establishment of the logistics system of the Malian army, but this is financed from EU funds instead of the mission budget.*

The first group sent by the EU, consisting of 70 experts, arrived in Bamako on 8<sup>th</sup> February, where they started to set up the headquarters of the mission, as well as the professional coordination with the authorities in Mali (European Union 2013b). The contingents sent by European states arrived continuously until early in April, when the training itself started. The task of the European instructors, arriving from 22 European states, is to train 2800 Malian soldiers in a way to be able to stand up to the currently better motivated, better equipped and better paid radicals.<sup>6</sup> And let us be clear, there is a serious need for that, since the government forces are so demoralized that they can perform military activities only to a limited extent. In addition, France articulates more and more resolutely that it does not wish to station almost 4000 troops in Mali and that it will withdraw them by the end of the year. It can be seen clearly that the French political and military leadership does not trust the abilities of the reconstructed government army, thus it wants to station a 1000-strong force in Mali which, together with the African troops of the MINUSMA operation created by the UN, would secure the stability restored by the French at a high price (Kolster 2013). According to certain opinions, in order to protect their political and economic interests and maintain the stability of Mali, the French want to bring the EU’s training mission to success by any means, and they requested for the same reason to lead the EUTM MALI. In exchange, they provide the largest national contingent for the operation.

The military’s restructuring itself will not be an easy task, since there is a chaotic situation in the ranks of the military of Mali, similarly to most of the African countries (Smith 2013). The members of the army are on the one hand underpaid, inadequately equipped, trained and appreciated. On the other hand, they are a serious threat to the country’s political structure, which is also represented by the high number of military coups. Maybe due to this, many high-rank soldiers serve in the Malian military, whom the politicians tried to bribe with various positions and promotions, even though they do not possess real military qualifications, experience, and some of them are not able to even read a map. According to a government soldier, 9 out of 10 officers are the sons of officers, thus they are literally “born to be officers” (Thiénot 2013). A considerable part of the army is not suitable for military service because of its age, but the government does not risk pensioning them off, since as unemployed they could instantly take up arms against the leadership of the country. Thus they rather pay them to remain in their barracks. The numbers, training and morale of the military ranks is not satisfactory, as the 2012 events proved. It poses another problem that the 2012 military coup has divided the military of Mali, provoking bloody clashes between the troops loyal to Sanogo, the leader of the coup, and those loyal to the former president, Amadou Toumani Touré (International Crisis Group 2013, 14-16). During the current reconstruction of the army, mixed units are formed,

<sup>6</sup> *These countries are the following: France (207 men), Germany (71 men), Spain (54 men), the United Kingdom (40 men), the Czech Republic (34 men), Belgium (25 men), Poland (20 men), Italy (19 men), Sweden (14 men), Finland (12 men), Hungary (10 men), Ireland (8 men), Austria (7 men), Bulgaria (4 men), Greece (4 men), Slovenia (4 men), Estonia (2 men), Lithuania (2 men), Latvia (2 men), Luxembourg (1 man), Romania (1 man) and Portugal (1 man).*

consisting of Tuareg, Arab and Black African soldiers,<sup>7</sup> who should trust each other, which, in light of the events of the latest conflict – the execution and “treason” of Tuareg soldiers serving in the military of Mali – will not be easy (BBC 2013). Another problem is that the members of various armed militias fighting against the Tuaregs for years (Ganda Izo, Ganda Koy, etc.) can also join the army, where it is unlikely that their former opponents will greet them warmly. Such a composition of the army incorporates later infightings that could affect the deployability of the army negatively. The majority of the soldiers of the battalions awaiting training have been soldiers for 2-3 years. Several of them have real battle experience, but the military trainers did not insist on that to avoid weakening the troops stationed in the North that are part of the fight against the extremists. They did, however, insist on excluding soldiers that participated in atrocities against the civilian population.

According to the EU plans, after the 15-month-long training, four light infantry battalions would be created that would operate under unified command and training, incorporating artillery, engineering, and logistics brigades, capable also of independent action. During the training, the soldiers of the Malian battalions are prepared in 10-week intervals.<sup>8</sup> They need to get forged together during this time in a way to be able to execute common tasks as a battalion or a company. During the preparation of the troops each nation undertook a different task. The training group created by the Baltic states (Finland, Sweden, Lithuania and Estonia) and the 31-man group composed of British and Irish instructors provide mostly light infantry training, another British group prepares artillerymen, the Greeks provide intelligence training, the Hungarians train snipers, while the Germans medical (Hettyey 2013, 5) and engineering-demolitions (Drechsel 2013; Deutsche Welle 2013) units, the Spanish provide special operations (Naranjo 2013), while the Polish logistics training. There are also other nations that carry out other logistical-administrative tasks besides the training, as well as those which, although not actively taking part in the training, have an important role in securing the mission. For instance, the Germans and the Austrians have set up together a field hospital at the training base, the Belgians operate the helicopters of the mission (Bamat 2013b), while the paratroopers of the Czech Republic protect the headquarters, and the French and the Spanish are responsible for the security of the training center. But there are also countries that provide “only” material support, like Cyprus, that sent 2400 pieces of 7.62 mm “Zastava” (a Yugoslav variant of the Kalashnikov) assault rifle for the government soldiers (Bata 2013). Naturally, also those nations that have provided material aid are interested in all aspects of the operation. The French and the Belgians have provided mainly uniforms and other military equipment for the reorganizing units of the Malian military. The logistical-material support provided

<sup>7</sup> *After the previous Tuareg rebellions, the government attempted to coopt Tuaregs into the government forces, and later the Americans in the framework of the “Pan Sahel Initiative” program, but apart from a few exceptions, these initiatives ended with failure. Source: Besenyő 2013, 110-114, 121-122.*

<sup>8</sup> *This time might seem insufficient in the light of the fact that the training of an ordinary battalion lasts 27 weeks. The main problem is not posed by the individual skills of the soldiers, but if they would be able to act as a coherent, well-cooperating unit after 10 weeks of training, and strengthen the positions of the government in the northern territories.*

for the reconstruction of the military is as important as the training of soldiers, as the soldiers of Mali lost a significant part of their equipment last year. As a result, during the joint French-Malian operations several African soldiers may have been waiting for possible action unarmed. Currently the training and equipment of Islamist radicals largely surpasses that of the government troops who would be unable to fight any battle against them. The equipment of the government forces is not financed from the EUTM MALI budget, but through the bilateral agreements of European and other states, as well as through the offers of donor states. The supplying of the Malian soldiers with equipment began simultaneously with the training, which, however, hindered the work of the Polish instructors, as they had to balance the training of the logistics squad with the receiving and commissioning of new vehicles, as well as the dispensing of weapons and equipment to subunits (Chojna-Abarchan 2013).

During the training, additional emphasis is put on the topic of human rights – the issue of women, children and refugees – as well as on the cooperation and communication with the civilian populace, because not only the Islamist extremist militants, but also the government forces of Mali have committed several cases of crimes against humanity in the course of Operation Serval (Amnesty International 2013), as well as during recent clashes (Lunn, Mills and Lang 2013). Several humanitarian organizations are included in this programme, which strived during their lectures to hand over the relevant information and change the attitudes of the Malian soldiers participating in the training. This is also necessary because the EU cannot afford itself to just train the government forces, but also take an active part in the total restructuring and reforming of the military, so the priority of its members will not be to take revenge against the northern Tuareg and Arab minority for recent events (Lacher and Tull 2013).

The training of the first, almost 700-strong battalion started on 2<sup>nd</sup> April 2013 and finished on 21<sup>st</sup> June 2013, when the soldiers in training received the documents certifying the completion of the 10-week training. The training was sealed by a military exercise that was evaluated well by both the instructors and the EU (Tinti 2013). Following the success, the Netherlands and Belgium have also indicated that, revising their former position, they are willing to send troops to the operation. The “Waraba” battalion<sup>9</sup>, led by Lieutenant Colonel Yacouba Sanogo, left the camp after its training to be deployed in the city of Gao in northern Mali, and the European instructors, after a few days of rest, began the training of the second battalion (Tigner 2013). Whether the EUTM MALI is a success story, it will be decided in northern Mali, when the soldiers of the “Waraba” battalion first fight the extremists...

Besides the training mission, the European Union takes an active part in the rebuilding of the country. On 15<sup>th</sup> May 2013, the representatives of the EU, France and Mali met in Brussels, where they made substantial financial commitments to aid the restoration of the economy, of the political dialogue and democratic processes (European

<sup>9</sup> *The name of the battalion means 'lion' in one of the languages (bambara) spoken by the locals.*

Commission 2013; Spence and Simon 2013). The EU does not only support the election in July with 17 million Euros, but also takes part in its organizing, and sends observers who monitor the observation of election rules.

## 1.1 Hungarian involvement in the EUTM

Hungary stated already early in 2013 that, while Africa is not a part of its closer sphere of interest; it intends to send 5-10 military trainers to the European Union Training Mission (Delaporte 2013). The actual number and type of experts and instructors sent by Hungary depended partly on the country's commitments, partly on the EU's needs, which was clarified in the force generation process and then at the informal meeting of EU ministers of defense on 12-13<sup>th</sup> February 2013 in Dublin.

The country's involvement in the mission was supported by all parliamentary parties except the far-right Jobbik.<sup>10</sup> Thus, according to the decision of the government, the Hungarian Defence Forces contribute at most 15 servicemen (at most 30 in rotational periods) to the mission (Government of Hungary 2013). The Hungarian involvement lasts for a period determined in the mission's mandate, but no longer than 18<sup>th</sup> May 2014. This does not include the time allotted for deployment and extraction. In order to execute the tasks associated with EUTM MALI, the government decided to reallocate a one-time amount of HUF 555 million from the reserve funds for emergency measures.

The preparation for the mission started already in February, where, besides the special (sniper and instructor) training, the assigned troops received training in peacekeeping operations, battlefield knowledge, engineering and medical skills, among others (Markovics 2013). The lack of accessible data about Mali presented a problem; therefore, the Geoinformation Service of the Hungarian Defence Forces created a 220-page "Mali country review" for the liaison officer's takeover in August. The material was already used at the preparation of the senior officer (Besenyő and Miletics 2013). Of the 10-strong Hungarian contingent in Mali, the liaison officer was serving at the mission's headquarters already in March, the medical team of 3 arrived on 18<sup>th</sup> March, while the 6 sniper trainers on 13<sup>th</sup> April. The Hungarian medical specialists are assigned to the German field hospital, along with their German and Austrian colleagues (Fuchs 2013). The members of the Hungarian sniper instructor team started the training almost immediately after their arrival, which they conduct together with the Portuguese (HVG 2013, Székesfehérvár 2013).

During the training it could present a problem that a part of the Hungarian soldiers do not speak French, even though they received language courses during their

<sup>10</sup> *The representative of the far-right Jobbik party has vehemently opposed the Hungarian involvement in the EU operation, referring to the fact that Zsolt Németh, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, has offered Hungarian soldiers and equipment (helicopters, etc.) imprudently, and that Hungary has no business in a conflict that erupted due to the fault of Western states, and due to French colonialist interests. Thus they did not vote for the resolution that approved Hungarian participation in the mission.*

preparation. However, they are not the only ones, as the military trainers of several countries conduct the training in English. Their briefings and taskings are translated by interpreters for the Malian soldiers (UK Ministry of Defence 2013). Thus, the leadership of the mission has organized a language course for those trainers that speak only English. Another problem is presented by the adaptation to the different climate, as well as the high number of malaria infections. Still, the leadership of the mission is satisfied with the professional performance of Hungarian soldiers.

## Conclusion

In the light of the events thus far, it seems that, while the EUTM MALI can succeed in training the four Malian battalions, the EU cannot withdraw from Mali after 15 months. The country of Mali is still divided, and while they speak about reconciliation and the political-economic integration of the northern regions, the ensuring of the rights of the Tuareg minority still seems uncertain (International Crisis Group 2013, 27-32). The security situation in the country is not stable yet, as a number of refugees have not yet returned to their dwellings (UNHCR 2013), and the decentralization process has yet to begin. There are too many unaccountable, corrupt and incompetent politicians in Malian politics, who are responsible for the recent state of Mali (IRIN 2013). The MNLA still has not laid down its arms,<sup>11</sup> the military is still divided, and the salary, equipment and reliability of Malian soldiers are still and will remain well below expectations, and the soldiers trained by the European instructors will not be sufficient by themselves to secure the country's sovereignty and repel the attacks of the Islamist extremists and other terrorist groups. If the whole military does not undergo a complete restructuring, is not paid well enough and separated from various political groups, then the soldiers will occupy themselves once again with politics and their personal livelihood – including such illegal, but profitable businesses like arms, drug and tobacco smuggling, etc. – instead of their original mission, the defending of the country. Thus the army could remain one of the main sources of instability in Mali.

In my opinion, the results of the work of the EUTM MALI will be realized only after years, when the French and AFISMA troops have already been withdrawn from the country. The experiences of the EUTM SOMALIA operation also show that, where 3 years had to pass until the Somalian government forces trained by European (including Hungarian) instructors could achieve tangible results – still with significant international support! – against the Islamist radical groups. Since the training of soldiers can only achieve partial results, the reconstruction of the country and the restoration of the state apparatus by international – including

<sup>11</sup> This creates a very dangerous precedent, as the French do not let the government forces to enter the region of Kidal, thus the territory is controlled by MNLA militants. Thus there are in fact two militaries operating in Mali. It is not known, when and with what guarantees will the Tuaregs lay down their arms, even though the government and the MNLA have officially concluded peace in the end of May. Source: International Crisis Group 2013, 10-12.

EU – aid and subsidies are also needed.<sup>12</sup> This has already started according to the plan created by the government of Mali, the ‘Plan for the Sustainable Recovery of Mali 2013-2014’ (Republic of Mali 2013), but for the realization more time is needed than the 15 months of EUTM MALI. The region and Mali in it can be stabilized only by a long-term, detailed – economic, social, migration, humanitarian, security – “action plan”, supported by the investment of substantial financial resources. But, if the EU wants to assure that the Malian government does invest the provided financial support efficiently, then it must remain in the country and actively influence the reconstruction and restructuring of the country. The exact details of that must be determined by the decision-makers of the European Union.

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<sup>12</sup> *To make Mali operational, the wider Sahel region (Algeria, Mauritania, Niger, Libya, Burkina Faso, Senegal and Guinea-Bissau and Nigeria) must be supported, due to the vulnerability of these states and the security vacuum that was present in the region for decades – and reduced only temporarily by the French military intervention. If this will not happen, the Islamist extremists – as the “multinational” rebel and terrorist groups cannot be withheld by the otherwise unguarded borders – will simply move on to the next country, for instance Niger, and start over all that led to the intervention of the international community in Mali. The use of aid must be supervised strictly, of course, as, according to experiences; the majority of earlier aid was not used for purposes meant by the donors (Good Governance Africa 2013).*

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## VARNOSTNI IZZIVI V JUGOVZHODNI EVROPI

### SECURITY CHALLENGES IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE

**Povzetek** Namen tega članka je opredeliti glavne varnostne izzive v Jugovzhodni Evropi. Mešanica izzivov se je od konca hladne vojne in vojn v nekdanji Jugoslaviji korenito spremenila v korist nevojaških groženj. Zdi se, da se je izteklo obdobje verskih in ideoloških vojn ter preoblikovanja državnih mej na Zahodnem Balkanu. Mir v regiji, ki je bil zagotovljen od zunaj, sta podprla dva mednarodna protektorata. Zatiranje oboroženega nasilja se ni odrazilo v dolgoročni stabilnosti, saj se na Balkanu znotraj skupnosti še vedno razraščajo nacionalizem, nestrpnost in sovraštvo. Kljub precej izboljšanim meddržavnim odnosom možnosti za medetnične konflikte in nadaljnjo drobitev v nekdanji Jugoslaviji še niso v celoti izčrpane. Med najočitnejše nevojaške grožnje spadajo organizirani kriminal, korupcija, naravne in ekološke nesreče, podnebne spremembe in šibka varnost preskrbe z energijo. Vključitev celotne Jugovzhodne Evrope v evro-atlantske povezave je pri tem najboljša obljuba, zato obstaja pričakovanje, da bo Jugovzhodna Evropa sčasoma postala regija demokracije, blaginje in stabilnosti.

**Ključne besede** *Regionalna varnost, Jugovzhodna Evropa, Balkan, vojaške in nevojaške grožnje.*

**Abstract** The purpose of this article is to identify the principal security challenges in South Eastern Europe. The mix of challenges has changed radically since the end of the Cold War and the wars in the former Yugoslavia, in favour of non-military threats. The era of wars of religion, ideology and redrawing of state borders in the Western Balkans seems to be over. The tranquillity in the region, imposed from the outside has been buttressed by two international protectorates. The suppression of armed violence did not add up to long-term stability as the underbrush of nationalism, intolerance and inter-communal hatred still survives in the Balkans. The potential for interethnic conflicts and for further fragmentation in the former Yugoslavia has not

yet been fully exhausted in spite of much improved interstate relations. Prominent among the non-military threats to security are organized crime, corruption, natural and ecological disasters, climate change and weak energy security. The inclusion of the entire South Eastern Europe into Euro-Atlantic structures offers the best promise. There are thus good reasons for moderately optimistic expectation that the South Eastern Europe will eventually become a region of democracy, prosperity and stability.

**Key words** *Regional security, South Eastern Europe, Balkans, military and non-military threats.*

**Introduction** During the two last decades, parts of Southern Europe have prominently figured as the most turbulent on our continent and a notable source of insecurity spilling over to other parts of Europe. On the other hand, regional security in South Eastern Europe<sup>1</sup> (SEE) has been tangibly influenced by geopolitical developments in the wider Euro-Atlantic area. The shifts in power relations among major extra-regional powers have impacted on the (in)balance between conflict and cooperation within in the region.

Since the end of the “Cold War” and the wars in the Western Balkans, the chief sources of insecurity in SEE have evolved considerably. In the new mix, non-military challenges have in the last decade gained primacy over military ones. The question is whether the overall evolution of regional security could be positively assessed in spite the still present non-negligible intraregional conflict potential.

## 1 THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

SEE overlaps partly with the regions of Eastern Mediterranean, Central Eastern Europe and the Black Sea. The central part of SEE – the Balkans has contained a unique and the most heterogonous mixture of peoples and ethnic minorities in Europe (culturally, linguistically and religion-wise per square mile) (Johnsen, 1995, pp. 9-60). Consequently SEE has never become a coherent region in cultural, political and economic senses having clearly lacked its own center of gravity. The high sensitivity of its elites to external influences and to the shifts in relations among major extra-regional powers stands out as the second salient feature of SEE as region. In these respects, SEE has differed very appreciably from other European regions, particularly Scandinavia. Not incidentally, the geopolitical fault line stretching from SEE eastward, all the way to the Pacific, was branded by Z. Brzezinski the “Eurasian Balkans” (Brzezinski, 1997, pp. 7-25, 29-45, 99-108).

The geopolitical instability in SEE has had deep historical roots. The Balkans has long merited the distinction as the most volatile part of the European continent. Throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century, wider social upheavals and wars between

<sup>1</sup> For the purpose of this article South Eastern Europe encompasses the countries between Slovenia in the Northwest, Moldova in the Northeast and Greece and Cyprus in the South.

continental powers stimulated or provoked in the Balkans local, rebellions, revolutions, *coup d'états*, state breakdowns, warfare within the region, terrorism and other forms of violence. The latest bouts of armed violence and wars in the Balkans took place in 1991 – 1995 and in 1998-2003 (Blank, 1995). The former upsurge was largely triggered by otherwise positive developments in the Euro-Atlantic area – the end of the “Cold War”, the breakdown of Eastern European and of the Soviet communist regimes, the dissolution of the Warsaw pact and the ensuing transition towards democratic political systems and market economies.

Social instability, economic difficulties and political unrest have very significantly contributed to an explosion of interethnic conflicts. Their severity has been further magnified by modern mass media and often exploited by ruthless politicians. Political instability accompanied by violence has led since the 1970's to the fragmentation of Cyprus, Moldova, two Yugoslavias (SFRY, FRY) and subsequently three ex-Yugoslav republics. The process of “balkanization” doubled the total number of *de facto* existing states in SEE from eight to sixteen. The Balkan wars produced up to 130 thousand estimated deaths, with the most tragic results in Bosnia & Herzegovina with about 100 thousand deaths, in Croatia and in Kosovo. In addition, they created two to three million refugees and displaced persons. The wars also left thousands illegal caches of small arms and ammunition which have supplied the black market controlled by organized crime. By rough estimates, the wars has left at least a million planted anti-tank and anti-personnel land mines. Although de-mining activities, supported financially by the USA and several EU members, have been quite successful there are still several hundred planted mines in several areas of B & H and Croatia. There are also thousands of dangerous remains of cluster bombs in rural Serbia, the results of NATO bombing in 1999 (ITF Annual Report 2012, p. 49, 63).

SEE has won the distinction of the only region in Europe which has been the theatre of several UN peace-keeping missions and of the first NATO's “out-of-area” military intervention. In 1995, following unsuccessful attempts by UN, CSCE/OSCE and EEC/EU (Burg, 1995, pp. 47-86) and only after considerable hesitation a USA-led coalition of Western powers decided to impose peace on the Western Balkans by force. The end of armed hostilities was finally achieved in 2003 in Croatia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia.

The consequences of political fragmentation and armed conflicts in the Western Balkans had caused huge dislocation and losses in the region's countries, their human capital, industrial and agriculture production and infrastructure (Altmann, 2004, pp. 69-84). In some parts of the Western Balkans, war losses, the breakdown of previously integrated transportation and energy systems, economic fragmentation and the loss of export markets had reduced the region's combined GNP to the pre-1990 level. The very unevenly distributed damage has greatly increased the intraregional differentials in GNP p. c. (Batt, 2004, pp. 7-19) and in the levels of unemployment. In the poorest SEE states, the latter have become the highest on the continent. The Balkan wars had led to a big increase in the governments' sponsored or tolerated trafficking

in war materials. The wars also contributed to a spill-over of organized crime into Western Europe. High unemployment and poverty in parts of the region have stimulated corruption, organized crime, illegal migration and numerous kinds of illegal trafficking, particularly in narcotics and small arms.

The tectonic geopolitical shifts in the early 1990s and the crisis of neutralism and non-alignment led to a radical political and military realignment in SEE. With the greatly reduced Soviet/Russian influence practically the entire region has become politically and economically oriented towards the West. The end of the NATO/Warsaw pact confrontation and the lack of large-scale mineral, energy or other natural resources led to a very considerable decline of the region's geopolitical importance. SEE has ceased to be an object of overt contests for political and military domination by superpowers. The region has gained instead the international notoriety as a source of troubles and a costly nuisance.

According to the statistics on armed conflicts around the world, recently compiled by the Uppsala Peace and Conflict Research Project (Harbom, 2009, pp. 577-580), among all continents Europe has experienced the deepest drop since the last peak in the early 1990s. The real value of this positive finding should however not be overestimated. Similarly as elsewhere, although less intensively than in Asia and Africa, a considerable conflict potential still remains on or close to our continent. This is particularly true of South Eastern Europe and also and more so of the adjacent regions in the Mediterranean, Northern and Southern Caucasus and in the Near East. In addition to power politics, unresolved interstate territorial and political disputes, domestic religiously-coloured extremism, competition for energy, water and other scarce natural resources, external meddling etc. the conflict potential in Europe's Southern neighbourhood has been enhanced by several aspects of globalization, including its mass information effects, and by, in the long-run the inevitable progress of individual and collective emancipation which internally destabilize established authoritarian political orders, particularly in multinational and multiconfessional societies.

## **2 THE CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION**

The suppression of armed violence did not add up to long-term stability in the Balkans, as has been manifested since 2001 by the local outbursts of violence in Kosovo, Serbia, on the Kosovo-Serbia border, in Macedonia and by the paralyzed central government in Bosnia & Herzegovina.

The "European Security Strategy", adopted by the European Council in 2003, posited as the main global threats to the EU members: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states, terrorism and organized crime, cyber security, energy security and climate change (Vasconcelos, ed., 2009, pp. 38-41, 64-67). Other EU documents mention also as real or potential problems the unresolved conflicts among and within neighbouring states and securing the EU external borders. The actual situation in SEE and even more so the public perception of security threats differ

substantially from these official EU assessments. Respondents in public opinion surveys in most European states have been generally more concerned with other aspects of human insecurity, such as unemployment, crime, drug abuse, corruption, environmental damage, natural disasters (floods, fires) traffic accidents etc. than with the threats highlighted in the official EU and NATO documents (SJM, 2009, p. 494, 2012, table V7).

Once imposed from outside the tranquillity in the region has been buttressed in the Western Balkans by two international protectorates - in B & H and Kosovo. In B & H, the NATO-led SFOR has been replaced by the much smaller EUFOR, supported by a small NATO special unit and rapid intervention capability. In Kosovo, NATO maintains also about 6,000 military personnel in the multinational KFOR, while EU runs the 2,300-strong mission EULEX which include international police, prosecutors, prison officials, administrative overseers etc. Since 1975 the line of demarcation between two parts of Cyprus has been guarded by the UN peacekeeping mission UNFICYP, today with about 600 soldiers. Two decades since a local mini-war caused by the secession of Transnistria, there are today about 1,500 Russian military personnel, among them 335 “peace-keepers” in Moldova (Military Balance, 2013, pp. 103, 203).

