

# VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA

## MILITARY HISTORY

Številka/Number 2 (15), Letnik/Volume 9/2008



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Izdajatelj: Vojaški muzej Slovenske vojske

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# Kazalo

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# Nagovor urednika

## Introduction



Spoštovani prijatelji vojaške zgodovine,

že na začetku bi se vam rad zahvalil za vse prijazne in vzpodbudne besede, ki smo jih bili v Vojaškem muzeju Slovenske vojske in Uredništvu Vojaške zgodovine/Military History, deležni ob izdaji prve prenovljene številke VZ/MH. Kot sem zapisal že v uvodniku k njej, smo se podali na pot preraščanja v vojaško zgodovinski strokovni in znanstveni časopis, zato so za vse nas, ki jo ustvarjamo, dobrodošle tudi malo manj prijazne besede, saj le odkrita beseda, tudi o naših pomanjkljivostih, pelje do cilja, ki smo si ga zastavili. Kot boste zasledili skozi branje te številke, boste tako lahko opazili, da smo lahko nekatere vaše predloge upoštevali že v tej številki, druge pa bomo v naslednjih.

Recenzirani znanstveni članki raziskovalcev vojaške zgodovine iz Vojaškega muzeja Slovenske vojske in zunanjih sodelavcev, so tudi tokrat objavljeni po vrstnem redu oziroma glede na časovno obdobje, ki ga v svoji razpravi obravnavajo. Članek brigadirja mag. Branimirja Furlana obravnava usodo generalov poražene strani v ameriški državljanski vojni. Dr. Tomaž Teropšič v svoji razpravi obravnava strategijo in taktiko nemškega okupatorja na Spodnjem Štajerskem med 2. svetovno vojno. Generalmajor v pokoju Marjan F. Krajnc, v svojem prispevku obravnava nekatere dokumente o pripravah in ustanovitvi Slovenske narodne vojske ter njen tragični konec maja 1945. Matjaž Ravbar pa v svojem članku o Korejski vojni 1950 – 1953 združuje znanstveno raziskovalno delo vojaškega zgodovinarja raziskovalca v arhivu in na terenu. Stotnik Boris Bolfek pa, ob 40. obletnici ustanovitve Teritorialne obrambe Slovenije, v svoji razpravi obravnava ustanovitev in delovanje ene njenih najpomembnejših enot, Zaščitne brigade TO, ki se je v obdobju priprav na osamosvojitve

*Dear friends of military history,*

*In the beginning, I would like to express my appreciation for all the nice and encouraging words we received in the Slovenian Armed Forces Military Museum and the Editorial Office of the Vojaška zgodovina/Military History (VZ/MH) journal upon the publishing of the first issue of the journal VZ/MH. As I have written in its editorial, we have taken a path towards becoming a military history professional and scientific journal. We, the authors, therefore welcome even less friendly remarks, since only honest remarks about our weak points can bring us to the objective we have set for ourselves. As you will be able to notice, we have already complied with some of your remarks in this issue, while others will be considered in the following issues.*

*Reviewed scientific articles of researchers of the Slovenian Armed Forces Military Museum and some external colleagues are again published in a sequence of historical periods treated in the articles. The article of Brigadier Branimir Furlan treats the fate of defeated generals in the American Civil War. Dr. Tomaž Teropšič discussed the strategy and tactics of the German occupying forces in Lower Styria during World War II. Retired Major General Marjan F. Krajnc wrote about some of the documents regarding the preparation and establishment of the Slovene National Army and its tragic end in May 1945. In his article about the Korean War 1950 - 1953, Matjaž Ravbar integrated scientific research work of a military historical researcher in the archives and on the field. On the occasion of the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the establishment of the Slovenian Territorial Defence, Captain Boris Bolfek wrote about the establishment and operation of one of its most important units, the Territorial Defence Protection Brigade, which was during the preparations for the Slovenia's gaining of independence transformed into an elite military unit of the new Slovenian state, the MORIS Brigade. Today, the 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade of the Slovenian Armed Forces carries on its tradition.*

*In the second part of the journal, we present to you*

Slovenije preoblikovala v elitno vojaško enoto nove slovenske države, brigado MORiS, danes pa njeno tradicijo nadaljuje 1. brigada Slovenske vojske.

V drugem delu časopisa pa predstavljamo publicistično dejavnost Vojaškega muzeja Slovenske vojske oziroma dela, ki so izšla v naši knjižni zbirki Slovenska vojaška zgodovina, ki odpira nova poglavja nacionalne vojaške preteklosti ter s tem pomaga razumeti našo sedanjost, prav tako pa prispeva k razvoju slovenske vojaške misli.

Med 20. in 23. aprilom 2008 smo v Vojaškem muzeju Slovenke vojske skupaj z Landesverteidigungsakademie Österreichisches Bundesheer v Ljubljani in Kobaridu organizirali 8. konferenco Mednarodnega združenja za vojaško zgodovino (Military History Working Group - MHWG). Gostitelj konference je bil minister za obrambo RS g. Karl Erjavec, uvodni nagovor na konferenci pa je imel načelnik Generalštaba Slovenske vojske generalpodpolkovnik Albin Gutman. 95 udeležencev iz 19 držav je v svojih člankih, pod skupnim naslovom *Experience of War*, ki bodo objavljene v posebnem zborniku, obravnavalo vojaško zgodovinsko tematiko z vidika izkušenj preteklih vojskovanj za današnji dan. Konferenco, pa tudi nekaj utrinkov iz drugih razstav, ki smo jih v tem obdobju pripravili v VMSV, pa prinašamo ob koncu časopisa.

polkovnik doc. dr. Tomaž Kladnik  
glavni urednik

*the publishing activity of the Military Museum and the works published in our collection Slovenska vojaška zgodovina (Slovenian Military History). This collection opens up new chapters of the national military history, thereby contributing to the comprehension of the present as well as to the development of the Slovenian military thinking.*

*Between 20 and 23 April 2008, the Slovenian Armed Forces Military Museum together with Landesverteidigungsakademie Österreichisches Bundesheer organised the 8<sup>th</sup> Conference of the Military History Working Group – MHWG in Ljubljana and Kobarid. The conference was hosted by the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia Mr Karl Erjavec and the introductory address was given by Chief of the General Staff of the Slovenian Armed Forces. The 95 conference participants from 19 countries discussed in their articles with a common title *Experience of War* the military history issues from the point of view of lessons learned in the past war operations applied to the present-day situation. A report from the conference and some highlights of other exhibitions prepared by the Slovenian Armed Forces Military Museum during the said period are presented at the end of the journal.*

Colonel Tomaž Kladnik, PhD  
Editor-in-Chief







# Usoda generalov vojske Konfederacije po koncu državljanske vojne

## Generals of the Confederate Army After the Civil War and their Destiny

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### Izvleček

Članek obravnava politiko zmagovalcev ameriške državljanske vojne do generalov, ki so vodili enote uporniške vojske Konfederacije. Analiza ukrepov vlade ZDA govori o zavračanju njihovih uslug in poskusu njihove izključitve iz javnega življenja, kar pa se v praksi ni uresničilo. Številni od njih so našli nove vloge v civilnem javnem življenju in zasedli pomembne položaje v upravnih strukturah, celo vladi. Vojaške kariere pa je bilo za večino konec.

Ključne besede: državljanska vojna, generali, Konfederacija

### Uvod

Appomattox v Virginiji, 9. aprila 1865. General Ulysses S. Grant, ki je poveljeval armadam Združenih držav Amerike, in general Robert E. Lee, poveljujoči armadi Severne Virginije, sta se sešla v hiši majorja McLeana, da bi končala eno od najbolj tragičnih in krvavih vojn v ameriški zgodovini. Približno ob 15.45 je general Lee podpisal vdajo. Tedaj je bila kratka zgodovina držav Konfederacije blizu koncu.

Do konca maja so se vdale vse enote Konfederacije in usoda več kot 174.000 vojakov in mornarjev je bila v rokah zvezne vojske. Med njimi je bilo več sto častnikov, ki so izbrali vojaško kariero za poklic. V skupini častnikov Konfederacije je bilo 425 posameznikov, ki jih je predsednik Davis povišal v generale. 299 jih je dočakalo konec vojne (Warner, 1959). Štiri leta dotlej so izvajali povelja svojega predsednika in vodili enote v obrambi domovine.

### Abstract

*The policy towards the generals who led the rebellion Confederate troops implemented by those who won the American Civil War is the subject of this article. The analysis of the measures accepted by the U.S. Government shows the denial of their services and the attempt of their exclusion from the public life; what had not happened. Many of them found new roles in the civilian public life and performed important duties in the administration, even in the U.S. Government. However, for the majority the military careers were completed.*

Keywords: civil war, generals, Confederation

### Introduction

*Appomattox, Virginia, April 9, 1865. General Ulysses S. Grant, commanding the U.S. armies, and General Robert E. Lee, commanding the Army of Northern Virginia, met in McLeans's house to bring to an end one of the most tragic and bloodiest wars in the American history. It was about 3:45 PM when General Lee signed a letter with the terms of surrender. In that moment the short history of the Confederate States was close to its end.*

*By the end of May, all Confederate troops surrendered and the destiny of more than 174.000 soldiers and sailors was in Union hands. Among them, hundreds of officers, who had selected military careers as a life-time profession. There were 425 individuals who received appointment by the President Davis to one of four grades of general, of whom 299 witnessed the end of war (Warner, 1959). During the past four years they had followed the orders of their President and led troops defending their homeland. Some of*



Nekateri od njih so se bojevali proti kolegom z akademije West Point. Je konec državljanske vojne pomenil konec njihovih vojaških karier? Kako prizanesljiv ali maščevalen je bil zmagovalec? Kakšna je bila njihova vloga v obdobju po vojni pri obnovi Združenih držav?

## Vdaja

*»Vem, da nas bodo obtoževali. Ne bodo razumeli, kako so nas številčno prekašali. Vendar to ni vprašanje, polkovnik. Vprašanje je, ali je prav, da predam to armado. Če je prav, potem bom prevzel vso odgovornost.« (Freeman, 1935: 121). General Robert E. Lee v Appomattoxu, 9. aprila 1865*

S podpisom pogojev za vdajo je general Lee predal generalu Grantu njegov del vojske Konfederacije. Čeprav je bil 9. februarja 1865 določen za poveljujočega vsem armadam, ni želel prevzeti odgovornosti za brezpogojno vdajo. Pogoje je odobril predsednik Konfederacije Jefferson Davis. Zadnja vdaja je bila 26. maja, ko se je general Kirby E. Smith vdal generalu Edwardu R. S. Canbyju v New Orleansu. S tem se je končal vojaški odpor Juga.

Težko je opredeliti končno število pripadnikov, ki so se vdali armadam ZDA. V Konfederaciji niso imeli podatkov o kadrih in včasih celo poveljniki niso natančno vedeli, koliko vojakov imajo na voljo. V svojem pismu predsedniku tri dni po vdaji je general Lee poročal, da je generalu Grantu predal »7.892 pripadnikov pehote z oborožitvijo, 63 kosov artilerijskega orožja in približno 2.100 konjenikov« (ibid: 724). General Grant v svojih spominih omenja, da je bilo približno »28.356 častnikov in vojakov, ki jih je bilo treba pogojno obsoditi, številni med njimi niso imeli oborožitve« (ibid). Lee je priznal Grantu, da ni imel natančnih podatkov o tem, koliko pripadnikov armade je predal.

V izmenjavi pisem z generalom Grantom od 5. do 9. aprila je general Lee iskal možnosti za takšne pogoje, ki bi omogočili častno predajo ter preprečili poniževanje in neustrezno obravnavo. General Grant si je prizadeval čim prej končati sovražnosti in je sprejel skoraj vse Leejeve zahteve. Njegova velikodušnost se je potrdila med pogajanjmi, ko je na Leejevo zahtevo osebno dodal pogoje, da lahko častniki zadržijo osebno oborožitev, svoje konje in prtljago. Ob tem je izjavil, da »se lahko vsak častnik ali vojak vrne domov in ga pri tem ne bodo

*them had fought against their West Point peers. Was the end of the war the end of their military careers? How generous, or vindictive was the winner? What was their role in the post-war period during the reconstruction of the Union. These and associated questions are the subject of this study.*

## The surrender

*“I know they will say hard things of us. They will not understand how we were overwhelmed by numbers. But that is not the question, Colonel. The question is, is it right to surrender this army. If it is right, then I will take all the responsibility” (Freeman, 1935: 121). General Robert E. Lee at Appomattox, Virginia. April 9, 1865.*

Signing the terms of surrender, General Lee surrendered to General Grant his portion of the Confederate Army. Although he had been general-in-chief of all of the Confederate armies since February 9, 1865, he did not want to assume a responsibility for the total surrender. He let other commanding generals making their own decisions. The terms of surrender were approved by the President of the Confederate States, Jefferson Davis. The last surrender occurred on May 26 at New Orleans where General Kirby E. Smith surrendered to General Edward R. S. Canby. With this capitulation Southern military resistance ended.

The total number of troops surrendered to the U.S. armies is hard to determine. The Confederates had not maintained detailed personnel data, and sometimes even commanders were not sure how many soldiers they had. In his letter to the President three days after the surrender, General Lee reported that he surrendered to General Grant “7,892 infantrymen with arms, 63 pieces of artillery, and approximately 2,100 cavalryman” (ibid: 724). General Grant in his memoirs submits that about “28,356 officers and men left to be paroled, and many of them were without arms” (ibid). Lee admitted to Grant that he didn’t have a correct overview how many troops he had left.

Exchanging several letters with General Grant from 5<sup>th</sup> to 9<sup>th</sup> April, General Lee sought for terms that would enable a honorable surrender preventing humiliation and inappropriate treatment. While General Grant trying to end all hostilities as soon as possible, accepted almost all of Lee’s requests. His generosity was proven during the negotiations, upon Lee’s additional request, he personally added that officers could retain side-arms, private horses, and baggage, and “each officer and man will be allowed to return to his home, not to be disturbed by the U.S. authorities so long as they observe their paroles, and



General Grant (peti z desne) s svojim štabom pri City Pointu v Virginiji

General Grant (fifth from right) and his staff at City Point, Virginia

ovirale oblasti, vse dokler bo delal v skladu s pogojno kaznijo in spoštoval veljavne zakone, kjer bo živel« (Ibid: 739). Prav tako je obljubil 25.000 obrokov za prehrano Leejeve armade, ki je bila odrezana od oskrbe. Da bi preprečil poniževanje južnjakov, je general Grant celo izdal navodilo svojim enotam, naj ne prosлавljajo predaje in naj se vzdržijo pozdravnega streljanja: »Vojne je konec, uporniki so spet naši rojaki in najboljši znak vnovičnega združevanja po zmagi bo, da se vzdržimo vseh vrst kazanja zmagoslavja na bojišču.« (Johnson, Buel, 1982: 743).

Lee je pripadnike armade seznanil z vdajo v pisnem ukazu 10. aprila. V njem je navedel pogoje in se poslovil od njih. Častniki in vojaki so se različno odzvali na ukaz. Nekateri so bili

*the laws in force where they may reside" (Ibid: 739). He also promised 25,000 rations for the Lee's army, which was cut off from supplies. In order to prevent humiliation of the Confederates, General Grant even instructed his troops not to celebrate and abstain from firing of salutes. "The war is over, the rebels are our countryman again, and the best sign of rejoicing after the victory will be to abstain from all demonstrations in the field" (Johnson, Buel, 1982: 743).*

*Lee's troops were informed about the surrender by his written order on April 10. With the order he passed the terms of surrender and gave his farewell address. His officers and soldiers reacted to it in their own way. Some wept, others were dazed, trying to understand how the Lee's army could surrender. All who were able joined to say farewell to him - to say good-by to their commander. Grant's terms*

pretreseni, drugi zbegani in so poskušali razumeti, kako se je Leejeva armada lahko vda-la. Vsi, ki so lahko, so se osebno poslovi-li od svojega poveljnika. Grantove pogoje so uporabljal-i za vdajo armad Konfederacije. Napisni so bili v duhu Lincolнове vizije in usmeritev – končati vojno in začeti obnovo Združenih držav. Njegovi poveljniki so jih razumeli in jim sledili.

## Politika

»Z zlobo proti nikomur; z usmiljenjem do vseh;... trudimo se dokončati naše delo; obve-žimo rane našega naroda.« (Randal, Donald, 1969: 527). Predsednik Abraham Lincoln, mar-ca 1865

Predsednik Združenih držav Abraham Lin-coln je v več javnih nastopih in pred vladno administracijo izrazil svojo vizijo o obnovi Združenih držav. Oproščanje, pomirjanje in dobra volja so bila vodila dejavnosti po vojni. 14. aprila je članom svoje vlade povedal, da »ne bo nobenih tožb in nobenega prelivanja krvi po vojni« (ibid). Istega dne je bil ustreljen in je umrl. Vladna politika proti poraženemu sovra-žniku se je obrnila v drugo smer.

29. maja, dva dneva po predaji zadnjega ge-nerala Konfederacije, je predsednik Andrew Johnson objavil pomilostitev za vse, ki so se bo-jevali na strani Konfederacije, razen izjem. Med temi so bili poleg nekaterih civilnih uslužben-cev in diplomatov častniki nad činom polkovni-ka v kopenski vojski in poročnika v mornarici. Izjeme, za katere amnestija ni veljala, so bili tudi vsi, ki so se izobraževali na vojaških aka-demijah ZDA (ibid: 767). Objava o amnestiji je bila v nasprotju z Grantovimi pogoji o predaji. Borci Juga so jo sprejeli s presenečenjem in raz-očaranjem. Septembra 1867 je bila amnestija razširjena, vendar so bili brigadirji in generali še vedno izjeme. V objavi amnestije ob božiču leta 1968 so vse izjeme zbrisali in politika proti nekdanjim upornikom se je spet približala Lin-colnovemu konceptu.

V vmesnem obdobju je bila škoda že storjena. Pomanjkanje jasnih političnih usmeritev, spre-minjanje politike in različni pogledi na obnovo so povzročili različen pristop do obnove države. To obdobje ameriške zgodovine je označeno kot 'tragična era' ali 'obdobje sovraštva'. Zanj sta značilni sovražna obravnava južnjakov in upo-raba neustreznih metod pri upravljanju južnih

of surrender were generally used for the surrender of other Confederate armies. They were formed accord-ing to Lincoln's vision and guidance – to bring the war to an end and start re-building the Union. His commanders understood and followed the guidance.

## The politics


*"With malice toward none; with charity for all;... let us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation's wounds;" (Randal, Donald, 1969: 527). President Abraham Lincoln, March 1865.*

The President of the U.S., Abraham Lincoln, ex-pressed in several addresses to the public and admin-istration his vision for the reconstruction of Union. Forgiveness, conciliation, and good will were to di-rect all actions after the war. On April 14, he said to the members of his cabinet that, "there [will] be no prosecution, no bloody work after the war" (ibid). Unfortunately, he was shot and died the very same day. The government policy about the defeated enemy turned in a different direction.

On 29 May, two days after the last Confederate general surrendered his troops, President Andrew Johnson issued a proclamation of amnesty to all per-sons, with some exceptions, who had fought on the Confederate side. Among the exceptions, besides some civilian and diplomatic officers, were the officers above the rank colonel in the Army and lieutenant in the Navy. Those who had been educated at the United States military academies were excepted too (ibid: 767). This proclamation was written in a different spirit than Grant's terms of surrender. The Southern combatants accepted it with surprise and disappoint-ment. The amnesty was broadened by presidential proclamation in September 1867; however, brigadiers and higher officers were still excepted from the am-nesty. With the Christmas proclamation, 1868, all exceptions were removed, and the policy toward ex-rebels moved close to Lincoln's concept again.


In the mean time, the damage had already been done. A lack of clear political guidance, changing pol-icy, and different views on the reconstruction resulted in a different approach in re-building the Union. This period will be remembered in American history as "The Tragic Era", or "The Age of Hate". It was charac-terized by the hostile treatment of the Southerners and an application of inappropriate methods in governing the Southern States - all under the auspice of the U.S. Army. Ex-Confederate soldiers provoked clashes with Federal soldiers that resulted in violence and death. Retaliation prevailed over Lincoln's "forgiveness and good will".





General Robert E. Lee teden dni po predaji svoje armade

*General Robert. E. Lee one week after surrendering his army*



McLeanova hiša v kateri je general Lee podpisal predajo

McLean's house where general Lee surrendered his troops

držav – vse pod nadzorom ameriške vojske. Provokacije nekdanjih vojakov Konfederacije so izzivale spopade z vojniki zvezne vojske, kar je povzročalo nasilje in smrt. Maščevanje je preglasilo Lincolnovo »oproščanje in dobro voljo«.

Cilj politikov, po večini republikancev, je bil preprečiti južnjakom vnovično prevzemanje politične moči po vojni. Ob podpori vse več ljudi na severu so prišli do spoznanja, da so potrebna ustavna dopolnila za zavarovanje zmage. Leta 1866 je kongres sprejel 14. dopolnilo k ustavi. Tretji odstavek dopolnila je predvideval ukrepe proti nekdanjim pripadnikom Konfederacije.

*Preventing Southerners from regaining political power was a goal of many politicians, mostly Republicans, after the war. Supported by more and more people in the North, they came to believe that a constitutional amendment was needed to safeguard the victory. In 1866 the Congress adopted an amendment on the Constitution. The 3<sup>rd</sup> section of the amendment imposed sanctions on ex-Confederates. "Those, who had engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the U.S. after having sworn officially to support the Constitution were disqualified from holding any office, civil or military, State or Federal" (Ibid: 584). With this amendment the Congress denied potential military*



»Tisti, ki so bili udeleženi v odporu ali upor, čeprav so enkrat prisegli, da bodo podpirali ameriško ustavo, ne morejo nikoli več biti v vojaški ali civilni službi države ali federacije.« (ibid: 584) S tem je kongres onemogočil morebitne vojaške kariere ali civilno službo nekdanjim častnikom, ki so se pridružili armadam Konfederacije. Sprejetje 14. dopolnila je spremljalo veliko kontroverznosti in je še vedno sporno dejanje v zgodovini ameriške demokracije. Predsednik Johnson mu je zelo nasprotoval in južne države ga niso hotele ratificirati. Pojavljale so se zlorabe zakonov in kongres je celo spremenil proces ratifikacije. 14. dopolnilo je bilo sprejeto 9. julija 1868.

Tudi če ga ne bi bilo, nekdanji pripadniki Konfederacije niso imeli veliko možnosti za nadaljevanje vojaške kariere v ameriški vojski. Zaradi neugodnih gospodarskih razmer je vlada terjala hitro demobilizacijo obeh, ameriške in vojske Konfederacije. Južnjaške enote so bile razpuščene takoj po vdaji. Prav tako so se hitro demobilizirale sile ZDA. Leta 1868 je redna ameriška vojska štela približno 44.000 mož in vsekakor ni bilo potreb ali želja za kadrovske okrepitve z juga.

## Prihodnost

»Sedaj, ko je vojne konec, ko so južnjaške države položile orožje in so bila s severnimi državami odločena sporna vprašanja, verjamem, da je dolžnost vsakega, da se združi v naporih za obnovo države in vnovično vzpostavitev miru in sožitja...« (Freeman, 1935: 221). Robert E. Lee, septembra 1865

Za večino južnjakov Leejeva predaja ni pomenila konca življenja, ampak začetek prilagajanja na nove okoliščine. Energijo so usmerili v drugačne bitke: za ekonomsko preživetje ter obnovo svojih domov in držav. V nasprotju z nekaterimi nekdanjimi generali Konfederacije je Lee poskušal ohrabriti južnjake in je želel biti zgled lojalnega državljan. Na začetku je zavrnil vsako službo in je iskal mir na deželi. Po premisleku je spremenil načrte in je, namesto da bi postal poljedelec, sprejel funkcijo predsednika manjše fakultete v Lexingtonu v Virginiji. Na tej dolžnosti je osebno pomagal pri obnovi Virginije in spodbujal tudi druge. To mu je pomagalo tudi pri iskanju »prave resnice in pravilne presoje dogodkov minulih štirih let« (Ibid).

*careers and public service for former U.S. officers who had joined the Confederate armies. The adoption of the 14<sup>th</sup> amendment was full of controversy and still remains a dubious moment in the history of American democracy. President Johnson strongly opposed the amendment; Southern states didn't want to rectify it. There were abuses of the law, and the Congress even changed the process of ratification. July 9, 1868, is the day, when the 14<sup>th</sup> amendment was ratified.*

*However, even without the 14<sup>th</sup> amendment, there still would not have been many possibilities for ex-Confederates to continue their military careers in the U.S. army. Facing unfavorable economic conditions, the Government directed rapid demobilization of both the U.S. and Confederate armies. Southern forces disintegrated promptly after the surrender of Generals Lee and Johnston. The Union forces were also demobilized very quickly. In 1868, the regular U.S. Army numbered approximately 44,000 men, and there was certainly no need or desire for personnel augmentations from the South.*

## The Future

*"The war being at an end, the Southern States having laid down their arms, and the questions at issues between them and the Northern States having been decided, I believe it to be the duty of every one to unite in the restoration of the country, and reestablishment of peace and harmony..." (Freeman, 1935: 221). Robert E. Lee, September 1865.*

*For most Southerners Lee's surrender was not the end of life, but the beginning of readjustment to new conditions. They turned their energies to fight a different battle. A battle for economic survival and rebuilding their homes and States. As oppose to some other ex-Confederate generals, Lee tried to encourage Southerners and wanted to serve as an example of a loyal citizen. He initially rejected any public service, seeking peace and tranquility in the country. After consideration, he changed his plans and instead becoming a farmer he accepted the presidency of small college in Lexington, Virginia. In the new job he made a personal contribution in the reconstruction of Virginia and served as an inspiration for others. It also enabled him to search for "a true knowledge and correct judgement of the events of the past four years" (ibid).*

*Conversely, there was a group of ex-Confederate generals that could not accept reality. The defeat was unbearable or unconceivable for them. General Jubal Anderson Early from Virginia, for example, moved to Mexico and then to Canada. After returning to the*



Povsem drugače pa se skupina nekdanjih generalov Konfederacije ni sprijaznila z realnostjo, saj niso znali prenesti poraza. General Jubal Anderson Early iz Virginije se je npr. preselil v Mehiko in pozneje v Kanado. Po vrnitvi v ZDA je poskušal prepričati somišljenike, naj emigrirajo v Novo Zelandijo. General Robert Augustus Tombs iz Georgije ni nikoli prosil za oprostitev pogojne kazni in vnovično pridobitev ameriškega državljanstva, kar mu je onemogočalo delo v javnih službah. General Henry Alexander Wise iz Virginije prav tako ni iskal amnestije ali obnovitve državljanskih pravic. Večina južnjaških generalov pa je kljub vsemu sledila Leejevemu zgledu. V novih razmerah se je po koncu vojne znašlo 299 generalov vojske Konfederacije. Pred vojno so bili po večini pravniki, podjetniki, lastniki plantaž ali tisti, ki so vojaško kariero izbrali kot poklic. Večina zadnjih je bila diplomantov akademije West Point, nekateri pa niso imeli vojaške izobrazbe in so bili neposredno imenovani v ameriško vojsko. Vsi so pripadali skupini 293 častnikov redne ameriške vojske, v kateri so leta 1861 dali odpoved in se pridružili Konfederaciji.

Večina generalov se je takoj po vojni vrnila v svoje matične države. Nekateri so emigrirali v Mehiko, Kanado, Veliko Britanijo ali na Kubo. Vsi, razen nekaj izjem, so se vrnili v ZDA. Na splošno so nepoklicni vojaki nadaljevali v svojih poklicih, ki so jih opravljali pred vojno. Nekdanji častniki ameriške vojske so poskušali začeti nove kariere. Nove službe so našli v trgovini, izobraževanju, javnih službah, novinarstvu, inženirstvu in drugih področjih civilnega življenja. Nekateri diplomanti West Pointa so postali vodilni inženirji v velikih projektih na železnici, v gradbeništву in naftni industriji.

Precej velika skupina nekdanjih generalov Konfederacije, tako poklicnih kot nepoklicnih vojakov, je našla priložnost, da prispeva k obnovi in razvoju matičnih držav v politiki ali vladi ZDA. Prevzeli so dejavnejšo vlogo kot njihov poveljnik, general Lee. Zapisi kažejo, da so bili tedaj južnjaški generali na več kot sto položajih na državni ali zvezni zakonodajni ravni ali v javnih službah. Med njimi je bilo 33 članov kongresa, 17 guvernerjev in 51 tistih, ki so opravljali službo v vladi ZDA (diplomati, javni tožilci, sodniki itn.). Ugotovimo lahko, da 14. dopolnilo k ustavi dejansko ni izpolnilo


*U.S. he tried to promote the emigration of his peers to New Zealand. General Robert Augustus Tombs from Georgia never applied for a pardon as a mean of regaining the citizenship what excluded him from public service. General Henry Alexander Wise from Virginia also never sought amnesty or restoration of his civil rights. The majority of the Southern generals, however, followed Lee's example.*

*Two hundred ninety nine generals of the Confederate army found themselves in a new situation after the war. Most of them were pre-war lawyers, businessman, planters, or those, who had selected a military career as a life-time profession. The majority of later were the West Point graduates; some had no military education and were commissioned directly to the U.S. army. They all belonged to the group of 239 officers of the regular U.S. army who resigned in 1861 and joined the Confederacy.*

*Immediately after the war the majority of generals returned to their home states. Some emigrated to Mexico, Cuba, Canada or England. They all, with few exceptions, returned to the U.S. Generally, non-professional soldiers resumed their pre-war professions, while the former U.S. officers tried to establish new careers. They found new jobs in journalism, engineering, commerce, education, public service and other areas of civil enterprise. Some West Point graduates became leading engineers of major railway, oil, or construction projects.*

*A significant group of ex-Confederate generals, both professional and non-professional soldiers, found an opportunity to contribute to the restoration and development of their home states in politics and the U.S. government. They assumed more active roles than their commander, General Lee. The records show that Southern generals could be found in more than a hundred positions of the state and federal legislatures or in the public service. Among them, 33 members of the Congress, 17 governors, and 51 performing duties in the U.S. government (diplomats, attorneys, judges etc.).*

*It can be recognized, that the 14<sup>th</sup> amendment actually didn't fulfill the purpose expected by the Northern politicians. It did not prevent ex-Confederates from assuming high positions in public service. Even the former U.S. Army officers who resigned in 1861 and were directly targeted by the amendment, performed many duties in the U.S government and other public services. Among them were 4 members of the Congress, 4 governors and 15 others in high positions in the U.S. government. After 1880 the swing of political opinion back to ex-Confederate leaders became evident. The period of the presidency of Grover Cleveland, from*



Veterans of the 35<sup>th</sup> and 36<sup>th</sup> Massachusetts Infantry stand one last time with their battle flags before returning to their hometowns

*Veterani 35. in 36. pehotnega polka iz Massachusettsa stojijo še zadnjič skupaj s svojimi bojnimi zastavami pred vrnitvijo v domače kraje.*

pričakovanj severnjakov. Nekdanjim pripadnikom Konfederacije ni onemogočilo zavzeti visokih položajev v javnih službah. Celo nekdanji častniki ameriške vojske, ki so leta 1861 dali odpoved in se je dopolnilo neposredno nanašalo nanje, so opravljali veliko dolžnosti v vladi ZDA ali drugih javnih službah. Med njimi so bili štirje člani kongresa. Po letu 1880 je dejansko nastal obrat političnega mnenja glede nekdanjih vodij Konfederacije. Obdobje 1885–1889, v katerem je bil predsednik Grover Cleveland, je bilo zelo uspešno za južnjaške generale. Cleveland je številne od njih imenoval na različne diplomatske položaje v tujini in vodilne položaje v vladi.

1885 to 1889, was very fruitful for the Southern generals. Cleveland appointed many of them to different diplomatic positions abroad and leading positions in the government.

There was a group of generals that did not try to find jobs in a civilian sphere. They were professional soldiers and wanted to remain such. The doors to the U.S. military establishment were generally closed not only because of the 14<sup>th</sup> amendment, but also because of the reduction of the Federal military. Those who didn't satisfy their ambitions commanding veteran organizations or at least commanding police units, decided to continue their military careers abroad. They accepted positions in the Egyptian army, joined the Imperial forces in Mexico, fought with the

Skupina generalov pa ni iskala službe v civilnem življenju. Bili so poklicni vojaki in so to hoteli tudi ostati. Vrata v strukturo ameriške vojske so bila po večini zaprta, in to ne samo zaradi 14. dopolnila, ampak tudi zaradi zmanjševanja zvezne vojske. Tisti, ki niso mogli zadovoljiti svojih ambicij s poveljevanjem veteranskim organizacijam ali pa vsaj enotam policije, so se odločili nadaljevati vojaško kariero v tujini. Sprejeli so položaje v egiptovski vojski, se pridružili imperialnim silam v Mehiki, se bojevali z revolucionarji na Kubi ali celo poveljevali francoskim enotam v francosko-pruski vojni.

Za nekatere je bila priložnost, da spet oblečejo modro uniformo, špansko-ameriška vojna, v kateri so vodili ameriške prostovoljce. Generali Joseph Wheeler iz Georgije, Fitzhugh Lee iz Virginije in Matthew Calbraith Butter iz Južne Karoline so bili vnovič imenovani v vojsko ZDA. Nekateri so opravljali različne dolžnosti v izobraževalnih ustanovah vojske ZDA. General George Doherty Johnson iz Alabame je bil npr. načelnik vojaške akademije Južne Karoline, general Edmund Kirby Smith iz Floride pa je bil predsednik Zahodne vojaške akademije v Tennesseeju. Čeprav so bile redke, izjeme dokazujejo, da so izkušnje in znanje južnjaških generalov še vedno cenili.

## Povzetek

Konec državljanske vojne je na splošno pomenil konec vojaške kariere južnjaških generalov. V vojaški strukturi zvezne vojske ni bilo prostora zanje. Tega ni povzročila le nasprotujoča si in v začetku maščevalna vladna politika, ki jim je preprečevala prevzemanje vodilnih položajev, ampak je bil vzrok tudi zmanjševanje redne vojske ZDA, ki dejansko ni potrebovala kadrovskih okrepitev. Tisti, ki se niso želeli prilagoditi na nove razmere in sprejeti katero koli službo, ki ni bila vojaška, so našli delodajalce v tujini. Najsrečnejši so lahko spet oblekli modro uniformo in so bili vnovič imenovani na položaje v vojski ZDA. Teh je bilo zelo malo in njihovi položaji niso bili nikoli enaki tistim, ki so jih dosegli pred tem. Večina se je obrnila v novo smer in so iskali možnosti osebnega zadovoljstva in preživetja. Med njimi so bili tisti, ki so sprejeli politiko kot novo delovno okolje, kjer so lahko prispevali k obnovi in razvoju matičnih držav in federacije.

*revolutionaries in Cuba, or even commanded French troops in the Franco-Prussian war.*

*The Spanish-American war was an opportunity for some generals to don again the blue uniforms and lead U.S. volunteers. Generals Joseph Wheeler from Georgia, Fitzhugh Lee from Virginia, and Matthew Calbraith Butter from South Carolina were among those who became commissioned again to the U.S. army. Some generals could be found in different positions in the U.S. military educational institutions. General George Doherty Johnson from Alabama, for example, was superintendent of the South Carolina Military Academy, and General Edmund Kirby Smith from Florida, presided over the Western Military Academy in Tennessee. Though rare examples, they prove that when needed the experience and knowledge of the Southern general was still appreciated.*

## Summary

*The end of the Civil War was generally the end of military careers of the Southern generals. There was no place for them in the Federal military establishment. Not only did government policy, though adverse and avenging at the beginning, prevent them from assume leadership positions, but reduced U.S. regular forces actually did not require additional personnel augmentations. Those who did not want to adapt to the new situation and accept any other job than the military found new employers outside the U.S. The luckiest were able to don the blue uniform and were commissioned to the U.S. army again, however, there were few of them and their positions would have never been the same as were before. The majority turned to new directions seeking possibilities for personal satisfaction and economic survival. Among them were those who found politics a new working environment where they could contribute to the reconstruction and development of their home states and the federation. Although the initial political attitudes of the winners in order to protect the victory placed many obstacles on their ways, a gradual shift of the policy through the following years allowed Southern generals more and more opportunity to play an active role in public service. Their efforts, experience, knowledge, and love of homeland were needed and appreciated; the Southern military leaders were not disqualified from public life. By the end of the first decade after the war, it became apparent that wisdom and pragmatism prevailed. America was again following Lincoln's ideal: forgiveness, conciliation, and good will.*

...



Čeprav so politična stališča zmagovalcev, da bi zavarovali zmago, pred njih postavila številne ovire, je postopen obrat v politiki v poznejših letih omogočil južnjaškim generalom vse več priložnosti za dejavno vlogo v javnih službah. Njihova prizadevanja, izkušnje, znanje in domoljubje so potrebovali in cenili. Južnjaških voditeljev niso odstranili iz javnega življenja. Na koncu prvega desetletja po vojni je postalo očitno, da sta prevladala modrost in pragmatizem. Amerika je spet sledila Lincolnovim idealom: oproščanju, pomirjanju in dobri volji.

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# Strategija in taktika nemškega okupatorja na Spodnjem Štajerskem

## Strategy and Tactics of the German Occupying Forces in Lower Styria

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### Izvleček

Avtor na podlagi literature ter arhivskih virov v Arhivu Republike Slovenije in Posavskem muzeju Brežice obravnava strategijo in taktiko nemškega okupatorja na Spodnjem Štajerskem v času 2. svetovne vojne. V obravnavo je vključil izsledke terenskega dela, spominsko gradivo in časopise. Fotografije so iz Posavskega muzeja Brežice, Muzeja novejšje zgodovine Slovenije, Muzeja narodne osvoboditve Maribor in Pokrajinskega muzeja Slovenj Gradec.

Nemška policija na Slovenskem v letih 1941–1945 je bila, razen kratkega obdobja treh jesenskih mesecev 1943, v zahodni Sloveniji, glavna vodilna nemška oborožena sila pri zatiranju slovenskega naroda kot celote in partizanskega osvobodilnega gibanja kot njegovega bojujočega se dela. Akcije ali operacije proti partizanskim enotam so po nalogu gestapa vodili enote zaščitne policije, orožništvo in vermanšaft Štajerske domovinske zveze. Za večje operacije so uporabili tudi vojsko. Vsi ukrepi in drugi napor nemškega okupatorja so bili zaman, kajti vse do konca vojne niso našli učinkovitega protiukrepa zoper partizanski način bojevanja.

Ključne besede: Druga svetovna vojna, Slovenija, Štajerska, nemška strategija in taktika, okupacija, nemška policija, protipartizanski boj, operativni štab za uničevanje band, zaščitna področja, folksšturm, vermanšaft

### Abstract

*The article deals with the strategy and tactics of the German occupying forces in Lower Styria during the Second World War on the basis of literature and archive sources in the Archives of the Republic of Slovenia and the Posavski muzej Brežice (Posavje Museum Brežice). The paper also includes the results of the field research and information contained in memoirs and newspapers. The photographs are from the collections of the Posavski muzej Brežice (the Posavje Museum Brežice), the National Museum of Contemporary History, Museum of National Liberation Maribor, and Carinthian Regional Museum Slovenj Gradec.*

*With the exception of a short three-month period in the western Slovenia in the fall of 1943, the German police was the main German armed force to oppress the Slovenian people as a whole and the partisan liberation movement as the actively resisting part of the population. Activities or operations against the partisan units were conducted by the protection police units, gendarmerie and the Wehrmannschaft of the Styrian Homeland League on Gestapo orders. For operations of greater importance, the army was used, as well. All of the German occupying authorities' measures and efforts were unsuccessful as throughout the war they discovered no effective means to counter the partisan way of fighting.*

*Keywords: Second World War, Slovenia, Styria, German strategy and tactics, occupation, German police, fight against the partisans, Operation Headquarters for the destruction of bandit formations, protectorates, Volkssturm, Wehrmannschaft*



## Okupacija

Po napadu Nemčije in Italije na Jugoslavijo, 6. aprila 1941, je bila Slovenija operacijsko območje dveh sovražnih armad. S severa in severovzhoda je vanjo prodirala 2. nemška armada, z zahoda pa 2. italijanska armada. Strateško pobudo je imelo nemško vrhovno poveljstvo, ki je predvidevalo globlji prodor v notranjost Slovenije šele po prodoru svojih enot do Zagreba, da bi odrezalo enote 7. jugoslovanske armade (Triglavska in Dravska divizija, obmejne in posadkovne enote, Triglavski planinski odred) v Sloveniji. Omenjena 2. nemška armada (49., 51., in 52. korpus) je zato prve dni vojne prodirala počasi in se bojevala predvsem na obmejnem območju. Prvi dan vojne je zavzela Prekmurje, 8. aprila pa območje do Drave z mesti Maribor, Ptuj, Ormož in Ljutomer. Šele po prodoru nemške vojske z Madžarske v Zagreb in razglasitvi NDH je nemška vojska 11. aprila prodrla v notranjost Slovenije, iz katere so se vojaki Triglavске in Dravske divizije ter Triglavskega planinskega odreda umaknili, se vdali ali razšli.<sup>1</sup> Aprilska vojna je v Sloveniji trajala le šest dni.<sup>2</sup>

V Posavje in Obsotelje so na veliki petek, 11. aprila, prihiteli prednji in bočni oddelki dveh

## Occupation of Lower Styria

After the German and Italian attack on Yugoslavia on 6 April, 1941 Slovenia became an area of operational activity for two enemy armies. The German 2nd Army launched its attack from the north and the northeast while the Italian 2nd Army invaded from the west. The German High Command held the strategic initiative and anticipated that the German units would continue their march deeper into Slovenia only after their breakthrough to Zagreb, thereby cutting off the units of the Yugoslav 7th Army (the Triglav and Drava Divisions, border and garrison units, the Triglav Mountain Detachment) in Slovenia. Therefore, the German 2nd Army (49th, 51st and 52nd Corps) advanced slowly in the first days of the war and the battles took place mostly in the border area. The Prekmurje province was conquered on the first day of the war and the area towards the Drava river with the towns of Maribor, Ptuj, Ormož and Ljutomer followed on 8 April. It was not until the German army moved in from Hungary, conquering Zagreb, and until the Independent State of Croatia was proclaimed that the German army surged into Slovenia's interior on 11 April. The soldiers of the Triglav and Drava Divisions and of the Triglav Mountain Detachment withdrew, surrendered or dispersed.<sup>1</sup> The April War in Slovenia lasted only six days.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Tone Ferenc: Okupacijski sistemi na Slovenskem 1941–1945. Modrijan, Ljubljana 1997, str. 5 (naprej: Ferenc, Okupacijski sistemi na Slovenskem); Zdravko Klanjšček: Pregled narodnoosvobodilne vojne 1941–1945 na Slovenskem. Partizanska knjiga, Ljubljana 1989, str. 29 (naprej: Klanjšček, Pregled NOV)

<sup>2</sup> Mobilizacijsko mesto rezervnega pehotnega poročnika Vojske Kraljevine Jugoslavije Lada Ambrožiča je bilo v Sevnici. Spomine na razsutje jugoslovanske vojske aprila 1941 na območju Sevnice je opisal v knjigi: Lado Ambrožič – Novljan: Pol stoletja pozneje. Društvo piscev zgodovine NOB Slovenije, Ljubljana 1992, str. 5–12. Ivan Kržan je opisal dogodke iz brežiškega konca: »Bilo je v meščanski šoli dr. Razlaga v Brežicah v zadnjih dneh marca 1941. Bili smo v risalnici pri učni uri geometrije in risanja. V razred je stopil ravnatelj šole gospod Mikolič. Zaskrbljeno se je nekaj pogovoril s profesorico Ivančevno, nato pa se je obrnil k nam dijakom z besedami: »Dragi dijaki, do nadaljnjega prekinjamo pouk, prostore naše šole bo zasedla vojaščina, pospravite vaše stvari in pojdite domov!« Telovadnica je že tako nekaj časa služila vojaščini kot skladišče razne vojaške opreme. [...] Bližali so se velikonočni prazniki, bilo je lepo, toplo in sončno pomladansko vreme. Širile so se različne govorice, točnih obvestil je bil deležen le redko kdo, saj ni bilo radijskih sprejemnikov, pravzaprav so jih imeli le redki. Tik pred prazniki smo pa že na lastni koži doživeli kruto resnico, da se je dejansko tudi za nas pričela vojna. Skupina letal je nekajkrat zaokrožila nad mestom in okolico. Mislim sem, da so naša, a ko so se pričela strmoglavo spuščati in ko so padle prve bombe, sem spoznal, da so sovražna. Z letališča na Krškem polju so se pričeli dvigati stebri dima, kar je bil znak, da so zadeli naša letala na tleh. Vseposvoda se je pričelo pojavljati vedno več vojaštva, zaznati je bilo vedno več nervoze tako med civilnim prebivalstvom kot med vojaki. Zvedeli smo, da so Nemci že prekoračili našo mejo in da se z veliko naglico približujejo našim krajem. Ni bilo treba dolgo čakati in že so se valile dolge kolone raznih rodov nemške vojske skozi Brežice. K nam so prispeli iz mariborske smeri preko Bizelskega, v Brežicah so se pa ločili, ena kolona je šla proti Zagrebu, druga pa proti Novemu mestu. Nič ni pomagalo topništvo naše vojske na vzpetinah nad Svetimi gorami, padla ni niti ena granata. V trenutku je bilo vse v razsulu, jugoslovanska vojska se je dobesedno razbežala. Vseposvoda so bili na begu domačini – rezervisti, ki jih Nemci sploh niso odpeljali v ujetništvo, če so bili Slovenci ali Hrvati. Drugače je bilo seveda s Srbi in ostalimi južniki in brežiška osnovna šola je bila hitro polna teh ujetnikov.« (Ivan Kržan: Od velike noči 1941 do božiča 1945. Nemška mobilizacija Slovencev v 2. svetovni vojni. 4. zbornik. Zveza društev mobiliziranih Slovencev v nemško vojsko in Muzej narodne osvoboditve Maribor, Maribor 1998, str. 162)

<sup>1</sup> Himmler, having ordered as much as a year earlier that the Slovenian partisans in the German-occupied area were to be crushed, was dissatisfied with Rösener's results. On 21 June 1943, he wrote to him: »I am displeased with your activities and the activities of your troops. The enemy has actually suffered smaller losses than we. Be on the move night and day. Even weak forces can have some success if the initiative remains on our side.« A month later, he wrote again and added a diagram comparing police troops in Germany, Ukraine, and in Rösener's area of command. »You will find that, when taking into account the number of the population, you have the largest possible number of police force that we are prepared to employ anywhere in the German area of interest. Consequently, I expect you to get rid of the bands in your area thoroughly and without delay.« Tone Ferenc: Okupacijski sistemi na Slovenskem 1941–1945. Modrijan, Ljubljana 1997, p. 5 (hereinafter Ferenc, Okupacijski sistemi na Slovenskem); Zdravko Klanjšček: Pregled narodnoosvobodilne vojne 1941–1945 na Slovenskem. Partizanska knjiga, Ljubljana 1989, p. 29 (hereinafter Klanjšček, Pregled NOV).