Although much less intense than during the Cold War, the rivalry between USA and the Russian Federation for the influence in SEE has been revived. The Russians have since been using energy exports and sizeable parastate investments as their main tools, particularly in the energy sectors in Serbia and the Republic *Srpska* in B & H as well as in industry and real estate in Montenegro. A brigade-size military outpost in Moldova, a large naval and air base on the Ukrainian territory in Crimea, the Russian Navy in the Black Sea and a rotating squadron in the Eastern Mediterranean mark the decreased Russian military muscle in SEE and its immediate vicinity, compared with the Soviet pre-1991 levels. There are also some US and Russian operational tactical nuclear weapons still present in or close to SEE. The US military presence in SEE has, on the other hand, moderately increased largely due to the volatility in the Near-and Middle East. In addition to the USN Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and the US Air Force’s presence in Italy, Greece and Turkey USA has built up a substantial land base Bondsteel in Kosovo and acquired the rights to use military training and transit facilities in Romania and Bulgaria. In July 2011 USA concluded an agreement with Romania on placing on its territory a battery of antiballistic missiles. These activities presage SEE’s future role in the declared US and NATO’s Theatre Missile Defence against potential threats from Iran (while the Russians view this development very differently and as a threat to them).

One important aspect of security in SEE since the end of the “Cold War” has been a very considerable change in the levels of defence spending, military manpower, stocks of conventional weapons, arms production and exports. These movements were reflected in the holdings of heavy conventional weapons prior, soon after and in 2011 the incomplete implementation of the CFE Treaty due to disagreements between

NATO and the Russian Federation (see Table 1). The table shows that the former Communist-ruled states drastically reduced their defence outlays, both for political and economic reasons. This applies not only to the two former WTO members (Romania and Bulgaria) but also to the former non-WTO states not included into CFE- to Albania and to seven ex-Yugoslav states. The present levels in the latter are as follows (see Table 2).

Table 1

	Tanks			Artillery			Aircraft		
Romania	2,960	1,375	437	3,928	1,475	899	505	430	69
Bulgaria	2,209	1,475	80	2,085	1,750	311	335	234	42
Greece	2,276	1,735	1,462	2,149	1,878	3,353	458	650	282
Turkey	3,234	2,795	2,494	3,210	3,529	7,807+	355	750	354

Source: *The Military Balance 2013, 2013*. London: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies. pp. 118-119, 141-142, 168-169, 183-185. Goldblat, J., 1994. *Arms Control, A Guide to Negotiations and Agreements*. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute: London: Thousand Oaks: New Delhi: Sage Publications. pp. 176-177.

Table 2

	Active	Reserve	MBTs
Serbia	28,150	50,150	212
Croatia	18,600	21,000	72
Bosnia & Herzegovina	10,550	-	316
Slovenia	7,600	1,700	45
Macedonia	8,000	4,850	31
Montenegro	2,080	-	-
Kosovo	2,500	800	-
Total	78,445	78,521	883

Source: *The Military Balance 2013, 2013*. London: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies. pp. 117, 120, 154-155, 157, 170, 173.

In the group of ex-Yugoslav states most reductions took place after the termination of Balkan wars. The drawdown produced much lower totals of military manpower and heavy conventional weapons compared with those in the 1980s in the defunct SFRY.

Active armed forces have been roughly reduced by half, while those of the reserves and heavy conventional weapons by, at least, two thirds. On the other hand, the two older NATO members (Turkey and Greece) have continued with high defence spending inter alia due to the unresolved disputes over Cyprus and the airspace over the Aegean Sea. This policy in Greece has contributed significantly to its near bankruptcy.

Another aspect of regional security has been related to the existing nuclear installations. There are today only five operating nuclear power stations in the region and a small number of nuclear research reactors. Although all SEE states adhere to the NPT regime, the problem of nuclear safety (including the disposal of nuclear waste) however exists. Its acuteness has been reduced by the shutting down, under the EU pressure of four out of six older Soviet-built reactors at Kozluduy in Bulgaria.

There are in the region three *de facto* existing states whose legal status has been contested – the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Republic of Transnistria and Republic of Kosovo. The latest addition to the list – Kosovo remains an internally very weak state, lacking the control over its entire territory and population and *de facto* an international protectorate. The unsettled situation of the three states provides grounds for new potential conflicts in the region. Moreover there have been recently public threats by and accusations of secessionist intentions against some prominent politicians and public figures in the Republic Srpska in Bosnia & Herzegovina and in Sandzhak and Voivodina in Serbia. So the potential for sharp interethnic conflicts (also in Macedonia) and for further fragmentation in the ex-Yugoslav space (Bosnia & Herzegovina, Serbia and Macedonia) has not yet been fully exhausted. Low-level armed clashes generated by vigilante militias or by armed civilians could still occur in Bosnia & Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo. (Bugajski, 2013, pp. 149-150) Moreover, among the six internationally recognized ex-Yugoslav states there remain a number of unresolved and very sensitive issues, including the problems of succession such as contested segments of interstate borders on land, on the Danube and in the Adriatic Sea.

In the adjacent region of Transcaucasia there are additionally three flashpoints of sharp interstate tensions. In 2008, they resulted in a mini war in Georgia and in 2012 in deadly border shootings on the demarcation line between Armenian and Azeri forces. These armed conflicts have directly involved not only three secessionist and internationally practically unrecognized parastates – Abkhazia, Southern Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh but also the Russian Federation, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. All three “frozen conflicts” remain on Europe’s security and political agenda (Bebler, ed., 2012).

Among other political issues in the Balkans, one should mention the situation of underprivileged ethnic minorities, particularly of the Roma whose population has been fast growing in the Balkans. In autumn 2011, the Roma became targets of racist attacks in 14 Bulgarian towns. (Bugajski, 2013, p. 152) Moreover, there is in

the region, at least, a half million refugees and displaced persons. SEE has recently witnessed mass unrest, violent demonstrations and vandalism provoked by economic troubles, high unemployment and political dissatisfaction in Albania, Serbia, Croatia and Greece. Official data on unemployment rates show 45 percent in Kosovo, 32 percent in Macedonia, 27 percent in Bosnia & Herzegovina and 20 percent in Serbia indicating very difficult social and political conditions in the Balkans. Those difficulties have been magnified by deficient state building and often divided and poor leadership. (Bugajski, 2013, p. 144) Greece has also been under strong pressure of illegal migration, principally from the Near- and Middle East. From among up to 120,000-150,000 estimated irregular migrants across the Mediterranean, at least, a third reaches the EU via South Eastern Europe. The increased flow caused by wars in North Africa and the Near East has led to troubles and subsequent militarization along the short EU external border between Greece and Turkey. On the other hand, the newest EU member states - Romania and to a lesser extent also Bulgaria "exported" into the rest of the EU a part of their own social insecurity when, e.g. a large number of their Roma migrated to and overstayed in illegal encampments in Italy, Spain and France. Severe police countermeasures produced political ripples in EU institutions while the flood of other Romanian job seekers in Spain posed additional problems for the freedom of movement of persons within EU.

SEE has been exposed to a number of other non-military challenges to security. Some of these have originated in SEE itself, while some have been imported from or linked to similar phenomena in states outside the region. Prominent among non-military challenges are organized crime and corruption. According to some analysts, they have the potential of becoming the gravest threat to regional security (Grahovac, 2012). Organized crime from the Balkans, often in cooperation with Italian and other extra-regional criminal organizations has been active in bank and post office robberies, in various forms of smuggling and illegal trafficking, including in humans, human organs, drugs, arms, counterfeit goods, tobacco products etc. It has been estimated that about three quarters of heroin (mostly from Afghanistan) and a considerable part of cocaine (from Latin America) enters Western Europe via SEE. The single biggest source of light weapons illegally exported from SEE has been reportedly the Russian-protected and internationally unrecognized Republic of Transnistria in Moldova.

Since the termination of the last wars the Balkans – previously a hotbed of political terrorism – have lost a good deal of this notoriety and become mainly a transit or hiding area for terrorists and indicted or sentenced criminals. However, there have been individual acts of terrorism in Sarajevo in October 2011 and in Burgas in July 2012 as well as arrests of presumed Islamic extremists in Bosnia & Herzegovina and in Sandzhak. (Bugajski, 2013, p. 151)

Among real or potential non-military security threats which affect SEE (and other parts of Europe) one should mention also natural and ecological disasters, climate change and energy security (Kovačević, 2011, pp. 62-64). Parts of the region have

suffered recently from devastating floods and forest fires. The Russian-Ukrainian squabbles over gas transit have exposed the fragility of energy security in SEE. The interruption of gas supply in winter 2008/2009 hit worst the city dwellers in B & H. The already high dependence of SEE on imports of carbon fuels is likely to further increase. Several competing projects of trans regional gas pipelines, notably Russian-promoted Southern Stream and the EU-backed Nabucco, envision crossing SEE. If and when implemented these very demanding undertakings will strongly impact on energy security not only of SEE but also of EU at large (Altmann, 2011, pp. 37-41).

### 3 SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE AND THE WIDER INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The political conflicts on Cyprus and in Moldova, as well as between Macedonia and Greece have testified to the Balkan elites' very low ability to find pragmatic solutions through compromise and mutual accommodation and to assure regional stability. So far, none of the regionally generated initiatives of enhanced cooperation has proven viable. The efforts to infuse from the outside the cooperation with and among the region's states have been more promising (Delevic, 2007, pp. 31-72). These efforts have resulted since the 1990s in a web of international organizations, almost exclusively Western in origin. This web has included the "Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe", CEFTA, SECI, NATO's "Partnership for Peace", "South East Europe Initiative, Regional Cooperation Council", *et al.*

The international record of dealing with the sources of instability and insecurity in SEE has highlighted the complexity of its problems which defy quick one-dimensional solutions and the underestimated links between the region's security and the security in other parts of Europe. There is a need for a robust international action to improve the economic and social situation in most of the Balkans while avoiding the vicious circle of the region's external dependency. Foreign military and police presence will be still needed, probably for many years to come. The ability of the international community to help manage numerous problems could be best enhanced by further strengthening the EU's and NATO's role and influence in SEE. The NATO Strategic Concept of 2011 stresses the aim of "facilitating Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans ... [in order] ... to ensure lasting peace and stability based on democratic values, regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations" (NATO, 2011, p. 31).

Despite numerous hurdles, the EU and NATO have actively fostered multifaceted regional cooperation, particularly among the ex-Yugoslav states (Rupnik, 2011, pp. 17-30). Since 2008, the net of EU stabilization and association agreements has been extended to cover the entire region, except Kosovo. These agreements have served as steps in bringing closer to and eventually admitting all remaining Balkan states into the ranks of EU members. The admission of Croatia and Albania into NATO in 2009 also contributed to the stabilization in the region. In 2013, Croatia

entered the EU, while Turkey, after a very long waiting period became an official candidate and started pre-accession negotiations which were for some time stalled largely due to the Cyprus problem. Serbia and Montenegro entered the groups of candidates in 2012, while Macedonia's candidacy (both to the EU and NATO) remains in limbo due to Greece's ridiculous veto over Macedonia's name. Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina and also Kosovo (within the context of UN Security Council Resolution no. 1244/99) remain potential future candidates although the implementation of the EU's Thessalonica promise to embrace in its ranks the entire Balkans keeps being delayed due to financial and economic crisis in the Eurozone and to the enlargement fatigue among the old members. (Grabble, Heather, 2013, pp. 109-113) The NATO summit in Chicago in May 2012 reconfirmed Macedonia's candidacy, welcomed Montenegro's progress towards NATO membership, praised Bosnia & Herzegovina's membership aspirations, expressed support for Serbia's Euro-Atlantic integration and for the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue as well as for further consolidation of peace and stability in Kosovo. In the decades to come, the process of EU and NATO enlargement indeed provides the best hope for progress of SEE regional security.

However, a note of caution would be in order. The promised inclusion of the entire region into the European Union is not around the corner. Even when it happens it would be security-wise insufficient. The record shows that despite the simultaneous membership of both states in the European Union, it took Great Britain and Ireland more than three decades to reach a symbolic reconciliation and conclude compromise within the Good Friday Agreement on Ulster. After a similarly long simultaneous membership in the EU and NATO, the conflict between Great Britain and Spain over Gibraltar still remains unresolved. Sixty years of two countries' membership in NATO have not stopped the arms race between Greece and Turkey and did not bring closer a resolution of the Cyprus problem. The admission of the Republic of Cyprus in the EU also did not advance its resolution and perhaps made it more difficult. Today, more than 60 years since the country's joining NATO and the European Communities, the relations between the two main national communities in Belgium are worse than they have ever been.

The historic record also shows that in the 1860s, late 1870s, early 1880s, in 1908-1913, 1914-1921, 1937-1945, 1947-1949, mid-1970s, late 1980s, in 1991-1995 and 1999-2003 the flare-ups of violence have almost regularly punctured the periods of relative peace in the Balkans. The last time peace did not come from within the region, but was imposed by the West's military intervention. The underbrush of nationalism, intolerance and inter-communal hatred unfortunately still survives in the Balkans. In some Balkan countries, the societies became more nationally and religiously segregated than they were a quarter of century ago. This is particularly true of Bosnia & Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia. This is why, in order to break with the negative pattern of the last 150 years, the Balkan elites need to show much wiser and more responsible behaviour than their predecessors did.

The present security situation in the region is certainly better than it was at the turn of the century. It was due to a number of encouraging developments. The extra-regional sources of conflict in, over or about SEE have been radically reduced. The Western Balkans is no longer Europe's powder keg as it was in 1914. The era of wars of religion, ideology and of redrawing state borders in the Balkans seems to be over. Compared to the early 1990s, the relations between ex-Yugoslav states have greatly improved. The latest achievement – the agreements on normalization between Serbia and Kosovo has come about with the help of active prodding and mediating involvement by the European Union. The Brdo Process initiated by Slovenia promises to further develop and intensify regional cooperation. Most countries in the region have undergone radical transformation of their political orders. Instead of authoritarian and, among them also totalitarian regimes of the late 1980s the region is composed today of, in various degrees, democratic political systems. And democracies almost never fight wars among themselves. Moreover, the considerable demilitarization in most Balkan states has greatly reduced their warfare capabilities. The Balkan elites have hopefully also learned from the negative experience of the last two decades and of its harmful consequences. Unlike in 1990-1991, the hottest potential trouble spots in the Western Balkans are today under international surveillance in the form of present foreign troops, civilian controllers and two *de facto* protectorates. In addition, the countries of the region are recipients of considerable financial assistance and developmental loans. There is also a web of the above-mentioned regional cooperation schemes, including those in security and defence matters. The SEE states themselves contribute today their peacekeepers to a number of NATO, EU and UN stabilization and observation missions in Europe, the Mediterranean, Transcaucasia, Near and Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. All this provides good reasons for moderately optimistic expectation that the Balkans will become eventually a region of democracy, prosperity and stability enhancing and not diminishing the security on and around the European continent.

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## DOBRO UPRAVLJANJE OBRAMBNIH SISTEMOV V ČASU GLOBALIZACIJE

### GOOD GOVERNANCE OF DEFENCE SYSTEMS IN GLOBALIZATION ERA

**Povzetek** Globalizacija, gospodarska soodvisnost, informatizacija in telekomunikacije so pospešile gospodarsko rast držav v razvoju. Pomemben dejavnik gospodarske rasti je tudi dobro upravljanje in poslovanje, povezano s politično stabilnostjo. Globalno upravljanje se namreč začne pri nas, našem delovanju in ravnanju v mikro okolju. Dobro delovanje na mikro ravni je nato popotnica za uspešno vključevanje v procese na makro in globalni ravni. To velja tako za vsakogar izmed nas kot tudi za državo. Dobro delovanje oziroma upravljanje na mikro ravni – intraupravljanje – je pogoj za uspešno zunanje upravljanje, in sicer ekstraupravljanje na makro oziroma globalni ravni. Zmožnost lastnega intra- in ekstraupravljanja je odvisna od zmožnosti sprejemanja odločitev. Ta se zmanjšuje s povečevanjem zadolženosti države in njeno zunanjo nekredibilnostjo zaradi nenavadnih ravnanj njenih upravljalcev.

Posebno področje razprave predstavlja dobro upravljanje obrambnega sistema, kajti v procesih nadaljne optimizacije in racionalizacije se je treba dotakniti tudi vseh vprašanj, povezanih z okoljem, v katerem deluje obrambni sistem. Izhajati je treba iz tega, da je integracija znotraj obrambnega resorja nujna in čimprejšnja, prav tako tudi znotraj resorja za notranje zadeve. Tako integrirane obrambne strukture na eni strani in notranjevarnostne na drugi strani je nato treba optimalno in racionalno povezati. Integracija teh dveh struktur ni mogoča zaradi številnih strokovnih razlogov.

**Ključne besede** *Evropska unija, globalizacija, Nato, obrambni sistemi, Slovenija, vojaški izdatki, dobro upravljanje.*

**Abstract** Globalization, economic interdependence, informatisation and telecommunications have accelerated economic growth in developing countries. An important factor of the economic growth is also good governance and operations in relation to political stability. Namely, global governance starts with us, with our operation and performance in a micro-environment. Good governance on a micro-level can then serve

as a good companion on the path towards inclusion in the processes on a macro and global level. This is true for each and everyone of us as well as for the country. Good governance, that is governance on a micro level, *intra-governance*, is a pre-condition for successful external, *extra-governance* on a macro, global level, whereas an ability of our own intra- and extra-governance depends on the ability to take decisions. However, this ability decreases with increasing indebtedness of the country and its external unreliability resulting from unusual actions of its managers.

Good governance of the defence system represents a special topic of the discussion, as the processes of further optimization and rationalization need to address also the issues relating to the environment in which the defence system operates. Our reasoning must therefore stem from the fact that integration is urgent within both, the defence and interior structure. The integrated defence structure on one side and the internal security structure on the other should then be optimally and rationally integrated. However, integration of these two structures is impossible for numerous expert-level reasons.

**Key words** *European Union, globalization, NATO, defence systems, Slovenia, military expenditure, good governance.*

**Introduction** Governance and good governance are two concepts that are not very well known in a general context, let alone in a more specific defence or military field. Nevertheless, worth mentioning is the importance of good governance in the defence field as something that is not only desired or recommended, but urgent. In the time when financial resources are declining and when rationalization and optimization are on the move, good governance can act as a unique shock absorber trying to reduce the damage suffered by the defence system. The optimal ratio between the financial resources allocated for the costs of the personnel, operational activities and new acquisitions, which is 50:30:20, represents, in the case of Slovenia, a distant history and even more uncertain future.

Slovenia has found itself in a worse economic crisis than the majority of the European Union or Euro zone. It forms part of the environment where developing countries have not known the meaning of the economic crisis for a decade or two. Therefore, the ambition and the main purpose of this article is, in addition to explain the basic terminology, to demonstrate and analyze the actual economic crisis from the global and European point of view, to determine how, if at all, the economic crisis influences the global defence expenditure, and to analyze the placement of Slovenia in this context both, from the economic and defence point of view. A logical question that arises at this point refers to the relation between good governance and economic crisis.

I dare to say that countries with a stable political structure, aspiring-to-the-statehood tradition and due understanding of the meaning of the governance, training,

education and appointment of the right people to the right positions at the right time can ensure better governance of the state and, consequently, of its (defence) systems. The lack of these traditions coupled by frequent replacements of governments in the crisis period has caused a lot of economic damage and, indirectly, damage in the defence field. Once the economic crisis broke out in the country, Slovenia first cut the defence expenditure, which, unfortunately, has not diminished the crisis. The dilemma of whether to have butter or guns in Slovenia has not increased the amount of butter once the financial resources allocated for guns decreased.

The figures presented in the continuation of the article speak for themselves. A mixed methodological approach and a combination of a descriptive method, a method of direct observation with participation and, in particular, a secondary analysis of statistical data allow the complex problems, such as governance of defence systems in the globalization era, to be addressed in a thorough way. At this point, at least in the case of Slovenia, we must open a discussion on the need to ensure good governance of the defence and internal security sub-system within the national security system, i.e. between the Slovenian Armed Forces and Police<sup>1</sup> in the narrow sense.

Slovenia is also part of the globalization as a process and concept which we have lived for more than a half of the century and which has, particularly in the framework of the international relations studies, opened the door for a new study area relating to global governance. The contents relating to global governance are addressed by numerous scientific disciplines and subjects, such as geostrategic studies, diplomatic studies, trade relations, military and defence studies, peace studies, governance, etc. The acceleration experienced by the globalization and its transition to the third level, Globalization 3.0 as termed by Friedman (2007), further increase the importance of global governance in a *flat world*. In the near future the issues relating to global governance and operations will most probably outgrow the conceptual framework and become a new scientific discipline.

Is the world in a global crisis? Are the reasons for the crisis clear and known to everybody? Do we know how and are we able to eliminate them? What can be done about it on the level of a two million country which is the EU and NATO member state? What can be done about it on the level of an individual, an active citizen? The time in which we live is characterized by this and numerous other issues, as we have been dealing with them for some years now. How to explain to workers who have lost their jobs in a factory or the service sector this is a result of Slovenia being exposed to globalization influences as well? The loss of ten thousands of jobs in Slovenia in the past few years partially results from globalization and our inability to adapt to global trends, while partially the cause and fault also lie in us. But not

<sup>1</sup> *The media discussions in the summer of 2013 about the Slovenian Police were both, comical and worrying. Discussing that the Police have no financial resources for basic maintenance of their car park or for acquisition of new tyres for police vehicles demonstrates that something is clearly very wrong in the governance of the Slovenian national security system.*

in factory workers who do their job professionally and always within the deadline, but in the managing personnel who is responsible for running and managing the company's operations. Do they know, do they have the ability and do they understand what is going on around them?

In the past few decades the media have daily bombarded us with the words such as global, globalization, globalized world, etc. For five or six years we have also constantly used the phrase economic (global) crisis, a crisis as a result or consequence of the global governance which has obviously not been very adequate. And the outcome is a crisis. The things are, of course, not that simple; poor governance equals the crisis; the links between cause and effect undoubtedly exist. To be able to understand these links, we must explain and define what exactly globalization is, what global governance is and how to add operations to global governance. We can also generally discuss governance and operations on a global level, i.e. global operations.

However, this discussion is more of a fundamental than substantive character. A substantive discussion is necessary and urgent, the same as the search for answers to numerous questions asked in the introduction. A limited room for discussion does not enable a thorough and in-depth analysis. Nevertheless, it allows and requires a clear definition of the meaning of the phenomena presented as well as a demonstration of their interdependence. All this makes a good framework and starting-point to seek and understand various offered answers to the questions asked in the introduction. Mathematically speaking, the common denominator is something that is urgently needed when discussing global governance and operations, as only the common denominator in the semantic field can enable and offer an adequate basis for an analytical as well as scientifically and methodically correct discussion on global governance and operations.

## 1 ON GLOBALIZATION

According to the Dictionary of Standard Slovene Language<sup>2</sup>, an adjective *global* has three meanings. The first two are directly associated with the understanding of the **globalization** concept. The first meaning is defined as »comprehensive, total - addressing a problem in a general manner, without details«. The second meaning of the word is defined as »pertaining to the entire globe, the whole world«. The third meaning »vague, general« is, however, less useful for our discussion. The noun globalization has yet to find its place in the SSKJ; therefore, when writing in Slovene, the adjective global offers us the necessary help.

It must be understood that globalization cannot be simply and universally defined. Its concept for the first time appeared in Webster Dictionary in 1961. In their study Al-Rodhan and Stoudmann (2006) listed 114 various definitions of the globalization,

<sup>2</sup> Hereinafter referred to as "SSKJ" (digital edition, 2000. Ljubljana: Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts).

and as a result of their analysis offered their own definition: »Globalization is a process that encompasses the causes, course, and consequences of transnational and transcultural integration of human and non-human activities (ibid.) «. To simplify the understanding of globalization I will give some more definitions which, in my opinion, describe this phenomenon very well.

»Globalization as a historical process denotes the intensification of worldwide social relations and interactions such that distant events acquire very much localized impacts and vice versa. It involves a rescaling of social relations, from the economic sphere to the security sphere, beyond the national to the transnational, transcontinental and transworld (Held and McGrew, 2007, p. 2). “The first definition of the World Bank from 2001 states that »globalization is the growing integration of economies and societies around the world”.<sup>3</sup> Its second definition argues that »globalization refers to the growing interdependence of countries resulting from the increasing integration of trade, finance, people, and ideas in one global marketplace ... Globalization started after World War II but has accelerated considerably since the mid-1980s, driven by two main factors, technological advances, including computation, and the increasing liberalization of trade and capital markets.«<sup>4</sup>

For the purposes of this article, let me explain that *globalization is understood as a constant ongoing process which encompasses the entire world in all spheres of life of an individual and a country. Its key characteristic is that actions performed on a micro level in remote places can have implications on a macro, global level, and the other way around.* Globalization is thus something that lives today, with us and by our side. It is a process that has lasted for decades and whose end is not on the horizon. On the contrary, new technical innovations have a direct effect on relations on all levels of a social life even in the most remote places of the world. Additional economic liberalizations are a constant in the world trade. For example, the year 2013 will remain marked by the beginning of negotiations between the EU and US on signing the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement<sup>5</sup> which will, of course, have direct implications and consequences also for Slovenia as an EU member.