<sup>2</sup> As a reserve infantry lieutenant in the army of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Lado Ambrožič had to report to the military assembly point in Sevnica. He described the disintegration of the Yugoslav army in April 1941 in Sevnica area in: Lado Ambrožič – Novljan: Pol stoletja pozneje. Društvo piscev zgodovine NOB Slovenije, Ljubljana 1992, pp. 5–12. Ivan Kržan gave an account of the events in Brežice. »It was in the dr. Razlag school in Brežice in the last days of March 1941. We were in our drawing classroom and in the middle of a geometry and drawing lesson. The school principal Mr. Mikolič entered the classroom. He had an anxious conversation with Mrs. Ivančeva and then he turned to the students and said: »Dear students, classes are suspended until further notice, the school building is needed by the army, take your things and go home!« The gym had already been used by the military as a military equipment warehouse for some time. [...] The Easter holidays were approaching and we had a nice, warm and sunny spring weather. Although rumors abounded, only a few people had access to accurate information as radio sets were few and far between. But just before the holidays, we were able to experience the cruel truth ourselves – the war had really started for us. A group of airplanes circled the town and the surrounding area several times. I thought they were ours, but after they began diving and the first bombs fell, I realized they were enemy airplanes. Columns of smoke appeared in the airfield in the Krško polje showing that our grounded airplanes were hit. There were more and more soldiers around. Their and the civilian population's nervousness escalated. We learned that the Germans had already crossed the border and were rapidly approaching in our direction. We didn't have long to wait before various military services began to roll through Brežice in long army columns. They arrived from the

nemških divizij. Od Celja proti Zidanemu Mostu in Sevnici ter čez Mirensko dolino in Novo mesto proti Beli krajini je tisti dan hitela glavina 1. gorske divizije (poveljnik Generalleutnant Hubert Lanz) iz 49. planinskega korpusa, njeni bočni oddelki pa so od Sevnice prodirali ob Savi na vzhod, v Krško in Brežice. Od Slovenske Bistrice je čez Podčetrtek hitela proti Zagrebu 132. pehotna divizija (poveljnik Generalmajor Sintzenich) iz 51. pehotnega korpusa, njeni bočni oddelki pa so tisti dan pri Brežicah prišli tudi do Save. Ob reki navzgor so jim prišli naproti oddelki 14. tankovske divizije, ki so se 10. aprila prvi pripeljali v Zagreb in nato odšli proti Karlovcu. Tako so nemške enote od 11. do 14. aprila 1941 zasedle vse večje kraje v Posavju oz. na Kozjanskem.<sup>3</sup> Še pred tem je prvi dan vojne nemško letalstvo bombardiralo jugoslovansko vojaško letališče v Cerkljah.<sup>4</sup>

Z ozemljem, ki ga je zasedla nemška vojska, je upravljal vrhovni poveljnik suhozemne

*On Good Friday on 11 April, the front and flank units of two German divisions swept into the area of Posavje and Obsotelje (the regions around the Sava and Sotla rivers). On the same day, the majority of the 1st Mountain Division (commanded by Generalleutnant Hubert Lanz), part of the 48th Mountain Corps, advanced from Celje towards Zidani Most and Sevnica and then further through the Mirna Valley and Novo mesto to White Carniola. Meanwhile, its flank left Sevnica, followed the Sava river to the east and then continued in the direction of Krško and Brežice. 132nd Infantry Division of the 51st Infantry Corps (commanded by Generalmajor Sintzenich) moved from Slovenska Bistrica, passing Podčetrtek on its way to Zagreb. Its flank reached Sava at Brežice on the same day. There it was met by the units of the 14th Tank Division making their way up the Sava river. The latter troops had been the first to reach Zagreb on 10 April and had been part of the surge towards Karlovac. In this way the German units were able to occupy all the major towns in Posavje and Kozjansko between 11 and 14 April.<sup>3</sup> The Yugoslav*

<sup>3</sup> Tone Ferenc: Tragedija Slovencev na izselitvenem območju ob Savi in Sotli. Zbornik Krško skozi čas, Krško 1977, str. 379 in 380 (naprej: Ferenc, Tragedija Slovencev); Tone Ferenc: Nemška okupacija. Zbornik Med Bočem in Bohorjem, Šentjur pri Celju—Šmarje pri Jelšah 1984, str. 247 in 248 (naprej: Ferenc, Nemška okupacija). Nemško okupacijo Brežic aprila 1941 je opisal Ivo Graul: »Seveda pri nemškem vojaškem zavzetju Brežic ni šlo za kako obredno pobožnost. V mestu in okolici ni bilo jugoslovanskih častnikov in vojakov. Je pa nemško vojaško poveljstvo od takratne brežiške posvetne oblasti zahtevalo brezpogojno vojaško predajo. Ta križev pot na nacistično Golgoto je seveda lahko opravila samo vojaška oseba. V tej zvezi je bila na udaru spet naša družina. Pri Nemcih ni človek nikoli vedel, kaj nameravajo. Na ta vojaški obred so čakale nemške motorizirane in druge vojaške enote v predmestju z bizeljske strani. V naglici je morala brežiška posvetna oblast v zadnjih trenutkih svojega obstoja poiskati dva osebna avtomobila, dva voznika in častnike. Voznika sta bila Franc Žokalj iz Krške vasi in moj oče. Avtomobil, ki ga je vozil moj oče, je bil last veletrgovca Schmidta. V jugoslovanski častniški uniformi sta se oblekla rezervista zdravnik dr. Vinko Hudelist in lekarnar mag. Mihelič. Imela sta tudi sablji. Vse to se je dogajalo v neposredni bližini našega stanovanja. Čez cesto pred občino. Še zdaj vidim dr. Vinka Hudelista. Imel je dolgo, že sivo brado, ki mu je segala čez vojaški opasač. Kako je bilo pri obredu vojaške predaje mesta, ki se je poslej imenovalo Rann an der Save, je po vrnitvi povedal oče. Najprej so obema častnikoma, ne preveč nežno, odstranili znake čina na ramenskem delu uniforme in odvezli sablji ter ju prelomili na dvoje. Vse je postalo farsa. V ozadju te pa so bili nedvomno brežiški kulturbundovci in nemčurji. Preden so po uradni kapitulaciji Nemci prihrumeli v mesto, je bila v njem mučna tišina. Na glavni cesti skozi mesto ni bilo nikogar. Samo Lojze Lipužič, mož mamine tete Pavle, in jaz. Ko sva se za hip ustavila pred faro cerkvi, je odbila cerkvena ura v stolpu s tremi udarci ob zvon petnajsto uro. Takrat je pripeljal izza vogala pri sodišču nemški motorist. Motor je imel prikloico in na njej pritrjeno strojnico. Lahko bi rekel, da so zavzeli moj rojstni kraj trije nemški nacistični do zob oboroženi vojaki s čeladami na glavi. [...] Počasi so se začeli na pločnikih zbirati meščani in opazovati moderno nemško vojsko. Brez vzklikov ali slavja. Še nemško misleči so se za zdaj potuhnili. Ker vojaškega mimohoda dolgo ni bilo konec, je nekdo ugotovil, da grejo zdaj isti nemški vojaki že tretjič skozi mesto. Pri gradu in mestnem parku so zavili levo in se po cesti pod obzidjem mesta spet vračali na glavno cesto. Tako so razkazovali svojo nemško nacistično moč.« (Ivo Graul: Spomini ne dajo miru. Samozaložba, Ljubljana 1998, str. 50 in 51)

<sup>4</sup> »Sestega aprila, navsezgodaj, je tišina pretrgalo brnenje nemških letal, ki so z bombardiranjem in strojničnim ognjem uničila in onesposobila vojaško letališče v Cerkljah ob Krki. V neposredni bližini Brežic. Brežičani so najprej pomislili, da gre za domače obrambne letalske vaje. V hiši sredi mesta, kjer smo stanovali, smo opazovali letalski napad v prvem nadstropju skozi straniščno okno. Večina je ugibala, kaj je zdaj to? Mama pa je takoj vzklila: »Vojna je!« Letala so letala tako nizko, da smo videli pilote. Kasneje smo videli tudi velike jate nemških letal, ki so letela nad pogorjem Orlice. Bila so na poti proti Beogradu in ga močno poškodovale.« (Ivo Graul: Spomini ne dajo miru. Samozaložba, Ljubljana 1998, str. 48)

*direction of Maribor via Bizeljsko and parted into two columns in Brežice: one left for Zagreb and the other for Novo mesto. Our army artillery on the slopes above Svete gore had no effect: not a single grenade was discharged. In the space of a moment, everything disintegrated and the soldiers of the Yugoslav army literally ran away. Everywhere, the locals were on the run – the reservists who the Germans didn't even capture as prisoners provided they were Slovenians or Croats. Serbs, of course, were a different story. The Brežice elementary school was soon filled with these prisoners.« (Ivan Kržan: Od velike noči 1941, do božiča 1945. Nemška mobilizacija Slovencev v 2. svetovni vojni. 4. zbornik. Zveza društev mobiliziranih Slovencev v nemško vojsko in Muzej narodne osvoboditve Maribor, Maribor 1998, p. 162).*

<sup>3</sup> Tone Ferenc: Tragedija Slovencev na izselitvenem območju ob Savi in Sotli. Zbornik Krško skozi čas, Krško 1977, pp. 379 and 380 (hereinafter: Ferenc, Tragedija Slovencev); Tone Ferenc: Nemška okupacija. Zbornik Med Bočem in Bohorjem, Šentjur pri Celju—Šmarje pri Jelšah 1984, pp. 247 and 248 (hereinafter: Ferenc, Nemška okupacija). The German occupation of Brežice in April 1941 was described by Ivo Graul. »There was certainly no ritual piety involved in the German conquest of Brežice. There were no Yugoslav officers or soldiers in the town or in its neighborhood. However, the German military command demanded unconditional military surrender from the Brežice civil authorities. This cross could of course only be born to the Nazi Golgotha by a military person. Once again, my family was involved. With the Germans, you never knew what they were up to. Their motorized and other units were waiting for this military ritual in the suburbs in the Bizeljsko direction. The Brežice civil authorities spent the last minutes of their existence hurriedly searching for two cars, two drivers and officers. Franc Žokalj from Krška vas and my father ended up as drivers. The car that was driven by my father belonged to the merchant Schmidt. Two reservists, the physician dr. Vinko Hudelist and the chemist Mihelič, M.A. put on Yugoslav officer uniforms. They even had sabres. It all took place in the immediate vicinity of our apartment. Across the street, in front of the municipality building. I can still see dr. Vinko Hudelist in front of me. He had a long greying beard reaching over the belt of his uniform. The ritual of the military surrender of the town (that was now to be known as Rann an der Save) was described by my father after his return. First, the marks of their rank were removed, none too gently, from the two officer's shoulders. Then their sabres were taken away and broken in half. It all turned into a farce and its strings were pulled, without any doubt, by the Brežice Kulturbund members and German sympathizers. An uneasy silence enveloped the town until the Germans roared in after the official capitulation. The town's main street was empty. There were only Lojze Lipužič, the husband of my mom's aunt Pavla and I. Just when we stopped in front of the parish church, three tolls from the bell-tower announced it was 3 p.m. Then, a German soldier on a motorcycle appeared from behind the corner of the court building. His motorcycle had a sidecar with a machine gun attached to it. It could be said my hometown was conquered by three helmeted and heavily armed Nazi German soldiers. [...] The townspeople slowly began to gather on the sidewalks and observe the modernly armed German army. There were no cheers, no celebration. Even the German sympathizers were lying low. The march through town lasted very long and then someone realized the German soldiers were passing through for the third time already. When they reached the castle and the park they turned left and took the road next to the city walls to return to the main street. This is how they showed their Nazi German strength« (Ivo Graul: Spomini ne dajo miru. Samozaložba, Ljubljana 1998, pp. 50 and 51).

vojske, Generalfeldmaršal Walther von Brauchitsch. Nemški okupator na ozemlju Slovenije ni pustil bojnih enot,<sup>5</sup> saj ni pričakoval odpora. Menili so, da bodo za opravljanje nalog zadostale zgolj policijske sile. Vojaška uprava je na nemškem zasedbenem delu Slovenije obstajala le nekaj dni in je skoraj ni bilo čutiti: lepila je razglase o ukrepih za vzdrževanje reda in miru, o obvezni oddaji orožja, streliva in druge vojaške opreme, plenila skladišča in drugo zapuščino nekdanje jugoslovanske vojske, rekvirirala stanovanja za vojaške oddelke itn. Na Spodnjem Štajerskem so 14. aprila 1941 uvedli začasno civilno upravo, za vodjo pa je bil imenovan pokrajinski vodja NSDAP in državni namestnik za Štajersko dr. Sigfried Uiberreither.<sup>6</sup> Ta je kot prihodnji šef civilne uprave za Spodnjo Štajersko že od konca marca 1941 vodil neposredne priprave za zasedbo in upravljanje Spodnje Štajerske.<sup>7</sup>

Poglavitni namen nemške države v 2. svetovni vojni je bil osvajalen. Za svoj narod

military airfield in Cerklje was bombed by the German air force as early as the first day of the war.<sup>4</sup>

The territory occupied by the Germans was administered by the Commander in Chief of the German Land Forces, Generalfeldmarschall Walther von Brauchitsch. Since no resistance was expected, the German occupying forces left no combat troops in Slovenia<sup>5</sup>. It was assumed that all duties could be carried out by the police forces alone. Military administration in the German-occupied Slovenian territory was over in a matter of days and its influence was barely felt while it existed. The administration's duties encompassed pasting up proclamations of measures for maintaining peace and order and of compulsory surrender of weapons, munitions, and other military equipment; looting warehouses and other possessions that were left behind by the former Yugoslav army; requisitioning billets for the troops etc. On 14 April 1941 a temporary civil administration for Lower Styria was established. It was headed by dr. Sigfried Uiberreither, the Gauleiter (NSDAP regional leader) and Reichsstatthalter (Reich governor) of Styria.<sup>6</sup> As the future head of civil administration

<sup>5</sup> Nemško vrhovno poveljstvo je na celotnem območju Jugoslavije pustilo le štiri pehotne divizije tretjega vpoklica. Te so bile sestavljene iz vojakov starejših letnikov, ki niti po fizični kondiciji niti po vojaški usposobljenosti niso bili sposobni za ofenzivne operacije. Poleg tega so bile te divizije precej slabše oborožene od drugih operativnih enot. Imele so manj topov in primanjkovalo jim je motorizacije, zato so bile slabše premične in počasne pri manevriranju. V nemški vojaški administraciji so bile takšne divizije prepoznavne po tem, ker se je njihova številka začela s 7. Maju 1941 so bile v Srbiji razmeščene 704., 714. in 717. divizija, v Bosni s sedežem v Sarajevu pa 718. divizija. Poleg njih je imel nemški okupator na voljo še nekaj samostojnih policijskih bataljonov. Osnovne naloge teh enot so bile varovanje nemških skladišč in opravljanje stražarske službe, zavarovanje prometa in železniških križišč. Nemške voje enote so bile nameščene v večja mesta in okrajna središča tako, da jih vasi niso videli niti občutile njihove navzočnosti. (Vladimir Velebit: Tajne i zamke II. svetskog rata. Prometej, Zagreb 2002, str. 120 in 121)

<sup>6</sup> Sigfried Uiberreither se je rodil leta 1908 v Salzburgu. Študiral je na pravni fakulteti v Gradcu in bil leta 1933 promoviran. Od 1930 je delal kot nameščenec pri bolniški blagajni in bil od 1933 član SA, kjer je dosegel najvišji čin. Ob anšlusu marca 1938 je bil v Gradcu policijski direktor, maja tistega leta je postal pokrajinski vodja NSDAP in 1940 še državni namestnik za Štajersko. Po nemški zasedbi Spodnje Štajerske ga je Hitler 14. aprila 1941 imenoval za šefa civilne uprave Spodnje Štajerske, Heinrich Himmler pa še za svojega pooblaščenca za utrjevanje nemštva v tej pokrajini. Odgovoren je bil le Hitlerju in kot vsemogočni nacistični veljak do konca vztrajal pri začetni zasedbeni politiki. Zlasti si je prizadeval čim hitreje in čim bolj popolno uresničiti Hitlerjev ukaz o ponemčenju Spodnje Štajerske in njeni vključitvi v nemški rajh. Po začetku upora v Spodnji Štajerski je izdajal ukrepe za njegovo zadušitev oz. omejitve; pri streljanju talcev si je obdržal pravico do pomilostitve, vendar jo je redko uporabil. Čeprav varnostni aparat ni bil v njegovi pristojnosti, si ga je praktično podredil. Iz prestižnih razlogov tudi ni dovolil Rösenerju, da bi se dejavnije vključeval v izvajanje politike na Spodnjem Štajerskem. Leta 1943 je Uiberreither postal obrambni komisar, pristojen za Štajersko, od jeseni 1944 pa je bil odgovoren za utrjevalna dela na vzhodni in južni meji Štajerske. Po vojni so ga zavezniške oblasti zaprle v Wolfsbergu, od koder je pred izročitvijo jugoslovanskim oblastem pobegnil v Južno Ameriko. Pred smrtjo se je vrnil v Avstrijo. (Tone Ferenc: Sigfried Uiberreither. Enciklopedija Slovenije 14, str. 19)

<sup>7</sup> Tomaž Teropšič: Kozjanski odred, 1. knjiga. Založba Obzorja Maribor, Maribor 1993, str. 15 in 16 (naprej: Teropšič, Kozjanski odred 1)

<sup>4</sup> »On 6 April, at the crack of dawn, the silence was shattered by the hum of the German planes. Their bombs and machine-gun fire destroyed and disabled the military airfield in Cerklje ob Krki. Right next to Brežice. At first, the townspeople thought it was a defense air exercise of the Yugoslav army. We lived in a house in the middle of town and we were able to watch the air attack from the window of the toilet on the first floor. Most of us were speculating about what was happening. However, my mom immediately exclaimed: «It's the war!» The planes were so low we were able to see the pilots. Later on, we noticed swarms of planes over the Orlica mountains. They were on their way towards Belgrade and caused much damage there« (Ivo Graul: Spomini ne dajo miru. Samozaložba, Ljubljana 1998, p. 48).

<sup>5</sup> Only four infantry divisions that were third to be enlisted were left in the entire Yugoslav area by the German High Command. They consisted of older soldiers that were incapable for offensive operations because of their lack of both physical fitness and military training. Besides, these divisions were not armed nearly as well as other operative units. Their artillery was small and they were not very motorized which affected their mobility and maneuvering capacity. In the German military administration this type of division was recognizable by the number that always began with seven. In May 1941, 704th, 714th, and 717th divisions were stationed in Serbia and 718th division with headquarters in Sarajevo was stationed in Bosnia. Besides the aforementioned divisions, the German occupying forces had some independent police battalions. The troops were mostly charged with protecting German warehouses, guard duties, and with protecting traffic and railway crossroads. German military units were stationed in larger towns and county centers so that people in the villages did not even feel their presence (Vladimir Velebit: Tajne i zamke II. svetskog rata. Prometej, Zagreb 2002, pp. 120 and 121).

<sup>6</sup> Sigfried Uiberreither was born in 1908 in Salzburg. He studied at the Graz Faculty of Law and received a doctorate in 1933. From 1930, he worked in health insurance and became a member of the SA where he achieved the highest rank. At the time of the Anschluss in March 1938, he was a police inspector in Graz. In May of the same year, he became the Gauleiter (NSDAP regional leader) and in 1940, Reichsstatthalter (Reich Governor) of Styria. On 14 April 1941, after the German occupation of Lower Styria, Hitler appointed him as head of civil administration for Lower Styria while Heinrich Himmler selected him to be his representative for strengthening of germanism in that province. He was directly subordinate to Hitler and as a powerful and prominent Nazi member he adhered to the planned occupation policy till the very end. He made every effort to put Hitler's order on germanisation of Lower Styria and its inclusion into the Third Reich into effect as rapidly and as comprehensively as possible. He issued measures designed to smother the rebellion in Lower Styria or at least limit it. Although he had the prerogative to grant an amnesty to hostages that were condemned to die by shooting, he rarely used it. Even though he was not actually responsible for the security structure, in reality he brought it under his control. In order to enhance his prestige he did not allow Rösener to take a more active part in the implementation of policies in Lower Styria. In 1943, he became a defense commissioner for Styria and from the fall of 1944, he was responsible for fortifying the eastern in southern border of Styria. After the war, he was jailed in Wolfsberg by the Allied authorities but escaped to South America in order not to be handed to the



so nameravali pridobiti čim več ozemlja in naravnega bogastva. Nemškemu narodu so želeli predvsem izbojevati življenjski prostor v vzhodni Evropi. V skladu s tem je okupator želel uničiti slovenski narod kot etnično enoto, da bi narodnostne meje izenačil z državnimi. Slovenski narod je bil obsojen na hitro smrt, izginil naj bi z obličja Zemlje. Slovenci bi bili tako čez nekaj časa le še zgodovinski pojem.<sup>8</sup> To bi dosegli z izgonom velikega dela narodno zavednih Slovencev, priseljencev in ljudi, katerih imetje so potrebovali za krepitev nemštva. Izpraznjen prostor bi zapolnili z načrtno in množično naselitvijo Nemcev. Načrt so nameravali uresničiti s popolnim in bliskovitim predvidenim ponemčenjem tistih Slovencev, ki bi še ostali doma. Takšna je bila strategija nacističnih oblastnikov. Vse to so nameravali izvesti z nasiljem in pri tem uporabiti tudi najbolj krute oblike nasilja, s čimer so že opredelili svojo taktiko.<sup>9</sup>

Uresničevanje cilja nemške okupacije na Slovenskem je bila predvsem naloga civilne uprave. Njen šef za Spodnjo Štajersko je bil ves čas okupacije dr. Sigfried Uiberreither. Na svojem območju je imel večje pristojnosti, kot jih je imel kot državni namestnik na Štajerskem. Podrejen je bil neposredno Hitlerju in edini odredbodajalec za zasedeno pokrajino, saj so zakoni in odredbe osrednjih organov nemške državne uprave veljali na slovenskem Štajerskem le, če jih je šef civilne uprave izrecno uvedel s posebno odredbo ali razglasom v svojem uradnem listu. Na vodilna mesta v urad je namestil izključno naciste iz Gradca, ki so trdovratno vztrajali pri začrtani okupacijski politiki kljub njenim vidnim neuspehom.<sup>10</sup>

Varnostno policijo, varnostno službo in kriminalistično policijo na slovenskem Štajerskem je upravljal pooblaščenec šefa varnostne

*Uiberreither had been in charge of direct preparations for the occupation and administration of Lower Styria since the end of March 1941.<sup>7</sup>*

*During the Second World War, the main objective of the German state was to conquer new territories and to acquire as many lands and natural resources as possible. Above all, its aim was to obtain Lebensraum in eastern Europe for German people. Accordingly, the occupying forces wanted to destroy the Slovenian nation as an ethnic unit in order to align ethnic and state borders. The Slovenian people were to be set on a path to extinction and disappearance as a nation. In due course, Slovenians were to be known only in history.<sup>8</sup> The basic plan for the obliteration of the Slovenian people as an ethnic unit was to be accomplished by exiling a large number of nationally conscious Slovenians, immigrants and people whose wealth was needed for strengthening of germanism. The area thus emptied was to be re-settled with Germans. The plan would be concluded by the complete germanisation of the remaining Slovenians which was expected to take place shortly. The plan described was the essence of the Nazi authorities' strategy. It was to be implemented with violence in its cruelest form, thus shaping the authorities' tactics.<sup>9</sup>*

*The realization of the German objective in the occupied Slovenia was entrusted mainly to the civil administration for Lower Styria. It was headed throughout the occupation by dr. Sigfried Uiberreither who held more powers than during his tenure as the Reichsstatthalter of Styria. He was directly subordinate to Hitler and represented the sole regulation authority for the occupied province as the laws and decrees issued by the central German authorities came into force in Slovenian Styria only when he explicitly introduced them by a special decree or proclaimed them in his official journal. For senior officials in his office he selected exclusively Nazi Party members from Graz. This was the reason why the planned occupation policy was so obstinately adhered to in spite of its obvious lack of success.<sup>10</sup>*

<sup>8</sup> Ferenc, *Okupacijski sistemi na Slovenskem*, str. 13

<sup>9</sup> Tone Ferenc in Milan Ževart: *Nekatere značilnosti in posebnosti fašistične okupacije ter narodnoosvobodilnega boja in revolucije na slovenskem Štajerskem*. Časopis za zgodovino in narodopisje št. 1-2/1979, str. 450 (naprej: Ferenc – Ževart, *Nekatere značilnosti*); Ferenc, *Okupacijski sistemi na Slovenskem*, str. 21

<sup>10</sup> Tone Ferenc: *Nacistična raznarodovalna politika v Sloveniji v letih 1941–1945*. Založba Obzorja Maribor, Maribor 1968, str. 144 (naprej: Ferenc, *Nacistična raznarodovalna politika*); Ferenc – Ževart, *Nekatere značilnosti*, str. 451. Na Gorenjskem je nemški okupator zaradi velikega pomena tamkajšnje oboživitvene industrije in prešibkega jedra tamkajšnjih Nemcev z opustitvijo pridobivanja ljudi za nemško vojsko, dovoljevanjem slovensčine v nekaterih osnovnih šolah in zlasti propagandnega vpliva protikomunističnega tabora iz Ljubljane uvedel nekoliko drugačno taktiko. Cilj je ostal enak, saj je šef civilne uprave dr. Friedrich Rainer julija 1942 napovedal, da bo imela Gorenjska po vojni le 120.000 prebivalcev, med njimi kar dve tretjini Nemcev (Tone Ferenc: *Priprave na konec vojne*. Slovenija v letu 1945. Zbornik referatov. Zveza zgodovinskih društev Slovenije, Ljubljana 1996, str. 8)

*Yugoslav authorities. Before his death, he returned to Austria (Tone Ferenc: Sigfried Uiberreither. Enciklopedija Slovenije 14, p. 19).*

<sup>7</sup> Tomaž Teropšič: *Kozjanski odred*, 1. knjiga. Založba Obzorja Maribor, Maribor 1993, pp. 15 - 16 (hereinafter: Teropšič, *Kozjanski odred* 1).

<sup>8</sup> Ferenc, *Okupacijski sistemi na Slovenskem*, p. 13.

<sup>9</sup> Tone Ferenc, Milan Ževart: *Nekatere značilnosti in posebnosti fašistične okupacije ter narodnoosvobodilnega boja in revolucije na slovenskem Štajerskem*. Časopis za zgodovino in narodopisje št. 1-2/1979, p. 450 (hereinafter: Ferenc – Ževart, *Nekatere značilnosti*); Ferenc, *Okupacijski sistemi na Slovenskem*, p. 21.

<sup>10</sup> Tone Ferenc: *Nacistična raznarodovalna politika v Sloveniji v letih 1941–1945*. Založba Obzorja Maribor, Maribor 1968, p. 144 (hereinafter: Ferenc, *Nacistična raznarodovalna politika*); Ferenc – Ževart, *Nekatere značilnosti*, p. 451. Due to the importance of its armament industry and the low number of Germans in the area, the German occupying authorities used a different tactic in Upper Carniola: foregoing the recruitment into the German army, allowing the Slovenian language to be used in some of the schools and permitting the propaganda influence of Ljubljana anti-communists. However, the aim obviously remained the same as testified by the prediction made in July 1942 by the head of the civil administration dr. Friedrich Rainer. Rainer expected that



Enote 1. gorske divizije na poti med Boštanjem in Sevnico od 10. do 14. aprila 1941. Fototeka Posavskega muzeja Brežice

*Units of the 1st Mountain Division on their way from Boštanj to Sevnica between 10 and 14 April 1941. Photo archive of the Posavski muzej Brežice.*

policije in varnostne službe v Mariboru, ki se je kmalu preimenoval v poveljnika varnostne policije in varnostne službe za Spodnjo Štajersko. Za svojega pooblaščenca je šef državnega glavnega varnostnega urada (RSHA) Reinhard Heydrich določil dotedanjega vodjo odseka varnostne službe v Gradcu Standartenführerja SS Otta Lurkerja, ki je bil tedaj najbolj seznanjen z razmerami v deželi, saj je imel v rokah obsežne elaborate in celo izdelane seznime ljudi, ki bi jih bilo treba po prihodu aretirati. Imel je tudi že organizirano vohunsko mrežo.<sup>11</sup>

V Nemčiji so bile posamezne veje varnostne policije in varnostne službe na terenu in v deželah povsem ločene med seboj in jih je le na območju vojnega okrožja usklajeval inšpektor varnostne policije in varnostne službe. V deželah so bili t. i. »uradi državne policije« (Staatspolizeistellen), »uradi kriminalistične policije« (Kriminalpolizeistellen) in »odseki varnostne službe« (Sicherheitsdienstabschnitte), ki so

*The security police, security service, and criminal investigation police in Slovenian Styria were led by the representative of the head of the security police and security service in Maribor. The title of the post soon changed to the security police and security service commander for Lower Styria. The representative, SS-Standartenführer Otto Lurker who had previously been the commanding officer of the security service section in Graz, was appointed by Reinhard Heydrich, the head of the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA). Heydrich's choice stemmed from the fact that Lurker was the person who was best acquainted with situation in Styria owing to having at his disposal comprehensive and detailed reports as well as lists of persons to be arrested after the arrival of Germans. In addition, Lurker had already organized a spy network.<sup>11</sup>*

*In Germany, the field and Länder offices of the respective branches of the security police and security service were completely separate and it was only in military districts that they were co-ordinated by the inspectors of the security police and security service. In the Länder,*

<sup>11</sup> Ferenc, Nacistična raznarodovalna politika, str. 148

*Upper Carniola would have only 120 000 inhabitants by the end of the war and that as many as two thirds of them would be German (Tone Ferenc: Priprave na konec vojne. Slovenija v letu 1945. Zbornik referatov. Zveza zgodovinskih društev Slovenije, Ljubljana 1996, p. 8).*

<sup>11</sup> Ferenc, Nacistična raznarodovalna politika, p. 148.

lahko imeli svoje enote. V nekaterih zasedenih deželah, tudi na slovenskem Štajerskem in Gorenjskem, so bili ti uradi združeni pod vodstvom poveljnikov varnostne policije in varnostne službe. Ti so potem ustanovili nekaj enot za vsako od omenjenih vej policije.<sup>12</sup>

Prve tri mesece sta bili varnostna policija in varnostna služba na slovenskem Štajerskem sicer združeni, vendar bolj decentralizirani kot pozneje. Urad poveljnika je bil sestavljen iz treh enot: urada tajne državne policije, urada kriminalistične policije in urada varnostne službe. Vsak je imel vodjo, ki je bil neposredno podrejen poveljniku. Tako je bil vodja urada tajne državne policije v Mariboru takratni vodja urada državne policije v Gradcu Sturmbannführer SS in vladni svetnik dr. Walter Machule (namestnik Sturmbannführer SS in vladni svetnik dr. Josef Witiska). Vodja urada kriminalistične policije v Mariboru je postal tedanji vodja urada kriminalistične policije v Gradcu Sturmbannführer SS in kriminalistični direktor dr. Fritz Glass. Urad varnostne službe v Mariboru je vodil Lurker sam (namestnik Hauptscharführer SS dr. Kurt Otto Mack). To so spremenili že julija 1941, ko so urad poveljnika varnostne policije in varnostne službe organizirali po zgledu glavnega državnega varnostnega urada v Berlinu v šest oddelkov ali referatov. IV. oddelek je bil oddelek za zatiranje nasprotnikov nacionalnega socializma in tretjega rajha. Nova reorganizacija je bila spet v začetku leta 1944 z namenom zmanjšati število oddelkov in uslužbencev.<sup>13</sup>

Naloga poveljnika varnostne policije in varnostne službe na slovenskem Štajerskem je bila z vsemi sredstvi odkrivati, zatirati in uničevati politične nasprotnike nacionalnega socializma in tretjega rajha, zatirati kriminal in nadzorovati vedenje prebivalstva, delo uradov itn. Njegove pristojnosti so bile glede na posebne, t. i. nacionalpolitične naloge šefa civilne uprave in zelo močno razvit narodnoosvobodilni boj še večje. Bil je namreč izvajalec načrtov o množičnih deportacijah slovenskega prebivalstva. Že poleti 1941 je postala njegova naloga sledenje in zatiranje pripadnikov narodnoosvobodilnega gibanja.<sup>14</sup>

there were the state police (Staatspolizeistellen) and criminal investigation police (Kriminalpolizeistellen) departments as well as security service sections (Sicherheitsdienstabschnitte), some with several posts. However, in some of the occupied lands, including the Slovenian Styria and Upper Carniola, these departments were combined under the command of security police and security service commanders who established a few posts for each type of police organization.<sup>12</sup>

For the first three months of the occupation, the security police and security service in Slovenian Styria were grouped under the same commander, however, they were more decentralized than in the later period. In fact, the commander's office consisted of three separate departments: the secret state police, criminal investigation police and security service. Each of these had its own leader who answered directly to the commander. The responsibility for the secret state police department in Maribor was given to the former head of the state police department in Graz, the SS-Sturmbannführer and government councilor (Regierungsrat) dr. Walter Machule (with the SS-Sturmbannführer and government councilor dr. Josef Witiska acting as his deputy). The criminal investigation police department in Maribor was entrusted to SS-Sturmbannführer Kriminaldirektor dr. Fritz Glass who had previously headed the criminal investigation police department in Graz. The security service department in Maribor was led by Lurker himself (with SS-Hauptscharführer dr. Kurt Otto Mack as deputy). This decentralised organizational system was abandoned in July 1941 and replaced by an arrangement whereby the security police and security service were divided into six departments or Ämter according to the model of the Reich Security Main Office in Berlin. Amt IV dealt with suppressing the opponents of National Socialism and the Third Reich. A further reorganization took place in early 1944 and was motivated by the wish to reduce the number of departments and employees.<sup>13</sup>

The task of the security police and security service commander for Lower Styria was to identify, suppress, and destroy the political opponents of National Socialism and the Third Reich by any means necessary, suppress criminal activities, and monitor the behavior of the population and the work of public offices etc. The scope of his tasks and competences was even greater when taking into account special (i.e. national political) duties of his office and the fact that the national

<sup>12</sup> Prav tam

<sup>13</sup> Ferenc, *Nacistična raznarodovalna politika*, str. 149 in 150; Rupert Butler: *Ilustrirana zgodovina gestapa*. Style maxima, Murska Sobota 1998, str. 213 (naprej: Butler, *Ilustrirana zgodovina gestapa*)

<sup>14</sup> Ferenc, *Nacistična raznarodovalna politika*, str. 150

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Ferenc, *Nacistična raznarodovalna politika*, pp. 149 and 150; Rupert Butler: *Ilustrirana zgodovina gestapa*. Style maxima, Murska Sobota 1998, p. 213 (hereinafter: Butler, *Ilustrirana zgodovina gestapa*).



Osnovni nalogi okupacijskega aparata na Spodnjem Štajerskem, varnostno-policijskega in obveščevalnega, sta bili varovanje nemške oblasti in germanizacija. Prevzele so jih službe RSHA.<sup>15</sup> Težišče operativnega in s tem obveščevalnega dela je bil gestapo. SD,<sup>16</sup> strankina obveščevalna služba, je pokrivala vsa področja vsakdanjega življenja. KRIPO<sup>17</sup> je skupaj z gestapom<sup>18</sup> sestavljal SIPO,<sup>19</sup> ki je sodeloval z drugima dvema vejama obveščevalne službe.

Naloge SD in gestapa so razvidne iz navodila za izvajanje nujnih ukrepov. Pred prihodom na Spodnjo Štajersko sta jih prejela SD in gestapo. Ukrepi so obsegali:

- 1) Zapiranje vseh slovenskih narodnih in kulturnih organizacij ter izrabljanje njihovega gradiva za obveščevalne namene, ugotavljanje in po potrebi zapiranje njihovih funkcionarjev; preiskave in zapiranje prostorov političnih strank oz. ugotavljanje njihovih vodstev; ugotavljanje judovskih in prostozidarskih krogov; ugotavljanje protinemško usmerjenih duhovnikov, da bi jih aretirali; zapiranje odvečnih cerkvenih organizacij in ustanov.
- 2) Ugotavljanje vseh učiteljev, ki niso prijateljsko razpoloženi do Nemčije, da bi jih aretirali; nadzorovanje izvajanja splošnega zapiranja šol; uvajanje zgodnejše ure prepovedi nočnega gibanja za šolsko mladino; prepoved mladini, da bi zapuščala matične občine.
- 3) Zasliševanja uslužbencev okrajnih načelstev in občin o njihovem odnosu do Nemčije; začetki odpuščanja uslužbencev in aretacije; opazovanje sabotiranja nemških uredb v sektorju splošne uprave in njihovo prijavljanje nadrejenim ustanovam; preprečevanje odtujevanja arhivov; to velja tudi za sodišča, sodne uslužbenke in sodni arhiv.
- 4) Za začetek zaprtje vseh kinodvoran; izvajanje predpisov o kaznovanju ljudi, ki poslušajo tuje radijske postaje; zaplemba

liberation war was in full swing. In particular, the commander was charged with the implementation of plans for mass deportation of Slovenians. As early as in the summer of 1941, his fundamental task became to keep surveillance over the members of the liberation movement and suppress them.<sup>14</sup>

The two basic duties of the entire occupation apparatus in Lower Styria were to protect the German authority and proceed with germanisation. The tasks from the field of police security and intelligence were performed by the RSHA services.<sup>15</sup> The operational (and accordingly intelligence) work was focused in the hands of Gestapo. The SD<sup>16</sup>, the Nazi intelligence service, was carrying out intelligence assignments encompassing all areas of daily life. The KRIPO<sup>17</sup> and the Gestapo<sup>18</sup> were part of the SIPO<sup>19</sup>. In addition to its own work, the last was responsible for co-operation with the other two branches of German intelligence services.

The assignments of the SD and the Gestapo are clearly stated in the instructions for urgent measures that were issued to both before German arrival in Lower Styria. These measures included:

- 1) Abolishing all Slovenian national and cultural organizations and using their materials for intelligence purposes, as well as identifying and, where necessary, arresting the organization functionaries; conducting searches on political parties' premises, closing down these premises, and identifying the parties' leaderships; identifying Jews and Freemasons; identifying priests of anti-German sentiment in order to arrest them; shutting down unnecessary church organizations and institutions.
- 2) Identifying all teachers of anti-German sentiment in order to arrest them; controlling the implementation of closing of all schools; setting an earlier curfew for school-age youths; banning the youths from leaving their municipality of residence.
- 3) Interrogating the staff of the county offices and municipalities on their view of Germany; dismissing the staff and arresting them; monitoring the occurrences of non-implementation of German decrees in the general administration sector and reporting

<sup>15</sup> Reichssicherheitshauptamt

<sup>16</sup> Sicherheitsdienst – Varnostna služba. »SD – Sicherheitsdienst Reichsführerja SS – je edina politična obveščevalna služba, »oko in uho« nacionalsocialistične države in nacionalsocialističnega gibanja. Čeprav varnostna služba ni državna oblast, opravlja za državo naloge, ki jih je določilo notranje ministrstvo rajha. Naloga SD je, da popolnoma obvlada celotno politično dogajanje, posebej tam, kjer sam ne nastopa javno. SD preučuje vsa področja vsakdanjega življenja, da bi o tem lahko obveščal državno in partijsko vodstvo.« Izvleček iz navodila za delo zaupnikov SD (Forte, Nič več strogo zaupno II, str. 128)

<sup>17</sup> Kriminalistična policija

<sup>18</sup> Geheime Staatspolizei – Tajna državna policija

<sup>19</sup> Sicherheitspolizei – Varnostna policija

<sup>14</sup> Ferenc, Nacistična raznarodovalna politika, p. 150.

<sup>15</sup> Reichssicherheitshauptamt.

<sup>16</sup> Sicherheitsdienst – the security service. »SD – Sicherheitsdienst of the Reichsführer SS – is the sole police intelligence service, »the eyes and ears« of the Nazi state and movement. Even though it is not a national authority its functions, determined by the Reich interior ministry, are carried out in the name of the state. SD is charged with controlling the entire political sphere even when keeping a low public profile. SD investigates all areas of day-to-day life in order to report to the state and party leadership.« Extract from the instructions for the SD confidants (Forte, Nič več strogo zaupno II, p. 128).

<sup>17</sup> Criminal investigation police.

<sup>18</sup> Geheime Staatspolizei – the secret state police.

<sup>19</sup> Sicherheitspolizei – the security police.

radijskih postaj Slovencem; preprečevanje tihotapljenja slovenskih časopisov; zapiranje knjižnic in knjigarn, nato pregledovanje njihovih knjig ter izločanje in shranjevanje neustreznih.

- 5) Ugotavljanje številčnosti in odstotkov kategorij po narodni pripadnosti v kategorijah: Slovenci, nemško nastrojeni vindišerji, folksdojčerji, preostali; ugotoviti, ali se poskušajo Slovenci zaradi svoje varnosti opredeliti za Nemce.<sup>20</sup>

Zaradi narodnoosvobodilnega boja se je zgodila sprememba v nalogah nemškega aparata, kajti NOB je opredelil značilnosti prihodnje dejavnosti SIPO in SD v Sloveniji. Boj z uporniki je postal najpomembnejša naloga SS in policijskega aparata.