Signing and implementing such agreements is part of measures relating to neoliberalism which is, as one of the four policy development types, the most in favour of globalization. Some aspects of globalization enjoy support of both, reformists and transformists, while the rejection approach defends a return to the society without globalization infrastructure. The neoliberal approach is based on four pillars of globalization policy: deregulation of markets, liberalization of cross-border trade, privatization of ownership and services, and strict reduction in public expenditure. As

<sup>3</sup> See <http://www1.worldbank.org/economicpolicy/globalization>.

<sup>4</sup> See [www.worldbank.org/depweb/beyond/beyondco/beg\\_12.pdf](http://www.worldbank.org/depweb/beyond/beyondco/beg_12.pdf).

<sup>5</sup> See remarks by the President in the State of the Union Address, [www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/2012/reamarks-president-state-union-adrrress](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/2012/reamarks-president-state-union-adrrress), 23.4.2013.

mentioned before, the rejection approach entirely refuses to accept globalization, while reformism, the same as the rejection approach, opposes the neoliberal market-oriented concept of globalization, but does not reject globalization as such. It suggests state interventions in the form of public policies designed to regulate globalization processes, and defends transnational mechanisms of public policy development. Transformists would like to transform globalization trends in a similar way as reformists, with a final aim to transform the current social structures so that they would outgrow capitalist institutions (Ferfila, 2007, p. 301-302).

In two of the four policy development types we can recognize a wish for radical changes to the existing neoliberal political paradigm. A complete rejection of globalization or a demand to outgrow capitalist institutions sound rather *neosocialist*. It has been seen in practice that neoliberal globalization brings not only numerous opportunities, but also traps. Each individual, country and society has a possibility to take advantage of the available opportunities. If they fail to do so, the traps can be very painful. A combination of neoliberalism and reformism may be a good option for the future. This is true also for Slovenia which, of course, cannot afford autarky; however, a *combined approach* may allow it to retain some positive systemic structures from the previous political system. Health care services and pension benefits must remain available to the widest population. On the other hand, we must support education in a spirit that we must take care of ourselves and demand from the state equal opportunities and not a comprehensive care for individuals. The outcome could be a genuine Slovenian model which would take into consideration national characteristics, size, (political) history, geographic position, etc. Establishment of a conceptual framework is therefore a very important task; however, of at least similar importance is implementation of this concept in practice which requires a high-quality execution of the pre-set tasks. In order to attain this goal, we need a wide range of people with various skills among which, I dare to say, the most important is governance.

## 2 ON GOVERNANCE

Each organization or an organized group of people needs to be managed and governed. Organizational theories dedicate a lot of attention to this issue. »Each organization needs a few different organizational structures for various tasks (Drucker, 2001, p. 22). « Managing an organization and its various structures is the responsibility of management. »Management is a precisely defined body that is specific for each organization and at the same time common to all organizations.... The main point of the management existence is that institutions achieve results that are visible also outside these institutions (ibid.). « Management can therefore be bodies or the people that manage. **Governance** is a verbal noun of the verb “to govern” and describes two types of activities: »An activity that deals with governing, directing life in a social community, and activity that deals with taking decisions on life and with performing basic tasks in a working community (SSKJ, 2000). «

In relation to governance the term **leading**, a verbal noun of the verb lead, is often used. The verb lead has several meanings of which the following are crucial for our discussion:

- To make sure that something works, or that is performed in a certain manner;
- To be in first position when directing activities of a) a group, community, organization, b) a working unit;
- To be in first position when taking decisions on a course of something;
- To cause, with example or advice, that somebody acts in a certain manner;
- To make sure or cause that something is achieved (ibid.).

The difference between a traditional leader and manager lies also in the fact that the power of a traditional manager derives from the organizational structure. Management therefore strives for stability, order and resolution of problems within the existing structures, while the power of a leader comes from their personality and knowledge. Moreover, leading defends a vision, creativity and changes within an organization (Hočevar et al. 2003, p. 148). It is obvious, without any analysis of the expert technical literature, that leading is closely associated with governance. We can claim that governance is a wider activity on a macro, global and strategic level, while leading takes place on a direct, meso- and micro level and is, as such, an operational-tactical activity. Leading essentially encompasses interactions among the people and envisages a certain form of hierarchy, while governance does not necessarily require direct interactions among the people that are governed.

A specific form of leadership or an independent activity, primarily on a micro-meso, tactical-operational level, is called **commanding**. This term is most often used by uniformed professionals (armed forces, fire-fighters) and also by various groups. SSKJ defines the verb command as »to perform leading, leadership functions in a military unit or an adequate institution ... to perform leading, leadership functions in a unit, group or to give orders«. The military dictionary defines commanding as the »act of leading«, and does not give any special attention to personnel management (Vojaški slovar, Korošec T. et al, 2002 p. 343). Contemporary military terminology defines command as »authority of an individual in armed forces to direct and coordinate military forces or control over them« (ASVTS<sup>6</sup>, Furlan T. et al., 2006, p. 54). At this point I would like to add that this can be applicable on all levels of command. Most often commanding is manifested through **giving orders**, where a demand to do a certain action is expressed; to order means »to express a will that someone must do a certain action (SSKJ)«. A synonym of the order can also be a **command** as a »written, oral or signal communication which transfers instructions from superiors to their subordinates« (ASVTS, Furlan T. et al., 2006, p. 177).

All the above mentioned definitions reveal that the concepts, such as governance, leading, and commanding, are closely correlated and have one common characteristic; decision, decision-taking, which means expressing a will, demand, opinion, wish

<sup>6</sup> *Angleško-slovensko vojaški terminološki slovar (English-Slovene Military Terminology Dictionary)*, Furlan B., et al., 2006. Ljubljana: PDRU.

how something should be or will be. This context includes also giving and determining directions. After the demonstration of the ratio between the concepts, which are many times used as synonyms in everyday life but not always in expert literature, the attention will be focused on a more accurate definition of governance as the most important form of expressing will on a strategic level.

The founder of the contemporary management theory Henry Fayol argues there are five functions and 14 principles of management.<sup>7</sup> The functions are the following:

- Forecasting and planning,
- Organizing,
- Commanding or directing,
- Coordinating,
- Controlling (obtaining feedback information).

Taking decisions on needs and ways to satisfy those needs is called management. To manage means to direct or to give sense to something. Moreover, management must encompass also implementation of certain actions or activities. Management thus consists of two essential elements: an element to determine the course of action in order to achieve the pre-set goal, and an element to execute actions which enable the pre-set goal to be attained (Brezovšek, 2001, pp. 49 – 60).

A special form of management on a strategic level both, in a public and private sector is called **governance**.<sup>8</sup> The public sector often calls it just governance, while the private sector uses the term corporate governance. The World Bank defines governance as »the way... power is exercised through a country's economic, political, and social institutions«. <sup>9</sup> The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines it as »the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority necessary to manage a nation's affairs ... Good governance is characterized by participation, transparency, accountability, rule of law, effectiveness, equity, etc«. It refers to management of government issues without abuse and corruption and on the basis of the rule of law<sup>10</sup>. As mentioned before, the private sector uses the term *corporate governance*, which refers to »procedures and processes according to which an organisation is directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among the different participants in the organisation – such as the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders – and lays down the rules and procedures for decision-making« (OECD).

All of the above considerations clearly state that governance, management and leadership have numerous common characteristics. It is common to all that they have

<sup>7</sup> Fayol, in V. K. Narayanan and R. Nath, *Organization theory: a strategic approach*, Homewood, Il. Irwin 1993.

<sup>8</sup> The principles are the following: division of work, authority, discipline, unity of command, unity of direction, subordination of individual interests to the general interest, (honest) remuneration, centralisation, scalar chain, order, equity, stability of tenure or personnel, initiative, esprit de corps.

<sup>9</sup> Governance is a verbal noun of the verb govern which means to: »decide, give orders, particularly in an organized social society, especially in a country, and give guidance and directions« (SSKJ, 2000).

<sup>9</sup> World Bank's PRSP Handbook, *What is governance?* <http://web.worldbank.org>, 21.4.2013.

<sup>10</sup> Glossary of statistical terms, OECD, <http://stats.oecd.org/glossary>, 22.4.2013.

authority as a right to influence on, decide on and order to either individuals or organized social communities regardless of their size or placement into the public or private sector. If they were put in the hierarchical relation, governance would be at the top and commanding on the bottom. This can be seen also in Table 1.

At this point we need to place stress on global governance as a special hierarchical form of leading and governance. Global governance is »management of global processes in the absence of a global government (Najam in Riazati, 2006)«. The definition offered by the United Nations is much more evident: »Global governance can thus be defined as the sum of laws, norms, policies, and institutions that define, constitute, and mediate trans-border relations between states, cultures, citizens, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, and the market. It embraces the humanity as a whole, trying to bring more predictability, stability when facing with transnational challenges—such as climate change and environmental degradation, nuclear proliferation, and terrorism.«<sup>11</sup>

The areas that can be placed in the context of the global governance are the following:

- Environmental issues and governance of the planet,
- Economy and globalization,
- Reform of political institutions,
- Resolution of conflicts, security and peace,
- Science, education, information science and communications.

**Table 1:**  
Governance in  
the private and  
public sector,  
and in the  
defence-military  
area

	PRIVATE SECTOR	PUBLIC SECTOR	DEFENCE/MILITARY
Global level	Global governance	Global governance	Global governance
Strategic (macro) level	Corporate governance	Governance/ management	Governance, leading
Operational (meso) level	Leading	Leading	Leading, commanding (also)
Tactical (micro) level	Deciding	Deciding, ordering	Ordering, commanding

Source: Author's own work.

All these areas can be studied from the global or regional perspective. Global governance is not governance in the sense of exerting authority. However, it includes numerous elements of governance and is in itself a concept in the international relations. When naming global governance in Slovene, we can see the urgency of finding a more adequate term which matches the translation and is semantically

<sup>11</sup> UN Intellectual History Project, <http://www.unhistory.org/briefing/15GlobalGov.pdf>, 22. 4. 2013.

suitable. Just like the authority is an integral part of governance, management and leading, the essential part of them all is also giving directions, coordination, search for feedback information, forecast and planning. All three concepts can be used as synonyms on a strategic level, but of course not on a tactical level. Due to specific understanding of the term governance in Slovene and on the basis of the analysis I assess as suitable to use the terms *global governance* and *corporate governance*. I can conclude that one of the main pre-conditions for good governance is also appropriate and timely allocation of financial resources, which means that we must dedicate more financial resources to what is high on the priority scale. In the sphere of leading and commanding, more attention is put on a human factor and direct work with people. Only the right combination of both can lead to success of any large system, let alone a system as complex as the defence one.

### 3 IS GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS REALLY GLOBAL?

International relations are a scientific discipline dealing with a wide range of issues relating to the functioning of states, transnational subjects, international and non-governmental organizations, namely of all bodies that take part in international interactions. Three main theories are traditionally dominant in the field of international relations: realism, liberalism and Marxism. However, in the past few years constructivism has been on the rise (Smith and Baylis, 2007, p. 8). The theoretical framework of international relations encompasses also other theoretical concepts that are either independent or branches of the above mentioned ones. The most well-known are the following: neoliberalism, dependency theories, critical theories, etc. From the viewpoint of global governance we must emphasize the perception of globalization of the key theoretical approaches in international relations. We must first point out that all key theories recognize globalization as a fact. The difference lies in the (non) understanding of its importance and influence on the key social relations and international (capitalist) relations.

*Realists* do not perceive globalization as a change in the most important characteristic of the global politics – territorial division of the world into national states. Economies are becoming increasingly interdependent as a result of their mutual connections. This, however, is not true for the system of countries which preserve their sovereignty. Moreover, the threat of use of force and the significance of the balance of power do not diminish. *Liberalists* see things differently, namely as an end product of a lengthy transformation of the global politics. In their opinion globalization undermines the essence of the realistic theory, as the countries are no longer the central operators as they used to be. Liberalists are particularly interested in a revolution in technology and communications, as represented by globalization. *Marxists* find globalization exaggerated, as it is only the last level in the development of international capitalism. It does not mean a high-quality shift, but further deepens division lines between the core, periphery and semi-periphery. Constructivists see globalization as an external force which impacts the countries and for which the leaders say it is reality they cannot escape. This is a very political stance, as the leaders can co-shape

globalization and social movements with the help of contemporary forms of communication, such as the Internet (ibid.).

Regardless of various conceptual aspects of globalization, we can conclude that we must be aware of the sole fact of its existence in international relations and act in a pro-active manner, as in this way individuals, social groups and countries can impact globalization, co-shaping globalization processes. At this point there is no need to give in to fate thinking we are too small. With the right level of realism and sobriety, this is true also for small countries such as Slovenia. In this context we must also explain a term which is very closely associated with globalization and which has been around for at least five years. A global economic crisis or, simply, a crisis is »a situation in an economy where favourable development conditions start to rapidly deteriorate« and an «unfavourable, hard-to-solve situation» (SSKJ). The SSKJ descriptive definition undoubtedly makes it clear that the talk is about a situation which is not good. It is therefore good to remember that it is not necessarily so. The Chinese sign for a crisis is a combination of the characters for danger and opportunity.<sup>12</sup> The latter emphasises a positive aspect which is an integral part of any crisis. A crisis is therefore a time of danger, insecurity, lack of clarity and predictability, but also a time which offers opportunities. Many investors say that a crisis is a time when they look for new opportunities to do business and make investments.

Economic indicators do not confirm the economic crisis. The crisis is global from the European/Western point of view. However, the situation is completely different in China, India and other developing countries (Table 2). The West has been in economic decline for some years or even decades; therefore, the theories about the rise of the East and decline of the West are not pure imagination<sup>13</sup>. At this point we can therefore ask the following question: *how global is really the global crisis?*

All the time we have talked about the global economic crisis, the economic growth in Asia has always exceeded six per cent. This has not been true for only the past few years, as this trend has been going on since 1995 and, according to predictions, it will last until the end of the second decade of this century. On the contrary, developed economies have struggled with one or two per cent growth. In 2008, when the GDP fall was the biggest, the Euro zone experienced a -4.4% drop, while Asia registered almost a seven per cent growth. All these above mentioned considerations make it clear that Europe and the West will have to accept the new reality which is associated also with globalization processes – unfortunately in a way that will not benefit us. The crisis has thus mostly affected the Euro zone. What is more, the situation is further deteriorating. Slovenia is among the worst countries in the Euro zone. It is also one of the two Euro zone countries with a negative growth forecast for 2014.

<sup>12</sup> The word crisis is a combination of the signs for danger and opportunity, in traditional Chinese these are: 危機.

<sup>13</sup> More on this matter in Črnec, Damir, *Izzivi in priložnosti Slovenije v geopolitičnem in geostrateškem okolju 21. Stoletja*, in *Izzivi moderne države* (edited by M. Avbelj), Brdo pri Kranju 2012, pp. 33-66.

**Table 2:**  
Changes in  
global and  
Slovenian GDP

	Global GDP	Developed economies	Euro zone	Developing countries	Asia	Slovenia
1995–2004	3.6%	2.8%	2.2%	4.9%	7.1%	4.0%
2006	5.3%	3.0%	3.2%	8.3%	10.4%	5.8%
2007	5.4%	2.8%	3.0%	8.8%	11.6%	7.0%
2008	2.8%	0.1%	0.4%	6.1%	7.9%	3.4%
2009	-0.6%	-3.5%	-4.4%	2.7%	6.9%	-7.8%
2010	5.2%	3.0%	2.0%	7.6%	9.9%	1.2%
2011	4.0%	1.6%	1.4%	6.2%	8.1%	0.6%
2012	3.2%	1.2%	-0.6%	5.1%	6.6%	-2.5%
2013*	2.9%	1.2%	-0.4%	4.5%	6.3%	-2.6%
2014*	3.6%	2.0%	1.0%	5.1%	6.5%	-1.4%

\*Forecast

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2013<sup>14</sup>

Only a short walk through a theoretical aspect and conceptual apparatus associated with globalization, global governance and operations can enable a discussion and analysis to determine where Slovenia actually is. A young country still struggling with numerous after-birth difficulties and challenges, yet a member of the European Union and NATO. The Slovenian economic crisis is an integral part of the Euro zone crisis, but certainly not of the global crisis, as the latter does actually not exist from the non-Western perspective. Slovenia is, as a result of developments around us and particularly because of us, in a very bad economic situation. When in 2009 the GDP fall in the Euro zone was 4.4%, it was almost about eight per cent in Slovenia. In the following years when the GDP in the Euro zone started to recover, it was about zero in Slovenia. In 2012 it fell by 2.5% with a forecast of a further decrease by 2.6% in 2013 and by 1.4% in 2014<sup>15</sup>. If the forecast for 2013 comes true, the Slovenian GDP will fall to the 2007 level, meaning it will decrease by 2.5 billion Euros if compared to the peak in 2008<sup>16</sup>. As demonstrated by the figures in Table 2, Slovenia has been doubly affected by the global economic crisis; firstly, as a member of the European Union which, as such, is still struggling with the crisis and, secondly, as one of the European Union members mostly affected by the crisis, the same as Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Cyprus. Economic inefficiency of Slovenia as a country has a tragic impact also on the financial resources allocated for defence purposes that are far from two per cent of GDP, which was a political commitment of Slovenia upon its entry into NATO.

<sup>14</sup> Modified for the Table, see <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/pdf/text.pdf>, 24. 10. 2013.

<sup>15</sup> According to the latest information of the IMF, October 2013, [www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org).

<sup>16</sup> In 2008 the Slovenian GDP amounted to 37.135 billion euros, [www.stat.si](http://www.stat.si). 2008 was also the last year in which the budgetary revenue was 0.2% higher than expenditure.

## 4 ON DEFENCE SYSTEMS AND EXPENDITURE

At the beginning allow me to explain what the defence system actually is. The 2010 Resolution on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia defines the Slovenian defence system in line with the contemporary understanding of defence systems. The defence system encompasses a spectrum of political, normative, organizational, military, personnel, material-technical, intelligence-security, information-communication, development-research, educational and other activities organized by the state with an aim to ensure efficient defence. It consists of two components: the *Slovenian Armed Forces* as the authority responsible for military defence and development of military capabilities, and the *non-military part of the defence system* responsible for development and implementation of defence policy, provision of conditions for operation of the entire defence system, provision of non-military capabilities in support of the Slovenian Armed Forces and allied forces, and preparations and measures for defence purposes of the country and for functioning of the defence system in crisis situations.<sup>17</sup> The defence system as such does not include the field of protection and rescue which is placed within the third sub-system of the National Security System of the Republic of Slovenia called the *System of Protection against Natural and Other Disasters*.<sup>18</sup>

Protection and rescue costs do not fall into the category of military expenditure. In the case of Slovenia military expenditure covers the budget of the Defence Ministry and Slovenian Armed Forces, and the costs of military pensions which are, however, a different budgetary item. This definition of the military expenditure is in line with the definition of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

The SIPRI definition includes all expenditure of military forces, and particularly of:

- The armed forces, including peace keeping forces,
- Defence ministries and other government agencies engaged in defence projects,
- Paramilitary forces when judged to be trained, equipped and available for military operations, and
- Military space activities.<sup>19</sup>

The contemporary changed global security environment, in addition to transnational threats as defined by the 2010 Resolution on the National Security Strategy<sup>20</sup>,

<sup>17</sup> *Through the implementation of activities which contribute to the defence of the country, other national authorities, local community bodies and civil society organisations of particular importance for defence are also included in the defence system (Resolution on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia, 2010).*

<sup>18</sup> *The third sub-system is called the Internal Security System. Slovenia is one of the few countries whose Defence Ministry includes the protection and relief area. This field is usually either part of the Interior Ministry, or it is an independent ministry or a government office.*

<sup>19</sup> *See [www.sipri.org](http://www.sipri.org), <http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/measuring-military-expenditures#defining-military-expenditure>, 20. 8. 2013.*

<sup>20</sup> *Resolution on National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia (ReSNV-1), Official Gazette of the RS No. 27/10.*

increases the military-security lack of predictability<sup>21</sup> as a result of the global multipolarity. Until the end of the 1980s when the world was divided into two blocs, the world of two superpowers was more or less globally balanced. The wars that broke out were under sole »control« of one of the superpowers. However, when this balance fell apart, leading to asymmetry<sup>22</sup> of global conflicts, the lack of predictability became one of the risk factors also on the global level.

**Table 3:** The 15 countries with the highest military expenditure in 2012. Spending figures are in US\$, at actual prices and exchange rates. The figures of changes are calculated from spending at permanent prices in 2011.

Rank		Country	Spending in 2012 (\$ billions)	Changes (%)		Share of GDP (%) x	
2012	2011			2011-12	2003-12	2012	2013
1	1	USA	682	- 6.0	32	4.4	3.7
2	2	China	(166)	7.8	175	(2.0)	(2.1)
3	3	Russia	(90.7)	16	113	(4.4)	(4.3)
4	4	UK	60.8	- 0.8	4.9	2.5	2.5
5	5	Japan	59.3	- 0.6	- 3.6	1.0	1.0
6	5	France	58.9	- 0.3	- 3.3	2.3	2.6
7	8	Saudi Arabia	56.7	12	111	8.9	8.7
8	7	India	46.1	- 0.8	65	2.5	2.8
9	9	Germany	(45.8)	0.9	- 1.5	(1.4)	1.4
10	11	Italy	(34.0)	- 5.2	- 19	1.7	2.0
11	10	Brazil	33.1	- 0.5	56	(1.5)	1.5
12	12	South Korea	31.7	1.9	44	2.7	2.5
13	13	Australia	26.2	- 4.0	29	1.7	1.9
14	14	Canada	(22.5)	- 3.9	36	(1.3)	1.1
15	15	Turkey xx	(18.2)	1.2	- 2.1	2.3	3.4
World			1 753	- 0.5	35	2.5	2.4

( ) = SIPRI assessment

x Military spending figures in percentage of GDP are based on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) data of October 2012.

xx the United Arab Emirates may have been ranked the fifteenth; however, there is no available data for the UAE in 2012.

Source: SIPRI <http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/Top%2015%20table%202012.pdf>, 25.4.13

<sup>21</sup> More on defence-military aspects in D. Črnčec, *Izzivi in priložnosti Slovenije v geopolitičnem in geostrateškem okolju 21. stoletja*, in *Izzivi moderne države* (edited by M. Avbelj), FDŠ, Brdo pri Kranju 2012, pp. 33–66.

<sup>22</sup> More thoroughly on asymmetry and conflicts in D. Črnčec, D. Guštin and U. Svete, *Asimetrija in nacionalna varnost: od zgodovinskih izkušenj do sodobnih izzivov*, Defensor, Ljubljana 2011.

At this point I would like to, with regard to defence-military issues, emphasize a unique asymmetry we can witness in today's world. The costs of military expenditure as defined by SIPRI<sup>23</sup> are 2.5% of the global GDP. In 2003 this figure amounted to 2.4% of the global GDP. Particularly striking are the following data from Table 3: China increased its military spending by 175%, Russia by 113%, Saudi Arabia by 111%, India by 65% and Brazil by 56%. On the other hand, the Western statistics are as follows: Canada and the United States increased their military spending by 36%, Australia by 29% and the United Kingdom by 4.5%. Italy decreased its military spending by 19%, France by 3.3%, Germany by 1.5% and Japan by 3.6%.<sup>24</sup> A short analysis of these data shows that in the past ten years the costs of military expenditure have increased by 0.1% of the global GDP. If speaking of military spending as equivalent to 2.5% of the global GDP, the expenditure has increased most in non-Western countries and the least (or they even decreased) in western European countries, including Slovenia. Nevertheless, 58% of the expenditure is spent by the United States, western and central Europe, which means a decrease from 60% in the peak years of 2008 and 2009. China is increasing its defence expenditure and developing global-range capabilities. In April 2013 the media reported that after launching its first aircraft carrier in 2011, China started to construct a new one.<sup>25</sup> Aircraft carriers are ships that are not intended for coastal defence. They are deep waters ships and represent global military resources. The highest number, ten, is possessed by the United States.

After the end of the Cold War, Europe started to gradually reduce the size of armed forces. This process was accelerated by the beginning of the global economic crisis which is most evident exactly in Europe. At this point the term disarmament would not be the most appropriate to use; however, if this trend continues, this is exactly what will happen. Although cumulative figures are still quite high, the percentage of GDP allocated for defence purposes is decreasing. For some time this fact can still be justified with an excuse that Europe perceives the military threat as reduced, which is stated also by the Slovenian National Security Strategy. However, it is not necessarily so. Numerous armed conflicts in the past two decades at the EU borders have proved quite the opposite. The Balkans area is still a powder keg although not to the extent it used to be, the Mediterranean is in either a latent or open (Syria) conflict, while the Caucasus Mountains continue to require careful monitoring. International interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan were conceptual experiments how to solve a conflict starting from its roots. The success of this concept will be discussed for quite some time.

Upon their entry into NATO in 2004, Slovenia and six other new member states undertook to increase their defence expenditure to two per cent of GDP. However, Slovenia did not increase them. What is more, it drastically decreased them so that

<sup>23</sup> *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the Swedish independent research institution which, among other things, is engaged also in global security issues.*

<sup>24</sup> *The 15 countries with the highest military expenditure in 2012, www.sipri.org, 25. 4. 2013.*

<sup>25</sup> *China building new aircraft carrier (Kitajska gradi novo letalonosilko, Večer, 25. 4. 2013).*

in 2012 they amounted to only a good percent of GDP<sup>26</sup>. The forecast for 2013 and 2014 predicts a further decrease to between 0.8 and 0.9% of GDP. The ratio between the costs of the personnel, operational activities and acquisition of new equipment is dramatic. Almost 85% of the resources are allocated for the personnel and less than five per cent for acquisition of new equipment. At this point a question arises whether the defence system allowing such unprofessional anomalies is well governed. However, the things are, of course, not as they seem. Under the existing financial circumstances the defence system is a vegetating system. It is a system in need of an efficient shock therapy and establishment of a professionally sustainable situation and ratio between the financial resources allocated for the personnel, operational activities and equipment.

The proposal how to tackle defence priorities with available resources focuses on the following four main points: a new review of ambitions and priorities; continuation of reforms in the Slovenian Armed Forces; development of new starting-points for negotiations with NATO on new capability goals; and regulation of the crisis management system and civilian capabilities provision (Garb, 2012, p. 72). The proposal aims to find a solution to defence issues, starting with good governance of the defence system. In the process of further optimization and rationalization we must also address the issues relating to the environment in which the defence system operates. Our reasoning must therefore stem from the fact that integration is urgent within both, the defence and interior structures. The integrated defence structure on one side and the internal security structure on the other should then be optimally and rationally integrated. However, integration of these two structures is impossible for numerous expert-level reasons. As the key reason I would like to emphasize the fact that the political system in a still young Slovenian democracy could not handle this, as such organization would overly resemble the organization of security structures in totalitarian countries. Besides, Slovenia has already had such experience. Radical reforms of the defence and security system are, and will be even more, urgent. Their legitimacy must be ensured through a public expert and political discussion, and later on through a wide support when adopting new legislative solutions.

**Conclusion** This short discussion is an introduction into understanding of a phenomenon that influences an individual operating in the defence-security sphere of a globalized world. Understanding of the basic conceptual apparatus and establishment of a semantic common denominator are of key importance when starting to study complexity of global processes and understanding the role of governance and operations. Regardless of who is big or small, reach of poor, we are all faced with globalization here and now. Understanding of this phenomenon enables individuals to take advantage of available opportunities and, at the same time, to avoid obstacles. The global economic crisis is not a crisis in India, China or most developing world countries. It is a Eurocentric view of the global economic situation in which the West is losing the position it held

<sup>26</sup> Detailed information is available in Garb, 2012.

at the beginning of the industrial revolution. Globalization, economic interdependence, informatisation and telecommunications have accelerated economic growth in developing countries. An important factor of the economic growth is also good governance and operations in relation to political stability. China and India can set an example for all the countries to see how important political stability and understanding of the need for good governance are.

Namely, global governance starts with ourselves, with our operation and performance in a micro-environment. Good governance on a micro-level can then serve as a good companion on the path towards inclusion in the processes on a macro and global level. This is true for each and everyone of us as well as for the country. Good governance, that is governance on a micro level, *intra-governance*, is a pre-condition for successful external, *extra-governance* on a macro, global level, whereas an ability of our own intra- and extra-governance depends on the ability to take decisions. However, this ability decreases with increasing indebtedness of the country and its external unreliability resulting from unusual actions of its managers.

Governance of defence systems as a special skill or science is something that needs to be built, upgraded and cherished. *Firstly*, it is an area whose scientific research needs to be expanded and deepened. We must make sure that knowledge and findings do not remain captured in academic classrooms, but that they become available also to key decision-makers and governors. Academics and practical governors must then make sure that their experience and findings are regularly exchanged and upgraded. *Secondly*, the public discussion must stem from the fact that Slovenia is an independent and democratic state governed by the rule of law, which draws its power from the referendum will of its people that opted for an independent country. *Thirdly*, thorough discussions on urgent reforms in the defence and security area are and will continue to be required also in the future. The results must be concrete proposals on how to proceed. We must begin with the fact that integration is urgent within both, the defence and interior structure. The integrated defence structure on one side and the internal security structure on the other should then be optimally and rationally integrated. *Fourthly*, we must start from the wider Euro-Atlantic framework of which we form an integral part. Let us not reinvent the wheel. Let us not discuss how to transform the army into the police or the other way around. Such practices do not exist, as neither democracy nor comparative foreign practice can handle them. Besides, putting the blame on financial optimization is only a cheap excuse. And, *lastly*, the search for a wider social and political consensus on the urgent basic reforms in the defence and security area is the only right and possible way forward. Let us not discuss whether this is necessary. A modest contribution of this article proves we have already outgrown this discussion. We must stop the slow death of the police and army, and find the right solution for at least a decade or two. The debate must begin and end with a thorough discussion on good governance on all levels of defence and internal security structures.

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## VPLIV KORPORATIVNE VARNOSTI NA NACIONALNO VARNOST

### THE INFLUENCE OF CORPORATE SECURITY ON NATIONAL SECURITY

**Povzetek** V sodobnem svetu je varnost izpostavljena številnim nadnacionalnim in asimetričnim grožnjam. Take okoliščine zahtevajo sodelovanje in skupna prizadevanja varnostnih zmogljivosti nacionalnih držav, pa tudi njihovo trdnejše povezovanje v kolektivni sistem mednarodne varnosti. V tem okviru korporacije kot najbolj razviti poslovni sistemi, ki presegajo nacionalne meje, vzpostavljajo sistem korporativne varnosti, ki poleg svoje temeljne funkcije, torej zaščite varnosti podjetja, dodatno vpliva na nacionalno varnost.

V času globalne soodvisnosti sta nacionalna varnost in gospodarski razvoj neločljivo povezana. Medtem ko varnostna tveganja ogrožajo pretok ljudi in kapitala, stabilni gospodarski razvoj in uspešno izvajanje javnih služb spodbujata legitimnost in krepitev socialne kohezije v državi, s čimer se zmanjša nevarnost družbene fragmentacije. Po drugi strani pa lahko gospodarska kriza in recesija sprožita varnostne grožnje, od brezposelnosti, revščine in politične nestabilnosti do znotrajdržavnih in mednarodnih konfliktov.

Na stanje korporativne varnosti v državah Zahodnega Balkana in njeno vlogo v sistemu nacionalne varnosti vplivajo predvsem trenutna gospodarska in finančna kriza, nedokončan proces tranzicije, politična nestabilnost, nove oblike varnostnih tveganj in groženj, porast organiziranega kriminala in korupcije ter slaba pravna in normativna ureditev nedržavnega varnostnega sektorja.

**Ključne besede** *Nacionalna varnost, družba, korporativna varnost.*

**Abstract** In the modern world, security is exposed to numerous transnational and asymmetric threats. Such circumstances necessitate the collaboration and joint efforts of the security capacities of national states, as well as their firmer integration into the

collective system of international security. Within that framework, corporations, as the most developed business systems that transcend national boundaries, establish a system of corporate security that, in addition to its basic function as the protection of the security of a business, exerts further influence on national security.

In the era of global interdependence, national security and economic development are intricately connected. While security risks jeopardize the transfer of people and capital, stable economic development and successful provision of public services stimulate legitimacy and strengthen the social cohesion within a state, thus reducing the threat of societal fragmentation. On the other hand, economic crisis and recession can fuel security threats, from unemployment, poverty, and political instability, to intra- and international conflicts.

The state of corporate security in the countries of the Western Balkans and its position in national security systems is influenced primarily by the following factors, the ongoing economic and financial crisis; the unfinished process of transition; political instability; new forms of security risks and threats; the coupling of organized crime and corruption; insufficient legal and normative organization of the non-state security sector.

**Key words** *National security, corporation, corporate security.*

**Introduction** The transition from the XX to the XXI century was marked by the onset of a worldwide shift in security trends, with the focus of security widening from the military-political sphere to many other areas, in particular to economic, energy, social, ecological and information and communications security, including human security and the security of society in general. The end of the bloc confrontation, the processes of democratization, globalization trends, integrative processes and established mechanisms of prevention in the area of international security, as well as growing economic and cultural cooperation and interdependence, have reduced the risks of the escalation of regional conflicts, as well as the escalation of crises on a wider scale and open interstate conflicts.

The traditional understanding of national security, based on the concept of sovereignty, i.e. the model of protection of state and societal values and interests, loses its meaning and significance in actuality. The new concept of national security focuses on human security and the participation of individuals in international and global security. In place of the state, the role of active security subjects has been increasingly overtaken by individuals and non-governmental, sub-national and transnational entities. Apart from traditional security functions – diplomacy, intelligence and defense – contemporary states place emphasis on the importance of economic, energy, cultural, social, information, and other spheres of security.

Having considered these facts, it can be argued that a key precondition for the functioning of a state is the corresponding level of its economic development. All relevant components of the social life of an individual are conditioned by his standard of living, meaning that the survival and development of a state's democratic institutions are dependent on the level of economic development. According to John Dewey, economic history is more human and more democratic, and hence more liberalizing than political history (Dewey, 1966, pp. 232-233). However, this does not necessarily indicate that societies with richer economic histories are politically more progressive, nor that economic development alone is enough to eradicate authoritarianism within a nation; in fact, what is being stated is that only at a certain level of economic prosperity can the level of education and political culture which makes citizens ready for democratic challenges be achieved. (Lipset, 1960, p. 50).

The increased availability of information, as well as that of capital, services, products and people, in a world in which the significance of international boundaries has changed, has created new social, political, economic and cultural relations. Thus, the world as we now know it is almost unrecognizable in comparison to the one which existed until the last decades of the XX century. The underlying premise of such a situation is that the concept of the sovereignty of a national state and economy has been violated, and that new regional and transnational associations and systems are being established throughout the world, acting as regulators of a globalized economy. One of those key associations and systems is the large, transnational corporation.

The conditions of doing business on national and international levels reduce the capability of corporations to predict future occurrences, consequently increasing the uncertainty of all aspects of their function. The increasing number of organizations, groups and individuals – as well as the appearance of new methods and means of compromising available to them – with the potential to jeopardize the survival, growth and development of corporations, is evident, regardless of whether they do it for economic, political, ideological or religious reasons. In an attempt to avoid or diminish the consequences of different forms of threat to their business and property, and in order to achieve their business goals, modern corporations are obliged to pay more attention to threat-identification and assessment, as well as to risk management. Of additional importance is the introduction and implementation of defense mechanisms - the most important being corporate security, as an efficient integral system of protection from inside.

Inadequate preparation of corporations with regard to the identification of and reaction to symptoms of latent and strategic crises can significantly endanger their business, something which was observed in the case of many companies following the onset of the international financial and economic crisis in 2008.

Given the significance of corporate security in relation to achieving the strategic goals of a company, an organizational unit assigned to undertake security tasks should be set up in a way that ensures the establishment of clear responsibilities and precise authorization for the execution of its primary purpose. Should a firm or company with a high number of employees, or one doing business in different locations be involved, an organizational unit on the first level of division of labor is necessitated. As regards smaller companies, for tasks within the scope of security management, a corporate security manager should be named and should report directly to top management. In the event that this is not economically viable, a top-level executive must assume the role of a security manager (Trivan, 2012, p. 227).

There is no doubt that in Western Balkan countries, an important part of the current function of corporate security within companies is still related to activities that are, in the broadest sense, related to the physical and technical protection of individuals, property and operations of the company, internal factors that these operations organize and direct, as well as the contracting of external or internal subjects that can implement it in practice. It can be argued that the current “epicenter” of corporate security in the region is self-protection activity in large technical-technological systems, which results in errors in definitions of the concept and content of corporate security. The problem is made more complex by the fact that some companies that are compulsorily-protected (banks, post offices and other institutions) may employ private security for most categories of service, whether protective or self-protective.

The work, as well as an earlier empirical research conducted in Serbia, have required the application of various scientific methods (historical-comparative method, case study, content analysis, examination). Research results suggest a necessity of further adjustment of organizational forms of corporate security in the companies in Serbia and in other countries of the Western Balkans.

Statistical method was used in the research, with certain limitations. Mentioned limitations in application of this method were conditioned by the researches of mostly quality and not quantity contents. In the selected deliberate pattern, which, taking into consideration the research problem was the only one possible, 34 respondents were included (30 corporate security managers in companies and two representatives of each, the Security-Intelligence Agency and the Army-Security Agency).

We have used a questionnaire which was based on the semi-open (semi-guided) questions as an instrument of the empiric research of situation in the corporate and national security area. By the test method (structured expert’s interview) information was collected about the factual situation of functioning of corporate security in companies in the Republic of Serbia, about various segments of scientific foundation of basic theoretical provisions on national and corporate security and about

their mutual influence, as well as a value judgments of leading corporate security managers and representatives of the Republic of Serbia security services about questions that were a subject of the research.

## 1 NATIONAL SECURITY

### 1.1 Conceptual determiners of national security

The precursor to the modern concept of national security is thought to be “The Doctrine of inviolability of sovereignty”, dating from the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, which gave the right to a ruler to decide the religion of his realm (*cuius regio, eius religio* – whose realm, his religion). This right was confirmed and reviewed by the Prague Treaty of 1635, and the Westphalia Treaty of 1648, which marked the end of the Thirty Years’ War between Catholics and Protestants. It is about the last feudal war, which was the first war of the sovereign state. After that, the European rulers were refusing to accept a secular authority of the Roman Catholic Church. They have replaced the Papacy System from the Middle Ages with a geographically and politically separate states, which were not recognizing any type of higher governance. The same legal rights were given to the newly liberated states, the territory under their exclusive control, unlimited control related to the internal policy affairs and the freedom of leading the foreign affairs and conclusion of agreements with other states. A concept of the state sovereignty was established then, that no one is above the state and the political authority is based on the territory and autonomy. Territoriality – internal sovereignty – signifies the right of an exclusive political authority over a certain geographic area, whilst autonomy – external sovereignty – signifies that no outside factor – namely, another country – has authority within the boundaries of a defined state (Holsti, 2006, pp. 17-23).

As for the concept of “national security”, we can understand it to be the objective state of a nation and a country, in which its legitimate organs and institutions undertake legal measures and activities with the aim of achieving basic national interests in the field of foreign and internal policies, economy, defense, education, scientific work, culture, and other areas of social life. Starting from this theoretical definition, national security depends on its military-political and geostrategic position, the character of the state, as well as the characteristics of international relations in both its immediate and wider surrounding. According to the definitions of several international relations experts, national security means “the lack of any fear of attack, endangering of interests or threat of any other country or countries” (Bourquin, 1934, p. 473).

There are numerous definitions of the concept of national security in contemporary literature, the content of which comprises key elements of the concept of security (the object of security, the subject of security and the subject of threat), as well as the activities undertaken by the aforementioned elements. The term “national security” has been in use since 1943 when Walter Lippman used it for the first

time in his seminal work “U.S. Foreign Policy”. After World War II, the concept of national security found widespread use in the political glossary of modern states. In that context, it was used to denote the internal and external security of the state; that is, the security of a state in relation to internal and external sources of threat or hazard. It is the security of a state that enables its survival and normal function, with all elements of independence, territorial unity and constitutional order (Masleša, 2001, p. 37). Some feel that such use of the term “national security” is inadequate, given that it defines the security of a state, and not of a nation, which generally pertains to a broader geographical area. In that sense, the term “state security” is more correct, as it signifies the security of state values and interests, primarily sovereignty, constitutional order and government, thus rendering the everyday security of individuals a secondary priority (Mijalković, 2009, pp. 60-61).

Though the term “national security” is employed extensively, the concept lacks a unified, universal definition. Each proposed definition has relied on other contentious and unclear concepts, particularly when it comes to defining values vulnerable to threat and which require protection (Dimitrijević, 1973, p. 20). Therefore, in the “International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences”, national security was defined as the capability of a state (nation) to protect its inner values from outside threats (Sills, Merton, 1968, p. 40). Amin Hewedy understands national security as a function of national states, through which, in accordance with their own current and future capacities, and with respect to global changes and development in the world, protect their own identity, existence and interests (Hewedy, 1989, p. 16), whilst B. Javorović defined it as a global security of a political community, and as a particular security within the framework of the internal community. In that sense, national security is understood to include both the internal and external security of the state, i.e. the security of the state with regard to internal and external threats, which enables its existence and normal functioning (Javorović, 2001, pp. 23-24). D. Nelson regards national security as a basic frame of any other security and defines it as a relation between state threats and state capacities. Furthermore, he has stated that a balanced relationship between threats and capacities offers potential conditions for peace and prosperity (Nelson, 1997, pp. 348-350). Taking into account the above statements, it is reasoned that “hard power”, i.e. military power, is becoming increasingly offset by so-called “soft power,” to wit, economic-financial, technical-technological, communications and information, political and democratic-social power. (Simić, 2002, pp. 37-38).

Common elements in the varying definitions of national security that are relevant to the content of this concept are as follows, the state as an object and subject of national security; defense and control of national (state) territory; public security – personal and property protection; the preservation of national sovereignty; the realization of basic functions of society (social-economic, social-political, cultural, ecological, economic, etc.); the strategy and politics of security; the security of total state potential; the protection of national interests; security from aggression and external pressures; security from internal subversions; security from threats to

proclaimed fundamental societal values; the subjective feeling of safety, security and well-being. Taking all this into account, a broad spectrum of elements and activities contained within the concept of national security can be noted. Distinguishing between concepts of state and society in contemporary theory and practice, it can be concluded that certain elements representing the security of society and individuals also represent the contents of national security. This implies that a state is not the sole object of national security, but that this concept also comprises a societal and individual security.

## 1.2 Components of national security

With the aim of the protection of national security and the realization of national interests - understood as a set of values and goals that are to be achieved or preserved from other nations by the use of capabilities and potential of a state or a nation - every state establishes a system of national security according to its needs. The pillars of the national security system are, the state, which confronts security challenges and threats in an organized manner; society (citizens), which confronts them primarily through unorganized forms and non-governmental sectors which complement the security function of a state and society. To some degree, we can include the international community as a pillar of the security system, primarily with regard to the prism of international law and the different methods of collaboration within the security sphere. The content of the state's national security system is defined in terms of the influence of various threat elements (real or presumed) stemming from both external and internal sources. Modern practice shows that distinguishing between real and presumed sources of threat is often difficult, and sometimes impossible (Tatalović, Bilandžić, 2005, pp. 74-75).

The subjects of the national security system are, the state apparatus, non-state subjects, intergovernmental capacities and citizens, as well as services, organizations, organs, bodies and institutions which, through their regular activity, directly or indirectly realize security function or contribute to its realization. These forces are organized, trained, equipped and authorized organizational units of conventional security subjects, who directly undertake a particular group of security tasks. "Activities" are elements of the national security system that enable the functioning of the system on two levels, at the internal level, with the aim of conceiving, organizing, establishing, functioning and improving the security system, and at the external level, with the aim of neutralizing of threats, and the maintenance and improvement of security. "Duties" are legally defined parts of the function (sub-functions) of national security, by which the goals of the security system are accomplished, and whose realization is in the authorization of particular security subjects and forces. "Security measures" are operations and activities undertaken by the security system in situations unfavorable to the core values of a society, with the aim of moving the security subjects and forces from a regular state to one of increased readiness for the neutralizing of existing or forthcoming threats (Mijalković, Milošević, 2011, pp. 15-16).

### 1.3 Security sector

Notwithstanding important differences between comprehensive and restrictive definitions of the security sector, there is also a significant level of agreement concerning the basic institutions which fall within the scope of that sector, namely the army, the police and the security services. *Differentia specifica* between these and other state institutions is that the first ones are authorized to use force on behalf of the state (Edmunds, 2007, p. 23). Through such a definition, a clear and unambiguous difference is made between security sector institutions and other state organs; however, the differences between the aforementioned institutions have not received much attention. For instance, the notion of “security system reform” is considered in conjunction with the presumption that it is equally attributable to each of the three mentioned institutions, thus neglecting and negating important differences between them. Within the framework of the process of transition of post-authoritarian and post-conflict societies of the former Eastern bloc countries, including the states of the Western Balkan region, there is an ongoing reform of the security sector. By this, we understand a separate theoretical concept which, under the influence of the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), has developed into a comprehensive and well-rounded political strategy. This concept is increasingly used in the interpretation of society and security processes in a national state or union of several states, and the achievements of security sector reform are seen as an important indicator of the direction, tempo and reach of the total democratic reform of a whole society.

Given that the term “security sector” encompasses the completeness of a concrete society and its component institutions, its reform comprises and requires, changes in the way of thinking and practicing security; changes in constitutional and institutional arrangements; the establishment and development of democratic, civilian control over armed forces; reform of the armed forces, i.e. redefinition of the purpose and tasks of each of their components, and the resultant change of their structure, training, equipment and number, as well as various forms of international security collaboration and an increased level of security integration (Shaw, 2000, pp. 14-16).

It should be taken into account that defined limits between private and public/state security sector have not yet been established. Though it is possible to classify the forms of the organization and methods of control over non-state and state subjects in these sectors, the tasks themselves are much more difficult to differentiate. This refers in particular to the tasks of the private security sector, which bear many similarities to public sector police work. Consequently, many authors differ in their classification of the tasks or functions of private security, considering them to be, in a way, akin to the tasks and functions of the police. A similar pattern is followed by national lawmakers during the normative regulation of certain issues related to the private security sector (Trivan, 2012, p. 172).

## 2 CORPORATE SECURITY

### 2.1 The functioning of modern corporations

According to the “Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary” the term “corporation” is defined as “a large business company, an organization or a group of organizations that is recognized by law as a single unit, which has similar rights to an individual, and which represents the most common way of business association” (Oxford, 2000, p. 279). Thus, a corporation represents the union of different interest groups (stakeholders) – shareholders, management, employees, deponents, and the local community.

The basic principles upon which modern corporations are based are profit efficiency, HSEC (Health, Safety, Environment Management, and Community Relations), and BCCM (Business Crisis and Continuity Management). The HSEC principle comprises of, Health – the promotion and improvement of the health standards of the employees and the local community; Safety – the establishment of safety values and the provision of a safe and secure workplace for the employees; Environment – the promotion of an efficient use of business resources, concurrent with the reduced pollution of environment; Community – adherence to ethical principles, contribution to the economic prosperity and sustainable development of the local community, and respect for the human rights. Implementation of the BCCM principles involves facilitating the functioning of a corporation in normal conditions, during crises, emergencies and accidents, as well as enabling business continuity after the end of crisis and emergency situations, which requires proactive and reactive action and administration by the management.

Characteristics of the business practice of modern companies are simultaneity and interdependence of opportunities, vulnerabilities and dependencies. Although every business operating in an open market has an opportunity to succeed, it is also vulnerable, regardless of whether the threats to which it is exposed are results of market competition or stem from general insecurity. Modern corporations, in order to function successfully in today’s conditions, must anticipate future events and threats. The duty of top management is to define convenient business responses to all challenges. Moreover, the functioning of companies cannot be seen as isolated, but intertwined and dependent on the multitude of circumstances and events caused by worldwide globalization trends and the current international economic and financial crisis. Thus, security management, now more than ever, requires in-depth understanding of the threats with which corporations are faced. In these uncertain times, no business is immune to an unforeseen circumstance. (Mishkin, Eakins, 2005, pp. 380-381).

The causes and forms of endangerment which relate to the security of corporations include, technical and technological accidents; natural disasters; criminal offenses that damage a business subject (diversions, terrorism, sabotage, destruction or damage of the production tools or products); classic criminal offenses;

“white collar crime” committed by employees, most often in collaboration with business partners (abuse, corruption, bribery, embezzlement, robbery, agreement to do business against the company’s interest); criminal offenses of causing general danger and criminal offenses against human health and environment; leaking of confidential data; tort (the breaching of work discipline, deviation from prescribed work organization, transgression or usurpation of authority and competence, in-compliance or insufficient compliance with procedures, negligent operation); social and other disturbances within the corporation.

## 2.2 Concept and basic characteristics of corporate security

According to some definitions, corporate security represents the presence and/or absence of premeditated, negligent or accidentally-caused hazards in the largest business systems in the area of corruption, organized crime, business secrecy, informational security, physical and technical security and safety at work. In this regard, corporate security is a strategic function of a company, with the goal of achieving safety of the business success of the corporation. It comprises the elimination of all risks and hazards that can impact business activities and achievement of business goals; the reduction of threats to a minimum; the maintenance of operation during crisis conditions (crisis management), the overcoming of crises, and the return to normal functioning“ (Ivandić Vidović, Karlović, Ostojić, 2011, p. 34). Within the framework of corporate security, security management refers to the organization and administration of the system of protection of corporate employees and property. Its responsibilities necessitate the setting of goals, planning, organization, the issuing of orders, control, coordination, and the responsibility for safe operational conditions within the company.