Redarstvena policija (Ordnungspolizei), to sta tvorili predvsem zaščitna policija (Schutzpolizei) in orožništvo (Gendarmerie), je sodila pod poveljnika redarstvene policije (Befehlshaber der Ordnungspolizei) v XVIII. vojaškem okrožju v Salzburgu Obersta Helmuta Mascusa. Ta je že 10. aprila 1941 poslal na slovensko Štajersko in Gorenjsko dva policijska bataljona (5 čet in motorizirani oddelek), dva rezervna policijska bataljona (5 čet in motorizirani oddelek), samostojen policijski motorizirani oddelek, 643 orožnikov, 2390 mož SA in 255 mož nacionalsocialističnega motoriziranega korpusa (NSKK).<sup>21</sup> Policisti in orožniki so ostali, člani SA in NSKK pa so se že aprila in maja 1941 vrnili na Štajersko in Koroško. Naloga vseh enot je bila očistiti obe pokrajini ostankov jugoslovanske vojske (zato so v drugi polovici aprila izvedle veliko očiščevalno akcijo na Pohorju), zbrati njeno orožje in strelivo, zavarovati javne stavbe in prometne zveze ter pomagati političnim komisarjem.<sup>22</sup>

Orožništvo na Spodnjem Štajerskem je bilo podrejeno poveljniku orožništva pri šefu civilne uprave. To je bil Oberst Hugo Nowotny, tudi poveljnik orožništva za Štajersko. Vsak okraj je sredi aprila dobil okrajnega orožniškega vodjo in nekaj postaj. Ko so 1. julija oz. 1. avgusta ukinili okraje in ustanovili okrožja, so ta dobila okrožne orožniške vodje. Več okrožij so združili v glavarstva, velika okrožja pa razdelili na oddelke. Tako sta bili od poletja 1941

such occurrences to higher institutions; preventing the removal of archive materials; all of the above applying also to courts, court employees and court archives.

- 4) Starting by closing all cinemas; implementing regulations on sanctioning the persons listening to foreign radio stations; confiscating radio sets from Slovenians; preventing smuggling of Slovenian newspapers; closing down the libraries and bookshops and then reviewing the books in order to separate and store unsuitable ones.
- 5) Determining the numbers and percentages of people of different nationalities using the following categories: Slovenian, Windischer (German sympathizers), Volksdeutscher (German minority), other; establishing whether Slovenians are trying to protect themselves by declaring themselves German.<sup>20</sup>

The national liberation war brought about a change in the duties of the German apparatus and determined the nature of future SIPO and SD activities in Slovenia. The task of crushing the resistance became the new priority of the SS and the police.

The order police (Ordnungspolizei), i.e. mainly the protection police (Schutzpolizei) and gendarmerie, was placed under the command of Oberst Helmut Mascus, the commander of the order police (Befehlshaber der Ordnungspolizei) of XVIII military district, Salzburg. As early as on 10 April 1941 he despatched two police battalions (5 companies and a motorized unit), two reserve police battalions (5 companies and a motorized unit), an independent motorized police unit, 643 gendarmes, 2390 SA soldiers and 255 soldiers of the National Socialist Motor Corps (NSKK) to Slovenian Styria and Upper Carniola.<sup>21</sup> The police and the gendarmes stayed while the SA and NSKK members returned to Styria and Carinthia in April and May 1941. The mission of all of these troops was to clear the area of the remainder of the Yugoslav army (for this purpose, a military action took place in the Pohorje mountain range in the second half of April), collect its weapons and munitions, secure public buildings and traffic communications, and aid the political commissars in discharging their duties.<sup>22</sup>

The Lower Styrian gendarmerie was subordinate to the head of the civil administration's gendarmerie commander Oberst Hugo Nowotny (who was also the gendarmerie commander for Styria). In the middle of April, county gendarmerie commanders were appointed and a few gendarmerie stations were opened in each

<sup>20</sup> Nemačka obaveštajna služba III. Državni sekretariat za unutrašnje poslove FNRI, Beograd 1957, str. 167 in 168 (naprej: Nemačka obaveštajna služba III).

<sup>21</sup> NSKK – Nationalsozialistisches Kraftfahrerkorps

<sup>22</sup> Ferenc, Nacistična raznarodovalna politika, str. 150 in 151

<sup>20</sup> Nemačka obaveštajna služba III. Državni sekretariat za unutrašnje poslove FNRI, Beograd 1957, pp. 167 and 168 (hereinafter: Nemačka obaveštajna služba III).

<sup>21</sup> NSKK – Nationalsozialistisches Kraftfahrerkorps.

<sup>22</sup> Ferenc, Nacistična raznarodovalna politika, pp. 150 and 151.

na slovenskem Štajerskem dve orožniški glavarstvi (Maribor in Celje), šest okrožij in 104 postaje s 5 do 10 orožniki.<sup>23</sup>

Delovanje obeh vej nemške policije, redarstvene in varnostne, ter varnostne službe je v XVIII. vojaškem okrožju usklajeval višji vodja SS in policije Gruppenführer SS in Generalleutnant policije Alfred Rodenbucher, od 15. maja do decembra 1941 Brigadeführer SS in Generalmajor policije dr. August Scheel, nato pa do konca vojne Gruppenführer SS in Generalleutnant policije Erwin Rösener. Prva dva sta imela sedež v Salzburgu, Rösener pa na Bledu, po kapitulaciji Italije pa v Ljubljani.<sup>24</sup>

## Okraj Brežice

V okrožju Brežice je bil eden od najpomembnejših uradov orožniško okrožno vodstvo, ki mu je poveljeval orožniški Oberleutnant Josef Hödl-Schlehhofer (nasledila sta ga Hauptmann Friedrich Schick in Alfons Tschaschel) in je imelo v začetku 13 postaj, vsako za 2 do 4 občine. Postaja v Krškem, ki jo je ves čas okupacije vodil podčastnik Fritz Gruber, je bila pristojna za občine Krško, Videm in Leskovec. Pozneje je bil v Krškem tudi orožniški oddelek, ki ga je vodil Leutnant Vinzenz Gatti, takšna oddelka sta bila nekaj časa tudi v Kozjem in Brežicah. Pozneje so število in moč postaj spreminjali glede na moč in širino narodnoosvobodilnega boja. Kmalu za orožniki je v brežiški okraj prišla zaščitna policija, in to 72. rezervni policijski bataljon pod poveljstvom majorja Richarda Maiwalda. Bataljon, katerega poveljstvo in vsaj ena četa sta ostala v Krškem več kot leto dni, je imel najprej nalogo zavarovati mejo na Dolenjskem in pomagati pri izganjanju Slovencev. Pomagala sta še 93. in 171. policijski bataljon.<sup>25</sup>

Ko so konec marca in v začetku aprila 1941 v Gradcu določali organe nemške varnostne policije in varnostne službe za slovensko Štajersko, so določili tudi skupino, ki naj odide v Brežice in tam vzpostavi postajo obmejne policije (Grenzpolizei-posten). Večina ljudi je bila iz tedanjega komisariata obmejne policije v Lipnici na Zgornjem Štajerskem in temu podrejene postaje v Špilju, ki ju po prenosu štajerske meje na Dolenjsko niso več potrebovali na avstrij-

county. When administrative counties were transformed into administrative districts on 1 July and 1 August, the appellation was changed to »district gendarmerie commander«. Together, several districts formed a gendarmerie region (Gendarmeriehauptmannschaft). Larger districts were divided into gendarmerie departments (Gendarmerieabteilung). Thus, there were two gendarmerie regions (Gendarmeriemannschaft) (Maribor and Celje), six gendarmerie districts and 104 gendarmerie stations in Slovenian Styria as from the summer of 1941. Each gendarmerie station had 5 to 10 gendarmes.<sup>23</sup>

The two main branches of the German police, i.e. the protection police and the security police, as well as the security service of the XVIII military district were coordinated by the Higher SS and Police Leader Alfred Rodenbucher. From 15 May 1941 to December 1941 they were coordinated by SS- Brigadeführer and major general of the police dr. August Scheel and later by SS- Gruppenführer and lieutenant general of police Erwin Rösener who performed these duties until the end of the war.<sup>24</sup>

## Brežice County

One of the most important public departments of the Brežice district was the district gendarmerie command headed by the Gendarmerie-Oberleutnant Josef Hödl-Schlehhofer (who was later replaced by the Hauptmann Friedrich Schick and Hauptmann Alfons Tschaschel). In the beginning the command encompassed 13 gendarmerie stations whose area of competence extended over 2 to 4 municipalities. The gendarmerie station in Krško was led throughout the war by a non-commissioned officer Fritz Gruber and included the municipalities of Krško, Videm, and Leskovec. Later on, Krško had a gendarmerie department under the command of Leutnant Vinzenz Gatti. For a while, similar departments existed in Kozje and Brežice. In later period, the numbers of gendarmerie stations and the gendarmes were regularly adapted to take into account the spread of the liberation movement and the number of its members. The arrival of the gendarmes to the Brežice county was soon followed by the arrival of the protection police, namely the 72nd reserve police battalion under the command of Major Richard Maiwald. The battalion command and at least one company remained in Krško for over a year and the battalion's first assignment was to secure the Dolenjska border and to assist in deporting Slovenians. Two

<sup>23</sup> Ferenc, Nacistična raznarodovalna politika, str. 151

<sup>24</sup> Prav tam

<sup>25</sup> Ferenc, Tragedija Slovencev, str. 386, 387 in 416

<sup>23</sup> Ferenc, Nacistična raznarodovalna politika, p. 151.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.



skem ozemlju.<sup>26</sup> V Brežice so prišli 16. in 17. aprila 1941. Postaja obmejne policije pod vodstvom kriminalističnega sekretarja Adolfa Lutzja je nadzorovala osebni potniški promet na mejnem prehodu v Dobovi in nekaj časa tudi pri Veliki Dolini, vse drugo naj bi opravljala le mimogrede. Podrejena je bila komisariatu obmejne policije v Celju, vendar le do jeseni 1942, ko so se njene naloge toliko spremenile, da so jo preimenovali v enoto gestapa in podredili poveljniku varnostne policije in varnostne službe Spodnje Štajerske.<sup>27</sup>

Njena temeljna naloga je bila zatiranje narodnoosvobodilnega gibanja in je imela pri obmejni službi v Dobovi le svoj oddelek, dokler se leta 1943 tudi ta ni osamosvojil kot obmejna policijska postaja, podrejena neposredno poveljniku varnostne policije in varnostne službe v Mariboru. Postajo je vodil kriminalistični sekretar Buecher. Prva naloga enote gestapa v Brežicah, ki je tedaj še bila postaja obmejne policije, je bila aprila 1941 aretirati vse ljudi, predvidene za izgon, oz. tiste, ki jih je predvojna nemška obveščevalna služba registrirala kot sovražne do tretjega rajha. Aretirali so tudi tiste prebivalce, za katere bi politično negativno mnenje podali folksdojčerji. Na tej podlagi so iz vrst folksdojčerjev pridobivali prve agente. Zaradi ugotovljenih ponovljenih primerov samovoljnih in popolnoma neobjektivnih prijav so z nekaterimi prenehali sodelovati, veliko pa so uporabljali usluge Štajerske domovinske zveze, ki je imela precej razvejano organizacijo. S krepitvijo NOG v brežiškem okrožju je gestapo poleti 1942 za obveščevalno delo uporabljal gozdarje in gozdarske delavce. Del teh prisilno pridobljenih sodelavcev gestapa je zelo malo sodeloval s tajno policijo, med njimi pa so bili tudi taki, ki so redno dostavljali poročila. Največ agentov so pridobili iz vrst aretiranih, ki so morali opravljati obveščevalno delo proti NOG zaradi izsiljevanj oz. pod velikim pritiskom. Del agentov je deloval na ideološki podlagi, drugi zaradi gmotnih koristi. Nekateri so postali agenti tudi zaradi službenih položajev.<sup>28</sup>

Enota gestapa v Brežicah je dosegla največji uspeh februarja 1943, ko je vtihotapila svojo agentko v 2. četo Kozjanskega bataljona.

more battalions, the 93rd and the 171st police battalion, were used for the same purpose.<sup>25</sup>

The form of the German security police and security service institutions for Slovenian Styria had been already determined in Graz at the end of March and beginning of April 1941. At the same time a group charged with establishing a border police station (*Grenzpolizeiposten*) in Brežice had been appointed. Most employees were transferred from the border police commissariat in Leibnitz in Austrian Styria and from one of its police stations in Spielfeld, as both of these became redundant with the transfer of the border from Styria to Lower Carniola.<sup>26</sup> The new policemen arrived in Brežice on 16 and 17 April 1941. The border police station was headed by Kriminalsekretar Adolf Lutz and was mainly responsible for supervision of the cross-border movement of persons at the Dobova and, for a time, at the Velika Dolina border crossing points. Their other tasks were only of minor importance. At first, the border station operated under the command of the border police commissariat in Celje. However, by the fall of 1942 its priorities have changed and it was transformed into a Gestapo post under the command of the security police and security service commander for Lower Styria.<sup>27</sup>

The mission of the station was to suppress the national liberation movement while all its border duties in Dobova were discharged by only one department. In 1943, the station ceased to be responsible for border duties altogether as the department became an independent border police station. The police at the Dobova station were subordinate to the security police and security service commander in Maribor and were led by Kriminalsekretar Buecher. Before the border police station became a Gestapo post, its first task (in April 1941) was to arrest all persons foreseen for deportation and persons the German intelligence had registered as enemies of the Third Reich before the beginning of the war. Any inhabitant for whom a Volksdeutscher expressed a negative political opinion was jailed. The Volksdeutscher also represented the first source of agents. Due to constant occurrences of subjective and completely unobjective opinions, some of the agents were let go and the services of the wide spread organization of the Styrian Homeland League (*Steirischer Heimatbund*) were used instead. When the national liberation movement in the Brežice district gained strength in the summer of 1942, the Gestapo forcibly recruited foresters and forest workers

<sup>26</sup> Ferenc, *Tragedija Slovencev*, str. 387

<sup>27</sup> Prav tam

<sup>28</sup> Ferenc, *Tragedija Slovencev*, str. 387; Nemačka obavešajna služba III, str. 437–439

<sup>25</sup> Ferenc, *Tragedija Slovencev*, pp. 386, 387 and 416.

<sup>26</sup> Ferenc, *Tragedija Slovencev*, p. 387.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*



Nemški orožniki korakajo po glavni ulici v Brežicah leta 1942. Fototeka Posavskega muzeja Brežice

German gendarmes marching through the main street of Brežice, 1942. Photo archive of the Posavski muzej Brežice.

Agentki Vidi Jošt so obljubili, da bodo njenega brata izpustili iz zapora, če ona uspe pridobiti informacije za uničenje čete. Na podlagi njenih informacij sta policija in orožništvo napadla tabor čete v Rakonci pri Osredku in jo uničila. Gestapo je nato Vido Jošt iz varnostnih razlogov premestil v Gradec.<sup>29</sup> Enota gestapa v Brežicah je na svojem območju aretirala približno 300 ljudi, od katerih so jih od 25 do 30 ustrelili kot talce, približno 70 pa poslali v koncentracijska taborišča. Po odhodu Lutza 1944 je enota nekaj časa vodil kriminalistični sekretar Franz Sums, od januarja 1945 pa Untersturmführer SS Fritz Smole. Namestnik vodje enote je bil kriminalistični asistent Emil Vogel. V enoti so daljši ali krajši čas delali ti pripadniki gestapa, ki so vsi bili podčastniki SS in kriminalistični uslužbenci: Rainer Benings, Paul Buchwald, Helmut Engel, Josef Faschinger, Hermann Fey, Kurt Herold, Walter Iskra, Robert Juengling, Alois Kollmann, Franz Mitterhoeffler, Josef Puhwein, Emil Ronacher, Hubert Simschitz, Walter Weihser, Alois Welina, Franz Weigels, Hans Zeiner in Kurt Zibell.<sup>30</sup>

for intelligence purposes. Some kept their collaboration with the secret police to a minimum although others were delivering regular reports. Most agents were recruited from the ranks of prisoners who were blackmailed or pressured to inform on the national liberation movement. Some agents volunteered for ideological and some for financial reasons. There were others who became agents because of their jobs.<sup>28</sup>

The Gestapo post in Brežice attained its greatest success in February 1943 when it managed to insert an agent into the 2nd company of the Kozjanski battalion. The agent, Vida Jošt, had been promised her brother would be released from prison if she acquired information leading to the destruction of the battalion. On the basis of information provided by her, the police and gendarmerie launched an attack on the company's camp in Rakonca at Osredok and annihilated the company. Subsequently Gestapo transferred Vida Jošt, for safety reasons, to Graz.<sup>29</sup> Approximately 300 persons were arrested by the Gestapo post in Brežice in its area of operations. 25 to 30 were executed as hostages and approximately 70 were sent to concentration camps. After Lutz' departure in 1944, the post was headed by Kriminalsekretar Franz Sums and

<sup>29</sup> Nemačka obaveštajna služba III, str. 439; Teropšič, Kozjanski odred 1, str. 28 in 29

<sup>30</sup> Nemačka obaveštajna služba III, str. 441

<sup>28</sup> Ferenc, Tragedija Slovencev, p. 387; Nemačka obaveštajna služba III, pp. 437–439.

<sup>29</sup> Nemačka obaveštajna služba III, p. 439; Teropšič, Kozjanski odred 1, pp. 28 and 29.

Podobno nalogo kot postaja obmejne policije v Brežicah je imela v prvih mesecih okupacije postaja oziroma postojanka obmejne policije v Sevnici na tamkajšnjem mejnem prehodu. Vodil jo je Unterscharführer SS Albert Opitsch in je bila prav tako podrejena komisariatu obmejne policije v Celju, dokler je niso jeseni 1942 ukinili, ker je Italija tam zaprla mejo za ves promet. Tudi ta postaja ali postojanka je sodelovala pri izvajanju okupatorjevih ukrepov proti narodnoosvobodilnem gibanju.<sup>31</sup>

Spomladi 1943 so za policijsko obmejno službo pri Dobovi poskrbeli tudi nemški policijski organi na Hrvaškem. Policijski akcijski oddelek za Hrvaško je v Brežicah ustanovil svoj »obmejni urad«, ki ga je vodil orožniški Leutnant Tanholzer.<sup>32</sup>

Ker sta imeli postaji obmejne policije v Brežicah in Sevnici v začetku predvsem naloge na obmejnih prehodih, je imela naloge nadzorovanja prebivalstva in zbiranja informacij predvsem enota nemške varnostne službe v Brežicah. Enoto SD, ki se je ukvarjala tudi z izganjanjem Slovencev iz brežiškega okraja, je vodil Untersturmführer SS Leopold Carmann, za njim pa Unterscharführer SS Viktor Aichelburg.<sup>33</sup>

Posledica obmejne lege brežiškega okraja oziroma okrožja je bila vrsta obmejnih carinskih postojank. Vzpostavili so jih spomladi in poleti 1941, ko so na zemljevidih in tudi na terenu določili natančnejši potek državnih meja. Okrajni carinski komisariati v Kozjem, Brežicah, Krškem, Radečah (nato v Sevnici) so imeli ob meji od Podčetrтка do Polšnika pri Litiji celo vrsto obmejnih stražnic. Njihova naloga je bila varovati mejo in nadzorovati maloobmejni promet. Najbližje Krškemu je bila stražnica v Velikem Podlogu, ki je imela več kot 30 obmejnih stražarjev.<sup>34</sup>

Vojaški uradi in vojaška poveljstva v brežiškem okraju so nastali nekoliko pozneje. Še leta 1941 je nemški okupator povečal letališče v Cerkljah (Flugplatzkommando B 7/XVII) in tja pripeljal lovsko eskadriljo, jeseni 1944 pa se je tja umaknila z Balkana letalska enota E (v) 210/XVII. Novembra 1941 so v Brežicah uredili tudi vojaški prijavni urad (Wehrmeldeamt),

later, from January 1945, by SS- Untersturmführer Fritz Smole with Kriminalassistent Emil Vogel as deputy. The following Gestapo members, all of them non-commissioned SS officers and criminal investigation police employees, worked at the Gestapo post for a shorter or longer period of time: Rainer Benings, Paul Buchwald, Helmut Engel, Josef Faschinger, Hermann Fey, Kurt Herold, Walter Iskra, Robert Juengling, Alois Kollmann, Franz Mitterhoeffler, Josef Puhwein, Emil Ronacher, Hubert Simschitz, Walter Weihser, Alois Welina, Franz Weigels, Hans Zeiner in Kurt Zibell.<sup>30</sup>

For the first months of occupation, a responsibility similar to the one of the Brežice police border station was given to the Sevnica police border station (or base). It was situated at a border crossing point and led by the SS-Unterscharführer Albert Opitsch. It operated under the command of the border police commissariat in Celje until it was abolished in the fall of 1942 due to Italy's closing of its borders to all traffic. This border station took part in implementing the measures of the occupying forces against the national liberation movement.<sup>31</sup>

In the spring of 1943, another border police service at Dobova was established by the German police authorities in Croatia. The police action department for Croatia established a »border department« at Brežice, headed by gendarmerie Leutnant Tanholzer.<sup>32</sup>

Since the border police stations in Brežice and Sevnica mostly busied themselves with the border crossing points in the first stage of occupation, the tasks of overseeing the population and gathering intelligence fell mainly to German security service post in Brežice. The SD branch also took part in deporting Slovenians from the Brežice county. It was commanded by the SS-Untersturmführer Leopold Carmann and later by SS-Unterscharführer Viktor Aichelburg.<sup>33</sup>

The geographical position of the Brežice county or district caused several customs border posts to be created in the spring and summer of 1941 after precise border lines had been determined both on the map and on the ground. County customs commissariats in Kozje, Brežice, Krško, and Radeče (later in Sevnica) put up a number of guardhouses on the border from Podčetrtek to Polšnik at Litija. They were responsible for guarding the border, supervising the frontier traffic, etc. The guardhouse closest to Krško was in Veliki Podlog, employing more than 30 border guards.<sup>34</sup>

The military departments and commands in the

<sup>31</sup> Ferenc, *Tragedija Slovencev*, str. 387

<sup>32</sup> Prav tam

<sup>33</sup> Ferenc, *Tragedija Slovencev*, str. 387 in 388

<sup>34</sup> Ferenc, *Tragedija Slovencev*, str. 388

<sup>30</sup> *Nemačka obaveštajna služba III*, p. 441.

<sup>31</sup> Ferenc, *Tragedija Slovencev*, p. 387.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>33</sup> Ferenc, *Tragedija Slovencev*, pp. 387 and 388.

<sup>34</sup> Ferenc, *Tragedija Slovencev*, p. 388.



ki je imel le vojaško-mobilizacijske naloge in ga je vodil Oberstleutnant Hinzmann, podrejen vojaškemu okrožnemu poveljstvu (Wehrbezirkskommando) v Celju.<sup>35</sup>

Nemški okupator je priznal, da je pričakoval nekatere vrste odpora (propagandne akcije idr.), a ne partizanstva. Zelo ostro se je odzival na vse pojave narodnoosvobodilnega gibanja. Takoj je uvedel najbolj krute ukrepe, kot so streljanje talcev, požiganje vasi, izganjanje svojcev partizanov in ubitih talcev, »kraj« otrok idr. Taktika nasilja je bila ves čas eno od najpomembnejših orožij v boju proti NOG. Slovenci so bili tarče vseh vrst nasilja, ki si jih je izmislil nemški okupator, nekaterih celo v največjem obsegu med vsemi okupiranimi narodi v Evropi, če upoštevamo število prebivalstva. Ta taktika pa je uspevala le kratkoročno, kajti še tako strahovito nasilje ni moglo niti v celoti niti dolgoročno odvrniti prebivalstva od sodelovanja v boju proti okupatorju.<sup>36</sup>

## Nemška policija v boju proti partizanom

Na nemškem okupacijskem območju je boj zoper odporniške partizanske skupine prevzela policija: orožništvo, varnostna policija in tajna državna policija. Policijski bataljoni SS so postali osnovna bojna sila zoper partizanske čete jeseni 1941. Tedaj so v boj proti partizanom vključili še enote vermanšafta, ki so imele le status pomožnih organov policije. To je bil začetek procesa, ki je z različno močjo trajal do konca vojne, ko je okupator uporabljal slovenskega človeka za boj proti osvobodilnim silam lastnega naroda na nemškem zasedbenem ozemlju pod geslom »obrambe nacističnega novega reda pred komunističnimi banditi«. Toda udeležba posameznih oboroženih skupin vermanov še ni pomenila večjega delovanja te sestave v boju proti narodnoosvobodilni vojski. To se je zgodilo spomladi 1942.<sup>37</sup>

Vermane so koristno uporabili tudi orožniki. Orožniški vodja okrožja Celje Josef Kolmanitsch je sredi oktobra 1941 izdal navodila

Brežice county were set up a bit later. The airfield in Cerklje was enlarged by the German occupation authorities as early as in 1941 (Flugplatzkommando B 7/XVII) and a fighter squadron was transferred there. In the fall of 1944, the aviation unit E (v) 210/XVII withdrew to Cerklje from the Balkans. In November 1941, a recruiting office (Wehrmeldeamt) was established in Brežice. Its duties were exclusively in the field of military conscription. It was led by Oberstleutnant Hinzmann who was under the command of the Military Recruiting District Headquarters (Wehrbezirkskommando) in Celje.<sup>35</sup>

By their own admission, the German occupying forces were expecting some forms of resistance (propaganda activities etc.), however, they were not expecting the partisans. The crack down on the liberation movement was harsh. The cruelest measures, such as shooting of hostages, burning down villages, deporting the families of partisans and executed hostages, »stealing« children, etc. were introduced without delay. The constant tactics of violence were one of the most important weapons against the liberation movement. Slovenians were a target for all kinds of violence invented by the German occupying forces. When taking into account the number of the population, the extent of some forms of violence was greater than in any other nation in Europe. However, these tactics had only a short-term success as even the most appalling violence could neither prevent the population as a whole from taking part in the fight against the occupying forces nor prevent this from happening for a longer period of time.<sup>36</sup>

## German Police in the Fight Against Partisans

In the German-occupied territory, fighting against the partisan resistance groups was conducted by the police: gendarmerie, security police, and secret state police. From the fall of 1941, the SS police battalions were the main force employed to combat the partisan troops with the Wehrmannschaft units as their auxiliary force. This was the beginning of the process that continued with varying intensity until the end of the war whereby the occupying forces used Slovenians to fight their own people's liberation forces in the German-occupied territory under the slogan of

<sup>35</sup> Prav tam

<sup>36</sup> Tone Ferenc: Osvobodilni boj slovenskega naroda 1941–1945. Razstava ob petdesetletnici konca druge svetovne vojne. Ljubljana 1995, str. 9; Bili so uporni, str. 18 in 26

<sup>37</sup> Zbornik dokumentov in podatkov o narodnoosvobodilni vojni jugoslovanskih narodov, del VI, knjiga 3, dokumenta številka 147 in 159 (naprej: Zbornik VI/3, dok. št. 147 in 159); Klanjšček, Pregled NOV, str. 92 in 93; Tone Ferenc: Wehrmannschaft v boju proti narodnoosvobodilni vojski na Štajerskem. Letopis Muzeja narodne osvoboditve LRS, Ljubljana 1958, str. 90 (naprej: Ferenc: Wehrmannschaft v boju

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Tone Ferenc: Osvobodilni boj slovenskega naroda 1941–1945. Razstava ob petdesetletnici konca druge svetovne vojne. Ljubljana 1995, p. 9; Bili so uporni, pp. 18 and 26.



Nemški letalski bombi z letališča Cerklje ob Krki. Bombi hrani Posavski muzej Brežice. Foto: Jože Lorber, 2006. Fototeka Posavskega muzeja Brežice

German airplane bombs from the Cerklje ob Krki airfield. The bombs are kept by the Posavski muzej Brežice. Photo: Jože Lorber, 2006. Photo archive of the Posavski muzej Brežice.

orožniškim postajam o ukrepih ob partizanskih napadih. »Postaje se morajo takoj zvezati s Sturmführerjem vermanšafta, da bi vsako noč poleg pomožnih policistov na postaji prenočevalo še 5–8 (glede na prostorske zmožljivosti) zanesljivih vermanov. Postelje naj prikrbi župan. Moštvo naj se zamenjava tako, da ne bodo vsako noč na vrsto prišli isti ljudje.« V nadaljevanju je Kolmanitsch zapisal, naj postaje poskrbijo še za zveze. Banditi ob napadu takoj pretrgajo telefonske zveze, zato mora zanesljiv in odločen verman takoj po najkrajši poti oditi do sosednje postaje in obvestiti Celje. Na koncu je zapisal, naj orožniške postaje nadaljujejo urjenje vermanšafta.<sup>38</sup>

Varnostna policija in varnostna služba na Spodnjem Štajerskem si je v boju proti narodnoosvobodilnemu gibanju leta 1941 nabrala kar nekaj izkušenj. Komandant Lurker je konec leta napisal poročilo »Pobijanje komunističnega gibanja na spod. Štajerskem« in ga poslal v

»defense of the Nazi New Order against the communist bandits«. However, the use of isolated groups of armed Wehrmannschaft members did not mean that there was a wide-spread engagement of this formation against the national liberation army. Such further development did not occur until the spring of 1942.<sup>37</sup>

The Wehrmannschaft members were valuable to the gendarmes, as well. The gendarmerie commander of the Celje district Josef Kolmanitsch issued instructions on the partisan attacks to the gendarmerie stations in the middle of October, 1941. »The stations must immediately make contact with the Wehrmannschaft Sturmführer in order to have 5 – 8 (depending on the capacity of the premises) reliable Wehrmannschaft members to join the auxiliary police officers at the stations at night. Beds are to be provided by the mayor. The shift should rotate so as not to have the same people on duty every night.« Kolmanitsch added that the stations should take responsibility for the connections. The bandits habitually cut phone lines at the time of attack and in such

<sup>38</sup> Orožniško okrožje Celje vsem postajam orožniškega okrožja Celje. Celje, 14. oktobra 1941. Prispevki IZDG 1-2/1961, str. 327

<sup>37</sup> Zbornik dokumentov in podatkov o narodnoosvobodilni vojni jugoslovanskih narodov, del VI, knjiga 3, dokumenta številka 147 in 159 (hereinafter: Zbornik VI/3, doc., No 147 and 159); Klanjšček, Pregled NOV, pp. 92 and 93; Tone Ferenc: Wehrmannschaft v boju proti narodnoosvobodilni vojski na Štajerskem. Letopis Muzeja narodne osvoboditve LRS, Ljubljana 1958, p. 90 (hereinafter: Ferenc: Wehrmannschaft v boju).



Letalska enota z letališča Cerklje koraka po glavni ulici v Brežicah. Obmejni dan v Brežicah, maj 1944. Fototeka muzeja novejšje zgodovine Slovenije

*The aviation unit from the Cerklje airfield marching in the main street of Brežice. Border day in Brežice, May 1944. Photo archive of the National Museum of Contemporary History.*

RSHA v Berlin. En izvod je poslal v Salzburg, enega na Bled, šest pa različnim nacističnim veljakom po Štajerski. V poročilu je zapisal: »Najuspešnejše sredstvo za pobijanje KP in s tem banditov je izgradnja kolikor mogoče široke mreže zaupnikov /V-Personen/, ki bi prišli iz vrst aktivnih članov KP ali ki so bili sami člani bande. Riziko, da bi ta ali oni odpovedal, bi bil z uspehi z ostalimi daleč izravnano. Seveda je predpogoj za uspeh pri pobijanju komunistične bande stalno sodelovanje vseh s tem povezanih sil brez trenja, pri čemer mora biti brez pomena, kdo doseže uspeh. Zastrahilo vpliva tudi takojšnja ustrelitev komunističnih velezločincev, ki jo je treba imenoma v lepah naznaniti.«<sup>39</sup>

Nemška policija na Slovenskem v letih 1941–45 je bila, z izjemo kratkega obdobja treh jesenskih mesecev 1943,<sup>40</sup> v zahodni

*cases a reliable and decisive Wehrmannschaft member should be despatched immediately to the next station in order to contact Celje. The instructions concluded with the order that the gendarmerie stations continue to train the Wehrmannschaft members.*<sup>38</sup>

*The security police and the security service in Lower Styria gathered a lot of experience in fighting against the national liberation movement in 1941. At the end of the year, Commander Lurker composed a report on »Destroying the communist movement in Lower Styria« and submitted it to the RSHA in Berlin. One copy was sent to Salzburg, another to Bled, and six to various prominent Nazi Party members in Styria. The report stated: »The most effective means for the destruction of the Communist Party and thereby the bandits is to build the widest possible network of confidants /V-Personen/ who are either active members of the Communist Party or bandits. The risk of one of them failing would be more than counterbalanced*

<sup>39</sup> Arhiv Republike Slovenije, AS 1931, a. š. 411, poročilo komandanta varnostne policije in varnostne službe na Spodnjem Štajerskem. Maribor, 5. 12. 1941

<sup>40</sup> Gre za nemško ofenzivo 2. tankovskega korpusa SS, ki ga je vodil general Paul Hausser (1880–1972).

<sup>38</sup> *Gendarmerie district Celje to all its stations.. Celje, 14 October 1941. Prispevki IZDG 1-2/1961, p. 327.*



Sloveniji glavna vodilna nemška oborožena sila pri zatiranju slovenskega naroda kot celote in partizanskega osvobodilnega gibanja kot njegovega bojujočega se dela. Akcije ali operacije proti partizanskim enotam so po nalogu gestapa vodili enote zaščitne policije, orožništvo in vermanska Štajerske domovinske zveze. Za večje operacije so uporabili tudi vojsko.<sup>41</sup>

Nemška oblast na Spodnjem Štajerskem je dolgo podcenjevala pravi značaj narodnoosvobodilnega gibanja. Vzrok za to je bila napačna presoja razmer na podlagi podatkov folksdojčerskih agentov pred okupacijo odseku SD v Gradcu. Folksdojčerji, zbrani v Štajerski domovinski zvezi (ŠDZ), so to napačno sliko še naprej podpirali s trditvijo, da gre pri NOG za elemente, ki nimajo izvora na Spodnjem Štajerskem, ampak so prišli od drugod. Takšna stališča so ustrezala tudi šefu civilne uprave za Spodnjo Štajersko Uiberreitherju, ki se je želel postaviti pred Hitlerjem s hitro germanizacijo. Takšna stališča so v nemških krogih prevladovala tudi leta 1942. Verjeli so, da bodo hitro uničili NOG. To je razvidno tudi iz mnenja vodstva RSHA, da je upor kratkotrajen in da ga bodo lahko hitro zatrli z množico radikalnih ukrepov, s katerimi bodo upornike uničili ali vsaj tako zlomili, da ne bodo mogli resno ogrožati nemške oblasti na zasedenem območju.<sup>42</sup>

Državni vodja SS Himmler je 25. junija 1942 izdal »Smernice za akcije proti partizanom in drugim banditom na Gorenjskem in Štajerskem.« Po njih je bila prva naloga varnostne policije in varnostne službe »na kakršen koli možen način« ugotoviti stalna območja gibanja partizanskih enot in bivališča njihovih vodij, nato pa pripraviti hajko. Partizansko območje najprej obkolijo, za kar uporabijo deželno brambo ter nadomestne in rezervne policijske enote; na to obkoljeno ozemlje vdrejo posebne enote in uničijo partizane, njihove razkropljene enote pa naj gonijo z izvidniškimi enotami tako dolgo, dokler jih ne uničijo. Sledi »kazenska akcija« proti vasem in prebivalcem, ki so podpirali partizane. Okrožnica zelo na kratko pravi, da jih je treba narediti

by the success of others. Of course, the precondition for successful killing of the communist bandits is a constant cooperation of all parties involved, without friction and without attaching any importance to the question of who achieved the successful result. Another means of intimidation is to eliminate the dangerous communist criminals immediately by having them shot and then posting up their names.«<sup>39</sup>

With the exception of a short three-month period in the western Slovenia in the fall of 1943<sup>40</sup>, the German police was the main German armed force to oppress the Slovenian people as a whole and the partisan liberation movement as the actively resisting part of the population. Activities or operations against the partisan units were conducted by the protection police units, gendarmerie and the Wehrmannschaft of the Styrian Homeland League on Gestapo orders. For more important operations, the army was used, as well.<sup>41</sup>

The real character of the liberation movement was underestimated by the German authorities in Lower Styria for a long time. The reason is to be found in the inaccurate assessment of the situation prepared on the basis of data that had been provided to the SD section in Graz by the Volksdeutscher agents before the occupation. The Volksdeutscher and their Styrian Homeland League perpetuated this mistaken view of the situation by claiming that the elements of the national liberation movement did not originate in Lower Styria but rather elsewhere. The head of the civil administration for Lower Styria Uiberreither was happy to share such views as he hoped to make an impression on Hitler with the rapid success of germanisation. This false opinion still prevailed in German circles in 1942. It was believed that the national liberation movement would soon be broken. This can be discerned from the fact that the RSHA leadership believed the rebellion was transitory and could be suppressed quickly by a large number of radical measures. It was supposed that these measures would cause the destruction of the rebellion or at least affect the rebels sufficiently so as to prevent them from posing a serious threat to the German authorities in the occupied territory.<sup>42</sup>

On 25 June 1942, the Reichsführer-SS Himmler issued the »Guidelines on the Activities Against the Partisans and Other Bandits in Upper Carniola and Styria«. According to the guidelines, the first duty of the security police and the security service was to

<sup>41</sup> Butler, *Ilustrirana zgodovina gestapa*, str. 6–7 in 220

<sup>42</sup> Nemačka obavešajna služba III, str. 468 in 469

<sup>39</sup> Arhiv Republike Slovenije, AS 1931, a. š. 411, report of the security police and security service commander for Lower Styria. Maribor, 5. 12. 1941.

<sup>40</sup> Offensive of the German 2nd SS Tank Corps under the command of General Paul Hausser (1880–1972).

<sup>41</sup> Butler, *Ilustrirana zgodovina gestapa*, pp. 6–7 and 220.

<sup>42</sup> Nemačka obavešajna služba III, pp. 468 and 469.

za neškodljive. Moške – če je treba, ves moški rod v družini – je treba povsem iztrebiti, ženske teh družin odpeljati v koncentracijska taborišča, otroke pa spraviti v določene kraje v rajhu in o njihovem številu ter rasni vrednosti natančno poročati Himmlerjevemu štabu.<sup>43</sup> Konec julija 1942 je Himmler izdal odredbo o prepovedi uporabe naziva partizan. Z njo so se morali zelo temeljito seznaniti vsi podrejeni. V ukazih in poročilih so morali uporabljati naziva banda in razbojniška banda.<sup>44</sup>

Posebna službena navodila za boj proti partizanom je nemški okupator izdal 11. novembra 1942. Označena so bila z najvišjo stopnjo vojaške skrivnosti Geheime Kommandosache. V navodilih je bilo med drugim navedeno: »Z vojaškim viteštvom ali z določili Ženevske konvencije ta boj nima ničesar opraviti. Če boja proti bandam tako na vzhodu kakor tudi na Balkanu ne bomo vodili z najbrutalnejšimi sredstvi, potem jim enote, ki jih imamo, ne morejo priti do kraja. Zato so enote upravičene in tudi dolžne v tem boju brez omejitve uporabiti vsa sredstva tudi proti ženskam in otrokom, če le-ta vodijo k uspehom.«<sup>45</sup>

Nemška varnostna policija in varnostna služba sta različno pridobivali podatke. Uporabljali sta zaupnike (Vertrauensmann) in informatorje (Gewährsperson); samo na Spodnjem Štajerskem in Gorenjskem so leta 1942 uvedli izvidnike (Aufklärer). Njih so uporabljale po večini enote oz. oporišča gestapa. Po terenu so patrolirali in zbirali informacije o partizanskih premikih, kurirskih poteh in taborih. Ker so se veliko gibali po terenu, preoblečeni v partizane, so jih ljudje poimenovali »raztrganci.« Poleg njih so si gestapovci omislili še poseben boj proti partizanom s tako imenovanimi protibandami (Gegenbande). Konec leta 1942 so v Krškem pripravili poseben tečaj, na katerem so usposabljali pripadnike različnih nemških formacij: orožnike, izvidnike in preverjene sodelavce gestapa za posebno vrsto akcij proti partizanom. Udeležilo se ga je približno 400 ljudi. V začetku leta 1943 so oblikovali protibande Treff, Nikola, Karl in Elsa. Protibanda Karl je štela 60 mož. Predvsem zaradi pozornosti partizanov in terenskih organizacij protibande niso dosegle pomembnejših uspe-

discover the partisans' usual areas of operation and the whereabouts of their leaders by »any means available« in order to prepare an attack. According to the plan, the partisan area would first be surrounded by the Landwehr and the auxiliary and reserve police units; then, the special units would invade the encircled area, destroy the partisans, and pursue the dispersed partisan units with the reconnaissance units. Afterwards, the villages and inhabitants who had given their support to the partisans would be sanctioned. The circular briefly states they would be neutralised. The men – if necessary, all men of the family – would be killed and the women sent to the concentration camps. The children would be taken to specific places within the Reich, and their number and racial value reported to Himmler's headquarters.<sup>43</sup> At the end of July, 1942, Himmler issued a decree forbidding the use of the term »partisan«. His subordinates were required to fully acquaint themselves with the decree and use the term »bandits«.<sup>44</sup>

On 11 November 1942, the occupation authorities issued special working instructions for the war against the partisans. These were accorded the highest degree of confidentiality Geheime Kommandosache. Among other things, they stated: »This fight bears no relation to military chivalry or the provisions of the Geneva convention. If this struggle against the bandits is not fought using the most brutal means in the East as well as in the Balkans, then our troops will not be able to prevail. Therefore, in this fight the troops are justified and even obliged to use any means whatsoever even against women and children when such means will lead to success.«<sup>45</sup>

The German security police and security service used different approaches to obtaining information. They made use of confidants (Vertrauensmann) and informers (Gewährsperson); the use of military scouts (Aufklärer) that was introduced in 1942 was confined to Lower Styria and Upper Carniola. The latter were mainly used by the Gestapo posts and strongholds. Their duties encompassed patrolling and gathering information on partisan movements, messenger paths and partisan camps. They often performed field work posing as partisans and for that reason they received the nickname »men in rags«. In addition, the Gestapo devised another way to fight the partisans by using the so-called anti-bands (Gegenbande). At the end of 1942, a special course was organized in Krško to train the members of different German formations

<sup>43</sup> Zgodovina Slovencev. Cankarjeva založba, Ljubljana 1979, str. 794

<sup>44</sup> Nemačka obaveštajna služba VII, dok. št. 83, str. 359 in 360

<sup>45</sup> Forte, Nič več strogo zaupno II, str. 392–395

<sup>43</sup> Zgodovina Slovencev. Cankarjeva založba, Ljubljana 1979, p. 794.

<sup>44</sup> Nemačka obaveštajna služba VII, dok., št. 83, pp. 359 and 360.