It is thought that corporate security is integrated by definition, as it comprises various functions that require synchronization. As such, it represents a function of a corporation that controls and coordinates all security, continuity, and safety activities within a company. The existence of an efficient system of corporate security protects the company from dangerous activities, establishes the base for the management’s decision-making, provides the top management access to the confidential information, and sets into motion processes and procedures that prevent the leaking of classified data (Milošević, 2010, pp. 59-60).

Today, corporate security has become a strategic function of business subjects and, as such, defines the integrated security policies of corporations and their practical implementation. Consequently, the definitions of some authors state that the basic characteristics of corporate security are, the general security of a corporation; the responsibility of experts for corporate security, who nowadays face difficult tasks (simultaneously supporting increasing business needs and preventing increasingly sophisticated attacks on corporations); professional ethics, i.e. the feeling of belonging to the profession and the efforts of all corporate security professionals to aspire to a high level of performance (Murray, McKim, 2000, p. 6).

Pursuant to the doctrine and practice of countries with developed market economies and stable democracies, the functions of corporate security include, Administrative Security – procedures and policies in the area of information security; physical and technical protection (Out-Source/Proprietary) of machinery, equipment and objects; security of property and external partnerships (Personnel Security); Protective Security – protection of individuals and safety at work; Fire Security; Contingency Planning; Information Security; Executive Security; Event Security; security of agreed activities within state structures; investigations/Criminal Protection Program, as well as Security Education Awareness and Training Program (Kovacich, Halibozek, 2002, pp. 161-162).

The organizational structure of the security sector in corporations is a symbiosis of human and material resources which, in the most efficient manner possible, contributes to the successful realization of its tasks. The quality of a structure depends on many factors, with the basic criterion being the success of strategy-realization or the end-goal of corporate security. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze available ways of organizing the security sector or models of the formation of organizational structure (Massie, 1987, pp. 41-42). For small enterprises, and also for medium-size companies, the expenses required for the introduction of a system of corporate security are considerable, and difficult to attain. However, this is not to say that security should be ignored on the part of such enterprises. On the contrary, it is important that executives or owners are educated and well-informed in relation to security management issues, are prepared to utilize their internal resources for that purpose, and choose appropriate external partners in order to undertake security activities that they themselves cannot perform.

### **2.3 Corporate security as a part of the non-state security sector**

Theoretic efforts to define the non-state security sector have not produced universally-accepted results. According to some, that concept would, in a broader sense, include all activities in the security area outside the competencies of the state organs. More specifically, the non-state security sector contains only legally based professional activities organized for providing certain security services in the process of security protection and crime control. This is primarily related to the activities of private specialized security companies (hereinafter, PSC), the operations of organizational units in companies in charge of corporate security tasks, as well as the operations of private military companies, detective agencies and institutions for the implementation of criminal sanctions (Kesić, 2009, pp. 11-12).

Therefore, there is an insufficient distinction between private and corporate security. It should be noted that besides activities related to the private protection of individuals, operations and property (objects, space, and values), the operations of private military enterprises also enter the scope of private security, as well as other security-related operations undertaken on a commercial basis, mercenaries, private detention centers, different forms of “participation of citizens in crime control” and other (Matić, 2006, p. 61). On the other hand, the system

of corporate security organized and implemented within companies contains activities which, for a variety of reasons, are not normally delegated to specialized suppliers of private security (“business intelligence“, protection from industrial/business espionage, information security, security of operations contracted with the state structures). Furthermore, in accordance with the European Union guidelines, corporate security is defined as an integral security which covers security and safety jobs, and what includes information collection duties, security assessments and risk assessments, IT protection, crisis management, fire-protection, explosions and accidents, health and safety at work and other. (Ivandić Vidović, Karlović, Ostojić, 2011, p. 68).

1 Under the concept of Business Intelligence (BI) the most often we understand a legal collection of business information, in fact of the publicly available data, as well as processing of the mentioned information into the business analysis for the sake of providing support to the corporation management in making and realization of the best quality possible business decisions for preservation of its position within the business environment.

Unlike in developed countries, in the former Yugoslavia (with the exception of Slovenia and, to some extent, Croatia) the concept of corporate security has not yet been put into practice, whilst there is a mismatch in the approach to this issue in theory. Among Serbian authors there is no consensus in relation to the notion of corporate security; thus, it is often merged with the concept of private security. In literature from this region, definitions tend toward the following, it is a planned, organized and legally based individual or joint activity and function of organizations aimed at their own protection or protection of others, as well as at the protection of certain individuals, areas, assets, businesses or activities, and which are not covered by the exclusive protection of state organs.

In terms of previous development of the non-state security sector in the Southeastern Europe area, it is evident that there is a significant inequality. As a matter of fact, whilst the corporate security in the most countries of that area is relatively undeveloped, the grown private security sector, which is, by the outsourcing model, often being engaged for performance of security functions in companies, is followed by numerous problems, which are, due to joint legal, political, economic and cultural heritage, typical for these countries. Amongst them, the most important is the absence of appropriate standards and professional ethics in work, inadequate training of staff and insufficient material and technical equipment of companies for private security.

The process of the spreading of corporate security and the non-state security sector in general is global, universal and simultaneous. It is also characterized by uniqueness and diversity, due to the specific relations and processes existing in particular societies. Part of the operations performed by this sector is to relieve police services and enable them to dedicate their efforts to other legally-regulated activities, whilst on the other hand, the material and technical resources, as

well as knowledge and skills possessed by the staff employed in corporate and private security sector can be very useful for the state organs and citizens during a state of emergency. However, aside from the numerous advantages of the privatization of security sector, problems and risks stemming from it should not be forgotten, including its position in the national security system, oversight of the operations of companies that perform this profession, the ownership structure of those companies, staff contracting and training, and the evaluation of services they provide and other (McCarthy, 2006, pp. 30-33).

A major problem in the development of non-state security sector has been observed by a German theorist, V. Merkel. He argued that in so called deficient democracies and weak states, some actors (individuals, groups, institutions) exert direct influence on the direction and content of state decisions in accordance with their own interests. In such cases, the efforts of the state to pursue reform in the non-state security sector are often blocked due to the interests of the opposing structures, particularly if reforms would deprive them of financial, material and/or some other benefits. These opponents can be individuals who possess economic power (tycoons and oligarchs), economic complexes such as military-industry, multinational corporations, organized criminal, paramilitary and guerrilla groups etc. Furthermore, democratic reforms can be blocked by particular state institutions or its organs not subject to democratic control or accountability, such as armed forces, police and security services. The common denominator in relation to all of the aforementioned actors is that they use illegitimate channels in order to block reforms that would jeopardize their partial interest (Merkel, 2004).

The privatization of security functions, in addition to other factors, raises the question of accountability and transparency, particularly if the operations of the specialized agencies are to be undertaken on the territory of other states. With such activity comes the risk of potential abuse of power, the violation of legal norms and the violation of human rights and freedoms, as well as, in extreme cases, the exacerbation of social tensions and political destabilization in a country (Fabien, Dearden, 2006, pp. 13-16).

At first glance, the security privatization process can appear to be an example of the erosion of sovereignty of state power, given the violation of the monopoly over the use of legal violence. However, it is the state that decides when and which security contracts will be offered to the specialized legal entities, with the purpose of selling them to those who can afford to pay for this right. For this reason, it would be more precise to say that, instead of the erosion of state power, the privatization of security leads to the creation of a new web of security subjects in which the power of state and private actors is divided through the new technologies of governance, control, and coercion (Avant, 2004, p. 157).

## 2.4 Regulations in the area of corporate security

Corporate security in the highest number of national legislations is not separately administered by the appropriate regulations. However, the most important issues that are related to its functioning are the subject of various laws, primarily of those that refer to the security area, critical infrastructure, human rights protection....

In terms of the states from the territory of former SFRY, the Republic of Slovenia, while in procedure of admission to the European Union with full membership, regulated the issue of relationship of the state and non-state security sector (corporate and private security) by passing the Law on personal security and the Law on detective activity. In accordance with these regulations, the Ministry of the Interior and the Assembly (professional association of companies of the non-state security sector) are responsible for issuance of licenses and for supervision of work of this sector. Procedure for obtaining of the license differentiates personal and technical conditions which candidates are to fulfill when submit their application. Personal conditions include the following, citizenship of the Republic of Slovenia; adequate qualifications; psycho-physical capability and no criminal record for candidates for crime offences that are punishable *ex officio* and for the offences with elements of violence. Technical conditions are determined by the Minister of the Interior with a special regulation. Commission for issuance of the license consists of two representatives of MoI and three representatives of the Assembly.

Regulations in the Republic of Slovenia forbid for the subjects of non-state security sector making of business deals for which the police and judicial authorities are authorized, as well as performing of jobs for domestic and foreign intelligence or counter-intelligence services. Members of the respective sector cannot use special operational methods and means during their work, for which the Ministry of the Interior and Slovene Intelligence-Security Agency are authorized. If, during their work, they come across information about the committed crime offence that is punishable *ex officio*, they are obliged to inform a competent state authority about it.

Relation between the national security system and non-state security sector in the Republic of Croatia is regulated by the Law on protection of persons and property and detective activity and by the Law on private protection. Inspectorate of the Ministry of Interior is responsible for registration of enterprises, issuance of work licenses and for supervision of work of this sector.

In order to register a legal entity as enterprise for providing security services the following must be done, to get registered with the Commercial Court; register the person responsible for the enterprise; form organizational structure of the enterprise; register the armory and determine design of uniforms of employees, which must be different than uniforms of the state bodies. In order to have a particular person working in a non-state security sector, he/she must fulfill the following conditions, to have place of residence in the Republic of Croatia; to have appropriate

educational degree; to possess psycho-physical working capability; to have no criminal record, no investigation pending against him/her, and no convictions for offences with elements of violence during last three years; to have security checks successfully passed with the competent security agency; and that he/she speaks Croatian and is able to write Latin scripts.

The Law requires that the members of non-state security sector must pass the training and the examination with the authorized institution. Candidates who already have secondary school education (for private detectives higher or high education is required) attend mandatory training courses in duration of 40 hours for guards, and 80 hours for security officers, whilst for the detective's jobs additional training is not anticipated, but only passing the exam. However, former police officers, military police officers, state security services, former court and prison guards and bailiffs are exempt of the examination if they have three years of work experience in security jobs.

In Montenegro, conditions and way of performing of work and of performing jobs of protection of persons, property and assets which are out of the state competency, were administered by passing the Law on protection of persons and property in 2005, as well as of the authorization of persons who perform protection duties, of mandatory organization of the protection service, organization of internal protection service and of supervision over the protection work performance. In accordance with the provisions of this Law, companies and entrepreneurs may deal with jobs of physical and technical protection in Montenegro. These jobs may be performed only upon a written contract concluded between the purchaser and the entrepreneur who performs internal physical protection work of the protected object.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina functioning of the non-state security sector is administered on the entity level, in the Federation of BiH by the Law on agencies for protection of persons and property, and in the Republic of Srpska, by the Law on agencies for protection of persons and property and private detective work. Both Laws forbid to the agencies performing of jobs for the needs of the Army and Internal Affairs bodies, performing jobs of protection of managers of the executive power bodies, state administration bodies, canton, city and municipality bodies, as well as jobs of protection of representatives of political parties. Furthermore, employees of agencies cannot dispose with police authorization nor with the authorizations that possess prosecutors and judges, and they also cannot apply the operational methods and means which, on grounds of special regulations, are being applied by the Ministries and other competent state administration bodies.

In the Republic of Macedonia relation between the state and non-state security sector (in this country it includes providing services of physical and technical security and fire protection) is regulated by the Law on activities of personal and property security and the Law on weapons. The Ministry of the Interior of the

Republic of Macedonia and the Security Chamber, which are normally competent also for registration of enterprises and for issuance of the work licenses, control the implementation and following of legal provisions in this area. To obtain the work license in the non-state security sector, a candidate must have Macedonian citizenship and the place of residence in this country, cannot have a pending court decision on a ban of employment and must pass the state exam before the Security Chamber.

The Republic of Serbia is the only state in Southeastern Europe which has not yet legally administered the non-state security sector, in spite of the fact that a high number of companies which provide security services deals in the region and in Serbia during the last several years submitted a number of proposals how to legally regulate this sector. Despite the fact that this area is not legally regulated in Serbia such as in other countries, there is a high number of companies that perform jobs related to the sector of private security. Smaller number of agencies have joined up as legal bodies to the Serbian Chamber of Commerce, whilst other, smaller, informal “companies” which provide “ad hoc” services in that area, are not registered with the Chamber.

The arguments in favor of legal regulation of corporate security and non-state security sector are numerous, and through analysis it is possible to determine why, in some cases, this has not yet been done. Some authors have classified the reasons for the regulation of that area as follows, a determination of constitutional and other legal competencies and restrictions of work of private providers of security services; the protection of inviolability and privacy of individuals who come into contact with the non-state security sector; the prevention of use of private protection agencies for political purposes, for suppression of strikes, demonstrations and similar; the definition of space and objects in which private security enterprise is allowed to perform its operations; a definition of the role, area of cooperation and division of labor between the organs of state power (police) and the non-state security sector; enabling the public to clearly and visibly distinguish police staff from the staff of private protection agencies; the overseeing of delegated competencies by the members of the non-state security sector; the provision of additional legal protection of the employees of those agencies in performing their activities; the exclusion of criminals and ex-convicts from that sector; the securing of equal standards in the operations of security agencies; the control of arms possession within companies that provide security services; the overseeing of operations of multinational security companies; the provision of uniform training in those agencies; the elimination of unregistered companies in this area; the improvement of status and reputation of subjects of non-state security sector; the establishment of acceptable working conditions and the remuneration of employees in this sector; the increase of state income through licensing fees (Hakala, p. 2008).

Harmonization of regulations that refer to the non-state security sector has still not been conducted at the level of the European Union. In this area two organizations

are operating, the Confederation of European Security Services (CoESS) and UNI Europa. The two organizations, which promote minimum conditions for operation of private security companies, have so far adopted several joint documents related to some aspects of functioning of the private and corporate security sector in the EU member states, aiming to establish standards and an adequate level of professional ethics. And besides that, national legislatures of the European Union member states exhibit a significant diversities, that also reflect various traditions, social and cultural environment.

Despite the absence of harmonized legislature in the European Union, some aspects of the non-state security sector activity have been regulated by numerous conventions and recommendations adopted by the Council of Europe. These documents primarily refer to the human rights protection and preservation of the rule of law at national level, having in mind that these values may be jeopardized by the private security sector (right to privacy, freedom and security, non-discrimination, ethics, responsibility and protection of consumers and other).

It should also be mentioned that the shortcomings in the European legislature which refer to the non-state security sector do not also mean an absence of the appropriate legal regulations at the European level. In that regard, the European Commission reviews the legal regulation of PSC in certain member states in accordance with the principle of freedom of movement of people, freedom to provide services and freedom of law establishment. Having in mind that the industry of private security represents a significant economic sector in the European Union, we must apply the market laws when providing services of private security, whose implementation is within competence of the European Court of Justice.

## 2.5 Corporate security in Southeastern European states

When we analyze the development of corporate security in the Southeastern European states, we should bear in mind that the type of activity, as well as the membership of the company to the certain economical branch or industry, determine the nature of security jobs in it and the specifics of corporate security organization. In this respect, the most important industrial branches in this area are related to the exploitation of oil, gas, mines and other natural resources, including water. Business activity of corporation in these areas requires large investments and generates high revenues which are to be shared with the local authorities, which often becomes a source of disputes and frictions inside the state or between the states. (Trivan, 2012, p. 25). In these circumstances, a respectable level of communication with the surroundings is expected from security managers. Corporation practice indicates the high influence which these companies may have on the local surroundings and its existing characteristics (ecological, demographic, technical and technological) with regard to the level of protection of natural resources and reduction of various types of pollution. Corporate security in such corporations has got a high importance in situations connected with building and functioning of big infrastructure projects, especially of those which require displacement and relocation of the local population,

in order to obtain access to natural resources which are the subject of exploitation. Mining, oil wells and similar activities which degrade natural resources may often aggravate the local security situation, especially if they are not followed by provision of information to the population about potential health vulnerability. (Daničić, Stajić, 2008, p. 90).

According to the annual analysis, created by the SEENews and by the consultancy agencies A. T. Kearney and Euromonitor International, on the list of 100 biggest corporations in Southeastern Europe in 2011, the first ten posts were taken by, OMV Petrom (Romania – 4.1 billion € revenue), INA (Croatia – 3.6 billion € revenue), Lukoil Neftochim Burgas (Bulgaria – 3.4 billion € revenue), OMV Petrom Marketing SRL (Romania – 3.2 billion € revenue), Automobile – Dacia SA (Romania – 3.1 billion € revenue), Aurubis Bulgaria (Bulgaria – 2.9 billion € revenue), Petrol (Slovenia – 2.8 € revenue), Rompetrol Rafinare SA (Romania – 2.7 € revenue), Naftna industrija Srbije AD (Serbia – 1.9 billion € revenue) and Lukoil – Bulgaria EOOD (Bulgaria – 1.8 billion € revenue).

A certain number, of mostly large corporations in Southeastern Europe (SEE) has in the last decade expressed a readiness to invest a part of the profit in their own sectors of corporate security, as they have recognized them as an important support to the business process, competitiveness at the market and a successful functioning of the company. These investments have been leading to professionalization, as well as to a necessity for employment of a new category of professions – security managers, as competent experts responsible for management of processes related to security in corporation. Therefore, a demand for services of specialized companies for security consulting, business intelligence, information security, physical and technical security and other, has been growing. Awareness about the corporate security has progressed with the top management of a certain number of business subjects from this region during the past years, especially in comparison with the situation when a need for development of security system in companies has exclusively been looked upon through the services of physical and technical protection.

Under the influence of the global economic crisis, but also of various internal factors, corporation management in the countries of SEE has got more and more tighter maneuvering space in terms of anticipation possibility and realization of influence on the happenings important for the stable running of business. In an effort to remain at the market and to mitigate numerous negative consequences of crisis, more successful corporations from this area (mainly bigger ones, and often the multinational ones) focus even more on the timely identification and assessment of business-related threats, risk management as well as on the more efficient and wider implementation of the defense mechanisms, of which corporate security has got the biggest importance. In comparison to the situation in the developed economies, implementation of corporate security system is in the majority of Southeastern Europe countries in backlog, which is also typical for the Republic of Serbia.

Under the circumstances of the current crisis, in most Serbian companies (similar situation is in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania as well), only some functions of corporate security are being realized. Their security management realizes it either by engaging internal resources or by concluding contracts with special agencies (outsourcing). In almost all companies various jobs related to physical and technical security, fire protection, and health and safety protection at work are performed, and in most of them also the jobs of risk assessment and business security, as well as prevention and taking action in extraordinary situations. Information and administrative security are significantly lower on the list of priorities of business entities, the same as education programs and development of security culture of employees, and security of the top management. The domain of criminal protection of companies and conducting of internal investigations in companies, in the absence of sufficient normative provisions, is being reduced to internal controls and reviews, and to more or less successful cooperation of corporate security managers (or members of the agencies engaged for providing services of private security) with representatives of competent state bodies and services in the area where a business entity is located.

In the Republic of Serbia, like in other countries of the Western Balkans, a small number of companies protect themselves from the industrial and business espionage in an organized way. Such situation is caused by the habits kept from the time of socialism, when the state-owned enterprises were not only protecting their own information and projects, but they were even giving them free of charge. Available data indicate that the “business intelligence” activity has been carried out in a certain number of corporations which operate in this region. In practice, the content of these activities is most often related to searches on the Internet, conversations with individuals from competitive companies, transition of people from these enterprises to the work in the company, obtaining of data and exchange of data at the fairs, symposiums and similar events. However, there is no information that any business entity in Serbia has got a separate internal “business intelligence” organizational unit, which has, for years already, become a practice of modern corporations in the world (Trivan, 2012, p. 371).

The basic problems in the security management area in the Republic of Serbia, but also in most Southeastern Europe countries that are currently in the accession procedure to the European Union, besides the immediate consequences of the current economic crisis, are related to a lack of adequate legal documents in this area, unawareness in numerous companies of the necessity of functioning of the efficient system of corporate security (and often non-understanding of corporate security role), bad organization and bad staff composition of the corporation security protection services (significant presence and influence of former members of army, security and police agencies), lack or obsolescence of the existing rules and procedures, insufficient and non-regulated cooperation with competent state bodies (Kešetović, Simonović, 2009, p. 155).

### 3 THE INFLUENCE OF CORPORATE SECURITY ON NATIONAL SECURITY

Corporate security represents one of the basic criteria for the achievement of economic goals and the adoption of the economic measures for crisis situations, and also represents an important segment of the economic politics of a state. In addition, corporate security contributes to the energy security of a state, which includes diversified routes of supply, stability of delivery and production of fuels, creation of necessary autonomy and strengthening of regional position in supply of fuels and products. One of the goals of corporate security is that corporations, in line with their capabilities, support defense and security preparations on a national level, and in the event of a threat to the state, assist in providing the basic needs of citizens and logistic support to key structures in the system of national security. In order for these measures to be undertaken in a timely manner, harmonization of the existing and the adoption of new regulations that may improve the reaction of the state in different situations is of prime importance.

The increased risk of asymmetric security threats, especially in the aftermath of terrorist attacks in the USA in 2001, has played a part in developing the idea that protection of *critical infrastructure* should become one of the priorities of national security in almost all states (Čaleta, Rolih, 2011, pp. 41-42). Although in theory there is still no consensus regarding the content of the concept of critical infrastructure, we normally understand by that term natural and material assets, property, technical systems, communications, business operations and services that are of particular interest for a state and whose destruction or termination of functioning would jeopardize national security, the economic system, vital social functions, the health of the population, the public order and the protection of national interests. Technical systems, technological processes and operations in different parts of critical infrastructure at a national level have the potential to be the targets of various harmful activities, including terrorism.

Critical infrastructure must be specially protected and it is necessary to ensure its normal work, since one of the most difficult disorders that may happen is so called a chain reaction, which transmits the disorder also on other systems, multiplying the consequences. Result of a variety of disorders within the mentioned systems in theory is described as a cascade effect or a domino effect. Due to these reasons the main task of critical infrastructure management is prevention or reduction of probability of the occurrence of natural or man-induced effects which may lead to catastrophic disorders in the protected systems.

The process of European integrations, among other things, also requires establishment of interoperability between the regional infrastructures and infrastructure of the European Union as a whole. In that regard, a special accent is on the critical infrastructure as a bearer of stability of economic development and social relations, and due to that reason, recommendations and legal frames for protection of these resources have become a necessity in the national development programs.

In accordance with the Statute of the Council of Ministers of the European Union no. 114/2008 dated 08 December 2008, the definition of the “European Critical Infrastructure” (ECI) includes a critical infrastructure which is situated in the member states and whose disorder or destruction has got a significant influence on at least two member states. Which serious circumstances are in question, is assessed in accordance with the inter-sector criteria. This includes impacts on other types of infrastructure, which is expressed through cross-sector dependence.

In accordance with the Decision of Government of the Republic of Slovenia dated 19 April 2010, “critical infrastructure of national importance in RS covers those areas and services which are of a vital importance for the country and whose outage or destruction would have a significant influence and serious consequences to the national security, economy, key state functions, health, security and protection, as well as social protection”.

Having in mind the seriousness of consequences of jeopardizing the “key infrastructure”, in literature striving was noted that in their protection an integrated model of corporate security is applied, leaving some less sensitive functions (physical and technical security) of that system to the external specialized service provider from that area (outsourcing). That integrated model in the Critical Infrastructure Systems would be, when the functions of corporate security which may be an outsourcing subject are expected, according to M. Vršec, able to include, head security manager and his subordinates – operational security managers; organizational unit for security and protection (protection from natural, industrial, transport and other disasters, protection of persons, secret information and business secrets, protection of information and archives, protection of electronic communications, protection of patents, seals and corporation reputation, fire protection, protection from hazardous substances and protection at work), organizational unit for safety of documents; organizational unit for information technology protection; organizational unit for operational work; security control centre (Vršec, 2011, pp. 59-60).

*Corruption and organized crime*, traditionally deep-rooted in Southeastern Europe, endanger fundamental values of a society and lead to a decrease of trust in the national state institutions, hamper the implementation of essential reforms, slow the process of transition, economic development, and integration, discourage foreign investment, and can even threaten national security. With that in mind, corruption and criminality are often the key tests corporate security in a company can fail. Thanks to their resources, corporate security managers in both, the public and private sector can contribute significantly to the establishment of business procedures and control mechanisms, primarily through cooperation with other segments of business practice within the corporations. The establishment of a security system in financial and accountancy operations, adequate support for internal auditing and control activities, the functioning of the system of information security using “business intelligence” method, as well as the establishment of an adequate system of procurement, resistant to corruption, are of the utmost

importance. Another important aspect is collaboration with state and other institutions in suppressing criminal and corruptive practice inside a company.