<sup>45</sup> Forte, Nič več strogo zaupno II, p. 392 - 395.

hov, zato so jih jeseni 1943 razpustili.<sup>46</sup>

Nemški okupator je bil prepričan, da bo odpor leta 1942 v celoti zatrt, vendar ni šlo vse tako, kot so si zamislili oz. načrtovali. Nemški varnostno-policijski aparat je že leta 1941 nalletel na popolnoma nov element in novo obliko boja, kakršne dotlej ni bil vajen. Leta 1942 se je boj le še stopnjeval. Tako so morali na štabni seji pri predsedniku štajerske pokrajinske vlade 24. avgusta 1942 ugotoviti: »Število napadov je poraslo, izgube so žal na naši strani večje kot na strani banditov.« Komandant Lurker je v septembrskem poročilu spoznal vrednost terenske organizacije (OF). Ugotovil je, da je treba največjo pozornost v boju proti bandam nameniti terenski organizaciji,<sup>47</sup> saj ta tvori hrbtenico partizanstva. V boju s partizani bodo uspeli le, če v celoti razbijejo terensko organizacijo. Da prebivalstvo podpira bande, so ugotovili tudi na štabni seji v začetku oktobra 1942.<sup>48</sup>

Spoznanju, da partizanske enote ne morejo obstajati brez podpore prebivalstva oziroma organiziranega zaledja, je nemški okupacijski aparat prilagodil svojo taktiko protipartizanskega boja. Razmah NOG je poskušal leta 1942 preprečiti predvsem s poostritvijo nasilja. Težišče okupatorjevega prizadevanja je bilo usmerjeno zlasti v razbijanje organizacij odporiškega gibanja na terenu, njegovo nasilje pa je najbolj prizadelo sodelavce partizanov in Osvobodilne fronte ter organizatorje osvobodilnega gibanja na terenu. S svojimi ukrepi je nemški okupator leta 1942 na Spodnjem Štajerskem prizadejal NOG velike izgube na terenu in v partizanskih enotah.<sup>49</sup>

Na nemirnih območjih je okupator sredi leta 1942 dovolil samoobrambo tistim, ki so se zaradi partizanov čutili ogrožene, in jim dodelil orožje za osebno varovanje. Oktobra je okupator tam, kjer je menil, da je treba, organiziral samozaščito (Selbstschutz), ki jo je novembra nasledila deželna straža (Landwacht). Zaradi varnostnih razlogov so na nemirnih območjih sekali drevje in podrast ob cestah. V okviru ukrepov za pomiritev Spodnje Štajer-

- gendarmes, scouts, and experienced Gestapo associates - for special activities against the partisans. There were approximately 400 participants. In the beginning of 1943, »anti-bands« Treff, Nikola, Karl, and Elsa were formed. The Karl »anti-band« had 60 members. However, due largely to partisans' and field organizations' vigilance these »anti-bands« did not achieve any significant success and were dissolved in the fall of 1943.<sup>46</sup>

Even though the German occupying forces were convinced the resistance would be fully suppressed in 1942, events did not unfold according to expectations and plans. In 1941, the German security and police apparatus had encountered a completely new element and a novel form of resistance it was unaccustomed to. In 1942, the fighting only intensified. Thus, at the meeting of the Styria regional government on 24 August 1942, it was acknowledged: »The number of attacks has increased; unfortunately, we have suffered greater losses than the bandits.« Commander Lurker recognized the danger of the field organization (Liberation Front - OF) in a report, dated from September. He found that particular attention in the struggle against the bandits should be given to the field organization<sup>47</sup> as it was the backbone of partisans' resistance. He was of the opinion that a favorable result in the struggle with the partisans could only be expected when the field organization was completely broken. The fact that the population supported the bandits was acknowledged again at a meeting at the beginning of October 1942.<sup>48</sup>

Realizing that the partisan units cannot survive without the support of the population or a well organized hinterland, the German occupation apparatus modified its tactics against the partisans. In 1942, its efforts to stop the national liberation movement from spreading were largely marked by intensification of violence. The focus of these efforts was mostly on destroying the resistance movement's organizations in the field and the main targets of violence were the partisans' supporters, members of the Liberation Front, and organizers of the liberation movement in the field. The measures carried out by the German occupying forces in Lower Styria in 1942 caused severe losses to the national liberation movement both in the field and in partisan units.<sup>49</sup>

<sup>46</sup> Forte, Nič več strogo zaupno II, str. 304–310; Butler, Ilustrirana zgodovina gestapa, str. 218.

<sup>47</sup> Terrainorganisation. Pod pojmom terenska organizacija je mišljena organizacija Osvobodilne fronte slovenskega naroda.

<sup>48</sup> Zbornik VI/3, dok., št. 216; Nemačka obavešajna služba III, str. 225; Zbornik VI/4, dok. št. 162.

<sup>49</sup> Milan Ževart: Slovenska Štajerska leta 1942. Naš Zbornik 1997. Društvo piscev zgodovine NOB Slovenije, str. 58–70 (naprej: Ževart, Slovenska Štajerska 1942).

<sup>46</sup> Forte, Nič več strogo zaupno II, p. 304 - 310; Butler, Ilustrirana zgodovina gestapa, p. 218.

<sup>47</sup> Terrainorganisation. The term »field organization« is used to mean the Slovenian Liberation Front.

<sup>48</sup> Zbornik VI/3, dok., št. 216; Nemačka obavešajna služba III, p. 225; Zbornik VI/4, dok., št. 162.

<sup>49</sup> Milan Ževart: Slovenska Štajerska leta 1942. Naš Zbornik 1997. Društvo piscev zgodovine NOB Slovenije, p. 58 - 70 (hereinafter: Ževart, Slovenska Štajerska 1942).



ske so morali hišni gospodarji na notranji strani hišnih vrat namestiti lepake z besedilom odredbe šefa civilne uprave z dne 16. avgusta 1941. Ta je določala smrtno kazen za vse, ki bi kakor koli sodelovali z odporniškim gibanjem. Okupator je ustanavljal nove postojanke in po potrebi premeščal svoje enote na najbolj nemirna območja. Glavno vlogo v boju proti partizanom so imele leta 1942 policijske enote z orožništvom, okupator pa je v boj proti partizanom močnejše vključil tudi vermane Štajerske domovinske zveze. Število postojank vermanšafta je na območjih z močnejšim osvobodilnim gibanjem naraščalo. Naprave in objekte so poleg obratnih straž (Werkschutz)<sup>50</sup> varovale tudi vojaške enote.<sup>51</sup>

Nemškim oblastem na Spodnjem Štajerskem je bilo jeseni 1942 jasno, da zaradi neugodnih razmer na fronti ne bodo mogli okrepiti policijskih sil v Spodnji Štajerski in da bodo morali v protipartizanski boj še naprej vključevati vermanšaft. Toda bližala se je zima, za katero vermani niso bili dovolj opremljeni. Izkazalo se je tudi, da so bili koristni le za obrambo posameznih krajev pred partizanskimi napadi, v večjih samostojnih akcijah pa se niso izkazali. Ker je nemško vodstvo uvidelo, da se lahko obrambna naloga izvaja z veliko manj stroški, in ker pri stalnem delovanju ni mogoče dosledno izvajati službe v teritorialnih enotah, je pozno jeseni 1942 določilo vermanšaftu drugo obliko oboroženega boja proti narodnoosvobodilni vojski – organizacijo deželne straže.<sup>52</sup>

Odredbo o ustanovitvi deželne straže je 9. novembra 1942 izdal šef civilne uprave za Spodnjo Štajersko.<sup>53</sup> Temeljila je na Himmlerjevem ukazu s 17. januarja 1942 o ustanovitvi deželne straže, »ki naj služi prebivalstvu za obrambo pred pobeglimi vojnimi ujetniki in drugimi osebami, ki s pohajkovanjem ogrožajo javno varnost in red« in na njegovih navodilih za službo deželne straže, izdanih 11. avgusta 1942. V deželno stražo so prisilno vključili moške ustreznih letnikov, ki so morali ponoči

*In the middle of 1942, the occupation authorities authorised the people in restless areas who felt threatened by the partisans to defend themselves and assigned them weapons for self-defense. In October, self-defense (Selbstschutz) was organized where it was deemed to be necessary. It was replaced by the land watch (Landwacht) in November. For security reasons, trees and undergrowth next to the road were cut down. The measures for pacifying the Lower Styria required the house owners to paste up on the inner side of their house doors the decree of the head of the civil administration of 16 August 1941. The decree stipulated the death penalty for anyone involved in the resistance movement in any way. The occupation authorities established new stations and transferred their troops to the areas that were most restless. In 1942, the main force in the struggle against the partisans were the police and gendarmerie units. At the same time, the occupation authorities began to make more use of the Wehrmannschaft members of the Styrian Homeland League. The number of the Wehrmannschaft stations increased in the areas where the liberation movement was stronger. Facilities were protected by both the security guards (Werkschutz)<sup>50</sup> and the military troops.<sup>51</sup>*

*The German authorities were aware of the fact that the unfavorable conditions at the front would prevent them from strengthening police forces in Lower Styria in the fall of 1942 and that they would have to continue their use of the Wehrmannschaft against the partisans. However, the Wehrmannschaft members were not sufficiently equipped for the approaching winter. Besides, it became clear that their usefulness was limited to defending individual sites from the partisan attacks while they were ineffective in larger individual operations. As the German leadership came to realize that the defense could be undertaken with much less expense and that territorial units could not be used consistently in a continuous engagement, it entrusted the Wehrmannschaft with responsibility for a different kind of armed struggle against the liberation army in the late fall of 1942 – organization of the »land watch«.<sup>52</sup>*

*The decree establishing the land watch was issued*

<sup>50</sup> Obratna straža je bila organizirana po podjetjih v nemško okupiranih predelih Slovenije. Njena osnovna naloga je bila varovanje podjetja in njegove proizvodnje. Strokovno so bili podrejeni vojaškim in varnostnim organom, pa tudi obveščevalnim službam. S temi stražami je nemška obveščevalna služba izvajala nadzor nad delavci in uslužbenci v podjetjih. O zaposlenih v podjetju so vodili različne kartoteke. (Nemačka obaveščajna služba III, str. 137 in 138)

<sup>51</sup> Ževart, Slovenska Štajerska 1942, str. 64

<sup>52</sup> Ferenc, Wehrmannschaft v boju, str. 106 in 107

<sup>53</sup> Zbornik VI/4, dok. št. 184. V dokumentu je uporabljen izraz vaške straže namesto deželne straže. Mislim, da se je pri prevajanju iz nemškega jezika v srbohrvaški in nato v slovenski jezik zgodila napaka.

<sup>50</sup> Werkschutz was organized in companies in German-occupied parts of Slovenia. Its main responsibility was to protect the company and the production. In professional aspects it was subordinate to the military and security authorities as well as to intelligence services. It was used as a system to control company's employees. It kept various files on personnel members (Nemačka obaveščajna služba III, pp. 137 and 138).

<sup>51</sup> Ževart, Slovenska Štajerska 1942, p. 64.

<sup>52</sup> Ferenc, Wehrmannschaft v boju, pp. 106 and 107.



Vermeni pred odhodom v akcijo na železniški postaji v Mariboru 16. aprila 1942. Fototeka Muzeja narodne osvoboditve Maribor

*The Wehrmannschaft members before their departure for a military mission. Maribor railway station, 16 April 1942. Photo archive of the Museum of National Liberation Maribor.*

patruljirati po terenu in varovati nemške ustanove pod vodstvom nemških orožnikov, podnevi pa opravljati svoj poklic.<sup>54</sup>

Posamezne določbe v Uiberreitherjevi odredbi se glasijo:

1. Zaradi zaščite spodnještajerskega prebivalstva pred ljudmi, ki ogrožajo javno varnost in red, se na Spodnjem Štajerskem oblikujejo deželne straže.
2. Komandant orožništva bo formiral te straže v sporazumu z zveznim vodjem Štajerske domovinske zveze.
3. Deželni straži se lahko priključijo le močni in politično neoporečni možje različnih starosti, ki so vajeni orožja, posebej pa taki,

by the head of civil administration for Lower Styria on 9 November 1942.<sup>53</sup> It was based on Himmler's order of 17 January 1942 on establishing the land watch that »is to serve as a defense of the population against the escaped prisoners of war and other vagrants who are endangering the public safety and order« and on Himmler's instructions for the land watch service of 11 August 1942. Men of appropriate age were forcibly recruited for the land watch. At night, they patrolled and protected German institutions under the command of German gendarmes while performing their usual work duties during the day.<sup>54</sup>

Some of the individual provisions in Uiberreither's decree were as following:

1. Land watch shall be established in Lower Styria in

<sup>54</sup> Ferenc, *Wehrmannschaft v boju*, str. 107; Ferenc, *Nemška okupacija*, str. 258

<sup>53</sup> *Zbornik VI/4, dok., št. 184. The document uses the term »village watch« instead of the »land watch«. I believe a mistake has been made in translation from German to Serbo-Croatian and then to Slovenian.*

<sup>54</sup> Ferenc, *Wehrmannschaft v boju*, p. 107; Ferenc, *Nemška okupacija*, p. 258.

ki so bili pri naboru začasno odklonjeni ali razglašeni za nesposobne za vojaško službo. Ni dovoljeno, da se nekoga razglasi za nesposobnega z utemeljitvijo, da se ga bo dodelilo deželni straži.

9. Deželni stražarji so oboroženi s policijskim službenim orožjem. Službeno orožje čuvajo orožniške postaje; komandir postaje ga izroči deželnim stražam pred vsakokratnim nastopom službe. Po opravljeni službi je treba orožje znova vrniti orožniški postaji. Deželnemu stražarju je prepovedano odnesti orožje domov. V izjemnih primerih lahko to dovoli le poveljnik okrajnega orožništva.
10. Deželni stražarji morajo med službo nositi uniformo Štajerske domovinske zveze ali policijsko. Prepovedano je izvajati službo v civilni obleki.
17. Vse dosedanje samoobrambne formacije na Spodnjem Štajerskem z izjemo vermanshafta ŠDZ in kočevarske samozaščite (Gottscheer Selbstschutz) se hkrati z oblikovanjem deželne straže ukinejo.<sup>55</sup>

Sistem deželnih straž je ostal vse do februarja 1945, ko je Himmler ukazal njihovo ukinitvev in vključitev v Nemški folksšturm.<sup>56</sup>

Eden od novih ukrepov, ki jih je pozimi 1942/43 izvedel okupator na Spodnjem Štajerskem, je bilo povečanje števila orožniških postaj oziroma t. i. podružnic (Zweigposten). Komandant orožništva je 28. decembra izdal povelje, v katerem je zapisal: »Po naročilu višjega vodje SS in policije v Salzburgu moramo v Spodnji Štajerski vzpostaviti tako imenovane podružnice kar v največjem številu, da bi čim bolj zavarovale prebivalstvo malih krajev pred napadi.« Tako imenovane pomožne policiste, ki so bili nekakšni orožniški pripravniki, so na prostovoljni podlagi rekrutirali že od pomladi 1941, predvsem nekdanje jugoslovanske orožnike. Jeseni 1942 so začeli kot obveznike rekrutirati tako imenovane rezervne policiste, zgolj za vojna leta, predvsem moške, rojene pred letom 1909 (ti letniki niso bili predvideni za vpoklic v vojsko), vendar so z vpoklicem počakali do pomladi 1943, ko so ga narekovali ustanovitev orožniških podružnic, okrepitev orožniških postaj, posebej pa strah pred spomladansko okrepitvijo narodnoosvobodilnega gibanja. Zato so 1. marca 1943 vpoklicali 550

order to protect its population from persons endangering the public safety and order.

2. The land watch units are established by the gendarmerie commander in agreement with the Bundesführer of the Styrian Homeland League.
3. The land watch can only be joined by strong men of different ages who are politically irreproachable and are used to handling firearms, especially those who were temporarily rejected by the drafting board or were declared unfit for military service. It is not permitted to declare an individual unfit for military service with the argument that he will be assigned to the land watch.
9. Members of the land watch are armed with police weapons. Service weapons are kept at the gendarmerie stations; commander of the station hands them to the members of the land watch at the start of their shift. At the end of the shift, the weapons are returned to the gendarmerie station. A member of the land watch is forbidden to take weapons home. In exceptional cases, this can be authorised by the county gendarmerie commander.
10. Members of the land watch have to wear the uniform of the Styrian Homeland League or police uniform during their shift. It is forbidden to serve in civilian dress.
17. With the exception of the Wehrmanschaft of the Styrian Homeland League and the Kočevje self-defense (Gottscheer Selbstschutz), all existing self-defense formations in Lower Styria shall be disbanded with the establishment of the land watch.<sup>55</sup>

The land watch system remained in use until February 1945, when Himmler ordered the land watch units to be disbanded and included into the Deutscher Volkssturm.<sup>56</sup>

One of the measures that were carried out in Lower Styria by the occupation authorities in the winter of 1942/43 was to increase the number of gendarmerie stations by establishing some smaller posts (Zweigposten). The order issued by the gendarmerie commander on 28 December stated: »By the orders of the Higher SS and Police Leader in Salzburg, the so-called Zweigposten must be established in the greatest possible number so as to give the inhabitants of towns as much protection against the attacks as possible.« The so-called auxiliary policemen were first recruited, on a voluntary basis, as early as in the spring of 1941, mostly from the ranks of former Yugoslav gendarmes. In the fall of 1942, men who had been born before 1909 (and were therefore not

<sup>55</sup> Zbornik VI/4, dok. št. 184

<sup>56</sup> Ferenc, Wehrmannschaft v boju, str. 108

<sup>55</sup> Zbornik VI/4, dok., št. 184.

<sup>56</sup> Ferenc, Wehrmannschaft v boju, p. 108.



rezervnih policistov in jih razporedili po orožniških postajah.<sup>57</sup>

Rösener je marca 1943 poročal Himmlerju in zapisal: »Tolovajsko gibanje in obstoj tolpa v zadnjem času pokazala, da ni računati z zmanjševanjem njihove dejavnosti, ki se je prenesla na težaven gozdni teren na meji pokrajin Spodnje Štajerske in Gorenjske.« V mesečnem poročilu za maj je Rösener poročal: »Uničevanje tolpe je vedno večje. Tolovaji imajo velike izkušnje in poskušajo z zahrbtnimi napadi iz zased povzročati izgube nemškimi okupacijskim silam. Izogibajo se vsakega odprtega boja in bežijo pred akcijskimi silami. Le v zelo ugodnih položajih, in če vidijo nasproti sebi šibkejšie enote in ogledovalne patrulje, se z njimi spustijo v boj.«<sup>58</sup>

Himmler, ki je že pred letom dni ukazal popolnoma uničiti slovensko partizanstvo na nemškem zasedbenem območju, ni bil zadovoljen z Rösenerjevimi uspehi. 21. junija 1943 mu je pisal: »Z Vašo dejavnostjo in dejavnostjo Vaših oddelkov nisem zadovoljen. Sovražnikove izgube so celo manjše od naših. Bodite dan in noč na poti. Tudi s šibkimi silami se da nekaj doseči, če ostane pobuda v naših rokah.« Mesečni pozneje mu je spet pisal in priložil grafično primerjavo med zaposlenimi policijskimi silami v Nemčiji, Ukrajini in njegovim območjem. »Iz nje boste ugotovili, da imate glede na število prebivalstva največ policijskih sil, kar jih mi sploh zaposlimo na vsem nemškem interesnem območju. Pričakujem torej, da boste na svojem območju kmalu in temeljito opravili s tolparji.«<sup>59</sup>

## Povzetek

Glavni smoter nemške države v 2. svetovni vojni je bil osvajalni. Za potrebe lastnega naroda so nameravali pridobiti čim več ozemlja in naravnega bogastva. V skladu s tem je okupator želel uničiti slovenski narod kot etnično enoto, da bi narodnostne meje izenačil z državnimi. Slovenski narod je bil obsojen na hitro smrt, izginil naj bi z obličja zemlje kot narod. Izvedbo temeljnega načrta za uničenje slovenskega naroda kot etnične enote bi dosegli z izgonom velikega dela narodno zavednih Slovencev, priseljencev in ljudi, katerih imetje

eligible for military recruitment) were enlisted as reserve policemen, although they did not take up their duties until the spring of 1943 when their services became necessary due to the establishment of gendarmerie *Zweigposten*, process of strengthening the gendarmerie stations, and particularly the fear that the liberation movement would intensify in the spring. Therefore, on 1 March 1943, 550 reserve policemen were recruited and allocated to the gendarmerie stations.<sup>57</sup>

In March 1943 Rösener reported to Himmler: »The bandit movement and the existence of bands of outlaws have recently shown that we cannot hope that their activities will decrease. These activities have shifted to difficult forest areas on the borders of the Lower Styria and Upper Carniola.« In his monthly report for May, Rösener wrote: »The bands commit more and more destruction. The bandits have a lot of experience and are trying to cause losses to the German occupying forces by treacherous attacks from the ambush. They avoid open fight and flee from action forces. They only accept a fight when they are in a favorable position and faced with weaker or reconnaissance units.«<sup>58</sup>

## Summary

During the Second World War, the main objective of the German state was to conquer new territories and to acquire as many lands and natural resources as possible. Accordingly, the occupying forces wanted to destroy the Slovenian nation as an ethnic unit in order to align ethnic and state borders. The Slovenian nation was to be set on a path to extinction and disappearance. The basic plan for the obliteration of the Slovenian people as an ethnic unit was to be accomplished by exiling a large number of nationally conscious Slovenians, immigrants and people whose wealth was needed for strengthening of germanism. A massive colonization by the Germans was planned for the area thus emptied. This plan was the essence of the Nazi authorities' strategy. It was to be implemented with violence in its cruelest form, thus shaping the authorities' tactics. The realization of the German objective in the occupied Slovenia was entrusted mainly to the civil administration.

By their own admission, the German occupying forces were expecting some forms of resistance (propaganda activities etc.), however, they were not expecting the partisans. The crackdown on the liberation

<sup>57</sup> Ferenc, *Wehrmannschaft v boju*, str. 109

<sup>58</sup> Ferenc, *Kdo je Erwin Rösener*. Delo, 30. 12. 1998, str. 5

<sup>59</sup> Prav tam — Konec 1. dela

<sup>57</sup> Ferenc, *Wehrmannschaft v boju*, p. 109.

<sup>58</sup> Ferenc, *Kdo je Erwin Rösener*. *Delo*, 30. 12. 1998, p. 5.

so potrebovali za krepitev nemštva. Izpraznjen prostor bi zapolnili z načrtno in množično kolonizacijo Nemcev. Omenjeni načrt je predstavljal strategijo nacističnih oblastnikov. Vse to so nameravali izvesti z nasiljem in pri tem uporabiti tudi najkrutejše oblike nasilja, s čimer so že opredelili svojo taktiko. Uresničevanje cilja nemške okupacije na Slovenskem je bila predvsem naloga civilne uprave.

Nemški okupator je priznal, da je pričakoval nekatere vrste odpora (propagandne akcije itd), a ne partizanstva. Zelo ostro je nastopil proti vsem pojavom narodnoosvobodilnega gibanja. Takoj je uvedel najkrutejše ukrepe, kot so streljanje talcev, požiganje vasi, izganjanje svojcev partizanov in ubitih talcev, »krajo« otrok itd. Uvedel je taktiko nasilja, ki je bilo neprestano eno najpomembnejših orožij v boju proti narodnoosvobodilnem gibanju. Slovenci so okusili vse vrste nasilja, ki si jih je nemški okupator zamislil. Nekatere vrste od teh so med vsemi okupiranimi narodi v Evropi okusili celo v največjem obsegu, če upoštevamo število prebivalstva. To je bila taktika, ki je uspevala le kratkoročno, kajti še tako strahovito nasilje ni moglo niti v celoti niti za daljši čas odvrniti prebivalstva od sodelovanja v boju proti okupatorju.

Na nemškem okupacijskem območju je boj zoper odporniške partizanske skupine prevzela policija: orožništvo, varnostna policija in tajna državna policija. Policijski bataljoni SS so postali jeseni 1941 osnovna bojna sila zoper partizanske čete. Jeseni 1941 so v boj proti partizanom pritegnili še enote vermanšafta, ki so imele le status pomožnih organov policije. Toda udeležba posameznih oboroženih skupin vermanov še ni pomenila večjega angažiranja te formacije za boj proti narodnoosvobodilni vojski. To se je zgodilo spomladi 1942.

Nemška policija na Slovenskem v letih 1941–1945 je bila, razen kratkega obdobja treh jesenskih mesecev 1943, v zahodni Sloveniji, glavna vodilna nemška oborožena sila pri zatiranju slovenskega naroda kot celote in partizanskega osvobodilnega gibanja kot njegovega bojujočega se dela. Akcije ali operacije proti partizanskim enotam so po nalogu gestapa vodili enote zaščitne policije, orožništvo in vermanšaft Štajerske domovinske zveze. Za večje operacije so uporabili tudi vojsko.

Vsi ukrepi in drugi napor nemškega okupatorja so bili zaman, kajti vse do konca vojne

*movement was harsh. The cruelest measures, such as shooting of hostages, burning down villages, deporting the families of partisans and executed hostages, »stealing« children, etc. were introduced without delay. The constant tactics of violence were one of the most important weapons against the liberation movement. Slovenians were a target for all kinds of violence invented by the German occupying forces. When taking into account the number of the population, the extent of some forms of violence was greater than in any other nation in Europe. However, these tactics had only a short-term success as even the most appalling violence could neither prevent the population as a whole from taking part in the fight against the occupying forces nor prevent this from happening for a longer period of time.*

*In the German-occupied territory, fighting against the partisan resistance groups was conducted by the police: gendarmerie, security police, and secret state police. From the fall of 1941, the SS police battalions were the main force employed to combat the partisan troops with the Wehrmannschaft units as their auxiliary force. However, the use of isolated groups of armed Wehrmannschaft members did not mean that there was a wide-spread engagement of this formation against the national liberation army. Such further development did not occur until the spring of 1942.*

*With the exception of a short three-month period in the western Slovenia in the fall of 1943, the German police was the main German armed force to oppress the Slovenian people as a whole and the partisan liberation movement as the actively resisting part of the population. Activities or operations against the partisan units were conducted by the protection police units, gendarmerie and the Wehrmannschaft of the Styrian Homeland League on Gestapo orders. For operations of greater importance, the army was used, as well.*

*All of the German occupying authorities' measures and efforts were unsuccessful as throughout the war they discovered no effective means to counter the partisan way of fighting. In the second half of 1944, they started implementing extensive operations in order to weaken (if not destroy) the partisan army and prevent it from seizing communication routes that the Germans units intended to use during their withdrawal from the Balkans. At the same time, the occupying forces were aware that one of the reasons for the impossibility of destroying the partisan army was a well organized and managed hinterland. The partisans employed the proven tactics of appearing unexpectedly and disappearing again. The only instrument for their destruction with the exception of betrayal was to*

niso našli učinkovitega protiukrepa zoper partizanski način bojevanja. V drugi polovici leta 1944 so začeli izvajati obsežne operacije, s katerimi naj bi, če že ne uničili partizansko vojsko, le-to vsaj oslabili in potisnili stran od komunikacij, po katerih naj bi se nemške enote umikale z Balkana. Hkrati pa se je okupator zavedal, da ne bo mogel uničiti partizanske vojske tudi zaradi čvrsto organiziranega in vodjenega zaledja. Partizani so se v skladu s preizkušeno taktiko pojavljali zdaj tu, zdaj tam in izginjali. Edino sredstvo, razen izdajstva, s katerimi jih je mogel uničevati so bile široke preiskave zemljišča. Te so zahtevale veliko sil in so bile zaradi tega možne bolj poredkoma, kajti večina okupatorjevih čet je morala hkrati statično braniti vojaško pomembne objekte in komunikacije.

...

*conduct intensive search operations in the area. Since such operations demanded a lot of troops they could only rarely be carried out as most German troops were busy with the static defense of facilities of military significance and communications.*

...



A JUGOSLAVIJA  
UGOSLOVANSKE VOJSKE  
V E N I J I  
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## NAREDBA STR.POV.ŠT.117

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III.

# Kdo je kriv za tragičen konec Slovenske narodne vojske maja 1945?

## Who is to be Blamed for the Tragic Fate of the Slovenian National Army in May 1945?

MARIJAN F. KRANJC

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### Izvleček

Prispevek obravnava nekatere dokumente o pripravah in ustanovitvi Slovenske narodne vojske, pa tudi njen tragični konec maja 1945. Gre predvsem za dokumente, ki so v beograjskem arhivu nekdanjega Vojnogodovinskega inštituta JLA, ki pa zaradi nastalih razmer dobesedno propadajo. Da bi ohranili neprecenljivo zgodovinsko gradivo o slovenski vojaški zgodovini, je namen članka tudi opozoriti odgovorne v Vojaškem muzeju SV, da poskušajo v uradnih stikih s predstavniki vojaškega muzeja srbske vojske v arhivih določiti slovensko gradivo in rešiti, kar se še da. Naloga je zaradi propadanja dokumentov nujna, kar sem poskušal prikazati v »Zaupni naredbi št. 1. Ljubljanske divizije Slovenske narodne vojske za 20. maj 1945.«

Ključne besede: druga svetovna vojna, kvizlingi, Slovenska narodna vojska, arhivi, dokumenti

### Uvod

V tem članku ne nameravam celovito predstavljati nastanka, razvoja in konca Slovenske narodne vojske, sicer kvizlinške vojaške formacije, ki je na koncu, maja 1945, vsaj formalno združila razbite enote Slovenskega domobranstva in del četniške Jugoslovanske vojske v domovini – Sloveniji (Štajerski četniški odred).

Strokovni javnosti želim predstaviti zlasti posamezne dokumente, ki so v arhivu Vojnogodovinskega inštituta v Beogradu, v dokaj

### Extract

*This article deals with some of the documents on the preparations and the establishment of the Slovenian National Army, as well as with its tragic end in May 1945. Most of the documents are kept at the Belgrade archives of the ex-Vojnoistorijski institut JNA (Yugoslav People's Army's Institute of War History). However, due to current conditions, these documents are deteriorating. Another purpose of this article is to invite the Military Museum of the Slovenian Armed Forces to attempt locating Slovenian materials in the archives through its official contacts with the representatives of the Military Museum of the Serbian Armed Forces in order to preserve priceless historical materials on Slovenian military history. The task is urgent since the physical state of the documents is getting worse as I tried to demonstrate through the »Confidential order No 1. of the commander of the Ljubljana Division of the Slovenian National Army of 20 May 1945«.*

*Keywords: Second World War, quislings, Slovenian National Army, archives, documents*

### Introduction

*This article does not intend to present a comprehensive account of the establishment, development, and disbandment of the Slovenian National Army, a quisling military formation that, at the end of the war in May 1945, formally united the shattered troops of the Slovenian Home Guard (domobranci) and part of the Chetnik army in Slovenia (Styria Chetnik Detachment).*

*The intent of this article is to acquaint the expert public with individual documents from the*

neurejenem delu (škatli) z naslovom »Sovražne enote – Ljubljanska divizija«. Nekateri dokumenti so v zelo slabem stanju, tudi kopiranje je bilo opravljeno z zastarelo tehniko. Zato bi bilo nujno, da si VMSV kmalu ogleda razmere v arhivu in pridobi kopije dokumentov, ki propadajo.

## Slovenska narodna vojska

Dobro bi bilo podrobneje preučiti, kdo in kdaj je načel idejo o ustanovitvi Slovenske narodne vojske, ali je šlo za predlog politične osebnosti ali uglednih članov vojnega sveta Slovenske zaveze, v katerem so bili vrhunski slovenski častniki vojske Kraljevine Jugoslavije (polkovnik Vladimir Vauhnik, kapetan bojne ladje Anton Kokalj, podpolkovnik Ernest Peterlin in major Karl Novak). Osebnost domnevam, da bi lahko bila idejna pobudnika Maistrova borca polkovnik Vladimir Vauhnik, ki naj bi po nemškem nalogu sodeloval pri organiziranju vojske NDH, ali podpolkovnik Ernest Peterlin, ki je bil tudi poveljnik Slovenske legije, ilegalne in zelo močne polvojaške organizacije Slovenske ljudske stranke, ki je leta 1941 štela približno 5.000 pripadnikov. Ti so sestavljali tudi prve vaške straže, ki pač niso bile vedno in povsod samonikle, temveč so bile zelo skrbno načrtovane in povezane enote Slovenske legije. Nazadnje je podpolkovnik Peterlin moral tudi prevzeti njihovo vodenje in poveljevanje, ko ga je škof Rožman »rešil« iz italijanske internacije.

Ker imamo neposredno pričevanje generalštabnega polkovnika Karla Novaka, četniškega vojvode in poveljnika JVvD – do 1943 (Marijan F. Kranjc, Slobodan Kljakić, *Plava garda – poveljnikovo zaupno poročilo*, Maribor, 2006), lahko pogledamo nekatere njegove izjave. Tako na str. 26 in 27 navaja:

»Moje načelno stališče je bilo in ostalo do konca skladno z vojaškim programom Slovenske zaveze: samo ena jugoslovanska vojska pod poveljstvom njenih zakonitih poveljnikov, aktivna borba proti okupatorju v mejah možnosti in obramba pred partizani. Stališče Slovenske zaveze se je pod pritiskom vodstva Slovenske ljudske stranke spreminjalo, dokler se ni ustavilo na stališču: Slovenska zaveza je vrhovni politični forum slovenskega naroda in suverena oblast v Sloveniji (neke vrste vlada); ne jugoslovanska vojska, temveč Slovenska

Vojnoistorijski institut (VZI - the Institute of War History) in Belgrade. These are part of poorly sorted documents in a box titled »Enemy Units - Ljubljana Division«. Unfortunately, some of the documents are in a very bad state and the copying was done using out-of-date techniques. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance that the Military Museum of the Slovenian Armed Forces view the materials and obtain copies of deteriorating documents.

## Slovenian National Army

*The question of where and when the idea for the establishment of the Slovenian National Army originated merits further investigation. It should be further researched whether the suggestion came from a politician or from reputable members of the military council of the Slovenian Alliance (Slovenska zaveza) that included accomplished Slovenian officers of the Army of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (Colonel Vladimir Vauhnik, Battleship Captain Anton Kokalj, Lieutenant Colonel Ernest Peterlin or Major Karl Novak). In my opinion, the idea initiators could have been Colonel Vladimir Vauhnik or Lieutenant Colonel Ernest Peterlin, both Maister's fighters. On German orders, Vauhnik allegedly took part in organizing the Independent State of Croatia's army. Peterlin commanded the Slovenian Legion, a powerful clandestine paramilitary organization of the Slovenian People's Party. In 1941, the Legion numbered approximately 5 000 men. The same two men established the first groups of the Village Guard that did not always appear spontaneously but were carefully organized and closely connected units of the Slovenian Legion. In the end, Lieutenant Colonel Peterlin had to take command of these units after being »rescued« from an Italian internment camp by bishop Rožman.*

*Due to the existence of a direct testimony (Marijan F. Kranjc, Slobodan Kljakić, *Plava garda – poveljnikovo zaupno poročilo*, Maribor, 2006) of General Staff Colonel Karl Novak - a Chetnik "duke" and the commander of the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland until 1943 - it is possible to take a look at some of his statements. On pages 26 and 27 he states:*

*»The principles of my position remained consistent with the military program of the Slovenian Alliance: a single army under the command of its lawful commanders, an active fight, within the limits of the possibilities, against the occupying forces, and defense against partisans. Due to the pressure from the Slovenian People's Party, the position of the Slovenian Alliance changed several times until the final position was decided on: The Slovenian Alliance is the top*



narodna vojska, ki je podrejena Slovenski zavezi, ki bo ukaze generala Draže Mihailovića prilagodila koristim Slovenije in jih kot take zatem izvedla.

To stališče je pozneje, po mojem odhodu iz Slovenije,<sup>1</sup> postalo tudi javno, ko so bile enostransko razglašene slovenska država, slovenska vlada in Slovenska narodna vojska (s potrebnim dovoljenjem že skoraj poražene Nemčije).«

Na strani 45 omenjene knjige pa major Novak navaja, kako ga je podpolkovnik Peterlin prevaral, da bodo pripadniki vaških straž prestopili v enote Jugoslovanske vojske v domovini (JVvD). Zato je takoj pohitel v Novo mesto, ker je računal, da bo našel novih tisoč mož, vendar se jih je zbralo samo petdeset. Poveljniki vaških straž so mu pokazali pisni ukaz »polkovnika Ernesta Peterlina – Logarja«, s katerim je bil ta »prehod« prepovedan. Major Novak nadaljuje:

*»Polkovnik Peterlin mi je pozneje priznal, da je ukaz izdal na podlagi sklepa posebnega sestanka voditeljev Slovenske ljudske stranke in njene Slovenske legije. V tem ukazu je bilo rečeno, da bodo vaše straže postale »Slovenska narodna vojska« (ne jugoslovanska!) in da je narodno predstavništvo imenovalo polkovnika Peterlina za njenega poveljnika, zato naj vaše straže ostanejo na svojih mestih in ubogajo njegove ukaze.«*

Pozneje so vaški stražarji postali domobranci in vso stvar so vzeli v svoje roke Nemci, ki so domobrancem namenili vlogo pomožnih policijskih sil, po nekaterih indicijah pa so celo načrtovali vzpostavitev slovenskega SS-polka oz. divizije. Ker je general Rupnik pri SS-generalu Rösenerju večkrat videl polkovnika Prezlja, je logično sklepal, da bodo tudi slovenski četniki postali del te SS-enote.

Po kapitulaciji Italije in odhodu majorja Novaka v Italijo kot četniškega predstavnika za zvezo z zavezniškimi silami je nastala vrzel pri spremljanju »zgodovine« slovenskega četništva.

Major Novak sicer navaja, da je dolžnost poveljnika predal svojemu namestniku, polkovniku Ivanu Prezlju – Andreju, vendar so tega

political forum of the Slovenian nation and a sovereign authority in Slovenia (a type of government); it is not a Yugoslav army but rather a Slovenian army under command of the Slovenian Alliance. It will first adapt General Draža Mihailović's orders to the needs of Slovenians and then carry them out.

After my departure from Slovenia<sup>1</sup>, this position became public with a unilateral declaration of the Slovenian state, government, and the Slovenian National Army (with necessary authorization from the almost defeated Germany).«

On page 45 of the above-mentioned book, Major Novak states he had been deceived by Lieutenant Colonel Peterlin who had told him the Village Guard members would transfer to the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland. Expecting to acquire a thousand additional men, Novak immediately hurried to Novo mesto, however, he found only fifty men. The Village Guard commanders showed him a written order forbidding the transfer, issued by "Colonel Ernest Peterlin - Logar". Major Novak continues:

*"Later, Colonel Peterlin admitted to me that he issued the order on the basis of a decision taken at a special meeting of the Slovenian People's Party's and Slovenian Legion's leaders. The order stipulated that the Village Guard members should transfer to the "Slovenian National Army" (not the Yugoslav army!) and stated that the National Representation appointed Colonel Peterlin as their commander and that, therefore, the Village Guard members should remain at their posts and follow Peterlin's orders."*

The Village Guard members later became the Slovenian Home Guard, acting under the command of Germans. The latter gave the Home Guard the role of an auxiliary police force and there are signs that they planned to form a Slovenian SS regiment or division. Since General Rupnik often met Colonel Prezelj at SS-General Rösener's, he reached the logical conclusion that the Slovenian officer would join this SS unit.

After Italy capitulated and Major Novak left for Italy to act as a Chetnik liaison officer with the Allies, there is a gap in the "history" of the Slovenian Chetnik movement.

Major Novak claims he was succeeded by his deputy Colonel Ivan Prezelj - Andrej. However, on 26 September 1943, Prezelj was imprisoned by Germans. After his arrest, the Battleship Captain

<sup>1</sup> Major Novak je izstopil iz Slovenske zaveze 22. septembra 1943, ko je predal poveljstvo nad JVvD svojemu namestniku, polkovniku Ivanu Prezlju – Andreju, formalno pa kapetanu bojne ladje Antonu Kokalju. Novak je odpotoval v Italijo kot obveščevalni predstavnik generala Draže Mihailovića v Italiji z zahodnimi zavezniki.

<sup>1</sup> Major Novak left the Slovenian Alliance on 22 September 1943 when he transferred actual command of the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland to his deputy, Colonel Ivan Prezelj - Andrej, while leaving the formal command to Battleship Captain Anton Kokalj. Novak departed to Italy as intelligence service representative of General Draža Mihailović to Western Allies.

Nemci 26. 9. 1943 zaprli. Zato je dolžnost poveljnika sprejel kapetan bojne ladje Anton Kokalj, ki pa je po nekaj mesecih »odpovedal« in se umaknil na Gorenjsko. Nastalo naj bi neka kšna dvovladje, saj sta v nekaterih dokumentih omenjeni dve četniški poveljstvi: poveljnik vzhodne Slovenije (podpolkovnik Djoka Vujošević) in poveljnik zahodne Slovenije (major Andrej Glušič – Vojin).

### Kdo je bil »general Račič«?

Zanimivo je, da sem na dveh mestih – v beograjskem vojaškem arhivu in AS, dislociranem oddelku, našel dva dokumenta, ki potrjujeta, da je slovenskim četnikom do sredine junija 1944 poveljeval neki »general Račič«. Šlo je seveda za brigadnega generala Vladimirja Vauhnik! Zato prikazujem oba dokumenta: kopijo njegovega ukaza z dne 25. aprila 1944 (VZI, Beograd, šk. 150), s katerim je imenoval štiri člane (novega) vojnega sveta in določil njegove pristojnosti, pa tudi ukaz z dne 23. maja 1944 (AS, dislocirani oddelek, slovenski četniki) o vzpostavitvi organizacijskega oddelka ter postavitvi načelnika (majorja Mirka Bitenca) in članov tega oddelka (kapetanov 1. razreda ing. Lada Bevca in dr. Valentina Benedika). Zaradi vala nemških aretacij na Hrvaškem in v Sloveniji je brigadni general Vladimir Vauhnik, v. d. poveljnika Kraljevske jugoslovanske vojske v Sloveniji, sredi junija 1944 moral zapustiti Slovenijo. Prek Italije je na svoj rojstni dan 24. 6. 1944 prispel v Švico in mu lahko pripišemo avtorstvo omenjenih dveh ukazov.

V AS sem tudi našel nekakšno zbirno agenturno poročilo o Glavnem poveljstvu četniških odredov Slovenije (pri Notranjskem četniškem odredu), kjer je na prvem mestu navedeno: »Komandant general Vauhnik, na akte se podpisuje z ilegalnim imenom Račič. Star cca 45 let, visok cca 170 cm in bolj debel, delno plešast. Hodi v civilu v sivi obliki z dolgimi hlačami. Nosi usnjen površnik črne barve, siv klobuk.«

Poleg njega so v poročilu navedeni člani štaba: major Bitenc Mirko – Milan Tržan, neimenovan srbski podpolkovnik in poročnik korvete Pleš; obveščevalni štab DOS: podporočnik Bratko (Janežič, iz Litije), Rupreht (policist), Rus – Srač (policijski komisar z Vrhnik); intendatura: major Čokan, poročnik Živko, podporočnik Mirko, poročnik Branko

Anton Kokalj took over the command but resigned after only a few months and relocated to Upper Carniola. It seems there were two Chetnik commanders after that as some documents mention the commander of eastern Slovenia (Lieutenant Colonel Djoka Vujošević) and the commander of western Slovenia (Major Andrej Glušič - Vojin).

### Who Was "General Račič"?

It is interesting that I was able to find, in two different locations (at the Vojnoistorijski institut in Belgrade and at the branch location of the Arhiv Republike Slovenije - AS, Archives of the Republic of Slovenia), two documents confirming that the Slovenian Chetniks were under the command of a certain »General Račič« until the middle of June 1944. This is definitely a reference to the Brigade General Vladimir Vauhnik. Both documents are presented below: the copy of his order of 25 April 1944 (VZI, Belgrade, box 150) appointing four members of the (new) military council and setting out the council's competencies, and the order of 23 May 1944 (AS, branch location, Slovenian Chetniks) on the formation of an organizational department and on appointment of the chief of staff (Major Mirko Bitenc) and members of the organizational department (Captain first class (Eng.) Lado Bevc and Captain first class (Dr.) Valentin Benedik). A wave of German arrests in Croatia and Slovenia forced the Brigade General Vladimir Vauhnik (acting commander of the Royal Yugoslav Army) to leave Slovenia in the middle of June 1944. He reached Switzerland via Italy on his birthday, 24 June 1944. The authorship of the two documents can be attributed to him.

In the AS, I also found a sort of an agency synthesis report on the General Command of the Chetnik Detachments of Slovenia (based at the Inner Carniola Chetnik Detachment). It begins with: "Commanded by General Vauhnik who signs documents with the clandestine name Račič. He is app. 45 years old and app. 170 cm tall, rather fat and partially bald. He wears civilian clothes, a grey suit with long trousers. He wears a black leather overcoat and a grey hat."

The report mentions other members of the General Headquarters: Major Mirko Bitenc - Milan Tržan, an unnamed Serbian Lieutenant Colonel and Corvette Lieutenant Pleš; Intelligence Headquarters of the State Intelligence Service: Second Lieutenant Bratko (Janežič, from Litija), Rupreht (a police officer), Rus - Srač (police commissioner from Vrhnik); quartermaster's department: Major Čokan, Lieutenant Živko, Second Lieutenant Mirko, Lieutenant Branko

(iz Trsta) itn. Štab naj bi bil stalno ob Notranjskem četniškem odredu.

Milosav Samardžić v svoji drugi knjigi monografije z naslovom *General Draža Mihailović i opšta istorija četničkog pokreta*, Kragujevac, 2005, na str. 553–625 navaja šifre četniških poveljnikov, enot in sodelavcev, pa tako za Vladimirja Vauhnik, polkovnika in generala, v. d. poveljnika Slovenije, navaja te psevdonime: Vlajko, general Račić, p. puk. Vasić.

Zanimivo je, da je imel major Karl Novak zelo negativno mnenje o polkovniku Vladimirju Vauhniku. To niti ni zelo čudno, saj smo našli tudi nekaj depeš generala Mihailovića, v katerih majorju Novaku in polkovniku Vauhniku naroča iste naloge. To lahko pomeni le, da je bil polkovnik Vauhnik, sicer Mihailovićev sošolec iz visoke francoske vojne šole, nekakšen svetovalec mlajšemu majorju Novaku. Po drugi strani je tudi zelo zanimivo, da Vladimir Vauhnik v svojih spominih nikjer ne omenja svojega neposrednega sodelovanja oz. celo poveljevanja slovenskim četnikom. Njegov brat Miloš in prijatelj Makso Šnuderl celo energično zavračata, da bi Vauhnik poveljeval slovenskim plavogardistom (menda je zavrnil položaj partizanskega poveljnika!), saj bi kot v. d. poveljnika, tudi s činom brigadnega generala, vsekakor izgubil avreolo obveščevalne legende (več o tem v moji naslednji knjigi *Legendarni slovenski obveščevalci*).

## Dokumenti o ustanovitvi Slovenske narodne vojske

V beograjskem arhivu VZI sta tudi dve uredbi, in sicer: Uredba o ustanovitvi slovenske narodne vojske z dne 29. oktobra 1944 in Uredba o ureditvi slovenske narodne vojske z dne 21. januarja 1945, ki ju podajam v izvirniku (kopiji sta izročeni VMSV), brez komentarja, vendar z bistveno pripombo: ne gre za nikakršno avtohtono slovensko narodno vojsko, temveč za slovensko armado Kraljeve jugoslovanske vojske, kar dovolj zgovorno dokazuje tudi izkaznica, ki jo je ažurni poveljnik Štajerskega četniškega odreda delil svojim pripadnikom pred odhodom na Koroško – v britansko ujetništvo!

Ker je bil za prvega poveljnika Slovenske narodne vojske imenovan brigadni general Prezel, naj navedem kratko predstavitev iz moje knjige (*Plava garda – poveljnikovo zaupno*

(from Trieste), etc. The General Headquarters were apparently permanently based at the Inner Carniola Chetnik Detachment.

On pages 553 - 625 of his second monograph, titled *General Draža Mihailović i opšta istorija četničkog pokreta*, Kragujevac, 2005, Milosav Samardžić quotes the codes of Chetnik commanders, units and collaborators and mentions the following clandestine names of Vladimir Vauhnik, Colonel and General, acting commander for Slovenia: Vlajko, General Račić, Lt. Col. Vasić.

Major Karl Novak had a distinctly negative opinion of Vladimir Vauhnik. This is not surprising considering that several despatches by General Mihailović giving the same assignments to Major Novak and Colonel Vauhnik were found. The only possible interpretation is that Colonel Vauhnik, who had been Mihailović's classmate at a French high military academy, acted as an adviser to the younger Major Novak. On the other hand, it is interesting that nowhere in his memoirs does Vladimir Vauhnik mention his direct involvement with the Slovenian Chetniks and his role of a commander. His brother Miloš and friend Makso Šnuderl categorically deny that Vauhnik ever commanded the Blue Guard (plava garda) - (he is claimed to have rejected the position of a partisan commander!). This is due to the fact that he would lose the halo of an intelligence legend if he were found to have been an acting commander with the rank of Brigade General (this will be further discussed in my next book, *Legendarni slovenski obveščevalci*).

## Documents on the Establishment of the Slovenian National Army

There are also two regulations that can be found at the VZI archives in Belgrade: Regulation on the Establishment of the Slovenian National Army of 29 October 1944 and Regulation on the Organization of the Slovenian National Army of 21 January 1945. They are presented in this article in their original form (copies have been submitted to the Military Museum of the Slovenian Armed Forces). No comments are added except for a pertinent remark: this was not a purely Slovenian army but rather a Slovenian army of the Royal Yugoslav Army. This is well proven by identity cards given to the members of the Styria Chetnik Detachment by their then commander before their departure to Carinthia where they were interned by the British.

Because the Brigade General Prezelj was appointed the first commander of the Slovenian National Army a short presentation from my book (*Plava garda*



Narodni odbor za Slovenijo izdaje na podlagi narodne izjave s dne 29. oktobra 1944 in člena 7. uredba o ustanovitvi slovenske narodne vojske s dne 21. 1. 1945

#### uredbo

o ureditvi slovenske narodne vojske.

##### Člen 1.

Pripadniki slovenske narodne vojske so vsi telesno in duševno zdravi moški slovenske narodne skupnosti narodnosti v starosti od dopolnjenega 18. do dopolnjenega 55. leta starosti, ki niso v narodnostni ostri s svojim državljanstvom in dejansko nikoli niso izražili protinacionalnega slovenskega naroda in svojo državo v čemkoli v nasprotju s slovenskimi interesi in so:

- a) v ilegalnih odredih in enotah,
- b) v obstoječih vojaških enotah,
- c) izven obsega svojih skupin.

##### Člen 2.

Slovenska vlada mora za predlog državnega tajnika za vojsko splošno uredbi razpisati vojaško obveznost od 18. starostnega leta do vključno 50. leta.

##### Člen 3.

Služba v slovenski narodni vojski sloni na načelu prostovoljnosti in na načelu obveznosti v okviru zakonitih predpisov.

##### Člen 4.

V slovensko narodno vojsko morajo prostovoljno vstopiti tudi pripadniki drugih in slovenskih narodov ako se to izrazi s svojimi željami in se sprejeli. Častnike prejemajo vrhovna vojaška oblast, podčastnike poveljniki divizij, samostojnih odredov, kaplarje in moštvo pa poveljniki bataljonov.

##### Člen 5.

Pripadniki slovenske narodne vojske prisegajo kralju in slovenski narodu na glas:

"Jas (ine in priimek) privzem pri vsemogočnem Bogu, da bom poslušan slovenski narodu pa svetil in da vse čude vidim, da se bom za slovenski narod in njegovo svetino ter kraljevo Ju celovito in junaško boril, da se ne bom nikjer in nikoli iznevil vojski in stvari, ter da bom poslušal in steno izpolnil vsakega vseh od narodnega odbora za Slovenijo postavljenih nadrejenih starešin. Naj mi pri tem pomaga Vsemogočni Bog!"

##### Člen 6.

Kako bo razdeljena narodna država Slovenija v vojaškoteritorialne osirje, se bo predpisalo s posebno uredbi.

##### Člen 7.

Pripadniki slovenske narodne vojske morajo biti povišani v višje čine brez osirja na roke, čole in izpite predvidene v veljavni za vojski.

##### Člen 8.

Pravice povišanja imajo:

- 1.) Narodni odbor za Slovenijo za vse čine,
- 2.) državni tajnik za vojsko, poveljniki slovenske narodne vojske in poveljniki armad do vključno narodnika vodnika,
- 3.) poveljniki divizij in samostojnih odredov do vključno narodnika,
- 4.) poveljniki brigad in poveljniki mest Ljubljane do vključno podčastnika,
- 5.) poveljniki bataljonov v čin kaplarja.

##### Člen 9.

Pravice postavitve enot v štabih, razen poveljnikov, ima državni tajnik za vojsko v kolikor gre za položaje, ki se morajo ustalo enotje štabov postavljajo poveljniki sami in vrst vojske moštva, v katero spadajo tudi vsi podčastniki.

##### Člen 10.

Poveljniki čet postavljajo poveljniki divizij, samostojnih odredov in poveljstvo mesta Ljubljane. Četnike v svojem področju rasporejajo poveljniki bataljonov, v okviru čete pa poveljniki čet.

##### Člen 11.

Pri postavitvah, razporeditvah in napredovanjih ni razlike med aktivnimi in rezervnimi častniki ter podčastniki.

##### Člen 12.

Prijenki pripadnikov slovenske narodne vojske, pokojnine vseh vrst ter podpore vojinin vdovam in sirotam se bodo določile s posebno uredbi.

##### Člen 13.

Ta uredba je razpisana s dnem sprejetja v narodnem odboru za Slovenijo in stopi s istim dnem v veljavo.

Polekaj dne 5. aprila 1945.

Narodni odbor za Slovenijo: Uredba o ustanovitvi Slovenske narodne vojske, 21. 1. 1945 (VZI, Beograd, Sovražne enote, šk. 274)

National Committee for Slovenia: Regulation on the Establishment of the Slovenian National Army, 21 January 1945 (VZI, Belgrade, "Enemy units", box 274)

poročilo, Maribor, 2006, str. 29):

PREZELJ Ivan – Andrej (Nova vas v Loški dolini, 29. 8. 1895 – Cleveland, 22. 4. 1973), divizijski general JVVd. Kot rezervni poročnik AOV in Maistrov borec je bil udeleženec bojev na soški fronti. V VKJ je končal višjo vojno akademijo, bil vojni ataše v Grčiji, pred aprilsko vojno 1941 pa je bil načelnik prometne uprave GŠ VKJ. Po vrnitvi iz italijanske internacije leta 1942 se je priključil četniški vojski v Sloveniji kot namestnik majorja Novaka. Spomladi 1944 je bil povišan v brigadnega generala in obnem postavljen za poveljnika slovenske JVVd. Decembra 1944 je bil povišan v divizijskega generala, aprila 1945 pa imenovan za poveljnika Slovenske narodne vojske. Maja 1945 se je vdal angleški vojski v Italiji, od koder je do 1949 obveščevalno deloval proti SFRJ. Potem je emigriral v ZDA, kjer se je preživljal kot tovarniški delavec in poverjenik časopisa *Ameriška domovina*. Napisal je uvod za Vauhnikovo knjigo *Nevidna fronta*. Uporabljal je psevdonime Andrej, Areta in polkovnik Lesar.

O neslavni usodi formalnih pripadnikov Slovenske narodne vojske je četniški vojvoda in generalštabni polkovnik Karl Novak 9. decembra 1945 v Rimu napisal tudi tole:

»Ta usodna politika Slovenske zaveze oziroma njenega vsemogočnega klerikalnega dela je v Sloveniji preprečila zmago Kraljeve jugoslovanske vojske v domovini, a je zato

– poveljnikovo zaupno poročilo, Maribor, 2006, p. 29) is included:

PREZELJ Ivan - Andrej (Nova vas in Loška dolina, 29 August 1895 - Cleveland, 22 April 1973), Division General of the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland. As a Reserve Lieutenant of the army of Austria-Hungary he participated in the battles of the Soča Front. As a member of the Army of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia he graduated from a high military academy. He was a military attache in Greece and the chief of staff of the Transport Department of the Army of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia's Headquarters before the April War. After his return from Italian internment he joined the Chetnik army in Slovenia as Major Novak's deputy. In the spring of 1944, he was promoted to the rank of Brigade General and was simultaneously appointed commander of the Slovenian part of the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland. In December 1944, he was promoted to the rank of a Division General and became commander of the Slovenian National Army in April 1945. In May 1945, he surrendered to the British army in Italy and carried out intelligence activities against the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia until 1949. Later he emigrated to the United States where he made his living as a factory worker and contributor to the newspaper *Ameriška domovina* / *American Home*. He wrote an introduction for Vauhnik's *Nevidna fronta*. He was using clandestine names Andrej, Areta and Colonel Lesar.

The infamous fate of the formal members of the Slovenian National Army was described by the Chetnik



Izkaznica podnarednika »Rado«, pripadnika Štajerskega četniškega odreda oz. Dravskega odreda Slovenske armade Jugoslovanske vojske v domovini, izdana 26. 4. 1945 – pred odhodom na Koroško (Zasebni arhiv podnarednika »Rado«)

Identity card of the Junior Sergeant "Rado", a member of the Styria Chetnik Detachment /the Drava Detachment of the Slovenian Army of the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland, Issued on 26 April 1945, before the Departure for Carinthia (Personal Archives of Junior Sergeant "Rado")

povzročila tudi poraz klerikalne strankarske vojaške organizacije po italijanski kapitulaciji. Po nemški kapitulaciji poleti 1945 je prišlo tudi do strašne tragedije: t. i. Slovenska narodna vojska (tj. Rupnikovi domobranc, ki se niso smeli pridružiti vojski generala Draže Mihailovića) je po ukazu samooklicane slovenske vlade brez boja zapustila t. i. slovensko državo, nato so jo zavezniki razorožili in predali Titovim partizanom na milost in nemilost.<sup>2</sup>

Okrog 11.000 odličnih borcev je brez borbe padlo kot žrtve napačne vojaške taktike Slovenske zaveze, ki se je povsem odcepila od generala Draže Mihailovića in Kraljeve jugoslovanske vojske. Niso smeli zmagati za Jugoslavijo, toda morali so umreti za svojo stranko!»

“duke” and General Staff Colonel Karl Novak on 9 December 1945 in Rome:

“This fatal policy of the Slovenian Alliance or its all-powerful clerical part prevented the Royal Yugoslav Army in the Homeland from winning, but it also caused the defeat of the clerical party’s military organization after the Italian capitulation. After the German capitulation in the summer of 1945, a terrible tragedy occurred: the so-called Slovenian National Army (i.e. Rupnik’s Home Guard that was not permitted to join General Draža Mihailović’s army) followed the orders of the self-styled Slovenian government and left the so-called Slovenian state without putting up a fight. Later, they were disarmed by the Allies, handed over to Tito’s partisans, and left to the mercy of the latter.”<sup>2</sup>

Approximately 11.000 excellent soldiers died without a battle and as victims of the misguided military tactics of the Slovenian Alliance which seceded completely from the General Draža Mihailović and the Royal Yugoslav Army. They were not allowed to win for Yugoslavia, but they had to die for their Party!»

<sup>2</sup> Različni viri: Gre za ukaz britanskega generala Briana Robertsona z dne 14. maja 1945, po katerem so vse zajete domobrance oziroma pripadnike »Slovenske narodne vojske«, približno 11.000, vrnili v Slovenijo, kjer so bili zunajsoodno pobiti na Teharju in v Kočevskem rogu. (M. F. K.)

<sup>2</sup> Various sources: By the order of the British General Brian Robertson of 14 May 1945 commanding that all captured Home Guard and the “Slovenian National Army” members (approximately 11 000) be sent back to Slovenia. They were executed in Teharje and Kočevski Rog without a trial. (M. F. K.)



## Prvi dokument Ljubljanske divizije (rekonstrukcija)

V že omenjenem beograjskem arhivu je v škatli z napisom »Ljubljanska divizija« tudi nekaj dokumentov poveljnika te domobranske divizije, nazadnje vključene v Slovensko narodno vojsko. Iz kopij prve in zadnje strani je razvidno, da je besedilo komaj berljivo, zato sem naredil rekonstrukcijo in prepis.<sup>3</sup>

PREPIS – REKONSTRUKCIJA

PRVE »ZAUPNE NAREDBE« POVELJNIKA »LJUBLJANSKE DIVIZIJE« SNV

Žig za označevanje:

Vojnogodovinski inštitut JLA

Sovražne enote

Št. reg. 1, fascikla 1

Škatla 274

ZAUPNA NAREDBA št. 1

poveljnika Ljubljanske divizije SNV za 20. maj 1945

I.

Po prihodu slovenskih oboroženih enot na Koroško je radi nastalih razmer potrebno, da se vse te enote strnejo v eno celoto ter da se vsi pripadniki slovenske narodne vojske na tem ozemlju postavijo pod enotno vodstvo, zato

o d r e j a m:

1. Vsi pripadniki dosedanje Ljubljanske divizije, Gorske divizije, Dravskega, Gorenjskega in Primorskega odreda, ki se nahajajo na koroškem ozemlju, spadajo v Ljubljansko divizijo Slovenske narodne vojske pod mojim poveljstvom.

2. Ljubljansko divizijo tvorijo z današnjim dnem sledeče enote divizije: 1., 2., 3. in 4. polk, artillerijski divizion, tehnični, dopolnilni in orožniški bataljon in divizijska štabna četa.

II.

Častnike Slovenske narodne vojske razporejam po sledečem:

1. V štab Ljubljanske divizije:

- pomočnik poveljnika: polkovnik Vizjak Milko
- načelnik štaba: podpolkovnik Drčar Ivan
- pomočnik načelnika štaba: kapetan 1. razreda Sekolec Franjo
- pribočnik: poročnik Meršol Miroslav
- obveščevalni častnik: kapetan 1. razreda Kovač Avgust
- častnik za zvezo: kapetan Kraigher Metod
- častnik za formacijo in evidenco: kapetan 1. razreda Gliha Viktor
- pribočnik – častnik: major Lah Ladislav
- načelnik intendantske službe: major Pfeifer Josip
- referent sodstva: kapetan 1. razreda Capuder Alfonz
- referent zdravstva: poročnik Iglič dr. Maks
- načelnik veterinarske službe: kapetan 1. razreda Drinovec Milan
- verski referent: kapetan Lenček dr. Ignacij
- šef propagande: poročnik Ilija dr. Alojz
- tolmača: narednik Konda Ivan in podnarednik Kos Vladimir

<sup>3</sup> Osebnostne podatke sem lahko delno preverjal samo po knjigi Janka Modra, Dr. Valentin Meršol in veliki slovenski teden, Celje, 2005



## **The First Document of the Ljubljana Division (Reconstructed)**

A box titled "Ljubljana Division" in the aforementioned Belgrade archives contains some documents of the commander of the Ljubljana Home Guard Division that formed a part of the Slovenian National Army at the end of its existence. As copies of the first and the last page demonstrate, the text is barely legible, therefore I reconstructed it and made a transcript.<sup>3</sup>

### **TRANSCRIPT - RECONSTRUCTION OF THE FIRST "CONFIDENTIAL ORDER" OF THE COMMANDER OF THE "LJUBLJANA DIVISION" OF THE SLOVENIAN NATIONAL ARMY**

Stamped with:

Vojnoistorijski institut JNA (Yugoslav People's Army's Institute of War History)

Enemy units

Reg. No 1, file 1

Box 274

CONFIDENTIAL ORDER No 1

of the Commander of the Ljubljana Division of the Slovenian National Army of 20 May 1945

I.

Circumstances after the arrival of the Slovenian armed units to Carinthia require that these units be combined and that every member of the Slovenian National Army in Carinthia be put under the same command, therefore

*I o r d e r t h a t:*

1. All members of the current Ljubljana Division, Mountain Division, and Drava, Upper Carniola, and Primorska Detachments that are located in the region of Carinthia become a part of the Ljubljana Division of the Slovenian National Army under my command.

2. From today, the Ljubljana Division consists of the following division units: 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Regiments, Artillery Division, and Technical, Replacement and Gendarmerie Battalions and a Division Staff Company.

II.

The officers of the Slovenian National Army listed below are appointed to serve as:

1. Ljubljana Division Staff Headquarters:

- Assistant Commanding Officer: Colonel Milko Vizjak

- Chief of Staff: Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Drčar

- Assistant Chief of Staff: Captain first class Franjo Sekolec

- Adjutant: Lieutenant Miroslav Meršol

- Intelligence Officer: Captain first class Avgust Kovač

- Liaison Officer: Captain Metod Kraigher

- Formation and Records Officer: Captain first class Viktor Gliha

- Adjutant – Officer: Major Ladislav Lah

- Chief of Quartermaster's Department: Major Josip Pfeifer

- Legal Officer: Captain first class Alfonz Capuder

- Medical Officer: Lieutenant (Dr.) Maks Iglič

- Chief of Veterinary Services: Captain first class Milan Drinovec

- Chaplain: Captain (Dr.) Ignacij Lenček

- Propaganda Officer: Lieutenant (Dr.) Alojz Ilija

- Interpreters: Sergeant Ivan Konda and Vice-Sergeant Vladimir Kos

<sup>3</sup> Personal data could only be partially verified from the text of Janko Moder's *Dr. Valentin Meršol in veliki slovenski teden*, Celje, 2005.

Potrebno pisarniško osebje in pribočnike bo odredil pribočnik poveljnika divizije.  
Častniki za pojedine odseke štaba bodo postavljeni s posebnim ukazom.

## **2. 1. polk:**

poveljnik: podpolkovnik Cof Emil  
pribočnik: podporočnik Pipp Viktor  
intendant: poročnik Vovko Vladimir  
blagajnik: podporočnik Krobež Vladimir  
zdravnik: poročnik Končan dr. Oskar  
preiskovalni sodnik: podporočnik Kalin dr. Angel in vojak Kocmur Sebastijan  
kurata: Kupljenik Franc in Mejač Franc

poveljniki bataljonov

1. bataljon: kapetan 1. razreda Bitenc Stanko
2. bataljona: kapetan 1. razreda Tomič Leopold
3. bataljona: major Boh Ivan

poveljniki čet

1. čete: kapetan Belot Božidar
  2. čete: poročnik Mejač Franc
  3. čete: poročnik Jakoš Jože
  4. čete: poročnik Mrak Franc
  5. čete: podporočnik Sladič Jože
  6. čete: podporočnik Toganac Jože
  7. čete: poročnik Golob Stane
  8. čete: poročnik Kregalj Bogomir
  9. čete: poročnik Frakelj Franc
  1. težke čete: poročnik Auser Ivan
  2. težke čete: poročnik Kralj Franc
  3. težke čete: poročnik Škvarča Janez
- komandna četa: kapetan Buča Stane

vodniki: podporočniki Logar Franc, Vovk Janez, Starina Božo, Gostič Ciril, Hrovat Mirko, Komovec Franc, Potočar Anton, Grilc Slavko, Fric Franc, Vižintin Stane, Reven (?) Slavko, Kompara Anton, Kovačič Jože, Škrlj Stane, Habjan Franc, Truden Anton, Cerar Janez, Vovk Alojzij, Lužar Stane, Cerar Franc, Valant Franc in poročnik Puhan Karol.

## **3. 2. polk:**

poveljnik: podpolkovnik Rupnik Vuk  
pribočnik: podporočnik Mušič Rudolf  
intendant: poročnik Kosič Franc  
blagajnik: poročnik Smolinsky Miroslav  
zdravnik: Rupar dr. Marija  
preiskovalni sodnik: podporočnik Namar dr. Emil in vojak Jeglič Jože  
kurati: poročniki Mavec Jakob, Polda Anton in Pezdir Franc

poveljniki bataljonov

1. bataljon: kapetan 1. razreda Rihar Ivan
2. bataljon: kapetan 1. razreda Šabič Miloš
3. bataljon: kapetan 2. razreda: Šuštaršič Ratko

poveljnik čet

1. četa: poročnik Kralj Janez
2. četa: poročnik Pavlič Franc
3. četa: kapetan 2. razreda Kavčič Jože

Clerical staff and adjutants shall be appointed by the Division Commander's Adjutant.  
Officers of individual Headquarters sections shall be appointed by means of a separate order.

## **2. 1st Regiment:**

Commander: Lieutenant Colonel Emil Cof  
Adjutant: Second Lieutenant Viktor Pipp  
Quartermaster: Lieutenant Vladimir Vovko  
Bursar: Second Lieutenant Vladimir Krobež  
Physician: Lieutenant (Dr.) Oskar Končan  
Investigating judge: Second Lieutenant (Dr.) Angel Kalin and Private Sebastijan Kocmur  
Chaplains: Franc Kupljenik and Franc Mejač

### *Batallion Commanders*

1st Batallion: Captain first class Stanko Bitenc  
2nd Batallion: Captain first class Leopold Tomič  
3rd Batallion: Major Ivan Boh

### *Company Commanders*

1st Company: Captain Božidar Belot  
2nd Company: Lieutenant Franc Mejač  
3rd Company: Lieutenant Jože Jakoš  
4th Company: Lieutenant Franc Mrak  
5th Company: Second Lieutenant Jože Sladič  
6th Company: Second Lieutenant Jože Toganac  
7th Company: Lieutenant Stane Golob  
8th Company: Lieutenant Bogomir Kregalj  
9th Company: Lieutenant Franc Frakelj  
1st Heavy Company: Lieutenant Ivan Auser  
2nd Heavy Company: Lieutenant Franc Kralež  
3rd Heavy Company: Lieutenant Janez Škvarča  
Command Company: Captain Stane Buča:

Platoon commanders: Second Lieutenants Franc Logar, Janez Vovk, Božo Starina, Ciril Gostič, Mirko Hrovat, Franc Komovec, Anton Potočar, Slavko Grilc, Franc Fric, Stane Vižintin, Slavko Reven(?), Anton Kompara, Jože Kovačič, Stane Škrlj, Franc Habjan, Anton Truden, Janez Cerar, Alojzij Vovk, Stane Lužar, Franc Cerar, Franc Valant and Lieutenant Karol Puhar.

## **3. 2nd Regiment:**

Commander: Lieutenant Colonel Vuk Rupnik  
Adjutant: Second Lieutenant Rudolf Mušič  
Quartermaster: Lieutenant Franc Kosič  
Bursar: Lieutenant Miroslav Smolinsky  
Physician: Dr. Marija Rupar  
Investigating judge: Second Lieutenant (Dr.) Emil Namar and Private Jože Jeglič  
Chaplains: Lieutenants Jakob Mavec, Anton Polda and Franc Pezdir

### *Batallion Commanders*

1st Batallion: Captain first class Ivan Rihar  
2nd Batallion: Captain first class Miloš Šabič  
3rd Batallion: Captain second class Ratko Šuštaršič

### *Company Commanders*

1st Company: Lieutenant Janez Kralj  
2nd Company: Lieutenant Franc Pavlič  
3rd Company: Captain second class Jože Kavčič



4. četa: podporočnik Gorenc Jože
5. četa: podporočnik Babič Stanko
6. četa: podporočnik Vidmar Rudolf
7. četa: poročnik Stanjko Milko
8. četa: poročnik Lavrič Jože
9. četa: poročnik Pajnič Jože
1. težka četa: podporočnik Ivanc Ivan
2. težka četa: poročnik Golobič Jože
3. težka četa: poročnik Pezdir dr. Jože
- komandna četa: poročnik Bajec Teodor

Vodniki: podporočniki Hren Ludvik, Selan Leopold, Kranjc Jože, Štrukelj Zdravko, Švigelj Anton, Urh Niko, Mehle Andrej, Zajec Anton, Južnič Stane, Kalan Peter, Koroša Joško, Novak Janez, Kobal Anton, Gregorič Alojz, Pipp Dušan, Novak Franc, Žerjav Jože, Pogačar Peter, Pirih Milan, Praznik Janez, Žužek Nikolaj in Primc Feliks.

#### 4. 3. polk:

poveljnik: major Kunstelj Maks  
 pribočnik: poročnik Juvan Anton  
 intendant: poročnik Potočnik dr. Alojzij  
 blagajnik: podporočnik Primožič Ivan  
 zdravnik: podporočnik Juvan dr. Vladimir  
 preiskovalni sodnik: podporočnik Ložar Slavko in vojak Mele  
 kurati: poročniki: Molar Jože, Kunstelj Franc in Fink Matija

poveljniki bataljonov

1. bataljon: kapetan 1. razreda Leskošek Branko
2. bataljon: kapetan 1. razreda Vesel Janez
3. bataljon: kapetan 2. razreda Urbančič Stanislav

poveljniki čet

1. četa: poročnik Seibitz Miroslav
2. četa: poročnik Vovk Franc
3. četa: poročnik Prepar Cvetko
4. četa: kapetan 1. razreda Posavec Srečko
5. četa: kapetan 2. razreda Bastič Alojzij
6. četa: poročnik Lipoglavšek Franc
7. četa: poročnik Božič Anton
8. četa: poročnik Urbas Marjan
9. četa: poročnik Babnik Ivan
1. težka četa: podporočnik Tomc Vekoslav
2. težka četa: poročnik Pirih Vladimir
3. težka četa: poročnik Krpič Jože
- komandne čete: poročnik Tomšič Adolf

Vodniki: podporočniki Kristan Bojan, Benčina Milan, Budja Stanko, Ščančar Martin, Butole Feliks, Mlakar Ivan, Čampa Alojzij, Kočevar Franc, Grdadolnik Ivan, Govše Franc, Kostotič Jovo, Ovnik Jože, Kolbezen Vinko, Grčar Franc, Lovše Janez, Grsi Franjo, Flantar Anton, Kobal Jakob, Čelešnik Franc in poročnika Debevc Franc in Pliberšek Franc.

#### 5. 4. polk:

poveljnik: major Mehle Anton  
 pribočnik: podporočnik Kirschegger Ernest  
 intendant: podporočnik Pučko Andrej  
 blagajnik: podporočnik Gros Henrich

4th Company: Second Lieutenant Jože Gorenc  
 5th Company: Second Lieutenant Stanko Babič  
 6th Company: Second Lieutenant Rudolf Vidmar  
 7th Company: Lieutenant Milko Stanjko  
 8. Company: Lieutenant Jože Lavrič  
 9. Company: Lieutenant Jože Pajnič  
 1st Heavy Company: Second Lieutenant Ivan Ivanc  
 2nd Heavy Company: Lieutenant Jože Golobič  
 3rd Heavy Company: Lieutenant (Dr.) Jože Pezdir  
 Command Company: Lieutenant Teodor Bajec  
 Platoon commanders: Second Lieutenants Ludvik Hren, Leopold Selan, Jože Kranjc, Zdravko Štrukelj, Anton Švigelj, Niko Urh, Andrej Mehle, Anton Zajec, Stane Južnič, Peter Kalan, Joško Koroša, Janez Novak, Anton Kobal, Alojz Gregorič, Dušan Pipp, Franc Novak, Jože Žerjav, Peter Pogačar, Milan Pirih, Janez Praznik, Nikolaj Žužek and Feliks Primc.

#### **4. 3rd Regiment:**

Commander: Major Maks Kunstelj  
 Adjutant: Lieutenant Anton Juvan  
 Quartermaster: Lieutenant (Dr.) Alojzij Potočnik  
 Bursar: Second Lieutenant Ivan Primožič  
 Physician: Second Lieutenant (Dr.) Vladimir Juvan  
 Investigating judge: Second Lieutenant Slavko Ložar and Private Mele  
 Chaplains: Lieutenants Jože Molar, Franc Kunstelj and Matija Fink

##### *Batallion Commanders*

1st Batallion: Captain first class Branko Leskošek  
 2nd Batallion: Captain first class Janez Vesel  
 3rd Batallion: Captain second class Stanislav Urbančič

##### *Company Commanders*

1st Company: Lieutenant Miroslav Seibitz  
 2nd Company: Lieutenant Franc Vovk  
 3rd Company: Lieutenant Cvetko Prepar  
 4th Company: Captain first class Srečko Posavec  
 5th Company: Captain second class Alojzij Bastič  
 6th Company: Lieutenant Franc Lipoglavšek  
 7th Company: Lieutenant Anton Božič  
 8th Company: Lieutenant Marjan Urbas  
 9th Company: Lieutenant Ivan Babnik  
 1st Heavy Company: Second Lieutenant Vekoslav Tomc  
 2nd Heavy Company: Lieutenant Vladimir Pirih  
 3rd Heavy Company: Lieutenant Jože Krpič  
 Command Company: Lieutenant Adolf Tomšič  
 Platoon commanders: Second Lieutenants Bojan Kristan, Milan Benčina, Stanko Budja, Martin Ščančar, Feliks Butole, Ivan Mlakar, Alojzij Čampa, Franc Kočever, Ivan Grdadolnik, Franc Govše, Jovo Kostotič, Jože Ovnik, Vinko Kolbezen, Franc Grčar, Janez Lovše, Franjo Grsi, Anton Flantar, Jakob Kobal, Franc Čelešnik and Lieutenants Franc Debevc and Franc Pliberšek.

#### **5. 4th Regiment:**

Commander: Major Anton Mehle  
 Adjutant: Second Lieutenant Ernest Kirschegger  
 Quartermaster: Second Lieutenant Andrej Pučko  
 Bursar: Second Lieutenant Henrih Gros



zdravnik: podporočnik Janeš dr. Jože  
preiskovalni sodnik: podporočnik Petrič dr. Daniel in vojak Simčič Drago  
kurati: Zorman Viktor, Klobovs Tone in Kerč Boris

poveljniki bataljonov

1. bataljon: kapetan 2. razreda Pirih (ni imena)
2. bataljon: kapetan 2. razreda Knuplež Silvo
3. bataljon: kapetan 2. razreda Železnik Ignacij

poveljniki čet

1. četa: poročnik Babič Janko
2. četa: poročnik Rigler Franc
3. četa: poročnik Novak Vinko
4. četa: podporočnik Hribar Janez (?)
5. četa: podporočnik Nemec Jakob
6. četa: poročnik Mihelčič Vladimir
7. četa: poročnik Fludernik Marjan
8. četa: podporočnik Kšela (?) Ivan
9. četa: poročnik Nadrah Jože

1. težka četa: poročnik Vidmar Jože
2. težka četa: podporočnik Kepic Matija
3. težka četa: podporočnik Janko Jože

Vodniki: poročnik Cvetkovič Jože, podporočniki Jeretina Štefan, Intihar Alojz, Žnidaršič Marjan, Merlak Vinko, Kralj Vladimir, Žužek Ivan, Šušteršič Anton, Korošec Ivan, Rak Vincenc, Zabukovec Roman, Orehek Franc, Gorše Anton, Grohali Maks, Zupanc Jože, Ilijaš Franc, Kovač Anton, Kocmur Alojz in Habič Vinko.

## **6. Tehnični bataljon:**

poveljnik: major Škof ing. Rudolf  
pribočnik: podporočnik Pograjc ing. Vlado  
intendant: podporočnik Stančič Viktor  
blagajnik: poročnik Bergant Peter  
zdravnik: poročnik Grebenc dr. Alojzij (obenem za orožniški bataljon in artilerijski divizijon)  
preiskovalni sodnik: podporočnik Zupančič Anton (obenem za artilerijski divizijon)  
kurat: poročnik Trček Franc (obenem za centralno ambulanto)

poveljniki čet

četa za zveze: kapetan 2. razreda Bole Leon  
pionirska četa: poročnik Lavrič Ivan  
obrtiška četa: podporočnik Labernik ing. Marjan  
vodniki: poročniki Levičnik Janko, Remškar Franjo in Cekuta Vilko.

## **7. Artilerijski divizion:**

poveljnik: major Hočevar Gabriel  
pribočnik: poročnik Šprah Otmar  
intendant: podporočnik Planinc Franc  
blagajnik: (ni odrejen)  
zdravnik: poročnik Grebenc dr. Alojz  
kurat: poročnik Remškar Ivan

poveljniki baterij

1. baterija: (odrezano)
2. baterija: kapetan 2. razreda Škrba Rafael



Physician: Second Lieutenant (Dr.) Jože Janeš  
Investigating judge: Second Lieutenant (Dr.) Daniel Petrič and Private Drago Simčič  
Chaplains: Viktor Zorman, Tone Klobovs and Boris Kerč

#### *Battalion Commanders*

1st Battalion: Captain second class Pirih (first name unknown)

2nd bataljon: Captain second class Silvo Knuplež

3rd bataljon: Captain second class Ignacij Železnik

#### *Company Commanders*

1st Company: Lieutenant Janko Babič

2nd Company: Lieutenant Franc Rigler

3rd Company: Lieutenant Vinko Novak

4th Company: Second Lieutenant Janez Hribar(?)

5th Company: Second Lieutenant Jakob Nemec

6th Company: Lieutenant Vladimir Mihelčič

7th Company: Lieutenant Marjan Fludernik

8th Company: Second Lieutenant Ivan Kšela(?)

9th Company: Lieutenant Jože Nadrah

1st Heavy Company: Lieutenant Jože Vidmar

2nd Heavy Company: Second Lieutenant Matija Kepić

3rd Heavy Company: Second Lieutenant Jože Janko

Platoon commanders: Lieutenant Jože Cvetkovič, Second Lieutenants Štefan Jeretina, Alojz Intihar, Marjan Žnidaršič, Vinko Merlak, Vladimir Kralj, Ivan Žužek, Anton Šušteršič, Ivan Korošec, Vincenc Rak, Roman Zabukovec, Franc Orehek, Anton Gorše, Maks Grohali, Jože Zupanc, Franc Ilijaš, Anton Kovač, Alojz Kocmur and Vinko Habič.

#### **6. Technical Battalion:**

Commander: Major (Eng.) Rudolf Škof

Adjutant: Second Lieutenant (Eng.) Vlado Pograjc

Quartermaster: Second Lieutenant Viktor Stančič

Bursar: Lieutenant Peter Bergant

Physician: Lieutenant (Dr.) Alojzij Grebenc (also acting for the Gendarmerie Battalion and the Artillery Division)

Investigating judge: Second Lieutenant Anton Zupančič (also acting for the Artillery Division)

Chaplain: Lieutenant Franc Trček (also acting for the Central Medical Service)

#### *Company Commanders*

Signal Company: Captain second class Leon Bole

Pioneer Company: Lieutenant Ivan Lavrič

Artisan Company: Second Lieutenant (Eng.) Marjan Labernik

Platoon commanders: Lieutenants Janko Levičnik, Franjo Remškar and Vilko Cekuta.

#### **7. Artillery Division:**

Commander: Major Gabriel Hočevan

Adjutant: Lieutenant Otmar Šprah

Quartermaster: Second Lieutenant Franc Planinc

Bursar: (not assigned)

Physician: Lieutenant (Dr.) Alojz Grebenc

Chaplain: Lieutenant Ivan Remškar

#### *Battery Commanders*

1st Battery: (part of the document is cut off)

2nd Battery: Captain second class Rafael Škrba

3. baterija: poročnik (nejasno)  
Vodniki: (brez čina) Mastnak Maks, Vetrovec Jože, Škrabar Adolf, O...šek Franc, ...šak Ferdinand in Mešič Franc.

#### **8. Dopolnilni bataljon:**

poveljnik: kapetan 1. razreda Pavlovčič Franjo  
pribočnik: poročnik Bizjak Jože  
intendant: poročnik (nejasno)  
blagajnik: podporočnik Gliha Slavko  
zdravnik: podporočnik (nejasno)  
preiskovalni sodnik: podporočnik Zrnc Ernest  
kurat: poročnik Habjan Janez (obenem za orožniški bataljon)

poveljniki čet

1. četa (prej 23. četa): podporočnik Bajec Jakob
  2. četa (prej 26. četa): poročnik Berlot Viktor
  3. četa (prej 45. četa): kapetan 2. razreda Benko Janez
  4. četa (prej 45. četa): kapetan 2. razreda Kompara Franc
  5. četa (prej 46. četa): poročnik Lenščak Dušan
- rekonvalescentna četa: poročnik Černogoj Mladen  
delovna četa: kapetan 1. razreda Ronko Janez

Vodniki: poročniki Ahlin Alojz, Martinjak Leopold, Kužnik Henrik in Blumgartner Matija in poročniki Einspiller Josip, Kovač Albin, Pavlič ing. Emil, Tršan Lojze in Cvetličič Slavko.

#### **9. Divizijska štabna četa:**

poveljnik: poročnik Gašperin Janko  
Poveljnik mi bo predlagal v imenovanje intendanta, blagajnika in ostalo pisarniško osebje.

### **III.**

Sestav orožniškega bataljona bo odredil poveljnik bataljona in ga dostavil štabu na pregled in odobritev.

Za poveljnika orožniškega bataljona postavljam polkovnika Šturm Pavla.<sup>4</sup>

Za intendanta postavljam poročnika Pirc Antona, preiskovalnega sodnika bo postavil poveljnik bataljona iz vrst politične policije.

Zdravniško službo v orožniškem bataljonu bo izvrševal zdravnik tehničnega bataljona.

Verske posle v orožniškem bataljonu bo opravljal kurat dopolnilnega bataljona.

### **IV.**

Razpored vodnikov po četah bodo izvršili poveljniki polkov, divizionov in samostojnih bataljonov po svoji uvidevnosti. V slučaju potrebe za vodnike določiti tudi sposobne starejše podčastnike.

### **V.**

Vsi preostali častniki, ki niso po prednjem ukazu razporejeni, naj se takoj javijo štabu divizije (kapetanu Glihi) radi evidence in razporeda.

Razpored častnikov po tem ukazu izvršiti takoj.

<sup>4</sup> Pavle Šturm ni omenjen v knjigi Slovenski orožniki 1918–1941 avtorja Paleta Čelika, Ljubljana, Borec, 2001, temveč se omenja v knjigi Aleša Noseta Domobranci zdravo – Bog daj, Ljubljana: Modrijan, 2008. Rojen je bil 29. 6. 1897 v vasi Ivanjci v Prekmurju, častnik vojske Kraljevine Jugoslavije, 31. marca 1942 je bil aretiran v Ljubljani in poslan v taborišče Gonars, kjer je bil do 20. 5. 1942. V organizacijskem štabu Slovenskega domobranstva je bil jeseni 1943 imenovan za pomočnika načelnika štaba, v činu stotnika. Dne 6. 5. 1945 ga je predsedstvo Narodnega odbora za Slovenijo sprejelo v vrste Slovenske narodne vojske kot stotnika I. razreda, ga takoj povišalo v majorja in nato v podpolkovnika, in sicer kot poveljnika orožniškega bataljona v Ljubljanski diviziji Slovenske narodne vojske. Zavezniki so orožniški bataljon, ustanovljen 20. 5. 1945 na Vetrinjskem polju v sestavi Ljubljanske divizije, vrnil 27. maja 1945 v Slovenijo in njegova usoda je znana.



3rd Battery: Lieutenant (indecipherable)  
Platoon commanders: (no rank) Maks Mastnak, Jože Vetrovec, Adolf Škrabar, Franc O...šek, Ferdinand ...šak and Franc Mešič.

#### **8. Replacement Battalion:**

Commander: Captain first class Franjo Pavlovčič  
Adjutant: Lieutenant Jože Bizjak  
Quartermaster: Lieutenant (indecipherable)  
Bursar: Second Lieutenant Slavko Gliha  
Physician: Second Lieutenant (indecipherable)  
Investigating judge: Second Lieutenant Ernest Zrnc  
Chaplain: Lieutenant Janez Habjan (also acting for the Gendarmerie Battalion)

#### **Company Commanders**

1st Company (former 23rd Company): Second Lieutenant Jakob Bajec  
2nd Company (former 26th Company): Lieutenant Viktor Berlot  
3rd Company (former 45th Company): Captain second class Janez Benko  
4th Company (former 45th Company): Captain second class Franc Kompara  
5th Company (former 46th Company): Lieutenant Dušan Lenščak  
Reconvalescents Company: Lieutenant Mladen Černogoj  
Labor Company: Captain first class Janez Ronko  
Platoon commanders: Lieutenants Alojz Ahlin, Leopold Martinjak, Henrik Kužnik and Matija Blumgartner and Lieutenants Josip Einspiller, Albin Kovač, (Eng.) Emil Pavlič, Lojze Tršan and Slavko Cvetličič.

#### **9. Division Staff Company:**

Commander: Lieutenant Janko Gašperin  
The commander shall give me a proposal for the appointments of the quartermaster, bursar, and other clerical staff.

#### **III.**

The Battalion Commander shall give an order on the organization of the Gendarmerie Battalion and shall submit it to the Headquarters for a review and approval.

Colonel Pavle Šturm is appointed commander of the Gendarmerie Battalion. <sup>4</sup>

Lieutenant Anton Pirc is appointed quartermaster. The Battalion Commander shall appoint the investigating judge from the ranks of political police members.

Medical service in the Gendarmerie Battalion shall be performed by the Technical Battalion physician.

The chaplain of the Replacement Battalion shall be in charge of religious affairs in the Gendarmerie Battalion.

#### **IV.**

Platoon commanders shall be assigned to the Companies by the Corps, Division and Battalion Commanders according to their own judgment. If necessary, competent older non-commissioned officers can be appointed as Platoon commanders.

#### **V.**

Any officer who is not mentioned in the order above should immediately report to the Division Headquarters (to Captain Gliha) to be recorded and assigned.

The organization chart above enters into force immediately.

<sup>4</sup> There is no mention of Pavle Šturm in Pavle Čelik's *Slovenski orožniki 1918–1941*, Ljubljana, Borec, 2001. He is, however, mentioned in Aleš Nose's *Domobranci zdravo – Bog daj*, Ljubljana: Modrijan, 2008. Šturm was born on 29 June 1897 in the Ivanjci village in Prekmurje. He was an officer in the Army of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. On 31 March 1942, he was arrested in Ljubljana and sent to the Gonars concentration camp where he stayed until 20 May 1942. In the fall of 1943, he was appointed assistant to the Headquarters Chief of Staff in the Organizational Headquarters of the Slovenian Home Guard with the rank of Captain. On 6 May 1945, he joined the Presidency of the National Committee for Slovenia with the rank of Captain first class. He was immediately promoted to the rank of Major and later of Lieutenant Colonel in command of the Gendarmerie Battalion of the Ljubljana Division of the Slovenian National Army. The Gendarmerie Battalion, established on 20 May 1945 in the composition of the Ljubljana Division, was returned to Slovenia by the Allies on 27 May 1945. Its fate is well known.