Strategic advantages of corporations are not any longer founded on exclusively physical resources or on good management, but first of all on the knowledge that exists in the company and information received from the market. Information received must be filtered, processed and correlated in order to enable the company management to make particular conclusions and decisions on its basis. The problem which arises in this regard is that there is a huge amount of information which is available from the market, from the competition or from the corporation itself, and it is necessary to select the pieces which are really relevant for the certain purpose. As pointed out by some authors, gathering of timely, punctual and accurate information is not sufficient by itself, since it is necessary to correlate these pieces of information, to put them in an adequate context and to draw conclusions on their basis, which will enable the action, and finally, realization of profit for the corporation. In conditions of being overcrowded with information that characterise today's market, individuals and enterprises need a radar (Business Intelligence) which enables them to timely identify the relevant information, as well as to prevent the loss of time and delays on something which, in the long-run, does not bring profit for us (Singer, Alpeza, Balkić, 2009, p. 220).

With regard to the relationship between "business intelligence" and national security, it should be taken into account that state instruments still have a dominant role in providing its own internal and external security, in the protection of national interests. However, the role of corporate security and, by extension, of "business intelligence" is becoming increasingly important. This occurs in economic systems of all countries, regardless of the nature of their internal regulation. "Business intelligence" as an intelligence function is aimed at collecting and analyzing information that serves as a base for the decision-making process within a corporation, and can be performed within any of the business instruments when the national interest of a country towards foreign nations is in question. Nevertheless, corporate security and "business intelligence" have a dominant role in the area of national security that comprises public/general interests, aimed at the achievement of internal economic welfare, a high standard of economic development, high level of employment and living standard.

The operation of „business counter-intelligence“- that is, activities aimed primarily at security of a company and establishment of mechanisms for its protection - is highly important for national security. Any activity that serves to eliminate or reduce the results of the actors of industrial/business espionage, contributes to the strengthening of security of the economy of a state, which is a significant contribution to the total national security of that state. In Serbia, few companies employ any kind of protection against industrial and business espionage. The cause of such a state of affairs are habits inherited from socialism when socially-owned companies did not protect their own information and projects. What is more, they openly shared them

for free. With this in mind, a security culture – that is, the culture of business protection - needs to be adopted by all employees, regardless of their status within a corporation. That can represent a problem in practice, as top management sometimes disregards certain procedures, due to a common understanding that they are not subject to question, even though it is them in particular who are required to be the founders and pillars of the security culture; to lead by example and transfer the value system of security and protection to other employees.

In the case of the states from the Western Balkans area and the former SFR of Yugoslavia, more serious attention is being paid to the business-intelligence operation issues in the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Croatia. However, in Croatia, according to their authors, methods that are considered as Business Intelligence have been insufficiently applied in the business practice, first of all because most managers of Croatian companies have not been informed about them in the right way. Hence it occurs that the corporations in that country cannot also refer appropriately towards neither foreign partners who dispose with almost all relevant data, nor towards the domestic competition (Bazdan, 2009). Such a situation in the economy clearly indicates to a need for opening a good quality Business Intelligence agencies which would start up the slow mechanisms in Croatian economy. These agencies would be a precondition in creation of solid foundations for future directing of business information which will be needed for that state when it becomes a member of the European Union. It is interesting that in the Republic of Croatia, unlike highly-developed countries, only 9% of corporations use „business intelligence“ as a separate business function (companies such as Pliva, Adrisa and HT have got a formally tasked departments for Business Intelligence) (Singer et al., 2009).

Corporate *information systems* can be exposed to various security threats that endanger not just the technological segment of a company, but often the business as a whole. Those threats can come from the outside, but can also be sourced from within the system. The object under threat can be any asset in the information system, such as, the information-communication system of a corporation; computers and the data they contain; data about business associates; personal data of employees; various registers and databases; information-communication technology, including computers and mobile phones; operational and manufacturing processes in corporation; technology; staff employed in organizational units connected with information-communicative system; technical protection systems; intellectual property, etc. (Javorović, Bilandžić, 2007, p. 296).

The proper handling of *classified information* of a corporation extends to the entire life-cycle of those data or information, including also the aspects related to their removal and destruction. At the end of the life-cycle, classified data or information are examined and a decision is made as to whether they should be archived and stored permanently, have the classified tag removed and used publicly, or destroyed. The classified data or information that are no longer needed for the corporation's business, together with additional material, are destructed in such a way

that the reconstruction and unauthorized use by third parties is not possible (Matić, 2006, p. 181).

Corporate security is directly dependent on the democratic character and economic development level of a society. In times of the deep global crisis, which also reached Southeastern Europe, manifested by, among other things, the decaying and shutting-down of a number of companies, corporate security (which, incidentally, had not been developed in a modern sense) is not in a position to contribute to saving unsuccessful companies or the economic recovery of these countries.

It can be argued that companies throughout Southeastern Europe do not invest enough in security, with the exception of banks and corporations originating in developed economies, and in which security is of key importance for the normal functioning of a corporation. One of the consequences of the global economic crisis is an absolute and relative decrease of investment in corporate security, present in the majority of companies in Southeastern European countries. A lowering of the level of internal protection makes corporations vulnerable to internal and external security threats and hazards, particularly regarding different forms of crime and corruption. Therefore, it is necessary that even during the global economic crisis, a part of the profit of corporations doing business in this region remains invested in the establishment and improvement of the system of corporate security, as this is a function that represents a significant support to the business success of companies. In particular, this refers to the protection of critical infrastructure, the area of information security and the security education of employees.

### 3.1 Results of the empirical research on the influence of corporate security on national security

During 2011, in the territory of the Republic of Serbia, in his PhD dissertation, D.Trivan performed empirical research taking the form of expert interviews, with the aim of describing and explaining the level of influence exerted on the various areas of national security by performing functions of corporate security on the basis of collected and analyzed data and expressed value attitudes and remarks of executives/managers that administer security sector in corporations in Serbia, as well as of experts from national security services (BIA and VBA).

According to the answers from the interview, the most important sources and forms of corporation jeopardizing are,

Crime offences committed by usage of information technologies (IT)
Leaking of protected and classified data
Technical and technological accidents
Various minor offences (violation of work discipline, deviation of prescribed work organization, overdraft or usurpation of competencies and authorizations, non-implementation or partial implementation of the prescribed procedures, negligence at work)

The second group, by importance, consists of,

Crime offences of causing of public danger and crime offences against the health of people and the work environment
Economic crime offences committed by employees, most often in conjunction with business partners
Crime offences that are causing damage to the business entity (diversions, terrorism, sabotages, destruction of damaging of the production means and destruction of products)
Crime offences of the classic crime

The following is categorized into the less present sources and forms of jeopardizing of corporation,

Natural disasters
Social and other unrests within the company
Traffic accidents and incidents

Sources of jeopardising of national security and their influence to corporate security have been categorised by the examinees in the following way,

External aggression
Separatism
Terrorism
Armed rebellion
National and religious extremism
Activity of foreign intelligence services
Organised crime
Corruption
Money laundering
Problems od economic development
Consequences of natural disasters and of technical and technological accidents
Jeopardising of environment

The general conclusion of the research is that in Serbia exists an unregulated, non-delineated, unbalanced, and ultimately unsustainable relationship between the system of national security and the non-state security sector (private and corporate security).

The empirical research showed that corporate security has a large or medium influence on the achievement of state and national interests, on the economic power of the state, and the stability of the national economy. The majority of the interviewed corporate security managers were of the opinion that, despite its lack of functions in the area of protection of secrecy of data, corporate security has some, but not yet

sufficient influence on national information power. The research also showed a very unfavorable state of information-protection within corporations in Serbia.

The influence of corporate security on national security in the Republic of Serbia in the area of organized crime was evaluated by the interviewees as being at a medium level. On the other hand, it is thought that corporate security has a high impact on the prevention of corruption and “money-laundering”. According to the results of the empirical research, corporate security has a relatively small, i.e. insufficient, influence on national security in the area of prevention of political violence (assassinations, coups d’état, armed rebellions, conspiracies, uprisings, revolutions), as well as the suppression of different forms of extremism and torture. However, it was concluded that the impact of corporate security functions on national security is somewhat higher in the prevention of internal conflicts in the state (“the more successful companies, the stronger the state, which means less internal conflicts and the better situation of national security”).

### 3.2 Suggestions and proposals for the future

In order to have corporate security functions successfully carried out and to produce a higher positive influence to the national security, it is necessary to also do the following,

- It is necessary to have the corporate security developed in companies through the system established in accordance with the following principles,
- uniqueness (all elements and system factors at corporate level and in the parts of company are developed in accordance with the same principles, they are functionally connected and conjoined in the executive function at the corporation level, respecting the subordination and an obligation of carrying out instructions from the higher decision-making level);
- rationality (inclusion into the function of security of all available human, material and organizational resources of the company, forming of operational high-qualified services for security jobs which will efficiently plan, direct, harmonize, follow and control the functioning of all systemic factors);
- universality (organizational and functional conformation which will enable an efficient elimination of consequences of all assessed real sources and forms of jeopardizing and simultaneous engagement in several directions in order to realize the best effects);
- selectivity (precise and consistent defining, delegating and distribution of elements to the system factors of corporate security);
- adaptability (possibility of a fast and an efficient transmission of focus of activity of factors and redistribution of security system elements in accordance with the changes of work conditions, sources and forms of jeopardizing);
- reliability (capability of the system to be in permanent functional situation independent of anybody’s individual will and to stimulate the factors to the desirable and prescribed behavior).
- Taking into consideration the importance of corporate security for realization of strategic goals of the company, organizational unit which will carry out these jobs

should be set up in such way that it possesses clear responsibilities and precise authorizations in accomplishing its basic tasks. If we have a corporation with a high number of employees or a company which deals at various locations, this organizational unit should be at the first level of division of work assignments. In smaller companies it is necessary to establish a security board or appoint a security director/manager who will be directly responsible to the top management. If this is not economically feasible, one of the top managers in the company must take over also the role of security manager.

- Corporate security director should by ranking belong to the highest level of the middle management or to the lower level of the top corporation management. His/her task should be to set up goals, strategic planning, suggestion for alternative problem solutions, representation of corporation in the public through PR centre, directing and following activities of persons who are responsible for corporate security jobs in the company, incitement and encouragement of their professional development.
- Corporate security manager should coordinate and manage tasks of the security system and protection of persons, property and corporation business. In the management hierarchy of corporation, if in a company the function of security manager does not exist, he/she should be immediately subordinated to the head director, or to the majority owner.
- If the corporate security director/manager does not succeed to ensure an unambiguous and transparent support of the leading company management, especially if it goes through the ownership transformation, it will not be able to carry out the planned activities, it will lose its identity and the business role. In order to make success, he must be a promoter of all security procedures and has to motivate the employees to follow them for a safer business environment.
- It is necessary to have a permanent improvement of communication and an advancement of cooperation of managers and organizational units of corporate security in the companies with the competent state bodies and services, first of all in the area of the key infrastructure protection, prevention and elimination of accidents' consequences, preparation and management of crisis and extraordinary situations, information exchange and similar.
- Normative regulation is required as well as the establishment of cooperation of corporate and national security services in protecting corporations from industrial espionage and other types of external threat.
- In order to have the corporation fulfill its business goals, it is necessary that all the factors, which represent a threat in the accomplishment of goals, are identified, prevented or reduced to a minimum. This procedure includes identification, analyzing, evaluation and processing of security threats (risks), as well as establishing the level of permitted vulnerability of economic resources, service infrastructure and property, so as that the company would successfully implement its business strategy.
- In corporations it is necessary to entirely implement the principles that emanate from international standards HSEC (Health, Safety, Environment Management, Community Relations) and BCCM (Business Crisis and Continuity Management),

and also implement the required standards ISO (International Organization for Standardization).

- State bodies and institutions, by building of the unique security system and by developing the capacity of a society for crisis management, must enable a continuation of economic and business activities of the community also in crisis conditions (extraordinary situation, natural disasters, war conditions and other). In order to have this realized, it is required to establish a normative, organizational and functionally consistent security system which will enable a safer and more efficient protection of persons, property and corporation business.
- Rising of awareness of employees in corporation about the importance of preservation of data must be the everyday care. In that regard, it is required to present to the employees, by an unofficial communication or through seminars, what damages may be produced due to loss of important information and how this can reflect on them. One of preventive measures should be a periodical holding of informative meetings on protection, aiming to refresh earlier gained knowledge and to remind of the obligations in this sphere, as with the course of time the awareness related to the importance of protection and the alertness and vigilance towards the illicit activities is decreasing.
- It is necessary to legally confine competencies, authorizations and duties of the state and non-state security sector, especially with regard to the conditions and ways of application of the means of force, and usage of operational methods and means by which a person's right to privacy is violated, as well as to administer the way of performing security jobs.

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## VOJAŠKA STRATEŠKA POLITIKA UPRAVLJANJA MEDIJEV – OSEBNE IZKUŠNJE IZ RAZLIČNIH VOJN

### STRATEGIC MILITARY NEWS MANAGEMENT POLICY – PERSONAL EXPERIENCES FROM DIFFERENT WARS

**Povzetek** Vloga množičnih medijev v zahodnih demokracijah je ključnega pomena za oblikovanje javnega mnenja, ki se uporablja na volitvah za podporo ali zavrnitev vojaških ukrepov, ki jih predlaga vlada. Zaradi javne in politične narave vojaških operacij je postalo nujno, da vojaški poveljniki množične medije učinkovito vključijo v operativno delovanje in tako dosežejo svoje cilje. Operativni poveljnik in njegovo osebje morajo imeti dovolj natančne smernice za vključitev upravljanja medijev v operativne načrte. Avtor kot vojni dopisnik predstavlja svoje izkušnje iz različnih vojn ter napake in primere dobre prakse iz različnih vojsk. Glede na njegove osebne izkušnje je najbolje razvit in izpiljen koncept odnosov z javnostmi program gostujočih medijev iz ZDA, ki se je izkazal kot uspešen tako z vidika vojske kot medijev.

**Ključne besede** *Mediji, vojna, vojska, častniki za odnose z javnostmi, vojaška politika upravljanja medijev, program gostujočih medijev.*

**Abstract** The role of mass media in Western democracies is crucial for public opinion, which is used in the elections to support or reject military actions proposed by the government. Because of the public and political nature of military operations, it has become essential for military commanders to make effective operational use of the mass media in order to achieve their objectives. The operational commander and his staff must have a sufficient focused guidance to permit them to integrate media management into operational plans. Author as a war correspondent presents his experiences from different wars, mistakes and best practices from different armies. According to his personal experience, the most elaborate and developed public relations concept is the U.S. “Embedded Media Program” which proved successful from the perspective of the military as well as the media.

**Key words** *Media, war, armed forces, public affairs officers, military news management policy, Embedded Media Program.*

## Introduction

The press and the military have different military news management policies created by different missions, as well as different goals with regard to wartime news coverage. To fully understand the term “management” it has to be defined. Most of the modern scholars define the term “management” as planning, organizing, staffing, leading and controlling. All managers at all levels of every organization perform these functions, but the amount of time a manager spends on each one depends on, both, the level of management and the specific organization (Benowitz, 2001, pp. 5, 6). Media management policy for covering armed conflicts is directed by specific mission-related goals. According to Paul and Kim (2005, pp. XV), we can talk about two main mission-related goals of media in democracies, namely to uphold obligations to the public and to achieve profit. It is editors who decide why media should cover a specific military mission and to what extent. In the beginning and at the end of the decision-making process, the same general question always occurs: is this story interesting for the public (viewers/readers/listeners)? If the public shows interest in specific stories, the media respond with more extensive coverage. If the public shows no interest at all, there are almost no stories. Nevertheless, we have to be clear and not confuse the phrase “public shows interest” with the term “public interest”, which refers to the “general welfare”. The exact meaning of the term “public interest” is not always clear and it is central to policy debates, politics and democracy. On the contrary, the phrase “public shows interest” is quite clear, because ratings show what kind of stories the public prefers and in what kind of stories they show less interest. Johnson (2003) has reported that average cable news viewership has tripled in the United States during the war. In the first 19 days of the war, Fox News Channel averaged 3.3 million viewers, a 236% increase from the weeks preceding the war. CNN: 2.7 million, up 313%. MSNBC: 1.4 million, up 360%. With more viewers, TV stations achieve more profit and uphold obligations to the public. We could also talk about two main mission-related goals of the military in Western democracies, namely to achieve operational success and to maintain operational security. The difference is obvious when we talk about goals for news coverage. The media want to gain access to newsworthy information; provide newsworthy information to the public; fulfil obligations to the public; build market share; as well as maintain quality of news, objectivity (tell both sides of the story), accuracy and credibility. Military goals for news coverage, on the other hand, are the following: do not allow news coverage to compromise operational security; fulfil legal obligations regarding press access; use news coverage to support military mission; obtain good public relations; build credibility and support information operations. Despite these key differences, the military and the press do share certain commonalities. Both aspire to a high level of professionalism, and both focus on serving the public, albeit in very different ways. The military exists to defend and protect the state and its territory, while the press exists to keep the public informed. Both roles are considered critical to a healthy democracy (Paul and Kim, 2005, pp. XIV, XV).

The press and the military have different missions and goals; therefore the question of media access to the battlefield has regularly generated. Why is access to the battlefield so important for the media? Media cannot afford to rely solely on military

information, but must rely on verified information. The press must seek out multiple witnesses, ask various sides for comments and use other techniques. This approach of verification is what separates journalism from propaganda. Journalists, who work for the media, must be loyal to, both, the citizens and the public interest. Their role is very important for the society, since democracy depends on citizens having reliable, accurate facts put in a meaningful context. Military commanders need to understand the purpose and function of the role of the media in war reporting: the news media should serve as an independent and honest link between the military at war and the wider civilian society it is sworn to defend. The lack of knowledge and experience of military operations as well as military personnel is a recipe for frustration, bewilderment and error (Offley and Sword, 2001, pp. 14, 15).

In this paper, we try to show different relations occurring between the military and the media, as both sides struggled to develop an approach to reporting operations. We do not discuss what kind of military news management model would be perfect for the media, because really - there is nothing to discuss. It is a fact: a war correspondent is a journalist who covers stories first-hand from a war zone; therefore it is logical that the media want nothing more than a full and unlimited access to the battlefield. From the military point of view, however, this approach could represent a security risk. Our attempt is to present our experiences regarding the type of the military news management model, which has from the point of view of, both, military commanders and the press representatives, so far proven to be the best balance between the media and the military.

## 1 BALANCE BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND THE PRESS

The operational commander and his staff must have a thorough understanding of the media's historical and potential role in military operations. As we can see, this role is diverse and complex as military–media relations are in Western democracies. Of course, the commander cannot afford to rely upon ingenuity and upon selective applications of lessons learned in an effort to minimize his public affairs losses and limit damage to his mission. He needs thoughtful, comprehensive doctrine which recognizes the media's presence as an operational asset and articulates the means to employ that asset to best advantage (Shaffer, 1997, p. 1). The role of media is especially important during the war; so important that we could talk about a “diffused war”. The term used by Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2010, pp. 3) refers to a new paradigm of war in which the mediatisation of war enables a more diffuse causal relations between action and effect, creating greater uncertainty for policymakers in the conduct of war. Mediatisation, causality and decision-making can shape and reinforce one another in ways that make “diffused war” a coherent and intelligible paradigm.

According to Ulrich Keller (2001, p. 251), the first media war in history was the Crimean War (1853–1856). This was the first time that the public could read about the reality of warfare. Angry and shocked, the British public backlash from journalist

reports led the government to re-evaluate the treatment of troops and change some political decisions. The World War I (1914–1918), World War II (1939–1945) and Korean War (1950–1953) were characterized by rigid censorship. All states in conflicts imposed strict censorship on reporters. Patriotic coverage resulted in the full support of the people for the war effort. Only those reporters who agreed to full military censorship were given accreditation and allowed into the war theatre (Venable, 2003, pp. 66–71).

U.S. intervention in Vietnam War (1965–1973) was the first to be televised and the first of the modern era fought without military censorship. Technology enabled rapid transfer of information and images. But daily military briefings did not portray the same information that journalists had seen for themselves out in the field with the units. By 1960s and 1970s, television was present in the majority of U.S. homes, and military leaders would later blame the television news coverage in particular for eroding public support for military action in Vietnam. Since the Falklands conflict (1982), U.S. and U.K. military news management policy has been formulated as a response to the “myth of Vietnam” (Tumber and Palmer, 2004, p. 2). According to this myth, unsympathetic coverage produced by journalists with unlimited access to the battlefield and the help of technology turned public opinion against the war. Although Hallin (1989) showed this not to be the case (media coverage was only unsympathetic at the end of the war, after American public opinion had already turned), the myth has fulfilled a useful action for the military in the U. S. and in U. K.: it legitimized increasing control over the media (Lewis, 2006, p. 4).

By the time of the Gulf War (1991), experience in the Falklands, Grenada (1983), and Panama (1989) had led the Pentagon and the U.S. Ministry of Defence to develop a model of news management that severely restrained the media's ability to report. The fact that restrictions were imposed both on news content and access to the war weighs the news value of the photograph, film or videotape. The military blocked journalists' access to the war zone. In the Gulf War (1991), the media were unsatisfied, attacking the U. S. government for restrictions over the press. Public affairs officers grouped journalists who wanted access to the military units into small pools with escort officers, and the military units provided the transportation. Limitations on the transportation and the vast distances covered in the operation resulted in many journalists covering operations from hotels and reporting information from the formal briefings provided by the military. While there was no censorship in place, the inability of journalists to move freely about during the combat operation resulted in managed reporting (Sidle, 1991, pp. 62–73). Many military leaders painfully distrust the media and are cautious about what gets out to the press. One possible explanation for the army's distrust of the news media is that journalists do not always take the time for accurate reporting. In many cases, news media rush to deadline. Attribution, a fundamental part of news reporting, is often absent, and essential military terminology and critical facts are sometimes incorrect. In some cases, stories are completely fabricated (Miracle, 2003, p. 45). The underlying problem is that the military and the media hate each other, because soldiers nor reporters understand the nature

of war. The soldiers understand fighting. The journalists understand communications. Neither group knows that the political impact of combat depends on the communication of the fighting (Noyes, 1992, p. 33).

Before the War in Iraq (2003), representatives of the largest mass media in the U.S. and the EU required from the U.S. military news management policy without rigid restrictions over press. Journalists were frustrated by the rules of engagement during the last Gulf war. They threatened to blockade coalition pool reporting and military news conferences. The U.S. Government also faced a problem of counteracting the propaganda coming from the Saddam Hussein regime and Iraqi government. Before the war, there were approximately 200 foreign reporters in Baghdad. They were working under severe restrictions and were able to report government stories only. Therefore the Pentagon developed a new public relations concept known as “Embedded Media Program”. In comparison to the Gulf War of 1991, where the Pentagon controlled the news as tightly as possible, the war of 2003 was a wide-open affair for selected reporters.

## **2 PERSONAL EXPERIENCES FROM DIFFERENT WARS FROM 1991 TO 2003**

Numerous national and international initiatives attempted to collect experiences and lessons learned from the past about relations between the press and the military. Some of the official military reports tended to be open, while others were restricted or classified. Most of the analyses were conducted by the military. Here, we want to present experiences and lessons learned from a war correspondent’s point of view. As a war correspondent with fifteen years of experience from places such as the Balkans, Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq, I would like to briefly introduce some of my lessons learned. Before the War for Slovenia, I had been member of the Yugoslav People’s Army for a year. Later, I was member of the Slovenian military forces (Slovenian Territorial Defence). I worked as correspondent from different wars from Croatia (1991) to Iraq (2003), mainly for American-Slovenian private television company POP TV, Associated Press Television News and other media.

### **2.1 War for Slovenia (1991)**

War for Slovenia was an armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia that arose between the Slovenian security forces and the Yugoslav People's Army following Slovenia's declaration of independence on 25 June 1991. It lasted from 27 June 1991 until 7 July 1991, when the peace agreement was signed. As a soldier, I noticed that almost no restrictions applied for the media on the Slovenia's side, including the media who supported the action of the Yugoslav People's Army. Because the press in the former Yugoslavia was frequently infiltrated by the domestic intelligence and security agencies like the State Security Administration (SDB – Služba državne bezbednosti) and the military Counterintelligence Service (KOS - Kontraobaveštajna služba), this approach could have represented a security risk for Slovenians. The actions of

the Slovenian forces were successfully integrated with the military news management policy. An international media centre was established in the Slovenia's capital Ljubljana and Slovenian Prime Minister, and chiefs of the military and police forces provided the reporters with comprehensive briefings. Domestic and foreign media representatives were able to see action on the ground, in the field with the units, almost without any restrictions. The Slovenian government successfully presented the conflict to the foreign media and their public as the story of a small country fighting against one of the biggest armies in Europe to win democracy and independence from an authoritarian Yugoslav communist state. They attracted considerable international media and public sympathy. The Yugoslav People's Army wanted to severely restrain the media's ability to report, but it was unable to control the media or the territory. At Ljubljana Airport, Yugoslav troops killed two Austrian journalists. However, the war was too short to analyse the impact on news management during combat activities.