Izvod tega ukaza dostaviti Narodnemu odboru na vpogled.

Dostavljeno:

Narodnemu odboru za Slovenijo  
Poveljnikom 1., 2., 3. in 4. polka, art. divizijonu,  
teh. in dopol. bataljonu in štabni četi.

OVERAVA:

Načelnik štaba  
Podpolkovnik  
Drčar s. r.

POVELJNIK

General  
Krener s. r.

Glede na datum izdaje te »zaupne naredbe« in postavljeni rok izvedbe (takoj) je povsem jasno, da je šlo verjetno za izsiljen ukrep, ki so ga zahtevali britanski vojaški okupacijski organi. Možno je tudi, da so ukrepali zaradi urejanja razmer v ujetniškem taborišču, četudi se bolj nagibam k mnenju, da je šlo za prevaro poveljstva in moštva SNV. Podobnih ukrepov, kolikor je doslej znano, namreč britanske okupacijske oblasti niso zahtevale od navzočih ustaško-domobranskih in četniških formacij.

## Povzetek

Dogovor velike četverice na Jalti je bil nedvoumen: kvizlinške enote, ki so sodelovale z Nemci, se po zmagi izročijo kot ujetniki nacionalnim enotam zaveznikov. Končno, na usodo slovenskih domobrancev, na koncu preimenovanih v Slovensko narodno vojsko, so opozarjali slovenski predstavniki v londonski begunski vladi. Po principih poveljniške odgovornosti, a poveljniki slovenskega domobranstva in njihovi politični svetovalci so vse to vedeli, krivdo za tragičen konec dela neke vojaške formacije, četudi kvizlinške, vsekakor nosi poveljnik! Ko je general Krener spoznal svojo napako, se je preoblekel v civilno obleko in izginil.<sup>5</sup> Podobno je ravnalo še nekaj sokrivcev. Tako je nastala povojna slovenska (politična) emigracija.

Po odločitvi zveznega partijsko-državnega vodstva, a po nasvetu sovjetskih svetovalcev NKVD-ja, so zunajsodne in množične poboje pripadnikov slovenskih kvizlinških enot (in drugih – ustašev in četnikov) izvršile republiške Ozne in njim podrejene enote Knoja. Enote

*Considering the date of this “confidential order” and the implementation deadline (immediately) it is clear that this was probably a forced measure demanded by the British occupying forces. It is possible the action was taken in order to introduce discipline into the prisoner-of-war camp. However, I am inclined to believe this was a deception by the Slovenian National Army command and ranks as so far there is nothing to indicate that the British occupying troops demanded such measures from the Ustase-Home Guard and Chetnik formations.*

## Summary

*The agreement of the Four Powers was unequivocal: after the victory, the quisling units collaborating with the Germans would be handed over to the national units of the allies. Slovenian representatives in the Yugoslav government in exile pointed out the fate of the members of the Slovenian Home Guard (renamed Slovenian National Army at the end of the war). As the commanders of the Home Guard and their political consultants were well aware, the principle of the command responsibility leaves no doubt as to the commander's responsibility for a tragic end of a part of a military formation (even a quisling formation). When General Krener realized his mistake he donned civilian clothes and disappeared.<sup>5</sup> Several others did the same. This was the origin of the post-war Slovenian (political) emigration.*

*In accordance with the decision of the federal party-state leadership, acting on the advice from the Soviet NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs), extra-judicial mass executions of the members of the Slovenian quisling units were carried out by the Departments for Protection of the People (OZNA) of*

<sup>5</sup> Janko Moder, Dr. Valentin Meršol in slovenski veliki teden, Celje, 2005, str. 319

<sup>5</sup> Janko Moder, Dr. Valentin Meršol in slovenski veliki teden, Celje, 2005, p. 319.

*A copy of this order shall be communicated to the National Committee for its information.*

*Copied to:*

*National Committee for Slovenia*

*1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Corps commanders, Artillery Division,  
Technical and Replacement Battalions and Staff Company.*

*APPROVED BY:*

*Chief of Staff*

*(s) Lieutenant Colonel*

*Drčar*

*COMMANDER*

*(s)General*

*Krener*

JA so 15. maja 1945 prejele ukaz vrhovnega poveljnika maršala Tita, ki je prepovedal likvidacije ujetnikov, vendar so nekatere skupine vojakov kljub temu likvidirale posameznike ali skupine zaradi maščevanja. Tako je konec maja 1945 skupina vojakov JA na grozovit način likvidirala skupino 2.000 ustašev v tankovskem jarku na Teznem v Mariboru. Vojaki so bili primerno kaznovani. To je bil edini primer, ki ga je pozneje (1984) priznalo tudi vodstvo JLA. Osebnostno seveda obsojam takšne poboje, večina še živečih partizanov pa jih odobrava. Bo že še držalo, da je pravica vedno na strani zmagovalcev.

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## Literatura in viri

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Marijan F. Kranjc in Slobodan Kljakić, Plava garda – poveljnikovo zaupno poročilo, Maribor, 2007  
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Zasebni arhiv, nekdanji četniški podnarednik »Rado«, Maribor, 2007

individual Yugoslav republics and their subordinate People's Defence Corps of Yugoslavia (KNOJ) units. Even though the Yugoslav Army units received the order issued by the Supreme Commander Marshall Tito forbidding executions of the prisoners-of-war on 15 May 1945, revenge executions of individuals or groups of individuals were committed by individual groups of soldiers. At the end of May 1945, a group of the Yugoslav Army soldiers executed 2 000 Ustase in the anti-tank ditch in Maribor's Tezno. The soldiers were appropriately punished. This is the only case of execution that was later (1984) admitted by the Yugoslav People's Army command. Personally I condemn such killings, however, the majority of the partisans who are still living are in favor of them. It seems it is still true that justice is on the side of the victors.

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# Korejska Vojna 1950–1953

## Korean War 1950 – 1953

MATJAŽ RAVBAR

Kustos

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### Izvleček:

V članku je predstavljen pregled vojne na korejskem polotoku, ki je odločno zaznamovala usodo in življenje korejskega naroda. Po 38. vzporedniku se je vzpostavila 4 km široka demilitarizirana cona, ki fizično loči obe Koreji. Uradno sta sprti strani po več kot petdesetih letih še vedno v vojni.

Ključne besede: Korejski polotok, Korejska vojna, 38. vzporednik, Inchon, Kitajski prostovoljci.

### 1. Ob koncu 2. svetovne vojne

Konec 2. svetovne vojne je na političnem prizorišču izoblikoval dve velesili: Združene države Amerike in Sovjetsko Zvezo. Obe državi sta se borili za prevlado v svetu. Ta spopad je v zgodovino prišel pod nazivom »hladna vojna«. V tem času do prave vojne med velesilama ni prišlo, vendar pa sta se vojski spopadli posredno, v »manjših« vojnah oz. obrobni vojnah. Tako ali drugače sta nadzirali situacijo iz ozadja. Npr.: Grška državljanska vojna, vojna v Indokini, Korejska vojna.

### 2. Pred nevihto

Korejski polotok je na križišču treh velikih držav: Kitajske, Japonske in Rusije (oz. SZ). Vse te tri države so si poskušale pridobiti vpliv na polotoku. Ob oslavitvi Kitajske in ob japonski zmagi v Rusko – Japonski vojni je bil polotok leta 1910 priključen k Japonski<sup>1</sup>. Le – ta je začela izvajati nasilno okupacijo. Odpor proti okupaciji se je razmahnil in obsegal je vse

### Abstract:

*The article presents an overview of the war on the Korean peninsula that had a significant impact on the fate and life of the Korean nation. Korea was physically divided by a 4 km Demilitarized zone along the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel. After more than fifty years, the two sides in conflict remain officially at war.*

*Keywords: Korean peninsula, Korean war, 38. parallel of latitude, Inchon, Chinese Volunteers.*

### 1. Situation at the end of the Second World War

*The end of the Second World War saw the emergence of two political superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union, both trying to achieve world dominance. The resulting conflict entered history under the name of the "Cold War". There were no direct military confrontations between the two superpowers, however, their armed forces fought each other indirectly in "small wars". They were controlling the situation from behind the scenes by various means as in, for example, Greek Civil War, Indochina War, Korean War.*

### 2. Before the storm

*The Korean Peninsula is neighbored by three large states: China, Japan and Russia (or Soviet Union). All three had attempted to gain influence over the Korean Peninsula. Following the weakening of China and Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War the peninsula was annexed by Japan in 1910<sup>1</sup>. Japan's violent occupation spawned resistance of members of all social classes and all political factions. Due to the unresolved agrarian question, the communists gained particularly strong support.*

<sup>1</sup> Korea Old and New, ... str.: 241.

<sup>1</sup> Korea Old and New, ... p. 241.



Korejski polotok, vir: [www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle\\_east\\_and\\_asia/korean\\_peninsula.gif](http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/korean_peninsula.gif)

Korean Peninsula. Source: [www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle\\_east\\_and\\_asia/korean\\_peninsula.gif](http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/korean_peninsula.gif)

družbene sloje prebivalstva in vse politične opcije. Zaradi nerešenega agrarnega vprašanja so bili še posebej močni komunisti.

Bolj kot sami Korejci so o nadaljnji usodi Koreje odločale predvsem velesile. Tako so se Velika Britanija, Kitajska in ZDA v Kairu leta 1943 dogovorili za samostojno Korejo, ki naj bi jo razglasili »ob pravem času«<sup>2</sup>. SZ je bila z načrtom seznanjena v Jalti. Vendar pa zaradi nesoglasij glede podrobnosti pride samo do načelne rešitve korejskega vprašanja. Tudi pogovori v Jalti in Potsdamu niso prinesli dogovora.

From then on, the fate of Korea was decided by superpowers rather than by the Korean people. At the Cairo Conference in 1943, Great Britain, China, and U.S.A. resolved for independence and freedom of Korea "in due course"<sup>2</sup>. The Soviet Union was informed of the plan at the Yalta Conference. However, as the superpowers disagreed on details the Korean question was only solved in principle and even the Yalta and the Potsdam conferences did not bring about an agreement.

The Japanese army was soon forced into retreat. The Red Army continued its advance from the north while the U.S. army was approaching from the south

<sup>2</sup> Uporabili so izraz »independence in due course«, Cumings, Bruce: *The Origins of the Korean War...* str.: 106.

<sup>2</sup> Cumings, Bruce: *The Origins of the Korean War...* p. 106.

Ob hitrem zlomu japonske vojske je od severa prodirala Rdeča armada, od juga pa vojska ZDA (XXIV. korpus – general Hodge). Na pobudo ZDA so polotok razdelili po 38. vzporedniku<sup>3</sup>. Vendar sta se obe vojski ob svojem prihodu soočili z dejstvom, da so Korejci že ustanovili začasno vlado, v kateri so sodelovali tako komunisti in desničarji.

Sovjeti so sprejeli začasno vlado in se niso vmešavali v njeno delovanje. Vsekakor pa je navzočnost Rdeče armade pripomogla k prevladi komunistov nad zmernimi levičarji. Kmalu po vojni je bila izvedena tudi agrarna reforma, to je privedlo k veliki kmečki podpori komunistom. Na drugi strani pa general Hodge ni priznal začasne vlade in ustanovil je Vojaško vlado ZDA v Koreji (USAMGIK). V to vlado so zaposlovali tudi bivše okupatorje, Japonce, kar je privedlo do negodovanja Korejcev nad vojaško vlado in nepriljubljenost med ljudmi<sup>4</sup>. Kasneje v letu 1945 sta obe velesili na svojem delu polotoka začeli uvajati svojo politiko in komiteje. V oktobru 1945 se na polotok vrneta Rhee Sygman<sup>5</sup> in Kim Il Sung<sup>6</sup>. Oba sta s podporo ZDA oz. SZ počasi prevzemala vlogo političnega voditelja. Prvi na jugu, drugi na severu. Kljub vsesplošnemu razdoru se glede Koreje ZDA in SZ sporazumeta decembra 1945 v Moskvi. Sklep je predvideval skrbništvo štirih sil (ZDA, SZ, Kitajska, Velika Britanija) nad Korejo za čas vsaj 5 let<sup>7</sup>. Načrt je predvideval reševanje problema podobno kot pri Nemčiji, t.j. izvesti demokratične volitve. Do tega pa ne pride saj je prihajalo do sporov že pri komisiji, ki ni prinesla nobenega rezultata. V letu 1946 se vse vpletene strani o enotni Koreji niso mogle dogovoriti, prav nasprotno, okopi

(XXIV Corps – General Hodge). At the suggestion of the United States, the peninsula was divided along the 38th parallel<sup>3</sup>. However, upon their arrival both armies were faced by the fact that the Koreans have already established a temporary government that included both communists and right-wingers.

This temporary government was recognized by the Soviet Union. The latter did not intervene in the former's affairs, even though the Red Army's presence doubtlessly contributed to the communists prevailing over the moderate left-wingers. The implementation of the land reform soon after the war won the communists support among peasants. However, General Hodge did not recognize the temporary government, establishing the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) instead. By employing former occupiers, the Japanese, the military government incurred disapproval from the Koreans and was unpopular with the people<sup>4</sup>. Later in 1945, both superpowers began implementing their own policies and set up their own committees in their respective parts of the peninsula. In October 1945, Syngman Rhee<sup>5</sup> in Kim Il Sung<sup>6</sup> returned to the peninsula and gradually began to assume the role of political leaders, the former in the south and the latter in the north, with respective support of the United States and the Soviet Union. Despite their disagreements, the United States and the Soviet Union reached an agreement on Korea in Moscow in December 1945. The Moscow Agreement proposed a four power trusteeship (U.S.A., Soviet Union, China, Great Britain) of Korea for up to 5 years<sup>7</sup>. The plan envisioned a similar solution to the one in Germany, viz. democratic elections. However, this idea was unsuccessful due to disputes in the committee that brought about no results. In 1946, the interested parties were unable to come to an agreement on Korea and only became entrenched deeper in their respective positions.

<sup>3</sup> Delitev Koreje po 38. vzporedniku ni nova ideja. O tem sta Rusija in Japonska razmišljali že v letih 1896 in 1903. Prav tam, str.: 120, 121.

<sup>4</sup> Korea Old and New, ... str.: 336 – 338. Primerjaj tudi Cumings: The Origins of the Korean War, ... str.: 135 – 178.

<sup>5</sup> Rhee Sygman (1875 – 1965), imenovani tudi »Železni«, se je že kot mlad udeležil gibanja za neodvisnost in bil zaradi tega v letih 1898 – 1904 tudi zaprt. Kasneje je nadaljeval študij v ZDA, kjer je doktoriral leta 1910. Od leta 1919 je sodeloval v začasni vladi v Seulu. Predsedoval je vladi v izgnanstvu (Šangaj). V času II. sv. vojne je odšel v ZDA, kjer je lobiral za neodvisnost Koreje. Po koncu vojne se vrne v domovino in bil 1948 izvoljen za prvega predsednika Koreje. Državo je vodil skozi vojna leta. Leta 1960 je moral, zaradi mahinacij na volitvah, odstopiti. Odšel je v izgnanstvo na Hawaie, kjer je leta 1965 umrl. Saccone, Richard: Koreans to Remember, ... str.: 25 – 28.

<sup>6</sup> Življenje Kim Il Sunga, »Velikega vodje«, je bolj megljeno. Rodil se je leta 1912 v okolici Pjongjanga. V mladosti je skupaj z družino imigriral v Mandžurijo. Po letu 1932 vodi skupino gverilcev v boju proti Japoncem. Kmalu napreduje po vojaški lestvici v sam vrh korejskega odpora na severu-zahodu. Odlično sodeluje tudi z kitajsko in sovjetsko RA. Uri se tudi v vojaških šolah v SZ. Do leta 1945 postane vodja korejskih partizanskih enot. Kar mu je omogočilo da postane voditelj Severne Koreje. Umrl je leta 1994. Cumings: The Origins of the Korean War, ... str.: 35 – 36.

<sup>7</sup> Korea Old and New, ... str.: 340.

<sup>3</sup> The division of Korea along the 38th parallel was not a novel concept. It was considered by Russia and Japan in 1896 and 1903. Ibid., pp. 120, 121.

<sup>4</sup> Korea Old and New, ... pp. 336 - 338. Cf. Cumings: The Origins of the Korean War, ... pp. 135 - 178.

<sup>5</sup> Syngman Rhee (1875 - 1965) joined the independence movement as a young man and was jailed for six years (1898 - 1904). Later, he studied in the U.S. and acquired a doctorate in 1910. From 1919, he was involved in the temporary government in Seoul and was head of the Korean government in exile (Shanghai). During World War Two he departed for the U.S. where he lobbied for Korea's independence. After the end of the war, he returned home and was elected the first president of Korea. He led the state during the war years. In 1960, he was forced to resign due to electoral machinations. He left for exile in Hawaii where he died in 1965. Saccone, Richard: Koreans to Remember, ... pp. 25 - 28.

<sup>6</sup> Less is known about the life of the "Great Leader" Kim Il Sung. He was born near Pjongyang in 1912. As a youth, he emigrated with his family to Manchuria. After 1932, he led a guerilla group against the Japanese. He soon advanced in the army leadership of the Korean resistance in the northwest. He had excellent relations with the Chinese and the Soviet Red Armies and even underwent training in Soviet military schools. By 1945, he was in command of the Korean resistance units which enabled him to become the leader of North Korea. He died in 1994. Cumings: The Origins of the Korean War, ... pp. 35 - 36.

<sup>7</sup> Korea Old and New, ... p. 340.



so se poglobili. Vsaka stran je hotela združeno Korejo zgolj pod svojim vplivom. Reševanje korejskega vprašanja je treba razumeti v kontekstu »hladne vojne« oz. napenjanju moči obeh velesil in tedanjega razmerja sil, kitajske državljanske vojne,...

Zaplet so hoteli rešiti tudi v OZN. Na pobudo ZDA je Generalna skupščina OZN sklenila, da naj bi najkasneje do konca marca 1948 izvedli volitve pod njihovim nadzorom. Volitve pa so izvedli samo na jugu, kjer so zmagali desničarji pod vodstvom Rhee Sygmana. Spomladi 1948 je Koreja dobila dve vladi kmalu pa še dve državi. 15. avgusta 1948 je bila razglašena Južna Koreja. Mesec dni kasneje, 9. septembra pa še Ljudska demokratična republika Koreja.<sup>8</sup> SZ so priznale Ljudsko republiko, ZDA in OZN, Južno republiko. Ob nastanku dveh republik je bil zastavljen eden od temeljnih kamnov za kasnejši spopad. V teku leta 1949 so se sile SZ in ZDA umaknile iz polotoka. Režima Severne in Južne Koreja pa sta se v tem času močno oboroževala. Na severu je bilo okoli 200.000 vojakov z izkušnjami boja proti Čankajšku, na jugu pa okoli 60.000 dobro oboroženih vojakov<sup>9</sup>. Nastala je situacija, ki je samo čakala, da se vžge.

### 3. Vojna

Do manjših spopadov na 38. vzporedniku je prihajalo že od leta 1949, tako da se je situacija samo še stopnjevala. Še vedno se strani medsebojno obtožujeta, kdo je začel spopad. Dejstvo je, da so prvi napadli Severni Korejci, prav tako pa je tudi južna stran postorila vse, da se bi vojna nadaljevala, s podporo ZDA<sup>10</sup>. Velikost Severnokorejske vojske, ki je 25. junija 1950 napadla, se ocenjuje na 6 pehotnih divizij, 3 obmejne brigade, okoli 100 tankov T – 34 in T – 70, oz. okoli 100.000 vojakov. Izvedena sta bila še dva desanta na vzhodni obali pri Kangnungu in Samchaku.

Naslednji dan sta demarkacijsko črto prestopili še dve diviziji. 28. junija je padel Seul<sup>11</sup>. Obrambne linije so se sesedle. Medtem je Varnostni Svet OZN že razpravljal o Koreji in obsodil napad. V dveh tednih (od 25. junija do 7. julija) je na predlog ZDA VS izglasoval tri



*Each of the parties wanted exclusive influence over united Korea. It is important to stress that solving the Korean question should be viewed in the context of the "Cold War", in terms of rivalry between the two super-powers, or, in other words, in the context of the balance of power, as well as of the Chinese Civil War.*

*The United Nations wanted to help resolve the dispute. At the United States initiative, the UN General Assembly decided that UN supervised elections be held not later than the end of March 1948. But the elections were eventually only held in the south, resulting in the victory of the right-wingers led by Syngman Rhee. In the spring of 1948, Korea became a nation with two governments and soon afterwards with two states.*

<sup>8</sup> Nečak, Dušan: Obisk preteklosti... str.: 114.

<sup>9</sup> Prav tam, str.: 115. V maju 1950 so Južnokorejci povečali vojsko na 181.000.

<sup>10</sup> Prav tam, str.:120.

<sup>11</sup> Kegl i Menzon: Pomorski rat u Koreji,... str 37.



resolucije kjer so obsodili Severno Korejo in odredili ustanovitev oboroženih sil OZN, pod poveljstvom ZDA za pomoč Koreji. Predsednik Truman je za poveljnika izbral generala MacArthurja. Sile so bile sestavljene iz 16 držav, seveda najmočnejši sta bili ZDA in VB. MacArthur je imel poveljstvo nad 8. kopensko armado, 7. ladjevjem in 5. letalsko armado ZDA, poleg tega pa tudi poveljstvo nad južnokorejskimi silami. ZDA so tako izrabile organizacijo OZN za svoje interese v Aziji.

Za sile OZN je bilo nujno, da se čim prej izkrcajo na polotoku in ustavijo prodor Severne Koreje. Glavna točka obrambe je bilo mesto

On August 15 1948, South Korea was proclaimed. One month later, on September 9, Democratic People's Republic of Korea followed suit.<sup>8</sup> The Soviet Union recognized the latter while the United States and the UN recognized the former. The founding of the two republics laid part of the foundation for the ensuing war. In 1949, the Soviet and the U.S. forces left the Korean Peninsula while both the South and North Korean regimes proceeded with the armament. The North Korean army numbered approximately 200 000 troops that had acquired military experience by fighting Chiang Kai-shek. The South Korean army, on the other hand, had approximately 60 000 well-armed soldiers<sup>9</sup>. Korea was sitting on a keg of dynamite.

### 3. The War

Some minor skirmishes at the 38th parallel occurred as early as 1949 resulting in further escalation of situation. Each side still blames the other for starting the conflict. The North Koreans were certainly the first to attack but on the other hand South Korea, supported by the United States, did everything in its power for the war to continue<sup>10</sup>. At the time of its attack on 25 June 1950, the North Korean army's strength is estimated to 6 infantry divisions, 3 border constabulary brigades, approximately 100 T-34 and T-70 tanks, or approximately 100 000 soldiers. Additional offensive operations were carried out on the east coast in the Kangnung and Samcheok areas.

On the following day, the Military Demarcation line was crossed by two further divisions. Seoul fell on 28 June<sup>11</sup>. Defense lines collapsed. The UN Security Council held a debate on Korea and condemned the aggression. In two weeks (from 25 June to 7 July), at the suggestion of the United States the Security Council adopted three Resolutions condemning North Korea and called on its members to lend assistance to South Korea in the form of the joint UN forces led by the United States. President Truman entrusted the command to General MacArthur. Allied UN forces consisted of 16 states, the most powerful of which were the United States and Great Britain. MacArthur commanded 8th US Army, 7th Fleet, and 5th Air Force, as well as the South Korean forces. Thus, the United States used the United Nations to further the former's interests in Asia.

It was imperative that the UN forces land at the peninsula as soon as possible and stop the North Korean advance. The strongest defense position was held at the

<sup>8</sup> Nečak, Dušan: *Obisk preteklosti...*, p. 114.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid*, p. 115. In May 1950, the South Korean army increased to 181 000.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid*, p. 120.

<sup>11</sup> Kegl i Menson: *Pomorski rat u Koreji...*, p. 37.



Protiofenziva sil OZN, vir: [www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/macarthur/maps/koreatxt.html](http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/macarthur/maps/koreatxt.html)

Counter-offensive of the UN forces, source: [www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/macarthur/maps/koreatxt.html](http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/macarthur/maps/koreatxt.html)

Taejon, hkrati pa se je 18. julija pri mestu Pohang izkrcalo 10.027 vojakov, 2.027 vozil in 2.729 ton opreme<sup>12</sup>. Poleg svežih vojakov je letalstvo ZDA močno bombardiralo Severno Korejo. Vse to je upočasnilo prodor severnokorejske vojske.

Kljub temu je bila 8. armada v juliju prisiljena v defenzivo in gradnjo okopov okoli mesta Pusan na jugovzhodu polotoka. V avgustu se je nadaljeval močan pritisk severnokorejske vojske. Toda ob okrepitvah so jih skupne enote OZN zadržale. Na polotok sta prišla 1. in 9. korpus ameriške vojske. Do septembra se je v OZN vojski borilo že 180.000 vojakov, k tem moramo še prišteti 70.000 pripadnikov letalskih enot<sup>13</sup>. Enote OZN (takrat še vedno samo vojske ZDA, VB in Južne Koreje) so bile obklojene na ozkem koščku ozemlja pri Pusanu.

#### 4. Izkrcanje pri Inchonu

Sile OZN so bile v avgustu v defenzivi in MacArthur se je odločil za pomorski desant in Inchon, pristanišče na zahodni obali polotoka, pri Seulu. Odločitev za Inchon je bila logična, vse oskrbovalne poti Severnokorejcev so vodile okoli Inchona in Seula. Priprave na operacijo »Chromite« so se začele konec avgusta, tri tedne pred izkrcanjem. Specifičnost plimovanja v plitvi vodi okoli Inchona je narekovala, da se

city of Taejon. On 18 July, 10 027 soldiers landed at Pohang together with 2 027 vehicles and 2 729 tons of equipment<sup>12</sup>. The arrival of fresh troops, accompanied by intensive bombing of North Korea by the US Air Forces, slowed down the advance of the North Korean army.

Nonetheless, the 8th Army was forced into defensive positions and had to dig in in the vicinity of the city of Pusan in southeast Korea. In August, the North Korean army continued its advance, however, reinforcements enabled the UN allied forces to hold their ground. The 1st and the 9th Corps arrived to the peninsula. By September, the UN forces numbered as many as 180 000 soldiers, not counting the 70 000 Air Force personnel<sup>13</sup>. UN units (at the time consisting of soldiers from the United States, Great Britain and South Korea) were driven back into a small area around Pusan and surrounded.

#### 4. Landing at Inchon

In August, the UN forces were forced into defensive and General MacArthur decided on an amphibious assault on Inchon, a sea port in the vicinity of Seoul. The choice of Inchon was a logical one as all the North Korean supply routes led around Inchon and Seoul. Planning for operation "Chromite" began at the end of August, three weeks before the landing. The tide patterns in shallow waters around Inchon dictated for the attack to be carried out on 15 September as the tide was right only on 15 September, 11 October, and 3 November.<sup>14</sup>

In addition, the Wolmi-Do island, connected to the city by a causeway, held a great strategic importance in capturing Inchon. The UN forces decided to use the island as a spring-board for the attack on the city. The attempt to neutralise Wolmi-Do by heavy bombing began on 10 September. Reports claimed 39 out of 44 buildings were demolished<sup>15</sup>.

The attack of Wolmi-Do started early in the morning on 15 September. It was carried out by the 1st Marine Division and the resistance was quickly broken. On the following day, the 7th Infantry Division landed and the troops began advancing towards Seoul. Simultaneously, the 8th Army took the offensive and broke out of the Pusan perimeter. The North Korean army began retreating, thrown into additional confusion by the death of their "number one" General Kang

<sup>12</sup> Prav tam, str.: 61. Vojsko so premestili iz Japonske.

<sup>13</sup> Nečak: Obisk preteklosti... str.:126.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, p. 61. They were transferred from Japan.

<sup>13</sup> Nečak: Obisk preteklosti... p. 126.

<sup>14</sup> Kegl i Menzon: Pomorski rat u Koreji... p. 108.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, p. 124.



napad izvrši natanko 15. septembra. Ugodna plimovanja so bila samo 15. septembra, 11. oktobra, 3. novembra.<sup>14</sup>

Poleg tega je bil za zavzetje mesta zelo pomemben otok Volmi, ki je bil z mestom povezan z nasipom. Sile OZN so si otok izbrale kot odskočno desko za zavzetje Inchona. Nevtraliziranje otoka Volmi z močnim bombardiranjem se je začelo 10. septembra. Po poročilu naj bi bilo uničenih 39 od 44 zgradb.<sup>15</sup>

Desant na otok se je začel zgodaj zjutraj 15. septembra. Izvedla ga je 1. mornariško desantna divizija, odpor je bil hitro zlomljen. Naslednji dan se je izkrcala še 7. pehotna divizija in enote so začele prodirati proti Seulu. Hkrati je izvedla ofenzivo tudi 8. armada in obroč pri Pusanu je popustil. Vojska Severne Koreje se je začela umikati. K večji zmedi v severnokorejski vojski je pripomoglo dejstvo da je umrl general »številka ena« Kang Kun<sup>16</sup>. Do 30. septembra so sile OZN na 38. vzporedniku.<sup>17</sup>

Sprva so 38. vzporednik prestopile južnokorejske enote. Enote ZDA so to storile šele, ko je Generalna skupščina OZN dovolila vojno napredovanje. Fronta se je hitro pomikala na sever. Hkrati pa se je oglasil tudi kitajski zunanji minister Ču En Laj, da Kitajska ne bo gledala križem rok na invazijo sosednje države.<sup>18</sup>

Poleg kopenskega napredovanja pa so sile OZN izvedle še en desant na Wonsan, mesto na vzhodni obali. Sprva so v zalivu morali odpraviti okoli 3000 vodnih min, tako da se je lahko 10. oktobra 1. korpus južnokorejske vojske brez težav izkrcal. Do konca oktobra so sile 8. armade osvojile Pjongjang, Hungnam, in se približevale reki Jalu (Yalu), mejni reki med Korejo in Kitajsko. Boji so bili ostri in ozemlje je bilo povsem opustošeno. Severnokorejci so uporabljali taktiko »požgane zemlje«, prav tako pa so sile OZN z obsežnim bombardiranjem dodatno pustošili pokrajino. Konec oktobra so bile enote 1. južnokorejske divizije že na reki Jalu. Pri mestu Chosan so se prvič spopadle sile OZN in kitajska RA. 27. oktobra so kitajske enote 118., 119. in 120. polka vdrle preko reke Jalu<sup>19</sup>. Kmalu so se te enote vr-

Kun<sup>16</sup>. By 30 September, the UN forces reached the 38th parallel.<sup>17</sup>

The South Korean troops were the first to cross the 38th parallel while the U.S. troops waited for the authorization from United Nations General Assembly. The front line was rapidly moving north. At the same time, the Chinese foreign minister Zhou Enlai stated China would not allow a neighboring state to be invaded.<sup>18</sup>

In addition to advancing inland the UN forces carried out an amphibious assault at Wonsan on east coast. The first task was to clear the bay of approximately 3 000 sea mines to enable the First Corps of the South Korean army to disembark safely on 10 October. By the end of October, the Eighth Army troops captured Pyongyang and Hungnam and were approaching the Yalu River on the border between Korea and China. Heavy fighting devastated much of the country. The North Koreans were using "scorched earth" tactics, moreover, extensive bombing by the UN forces additionally ravaged the countryside. At the end of October, the 1st Division of the South Korean army had already reached the Yalu River. The first armed



Pozicije pred »božično ofenzivo«, vir: [www.koreanwar.org/html/maps/map3\\_full.jpg](http://www.koreanwar.org/html/maps/map3_full.jpg)

Situation before the "home by Christmas" offensive, source: [www.koreanwar.org/html/maps/map3\\_full.jpg](http://www.koreanwar.org/html/maps/map3_full.jpg)

<sup>14</sup> Kegl i Menzon: Pomorski rat u Koreji... str.: 108.

<sup>15</sup> Prav tam, str.:124.

<sup>16</sup> Prav tam, str.: 140. Takratni načelnik Generalštaba. Star je bil le 32 let a že z 18 letno vojaško kariero. Umrl je 8. septembra, tik pred izkrcajem pri Inchonu. Encyclopedia of the Korean War... str.: 304, 305.

<sup>17</sup> Nečak: Obisk preteklosti... str.:130.

<sup>18</sup> Prav tam. Poglej tudi Mikuž, Metod: Svet po vojni (1945 – 1954), str.: 167.

<sup>19</sup> Z namenom zavarovati mostove čez reko. Nečak: Obisk preteklosti... str.: 132.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, p.: 140. The then Chief of Staff. He was only 32 but with 18 years of military career behind him. He died on 8 September, just before the landing at Inchon. Encyclopedia of the Korean War... pp. 304, 305.

<sup>17</sup> Nečak: Obisk preteklosti... p. 130.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid. Cf. Mikuž, Metod: Svet po vojni (1945 - 1954), p. 167.

nile na Kitajsko, kasneje se je izkazalo da le začasno. To je bilo zadnje opozorilo Kitajske, da ne bo mirno gledala enot ZDA pred svojimi mejami. Fronta se je po posredovanju kitajskih enot ustalila.

## 5. Kitajski »prostovoljci«

Za konec novembra je MacArthur načrtoval obsežno ofenzivo in dokončno osvojitve Severne Koreje. Ofenziva se je začela 24. novembra. Ker naj bi bili doma že do božiča je dobila ime »božična ofenziva«. Toda tokrat so se v vojno vpletli kitajski »prostovoljci« in začeli protiofenzivo, le – ti naj bi štel dva korpusa oz. 6 divizij. Okoli 200.000 vojakov pod poveljstvom generala Lin Piaa, kar dokazuje da je šlo za organizirane »prostovoljne« enote oz. kar za kitajsko redno vojsko. MacArthur je ob protinapadu kitajskih sil zahteval blokado kitajskih pristanišč in bombardiranje Mančurije, celo uporabo atomskega orožja. Toda Truman se zato ni odločil. Kitajsko – korejske sile so hitro napredovale proti jugu, do 5. decembra so osvojile Pjongjang in na zahodu začele obkoljevati sile OZN pri jezeru Chosin. Ameriški vrh je ostro protestiral proti Kitajski, toda situacija se je hitro spreminjala v škodo silam OZN. V decembru se je obkoljena vojska od jezera prebela do Hungnama od koder se je evakuirala. Takrat se je zgodil obratni dogodek izkrcanja pri Inchonu. Delno se je vojska umaknila tudi po kopnem. Ob umiku iz pristanišča je v avtomobilski nesreči umrl poveljnik 8. armade general Walton Walker, nasledil ga je Matthew Ridgway<sup>20</sup>.

Iz Hungnama so evakuirali 105.000 vojakov in še 91.000 civilistov, 17.500 vozil in 350.000 ton materiala.<sup>21</sup> Kitajsko – korejske sile so 38. vzporednik dosegle za Novo leto 1951. V januarju pa so prestopili vzporednik in prodrli proti Seulu in ga tudi osvojili. MacArthur je svoje sile ponovno organiziral in s podporo letalstva začel ofenzivo. Kmalu se je pokazalo močno bombardiranje na položaje Kitajsko – korejskih sil, Seul so sile OZN ponovno zavzele 14. marca.<sup>22</sup> 23. marca so sile OZN izvedle desant pri mestu Munsan (38. vzporednik) in s tem fronto postavil na 38. vzporednik, kakor je bila že



*encounter between UN forces and the Chinese Red Army occurred at Choson. On 27 October, the Chinese 118th, 119th, and 120th regiments crossed the Yalu<sup>19</sup>. These troops soon returned to China, although it later became apparent the retreat was temporary, the attack being China's last warning that it would not tolerate U.S. troops at its borders. After the intervention by the Chinese troops the front line stabilized.*

## 5. Chinese "Volunteers"

*MacArthur planned to launch an offensive at the end of November and conquer North Korea. The offensive started on 24 November. Since it was expected the soldiers would be home by Christmas, it was known as the "home by Christmas" offensive. However, at this point Chinese "volunteers" got involved in the war and began a counter-offensive. Their strength was estimated at two corps or six divisions numbering approximately 200.000 soldiers. The fact that they were under the command of General Peng Dehuai proves these were organized "volunteer" troops or, in other words, the regular Chinese army. When the Chinese forces began their counter-attack MacArthur argued for blockading China's ports, bombing Manchuria and even for the use of atomic weapons. However, President Truman did not take that decision. The Chinese and the North Korean forces were rapidly advancing south. By 5 December they captured Pyongyang and began surrounding the UN forces at the Chosin Reservoir in the west. The United States government sharply protested against China but the situation was increasingly unfavorable for the UN forces. In December, the surrounded troops managed to withdraw to Hungnam and were subsequently shipped out. The situation was exactly contrary to disembarking at Inchon. Part of the army evacuated by land. During the retreat from the port, General Walton Walker, commander of Eighth Army, was killed in a vehicle accident. He was replaced by Matthew Ridgway<sup>20</sup>.*

<sup>20</sup> Nečak: Obisk preteklosti, ... str.: 138.

<sup>21</sup> Kegl i Menon: Pomorski rat u Koreji, ... str.: 251 – 252.

<sup>22</sup> Nečak: Obisk preteklosti, ... str.: 140.

<sup>19</sup> In order to secure bridges. Nečak: Obisk preteklosti, ... p. 132.

<sup>20</sup> Nečak: Obisk preteklosti, ... p. 138.



nekajkrat v tej vojni.

Zaradi MacArthurjevih nagnjen o uporabi atomskega orožja in ker je po desantu na Munsan pozval k pogajanju (brez odobritve predsednika Trumana), ga je predsednik zamenjal z dotedanjim poveljnikom 8. armade, generalpolkovnikom Matthewom Ridgwayom.

Aprila so ponovno napadle Kitajsko – korejske enote. Prodrle so na jug, vendar Seula niso osvojile. Boji so bili krvavi, obe strani naj bi uporabili tudi bakteriološko orožje<sup>23</sup>. Po hudih izgubah so se bili Severnokorejci prisiljeni umakniti.

Do 1. junija so sile OZN zopet prestopile 38. vzporednik in osvojile mesto Kansong. Hkrati pa so se začele priprave za pogajanja o premirju. Fronta se je ustalila na 38. vzporedniku. Sočasno s pogajanjem, ki so potekala sprva v Kansongu in nato v Panmunjonu, so potekale tudi nekatere ofenzive obeh strani, ki pa niso prinesle večjih teritorialnih uspehov. Poleg pogajanj in občasnih kopenskih ofenziv pa so nadaljnje mesece zaznamovali predvsem zračni napadi na Severno Korejo. Z več sto tisoč poletov<sup>24</sup> in bombardiranjem so sile OZN hotele preprečiti oskrbo vojske na severu.

Vojaško ladjevje je v letu 1952 in 1953 izvajalo pomorsko blokado večjih pristanišč. V

105 000 soldiers were evacuated from Hungnam, as well as 91 000 civilians, 17 500 vehicles, and 350 000 tons of cargo.<sup>21</sup> The Chinese and the North Korean forces reached the 38th parallel on the eve of New Year's Day of 1951. In January, they have crossed the parallel, advanced towards Seoul and conquered it. MacArthur re-organized his troops and launched an offensive with air support. Soon the Chinese and the North Korean were being intensively bombed and on 14 March, the UN forces recaptured Seoul.<sup>22</sup> On 23 March, the UN troops carried out an airborne operation on the city of Munsan. Since Munsan lies on 38th parallel the front line was re-established at the parallel as it had been several times before.

As MacArthur advocated the use of nuclear weapons and as, after the Munsan operation, he acted in negotiations without the president's authorization, Truman dismissed him and replaced him by the head of the 8th Army Lieutenant-General Matthew Ridgway.

In April, the Chinese and the North Korean troops relaunched the attack. They advanced south but did not capture Seoul. During bloody battles both sides allegedly used biological weapons<sup>23</sup>. After suffering severe losses the North Koreans were forced to retreat.

By 1 June, the UN forces crossed the 38th parallel once again and captured the city of Kansong. Meanwhile, the preparations for peace negotiations began. The front line stabilized at the 38th parallel.

<sup>23</sup> Prav tam, str.: 143.


<sup>24</sup> Kegl i Menzon: Pomorski rat u Koreji, ... str.: 317, 356 – 357. Operacija se je imenovala »Strangle«. Sistematično so v pasu 1° geografske širine (38°15' - 39°15') uničevali mostove, nasipe, tunele in druge konstrukcije. Operacija ni prinesla večjih uspehov, saj so izvidniška letala B – 26 poročala o nezmanjšanem prometu. Luknje na cestišču so se hitro zapolnile ali so se jim izognili. Ponekod ob porušenem mostu so naredili obvoz kar po strugi reke.

<sup>21</sup> Kegl i Menzon: Pomorski rat u Koreji, ... pp. 251 - 252.

<sup>22</sup> Nečak: Obisk preteklosti, ... p. 140.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. 143.





Razdelitev polotoka, vir: [www.nzhistory.net.nz/war/asia\\_korea\\_map](http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/war/asia_korea_map)

Division of the peninsula, source: [www.nzhistory.net.nz/war/asia\\_korea\\_map](http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/war/asia_korea_map)

teh letih se je na vrstili večji ali manjši spopadi na omejenem ozemlju, ponavadi za kak hrib ali vzpetino, ki pa so bili vseeno zelo krvavi. Med bolj znanimi so Pork Chop, Bunker hill, Old Baldy in območje Iron Triangle. Pogajanja so se prav zaradi občasnega nadaljevanja sovražnosti in nesporazumov zavlekla v leto 1953. Kot eden glavnih nesporazumov je bilo vračanje vojnih ujetnikov. Ker je bilo ujetnikov resnično ogromno, so se pogajanja o tej temi tudi tako zavlekla.

Tako so šele 27. julija vpletene strani (predstavniki OZN in Severne Koreje) podpisale pogodbo o ustavitvi ognja, 2 km demarkacijski črti, o vojnih ujetnikih in o politični konferenci, ki naj bi rešila korejsko vprašanje. Mirovna konferenca se je začela 26. aprila 1954 v Ženevi. Na njej pa dejansko ni prišlo do dogovora. Mnenja obeh strani so bila tako različna, da se niso mogli dogovoriti o rešitvi, enotni so bili le o ideji, da naj o prihodnosti odloča korejski narod sam. Ob koncu konference, 15. junija, se izkaže »status quo ante«, t.j. meja med obema stranema poteka na 38. vzporedniku.

Nato so se tuje sile na korejskem polotoku počasi začele umikati. Med septembrom in oktobrom 1958 se iz Severne Koreje dokončno umaknejo kitajski »prostovoljci«<sup>25</sup>, v Južni Koreji pa ostane okoli 40.000 vojakov ZDA vse do danes<sup>26</sup>.

## Povzetek

Korejska vojna je imele določene specifične. To je bil prvi večji spopad po 2. svetovni vojni. Je tudi klasičen primer vojne v obdobju »hladne vojne«, kjer se ZDA in SZ spopadeta le posredno in cilj je vpliv nad določenim območjem.