## 2.2 Balkan Wars (1991–2000)

The Croatian War for Independence (1991–1995) was fought between the forces of Croatia, which had declared independence from Yugoslavia, and the Yugoslav People's Army, and Serbian local and paramilitary units, some of them created by Serbian Secret Service (such as the Arkan's force). The Bosnian War (1992–1995) was an armed conflict between Serbs, Bosnians and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including forces from Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia. The war was characterized by brutality, ethnic cleansing, massacres of civilians, bitter fighting, indiscriminate shelling of cities and villages. The media described the War in Bosnia as the most devastating conflict in Europe since the end of the Second World War. The Kosovo War (1998–1999) included armed clashes between Serbian security forces and ethnic Albanian rebels (Kosovo Liberation Army), which broke out in February 1998. After a year of fighting and infliction of many civilian casualties, the peace talks did not bring any results. Even more, the conflict grew into a full-scale war in March 1999. The war ended with NATO intervention against Serbian forces. The Macedonian War (2001) was the insurgency in the north of the Republic of Macedonia which took place between February and August 2001. It was an armed conflict between ethnic Albanian rebels (former Kosovo Liberation Army members) and the security forces of the Republic of Macedonia.

During the Balkan Wars, the Yugoslav People's Army and Serbian security forces were using outdated military news management policy. It was based on the same theoretical dispositions, which had been established in the communist states. To understand it, we have to briefly describe the nature of the system in the former Yugoslavia. All media in former Yugoslavia were controlled by the state. Censorship was backed in cases where performances did not meet with the favour of the leadership. The ruling authorities viewed media as a propaganda tool, and widely practiced censorship to exercise almost full control over the information dissemination. To control the media, the ruling authorities were also using SDB and KOS, which controlled foreign reporters in the country. SDB was responsible for the terrorist attacks,

eliminations and kidnappings of dozens of enemies of the state, within Yugoslavia and internationally. It was responsible for providing press with the propaganda information against Western capitalist states, including conspiracy theories. Yugoslav media were deliberately provided with number of information which was only partly true. Those pieces of information were usually repeated and dispersed over a wide variety of media in order to create the chosen result in audience attitudes. This strategy was present in the media strategy of Yugoslav and Serbian government even after the fall of communism in 1991.

My experience with KOS officers as a soldier of the Yugoslav People's Army could demonstrate the aforementioned strategy. When I was a soldier in the Zeljava military airport near Bihač, KOS officers provided us with weekly briefings about the political situation in Yugoslavia. After ethnic conflicts between Croats and Serbs continued to increase, KOS officers forbade us to watch, listen or read any Slovenian or Croatian media news. In the beginning of the 1991 their weekly briefings included propaganda information against Western capitalist states and conspiracy theories (to discredit Slovenian and Croatian leadership). For example, they were talking about “top secret information which must not be told to anyone”. They for example said that Slovenian president Milan Kučan had been born in Serbia, that he was Serbian by nationality and that he secretly worked for Belgrade. They also said that Slovenian Minister of Defense Janez Janša had taken large sums of money to Austria and had bought a house, where he would stay during possible conflict between Slovenian and Yugoslav troops; that the President of Yugoslavia, a Slovenian, Janez Drnovšek was gay; that Croatian president Franjo Tuđman had brought to Croatia 4,000 fascist soldiers from Germany and Australia to fight against Yugoslav soldiers, etc. Of course, they told us straight away that we “have nothing to fear because they are poorly armed and we are members one of the strongest armies in the world”. When war in Slovenia started, KOS officers told us that they received fully confirmed information that all Slovenian leaders, including Kučan and Janša escaped to Klagenfurt, Austria and left Slovenian soldiers to fight Yugoslav troops alone. All this information was false.

During the Balkan Wars, Yugoslav and Serbian officials divided reporters into two groups, with two different news management systems:

- a) Domestic reporters and foreign journalists from the countries who supported Yugoslav or Serbian government policy (unofficially they were using a term “friendly reporters”).

“Friendly reporters” were mainly Serbian journalists; only few of them were foreign press representatives. Patriotic coverage by the main Serbian media resulted in the Serbian public’s support of the war effort. In the beginning of the Croatian War, Yugoslav and Serbian security forces or Serbian paramilitary units provided “friendly reporters” with the status of embedded reporters. They were able to join the troops in the frontline and had full and free access to operational combat missions and limited access to mission preparation. Their news was monitored. If their reports

did not support the state policy, they lost confidence and special status. After the war, some Serbian editors and journalists confirmed that the government, military and secret service imposed a large number of orders, bans and instructions on how to report about the war. Especially KOS provided them with false “exclusive stories about crimes against Serbian civilians”. The secret service was using the majority of “friendly reporters” for spreading false information and conspiracy theories. With the weakening of the SDB’s position a year before the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the secret service of the Yugoslav People’s Army (KOS) strengthened its position. KOS was spreading numerous conspiracy theories to the press (such as the information that the town of Dubrovnik was being defended by 30, 000 fascist soldiers and 7,000 Kurdish terrorists when, in reality, Croatian military forces in the area were at that time virtually non-existent; or the information that Vatican and Germany wanted to destroy Yugoslavia to impose a “Fourth Reich”) and carried out terrorist attacks like “Operation Opera Orientalis”. Operation involved diversions, the spreading of misinformation, and psychological warfare. This strategy resulted in the Serbian state-run press creating an atmosphere of fear and hatred among Yugoslavia’s Serbs by spreading exaggerated and false messages of ethnically based attacks by Bosnian Muslims and Croats against Serbian population. According to Serbian police officers who fought in the Croatian and Bosnian War, a small number of “friendly reporters” received from SDB and KOS officers not only instructions on how to report, but they were also working for the secret service. I was later able to confirm these statements in the interviews with some of the retired secret agents. I was surprised when during the first phase of Croatian and Bosnian War, two journalists (who did not have access to the non-Serb military positions) asked me about Croatian or Muslim military strength, moral, armament, number of tanks or artillery pieces in specific positions. These questions could indicate they were working for the secret service.

After the first few months of war and a full access to the battlefield were over, “friendly reporters” were given limitations. During the battle of Vukovar (August – November 1991), when international public was shocked by the brutality, ethnic cleansing and indiscriminate shelling of the town, the Yugoslav People’s Army commanders denied “friendly reporters” unlimited access to operational combat missions, although the commanders of some Serbian paramilitary units or Serbian forces in Bosnia did not respect this denial. After British reporters revealed the existence of concentration camps in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992), Bosnian Serbs imposed severe restrictions on all foreign reporters. In the Kosovo War, these restrictions were fully respected. The most severe restrictions were imposed on press coverage.

b) All other media representatives.

Just a few of them with good local connections had an opportunity to get access to the local Serbian troops and the frontline, like “friendly reporters”, without the obligation to report a pro-Serbian stance. Most of the foreign media representatives were presented to the military and the police force like potential spies and more likely enemies of the state, if they did not openly support Serbian political and military

actions. For them they imposed hard restrictions both on the news content and access to the frontline. It was impossible to get permission for access to the battlefield, frontline or approval to go on the territory which is under control of opposite forces. Most of Yugoslav People's Army commanders and later commanders of the Serbian troops were arrogant and sometimes brutal to the foreign reporters. Many reporters were robbed, harassed, imprisoned, beaten, tortured and killed. Approximately 75 journalists have died in the wars in the former Yugoslavia; most of them were killed by the Yugoslav People's Army or Serbian troops. They were not allowed to take any photos and videos of soldiers, weapons, military equipment or police troops even when far away from the frontline. As if there was no war in the country. Photos or filming of burned non-Serb villages or any traces of the crimes against civilian population were strictly prohibited. Yugoslav and Serbian forces were accusing foreign reporters of being hostile towards the Serbian nation, because they were also presenting opposing views from the Bosnian or Croatian sides. Serbian officials perceived reports about Serbian war crimes as hostile information presented by the Western press and accused reporters to be sympathetic towards the enemies or working as spies for foreign secret services. Because of the severe restrictions, Serbian troops believed that foreign reporters would rely on government briefings and the information reported by Serbian media. However, they were wrong. Reporters were able to reach the frontline from the non-Serbian side. The Yugoslav and Serbian news management strategies were a disaster and the consequences of this were devastating. The Serbs lost media war completely.

News management strategy of the Bosnian Muslims, Croats or ethnic Albanian rebels was much more different. All reporters (except reporters from the Serbian press and foreign journalists from the countries who supported Yugoslav or Serbian government policy) were very much welcome. This opened door to an extensive coverage of the conflicts. The quite free and unfettered access that the media were given by Croatian and Bosnian troops or ethnic Albanian rebels was unprecedented. In the begging of war in Croatia and Bosnia, reporters were given free and unlimited access to the battlefield and as a result the international public became a participant in almost every phase of war. Correspondents were free to move around the battlefield with no official guidelines. After a year of fighting, Croats and Muslims also imposed restrictions on the press coverage, but they allowed access to the frontline. The access to the frontline was only forbidden when an offensive was launched. It was really easy to get interviews from the police or military commanders. Military of all ranks from privates to generals could be interviewed, without any supervision or censorship, if they agreed, right there in the battlefield. When the international public saw the war on the evening news, a shift occurred in the public opinion about Croatian, Bosnian or Kosovo War. During the conflict between Bosnian Croats and Muslims in 1993, Bosnian Croats prohibited photography of destroyed non-Croat villages or traces of the crimes against civilian population. In August 1995, during the Croatian military operation Storm (it was the last major battle of the Croatian War of Independence: strategic victory in the Croatian and Bosnian War), Croatian forces imposed the tightest restrictions on the media coverage.

Even big mistakes in the news media strategy in Croatia and Bosnia (1991–1995) did not persuade Serbian officials or commanders to apply changes. Because Belgrade did not officially declare war in Kosovo in 1998, the government allowed reporters to work in the region quite freely after they were given press accreditations. Some reporters, however, were not able to get accreditations. During combat operations, security troops blocked all journalist access to the region of fighting. Even “friendly reporters” (with some exceptions) did not have access to operational combat missions and the frontline and it was almost impossible to get any interview from the police or military commanders. Interviews with police officers or soldiers were prohibited. When in 1999 the conflict became a full-scale war with the NATO intervention, Serbian authorities issued a statement ordering an immediate expulsion of all reporters from NATO countries. The Serbian information minister said their reporting was supporting the “aggressive acts of NATO”. Shortly afterwards, the Yugoslav information minister told foreign journalists in Belgrade that they were all welcome to stay. In practice, all journalists were expelled from Kosovo, except a few “friendly reporters” (from Serbia, Greece and Russia) who supported Slobodan Milosevic’s policy. They were, however, working under severe restrictions and censorship, operating mainly from the Pristina hotel. A few reporters of Serbian state-run media were embedded in the Serbian Army. Military secret service personnel (former KOS officers) provided them with the materials and instructions where and how to report. The majority of foreign reporters were expelled not just from Kosovo, but from the entire Yugoslav territory. Only a few of the biggest mass media representatives (like CNN or BBC) were allowed to stay, but only in Belgrade, and they worked mainly from hotels.

A number of foreign reporters with experiences from the Croatian, Bosnian and Kosovo wars told me in Macedonia in 2001 that most of the Macedonian officials and commanders at that time were still using the same strategy towards foreign press like Yugoslav or Serbian troops years before. In the beginning of the conflict, reporters were quite sympathetic towards the Macedonians and were very disappointed with the Macedonian attitude towards foreign press. The state government and the security forces were using news management model that severely restrained journalists’ work. They imposed tough restrictions on the access to the frontline. It was absolutely impossible to get permission for access to the battlefield or even approval to go on the territory which was under the control of the rebels. They hoped that the reporters would rely only on daily government briefings. However, that was not the case. Some reporters were able to cross no man’s land and many of them were able to obtain information and pictures from the rebels or civilians. Most of the time, they ignored bureaucratic government briefings. The Macedonian news management strategy was a complete disaster, most of the foreign reporters perceived it as censorship. Not so much because the restrained media’s ability to report from the frontline, but because of the government’s efforts to disable reporters from obtaining information, video materials or photographs from the opposite (rebel) side. Moreover, a number of reporters who had covered other Balkan wars in the past were convinced that there was a small difference between an unfriendly, hostile attitude towards the

foreign press, commanders from Serbian security forces, Yugoslav People's Army and Macedonian security forces. A lot of Macedonian soldiers, police officers and commanders had arrogant communication with the foreign reporters. They accused them of being sympathetic towards the rebels and that the information they provided did not match the information provided on daily government briefings. There were even bizarre scenes when for example Macedonian police or military commanders shouted at reporters as if they were kids, teaching them how to do their job. This behaviour was identical to the behaviour of the Yugoslav People's Army commanders in the beginning of the wars in Croatia or Bosnia. There were also other bizarre scenes, for example when they even strictly prohibited to film or photograph soldiers or military trucks in the street in the middle of city. To them, everything was a military secret. An interesting fact is that there were almost no military briefings, as if the Army did not have anything to do with the press. Most of the commanders and state officials (like most of the civilians) were trying to convince foreign reporters that the war in Macedonia was just a result of U.S. and EU conspiracy.

On the other hand, ethnic Albanian rebels welcomed the reporters. Commanders acted like public affairs officers, providing reporters with full support for communication with the civilians and the troops. The reporters were able to work in the rebels' territory quite freely. It was not good for the rebels that they were not careful about hiding the information which could compromise units or command positions. Nevertheless, they imposed strict restrictions on filming of the rebels' faces, arms or combat positions. As opposed to the Macedonian security forces, they allowed reporters to move freely to the territory which was under Macedonian control. Even by doing so, they were not able to dominate the media coverage of the war and garner international public support. The NATO forces closed all routes from Kosovo to Macedonia so that it was very hard for the press to reach rebel territory.

### 2.3 Second Chechen War (1999–2000)

The second war in Chechnya was launched by the Russian Federation against Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. It ended de facto independence of Chechnya and restored Russian control over the territory. The war has been known for bitter fighting, brutality, massacres and indiscriminate shelling of large towns. During the Chechen war in January 2000, I was able to reach the region of northeast Georgia. Chechen troops and refugees sought asylum in the Georgian Valley of Pankisi, which has a reputation of being a lawless area. Chechens would cross the border freely to flee from the Russian Army, regroup and re-arm. Foreign visitors were discouraged from entering the region by a series of high-profile kidnappings. Georgian police and army kept their distance as well, as rumours swirled that the area was a base of heavily armed heroin smugglers. Embedded with a Chechen military unit, I was able to cross dangerous, snowy mountains from the Pankisi Valley to the south of Chechnya. This was certainly my most dangerous and difficult mission so far. There was a danger of Russian air strikes, attacks of the Russian Special Forces, a danger of the Chechen radical militant groups, a danger of being killed or kidnapped. We were forced to cross over 2,000 and 3,000 meter high mountain passes. The highest

mountain of the Eastern Caucasus is Tebulosmta at an elevation of 4,493 meters above sea level. Unfortunately, there were no other option to enter Chechnya.

More or less, Russia was still working with the same news management policy which it used in the times of the communist Soviet Union. There have been a lot of similarities between the previously described media management system in the communist Yugoslavia. Russian media freedom remained extremely poor. Journalists continued to find it extremely difficult to cover the news freely, particularly with regard to government corruption, organized crime, police torture, human rights abuses and the situation in Chechnya. Russia remains one of the most dangerous countries in the world for the media due to the widespread lawlessness that allows politicians, secret service agents, and criminals to silence journalists. The Russian federal Ministry of internal affairs controlled media access to the area of the Chechen conflict. Russian journalists told me unofficially that Moscow was dividing media representatives into two groups: friendly reporters and all the others. "Friendly reporters" were more or less all state-run media journalists, who had been proving their reliability for years to the secret service, military and authorities. Some of them had access to operational combat mission. Their reports were under severe restrictions and censorship. Officers provided "friendly reporters" with the materials and instructions on how to report and organize interviews and visits to the troops, the frontline etc. Russian editors and journalists received from the politicians, military and secret service orders and instructions on how to report. If media reports did not support the state policy, reporters lost permission to work and in some cases reporters or editors who had covered the situation in Chechnya have been killed or severely beaten. The number of threats, violent assaults and murders of journalists have created a climate of fear. After the war was officially over, the government imposed strict bans on all video material that showed fighting between Russian troops and the rebels. At any stage of war, reporters did not have any access to mission preparation.

What kind of news management program did Russia use for other journalists who were not "friendly reporters"? None. They did not allow them to enter Chechnya. During the war, Russia imposed severe restrictions for traveling to Chechnya. Foreign journalists were required to have government accreditation to enter Chechnya, but even those with proper documents were sometimes refused access. Several Russian and foreign journalists were detained while on assignment in the North Caucasus region. Russia lost the media war for international public support, but they did not lose domestic public support. Russian press and Russian public supported government policy and the war.

In the beginning of the war, Chechen troops welcomed foreign reporters. If they caught a Russian journalist, however, they would kill him as a spy. Most of the Chechen commanders, soldiers and civilians were very friendly towards the foreign press, providing them with full support. We were able to work quite freely; however, there was still considerable danger of abductions. Information which could compromise units or command positions was strictly hidden. After the fall of Grozny

(February 2001), it was forbidden to film or photo the rebels' faces or combat positions. When Chechen troops lost war and went to insurgency, foreign reporters were not welcome anymore, because they were very afraid of Russian secret service infiltration.

Because of the media blockade, abuses of human rights on both sides did not reach the audience. It was simply too risky for reporters to go on the Chechen side, while kidnapping was commonplace in the lawless territories by the Islamic radicals. On the other side, Russia prevented media from entering Chechnya. So there were no witnesses and media reports about brutal war in which Russian soldiers as prisoners were brutally beheaded, innocent civilians were consistently killed, women raped and hospitals blown up. There were no witnesses of the torture of prisoners, which was also a common practice carried out by Russian security forces and Chechen rebels. The siege and fighting in Grozny left the capital devastated like no other European city since World War II.

## 2.4 Afghanistan War (2001)

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks led to the intervention in the Afghan Civil War by the United States and its allies. The main goal was to dismantle Al Qaeda, the terrorist organization led by Osama bin Laden and to remove from power the Taliban regime who supported Al Qaeda and hosted their leadership. Coalition forces were fighting in conjunction with the Northern Alliance. In the beginning, U.S. Army had no troops on the ground so they did not have the opportunity to control the media. But still, when U.S. conventional forces arrived to Afghanistan in 2002, lack of access became a frequent complaint. American journalists were permitted to embed with ground forces in limited numbers and for short periods of time.

With the permission of the Northern Alliance commanders, I arrived from Tajikistan to the town of Fayzabad in the east of Afghanistan as an Associated Press Television News associate. From there, we continued our way over the 4,430 meter high Anjuman Pass and Panjshir Valley to the direct vicinity of the capital Kabul. I stayed there from the beginning of air strikes against Taliban positions until the occupation of the capital. At that time, it was typical that there was no modern form of military force. Instead, combat power consisted of armed groups of tribal fighters. It is no surprise that there was no military news management. After having received media accreditation from the Area Command, the reporters had free access to Northern Alliance battle positions. We filmed and photographed without any limitations and we could easily make an interview with any soldier or commander. We easily accessed data such as the number of soldiers, reserve, weapons, unit tactics, methods of camouflage, location of headquarters or combat morale. We could be embedded with a unit and remain on the battlefield during engagements. Such unlimited access is on the one hand a journalist's dream, enabling the work without restrictions, but it is, on the other hand, hardly acceptable for a modern military force. Never in any war, where an organized modern armed force was engaged, did reporters have such unfettered access to the battlefield and movement within it, as it was the case

in Afghanistan in 2001. Access to the battlefield on the Taliban side, however, was impossible, because the Taliban offered considerable financial rewards to those who would seize or kill a foreign journalist.

## 2.5 Iraq War (2003)

The Iraq War started on 20 March 2003 by an invasion force led by the United States against Saddam Hussein regime. It was followed by a longer phase of fighting, in which an insurgency emerged to oppose the occupying forces and the newly formed Iraqi government. As a journalist, I did not get permission to report from Baghdad, so reporting from the coalition side was the only option. And a better one too. As I experienced as a reporter visiting Baghdad 1998, Saddam Hussein's regime did not allow media access to the frontline, reporters were able to operate in Baghdad only, under severe restrictions and censorship. They operated mainly from the hotels. All our movements through the city were monitored by the Iraqi secret service officers which provided escort and all interviews or contacts with the Iraqi citizens were "on the record". Interviews with the military or police personnel were not allowed.

Colleagues who worked in Iraqi capital during the war in 2003 told me that only those reporters who agreed to full censorship were given accreditation and were allowed to stay in the country. Some of the media representatives lost accreditation because Iraqi government did not like their reports. The fear of expulsion further deterred hard-hitting reporting. Iraqi officials detained, threatened, or otherwise intimidated several reporters. Shortly after the war began, they detained four reporters on false suspicion of espionage. Such Iraqi news management policy turned mass media much more against Saddam Hussein regime.

The U.S. concept of "Embedded Media Program" was in 2003 really revolutionary for mass media and the military. The program and the rapid advances in technology permitted most media to file real-time reports from the battlefield first time in history. U.S. led coalition gave accreditations for covering the war: 692 journalists, photographers, and news crews (including 20 percent from non-U.S. media) who were embedded within U.S. and British military units and 1,670 reporters who were unilateral (because of the logistic problems, security and worries that the military could not guarantee safety and working environment for almost 3,000 reporters they divided journalists to those with "embedded" and "unilateral" status). When the war started, 408 journalists were embedded with ground units. "Embed" and "unilateral" journalists signed contracts with the military promising not to report information that could compromise unit position, future missions, classified weapons, and information they might find (see more: U.S. Department of Defense: Public Affairs guidance on Embedding Media during possible future operation/deployments in the U.S. Central Commands area of responsibility, Washington, Jan 2003). The programme defines "embedded media" as a media representative remaining with a military unit on an extended basis, perhaps a period of weeks or even months. Their decision was that media would be given access to operational combat missions, including mission preparation and debriefing, whenever possible. If needed, commanders would

provide the embedded media with billeting, rations and medical attention commensurate with that provided to members of the unit, as well as access to military transportation and assistance with communications filling/transmitting media products, if required. With this program, the Office of the Secretary of Defence had three objectives: dominate the media coverage of the war, counter third-party disinformation and assist in garnering U.S. public and international support. Embeds could stay with units as long as they wanted. Most of them voluntarily disembedded between 9 April and 1 May 2003 because major combat operations were declared over, freedom of movement throughout Iraq increased, and many large media organizations established bureaus in Baghdad (Wright and Harkey, 2004, pp. 4, 6).

Embedded journalists (and some unilateral ones) lived, ate, and travelled with the troops. Not only far away from the frontline, but also during combat operations in the battlefield, what was for the most reporters absolutely impossible in previous conflicts. They also came under enemy fire with the troops. Thanks to 24-hour news coverage, the public watched the steady advance to Baghdad and saw the toppling of the symbols of the Iraqi regime. The only limits were the function of operational security and communications transmission difficulties. From an analyst standpoint, the Pentagon's innovative decision in favour of the "Embedded Media Program" is a fascinating case of organizational change in an exceptionally large, hierarchical, and presumably change-averse bureaucracy operating in a fast-paced and instable environment (Rid, p. 3). Critics of U.S. intervention in Iraq criticized embedded journalism. The practice has been criticized as being part of a propaganda campaign and an effort to keep reporters away from civilian populations and sympathetic to invading forces. But many of relevant studies shows (see: Cardiff School of Journalism: The role of embedded reporting during the 2003 Iraq war. Cardiff University, London, 2003. UN Institute for Media, Peace and Security: Lessons to be learned from 2003 Iraq war. Oxford, 2003.) that critics were unable to find evidence that substantiated the argument, that embedding turns reporters into public relations officers for the military – indeed, they were able to find examples in which embedding enabled journalists to subject military claims to critical scrutiny in a way that they wouldn't have been able to do if they were dependent on the U.S. military's briefing operation at Central Command in Qatar (Lewis, 2006, p. 3). In previous wars, reporters never had access to operational combat missions and mission preparation in such a large scale.

The "Embedded Media Program" was successful from the perspective of the military and the media. In is true that the US Army and especially the commanders on the field got more responsibilities, but also excellent opportunity to show their part of the story from the battlefield. In combat the commander is responsible for everything that belongs within his circle of influence. Since embedded reporters were attached to units, these reporters now become a commander's responsibility. The "Embedded Media Program" provided the media unprecedented access to military units and members of those units and allowed the American and international public to witness soldiers during combat operations. The military-media relationship was strengthened, the cultural gap was reduced, and many of the lingering suspicions

that each institution had of the other were greatly reduced. Because the interaction between the many individuals involved in the program was so close, relationships were formed that will assist both institutions in the coming years—when young commanders become senior commanders and reporters become producers, editors, and bureau chiefs (Wright and Harkey, 2004, p. 6). In public media, some authors mistakenly presented embedded journalism as a new concept because the term “embedded” first came into use in the media coverage of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. We have to know that embedding media with the military is not a new thing, but the magnitude of the effort and the number of media embedded was unprecedented.