V vojni je bilo angažiranih nekaj milijonov ljudi in velike vojaške zmogljivosti. Uporabljeno je bilo tudi nekaj vojaških novosti: helikopter, napalm bombe, letalo MiG – 15<sup>27</sup>. Žrtev je bilo ogromno. Ocene so različne, kljub temu pa se številke vrtijo okoli 2,8 milijonov žrtev<sup>28</sup> oz. okoli milijon mrtvih skupno na obeh straneh. Vojna je korejski polotok povsem uničila, infrastrukturno, gospodarsko,... in kakor vidimo ga

*While peace negotiations were held in Kansong and later in Panmunjon both sides carried out several offensives, although these did not result in any substantial territorial gains. Next to negotiations and some land offensives, the following months saw air attacks on North Korea. By carrying out several hundred flights<sup>24</sup> and air strikes, the UN Forces were attempting to cut the supply lines to the army in the north.*

*In 1952 and 1953, the military fleet blockaded larger ports from the sea. Both of those years saw a number of more or less significant armed conflicts that were confined to a limited area, often to a hill or a ridge, but were nevertheless bloody. Pork Chop, Bunker Hill, Old Baldy and the Iron Triangle area are among the best known battle sites. It was mostly due to these periodical hostilities and to other disagreements that the peace negotiations dragged on into 1953. One of the main disagreements concerned the return of the prisoners of war. The fact that their numbers were enormous contributed to the delay in negotiations on this issue.*

*Accordingly, it was only on 27 July when the parties concerned (UN and North Korean representatives) signed the armistice agreement providing for a demilitarized zone extending two kilometers in each direction from the military demarcation line, the release of prisoners of war, and a political conference to solve the Korean question. The peace conference opened on 26 April 1954 in Geneva. However, the discussion ended without reaching any agreement. The numerous differences of opinion between the opposing sides prevented them from reaching a solution, however, they agreed that the Korea people should decide their own future. At the end of the conference on 15 June, the status quo ante was restored, i. e. the border line between the Koreas ran along the 38th parallel.*

*After that, the foreign forces began to pull out from the Korean peninsula. From September to October 1958 the Chinese "volunteers" withdrew from North Korea<sup>25</sup>. In South Korea, approximately 40 000 United States soldiers are stationed up to the present day<sup>26</sup>.*

## Summary

*Korean War had certain specific features. It was both a first sizable armed conflict after World War Two and a classic example of a "Cold War" armed conflict in which the United States and the Soviet Union fought*

<sup>25</sup> Eight years,... str.: 3.

<sup>26</sup> Korea Old and New,... str.: 345.

<sup>27</sup> Nečak: Obisk preteklosti,... str.: 156. Prvič se množično uporabljajo reaktivna letala v bojnih akcijah. Poleg Mig – 15 se je izkazal tudi ameriški F – 86.

<sup>28</sup> Korea old and new,... str.: 345, primerjaj tudi Prebilih, Vladimir: Korejska vojna,... str.: 22 in Eight years,... str.: 71.

<sup>24</sup> Kegl i Menson: Pomorski rat u Koreji,... pp.: 317, 356 – 357. The operation was called "Strangle" and involved systematic demolition of bridges, dams, tunnels and other constructions in 38°15' - 39°15' latitude. The operation was not particularly successful as evidenced by the B-26 reconnaissance planes' reports that there was no decrease in traffic. Holes in the roads were either filled or avoided. The collapsed bridges were avoided by driving through riverbeds.

<sup>25</sup> Eight Years,... p. 3.

<sup>26</sup> Korea Old and New,... p. 345.

zaznamovala za vsaj 50 let.

Vojno lahko razdelimo vsaj na dve obdobji: prvo bi bilo obdobje velikih vojaških premikov, na sever ali jug; drugo pa obdobje statičnega vojskovanja, ko se je fronta že ustalila in je vojskovanje potekalo predvsem za manjše kraje oz. bombardiranje nasprotnih položajev.

Vojaško gledano ni bilo zmagovalca, saj je bila fronta po treh letih še vedno na 38. vzporedniku oz. tam kot prej. Čeprav obe strani trdita, da sta zmagali. Politično zmago lahko pripišemo LR Kitajski, saj je po tem spopadu postala regionalna sila katere vpliv se je razširil. Kasneje Kitajska dobi tudi sedež v VS OZN, kar ji danes omogoča status velesile<sup>29</sup>.

Zaradi nezmožnosti vojaško premagati nasprotnika, sta se velesili obrnili k oboroževalni tekmi. Kar je opredelilo drugo polovico 20. stoletja.

Korejsko vojno lahko gledamo tudi kot reakcijo ZDA na izgubo Kitajske oz. pregon Čankajška na Tajvan. Zato si je nato ZDA toliko bolj hotela ustaviti prodor komunistov v Aziji.

Razmere na polotoku pa še do danes niso rešene in obe Koreji sta pripravljeni braniti svojo domovino do zadnjega. Obe Koreji sta uradno še vedno v vojni, a je leto 2007 prineslo znatno otoplitev v njunih odnosih.

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*indirectly with the aim of gaining influence over an area.*

*The war involved several millions people and large military capacities. Some new inventions were used: helicopters, napalm bombs, MiG-15 Airplane<sup>27</sup>. The war was responsible for the death of a large number of people. Estimates vary from 2.8 million<sup>28</sup> to approximately 1 million of dead on both sides. The war ruined the Korean peninsula's infrastructure and economy and left its mark for at least the following fifty years.*

*The war took place in at least two stages. The first stage involved large military movements to the north or to the south. The second stage was characterized by static warfare after the front had been stabilized. Only smaller battles and bombing of enemy positions were taking place.*

*In military sense, neither side can be said to have won since the front remained on the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel and unchanged for three years. However, both sides are claiming victory. A political victory has been achieved by the People's Republic of China that became a regional power and extended its influence. Later China obtained a seat in the UN Security Council which gave it an opportunity to achieve superpower status<sup>29</sup>.*

*Since neither superpower was able to win they both engaged in armament race, thus defining the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.*

*The Korean War can also be regarded in the light of the U.S. reaction to the loss of its influence in China or Chiang Kai-shek's exile to Taiwan. These factors contributed to the U.S. determination to stop the spreading of communism in Asia.*

*The situation in the peninsula has remained unsolved. Both Koreas are prepared to defend themselves to the last man. Officially they are still at war, however, there has been a warming in their relations in 2007.*

...

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<sup>29</sup> Prebilič: *Korejska vojna*,... str.: 23.

<sup>27</sup> Nečak: *Obisk preteklosti*,... p. 156. First mass use of jet planes in battle operations. The Mig-15 and the American F-86 were particularly successful.

<sup>28</sup> *Korea Old and New*,... p. 345. Cf. Prebilič, Vladimir: *Korejska vojna*,... p. 22, and *Eight Years*,... p. 71.

<sup>29</sup> Prebilič: *Korejska vojna*,... p. 23.





Danes je Koreja posejana z vojnimi spomeniki kot je ta. Avtor fotografije: Matjaž Ravbar

Today, Korea is dotted with war memorials like this one. Photo: Matjaž Ravbar

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# Zaščitna brigada TO

## Security Brigade of the Territorial Defence Forces

BORIS BOLFEK

Kustos

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### Izveček

Po posredovanju sil Varšavskega pakta v Češkoslovaško leta 1968<sup>1</sup> je prevladalo spoznanje, da JLA ni zmožna ubraniti frontalnega napada z vzhoda. Sledilo je več sej zveznega sveta za splošni ljudski odpor (SLO), ki jih je vodil Tito, in izvršnega komiteja CK ZKJ, posledica je bilo sprejetje sklepa o dvokomponentnosti obrambe oziroma oboroženih sil: Jugoslovanske ljudske armade kot sile, ki bi ob morebitnem napadu sprejela in zadržala prvi udarec, in teritorialne obrambe, ki bi se upirala na okupiranih območjih in v zaledju<sup>2</sup>. V Sloveniji so koncept SLO vzeli najbolj zares in so v tem videli možnost za vnovični zametek slovenske vojske. Izvršni svet skupščine SRS je izdal odlok o ustanovitvi TO že 20. novembra 1968. V odloku je izvršni svet Glavnemu štabu za SLO naložil, da organizira, pripravlja in izvaja splošni ljudski odpor v Sloveniji. Začel se je razvoj poveljstev in enot teritorialne obrambe, ki so ga organizatorji že na začetku razumeli kot priložnost za vnovično oblikovanje slovenske vojske, ki je bila uradno ukinjena leta 1945<sup>3</sup>. Ena od takšnih enot je bila tudi zaščitna brigada teritorialne obrambe. Njen namen je bil, da v oboroženem boju samostojno in v sodelovanju z enotami organov za notranje zadeve,

### Abstract

After the intervention of the Warsaw Pact forces in Czechoslovakia in 1968<sup>1</sup> it became clear that the Yugoslav People's Army was not capable of holding up the frontal assault from the East. More sessions of the General Council for General People's Resistance followed, guided by Tito and the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, which resulted in the adoption of the conclusion on the two-component defence or armed forces: the Yugoslav People's Army as the force which would hold up the first strike during a potential assault, and the territorial defence forces which would fight in the occupied areas and in the rear<sup>2</sup>. Slovenia took the concept of general people's resistance most seriously and saw it as an opportunity for a rebirth of the Slovenian armed forces. The Executive Council of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia adopted an ordinance to establish the territorial defence forces as early as on 20 November 1968. Through this ordinance the Executive Council tasked the General Staff for General People's Resistance with the organization, preparation and implementation of the general people's resistance throughout Slovenia. Thus started the development of commands and units of the territorial defence forces which were officially abolished in 1945<sup>3</sup>. One of such units was also the security brigade of the territorial defence forces whose purpose was to, independently

<sup>1</sup> Leta 1968 so sile Varšavskega pakta posredovale na Češkoslovaškem. Ta poseg je bil na področju vojaških spopadov med socialističnimi državami še korak naprej od tistega na Madžarskem leta 1956. V njem so sodelovale sile petih držav: Sovjetske zveze, DR Nemčije, Poljske, Madžarske in Bolgarije. Posredovanja ni nihče zahteval, vse zakonite češkoslovaške oblasti, partijske in državne, pa so bile proti in so ga najostreje obsodile; sodelujoče sile niso bile nameščene na Češkoslovaškem, ampak so tja vdrle iz tujine. Začelo se je s hudo notranjo krizo zaradi nasprotij med konservativnimi stalinističnimi elementi in progresivnim delom partije in javnosti. Rapoša, Kazimir (ur.), *Stoletje svetovnih vojn*, Cankarjeva založba, Ljubljana 1981, str. 408.

<sup>2</sup> Božo Repe, *Jutri je nov dan*, Modrijan, Ljubljana 2002, str. 197.

<sup>3</sup> Janez Slapar, *Izkušnje razvoja TO in priprave na osamosvojitev ter vojna za samostojno Slovenijo*, V: *Vojsstvo 5*, MORS, Ljubljana 1999, str. 67.

<sup>1</sup> The year 1968 saw the intervention of the Warsaw Pact forces in Czechoslovakia which, in the area of military engagements among socialist countries, meant a step further from the intervention in Hungary in 1956. The forces of five countries participated in the intervention: the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria. The intervention was not requested by anybody. However, it was vigorously opposed and condemned by all legal, party and state, Czechoslovakian authorities. The participating forces were not deployed in Czechoslovakia, but invaded from abroad. The intervention started with a severe internal crisis due to conflicts among Stalinist elements and the progressive part of the party and population. Rapoša, Kazimir (ed.), *Stoletje svetovnih vojn*, Cankarjeva Založba, Ljubljana 1981, p. 408.

<sup>2</sup> Božo Repe, *Jutri je nov dan*, Modrijan, Ljubljana 2002, p. 197.

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enotami milice, narodno zaščito ter drugimi enotami TO in JLA izvaja varovanje vojaško-političnega vodstva SR Slovenije na vojnih lokacijah in v premiku.

Ključne besede: zaščitna brigada, republiško vodstvo, formacija, popolnjevanje, pouk in vzgoja.

*and in cooperation with the units of the authorities of interior affairs, police and home guard units, as well as other units of the Territorial Defence Forces and Yugoslav People's Army, provide the security of the military-political leadership of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia at war locations and in movement.*

*Key words: home guard, republic leadership, formation, manning, lessons and education.*



## Enota »Bor«

Korenine enote segajo v zaščitno enoto vojaško-političnega vodstva NOV in PO Slovenije.<sup>4</sup> Njen sedež je bil sprva v Gotenici<sup>5</sup>, konec sedemdesetih pa so ga preselili v objekt na Primožih, kjer je bilo poveljstvo in delavnica. Enota je na začetku obstoja leta 1968 delovala v okviru vojne enote 4195-3, imenovane »Bor«<sup>6</sup>. Enota »Bor«<sup>7</sup>, kot se je tedaj imenovala, je bila hierarhično podrejena glavnemu štabu za SLO, dejansko pa jo je vodil in zanjo skrbel Ivan Maček – Matija<sup>8</sup> vse od njenega nastanka leta 1968 do začetkov leta 1990<sup>9</sup>.

Da bi zagotovilo potrebne pogoje za delo republiškega vodstva v zaostrenih razmerah neposredne vojne nevarnosti in vojne, je tedanje politično vodstvo ustanovilo sistem »Bor«. Ta je obsegal<sup>10</sup>:

## The 'Bor' Unit

The origins of the 'Bor' unit go back to the security unit of the military-political leadership of the Slovenian National Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments<sup>4</sup>. At the beginning, the unit headquarters was in Gotenica<sup>5</sup>, however, in the late 70s it was moved to Primože, where there were a command and a workshop. In 1968, at the very beginning of its existence, the unit was a part of the war unit 4195-3 called 'Bor'<sup>6</sup>. The 'Bor'<sup>7</sup> unit, as it was its name at the time, was hierarchically subordinate to the General Staff for General People's Resistance, however, from its establishment in 1968 until the early 1990<sup>8</sup> it was taken care of and led by Ivan Maček-Matija<sup>9</sup>.

In order to ensure the necessary conditions for the work of the republic leadership during an immediate war threat and war, the then political leadership established the 'Bor' system which included<sup>10</sup>:

<sup>4</sup> Zaščitna enota je bila ustanovljena 25. maja 1942 na Polici pri Grosupljem v sestavi druge grupe odredov. Sestavljena je bila iz izbranih, prekaljenih in izkušenih borcev, ki so bili vsi člani KPS ali SKOJ. Njena osnovna naloga je bila ves čas enaka: omogočati uspešno delo CK KPS, izvršnega odbora OF in glavnega poveljstva slovenskih partizanskih sil. Naša Obramba, letnik 15, št. 2, 1983, str. 23.

<sup>5</sup> Gotenica je bila zaprto območje, veliko nekaj več kot dvesto kvadratnih kilometrov, sestavljeno iz dveh varnostnih območij. Širši varnostni krog je obsegal večji del občine Kočevje in Ribnice, ožji del pa širše območje okoli Gotenice in vasi Škrilj, ki je od Gotenice oddaljena približno 15 kilometrov zračne linije. Sistem varovanja je bil preprost, a zelo učinkovit. Oblikovali so ga z zelo malo ljudmi, temeljil je na strahu. Ožje varovano območje je varovalo od 30 do 40 vojakov IX. armade. Ti so poleg stražarske službe opravljali še druga dela. Zanimivo je, da med njimi nikoli ni bilo Slovencev. Večina vojakov, preoblečeni so bili v uniforme milice, je bila iz oddaljenih krajev južnih republik Jugoslavije. Poveljeval jim je rezervni častnik, Slovenec, ki pa je bil zaposlen na sekretariatu za notranje zadeve in je bil podrejen službi državne varnosti. Za varnost območja je skrbel Ivan Maček – Matija, ki dovolil, da bi v Gotenico in Škrilj prihajali častniki JLA, prav tako ni dovolil preletavanja helikopterjev nad območjem. Poskrbel je tudi, da sta bili vasi Gotenica in Škrilj izbrisani z vseh geografskih kart. Albin, Mikulič, MSNZ, Uporniki z razlogom, Ljubljana 2005, str. 38.

<sup>6</sup> Vojna enota 4195-3, imenovana »Bor«, je imela svoj naslov na Povšetovi 19 v Ljubljani, na katerega so prihajali dokumenti oz. pošta. V registru tedanjih vojnih enot je ni bilo. Po ustnem pričevanju g. Milana Lapanja, tedanjega delavca RSNZ.

<sup>7</sup> Zaščitna brigada je imela v različnih obdobjih različna imena. Sprva se je imenovala enota Bor, od leta 1980 do 1982 je bila 61. brigada TO, od 29. maja 1982 je imela naziv brigada TO Edvarda Kardelja – Krištofa in od leta 1986 se je imenovala 27. zaščitna brigada TO.

<sup>8</sup> Ivan Maček – Matija ali Angelo, rojen leta 1908 v Spodnji Zadobrovi, umrl leta 1993 v Ljubljani, se je izučil za tesarja in nato delal v gradbeništvu ter se zgodaj pridružil levičarskemu delavskemu gibanju. Leta 1930 je bil sprejet v KPJ ter bil leta 1934 izvoljen za sekretarja PK KPJ za Slovenijo. Leta 1935 so ga poslali v Moskvo, kjer je končal mednarodno leninsko šolo. Vojno je dočakal zaprt v Sremski Mitrovici, od koder je avgusta pobegnil na Fruško goro. Po delovanju v GS NOPOJ se je marca 1942 vrnil v Ljubljano, kjer je delovalo glavno poveljstvo slovenskih partizanskih čet, ter postal njegov politični komisar. Konec maja je s poveljstvom odšel na osvobodeno ozemlje na Dolenjsko in oktobra postal poveljnik GS NOV in POS. Sodeloval je pri ustanavljanju brigad, v ofenzivi proti postojankam MVAC ter januarja in februarja 1943 pri poveljevanju med boji na Hrvaškem. Julija se je kot član politbiroja CK KPS začel ukvarjati s političnimi in organizacijskimi zadevami. Enciklopedija Slovenije, 6, 1992, str. 8.

<sup>9</sup> Po ustnem pričevanju g. Milana Lapanja, tedanjega delavca RSNZ.

<sup>10</sup> AS 1589, fond Komisija za SLO in DS, tehnična enota 440, popisna enota 3624–3654.

<sup>4</sup> The security unit was established on 25 May 1942 in Polica near Grosuplje within the second partisan detachment, composed of the selected, skilled and experienced combatants who were all members of the League of Communists of Slovenia or the League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia. Its main task remained the same at all times: to facilitate the successful work of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Slovenia, the Executive Board of the Liberation Front and the General Staff of the Slovenian Partisan Forces. Naša Obramba, Year 15, No. 2, 1983, p. 23.

<sup>5</sup> Gotenica was a closed area of approximately 200 square km. Its security system was simple, yet effective, composed of two security areas. The large security area comprised almost entire municipalities of Kočevje and Ribnica, while the narrow security area comprised the surroundings of Gotenica and the village Škrilj approximately 15 kilometres of air distance from Gotenica. Very few people participated in the security system which was based on fear. The narrow security area was protected by 30 – 40 soldiers of the IX Army who, in addition to security activities, performed also other tasks. There were no Slovenians among them. Most soldiers, in police uniforms, came from remote areas of southern Yugoslav republics and were commanded by a Slovenian reserved officer, employed by the Secretariat of the Internal Affairs and subordinate to the National Security Service. The security of the area was the responsibility of Ivan Maček – Matija who, within the area, did not allow any Yugoslav People's Army's officers or helicopter over flights. He also arranged for the villages of Gotenica and Škrilj to be erased from all geographic maps. Albin Mikulič, Manoeuvre Structure of National Protection, Uporniki z razlogom, Ljubljana 2005, p. 38.

<sup>6</sup> The war unit named 'Bor' received the post at the Povšetova Street 19 in Ljubljana, which was its permanent address. This unit did not exist in the register of the then units. According to the oral report of Mr. Milan Lapanja, the then worker of the Republic Secretariat of Internal Affairs.

<sup>7</sup> The security brigade had various names. At first it was called the Bor Unit, from 1980 to 1982 the 61<sup>st</sup> Brigade of the Territorial Defence Forces, on 29 May 1982 it was named the Edvard Kardelj – Krištof Brigade of the Territorial Defence Forces and in 1986 it was named the 27<sup>th</sup> Security Brigade of the Territorial Defence Forces.

<sup>8</sup> According to the oral report of Mr. Milan Lapanja, the then employee of the Republic Secretariat of Internal Affairs.

<sup>9</sup> Ivan Maček – Matija, born in 1908 in Spodnja Zadobrova and died in Ljubljana in 1993, was a carpenter working in the construction area who early joined the left-wing workers movement. In 1930 he joined the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. In 1934 he was elected the Secretary of the Regional Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia for Slovenia. In 1935 he was sent to Moscow where he finished the International Lenin School. At the beginning of the World War II he was in prison in Sremska Mitrovica from where he escaped to Fruška gora. After working for the General Staff of the Yugoslav National Liberation Partisan Detachments he returned to Ljubljana in March 1942 and became the Political Commissioner of the Slovenian Partisan Force Headquarters which was based in Ljubljana. At the end of May he moved with the headquarters to the liberated area in Dolenjska and in October became the Commandant of the General Staff of the National Slovenian Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments. He participated in the establishment of brigades, in the offensive against the voluntary anti-communist police stations, and in commanding during the engagements in Croatia in January and February 1943. As a member of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Slovenia he started to deal with political and organizational issues. Enciklopedija Slovenije, 6, 1992, p. 8.

<sup>10</sup> AS 1589, fond Komisija za SLO in DS, tehnična enota 440, popisna enota 3624–3654.

določeno teritorialno območje z instaliranimi objekti in napravami v njegovi globini<sup>11</sup> pod posebnim režimom varovanja, za katerega so skrbeli posebna dislocirana enota IX. armade, postaja lokalne milice in področni podcenter SDV RSNZ;

vojno organizacijo in sistematizacijo enote za zaledno zadovoljevanje potreb osrednjega vodstva baze z določenim številom obveznikov za njeno delovanje po namenu in zagotavljanju zvez<sup>12</sup>;

neposredno<sup>13</sup> in globinsko varovanje<sup>14</sup> v vojnih razmerah;

programiranje, nadaljnjo izgradnjo in vzdrževanje objektov v okviru sredstev, ki jih je zagotavljala republika prek proračuna Republiškega sekretariata za ljudsko obrambo<sup>15</sup>.

Naloga zaščitne enote v okviru sistema »Bor« je bila prevzeti od enot RSNZ na prvi vojni lokaciji (fizično) varovanje republiškega vodstva ter skrbeti za stalno varovanje med premiki in delovanje vodstva<sup>16</sup>.

Načrti premikov republiških organov in organizacij na vojno lokacijo so bili zasnovani tako, da se na prvo oziroma osnovno lokacijo premaknejo vsi republiški organi in organizacije skupaj. Osnovne vojne lokacije, za katere

*A certain territorial area with underground<sup>11</sup> facilities under a special regime of security, provided by a special dislocated unit of the IX Army, the local police station and the regional sub-center of the National Security Service of the Republic Secretariat of Internal Affairs.*

*The war organization and systematization of the unit to provide the central base leadership with a necessary number of members needed for its functioning and communications<sup>12</sup>.*

*Direct<sup>13</sup> and underground security<sup>14</sup> during war conditions.*

*Programming, further construction and development of facilities within resources provided by the Republic through the Republic Secretariat budget for national defence.<sup>15</sup>*

*The purpose of the security unit within the 'Bor' system was to replace the Republic Secretariat of Internal Affairs units in the first war location in providing the (physical) security of the republic leadership, and to further provide continuous security during movements and ensure the necessary conditions for the work of the leadership.<sup>16</sup>*

*The plan of movements of republic authorities and organizations envisaged their simultaneous movement to the first or basic location. The basic war locations, for which the plans were produced, were<sup>17</sup>:*

<sup>11</sup> Republiški sekretariat za ljudsko obrambo in Republiški štab za teritorialno obrambo sta predlagala Izvršnemu svetu Skupščine SR Slovenije, da se v občini Kočevje določi območje, na katerem se iz obrambnih razlogov omeji prosto gibanje, prebivanje in naseljevanje prebivalstva. To območje je obsegalo posestvo Snežnik, ki je bilo praktično zaprto od leta 1950. Na podlagi tega predloga je Izvršni svet Skupščine SR Slovenije izdal odlok v skladu z 228. členom zakona o ljudski obrambi (Uradni list SRS št. 23-1057/76), s katerim je omejil prosto gibanje, prebivanje in naseljevanje jugoslovanskih državljanov in tujcev v teh območjih občin Kočevje in Ribnica: znotraj zamišljene črte od vasi Rakitnica (izključno) na Ložinski vrh kot 935–Mestni vrh trig. 1035–Burger hrib trig. 730–M. Mošenik trig. 701–Vrščič trig. 820–Stružnica–Rake–Loška stena trig. 876–Dragarski vrh trig. 961–Glavica trig. 947–Sušje trig. 1038–Mosti–Bela stena–Rakitnica ter območja, ki je potekalo znotraj zamišljene črte Štalcerski hrib–kota 527–trig. 538–trig. 580–Spodnji Log (izključno)–trig. 850–Laze (izključno)–Spodnje Žage–Suhor–Loško brdo–Štalcerski hrib. Jugoslovanskim državljanom, ki so stalno prebivali ali so bili zaposleni na omenjenih območjih, je bilo dovoljeno prebivanje, gibanje in zadrževanje na tem območju le s posebnimi dovolilnicami, ki jih je izdal Republiški sekretariat za notranje zadeve. AS 1589, fond Komisija za SLO in DS, tehnična enota 441, popisna enota 3655–3681

<sup>12</sup> Vojna organizacija in sistematizacija tehničnih enot baze (tehničnega bataljona) je bila v sestavi vojne sistematizacije RSNZ enote za zveze, od leta 1975 pa v sestavi vojne organizacije in sistematizacije RSNZ. Vzdrževanje in dopolnjevanje (rezervnega) stacionarnega centra zvez je bilo naloženo RSNZ s sklepom Sveta za narodno obrambo št. R-865/3-16, dne 25.3.1968.

<sup>13</sup> Neposredno varovanje je izvajala zaščitna enota milice.

<sup>14</sup> Globinsko varovanje so opravljale posredne enote T0, razporejene na širši lokaciji. Za to so leta 1975 namenili 5.800.000 din, leta 1976 so odobrili 7.200.000 din, za srednjeročno razdobje pa se predvidevajo naložbe v vrednosti 38.800.000 din. Izvajalec programa izgradnje in vzdrževanja objektov je bila posebna operativna skupina strokovnih in drugih delavcev v okviru posebnih organizacij. Ti delavci so bili uradno evidentirani pri RSNZ.

<sup>15</sup> AS 1589, fond Komisija za SLO in DS, tehnična enota 440, popisna enota 3624–3654, str. 2

<sup>11</sup> *The Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia was suggested by the Republic Secretariat of National Defence and the Republic Staff of the Territorial Defence to, within the municipality of Kočevje, determine the area in which free movement, residence and accommodation of the population would be limited due to defence purposes. This area comprised the territory of Snežnik which had been a closed area since 1950. On the basis of this proposal the Executive Board of the Assembly of Slovenia adopted an ordinance in line with the Article 228 of the National Defence Act (Official Gazette of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia, No. 23-1057/76) which limited free movement, residence and accommodation of Yugoslav citizens and foreigners in the following areas of the municipalities Kočevje and Ribnica: the area was positioned along the imaginary line from the village Rakitnica (exclusively) to Ložinski vrh corn. 935 – Mestni vrh trig. 1035 – Burger hrib trig. 730 – M. Mošenik trig. 701 – Vrščič trig. 820 – Stružnica – Rake – Loška stena trig. 876 – Dragarski vrh trig. 961 – Glavica trig. 947 – Sušje trig. 1038 – Mosti – Bela stena – Rakitnica and the area within the imaginary line Štalcerski hrib – corn. 527 – trig. 538 – trig. 580 – Spodnji Log (exclusively) – trig. 850 – Laze (exclusively) – Spodnje Žage – Suhor – Loško brdo – Štalcerski hrib. Yugoslav citizens who had a permanent address or were employed in the above mentioned areas were allowed to reside, move and stay in there only with special permits, issued by the Republic Secretariat of Internal Affairs. AS, fond Komisija za SLO in DS, tehnična enota 441, popisna enota 3655–3681*

<sup>12</sup> *The war organization and systematization of technical units of the base (technical battalion) took place within the war systematization of the Republic Secretariat of Internal Affairs communications unit. In 1975 it became the part of the war organization and systematization of the Republic Secretariat of Internal Affairs. The maintenance and equipping of the (reserved) stationary communications centre was, according to the Conclusion of the National Defence Council, No. R-865/3-16 of 25 March 1968, the responsibility of Republic Secretariat of Internal Affairs.*

<sup>13</sup> *Direct security was the responsibility of the security unit of the police.*

<sup>14</sup> *Underground security was indirectly performed by the Territorial Defence units, deployed in the wider area.*

<sup>15</sup> *5,800,000 dinars were allocated for these purposes in 1975 and 7,200,000 dinars in 1976. 38,800,000 dinars were allocated for the medium-term period. The facility construction and maintenance programme were implemented by a special operational team of expert and other workers within special organizations, who were officially registered within the Republic Secretariat of Internal Affairs*

<sup>16</sup> *AS 1589, fond Komisija za SLO in DS, tehnična enota 440, popisna enota 3624–3654, p. 2.*

<sup>17</sup> *AS 1589, fond Komisija za SLO in DS, tehnična enota 1437.*



so bili izdelani načrti, so bile<sup>17</sup>:

Podlipoglav<sup>18</sup>,  
Polhov Gradec<sup>19</sup> in  
Rakitna<sup>20</sup>.

Na levem bregu Save ni bila predvidena nobena osnovna vojna lokacija. Ob morebitni odločitvi, da pripravijo tako lokacijo, pa so predlagali območje Moravč kot četrte vojne lokacije. Iz vsake osnovne lokacije je bil predviden možen premik vseh republiških organov in organizacij skupaj ali po delih na rezervne vojne lokacije Ljubno, Kočevska, Cerkno in Jelovica<sup>21</sup>.

Za te vojne lokacije so bili usklajeni načrti Odreda za oskrbo (prevozi, nastanitve, preskrba in zdravstveno varstvo), Zaščitne enote milice (neposredno zavarovanje), Odreda za zveze (radijske in druge zveze) ter zaščitne enote TO (globinsko zavarovanje vojnih lokacij). Odred za oskrbo je lahko glede na svojo popolnjenost in opremljenost istočasno zagotavljal prevoze, nastanitev, preskrbo in zdravstveno varstvo na dveh osnovnih in več rezervnih lokacijah.

Podlipoglav<sup>18</sup>,  
Polhov Gradec<sup>19</sup> and  
Rakitna<sup>20</sup>.

No war location was envisaged on the left bank of the river Sava. In case such location would be necessary, Moravče was envisaged as the fourth war location. Each basic location enabled a simultaneous or gradual movement of all republic authorities and organizations to alternate war locations in Ljubno, Kočevska, Cerkno and Jelovica.<sup>21</sup>

For these war locations coordinated plans existed, made by the Supplies Detachment (transport, accommodation, supplies and medical care), Security Police units (direct security), Communications Detachment (radio and other connections) and Security unit of the Territorial Defence Forces TO (underground security of war locations). The Supplies Detachment was able to, depending on its manning and equipment, provide simultaneous transport, accommodation, supplies and medical care in two basic and several alternate locations. The provision of food and fuel was provided only in one war location, namely in Kočevsko, and envisaged supplies for 2,500 people for 90 days of war<sup>22</sup>.

<sup>17</sup> AS 1589, fond Komisija za SLO in DS, tehnična enota 1437

<sup>18</sup> Iz vojne lokacije Podlipoglav so načrtovali premik na območje Ljubno, Rakitna, Kočevska, Cerkno in Moravče. Smeri premikov so bile: 1. Podlipoglav–Ljubno (Podlipoglav–Vevče–Zalog–Domžale–Kamnik–Stahovica–Gornji Grad–Ljubno in Podlipoglav–Besnica–Litija–Zagorje–Trbovlje–Prebold–Polzela–Mozirje–Ljubno). 2. Podlipoglav–Rakitna (Podlipoglav–Litija c.–Ižanska c.–Ig–Gornji Ig–Rakitna; Podlipoglav–Lipoglav–Šmarje Sap–Škofljica–Ig–Gornji Ig–Rakitna ali Ig–Podpeč–Rakitna in Podlipoglav–Lipoglav–Šmarje Sap–Grosuplje–Podtabor–Turjak–Velike Lašče–Karlova–Nova vas–Bloke–Cajnarji–Selšček–Rakitna). 3. Podlipoglav–Kočevska (Podlipoglav–Lipoglav–Šmarje Sap–Grosuplje–Podtabor–Turjak–Ribnica–Grčarice–Kočevska Reka in Podlipoglav–Lipoglav–Šmarje Sap–Grosuplje–Mlačevo–Zdenska vas–Struge–Kočevje–Kočevska Reka). 4. Podlipoglav–Cerkno (Podlipoglav–Zadovol–Litija c.–Ižanska c.–Ig–Podpeč–Borovnica–Vrhnika–Logatec–Kalce–Godovič–Idrija–Cerkno in Podlipoglav–Lipoglav–Šmarje Sap–Škofljica–Ig–Podpeč–Borovnica–Vrhnika ali Podpeč–Brezovica–Dobrova–Horjul–Suhi dol–Cerkno). 5. Podlipoglav–Moravče (Podlipoglav–Vevče–Št. Jakob–Domžale–Želodnik–Moravče in Podlipoglav–Št. Jakob–Dolsko–Hotič–Vače–Moravče).

<sup>19</sup> Iz vojne lokacije Polhov Gradec so načrtovali premik na območje Ljubno, Rakitna, Kočevska, Cerkno in Jelovica. Smeri premikov so bile: 1. Polhov Gradec–Rakitna (Polhov Gradec–Horjul–Drenov Grič–Vrhnika–Borovnica–Preserje–Rakitna; Polhov Gradec–Dobrova–Podsmreka–Brezovica–Notranje Gorice–Podpeč–Preserje–Rakitna in Polhov Gradec–Horjul–Drenov Grič–Vrhnika–Logatec–Rakek–Cerknica–Rakitna). 2. Polhov Gradec–Kočevska (Polhov Gradec–Cerknica–Nova vas–Grčarice–Kočevska Reka in Polhov Gradec–Dobrova–Brezovica–Podpeč–Ig–Škofljica–Ribnica–Grčarice ali Kočevje–Kočevska Reka). 3. Polhov Gradec–Cerkno (Polhov Gradec–Črni Vrh–Gorenja vas–Cerkno; Polhov Gradec–Suhi Dol–Gorenja vas–Cerkno ali Suhi Dol–Smrečje–Idrija–Cerkno). 4. Polhov Gradec–Jelovica (Polhov Gradec–Hrastenica–Topol–Sora–Škofja Loka–Češnjica–Dražgoše).

<sup>20</sup> Iz vojne lokacije Rakitna so načrtovali premik na območje Ljubno, Podlipoglav–Lipoglav, Kočevska, Cerkno in Moravče. Smeri premikov so bile: 1. Rakitna–Kočevsko (Rakitna–Gor. Ig–Ig–Škofljica–Turjak (ali Želimlje–Turjak)–Ribnica–Grčarice– (ali Ribnica–Kočevje–Kočevska Reka); Rakitna–Selšček–Cvajnarji–Bloke–Sodražica–Ribnica in naprej ter Rakitna–Cerknica–Nova vas–Hrib–Glazuta–Grčarice (ali Hrib–Draga–Boravec–Kočevska Reka). 2. Rakitna–Cerkno (Rakitna–Podpeč–Borovnica–Vrhnika–Logatec–Kalce–Idrija in naprej; in Rakitna–Vrhnika–Rakek–Planina–Kalce in naprej). 3. Rakitna–Podlipoglav–Lipoglav (Rakitna–Gornji Ig–Ig–Škofljica–Šmarje Sap–Lipoglav in Rakitna–Gornji Ig–Ig (ali Rakitna–Podpeč–Ig)–Ižanska c.–Litija c.–Zadovol–Podlipoglav). 4. Rakitna–Moravče (Rakitna–Ljubljana (Litija c.)–Št. Jakob–Domžale–Moravče in Rakitna–Ljubljana (Litija c.)–Št. Jakob–Dolsko in naprej). 5. Rakitna–Ljubno–Luče (Rakitna–Ljubljana–Kamnik–Črnivec–Gornji Grad–Mozirje–Ljubno in Rakitna–Ljubljana–Trojane–Vransko–Gomilsko–Mozirje–Ljubno).

<sup>21</sup> AS 1589, fond Komisija za SLO in DS, tehnična enota 1437


<sup>18</sup> From the war location Podlipoglav movements were planned to the area of Ljubno, Rakitna, Kočevska, Cerkno and Moravče. Movement directions were the following: 1. Podlipoglav–Ljubno (Podlipoglav–Vevče–Zalog–Domžale–Kamnik–Stahovica–Gornji Grad–Ljubno and Podlipoglav–Besnica–Litija–Zagorje–Trbovlje–Prebold–Polzela–Mozirje–Ljubno). 2. Podlipoglav–Rakitna (Podlipoglav–Litija c.–Ižanska c.–Ig–Gornji Ig–Rakitna; Podlipoglav–Lipoglav–Šmarje Sap–Škofljica–Ig–Gornji Ig–Rakitna or Ig–Podpeč–Rakitna and Podlipoglav–Lipoglav–Šmarje Sap–Grosuplje–Podtabor–Turjak–V.Lašče–Karlova–Nova vas–Bloke–Cajnarji–Selšček–Rakitna). 3. Podlipoglav – Kočevska (Podlipoglav–Lipoglav–Šmarje Sap–Grosuplje–Podtabor–Turjak–Ribnica–Grčarice–Kočevska Reka and Podlipoglav–Lipoglav–Šmarje Sap–Grosuplje–Mlačevo–Zdenska vas–Struge–Kočevje–Kočevska Reka). 4. Podlipoglav–Cerkno (Podlipoglav–Zadovol–Litija c.–Ižanska c.–Ig–Podpeč–Borovnica–Vrhnika–Logatec–Kalce–Godovič–Idrija–Cerkno and Podlipoglav–Lipoglav–Šmarje Sap–Škofljica–Ig–Podpeč–Borovnica–Vrhnika or Podpeč–Brezovica–Dobrova–Horjul–Suhi dol–Cerkno). 5. Podlipoglav–Moravče (Podlipoglav–Vevče–Št. Jakob–Domžale–Želodnik–Moravče and Podlipoglav–Št. Jakob–Dolsko–Hotič–Vače–Moravče).

<sup>19</sup> From the war location Polhov Gradec movements were planned to the areas of Ljubno, Rakitna, Kočevska, Cerkno and Jelovica. Movement directions were the following: 1. Polhov Gradec – Rakitna (Polhov Gradec–Horjul–Drenov grič–Vrhnika–Borovnica–Preserje–Rakitna; Polhov Gradec–Dobrova–Podsmreka–Brezovica–Notranje Gorice–Podpeč–Preserje–Rakitna and Polhov Gradec–Horjul–Drenov grič–Vrhnika–logatec–Rakek–Cerknica–Rakitna). 2. Polhov Gradec–Kočevska (Polhov Gradec–Cerknica–Nova vas–Grčarice–Kočevska Reka and Polhov Gradec–Dobrova–Brezovica–Podpeč–Ig–Škofljica–Ribnica–Grčarice or Kočevje–Kočevska Reka). 3. Polhov Gradec–Cerkno (Polhov Gradec–Črni Vrh–Gorenja vas–Cerkno; Polhov Gradec–Suhi dol–Gorenja vas–Cerkno or Suhi dol–Smrečje–Idrija–Cerkno). 4. Polhov Gradec–Jelovica (Polhov Gradec–Hrastenica–Topol–Sora–Škofja Loka–Češnjica–Dražgoše).

<sup>20</sup> From the war location Rakitna movements were planned to the areas of Ljubno, Podlipoglav–Lipoglav, Kočevska, Cerkno and Moravče. Movement directions were the following: 1. Rakitna–Kočevsko (Rakitna–Gor. Ig–Ig–Škofljica–Turjak (or Želimlje–Turjak)–Ribnica–Grčarice– (or Ribnica–Kočevje–Kočevska Reka); Rakitna–Selšček–Cvajnarji–Bloke–Sodražica–Ribnica in dalje in Rakitna–Cerknica–Nova vas–Hrib–Glazuta–Grčarice (or Hrib–Draga–Boravec–Kočevska Reka). 2. Rakitna–Cerkno (Rakitna–Podpeč–Borovnica–Vrhnika–Logatec–Kalce–Idrija– and further; and Rakitna–Vrhnika–Rakek–Planina–Kalce and further). 3. Rakitna–Podlipoglav–Lipoglav (Rakitna–Gornji Ig–Ig–Škofljica–Šmarje Sap–Lipoglav and Rakitna–Gornji Ig–Ig (or Rakitna–Podpeč–Ig)–Ižanska c.–Litija c.–Zadovol–Podlipoglav). 4. Rakitna–Moravče (Rakitna–Ljubljana (Litija c.)–Št. Jakob–Domžale–Moravče and Rakitna–Ljubljana (Litija c.)–Št. Jakob–Dolsko and further). 5. Rakitna–Ljubno–Luče (Rakitna–Ljubljana–Kamnik–Črnivec–Gornji Grad–Mozirje–Ljubno and Rakitna–Ljubljana–Trojane–Vransko–Gomilsko–Mozirje–Ljubno).

<sup>21</sup> AS 1589, fond Komisija za SLO in DS, tehnična enota 1437

<sup>22</sup> Prav tam, p. 2.



Oskrba s hrano in gorivom pa je bila zagotovljena le na eni vojni lokaciji, na Kočevskem, ki je predvidevala oskrbo za 2.500 ljudi in za 90 dni vojne<sup>22</sup>.

Predvideno je bilo, da je v SR Sloveniji 561 ljudi (predvojni komunisti in revolucionarji, člani CK KPS in KPJ do leta 1952, poveljniški kader višjih enot NOV in POS, narodni heroji in člani Sveta federacije in republike), za katere bi morali zagotoviti premik oz. evakuacijo na vojno lokacijo. Možnost začasne evakuacije so predvidevali za še nekatere kategorije občanov, ki so bili sicer na manj izpostavljenih položajih med NOB in po njej, opravljali pa so zelo občutljive naloge (vidnejši borci VOS OF, VDV in OZNE, tožilci, nekateri republiški sekretarji) in nekateri vidnejši kulturni in javni delavci ter člani SAZU. Po približni oceni je bilo teh ljudi 300<sup>23</sup>.

Odprto je ostalo vprašanje evakuacije najbližjih družinskih članov, ker bi se s tem število skoraj podvojilo. Predlog je bil, da se za najožjega družinskega člana šteje mož ali žena. Tukaj pa so bili še ožji družinski člani republiških funkcionarjev, ki so bili po obrambnem načrtu razporejeni v vodstvo republiških organov in

*In the Socialist Republic of Slovenia there were 561 persons (pre-war communists and revolutionaries, members of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Slovenia and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia until the year 1952, commanders of the superior units of the Slovenian National Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments, national heroes and members of the Council of Federation and Republic) who should have been provided with the movement or evacuation to a war location. The possibility of a temporary evacuation was envisaged also for some other categories of citizens who held less exposed functions during the Yugoslav People's Liberation War and after it, but who performed highly sensitive tasks (combatants of the Security-Intelligence Service of the Liberation Front, National Security Army and Department for Protection of the People, prosecutors, some republic secretaries), as well as some prominent cultural and public workers, and members of the Slovenian Academy for Sciences and Arts. It was estimated that there were approximately 300<sup>23</sup> such persons.*

*The closest family members posed a problem. If they had been moved to a war location as well, the number of evacuated people would have almost doubled. It was suggested to consider a husband and a*

<sup>22</sup> Prav tam, str. 2

<sup>23</sup> Prav tam, str. 2

<sup>23</sup> Prav tam, p. 2.



organizacij (člani Predsedstva SR Slovenije in CK ZK Slovenije in drugi) – šlo je za nadaljnjih 100 do 300 ljudi<sup>24</sup>.

Premik, oskrbo in nastanitev določenih osebnosti bi opravili republiški, pokrajinski in občinski organi tako, da bi organi republike zagotovili evakuacijo in vse drugo za približno 104 oz. 200 ljudi (brez družinskih članov oz. z njimi). Tu so mišljeni predvsem člani Sveta federacije in Sveta republike (živeči predvsem v Ljubljani in bližnji okolici). To skupino bi evakuirali na območje ob Kolpi in bi jo nastanili po vaseh v okolici Starega trga. Za vse druge, ki bi jih določili za evakuacijo v primeru vojne, pa bi poskrbele pokrajine in občine po medsebojnem dogovoru. Posamezne pokrajine bi po domicilnem načelu opravile evakuacijo toliko ljudi:

|                   |     |
|-------------------|-----|
| Ljubljana mesto   | 202 |
| Ljubljana okolica | 21  |
| Gorenjska         | 22  |
| Dolenjska         | 12  |
| Koroška           | 4   |
| Notranjska        | 2   |
| Vzh. Štajerska    | 21  |
| Zah. Štajerska    | 21  |
| J. Primorska      | 43  |
| S. Primorska      | 28  |
| Pomurje           | 4   |
| Posavje           | 5   |
| Zasavje           | 16  |

V drugih republikah je bilo še 56 ljudi<sup>25</sup>.

Vsem organizirano evakuiranim bi priskrbeli pištole za osebno varovanje, taborniško opremo (spalne vreče), najnujnejšo osebno opremo, po možnosti radijski sprejemnik in podobno. Za prehrano, nastanitev, kulturno življenje, zavarovanje in drugo pa bi poskrbeli organizatorji evakuacij<sup>26</sup>.

## Formacija

Zaščitna enota je bila na začetku velikosti voda, vanjo so bili razporejeni le najbolj zanesljivi občani, po večini iz Kočevske Reke<sup>27</sup>. Leta 1973 so se v SR Sloveniji začele vzpostavljati brigade teritorialne obrambe. Tako je tudi zaščitna enota v začetku sedemdesetih prerasla v brigado TO, vendar je zaradi svoje specifičnosti

wife as closest family members. However, one should also bear in mind close family members who, in line with the defence plan, were deployed in the leadership of republic authorities and organizations (members of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia, members of the Central Committee of the League of Communists and others), and accounted to approximately 100 – 300 persons<sup>24</sup>.

The movement, supplies and accommodation of certain persons would have been provided by republic, regional and municipal authorities. The republic authorities would have provided the evacuation and other necessary things for approximately 104 – 200 persons (with or without family members), mostly members of the Council of Federation and Republic (who mostly lived in Ljubljana and its surroundings). This group would have been evacuated to the area near the river Kolpa, and accommodated in villages around Stari trg. All other persons, assigned for evacuation, would have been taken care of by regions and municipalities in line with mutual agreements. Individual municipalities would have, guided by the principle of residence, performed the evacuation of the following number of people:

|                               |             |
|-------------------------------|-------------|
| The city of Ljubljana         | 202 persons |
| The surroundings of Ljubljana | 21 persons  |
| The Gorenjska region          | 22 persons  |
| The Dolenjska region          | 12 persons  |
| The Koroška region            | 4 persons   |
| The Notranjska region         | 2 persons   |
| The East Štajerska region     | 21 persons  |
| The West Štajerska region     | 21 persons  |
| The South Primorska region    | 43 persons  |
| The North Primorska region    | 28 persons  |
| The Pomurje region            | 4 persons   |
| The Posavje region            | 5 persons   |
| The Zasavje region            | 16 persons  |

In other republics there were other 56 persons<sup>25</sup>.

All evacuated persons would have been provided with a pistol for personal protection, camping equipment (sleeping bags), basic personal equipment, a transistor, if possible, etc. The food, cultural life, protection, etc. would have been provided by the organizers of evacuations.<sup>26</sup>

## Formation

At its beginning, the security unit was a platoon size and included most reliable citizens, mostly from

<sup>24</sup> Prav tam, str. 3

<sup>25</sup> Prav tam, str. 4

<sup>26</sup> Prav tam, str. 4

<sup>27</sup> Albin, Mikulič, MSNZ, Uporniki z razlogom, Ljubljana 2005, str. 129

<sup>24</sup> Prav tam, p. 3.

<sup>25</sup> Prav tam, p. 4.

<sup>26</sup> Prav tam, p. 4.





že v miru imela predvideno stalno sestavo, kar je bila njena posebnost med brigadami TO. V njej so bile zastopane vse funkcije za priprave brigade po vojni formaciji, poleg tega je bilo že vzpostavljeno mini poveljstvo – jedro za vodenje in poveljevanje, tako da je lahko izvajala vse naloge, ki bi bile pred njo v primeru vojne, izrednih razmer, namenjena pa je bila tudi za protispecialno delovanje. Mirnodobna stalna sestava brigade<sup>28</sup> je štela 11 delavcev (po formaciji 12), ki so opravljali večino del. Brigada je bila sestavljena iz poveljstva, prištavnih enot in pehotnih bataljonov. Zaradi namembnosti nalog pa vsega ni mogla reševati le s

Kočevska Reka<sup>27</sup>. In 1973 a process of formation of territorial defence brigades started. Thus, also the security unit was transformed into a territorial defence brigade. However, due to its specific purpose, permanent forces, also in peace time, were envisaged for this unit only. Its formation included all functions needed for the preparation of the brigade in line with the war formation. Already formed was a mini command – a nucleus designed for commanding over the brigade with an aim to prepare the brigade to perform all necessary tasks in the event of a war and emergency situation, as well as during counter special operations. Peacetime permanent forces<sup>28</sup> included 11 members (according to the formation 12 members) who performed the majority of work. According to the formation the brigade included the brigade headquarters, the brigade, sub-staff units and infantry battalions. Due to the intended purpose of its tasks, the brigade was not able to perform all its duties with infantry units only. Therefore it included also other branches (engineer, tank, anti-aircraft, ABCD and communications). All this increased its fire power and according to the then unit commander, Milan Zabukovec – Miloš<sup>29</sup>, the brigade could have been, due to its structure, considered as the very beginning of a division. The brigade was thus composed of the headquarters, sub-staff units, four infantry battalions, an engineering company, a communications company, a tank company, an ABCD company, and an air-defence platoon, 2,500 persons altogether. The formation did not change until 1985 when the reorganization started which resulted in a decrease to 1,566 persons.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Stalno sestavo (v začetku osemdesetih imenovano tudi 30. razvojna skupina) so v različnih obdobjih brigade sestavljali Milan Zabukovec – Miloš kot prvi poveljnik brigade od leta 1968 do leta 1988. Od leta 1988 do leta 1990 ga je zamenjal Franc Carl, Anton Krkovič je opravljal delo operativca v brigadi do leta 1988. Oktobra 1990 je prevzel poveljevanje brigade, Cvetko Zorko je opravljal delo operativca v brigadi, Jože Polovič je bil načelnik štaba v brigadi, Štefan Cimer pomočnik za zaledje, Miran Loparec referent za tehniko, organizacijsko-mobilizacijske in kadrovske zadeve, Ivan Oberstar je opravljal idejnopolitično delo v brigadi do leta 1980, zamenjal ga je Albin Mikulič, Branko Obrenovič je bil vzdrževalec oborožitve in materialno-tehničnih sredstev (MTS), Stanka Kep tajnica v brigadi, Pavle Krapež in Blaž Štimac skladiščnika, Jože Pugelj vodja žrebetišča Briga in Mirko Škoda oskrbnik v njem. Poleg stalne sestave so v poveljstvu opravljali pomembne dolžnosti še pripadniki rezervne sestave: Ivan Hvala kot politični komisar, Andrej Bremec kot partijski sekretar in Miha Brejc kot načelnik varnosti v brigadi. (po ustnem pričevanju Albina Mikuliča)

<sup>27</sup> Albin, Mikulič, *Manoeuvre Structure of National Protection (MSNZ), Uporniki z razlogom*, Ljubljana 2005, p. 129.

<sup>28</sup> The permanent forces (in the early 80. named also the 30<sup>th</sup> Development Group) were in different periods composed of: Milan Zabukovec – Miloš<sup>28</sup>, the first Commandant from 1968 until 1988 when he was replaced by Franc Karl who held this position until 1990; Anton Krkovič was the operative member who in 1990 became the Commander; Cvetko Zorko – the operative member; Jože Polovič – the Chief of Staff; Štefan Cimer – Assistant Commander for the brigade rear; Miran Loparec – responsible for technical, organizational and personnel issues; Ivan Oberstar – responsible for ideological-political work, in 1980 he was replaced by Albin Mikulič; Branko Obrenovič – responsible for the maintenance of weapons and material-technical resources; Stanka Kep – secretary, Pavle Krapež and Blaž Štimac – responsible for the warehouse; Jože Pugelj – manager of the Briga Stable; Mirko Škoda – responsible for the maintenance of the Briga Stable. In addition to permanent forces, members of the reserved forces also performed important duties. They were: Ivan Hvala – Political Commissioner; Andrej Bremec – Party Secretary and Miha Brejc – Chief of Security. According to the oral report of Albin Mikulič.

<sup>29</sup> Milan Zabukovec – Miloš, born in 1923 in Spodnja Zadobrova, officer, national hero who participated in the left-wing workers movement. In August 1941 he became a partisan and joined 'Mokrška četa' (company). In September 1942 he was deployed into the security unit of the General Staff of the Slovenian Partisan Forces where he remained until the end of the war. After the war he joined the People's Defence Corps of Yugoslavia. From 1968 until 1988 he was the Commandant of the Security Brigade of the Territorial Defence, responsible for the military and political leadership of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia. *Enciklopedija Slovenije*, 15, 2001, p. 13.

<sup>30</sup> AS 1589, fond Komisija za SLO in DS, tehnična enota 1473, p. 4.

pehotnimi enotami, zato so bili v njeni sestavi še drugi rodovi (inženirski, tankovski, protiletalski, atomsko-biološko-kemijski (ABKO) in zveze). To je povečalo njeno ognjeno moč in po navedbah tedanjega poveljnika enote Milana Zabukovca – Miloša<sup>29</sup> bi bila brigada po strukturi lahko celo zametek divizije. Sestavljena je bila iz poveljstva, prištavnih enot, štirih pehotnih bataljonov, inženirske čete, čete za zveze, tankovske, čete ABKO, logistične čete in voda protizračne obrambe – skupno 2500 ljudi. Takšna je bila sestava enote vse do leta 1985, ko so jo z reorganizacijo zmanjšali na 1566 ljudi<sup>30</sup>.

## Popolnjevanje brigade

Brigado so popolnjevali z najboljšim in posebej preverjenim kadrom. Ves čas nastajanja je imela prednost pri popolnjevanju z vojaškimi obvezniki, starešinami in z MTS iz popisa. Merila za razporeditev v enoto so bila strožji kot za druge enote TO in JLA, zlasti glede moralno-političnih odlik pripadnikov, njihove strokovne vojaške usposobljenosti in starosti. Še posebej so jih upoštevali pri kadrovanju starešin, saj so veliko pozornost namenjali moralno-političnim odlikam in družbenim dejavnostim, pogoj za imenovanje starešine na posamezno dolžnost pa je bila vojaško-evidenčna specialna usposobljenost (VES), ki so jo dosledno upoštevali<sup>31</sup>.

Kadrovsko so brigado popolnjevali iz 12 občin, t. j. 5 ljubljanskih<sup>32</sup> ter Domžal, Grosuplje, Kamnika, Kočevja, Kranja, Litije in Ribnice. Z reorganizacijo enote leta 1979 se je brigada zelo povečala, potrebovala je 700 vojakov, 50 nižjih častnikov in 80 častnikov. Za pomoč je vodstvo brigade zaprosilo območne odbore ZK, kjer so se dogovorili za obojestransko pripravljenost za kadrovsko krepitev brigade. Odbori so pri tem izrazili polno podporo in upoštevanje prednosti pri popolnjevanju brigade. Na podlagi stališč in sklepov iz Kočevja 11.09.1979 med sekretarji odborov občinskih

## The brigade manning

*The brigade was manned with the best and specially selected personnel. During its development the brigade was in an advantageous position regarding the manning with conscript soldiers and officers, as well as regarding the equipping with material-technical resources from the register. In comparison with other units of the Territorial Defence Forces and the Yugoslav People's Army, the criteria for the deployment into this unit were much stricter, especially regarding moral-political qualities of the members, their professional-military training and age. These criteria were strictly followed<sup>31</sup>, especially when recruiting new officers, since a lot of attention was given to moral-political qualities and social activities. The condition for appointing of a new sergeant major was a completed military-evidence special training.*

*The manning took place in 12 municipalities, in 5 Ljubljana municipalities<sup>32</sup>, as well as in Domžale, Grosuplje, Kamnik, Kočevje, Kranj, Litija in Ribnica. The unit reorganization in 1979 resulted in the increase of the formation so that 700 soldiers, 50 non-commissioned officers and 80 officers were needed. The brigade leadership searched for help within regional committees of the League of Communists and both sides expressed their preparedness for the brigade manning. The committees fully supported the brigade manning, as well as the manning priorities. In line with conclusions of the Secretaries of Municipality Conference Committees at the meeting in Kočevje on 11 November 1979, until the year 1981, the 100% manning had to be achieved. After 1980 the manning was based on the territorial-municipality principle. New opportunities arose for the deliberate personnel policy, the recruitment of unit members, soldiers and officers, as well as for the appointment of the most responsible officers, for the agreed percentage of membership of the League of Communists and especially for female conscript soldiers. In 1981 the unit manning stood at only 91.9%. 20.4% of members were over forty years old, whereas 40% of members were over 35. The most unfortunate age structure was observed in the municipalities of Kočevje and Ribnica.<sup>33</sup> In addition to the lack of conscript soldiers and officers*

<sup>29</sup> Milan Zabukovec – Miloš, rojen leta 1923 v Spodnji Zadobrovi, častnik, narodni heroj. Izučil se je za strojnega ključavničarja in sodeloval v levičarskem delavskem gibanju. Avgusta 1941 je postal partizan Mokrške čete. Septembra 1942 so ga dodelili zaščitni patrulji Glavnega poveljstva slovenskih partizanskih čet, kjer je v zaščitni enoti ostal do konca vojne. Po vojni je služboval v Knoju, od leta 1968 do 1988 je bil poveljnik zaščitne brigade TO vojaškega in političnega vodstva SRS. Enciklopedija Slovenije, 15, 2001, str. 13.

<sup>30</sup> AS 1589, fond Komisija za SLO in DS, tehnična enota 1473, str. 4.

<sup>31</sup> AS 1589, fond Komisija za SLO in DS, tehnična enota 1445, str. 4.

<sup>32</sup> Pet ljubljanskih občin je bilo: Ljubljana–Bežigrad, Ljubljana –Center, Ljubljana–Moste Polje, Ljubljana–Šiška in Ljubljana–Vič–Rudnik.

<sup>31</sup> AS 1589, fond Komisija za SLO in DS, tehnična enota 1445, p. 4.

<sup>32</sup> Ljubljana municipalities were: Ljubljana–Bežigrad, Ljubljana–Center, Ljubljana–Moste Polje, Ljubljana–Šiška and Ljubljana–Vič–Rudnik.

<sup>33</sup> AS 1589, fond Komisija za SLO in DS, tehnična enota 1445, p. 3.

konferenc in enote je bilo treba doseči 110-odstotno popolnitev enote po razrezu do leta 1981. Od leta 1980 je bilo uveljavljeno popolnjevanje enote po ozemeljskem – občinskem principu. Nastale so nove možnosti za načrtno kadrovsko politiko, za kadrovanje pripadnikov enote, vojakov in starešin, kot za imenovanje najodgovornejših starešin, dogovorjen odstotek članstva zveze komunistov in posebej tudi vojaških obveznic. Popolnjenost enote je bila leta 1980 le 91,9-odstotna, pri čemer je bilo 20,4 odstotka pripadnikov enote starih več kot 40 let in 40 odstotkov nad 35 let. Najbolj neugodna starostna struktura pripadnikov je bila v občinah Kočevje in Ribnica<sup>33</sup>. Ker pa so bili ključni problemi pri pomanjkanju starešin in vojakov obveznikov poleg starosti še specialnosti, so se dogovorili, da bodo odbori posredovali enoti seznime starešin, ki bi jih lahko razporedili v brigado. Skladno s tem so pripravili seznime s predlogi 163 starešin, ki bi ustrezali za popolnitev, vendar so jih v enoto prerazporedili le 23 ali 14,11 odstotka, kar je bilo malo ob upoštevanju potreb brigade. Tako je bilo predvsem zaradi strogih meril, predvsem o specialnosti in članstvu v ZK. Kljub temu pa so upali na uspeh predvsem zaradi vzpostavljanja samostojnih enot po posameznih občinah. Od njih so pričakovali pomoč pri kadrovanju v šolo rezervnih častnikov, katerih del naj bi po končanem šolanju prerazporedili v brigado. Od leta 1982 se je zamenjalo 10 odstotkov kadra na leto. Izmed novincev je moralo biti 30 odstotkov članov ZK. Z zamenjavo starešinskega kadra starejših letnikov pa so se pojavile zahteve, naj bodo novi častniki vsi člani ZK. Med vojaki in nižjimi častniki, ki so jih kadrovali v enoto, je bila prav tako zahteva po večjem številu članov ZK,<sup>34</sup> kot je bil njihov delež v enoti. Brigadi ni uspelo izpolniti v prvem petletnem ciklusu dogovorjene 110-odstotne popolnjenosti. Ta je bila leta 1984 še vedno 96,2-odstotna. Najobčutljivejša je bila vrzel pri vključevanju vojaških obveznikov in rezervnih častnikov v okviru posameznih specialnih nalog (PZO, merilci na minometih itn.) Med pripadniki enote iz posameznih občin je od sprejetih meril občutneje odstopala staro-

and their age, their specialities posed one of the key problems. Therefore it was agreed that the committees would provide the unit with the lists of potential officers to be deployed into the brigade. Accordingly, the committees prepared lists of 163 potential officers, however, only 23 or 14.11% were actually deployed. Considering the needs of the brigade this number was rather small. Bad results were mainly the consequence of strict criteria, especially regarding the required specialities and membership in the League of Communist. Nevertheless, success was anticipated, mostly due to the fact that individual units were going to be formed within individual municipalities which were expected to support the recruitment of the Reserved Officer Training School. After the concluded training, a part of the successful candidates was going to be deployed into the brigade. In 1982 the annual replacement of the 10% of the entire personnel began. 30% of the new personnel had to be members of the League of Communists. As for the replacement of older officers, all new officers had to be members of the League of Communists. The required number of members of the League of Communists among soldiers and non-commissioned officers also exceeded the actual number<sup>34</sup> Within the first five-year period the brigade did not manage to meet the need for the 110% manning which stood at 96.2% in the year 1984. The biggest lack was observed within the integration of military members and reserved officers into the framework of individual special tasks (anti-aircraft defence, mortar personnel). The discrepancy in age structure could be observed among the members of the unit from individual municipalities. In addition to the age structure, the quality of candidates posed another problem (especially in Ljubljana). Due to numerous obligations and an increasingly growing number of the absentees from the exercises, the manning was extremely demanding in Ljubljana, Therefore it was agreed to potentially establish a special coordinating authority to facilitate the implementation of these and other tasks<sup>35</sup>. Nevertheless, in the first five-year period the brigade managed to improve the age structure of the personnel<sup>36</sup>. In 1986 the reorganization of the unit resulted in a decrease in the number of personnel. From 1986 to 1990 the manning took place in 8 municipalities, in Ljubljana municipalities and in the municipalities of Kočevje, Domžale and Ribnica.

*The brigade manning in the second medium-term*

<sup>33</sup> AS 1589, fond Komisija za SLO in DS, tehnična enota 1445, str. 3

<sup>34</sup> Delež članov ZK med nižjimi častniki naj bi se povečal z 20 na 50 odstotkov, med vojaki pa s 17 na 44 odstotkov.

<sup>34</sup> The percentage of members of the League of Communists among non-commissioned officers was to be increased from 20% to 50%, while the same percentage among soldiers was to be increased from 17% to 44%.

<sup>35</sup> AS 1589, fond Komisija za SLO in DS, tehnična enota 1445, p. 3.

<sup>36</sup> In 1981 40% of military members were over 35 years old, in 1984 only 6.4%.





stna struktura. Problemi pa niso bili samo v zagotavljanju števila kadrov za enoto, temveč tudi v kakovosti kandidatov (zlasti v Ljubljani). Kadrovanje v enoti Ljubljana je bilo zaradi velikih obveznosti, pa tudi zaradi stalno večjega števila upravičeno odsotnih z vaj, še posebej zahtevno. Zato so se dogovorili za morebitno ustanovitev posebnega koordinacijskega telesa, ki bi olajševal izvajanje teh in drugih nalog<sup>35</sup>. Kljub vsemu pa so v brigadi uspeli v prvem petletnem ciklusu popraviti starostno strukturo kadrov<sup>36</sup>. Reorganizacija enote leta 1986 je zahtevala njeno kadrovske zmanjševanje. Brigada se je v drugem petletnem ciklusu (1986–90) popolnjevala iz osmih občin, poleg mesta Ljubljana še iz Kočevja, Domžal in Ribnice.

Popolnjenost brigade v drugem srednjeročnem obdobju do leta 1990<sup>37</sup>:

| Občina    | Razdelilnik | Popolnjeno | % popolnjenosti |
|-----------|-------------|------------|-----------------|
| Ljubljana | 1016        | 1047       | 103             |
| Domžale   | 90          | 104        | 115,55          |
| Kočevje   | 369         | 341        | 92,4            |
| Ribnica   | 80          | 93         | 103,3           |
| Skupaj:   | 1565        | 1566       | 100,06          |

## Vojaške obveznice

Od leta 1980 so v enoto vključevali tudi vojaške obveznice. Tako so jih leta 1980 vključili 8, leta 1981 pa še 18. Na podlagi dogovorov z družbenopolitičnimi skupnostmi naj bi v enoto vključili 5 odstotkov obveznic, leta 1981 pa so se na skupni seji poveljstva enote in sekretarjev OK ZKS občin, ki so popolnjevale enoto, dogovorili, da jih vanjo vključijo 10 odstotkov, od teh naj bi bilo 20 odstotkov članic ZK. Razporejali so jih na različne dolžnosti glede na njihovo usposobljenost in želje ter strokovno izobrazbo. Upoštevanje teh meril je oviralo vključevanje obveznic v enoto po sprejetih programih. Namesto dogovorjenih 10 odstotkov so imeli tako le 2,1 odstotka obveznic. Razlika med opravljenim iz leta 1981 in dopolnjenim je bila prevelika, saj je bila naloga preveč ambiciozno zastavljena. Da bi se občutneje približali sprejetemu cilju, so morale vse družbenopolitične organizacije v občinah v okviru petletnega načrta vključiti v enoto toliko obveznic

period until 1990<sup>37</sup>:

| Municipality | Required number | Actual number | % Manning |
|--------------|-----------------|---------------|-----------|
| Ljubljana    | 1016            | 1047          | 103       |
| Domžale      | 90              | 104           | 115,55    |
| Kočevje      | 369             | 341           | 92,4      |
| Ribnica      | 80              | 93            | 103,3     |
| Skupaj:      | 1565            | 1566          | 100,06    |



## Female conscript soldiers

In 1980 the unit started to recruit also female conscript soldiers. In that year 8 female conscript soldiers were recruited and in 1981 another 18. On the basis of agreements with socio-political communities it was agreed to recruit 5% of female conscript soldiers. However, in 1981, at the joint session of the unit headquarters and secretaries of the participating Municipality Committees of the League of Communists of Slovenia it was agreed to recruit 10% of female conscript soldiers. Among the deployed female conscript soldiers 20% were members of the League of Communists. In line with their training and education female conscript soldiers held various positions in the unit. During the recruitment these criteria had to be taken into account. However, their recruitment did not follow the approved plan. Instead of the agreed 10% only 2.1% of female conscript soldiers were recruited. The plan to recruit the 10% of female conscript soldiers, which was rather ambitious, was therefore not implemented. In order to achieve the 10% objective, all socio-political communities had to, within the five-year plan, recruit the following

<sup>35</sup> AS 1589, fond Komisija za SLO in DS, tehnična enota 1445, str. 3

<sup>36</sup> Leta 1981 je bilo 40 odstotkov obveznikov starih več kot 35 let, leta 1984 pa le še 6,4 odstotka.

<sup>37</sup> AS 1589, fond Komisija za SLO in DS, tehnična enota 1473, str. 4.

<sup>37</sup> AS 1589, fond Komisija za SLO in DS, tehnična enota 1473, p. 4.



(upoštevan je največji odstotek, 10)<sup>38</sup>:

| Občina    | Po razdelilniku | Vključenih | Neizpolnjeno |
|-----------|-----------------|------------|--------------|
| Ljubljana | 137             | 21         | 116          |
| Kranj     | 14              | 6          | 8            |
| Litija    | 10              | 2          | 8            |
| Kamnik    | 25              | 4          | 21           |
| Domžale   | 26              | 9          | 17           |
| Ribnica   | 13              | 5          | 8            |
| Kočevje   | 35              | 6          | 29           |
| Grosuplje | 9               | 3          | 6            |
| SKUPAJ:   | 269             | 56         | 213          |

## Popolnjenost z MTS in konji

Orožje, vojaško opremo in druga materialna sredstva je brigada hranila v odrejenih skladiščih, ki so bila solidno grajena in urejena<sup>39</sup>. Brigada je bila različno popolnjena s sredstvi. Prednost pri opremljanju so imela bojna sredstva. S tehničnimi sredstvi (osebnim in skupnim orožjem ter pripadajočim strelivom) je bila enota popolnjena 100-odstotno, kar je zagotavljalo uspešno opravljanje nalog.

Popolnjenost enote z orožjem<sup>40</sup>:

|                                  |     |
|----------------------------------|-----|
| Pištola 7,62 mm M 57             | 290 |
| Pištola 7,65 mm ČZ               | 100 |
| Pištola 9 mm Ingram              | 50  |
| Pištola signalna 26 mm           | 54  |
| Avtomat 9 mm MP 40               | 134 |
| AP                               | 497 |
| PAP                              | 379 |
| Puška 7,9 mm M.48                | 861 |
| PMtr 7,9 mm                      | 56  |
| PMtr 7,62 mm                     | 73  |
| RM                               | 87  |
| M M 60 mm                        | 24  |
| M M 82 mm                        | 19  |
| N T 82 mm                        | 12  |
| N T 75 mm                        | 8   |
| Mtr 12,7 mm Browning             | 12  |
| PLT 20 mm                        | 4   |
| Protiletalski lansirni mehanizem | 4   |
| Zaboj lansirni in rakete         | 6   |

Za omenjeno orožje je bilo na voljo dovolj streliva (2 bojna kompleta in pol). Odnos do

number of female conscript soldiers (the highest percentage, 10%, is taken into consideration)<sup>38</sup>:

| Municipality | Required number | Actual number | Discrepancy |
|--------------|-----------------|---------------|-------------|
| Ljubljana    | 137             | 21            | 116         |
| Kranj        | 14              | 6             | 8           |
| Litija       | 10              | 2             | 8           |
| Kamnik       | 25              | 4             | 21          |
| Domžale      | 26              | 9             | 17          |
| Ribnica      | 13              | 5             | 8           |
| Kočevje      | 35              | 6             | 29          |
| Grosuplje    | 9               | 3             | 6           |
| TOTAL:       | 269             | 56            | 213         |

## Equipping with material-technical resources and horses

Weapons, materiel and other material resources were kept by the brigade in well-built determined warehouses.<sup>39</sup> The brigade had various resources, among which fire power was prioritized. With technical resources (individual and other weapons and munitions) the unit achieved the 100% manning, which meant successful implementation of tasks.

Equipping with weapons<sup>40</sup>:

|                                   |     |
|-----------------------------------|-----|
| Pistol 7.62mm M 57                | 290 |
| Pistol 7.65mm CZ                  | 100 |
| Pistol 9mm Ingram                 | 50  |
| Signal pistol 26mm                | 54  |
| Automatic 9mm MP 40               | 134 |
| Automatic rifle                   | 497 |
| Semi-automatic rifle              | 379 |
| Rifle 7.9mm M.48                  | 861 |
| Machinegun 7.9mm                  | 56  |
| Machinegun 7.62mm                 | 73  |
| Rocket launcher                   | 87  |
| Mortar M 60mm                     | 24  |
| Mortar M 82mm                     | 19  |
| Recoil gun 82mm                   | 12  |
| Recoil gun 75mm                   | 8   |
| Heavy machinegun 12.7mm Browning  | 12  |
| Anti-aircraft gun 20mm            | 4   |
| Anti-aircraft launching mechanism | 4   |
| Launching package and rockets     | 6   |

Enough munitions were available for these weapons (2.5 allowances of ammunition). The unit's attitude

<sup>38</sup> AS 1589, fond Komisija za SLO in DS, tehnična enota 1445

<sup>39</sup> Skladišča orožja: Polovica orožja je bila v ožjem varovanem območju Gonenice. Minskoeksplozivna sredstva in intendantska oprema pa so bili v širšem območju varovanja v kraju Borovec. Do teh skladišč JLA ni imela dostopa. Druga polovica orožja je bila v vojašnici Bratstva in jedinstva (Ljubljana-Moste). Enota je imela tudi priročna skladišča na Povšetovi ulici v Ljubljani. (ustno pričevanje Albina Mikuliča)

<sup>40</sup> AS 1589, fond Komisija za SLO in DS, tehnična enota 533, popisna enota 5356-5383

<sup>38</sup> AS 1589, fond Komisija za SLO in DS, tehnična enota 1445.

<sup>39</sup> Weapons warehouses: Half of the weapons was stored in the narrow security area in Borovec to which the Yugoslav People's Army did not have an access. Mine-explosive means and purpose equipment were stored in a wider security area in the military post 'Bratstvo in jedinstvo' (Ljubljana-Moste). The unit had warehouses also in the Povšetova Street in Ljubljana. According to the oral report of Albin Mikulič.

<sup>40</sup> AS 1589, fond Komisija za SLO in DS, tehnična enota 533, popisna enota 5356-5383.



bojnih sredstev in opreme je bil v enoti zadovoljiv. Primerov odtujitve ali izgube orožja in opreme ni bilo, z izjemo nekaj manjših delov opreme, ki so se izgubili med usposabljanjem, kar pa je bilo glede na njihovo vrednost in obsežnost usposabljanja skoraj zanemarljivo. Večji del MTS je enota vzdrževala sama, le zahtevnejša dela so izvedli v specializiranih ustanovah oz. delovnih organizacijah. Drugače pa je bilo s popolnitvijo z drugimi sredstvi MTS. To je veljalo predvsem za popolnitev enote z manjkajočimi tovornjaki, inženirskimi stroji in konji, zato je bilo treba končati dogovore z DPS, ki so popolnjevale enoto. Z motornimi vozili so jo popolnjevali iz štirih občin in iz ene občine s konji. Formacijsko enota ni bila popolnjena z vprežnimi živalmi<sup>41</sup> in inženirskimi sredstvi<sup>42</sup>. Tudi sicer je bil ta segment neustrezno obravnavan<sup>43</sup>. Za usposabljanje na terenu, pa tudi predvidene dejavnosti v neposredni vojni nevarnosti in vojni, je bila enota skoraj povsem brez ustrezne opreme za taborjenje (šotori, spalne vreče, blazine in druga oprema). Pomanjkljiva je bila tudi oprema za izvajanje sodobnejših andragoških in pedagoških metod (videooprema, grafoskop, episkop). Vse to je bilo posledica pomanjkanja finančnih sredstev v obdobju gospodarske krize<sup>44</sup>. Težave je pomagal reševati poveljnik TO SRS. Kljub vsemu je bila opremljenost brigade, tako z bojnimi kot nebojnimi sredstvi, vsako leto boljša. Popolnjevanje z drugimi gmotnimi sredstvi (preostale vrste kolektivnega orožja, nove uniforme in nujna rezerva oblačil in obutve) so uredili s petletnim programom RŠTO Slovenije, ki so ga izvajali z vzajemnim združevanjem sredstev.

## Pouk in vzgoja

Pri načrtovanju vsebin usposabljanja so izhajali predvsem iz zahtev in ciljev Ukaza poveljnika TO SR Slovenije, namena enote, dosežene stopnje usposobljenosti vojaških obveznikov in enot, gmotnih možnosti ter kraja oz. zemljišča za izvedbo naloge. Usposabljali

towards the weapons and other equipment was satisfactory. There were no reported cases of missing or lost pieces of weapons or equipment. Some pieces of equipment got lost during the training, however, their value, in comparison with the scale of the training, was so little it was not worth mentioning. The majority of material-technical resources was maintained by the unit itself, only more demanding maintenance work was performed in special institutions or organizations. Other material-technical resources, especially equipping with the missing lorries, engineering machinery and horses, were the subject of agreements with the participating socio-political communities. Motor vehicles were provided by four municipalities, while horses were provided by one municipalities. The unit lacked draught animals<sup>41</sup> and engineering resources.<sup>42</sup> In general terms, this issue was inappropriately addressed<sup>43</sup>. The unit was inappropriate equipped with the camping equipment (tents, sleeping bags, pillows and other equipment) for the field training, as well as for the immediate threat of war or war. The unit also lacked the equipment for facilitating modern andragogic and pedagogic methods (video equipment, overhead projectors, episcopes). All this

was the result of insufficient financial resources during the economic crisis.<sup>44</sup> Also the Commandant of the Territorial Defence Forces of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia endeavoured to solve these problems. Nevertheless, every year the brigade was better equipped with weapons, equipment and other resources. The equipping with other material resources (other types of collective weapons, new uniforms and spare clothing and shoes) was determined in the five-year programme of the Republic Staff of the Territorial Defence, implemented on the basis of mutual combining of resources

## Lessons and education

The planning of training was based on the requirements and goals, set by the Commandant of the Territorial Defence Forces of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia, as well as on the unit's intent, the level of capability of conscript soldiers and units, possibilities for the provision of material resources and territory for the realization of the task. The training was

<sup>41</sup> Opremljenost s konji je bila številčno zadovoljiva samo v občini Ribnica, vendar so bili konji v veliki meri neustrezni. Iz Ljubljane sta bila razporejena samo dva konja, potrebovali bi jih 20.

<sup>42</sup> Zlasti je to veljalo za Ljubljano, ki je edina imela inženirske stroje.

<sup>43</sup> Razporejeni konji niso bili vajeni sedla, vleke orožja in jahanja, zato je bil podan predlog, da se lastniki konj zadolžijo z opremo (samarij, sedla).

<sup>44</sup> AS 1589, fond Komisija za SLO in DS, tehnična enota 1473, str. 6

<sup>41</sup> There were enough horses only in the municipality of Ribnica, however, the majority of horses was inappropriate. In Ljubljana 20 horses were needed, however, only two were deployed.

<sup>42</sup> This applied specially to the obligations of Ljubljana which was the only town to possess engineering equipment.

<sup>43</sup> Deployed horses were not used to the saddle, weapons and riding. Therefore it was suggested that horse owners should provide for the equipment (saddles, etc.).

<sup>44</sup> AS 1589, fond Komisija za SLO in DS, tehnična enota 1473, p. 6.



so po srednjeročnem načrtu enot teritorialne obrambe, pripravljenem za pet let. Cilj enote je bil za stopnjo boljša usposobljenost po vseh merilih vsako leto izvajanja programa. V petletnem ciklusu so izvajali temeljno usposabljanje in najmanj eno mobilizacijsko vajo. Temeljno usposabljanje za vse bataljone je bilo v Svetlem Potoku pri Kočevju<sup>45</sup>. Raznolikosti enot v brigadi je bilo prilagojeno usposabljanje njihovih pripadnikov. Urjenje so na začetku izvajali njihovi rezervni starešine, kar je bilo sprva težko, na koncu pa so dosegli pričakovane rezultate. Vzpostavili so tudi aktiv predavateljev za izvajanje programov v enoti, in sicer iz borcev zaščitne enote, vodstev družbenopolitičnih organizacij v občinah, ki so sestavljale enoto, ter iz republiških vodstev družbenopolitičnih skupnosti. Z JLA so sodelovali pri usposabljanju starešinskega kadra in določenih specialnosti, enota pa je ves čas sodelovala tudi z RSNZ<sup>46</sup>.

Zaradi precejšnjih kadrovskih sprememb, povezanih s posodabljanjem in povečevanjem enote, so posebno pozornost namenjali vodenju in poveljevanju oz. sposobnosti štaba in stalne sestave, da v najkrajšem času uveljavi vojni sistem vodenja in poveljevanja. Tako so leta 1980 in 1981 izvedli vaje, s katerimi so po predhodni reorganizaciji utrdili delovanje štaba brigade in poveljstev bataljonov. Enote pa so izvajale usposabljanje tudi v razmerah začasno zasedenega območja (ZZO), na območju verjetne uporabe enot. Tesno sodelovanje z vsemi subjekti na terenu je izboljšalo

*performed in line with five-year medium-term plans of the Territorial Defence units, the goal of which was to ensure a better implementation of the programme by the unit according to all criteria. Within five-year periods the basic training was carried out, as well as at least one mobilization exercise. The basic training for all battalions was carried out in Svetli potok near Kočevje<sup>45</sup>. Considering the diversity of the units, the education of their members was adjusted accordingly. Education was performed by reserved sergeant majors, which posed problems at the beginning, however, at the end of the training, the anticipated results were achieved. Also established was a board of lecturers, composed of members of the security unit and leaderships of socio-political organizations from the participating municipalities, as well as of members of republic leaderships of socio-political communities. The unit cooperated with the Yugoslav People's Army when training sergeant majors and when training certain specialities, while constantly cooperating with the Republic Secretariat of Internal Affairs.<sup>46</sup>*

*Due to significant personnel changes, related to modernization and the unit increase, special attention was placed on leadership and commanding, as well as on the capabilities of the staff and permanent forces to ensure that the war system of leadership and commanding could be established as soon as possible. Thus, in 1980 and 1981 exercises were performed which, after the reorganization, consolidated the work of the brigade staff and battalions headquarters. The units performed training even in temporary occupied areas, which meant the areas in which the units could possibly be employed. A close cooperation with all subjects*

<sup>45</sup> V Svetlem Potoku, kjer so usposabljali na podlagi petletnega ciklusa, je bilo v prvih treh letih 111 dni usposabljanja, ki se ga je udeležilo 3.684 starešin in vojakov.

<sup>46</sup> AS 1589, fond Komisija za SLO in DS, tehnična enota 1445, str. 2

<sup>45</sup> In Svetli potok the training was performed based on the five-year period. During the first three years, education was carried out within 111 days, attended by 3,684 sergeant majors and soldiers.

<sup>46</sup> AS 1589, fond Komisija za SLO in DS, tehnična enota 1445, p. 2.

kakovost usposabljanja, moralnopolitične razmere in bojno sposobnost poveljstev in enot. Poleg samostojnih vaj so izvajali različne vaje v sodelovanju z JLA, milico in DPS, ki so se končevale s streljanjem z osebnim in skupnim orožjem. Vzgojo in pouk enot so si ogledali tudi organi glavne inšpekcije zveznega sekretariata za narodno obrambo (ZSNO), Republiškega štaba za teritorialno obrambo (RŠTO), najvišji predstavniki političnega vodstva SRS in predstavniki JLA – IX. Armade ter Edvard Kardelj – Krištof<sup>47</sup>. Navzoči so bili tudi na različnih oglednih vajah in na koncu enoti priznali tudi najvišjo oceno, saj je bila brigada v letih od 1976 do 1978 najboljša enota v SR Sloveniji, leta 1982 pa je od zveznega sekretarja za ljudsko obrambo kot najbolje ocenjena enota v TO prejela veliko plaketo oboroženih sil SFRJ. Istega leta je dobila tudi odlikovanje »Red za vojne zaslugе z veliko zvezdo«<sup>48</sup>.

Težke gospodarske razmere v družbi konec osemdesetih so se odražale tudi pri odmerjanju finančnih sredstev, tako za popolnjevanje z OVO, vzdrževanje in obnavljanje teh, kot tudi za usposabljanje. Gospodarske razmere so prisilile enoto k skrajšanju razpoložljivega časa za usposabljanje na 5 do 10 dni. Zato so bile priprave temeljitejše, s poudarkom na posamičnem in intenzivnejšem usposabljanju<sup>49</sup>.

## Politična vzgoja

Zelo velik poudarek so namenjali politični vzgoji<sup>50</sup>. Poleg rednega programa ideološko-politične vzgoje so potekale tudi druge oblike političnega dela, kot so predavanja, obveščanje, kulturno, zabavno in športno življenje. Enota je upoštevala zahtevo, da je vsak njen pripadnik kar najbolje vojaško in strokovno usposobljen ter da se tudi nenehno idejnopolitično vzgaja.

## Sklep

Od nastanka in ves čas razvoja je imela enota zaradi specifičnosti prednost pri popolnjevanju in izboru kadrov. V poveljstvu je imela stalno



on a certain territory had a positive effect on the quality of the training, the moral-political situation and the war capabilities of commands and units. In addition to independent exercise, various exercises in cooperation with the Yugoslav People's Army, Police and socio-political communities were carried out, which concluded with shooting with individual and joint weapons. The lessons and training were observed also by the Inspectorat of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, the Republic Staff of the Territorial Defence, the highest representatives of the political leadership of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia and representatives of the Yugoslav People's Army's IX Army, as well as by Edvard Kardelj – Krištof<sup>47</sup>. In addition to lessons, they also observed various exercises and awarded the unit with highest marks. Between 1976 and 1978 the brigade was made the best unit in the Socialist Republic of Slovenia and received in 1981, as the best assessed unit of the Territorial Defence Forces, the Great Plaque of the Yugoslav Armed Forces given by the Federal Secretariat of the National Defence. In the very same year, the unit was awarded with 'Order of Military Merits with the Great Star'<sup>48</sup>.

Tough economic situation in the late 80s meant less financial resources for personal protective equipment, its maintenance and restoration, as well as for training. Due to economic situation the unit shortened the available time for the training (5 – 10 days) which resulted in more thorough preparation with the emphasis on individual and more intensive training<sup>49</sup>.

<sup>47</sup> Predsedstvo SFRJ je 29. maja 1982 poimenovalo zaščitno brigado TO po Edvardu Kardelju – Krištofu.

<sup>48</sup> AS 1589, fond Komisija za SLO in DS, tehnična enota 1445, str. 1

<sup>49</sup> Prav tam, str. 5

<sup>50</sup> Ideološko-politično vzgojo so imeli najmanj eno uro na dan. Poleg krajših dnevnih informacij so bili to komentarji pomembnejših aktualnih dogodkov. Izvajalec je bil tisti pripadnik enote, ki je najbolj poznal dogodek, ne glede na položaj in čin.

<sup>47</sup> On 29 May 1982 the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia named the Security Brigade of the Territorial Defence Forces after Edvard Kardelj – Krištof.

<sup>48</sup> AS 1589, fond Komisija za SLO in DS, tehnična enota 1445, p. 1.

<sup>49</sup> Prav tam, p. 5.



sestavu kot edina brigada teritorialne obrambe. Veliko pozornost so namenjali vojaško-strokovnemu usposabljanju in visoki moralno-politični zavesti vsakega posameznika. To dokazujejo dobri rezultati ter številna priznanja in pohvale, ki jih je prejela enota. Ves čas ji je veliko pozornosti namenjal Edvard Kardelj – Krištof, ki je bil tesno povezan z njo in po katerem je bila poimenovana.

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## Political education

*A lot of attention was given to ideological-political education<sup>50</sup>. An addition to regular lessons in ideological-political education, other forms of political work were carried out, such as lectures, as well as information, cultural, entertainment and sports activities. The unit followed the requirement for each member to receive the best military and professional training possible, and to be the subject of constant ideological-political training.*

## Conclusion

Since its establishment and during its development, due to its specific purpose, the security unit was in an advantageous position regarding the manning and personnel selection. Within the brigade headquarters the unit had its own permanent forces, which was unique. Within the unit a lot of attention was given to military-professional training, as well as to high moral-political awareness of each individual which resulted in excellent achievements and numerous recognitions and awards received by the unit. Edvard Kardelj – Krištof was fully committed and closely related to the unit which was named after him.

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<sup>50</sup> Ideological-political education lessons were held at least one hour a day in which short daily news and comments on important current events were examined. Lessons were led by the unit member who was most familiar with the event, regardless their status or rank.

## 8. Konferenca mednarodnega združenja za vojaško zgodovino









## Razstave vojaškega muzeja Slovenske vojske



Razstava Vojna za Slovenijo 1991 v vojaškem muzeju v Budimpešti  
Exhibition War for Slovenia 1991 at the Budapest Military Museum



Razstava vojaškega muzeja iz Budimpešte v Pivki  
Exhibition of the Budapest Military Museum in Pivka



Slovenski kontingenti v operaciji kriznega odzivanja v Afganistanu  
Slovenian contingents in the crisis response operation in Afghanistan



Sodelovanje pri razstavi Prva svetovna vojna  
Participation in the exhibition First World War



Slovenski kontingenti v operaciji kriznega odzivanja v Afganistanu  
Slovenian contingents in the crisis response operation in Afghanistan



Razstava Slovenci in vojaško gornišтво  
Exhibition Slovenians and Military Mountaineering



Slovenski kontingenti v operaciji kriznega odzivanja v Afganistanu  
Slovenian contingents in the crisis response operation in Afghanistan



Sodelovanje pri razstavi Slovensko meščanstvo  
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## SLOVENSKA PARTIZANSKA IN DOMOBRANSKA VOJSKA (Tomaž Kladnik)

340 strani, čb fotografije

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