Was the “Embedded Media Program” perfect? No, it was not. It was certainly a lot better than it was in the previous wars when war correspondents basically had no access to the frontline during combat activities (except in a short Slovenian war and in the first months of fighting in Balkan Wars and Afghanistan) or had no access to the country in war. But the main problem for the embedded reporters was the fact that they were assigned to a specific unit and had to stay with that unit unless permitted to leave. They were unable to rush off to another area where there might have been more action. If your unit was far away from action for a longer period of time, then you did not get any useful story for a long time. That also meant that you could not get where you wanted, which was crucial for media in democracy. The programme was certainly not perfect for 1,670 unilateral or non-embedded reporters. Only a small number of them were able to enter Iraq. That is the main reason why stories reported by many unilateral journalists in Kuwait tended to be more negative for U.S. led coalition troops. The Pentagon frowned on the presence of unilateral reporters in Iraq. Officials repeatedly warned that the military could not guarantee their safety and urged them to avoid the country. Once the war began, Kuwaiti authorities systematically prevented non-embedded reporters from entering southern Iraq. Those wishing to travel to the border were required to obtain official approval from the Kuwaiti government. In practice, only few received it. If the reporters managed to cross the border, they could work quite freely. U.S. and British military authorities often would not speak to them or allow them into military bases. Those unilateral journalists entering Iraq illegally do so at higher risk, with no expectation of any assistance from a coalition army. The unilateral crews were often thrown out of the war zone to Kuwait by coalition units because they did not have an embedded status. Embedded reporters were also much safer. As Bryan Whitman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (U.S. Department of Defense) said: “The independent, or unilateral, journalists out on the battlefield had everything wrong that could go wrong happen to them. They got killed; they got injured; they got captured; they got lost. Every bad scenario that you could think of happened to them. And that is not to say that it wasn't dangerous for embedded journalists either” (Sylvester and Huffman, 2005, p. 45). Indeed, nearly all of the 14 journalists killed during the initial stage of the war were unilaterals.

The “Embedded Media Program” allows new found freedoms to the media representatives on the battlefield but, it does not mean unrestricted access and reporting of

military operations. We all got clear guidelines established to ensure the safety and operational security of the media and military personnel. Violations of these rules could result in the termination of that media's permission to report from coalition forces side.

## Conclusion

Military news management which wants to severely restrain the media's ability to report from the battlefield could represent a threat to freedom of speech and to the foundation of democracy. The military control over the press could encroach on basic freedoms. For professional journalism in democracy, it is unacceptable to become a propaganda tool. On the other hand, however, we have to understand military resistance and desire for operational secrecy. There is no commander who would want to be held responsible for the failure of a military operation or even for the death of his soldiers because of free media access to the battlefield. Citizens of a democracy have the right to know about and judge what operations are being planned and conducted in their name. The military has an operational requirement for information to be made available only on a need-to-know basis. We are talking about the balance between citizens' "right to know" or the media's expectations/demands that the military grant them access to the battlefield, and military resistance and desire for operational secrecy. As we have seen from the history: the balance is a delicate matter. From army's perspective, it is essential to develop a quality strategic military news management. According to my experiences, the most improved and developed public relations concept seems to be the "Embedded Media Program", although the program was not very attractive for the media. An attractive program for us, reporters, would be a full and unlimited access to the battlefield like we have seen in a short Slovenian war and first months of fighting in Balkan Wars and Afghanistan. But for the military, this could represent a serious security risk. The "Embedded Media Program" appears to be the best solution to date at balancing the needs of the press and the military, although some improvements remain to be made: to allow more reporters to be "embedded" from different countries and to develop strategies which allow reporters to be able to rush off to another area where there may be more action.

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**Dr. János Besenyő** je doktoriral in magistriral iz obrambnega menedžmenta na Nacionalni obrambni univerzi Zrínyi Miklós v Budimpešti na Madžarskem. Trenutno je podpolkovnik v geoinformacijski službi madžarskih obrambnih sil. Kot udeleženelec mirovnih misij ZN je sodeloval v operacijah v Zahodni Sahari, Sudanu in Afganistanu. Objavil je več knjig in člankov o vlogi madžarskih obrambnih sil v Afriki. Je tudi strokovnjak za vprašanja Zahodne Sahare.

**János Besenyő, PhD**, holds a PhD in Military Science and an MSc in defense management from the Zrínyi Miklós University of National Defense, Budapest. He is currently a Lieutenant Colonel of the Geoinformation Service of the Hungarian Defense Forces. As a member of UN peacekeeping missions, he served in operations in Western Sahara, Sudan and Afghanistan. He has published several books and articles about the role of the Hungarian Defence Forces in Africa. He is also an expert on the issue of Western Sahara.



Valentin Areh

**Mag. Valentin Areh** je diplomiral iz zgodovine in sociologije na Univerzi v Ljubljani ter magistriral iz socioloških vidikov volilnega sistema ZDA. Kot doktorski kandidat se ukvarja z uspešnim izvajanjem načela celovitega obvladovanja kakovosti v državni upravi. Je novinar, vojni dopisnik in pisatelj in je delal z medijskimi podjetji Associated Press Television News, Reuters, CNN, Italia Uno, Media set, POP TV in RTV Slovenija. Bil je aktivni udeleženelec vojne za Slovenijo leta 1991.

**Valentin Areh, MSc**, holds a BA in history and sociology from the Ljubljana University and an MA in sociological aspects of the US electoral system. As a PhD candidate, he deals with a successful implementation of Total Quality Management principles in the State Administration. He is a journalist, war correspondent and writer and has worked with the Associated Press Television News, Reuters, CNN, Italia Uno, Media set, POP TV and Slovenian national television. He was an active participant of the 1991 War for Slovenia.



Navodila avtorjem  
za oblikovanje prispevkov

Instructions for the authors  
of papers

## NAVODILA AVTORJEM ZA OBLIKOVANJE PRISPEVKOV ZA SODOBNE VOJAŠKE IZZIVE IN VOJAŠKOŠOLSKI ZBORNIK

### Vsebinska navodila

#### Splošno

**Sodobni vojaški izzivi** je interdisciplinarna znanstveno-strokovna publikacija, ki objavlja prispevke o aktualnih temah, raziskavah, znanstvenih in strokovnih razpravah, tehničnih ali družboslovnih analizah z varnostnega, obrambnega in vojaškega področja.

**Vojaškošolski zbornik** je vojaškostrokovna in informativna publikacija, namenjena izobraževanju in obveščanju o dosežkih ter izkušnjah na področju vojaškega izobraževanja, usposabljanja in izpopolnjevanja.

Kaj objavljamo?

Objavljamo prispevke v slovenskem jeziku s povzetki, prevedenimi v angleški jezik, in po odločitvi uredniškega odbora prispevke v angleškem jeziku s povzetki, prevedenimi v slovenski jezik.

Objavljamo prispevke, ki še niso bili objavljeni ali poslani v objavo drugi reviji. Pisec je odgovoren za vse morebitne kršitve avtorskih pravic. Če je bil prispevek že natisnjen drugje, poslan v objavo ali predstavljen na strokovni konferenci, naj to avtor sporočiti uredniku in pridobiti soglasje založnika (če je treba) ter navesti razloge za ponovno objavo.

### Tehnična navodila

#### Omejitve dolžine prispevkov

Prispevki naj obsegajo 16 strani oziroma 30.000 znakov s presledki (avtorska pola), izjemoma najmanj 8 strani oziroma 15.000 znakov ali največ 24 strani oziroma 45.000 znakov.

#### Recenzije

Prispevki se recenzirajo. Recenzija je anonimna. Glede na oceno recenzentov uredniški odbor ali urednik prispevek sprejme, če je treba, zahteva popravke ali ga zavrne. Pripombe recenzentov avtor vnese v prispevek.

Zaradi anonimnega recenzentskega postopka je treba prvo stran in vsebino oblikovati tako, da identiteta avtorja ni prepoznavna.

Avtor ob naslovu prispevka napiše, v katero kategorijo po njegovem mnenju in glede na klasifikacijo v COBISS spada njegov prispevek. Klasifikacija je dostopna na spletni strani revije in pri odgovornem uredniku. Končno klasifikacijo določi uredniški odbor.

#### Lektoriranje

Lektoriranje besedil zagotavlja OE, pristojna za založniško dejavnost. Lektorirana besedila se avtorizirajo.

- Prevajanje** Prevajanje besedil ali povzetkov zagotavlja OE, pristojna za prevajalsko dejavnost oziroma Šola za tuje jezike Centra vojaških šol.
- Navajanje avtorjev prispevka** Navajanje avtorjev je skrajno zgoraj, levo poravnano.  
*Primer:*  
Ime 1 Priimek 1,  
Ime 2 Priimek 2  
V opombi pod črto se za slovenske avtorje navede, iz katere ustanove prihajajo. Pri tujih avtorjih je treba navesti tudi ime države.
- Naslov prispevka** Navedbi avtorjev sledi naslov prispevka. Črke v naslovu so velike 16 pik, natisnjene krepko, besedilo naslova pa poravnano na sredini.
- Povzetek** Prispevku mora biti dodan povzetek, ki obsega največ 1200 znakov (20 vrstic). Povzetek naj na kratko opredeli temo prispevka, predvsem naj povzame rezultate in ugotovitve. Splošne ugotovitve in misli ne spadajo v povzetek, temveč v uvod.
- Povzetek v angleščini** Avtorji morajo oddati tudi prevod povzetka v angleščino. Tudi za prevod povzetka velja omejitev do 1200 znakov (20 vrstic).
- Ključne besede** Ključne besede (3-5, tudi v angleškem jeziku) naj bodo natisnjene krepko in z obojestransko poravnavo besedila.
- Besedilo** Avtorji naj oddajo svoje prispevke na papirju formata A4, s presledkom med vrsticami 1,5 in velikostjo črk 12 pik Arial. Na zgornjem in spodnjem robu naj bo do besedila približno 3 cm, levi rob naj bo širok 2 cm, desni pa 4 cm. Na vsaki strani je tako približno 30 vrstic s približno 62 znaki. Besedilo naj bo obojestransko poravnano, brez umikov na začetku odstavka.
- Kratka predstavitev avtorjev** Avtorji morajo pripraviti kratko predstavitev svojega strokovnega oziroma znanstvenega dela. Predstavitev naj ne presega 600 znakov (10 vrstic, 80 besed). Če je avtorjev več, se predstavi vsak posebej, čim bolj zgoščeno. Avtorji naj besedilo umestijo na konec prispevka po navedeni literaturi.
- Strukturiranje besedila** Posamezna poglavja v besedilu naj bodo ločena s samostojnimi podnaslovi in ustrezno oštevilčena (členitev največ na 4 ravni).  
*Primer:*  
1 Uvod  
2 Naslov poglavja (1. raven)  
2.1 Podnaslov (2. raven)  
2.1.1 Podnaslov (3. raven)  
2.1.1.1 Podnaslov (4. raven)

### Oblikovanje seznama literature

V seznamu literature je treba po abecednem redu navesti le avtorje, na katere se sklicujete v prispevku, celotna oznaka vira pa mora biti skladna s harvardskim načinom navajanja. Če je avtorjev več, navedemo vse, kot so navedeni na izvirnem delu.

*Primeri:*

#### a) knjiga:

Primek, ime (lahko začetnica imena), letnica. *Naslov dela*. Kraj: Založba.

Na primer: Ulrich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

#### b) zbornik:

Samson, C., 1970. Problems of information studies in history. V S. Stone, ur. *Humanities information research*. Sheffield: CRUS, 1980, str./pp. 44–68. Pri posameznih člankih v zbornikih na koncu posameznega vira navedemo strani, na katerih je članek, na primer:

#### c) članek v reviji

Kolega, N., 2006. Slovenian coast sea flood risk. *Acta geographica Slovenica*. 46-2, str. 143–167.

### Navajanje virov z interneta

Vse reference se začenjajo enako kot pri natisnjenih virih, le da običajnemu delu sledi še podatek o tem, kje na internetu je bil dokument dobljen in kdaj. Podatek o tem, kdaj je bil dokument dobljen, je pomemben zaradi pogostega spreminjanja www okolja.

Ulrich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, str. 45–100. <http://www.mors.si/index.php?id=213>, 17. 10. 2008.

Pri navajanju zanimivih internetnih naslovov v besedilu (ne gre za navajanje posebnega dokumenta) zadošča navedba naslova (<http://www.vpvs.uni-lj.si>).

Posebna referenca na koncu besedila v tem primeru ni potrebna.

### Sklicevanje na vire

Pri sklicevanju na vire med besedilom navedite le primek prvega avtorja in letnico izdaje. *Primer:* ... (Smith, 1997) ...

Če dobesedno navajate del besedila, ga ustrezno označite z narekovaji, v oklepaju pa poleg avtorja in letnice navedite stran besedila, iz katerega ste navajali.

*Primer:* ... (Smith, 1997, str. 15) ...

Pri povzemanju drugega avtorja napišemo besedilo brez narekovajev, v oklepaju pa napišemo, da gre za povzeto besedilo. *Primer:* (po Smith, 1997, str. 15). Če avtorja navajamo v besedilu, v oklepaju navedemo samo letnico izida in stran (1997, str. 15).

## Slike, diagrami in tabele

Slike, diagrami in tabele v prispevku naj bodo v posebej pripravljenih datotekah, ki omogočajo lektorske popravke. V besedilu mora biti jasno označeno mesto, kamor je treba vnesti sliko. Skupna dolžina prispevka ne sme preseči dane omejitve.

Če avtor iz tehničnih razlogov grafičnih dodatkov ne more oddati v elektronski obliki, je izjemoma sprejemljivo, da slike priloži besedilu. Avtor mora v tem primeru na zadnjo stran slike napisati zaporedno številko in naslov, v besedilu pa pustiti dovolj prostora zanjo. Prav tako mora biti besedilo opremljeno z naslovom in številčenjem slike. Diagrami se štejejo kot slike. Vse slike in tabele se številčijo. Številčenje poteka enotno in ni povezano s številčenjem poglavij. Naslov slike je naveden pod sliko, naslov tabele pa nad tabelo. Navadno je v besedilu navedeno vsaj eno sklicevanje na sliko ali tabelo. Sklic na sliko ali tabelo je: ... (slika 5) ... (tabela 2) ...


Primer slike:



Slika 5: Naslov slike

Primer tabele:

Tabela 2: Naslov tabele



## Opombe pod črto

Številčenje opomb pod črto je neodvisno od strukture besedila in se v vsakem prispevku začne s številko 1. Posebej opozarjamo avtorje, da so opombe pod črto namenjene pojasnjevanju misli, zapisanih v besedilu, in ne navajanju literature.

## Kratice

Kratice naj bodo dodane v oklepaju, ko se okrajšana beseda prvič uporabi, zato posebnih seznamov kratic ne dodajamo. Za kratico ali izraz v angleškem jeziku napišemo najprej slovensko ustreznico, v oklepaju pa angleški izvornik in morebitno angleško kratico.

## Format zapisa prispevka

Uredniški odbor sprejema prispevke, napisane z urejevalnikom besedil MS Word, izjemoma tudi v besedilnem zapisu (text only).

## Naslov avtorja

Prispevkom naj bosta dodana avtorjeva naslov in internetni naslov ali telefonska številka, na katerih bo dosegljiv uredniškemu odboru.

## Kako poslati prispevek

Na naslov uredništva ali članov uredniškega odbora je treba poslati tiskano in elektronsko različico prispevka.

## Potrjevanje sprejetja prispevka

Uredniški odbor avtorju pisno potrdi prejetje prispevka. Avtorjem, ki sporočijo tudi naslov svoje elektronske pošte, se potrditev pošlje po tej poti.

**Korekture** Avtor opravi korekture svojega prispevka v treh dneh.

**Naslov  
uredniškega  
odbora** Ministrstvo za obrambo  
Generalštab Slovenske vojske  
Sodobni vojaški izzivi  
Uredniški odbor  
Vojkova cesta 55  
1000 Ljubljana  
Slovenija  
Elektronski naslov  
Odgovorna urednica:  
liliana.brozic@mors.si

**Prispevkov, ki ne bodo urejeni skladno s tem navodilom, uredniški odbor ne bo sprejemal.**

## INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE AUTHORS OF PAPERS FOR THE CONTEMPORARY MILITARY CHALLENGES AND THE MILITARY EDUCATION JOURNAL

### Content-related instructions

#### General

**The Contemporary Military Challenges** is an interdisciplinary scientific expert magazine, which publishes papers on current topics, researches, scientific and expert discussions, technical or social sciences analysis from the field of security, defence and the military..

**The Military Education Journal** is a military professional and informative publication intended for education and informing on achievements and experiences in the field of military education, training and improvement.

What do we publish?

We publish papers in Slovene with abstracts translated into English. If so decided by the Editorial Board, we also publish papers in English with abstracts translated into Slovene.

We publish papers, which have not been previously published or sent to another magazine for publication. The author is held responsible for all possible copyright violations. If the paper has already been printed elsewhere, sent for publication or presented at an expert conference, the author must notify the editor, obtain the publisher's consent (if necessary) and indicate the reasons for republishing.

### Technical instructions

#### Limitations regarding the length of the papers

The papers should consist of 16 typewritten double-spaced pages or 30,000 characters. At a minimum they should have 8 pages or 15,000 characters and at a maximum 24 pages or 45,000 characters.

- Reviews** All papers are reviewed. The review is anonymous. With regard to the reviewer's assessment, the Editorial Board or the editor accepts the paper, demands modifications, if necessary, or rejects it. Upon receiving the reviewers' remarks, the author inserts them into the paper.  
Due to an anonymous review process, the first page must be designed in the way that the author's identity cannot be recognized.  
Next to the title, the author should indicate the category the paper belongs to according to him and according to the classification in the COBISS<sup>1</sup>. The classification is available on the magazine's internet page and at the responsible editor. The Editorial Board determines the final classification.
- Proofreading** The organizational unit responsible for publishing provides the proofreading of the papers. The proofread papers have to be approved.
- Translating** The translation of the papers or abstracts is provided by the organizational unit competent for translation or the School of Foreign Languages, Military Schools Centre.
- Indicating the authors of the paper** The authors' name should be written in the upper left corner, aligned left.  
*Example:*  
Name 1 Surname 1,  
Name 2 Surname 2,  
In the footnote, Slovenian authors should indicate the institution they come from. Foreign authors should also indicate the name of the state they come from.
- Title of the paper** The title of the paper is written below the listed authors. The font in the title is bold, size 16 points. The text of the title is centrally aligned.
- Abstract** The paper should have an abstract of a maximum 1,200 characters (20 lines). The abstract should include a short presentation of the topic, particularly the results and the findings. General findings and reflections do not belong in the abstract, but rather in the introduction.
- Abstract in English** The authors must also submit the translation of the abstract into English. The translation of the abstract is likewise limited to a maximum of 1,200 characters (20 lines).
- Key words** Key words (3-5 also in the English language) should be bold with a justified text alignment.
- Text** The authors should submit their papers on an A4 paper format, with 1.5 line spacing, fontArial size 12 points. At the upper and the bottom edge, there should be approx. 3 cm of space; the left margin should be 2 cm wide and the right margin 4 cm. Each page consists of approx. 30 lines with 62 characters. The text should have a justified alignment, without indents at the beginning of the paragraphs.

<sup>1</sup> Co-operative Online Bibliographic System and Services

**A brief presentation of the authors**

The authors should prepare a brief presentation of their expert or scientific work. The presentation should not exceed 600 characters (10 lines, 80 words). If there are several authors, each should be presented individually, as shortly and as comprehensively as possible. These texts should be placed at the end of the paper, after the cited literature.

**Text structuring**

Individual chapters should be separated with independent subtitles and adequately numbered.

*Example:*

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Title of the chapter (1<sup>st</sup> level)
- 2.1 Subtitle (2<sup>nd</sup> level)
- 2.1.1 Subtitle (3<sup>rd</sup> level)
- 2.1.1.1 Subtitle (4<sup>th</sup> level)

**Referencing**

In the bibliography, only the authors of references one refers to in the paper should be listed, in the alphabetical order. The entire reference has to be in compliance with the Harvard citing style.

*Example:*

Surname, name (can also be the initial of the name), year. *Title of the work*. Place. Publishing House.

*Example:*

Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

With certain papers published in journals, the author should indicate, at the end of each reference, a page on which the paper can be found.

*Example:*

Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. 45-100.

**Referencing internet sources**

All references start the same as the references for the printed sources, only that the usual part is followed by the information about the Internet page on which the document was found as well as the date on which it was found. The information about the time that the document was found on the Internet is important, because the WWW environment changes constantly.

Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. p. 45-100. <http://www.mors.si/index.php?id=213>, 17 October 2008.

When referencing interesting WWW pages in the text (not citing an individual document) it is enough to state only the Internet address (<http://www.vpvs.uni-lj.si>). A separate reference at the end of the text is therefore not necessary.

**Citing**

When citing sources in the text, indicate only the surname of the author and the year of publication. *Example:* ..... (Smith, 1997) ...

When making a direct reference to a text, the cited part should be adequately marked with quotation marks and followed by the exact page of the text which the citing is taken from.

*Example:* ...(Smith, 1997, p.15) ...

**Figures, diagrams, tables**

Figures, diagrams and tables in the paper should be prepared in separate files which allow for proofreading corrections. The place in the text where the picture should be inserted must be clearly indicated. The total length of the paper must not surpass the given limitation.

Should the author not be able to submit the graphical supplements in the electronic form due to technical reasons, it is exceptionally acceptable to enclose the figures to the text. In this case the author must write a sequence number and a title on the back of each picture and leave enough space in the text to include it. The text must likewise contain the title and the sequence number of the figure. Diagrams are considered figures.

All figures and tables are numbered. The numbering is not uniform and not linked with the numbering of the chapters. The title of the figure is stated beneath it and the title of the table is stated above it.

As a rule, the paper should include at least one reference to a figure or a table..

Reference to a figure or a table is: ... (Figure 5) ..... (Table 2) .....


Example of a figure:



Figure 5: Title of the figure

Example of a table:

Table 2: Title of the table



**Footnotes**

The numbering of the footnotes is not related to the structure of the text and starts with number 1 in each paper. We want to stress that the aim of the footnotes is to explain the thoughts written in the text and not to reference literature.

**Abbreviations**

When used for the first time, the abbreviations in the text must be explained in parenthesis; therefore no additional list of abbreviations is needed. If the abbreviations or terms are written in English, the appropriate Slovenian term should be written along with the English original and possibly the English abbreviation in the parenthesis.

**Format type of the paper**

The Editorial Board accepts only the texts written with a MS Word text editor and only exceptionally those in the 'text only' format.




- Author's address** Each paper should include the author's address, e-mail or a telephone number, so that the Editorial Board can reach him or her.
- Sending the paper** A print or an electronic version of the paper should be sent to the address of the Editorial Board or the members of the Editorial Board.
- Confirmation of the reception of the paper** The Editorial Board sends the author a written confirmation regarding the reception of the paper. The authors who also list their e-mails receive the confirmation via e-mail.
- Corrections** The author makes corrections to the paper within three days.
- Editorial Board address** Ministry of Defence  
Slovenian Armed Forces  
General Staff  
Contemporary Military Challenges  
Editorial Board  
Vojkova cesta 55  
1000 Ljubljana  
Slovenia  
Electronic address:  
Editor in Chief:  
liliana.brozic@mors.si

**The Editorial Board will not accept papers, which will not be in compliance with the above instructions.**









## Vsebina

Liliana Brožič	UVODNIK EDITORIAL
Eric Ouellet, Jérôme Lacroix-Leclair, Pierre Pahlavi	INSTITUCIONALIZACIJA NEKONVENCIONALNEGA VOJSKOVANJA: PRIMER DARFURJA INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF IRREGULAR WARFARE: THE CASE OF DARFUR
János Besenyő	MISIJA EVROPSKE UNIJE ZA USPOSABLJANJE V MALIJU – SODELOVANJE MADŽARSKE THE EUROPEAN UNION TRAINING MISSION IN MALI – HUNGARY'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE MISSION
Anton Bebler	VARNOSTNI IZZIVI V JUGOVZHODNI EVROPI SECURITY CHALLENGES IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE
Damir Črnčec	DOBRO UPRAVLJANJE OBRAMBNIH SISTEMOV V ČASU GLOBALIZACIJE GOOD GOVERNANCE OF DEFENCE SYSTEMS IN GLOBALIZATION ERA
Dragan Trivan	VPLIV KORPORATIVNE VARNOSTI NA NACIONALNO VARNOST THE INFLUENCE OF CORPORATE SECURITY ON NATIONAL SECURITY
Valentin Areh	VOJAŠKA STRATEŠKA POLITIKA UPRAVLJANJA MEDIJEV – OSEBNE IZKUŠNJE IZ RAZLIČNIH VOJN STRATEGIC MILITARY NEWS MANAGEMENT POLICY – PERSONAL EXPERIENCES FROM DIFFERENT WARS